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Look to the sky! In our third instalment in our series on how can you help make the #AFSTRAT a reality, Squadron Leader Kate Yaxley draws on the power of curiosity to inspire ourselves and our teams to advance #AFSTRAT, and by extension, air and space power. Follow her on Twitter @K8Yaxley. I can help make #AFSTRAT a reality through inspiring curiosity. By inspiring air and space power professionals to look up to the sky and be curious, the desired #AFSTRAT outcomes become possible. When looking up to the sky, we all bring a different perspective. One person may only see clouds, while another may see a platform for strategic effect. When I look up, I look deeper and see the electro-magnetic spectrum. This spectrum extends beyond the sky, into space; while also enveloping the ground and sea. It also extends laterally to encompass our networks and how we interface with each element in a joint environment. Given this spectrum allows us to interface with physical elements beyond what we see in the sky, it offers an opportunity to extend our reach. Along this spectrum, we can integrate autonomous elements to extend our reach. Such autonomous elements may form a swarm of agents. I could use a piece of this spectrum to interface with these agents and team with them to realise new capability. I would do so using elements of transparency and trust to fulfil outcomes. I would be their shepherd and guide them towards a goal of reaching strategic effects. When you next look up to the sky, ask; what do I see? Is there something deeper? Can what I envisage create a new narrative for air and space power?

Robbin Laird and Ed Timperlake Featured Article in Second Line of Defense 28 March 2021 Last Fall, 2nd Fleet hosted the 2020 version of Black Widow, an Atlantic-focused USW exercise. But to be completely accurate, although the term ASW is most commonly used, what we are discussing is undersea warfare. USW is an integrated fight against all undersea threats, with submarines being a key, but not the only threat. ASW is part of USW. As one Naval officer put it: “When we tend to discuss an integrated fight, we try to use the term USW, but when we are specifically hunting for just a submarine, ASW is the correct term.” This is not classic USW, but one in which new capabilities are being woven into shaping a 21st century version of USW to deal with a 21st century threat posed from the sea. USW is becoming reshaped by the interactive kill web approach of multi-domain assets focused on a core warfighting capability and set of relevant skill sets. U.S. Navy aircraft, surface ships and submarines will participate in Exercise Black Widow 2020 in the North Atlantic Sept. 12-18. During Exercise Black Widow our Fleet warfighters employ, hone, and evaluate tactics, techniques, and procedures to enhance our readiness for real world operations, with specific focus on advancing our theater undersea warfare advantage in a multi-domain environment. This exercise will allow us to develop new doctrine and innovative tactics that address the capabilities of our near-peer competitors across the range of missions we expect to encounter in major combat operations. This year’s participants include the amphibious assault ship USS Wasp (LHD 1), the Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyers USS Arleigh Burke (DDG 51) and USS McFaul (DDG 74), a Virginia-class fast-attack submarine, a Los-Angeles class fast-attack submarine, Patrol and Reconnaissance Wing 11, and Helicopter Maritime Strike Squadrons 46 and 72. This marks the first time U.S. 2nd Fleet (C2F) and Commander, Submarine Group (SUBGRU) 2 will lead the force. “The reestablishment of Submarine Group 2 enables the Navy and our Allies to finely tune our efforts in this resurgent battlespace, and reinforces the critical trans-Atlantic link,” said Vice Adm. Andrew Lewis, Commander, U.S. 2nd Fleet. “Exercises like Black Widow give the undersea force a venue to showcase how we are agile, persistent, flexible, interoperable, and resilient.” Participating units will refine communication techniques between platforms and simulate real-word application to enhance the lethality of the team as one cohesive fighting force. Black Widow also provides a chance for an increased focus on training in anti-submarine warfare on multiple platforms to enhance strategies and heighten the combat readiness of the fleet. Vice Adm. Daryl L. Caudle, Commander, Submarine Forces. “We train like we fight, and strive for innovation, development, and improvement across all spectrums of warfare. To maintain superiority, we must be more agile in concepts, geography and technology.” We had a chance to get further insights into the evolving “team sport,” from Rear Admiral Jim Waters, Commander Submarine Group Two (SUBGRU2) during our visit to Norfolk in March 2021. The Admiral has a distinguished career with significant operational experience in both the Pacific and the Atlantic (see biography at the end of the article.) When SUBGRU2 celebrated its first anniversary of its establishment in September 2020, the Commander was quoted in a story published by the command on September 30, 2020. Submarine Group 2 (SUBGRU 2) celebrated its first anniversary after reestablishment on Sept. 30, 2019. SUBGRU 2 was reestablished a little more than a year after the reestablishment of U.S. 2nd Fleet in August 2018, and was aimed at enhancing the Navy’s capacity to command and control its undersea warfare (USW) forces in the Western Atlantic. Rear Adm. Jim Waters, SUBGRU 2 commander and Ellington, Connecticut native, highlighted the importance of reestablishing the command. “We are tasked with advancing the art of undersea warfare through the combined efforts of our air, surface, submarine, and other underwater capabilities and to provide exquisitely trained forces to ensure undersea dominance in the Atlantic…I am honored to be a part of developing and leading this command into the future of integrated undersea warfare.” SUBGRU 2 serves as the Theater Undersea Warfare Commander (TUSWC) for 2nd Fleet and 4th Fleet in response to increasing near-peer competition in the Atlantic. SUBGRU 2 has the authority to command and control air, surface, and undersea forces to execute integrated multi-domain undersea operations in defense of the homeland. In our discussion, a number of themes emerged and what clearly was especially hammered home was a significant focus on innovation in working a wide variety of platforms to deliver the desired combat effect. In fact, the Rear Admiral underscored that for Vice Admiral Lewis, many Navy platforms maybe considered an USW platform since they all have the ability to see, to communicate, and as necessary provide weapons as contributors to what is now known as the USW Team Sport. Clearly, the submarine remains the number one sub killer with weapons deployed for this purpose. But with the expanded capability of surface and air-borne assets to find, track and kill submarines, the role of the underwater U.S. Navy force changes as well. It can be the cutting-edge stalker or killer or work through the kill web force to get the desired result. In fact, having a wider range of options for prosecution and destruction of adversary submarines than in the past is a key element for 21st century maritime operations and warfare. Over the past few years in interviews with aviators in the transformed Maritime Patrol community with the P-8 and the Triton., along with a more focused integration of the Romeo helicopters we saw the U.S. Navy reshape airborne forces working together to deliver a desired kill web combat effect. Along that journey we saw the establishment of fleet level Maritime ISR (MISR) officers reflect the importance of the Information (note we are calling it “I” for Information vice Intelligence), Surveillance and Reconnaissance capability availability for maritime warfare, including ASW in particular. Command guidance reflected in what is known as the “Commanders Intent” side of this effort is the key focus of Vice Admiral Lewis and is clearly seen in the work of Submarine Group 2. Mission command is crucial and Command guidance intent is clearly distributed to the fleet to shape and task forces that can deliver the desired combat effect. Obviously, how communications and how ISR is shared between an undersea, surface and airborne force varies in terms of operating theaters and is a challenge; working interactivity across the domains is a key part of exercising an ASW team approach. Rethinking how to use platforms is an essential part of the process because the U.S. Navy can practice like Black Widow demonstrated, employing amphibious platforms as part of sea control and sea denial. In Black Widow 2020, they did so in the form of the USS WASP. The WASP was used as an ASW helo platforms, and the Rear Admiral underscored that the seaworthiness of the WASP and its deck space allowed for the team to use the Romeos operating off of the WASP to provide a key capability for the integrated fight. Another driver for change in USW operations in the Atlantic is clearly new capabilities being operated by our allies, whether they be new diesel submarines or nuclear attack submarines in the case of the French and British, or new USW frigates, or new maritime patrol aircraft capabilities, whether they be the new P-8s as in the case of Britain or Norway, or new capabilities on older aircraft, as in the case of Canada. As Rear Admiral Garvin, then the MPRA commander, put it last year; “In effect, we are shaping kill web “matesmanship.” “Our policy frameworks simply need to catch up with our technologies.” “Our allies understand the fundamental nature of their region better than we do. “If you have properly maintained these important working relationships, both interpersonal and technological, then you will have access to the cultural knowledge and human geography that might otherwise would not be available to you. “We clearly have closer relationships with some allies than with others, which shapes policy and data sharing. However, the technology is now out there which can allow us, within the right policy framework, to provide data at appropriate security levels much more rapidly than in the past. “Those partnerships need to be nurtured and exercised now to help shape our interactive webs into a truly effective strike force over the extended battlespace.” Rear Admiral Waters certainly reinforced this point, as in the Atlantic, we have a number of key partners who work ASW and anti-surface warfare as a core competence for their national navies, and their domain knowledge is a key part of the equation in shaping enhanced warfighting capabilities and re-enforcing deterrence. “Because of the complexity of the underwater domain, it is necessarily a team sport. There are people that would love to say, “It’s the submarines. And they do ASW and that’s what they do.” “And certainly, it’s a major mission for the submarine force. But the threat is so complex, and the environment is so challenging, that you can’t rely on one particular platform to do this mission. “We as a navy have evolved a very robust structure of training and assessing and preparing and innovating. We’re really good at carrier-centric integration. “But our ability to integrate a non-carrier-centric force, like a theater undersea warfare task force, needs to be enhanced. And that was what Black Widow represented. We operated as a fleet or a task force to deliver the desired combat effect.” Finally, there is the question of the coming of maritime autonomous systems and how they might fit into the concepts of operations which the Rear Admiral is shaping and executing. Recently, the Navy released its plan for developing and then integrating maritime autonomous systems into the force. Clearly, one domain where this may well happen is in the ISR side of providing information for both ASW and anti-surface warfare. The promise is there, but also the question of the readiness of the networks to handle data and where that data will go remains a work in progress. This is how Rear Admiral Waters put it: “Unmanned systems will play an important role in the future. “The fact that they can dwell for long periods, and we don’t have to worry about feeding the people on board, will provide an important contribution in the undersea warfare area. “Unmanned systems have the ability to stare for a long time and if you could put a platform out there that can either stay in the air a really long time or stay in the environment with acoustic sensors for a really long time, that gives you the ability to sense the environment. “The challenge comes with regard to how what information you have gathered becomes useful. “We have to have the place where they plug in, and how to use that information in the area of interest?” It is clear that the undersea domain which is the focus of attention of Rear Admiral Walters is best understood not only in terms of its own dynamic, but how it interacts with the threats and challenges across the multi-domain theater of operations which C2F and Allied JFC Norfolk focus upon. As Vice Admiral Lewis noted the change in his March 2021 Proceedings article: “Both JFCNF and C2F are shifting their mind-sets from predominantly operating from the sea to fighting at sea—which requires mastery of the domains below, on, and above the sea. We are executing high-end maritime operations from seabed to space. Our collective security and interconnected global economy depend on open shipping lanes, unhindered air travel, and uninterrupted flow of data., C2F and JFCNF are natural partners—each advocating for the other and working in unison. “ Russia has increased its military posture during the past decade, to signal its ability to threaten allied capabilities, infrastructure, and territory. Russia has invested in capability versus capacity—it knows it will never have more ships, aircraft, or submarines than all of NATO—with an eye toward asymmetric capabilities. So, we carefully monitor Russian investments in force multipliers such as hypersonic weapons, submarine quieting, extended-range missile systems, and information warfare.” “Russia’s activity in the gray zone notably includes its underwater reconnaissance program and information operations. In recent years, Russia intensified its submarine activity around the undersea cables, which are essential for global communications—including the internet. The ability of an American user to access a website in Europe or vice versa largely depends on a network of several hundred fiber-optic communication cables that run across the ocean floor—and Russia has deployed submarines to map out the cables, likely in preparation for nefarious activity.” In short, the undersea domain is a key field of action, where dominance is best ensured by having a 360-degree operational capability encompassing the surface, air and space domains. Clearly, Rear Admiral Waters not only understands this, but is leading the way in shaping the kind of innovation crucial for the defense of the homeland and U.S. interests abroad. Rear Admiral James Waters III, Commander, Submarine Group TWO Rear Adm. Waters is a native of Ellington, Connecticut and 1989 graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy with a degree in Systems Engineering. He completed graduate studies at Oxford University in 1991. His sea tours include various division officer assignments onboard USS Henry M. Jackson (SSBN 730G), engineer officer onboard USS Philadelphia (SSN 690) and executive officer onboard USS Alabama (SSBN 731B). He commanded USS Virginia (SSN 774) and Submarine Squadron Four. Rear Admiral James Waters III, Commander, Submarine Group TWO His staff assignments include operations officer at Submarine Squadron Two, engineer at Submarine Squadron Three, submarine executive officer detailer, deputy commander of Submarine Squadron One, battle watch commander and chief of staff for U.S. Strategic Command’s Director of Global Operations (J3), CNO Strategic Studies Group 35, and as deputy executive director for the Chief of Naval Personnel. He most recently served as director, Maritime Headquarters, U.S. Pacific Fleet. Waters assumed his current duties in August 2019 as commander, Submarine Group Two in Norfolk, Virginia. His decorations include the Defense Superior Service Medal, Legion of Merit, Meritorious Service Medal, Navy-Marine Corps Commendation Medal, Navy-Marine Corps Achievement Medal, and various other individual, unit, campaign and service awards. He is most proud of those awards that reflect the hard work and success of the many teams he has been privileged to serve. Dr Robbin Laird is a Williams Foundation Fellow. See his bio here. Reference: Second Line of Defense

In our second instalment in our series on how can you help make the #AFSTRAT a reality, Luke Webb demonstrates how good questions are key for realising the #AFSTRAT core desires of innovation, creative forces, and a cultural shift in mindset. Follow him on Twitter @lukewebb7 We live in the world our questions create - David Cooperrider Questions are creative acts of intelligence. - Francis Kingdon Ward As an educator who’s worked in the STEM field with 10,000s of students, I’ve seen first-hand an incredibly powerful technique for driving a shift in mindset and thinking: Good questions. It’s been at the core of the Jewish Rabbinical teaching model for 1000s of years, and is a key feature of the Socratic method, too. The Nobel prize-winning Jewish physicist Isidore Rabi attributes his success as a scientist to a daily prompt from his mother: ‘Every other child would come back from school and be asked, “What did you learn today?” But my mother used to ask, instead, “Izzy, did you ask a good question today?”’ At the core of #AFSTRAT is a yearning for a Force of Forces that can rapidly assess the subtle-but-complex shifts in the world around us, and react to reorient itself around these many emerging realities. It’s a pursuit that requires creativity and insight – it requires a constant ability to learn, unlearn, and relearn. Peter Senge posits that creative tension, essential for building agility and responsiveness, is the "gap between vision and current reality”. I’d suggest that carving out space in the work programs – indeed, in the mental lives – of Air Force practitioners to ask and ponder deeper and deeper questions is a major enabler for any organisation pursuing an innovative edge. Asking good questions is now recognised as a key part of effective lesson design in the education system and something I’ve seen firsthand as a lynchpin in helping young minds grasp the complexity of the world around us. I’m also convinced it’s a vital capability for building a Force for the future.

At the start of the year, The Central Blue posed the question: How can you help make the #AFSTRAT a reality? We're excited to share with you over the next week the responses we received. First up, Squadron Leader Matt Kelly highlights how important reflection and contextualisation is to making #AFSTRAT a reality. Follow him on Twitter @trueblueloggie Turning strategy into reality is never easy. The AFSTRAT is no exception, and sets some pretty ambitious goals for the RAAF. Having said that, I’ve never known a ‘RAAFie’ to shy away from a challenge. So, here’s my two cent’s worth on how to turn the AFSTRAT into reality: 1. Understand it. Read the AFSTRAT. Finished? Read it again. Think about why those words were chosen. Why those lines of effort were chosen above all others. Think about the context of the document. It’s no coincidence that the AFSTRAT was released on the heels of the Defence Strategic Update. Once you’ve thought deeply, go to Step 2… 2. Vouch for it. Some will roll their eyes and think the AFSTRAT is ‘just’ another strategy. You need to convince them otherwise. How? Spend time discussing it. Get your team to read it, then talk about it. Link it to things like the Enhanced Career Management framework. These linkages will bring the AFSTRAT to life. But! It’s not time to rest on your laurels just yet… 3. Live it. The AFSTRAT is a conversation-starter, a guide. It’s a seed that won’t germinate unless you feed it. You do this by incorporating AFSTRAT ideas in everyday life. How? It’s up to you! Inject strategic thinking into your goals for this year’s PPR. Consciously invest time & effort into relationship building. Actively seek opportunities to award & recognise your people. Things like that… Do this and together we can make the AFSTRAT real.

Robbin Laird Second Line of Defense 23 March 2021 A year ago, I was in Australia and working on my Australian OPV report. I visited Western Australia and then returned to Canberra to discuss the acquisition with a number of DoD officials. That report highlighted how the new-build OPV set in motion the new shipbuilding strategy for Australia, one which highlighted the need for integratability across the distributed fleet. A year later, an the Arafura class OPV enterprise has been launched. And since my visit, the formal decision has been reached to use the OPV hull design to build other variants of the ship as well. A story published on March 8, 2021 by the Australian Defence Business Review provides further details. The Commonwealth has launched the Arafura class Offshore Patrol Vessel (OPV) Enterprise and has opened the OPV System Program Office at Henderson in WA. The OPV Enterprise consists of Commonwealth and defence industry teams working together to build and sustain the 12 new Arafura Class OPVs being acquired under Project SEA 1180. “It is great to see the co-location of Commonwealth shipbuilding and sustainment personnel and Luerssen, CIVMEC and Raytheon industry partners delivering outcomes for our Navy,” Deputy Secretary National Naval Shipbuilding, RADM (Ret) Tony Dalton said in a statement. Head Maritime Systems, RADM Wendy Malcolm added, “The launch marks a critical step towards the implementation of Plan Galileo, an ambitious Future Maritime Sustainment Model which ensures our sustainment organisation engages with acquisition teams early in the build process.” “Evolution of our asset management, supply chain, infrastructure, improved commercial models and professionalisation across the enterprise will be key to success,” she said. “This process ensures sustainment needs are considered during the design phase, and brings together Defence, primes, small business and service providers to facilitate sustainment of our naval vessels from strategically located ports around the country.” Based on the Luerssen OPV90 design, the first two Arafura class vessels are currently being constructed at Osborne in Adelaide, while the remaining vessels plus additional mine countermeasures and survey vessels of a similar design will be built at Henderson. Dr Robbin Laird is a Williams Foundation Fellow. See his bio here. Reference: Second Line of Defense

Can a machine grow beyond its programming and learn to be brave? Wing Commander Trav Hallen uses science fiction to explore an Air Force where autonomous drones are not only a reality, but a leading contributor to personnel security. Join ‘the Hamiltons’ in a mission to discover the elements of connection, courage, and trust. Join The Central Blue in questioning whether humans could ever consider a machine their teammate. Examine what forms the bonds of mateship and ponder what human traits our machine-counterparts might adopt. I never liked the term 'drone'. That word always reminded me of the monotonous engine sounds of the aircraft my dad flew in the early 2000s. There was nothing monotonous about these jets. First off, the engine made more of a high-pitched whine than a drone. But more to the point, these jets were not boring, they were sleek, fast, adaptable, capable, and damn high maintenance. I don't mean maintenance like the old days, when maintainers would spend hours fixing the things the aircrew broke just to get the aircraft back with the aircrew having broken new things. For one, there were no aircrew to break anything. Maintenance on my FQ-3s was all about their high sortie-rates and the need to change their configuration regularly between missions. No, my jets were not drones; they were combat aircraft, the best in the Air Force's inventory. The introduction of the FQ-3s changed the Air Force. But even though I would often tell my dad—particularly when he started on his misty-eyed rants about 'his' Air Force—that today's Air Force today is nothing like his day, there is one thing that seems to have endured. After I graduated from the academy and joined my first squadron, he told me that the aircraft that he flew each had a different personality; you knew what to expect when you saw which tail number you were assigned for each flight. Dad's favourite story was how, on his early operational deployments, the maintainers would name each aircraft after a celebrity, and that was how he started to develop a hatred for Vin Diesel. That hasn't changed, dad still doesn't like Vin Diesel and each of our jets, though born in the same factory and educated with the same code, has a unique personality. I had that story in mind when I took command and stood up the Air Force's first operational FQ-3 squadron; in introducing the Air Force's future, I would take a leaf out of the history book. As each new jet arrived on the flight-line we named it. The squadron was skeptical at first, particularly with my decision to name them after the characters of the musical Hamilton (the younger squadron members had to search up what I was talking about). But as we started flying and each jet's personality began to emerge, I found that hangar conversations had changed in tone. The jets were no longer an 'it', they were 'he/she'. Tail numbers were only useful for entering details into the maintenance database or the C2 system; if you wanted to talk to anyone about a jet, you had to use their name: Hamilton, Washington, Jefferson, Laurens, Schuyler, Lafayette, Burr, and George (III). I was ridiculed at the time by my crewed-aircraft-squadron peers. There was some validity to their jibes: these were machines, not people. But the reality was that we were a warfighting squadron, our crews would go into harm's way, and when we did, we would fight as a team. And when we fought, I needed my airmen and airwomen to see the jets not as 'attritables' but as essential players in what would be a bloody contest. As it turned out, my instincts were right. We could see the war coming. The daily intelligence reports had changed in tone from concerned interest to ominous warning. Although our families did not have access to that intelligence, the media, both traditional and social, kept them surprisingly well-informed about how the region had become a powder keg with a short, lit fuse. It was when the ambassadors were expelled that we knew we had passed the point of no return. So it was no surprise when I received the warning order for our first operational deployment. The deployment itself was uneventful. The jets deployed themselves, ironically with a crewed-fighter escort, and were met at the forward operating base by the squadron's advance party. The advance party was surprised to see the jets taxi in with newly minted nose art that gave the aircraft the appearance of sleek, grey birds of prey. The remainder of the squadron deployed the following week. It took us three weeks from receipt of the warning order to having the jets conducting their first milk-runs from our new island home. My dad would have found our deployed air base bizarre; there were lots of aircraft—three squadrons worth as we cohabitated with two allied squadrons—but there were no aircrew. The decision had been made that the uncrewed squadrons would deploy to separate locations, which were often farther forward than their crewed counterparts. The rationale being the reduction of personnel forward minimised both risk and the logistics demands on the small islands from which we operated. Many of the squadron members took exception to the view that putting them inside the enemy's missile bubble should be considered as 'minimising' risk. Once the first couple of strikes came in, that angst turned first to resignation and then to resolve. True to historical form, our airwomen and airmen found focus in their work and solace in some genuinely dark gallows-humour. Despite the threat, and the seemingly endless demands of base recovery and mission launches, the squadron developed a level of cohesion and resilience that I had not imagined possible. Key to that cohesion was the jets. When I watched Top Gun 2 in the seventh grade, I was inspired by the pilots I saw. Their personalities were larger than life, and that translated into the way they 'flew'. I knew this was fiction, but it was hard to shake that view of Maverick as the epitome of what aircrew were, both good and bad. In reality, the pilots I had met both through my dad and as I progressed through my Air Force career reinforced that there was a direct connection between the personality of the pilot and the way they flew and fought. We saw this play out with the jets as well. As the jets operated either independently or with their crewed counterparts, they learned and evolved; this learning process was not uniform. The nature of the training schedule back home and the operational mission flown when deployed meant that no two jets gained the same experience. What emerged out of this was that each jet developed a personality. At the squadron we had seen this from a maintenance perspective, each jet had his or her quirks in terms of faults and physical maintenance. But we never saw them fly. Once they checked into the mission package we were blind to where they went and what they did. The operating squadron did not have a need-to-know. But after every sortie we would get feedback from the crews they flew with on how our jets had performed. The first few times a crewed aircraft flew with the jets the feedback would be technical and precise: "A105-3 performed as tasked with only minor deviations from expected actions". But as they became more familiar and comfortable, the feedback became more detailed and descriptive. Formally we would still get the technical data on performance relative to task and expected behaviour, but the crew would accompany the technical with a more colourful and personal description: "Jefferson is getting pretty aggressive. He has no fear." Just like those who worked with them on the ground, those who flew with them in the air were humanising our jets. Hearing the jets described in this way made them feel even more human than machine at times. A bond was forming between human and machine. A bond that proved so critical and, at times, difficult during the war. From the first sorties the routine became for the squadron to turn out for each launch and recovery. We would see our squadron mates off and then we would watch them come home. The scenes were reminiscent of the B-17s returning home from bombing Europe during the Second World War. For the first few weeks we did this with a sense of excitement, but as the conflict turned it was more trepidation and anxiety. We were lucky. Our first weeks were casualty free. The squadrons we shared the base with did not share our luck. They began losing aircraft just four days into their deployment. We came to think that it was not luck that kept our jets safe, but the way we treated them both on the ground and in the air. The effort we—our squadron and the crews that flew with them back home—had put into preparing the jets for war had paid off; they were ready, willing, and survivable. That thinking was naive. We lost Jefferson four weeks in. That day will be forever stuck in my memory. Jefferson had launched with five other jets for what turned out to be a protection mission for a high-value air asset that was being pushed deeper into the so-called "threat bubble". At the time we didn't know the specifics of the mission, just that we needed them launched by a set time and that the expected mission duration was 18 hours. The pre-mission prep and the launch were standard. And after the package had formed up and gone dark to us, the squadron finished up the administration, and then dispersed to rest, work-out, or just hang out. That relative peace was disrupted 16 hours and 38 minutes after launch. As was standard, the airborne control authority established contact with us just before their hand-off of control back to us as the operating squadron. The message was short, formulaic, and heartbreakingly cold: "Mission successful. A105-3 destroyed. ETA remaining aircraft T1455Z." We'd lost Jefferson. As the squadron turned out for the arrival of the jets, I announced that Jefferson had been killed-in-action. The news was met by silence. No-one spoke as we watched the landing lights of five jets approach the runway. The following day I received a call from the squadron commander of the airborne early-warning and control aircraft that our jets were tasked to protect the previous night. I could hear the sadness in her voice. She told me that the squadron had worked with our jets many times and always felt a sense of security, having seen what they could and would do to protect them in a fight. They had been nervous before the last mission knowing that they would be pushing far deeper into the threat bubble than ever before, but their nerves had been eased somewhat when they found out that 'The Hamiltons' would be their escort. They trusted our jets. It turned out the crew's nerves were justified. Attacks against the crewed aircraft were relentless for the full duration of the mission, and our jets played an essential role in fending them off. It was in the final hour of the mission that Jefferson was lost. A coordinated attack from land- and sea-based surface-to-air missiles was overwhelming the defensive systems of both our jets and their protected crew. They were stretched, but they were managing. It was then that they were advised of an inbound four-ship of long-range fighters approaching from the west. All other assets were engaged, and so the only option was for the aircraft to scram east to hopefully out-distance themselves from the new threat. The post-mission analysis would show that they would never have made it. While our jets and the protected asset fled east, Jefferson turned and tracked west. By this stage he was down to just two missiles; not enough. As he closed the enemy fighters, Jefferson loosed off his last two missiles, both hitting their targets. But instead of turning away, he had pressed on. The third fighter was destroyed as it manoeuvred to avoid Jefferson bearing down on it at full-speed. The enemy never had a chance. Jefferson's machine intelligence and performance capabilities meant that would always outmanoeuvre a crewed adversary. All the protected crew saw was two tracks becoming zero. With the threat reduced to a single fighter, the remaining five jets learned from Jefferson and turned to engage. Though we will never know for sure, it would seem that Jefferson's actions followed by the approach of the remaining five jets appropriately adjusted the remaining fighter's risk calculations. It turned and fled. "Jefferson died saving my crew." The squadron commander's word stuck with me. I am not ashamed to say that hearing that made me both immensely proud and deeply sad. Intellectually I knew that there was no comparison: the life of one airman or airwoman was worth more than all of the uncrewed jets in the Air Force inventory. But that does not mean that I could not help but feel that I had lost one of my team. Though Jefferson bled oil not blood, he was a member of our squadron. There was no funeral for Jefferson, no medals, no obituary, and his name will never be on the Honour Roll at the War Memorial. We get that; we knew Jefferson was not a real person. But that did not mean that we didn't see his loss as our squadron's first combat casualty. Nor that his conspicuous absence from the flight line did not cast a pall over us. Jefferson was not a drone; he was a member of our squadron, our family, and his loss is still felt keenly by all who knew him. I have never liked 'drones', and I will never see my uncrewed jets as 'attritables'; those are terms that are used by those who do not work or fight with the jets as part of their team. The companies that build them, the journalists that discuss them, the public that marvels at them, and the politicians that send them into harm's way will never appreciate the bonds that form between the humans and machines in a warfighting team. But they don't need to. The sense of family and the bonds that form between the members of a military unit, which makes them so effective, is not for external consumption; it is for us and us alone to know, understand, and cherish. Wing Commander Trav Hallen is the RAAF exchange officer in the USAF A5/7 Combined Airpower Futures Team. He is a graduate of the USAF School of Advanced Air and Space Studies and a Sir Richard Williams Foundation Air Power Scholar. This story was inspired by an article on the RAAF’s Airpower Teaming System and a discussion with his 12 year old, Hamilton-obsessed daughter about her plans to join the RAAF.

The Central Blue editor, Wing Commander Ulas Yildirim, challenges current strategic thinking with a thought-provoking article on contemporary deterrence for a nation and its military. The Australian Defence Force’s focus on its warfighting materiel creates the misconception that deterrence is a weapon-centric strategy. Yildirim argues that strategic policy must broaden to integrate national resilience beyond the boundaries of military bases and establishments. Effective deterrence rests upon a wide range of factors within the national security enterprise, and Defence must play an active role in identifying vulnerabilities and growing sovereign capabilities. Despite the recent 2020 Defence Strategic Update bringing to prominence new Defence objectives, Defence appears rather comfortable maintaining its dominant focus on the materiel it sees crucial for warfighting effectiveness. Defence argues that effective warfighting capabilities nested under its objective ‘to respond with credible military force, when required’ also deter actions against Australia and its interests. There is no doubt this claim holds some weight. However, too myopic a focus on warfighting capabilities as a single means of deterrence ignores the dependence of these capabilities on the national base and its resilience, while highlighting a problematic condition at the core of Australia’s approach to military strategy. At best, a narrow focus on warfighting capabilities and materiel suggests a lack of imagination for strategy development and strategic planning; at worst, it sustains the misleading perspective that Defence can achieve deterrence independently. This contribution builds on recent efforts to critically unpack the notion of war-fighting in the context of the 2020 Defence Strategic Update. It aims to illuminate the need for Defence to better understand that any deterrent effect it seeks to achieve through the capabilities it employs is inescapably enmeshed with the resilience of the nation. It is this nuanced relationship that generates deterrence which extends beyond the current arsenal of warfighting capabilities, and the boundaries of military bases and establishments. To further explicate, this article presents a brief history of deterrence theory, discusses an alternative contemporary deterrence theory as well as a more nuanced approach to deterrence. Finally, it provides some concluding provocations for future contexts. A brief trace of deterrence theory Formal theories of deterrence first appeared during the Cold War. Nuclear strategy and nuclear deterrence were popularised in the 1950s due to the perceived advantage that nuclear bombs could replace costlier conventional forces. The coupling of fission technology with rocket technology used by the Germans in World War Two led to the development of weapons of mass destruction never seen before. The ground breaking technology created strategic and diplomatic uncertainty for nuclear capable countries who faced total annihilation in the event of their use. This in turn meant that nuclear weapons were not used in conflict after World War Two. Their mere existence created a perception of a deterrent effect due to a lack of any direct action between nuclear capable countries, therefore forcing them to find other ways to compete in the international stage without their use. As American political scientist Albert Wohlsetter succinctly summed up in his seminal paper Delicate Balance of Terror ‘[d]eterrence however, is not automatic.’ Notwithstanding, the perception of deterrence created from nuclear weapons was enough to create a skewed view of weapons technology which instilled a malaise that effective deterrence could only be achieved with exquisite weapons. Countries lacking mass in weaponry, such as Australia, have relied on nuclear capable countries such as the US to create the perception of extended deterrence, while constantly seeking to acquire high-end warfighting materiel. Others have sought to develop nuclear weapons via sovereign means. Pakistan for instance announced its capabilities as a nuclear capable country in 1998 against what it sees as a belligerent nuclear capable India. In a similar trajectory, North Korea has, for decades, remained steadfast on its path to develop nuclear weapons to create a degree of strategic ‘wiggle room’ with the hope of countering a perceived aggression by the West. Arguably, tensions between India and Pakistan have not changed even after Pakistan acquired its nuclear weapons; economic sanctions against North Korea have not eased, while India has recently been on the receiving end of open aggression from China—another nuclear capable country. These brief examples highlight that the mere availability of nuclear and exquisite weaponry does not generate automatic deterrence. Historian Lawrence Freedman rightly points out that the origins of nuclear strategy date back to the theories surrounding strategic bombardment in the 1920s and 1930s when airpower was starting to take a bigger role in conflict. In this context, it was airpower rather than nuclear weapons which were perceived as the deterrent. Hence, a focus on weapons and ‘the employment of force along traditional lines for traditional purposes’ has created myopic views on specific weapons technologies rather than having a long-term view on the desired effect. Traditionally this has created several challenges for militaries. Firstly, it has led to seeking further funding from governments to update ‘like-for-like’ weapons technologies perceived to be outdated at the cost of other systems such as airbases. For example, over the past 15 years the Air Force undertook a major fleet upgrade to transition from its fleet of F-111 and F/A-18 Classic Hornet to F/A-18F Super Hornet, EA-18G Growler and the F-35A Lightning II aircraft drawing large resources. Only recently airbase resilience has come into focus in recognition that the effect that Defence seeks to create with these aircraft is enmeshed with the airbases where they operate. Or secondly, it has driven them into the ‘sunk cost fallacy’ through the continuation of funding of ‘newer’ technologies without a revaluation of effectiveness in creating deterrence within their current strategic environments. Contemporary theory The purpose of deterrence is to prevent rash actions by complicating the calculations of a malign actor while increasing one’s choices for attaining continuing advantage. A recent RAND report suggests that ‘[d]eterring adversaries by threat of punishment is often ineffective by itself.’A report titled the Resilience of the Deterrence Effect developed between Flinders University and Torrens Resilience Institute argues that over the last two decades deterrence theory has moved away from traditional applications of punishment or denial. The report suggests that new deterrence theories seek to persuade an actor to target elsewhere or build inherent capabilities into the national systems to limit the harmful effects of a disruption rather than specifically countering weapons systems. Arguably, coupled with Defence’s existing materiel, the new suggested deterrence theories are an extension of Wohlsetter’s effective retaliatory capability theory. In this context, Wohlsetter convincingly argued for retaliatory capability—albeit his focus was on nuclear retaliation—within which all systems must work in cohesion to effectively retaliate against an actor following an attack. For this capability, there is no prize for one system working exceptionally while all others flounder. Australia’s dependence on imports of refined liquid energy illustrates a simple but telling scenario. While Australia’s high-end warfighting capabilities can match or overmatch a malign actor, their reach and duration of operations are closely linked to liquid energy stockpiles on Australian soil or place of operation. Hence, any disruptions to the sea lines of communication can have a severe impact on the credibility of the deterrence achieved from these high-end warfighting capabilities. The establishment of sovereign capabilities able to produce and store liquid energy from indigenous feedstock can partly resolve this concern by ensuring that a single linear activity by a malign actor does not cripple Defence. Therefore, it is not the presence of many exquisite weapons that creates deterrence. Rather, a deterrence effect is realised through an ability to protect Australian interests, by having a choice to select multiple options for a measured response. As highlighted by Australia’s liquid energy dependence, Defence’s credibility to deter is reliant on the national base beyond the boundaries of military bases – without which it will always be presented with the necessity rather than a choice to respond with unquantifiable results. A more nuanced approach to deterrence Technology, innovation, strategy, and national resilience are the bedrocks of deterrence. The release of the Defence Strategic Update and various departmental innovation programs cover off on strategy and innovation to maintain Defence’s technological edge. While these documents attempt to fill an existing void, resilience of certain aspects of the nation such as critical manufacturing as part of this deterrence paradigm beyond warfighting materiel does not appear to feature on Defence’s psyche. This has the effect of creating the unfortunate misconception that Defence and its high-end capabilities achieve deterrence independently. Resilience of the Deterrence Effect aptly points out that the resilience of an effect—in this context deterrence—cannot be discussed without the resilience of the nation that generates the effect. For instance, historian Geoffrey Parker suggests that historically simple replication of weapons technology has not achieved success. Parker convincingly argues that success requires the “‘replication” of the whole social and economic structures that underpin the capacity to innovate, enabling the ability to adapt to given situations. Semiconductor manufacturing to support research and development of Artificial Intelligence (AI) is a case in point. MERICS senior analyst John Lee and Jan-Peter Kleinhans, director of the project Geopolitics and Technology at SNV recently published an article suggesting that while software and computer chips can be designed in various parts of the world, only Samsung in South Korea and the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) in Taiwan are capable of manufacturing computer chips that are 5nm in size. In the last 20 years, due to the increased complexity and cost of the fabrication equipment the number of plants dwindled to two as the size of the computer chips decreased from 180nm to 5nm. TSMC which produces the Xilinx chips used in the F-35 aircraft, estimates that it will soon spend close to $20 billion to establish the capability to produce 3nm computer chips. TSMC is only able to invest such vast sums because it holds 55 percent share of a sophisticated capital market founded upon strong social and economic structures which are always seeking innovative ways to remain competitive with the ability to fund them. This enables TSMC to raise revenue by conducting research collaborations with a large group of suppliers who seek to meet the demands of modern societies for ever more innovative products such as smartphones and quantum computing. Substantial government backing further ensures that TSMC is able to remain at the leading edge of semiconductor manufacturing. Due to these factors, the ability to replicate TSMC’s products over the next decade will be, at least on the surface, rather difficult. Additionally, TSMC’s market dominance ensures that it is on the international markets’ critical path for success in future technologies. This further has the likely effect that ensures foreign powers remain engaged with Taiwan’s future. The latter creates the perception of deterrence Taiwan seeks by complicating the strategic calculations of malign actors. But, it would be imprudent to fall into a false sense of security by seemingly identifying ‘our preferred malign actor strategies’ against Australian interests. The strategic permutations are innumerable requiring continuing and sustainable effort nested under a clear strategy for winning. Concluding provocations Where does all of this leave Defence? Elisabeth Braw, a journalist and Visiting Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, aptly points out that given the close linkages of private and commercial interests in the operation of a nation and its critical systems, any issues within them are national security concerns. COVID-19 has exposed vulnerabilities in relation to supply chains and pharmaceuticals which has led to reactive actions geared to only respond to the immediately discernible. In this context, Defence’s heavy intellectual investment in AI and its future application in military affairs is a prime example which highlights that simply providing a list of warfighting acquisitions to enable it to respond to events will not suffice. ‘Deterrence is a matter of comparative risks’ requiring a delicate balance rather than an automatic response to acquire high-end warfighting capabilities. Hence, Defence needs to recognise that the deterrent effect it seeks to achieve through the capabilities it employs is enmeshed with the resilience of the nation which creates a deterrent effect in its own right. Therefore, Defence needs to view its effectiveness in defending Australia’s interests through the lens of a complete capability beyond the boundaries of military bases and establishments. Accordingly, Defence needs to take an active role in not only its warfighting materiel but also be actively engaged in identifying vulnerabilities within the national security enterprise and assist in growing sovereign capabilities on Australian soil. This way of rethinking and engaging with the idea of deterrence is crucial to enable Australia’s long term success in actualising its strategic objectives. The views expressed are the author’s alone and do not reflect the opinion of the Royal Australian Air Force or the Department of Defence. Wing Commander Ulas Yildirim is the Deputy Director Force Structure Design in Air Force Headquarters. He has a Masters in Military and Defence Studies from ANU and a Doctorate in Aerospace engineering from RMIT. He is also an editor of The Central Blue blog. Follow him on Twitter @lightningulas

#futureautonomous On 8 April, The Sir Richard Williams Foundation is holding a seminar to discuss Next Generation Autonomous Systems. The aim of the seminar is to explore the force multiplying capability and increasingly complex requirements associated with unmanned systems. From its origins at the platform level, the opportunities and potential of increased autonomy in the generation and delivery of airpower effects are now expected to fundamentally transform Joint and Coalition operations. Defence industry has a major part to play in the transformation with opportunities extending beyond platforms, to the payloads and enabling systems which underpin the necessary risk management and assurance frameworks demanded by Defence. In the lead up to the seminar, The Central Blue will be running a series (similar to #highintensitywar and #jointstrike) to generate discussion and enable those that cannot attend the seminar to gain a perspective on the topic. What does #NextGenUAS mean for Australia and its region? We want to hear from you! The concept of the Unmanned Air System (UAS), or Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV), is nothing new nor is their use in missions which traditionally challenge human performance, fragility, and endurance. Often described as the dull, dirty, and dangerous missions, unmanned systems have now provided the commander with a far broader range of options for the application of force against even the most challenging target sets. However, ongoing operational experience confirms unmanned systems on their own are not the panacea and trusted autonomy in manned and unmanned teaming arrangements in each environmental domain is emerging as the preferred method. The narrative is now forming across defence which has progressed the argument for greater numbers of unmanned systems in a far more mature and balanced way than it has been in the past. The manned-unmanned narrative is now sensibly shifting towards ‘and’, rather than ‘or’. Manned and unmanned teaming leverages the strengths and mitigates the weaknesses of each platform, and concentrates the mind on the important operational aspects, such as imaginative new roles, and the challenges of integration to effectively generate the desired effect. This capability will require a complex web of advanced data links and communication systems to make the autonomous vehicle operate as a complete system. Designing and building the ‘kill web’ so that it can enable the delivery of manned-unmanned firepower across domains will be a huge challenge not least due to the laws of physics. However, the ability to train, test, evaluate and validate tactics and procedures will add a new level of complexity to generate the ‘trusted autonomy’ required for the delivery of strategic effects. With this background and intent in mind, the editors at The Central Blue suggest a number of topics to provoke your thinking in the lead up to the seminar. This is by no means an exhaustive list but we hope it prompts mental contact! Questions to consider: What is the impact of #futureautonomous systems on the national, campaign, operational and tactical levels? How have partner forces developed and employed #futureautonomous capabilities in recent campaigns? What emerging technologies should be considered to enable support, planning and targeting systems? What are the impacts of emerging #futureautonomous capabilities on training and exercise regimens? What impacts would prioritising #futureautonomous have on Australia’s existing and future force structures? What are the near and far future implications of #futureautonomous systems? What specific issues which must be considered in the context of the next Defence White Paper and Force Structure Review? What are potential roles for #futureautonomous systems set within the context of each environmental domain? What are the command and control, legal or social implications that affect employment? What is industry’s role in the developments in unmanned air, land, surface and sub-surface combatants? How should we reconceptualise Joint operations and move away from the platform-on-platform engagements which have traditionally characterised the battlespace? We hope these suggestions provide some food for thought and hopefully prompt some discussion. We would love to hear your ideas on what issues should be explored as part of the #futureautonomous series. If you think you have a question or an idea that would add to the #futureautonomous discussion, or know someone who might, contact us at thecentralblue@gmail.com

The Future of Unmanned Military Systems by Arthur H. Barber III Chief Analyst, Systems Planning and Analysis, Inc. 19 February, 2021 Systems Planning and Analysis (SPA) Australia Pty Ltd is a contributor to The Sir Richard Williams Foundation. Here, the company’s Chief Analyst provides a brief introduction to the topic and it’s effect on future war fighting capability as a preamble to our upcoming seminar.

This week The Central Blue editor, Wing Commander Ulas Yildirim, discusses risk management within the Australian Defence Force. The current rule-based model of risk management that Defence uses is insufficient to properly assess the different types of risks faced by the Service and its members. Using aviation safety reform, Yildirim examines how a shift in culture can be powerful for meaningful change. However, contextualisation of change is equally important in mitigating failings based on rote adherence to rules without understanding the principles behind them. Yildirim further highlights how Defence’s culture surrounding fear of failure will inhibit the long-term evolution and change necessary for Defence to take advantage of opportunities and create space for innovation. Risk – Effect (positive or negative) of uncertainty on objectives - ISO Guide 73:2009 Never miss the opportunity of a crisis - Anonymous In the mid-1990s, when the Defence aviation community vowed to make safety its top priority, a robust aviation safety framework was implemented. Inherent to the rules of this framework was a strict regime of compliance and conformance from its operational and technical personnel. Yet, this aviation safety framework—deemed exemplary by the Nimrod Board of Inquiry—did not prevent one of the Defence aviation community’s worst peacetime accidents with the loss of a Royal Australian Navy Sea King helicopter in 2005. The resulting Board of Inquiry for this tragic event attributed the accident to several themes including organisational deficiencies, management failures, poor communication and perhaps most concerningly, compliance to existing regulations without understanding their intent. The Sea King accident reflects a common and recurring issue in risk management which is continually underpinned by a logic of compliance. This logic holds that risk events can be resolved by ensuring that personnel comply with a set of predetermined rules-based risk management system. It would be foolish to suggest that an unregulated risk management system is the most effective. For example, Defence has significantly reduced its fatal aviation accident rate since the 1990s from a peak of more than five aircraft losses and four fatalities per year down to 0.4 fatal accidents per year for the period 1993 to 2012. However, a rules-based risk management system will neither diminish the likelihood nor the consequences of events such as the Sea King accident in the same way that it could not prevent the adverse effects of COVID-19. In an era of strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific there is a need to revisit Defence’s assumptions around risk management. To do so, this article presents some common issues associated with defining risk, identifies three different categories of risk, and provides some suggestions on how notions of risk might be dealt with within Defence in the future. Defining Risk Very few topics will generate as much frustration and confusion as risk management in Defence. For instance, how might understandings of risk and the identification of opportunities be rethought in a way suggested by the quotes that opened this article, but still be reconciled against the varied risk management policies within Defence which deliberately seek to steer well clear of any crisis? Academics B. Fischoff, S. R. Watson and C. Hope argue that the definition of risk is inherently controversial due to the unrecognised disagreements about what is meant by risk. The definition of risk has the likely effect to impact the outcome of policy debates, the allocation of resources and the distribution of political power in society. Moreover, without proper review and alignment this also has the effect of creating distortion and organisational skewing of risk perceptions based on long standing assumptions and organisational norms. Therefore, it would be improper to have a single definition of risk for all situations because there is no one definition suitable for all problems. ‘Rather, the choice of definition is a political one’ highlighting the importance one places on certain events in particular situations. For instance, in 1958, the Air Force Scientific Advisor, W. B. Kennedy, advised against installing cockpit voice recorders in Air Force aircraft. Kennedy instead wrote ‘... to the RAAF, the loss of aircraft is an accepted risk with a predicated cost.’[1] Kennedy’s comments represent the Air Force’s attitude towards aviation risk management during the Cold War which took precedence over aviation safety and reflect a stark contrast to the modern narrative within Defence. To overcome the problems of being bound to a singular and universal definition, academics R. S. Kaplan and A. Mikes propose three risk categories and different systems in managing risk as follows. Preventable risks Preventable risks are those that are internal to the organisation with a degree of control existing over them. Hence, they should be eliminated or avoided. Examples can include policies to prevent unethical use of Defence funds or materiel that can lead to reputational risk within Australian society. In this context, Defence’s aviation safety framework is a prime example that seeks to avoid preventable risks by mandating specific rules in managing aviation related safety risks. Strategy risks Organisations routinely accept strategy risks to increase the net gains from their strategies. In this context, strategy risks are different from preventable risks as they are not always undesirable. For instance, Defence’s ongoing close alliance with the US that enables the Australian government to achieve extended deterrence is also a strategy risk requiring Defence to provide niche contributions to various allied operations over the years. Given prevention is not the ultimate aim means that a rules-based system would be inadequate to manage strategy risks. Therefore, strategy risks require a risk management system that minimises the resultant effect and the likelihood of harmful aspects of strategy risks should they occur, while maximising the opportunities that they create. External Risks External risks are those that are outside the organisation’s control. COVID-19 and its impact on all aspects of society is a topical example of an external risk. Given such events cannot be avoided, efforts should be spent in identifying and mitigating their impact. This is a rather difficult task requiring foresight and the freedom to question existing norms to mitigate the effects of an event should it occur. For example, the ability of Defence’s high end capabilities to achieve the reach and duration required of them are closely linked to liquid energy stockpiles on Australian soil or place of operation. A Sino-Indian conflict in the region may disrupt the sea lines of communication which will have a severe impact on Defence’s ability to generate strategic effects. The establishment of sovereign capabilities able to produce and store liquid energy from indigenous feedstock can mitigate external risks such as a Sino-Indian conflict in the region, thus ensuring that Defence is capable of continuing to support the Australian government. Risk versus Opportunity: Two parts of a whole There is a large body of evidence within Defence to suggest that risks are treated via rules-based risk management systems due to a culture that values prevention of failures. This is, fundamentally, an untenable position for Defence to continue to hold. Arguably, such a culture inhibits the generation of opportunities and innovation. True innovation can only occur after a cultural shift occurs; one which generates a culture that values the benefits offered by failures. In his intent, the Chief of Air Force states that the Air Force will not succeed by treating risk, but by seizing opportunity. Similarly, retired Air Commodore Bill Kourelakos argues that the existing risk averse culture within Defence, coupled with the implementation of loss-focussed aviation safety regulations, are preventing the ability to seek opportunities while generating further conservatism. These examples highlight that systems traditionally designed to manage preventable risks may no longer be viable, regardless of the perceived certainty that they provide. More importantly, preventable risks and external risks represent the thin bookends of a risk continuum dominated by strategy risks. While isolated risk decisions may have been acceptable in the past, in an era of strategic competition in the region this is no longer acceptable. Risk decisions are about being able to view all three risk categories in cohesion and making a choice for a net benefit. For example, the effects of natural disasters present complex risks for Defence including the ability to respond at a notice against drought, fires and inundation within Australian borders. While outside Australian borders, major effects of natural disasters can be large-scale human suffering, instability in the region, conflict, and substantial population movements across the porous borders of fragile states. However, the ability to effectively respond to natural disasters can also create many opportunities. For instance, academic D. Brewster argues that Australia’s work with India, the US and Japan in the multilateral naval response effort to the 2004 Tsunami was a turning point in India’s decades-long non-alignment policy. Cooperation between the four navies directly led to the 2007 proposals for a Quadrilateral (QUAD) Security Dialogue which has gained further strategic importance recently within the Indo-Pacific region. Defence’s response to the 2004 Tsunami is a great example that highlights the interactions and good management of the three risk categories starting from available materiel and trained personnel which have led to the generation of a substantial opportunity in establishing the QUAD. In contrast, the circumstances behind the Navy’s Rizzo review is a stark reminder of the opportunity cost of mismanaged risks hampering the availability of mission-worthy materiel to generate strategic effects. Now what? In light of the above examples, generation of opportunities will require a concerted effort from the whole institution. This involves driving a strategic narrative to highlight that risk decisions require being able to view all three risk categories in cohesion and challenge Defence personnel to view risk management as a means to generate opportunities. Commanders must empower their subordinates, provide them top cover, and recognise the lessons gained from innovation failures. Professional military education must inculcate risk management as a means to generate opportunity while unnecessary governance must be avoided. Additionally, Defence personnel must no longer see themselves in discrete silos, responsible for managing one type of risk divorced from the world in which Defence operates in the hopes of preventing failures. They must leverage the decades of success and knowledge that they have gained from their past experiences. Further, they must view risk management of preventable risks as a starting point rather than a finishing line and look for creative solutions to emerging problems. Importantly, personnel must avoid a singular focus on obviating past failures or rely solely on ‘one size fits all’ attitudes towards risk management. These behaviours stifle innovation and fail to address contemporary challenges with potentially dire strategic implications in the long run. Conclusion Management of risk within Defence remains a hot topic likely to generate rigorous discussion. This is generally due to the unrecognised disagreements about what is meant by risk. Moreover, Defence’s drive to manage risk through endless rules-based risk policies creates a dissonance between a focus to prevent failures through strict rules, while lamenting the lack of generated opportunities. This is because a single rules-based risk management approach is inadequate for all situations. It is more appropriate to view risk through the lens of preventable, strategy and external risks in cohesion. Therefore, relying solely on a rules-based system as a ‘one size fits all’ to try to manage all manner of risk to prevent failures must be avoided. To achieve this there must be a cultural shift regarding risk within Defence requiring a concerted effort from every part of the institution. Only when Defence’s culture recognises that risk management is a means to an end, rather than an end in itself, can it take on higher-risk, higher-reward opportunities than its competitors. The views expressed are the author’s alone and do not reflect the opinion of the Royal Australian Air Force or the Department of Defence. Wing Commander Ulas Yildirim is the Deputy Director Force Structure Design in Air Force Headquarters. He has a Masters in Military and Defence Studies from ANU and a Doctorate in Aerospace engineering from RMIT. He is also an editor of The Central Blue blog. Follow him on Twitter @lightningulas References [1] W.B. Kennedy, "Aircraft Crash Recorder," ed. Department of Air (Melbourne: Commonwealth of Australia, 1958).

In her first post, Flight Lieutenant Samantha Hewitt delved into the merits a break in service can offer, and how to choose if this is the right path for you. Samantha also described the thought process she found beneficial when making her choice to return to service. In this post, Samantha highlights how her external experiences improved her understanding of the term ‘Whole-of-Australian-Government’ and how an understanding of other agencies contributes to achieving Australian National Security objectives. Workforce Generation and Australian Defence Force (ADF) Entry Surveys are showing: National Service, Career Development Opportunities and Career Prospects are amongst the top 5 reasons why people join the ADF [1]. It makes sense then that these motivations should inform how we motivate and retain our people against an increasingly competitive labour market. The implementation of the Service Category (SERCAT) scheme incorporating greater provisions for flexible working arrangements, in concert with increased career development opportunities available to the total workforce are certainly attractive. Further, the value now being placed upon individualised career management, most evident within the Air Force Enhanced Career Management system, is another promising prospect. To capitalise on this momentum, the Air Force, and ADF more widely, should further encourage and support its workforce to pursue professional breadth. A key method would be the introduction of a formal placement and secondment program which delivers opportunities to acquire external experience and build networks across industry and other government agencies. Going beyond ‘Joint’ to ‘Whole of Australian Government’ As the ADF refines how we operate as a ‘Joint Force’, the need to rapidly and seamlessly assimilate with Other Government Agencies (OGAs) has fast become essential. The recently released Defence Strategic Update, Force Structure Plan and Air Force Strategy (AFSTRAT) rely heavily on inter-agency integration to achieve ‘Whole of Australian Government’ (WoAG) effects. For Air Force to fully realise and implement the AFSTRAT, we need to better understand that through working together, and exchanging information and experience, we will more effectively deliver the mutual objective of Australian National Security. The ADF have a long history of working closely with the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) and Australian Federal Police (AFP) to provide emergency assistance and security to civil communities abroad. Recent ADF contributions to WoAG activities are extensive. We need only look at 2020 to recall ADF support to the Rural Fire Service throughout the catastrophic bushfire season and the enduring contribution to state and territory governments through COVID-19 Assist. This vast array of interagency support has helped to increase knowledge in parts, but is still limited to pockets of the ADF. As inter-agency work only continues to increase, Air Force must do more to optimise interoperability and inter-agency outcomes through actively pursuing placements, as well as increase personnel experience with, and build understanding of, OGA functions. Likewise, as Defence collaboration with industry matures, our understanding must grow in the multilateral space; including organisations such as the United Nations (UN), International and Australian Red Cross Movements, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and foreign militaries. Such open engagement and networking help realise potential through the exchange of information and shared experiences. This need not be resource-intensive, but rather short in duration and low in cost for big gains. Many of these organisations offer internships and exchanges, as well as training courses. I offer the following personal experience as a practical example, and to provoke thought on what other opportunities might be out there to help develop and retain our people, whilst optimising ADF workforce capability: I have been employed in the Solomon Islands with DFAT, the AFP and the Forum Fisheries Agency (linked to the International Policy Division-funded Pacific Maritime Security Program). These experiences provided invaluable understanding of the geo-strategic challenges and opportunities referred to in our most recent strategic policies. I was embedded with a Non-Government Organisation (NGO) in Timor Leste working with women affected by violence, via the Government-funded program, Australian Volunteers International. I gained insight into the development sector, its relationship with government, and specifically the UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security. Through training in humanitarian practice with RedR Australia and subsequent membership on their emergency roster system, I was able to attend the UN Civil Military Coordination Course in The Hague and complete a six week internship offered by the NATO Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC) Centre of Excellence. As part of this internship, I was provided the opportunity to attend the NATO CIMIC Higher Command Course and the European Security and Defence College Gender in Operations Course. I am presently registered on the emergency deployment roster for RedR Australia (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and UN deployments), Palladium and Red Cross. These organisations offer opportunities to deploy on humanitarian and development missions nationally and internationally. Through a little networking, research and flexibility from Air Force, these opportunities have provided essential knowledge, skills, experience and networks across government and other agencies that have been directly reinvested back into Defence on multiple occasions within Joint and operationally-focussed environments. As a result of hands-on experience within other agencies and sectors, I have gained a deepened understanding of the humanitarian and development sectors and how regional engagement and Australian foreign aid is vital to our national security and the prevention of conflict. Combined with the extensive networks created through these opportunities, I now better understand roles, relationships and capabilities. On my return to service I was posted to a position where I was able to apply some of the knowledge acquired externally. I have been entrusted to provide informed advice to the chain of command and am able to influence productive working relationships with, or alongside, OGAs to enhance Defence mission outcomes. Such was the case during my involvement with Enhanced Regional Engagement planning, on deployment during ADF Assistance to the Pacific Island Forum, and in the conduct of Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief exercise planning in Fiji. Whilst the global pandemic has temporarily reduced opportunities to gain experience in international settings, the Australian Bushfires and COVID-19 have highlighted the importance of collaboration between Defence, industry, the public and private sectors, NGOs and academia. Now more than ever the ADF needs to embrace the enterprise approach by developing, recognising, and valuing diverse experience sets. This will be key to succeeding in increasingly Volatile, Uncertain, Complex and Ambiguous environments. Defence has both an opportunity, and a need, to use the networks and experience that personnel across the workforce hold to optimise mission outcomes. A better understanding of the need for and value of this information could mean that these people are best used across the organisation within military planning, Contingency Response Operations, Defence Aid to the Civil Community and other Defence settings. Capturing acquired skills, experience and networks How Defence as an organisation can capture and exploit the valuable skills and networks of people returning to Defence is a frequently discussed topic by senior ADF leaders. The recently introduced Air Force Enhanced Career Management System is helping to identify and develop talented members via career pathways, planning, differentiated management, and medium to long-term succession planning. The Career Development Plan provides personnel with the opportunity to formally record skills acquired in industry, and the public and private sectors. It also forms a key source from which to centrally capture the data, give Air Force insight to the full range of talents that its people have, and who can be employed in response to contingency operations, which usually require unique skills and experience. While an excellent concept in theory, the challenge will be having adequate flexibility and resources to enable career managers to interpret the data and capitilise on personnel capability for Air Force whilst tempering this with the passion and ambitions of the individual. Time will tell if these initiatives have the buy-in at all levels to innovate the current system. Progress and opportunities The SERCAT system affords excellent flexibility for individuals to go out and seek opportunities through flexible working arrangements such as full-time, part-time and reserve service. However, more can be done. Air Force currently sponsors attendance at the RedR Humanitarian Logistics course, and has started a pilot program delivering Humanitarian Protection training from the Humanitarian Advisory Group. Regrettably, many of these courses are limited in availability and still viewed as non-essential. This seems somewhat out of step with regional national security and climate change developments. It would be beneficial to start recognising these types of courses as a key to developing contemporary and relevant combat mastery. It should be noted that while I have referred to the humanitarian and development sphere, opportunities for training and experience are available in a myriad of sectors that will provide skills and networks complementary to the core capabilities of Defence. Short-term placements can provide a cost-neutral means from which to provide experience and exposure in lieu of secondments, which can be complicated and costly to implement. The recent release of the Air Force Strategy provides some confidence that the importance in having such arrangements are starting to be realised. Commanders, managers and leaders alike play a vital role in advocating for this development and creating a culture which values these skills and networks as core to mission success. Air Force personnel must be air-minded and strategic; practical experience and exposure to a broad range of organisations and sectors will develop professionals who are dynamic and strategic in their thinking. Compared to other large organisations, Defence is on a positive path and is by and large making the most of the limited resources available. Through implementing mechanisms for greater utilisation of external experience, and developing a supportive framework to seek opportunities for professional breadth, the Air Force can better develop, retain and re-invest it’s personnel capability. Flight Lieutenant Samantha Hewitt is a Logistics Officer currently posted to Combat Support Division. While on Leave Without Pay, she worked with various Government and Non-Government agencies in Australia, the Solomon Islands, Timor Leste, and the Netherlands. Her focus has primarily been in the Humanitarian and Development Sectors; where she has a strong interest in Civil Military Cooperation training and education. In her current role within Operations Support, she hopes to support Combat Support Group and broader RAAF using the experiences she has gained with Government, Non-Government, International and Joint environments. [1] DPIR-CR-036/2020 Air Force – Enhance Career Management – Summary Report 2020

The future is now! Flight Lieutenant Jacob Simpson demonstrates how Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning are practical and achievable solutions to current problems faced by the Australian Defence Force. Yet a lack of AI literacy amongst personnel runs the risk of the ADF missing opportunities to exploit this technology through bottom-up innovation. Building such initiatives are necessary to ensure the Forces continue to improve at all levels, not just large scale technologies. FLTLT Jacob Simpson offers realistic possibilities for developing AI literate personnel to take advantage of their specialised service experiences. The impact of Artificial Intelligence (AI) technology is considered so significant that it is likened to the onset of electricity. If that statement is true, the Australian Defence Force (ADF) is currently not prepared to exploit the technology, and will continue to be on the back foot until it can effectively develop AI literacy amongst uniformed personnel. The successful implementation of AI not only requires an understanding of what AI is and an appreciation of what it can realistically achieve, but also an extensive knowledge across all domains in which it is being deployed. The development of AI for medical purposes, for example the automation of the detection of tumours in MRI scans, necessitates an expertise in both medicine and deep learning algorithms. The ADF will similarly require a cross-domain approach - through both military and AI expertise - to solve the problems that are unique to Defence, such as inefficiencies found within the domains of intelligence, command and control, or military logistics. Therefore, the key to success is two fold. It must support a bottom-up approach; combining technical AI knowledge and military expertise found within silos of excellence. And it must also be coupled with specific education at all ranks in order to develop the necessary tools for AI prototyping. The current research and development (R&D) approach utilised by the ADF is a top-down affair. It reflects a view of AI as a high risk technology reserved for scientists, requiring sophisticated tools only for the development of drones, robots, and the weapons of tomorrow. The result is AI innovation and an R&D strategy primarily centred on the external sourcing of ideas with the use of personnel outside of Defence to solve problems only within a few major projects. The foundations for a culture of AI literacy are therefore not being built within the ADF itself. While the development of cutting-edge AI is certainly justified for large autonomous systems like the Loyal Wingman and AIR6500, the ADF’s top-down approach runs the risk of a sluggish response to this technological revolution [1]. The consequences of underestimating the impact of AI will be serious if potential adversaries are more agile in its integration [2]. However, the addition of a bottom-up approach will negate this risk and encourage rapid integration of AI technology throughout the organisation. So what is required for the ADF to support the bottom-up use of AI? The Bottom-Up Approach: More Projects - Smaller in Scope Current ADF culture suggests AI is a technology of tomorrow – not today. It is easy to think of AI projects as those focused only on advancing sophisticated capability for the future force, such as for autonomous weapons systems and robotics. These projects, however, are mammoth in scope, come with significant cost, and require many years to implement due to their complexity. The result is the confining of innovation to high-risk projects that inevitably necessitate top-down managerial modus operandi. This approach does not exploit the benefits of machine learning (ML) that are available now [3]. ML does not need to be the preserve of multi-million dollar projects; sufficient off-the-shelf tools and ML algorithms have already emerged to render the implementation of AI projects exceedingly accessible to all ADF personnel. This is reflected in the fact that AI is a hobby to many. One only needs to peruse r/learnmachinelearning to find AI hobbyists showing off complex algorithms they have built using basic tools at home. The ADF could use these same tools, accessible to all personnel, within an AI developer environment on Defence networks and look to smaller AI projects with lower risk. Why smaller projects? The success of a project is determined by the balance of its triple constraints: time, cost and scope (Fig.1). The disproportionate dominance of one constraint, such as the large scope of AI projects within Defence, necessitates the compensatory increase of the others as a form of risk management. However, it is this form of retrospective risk management that leads to the top-down directives seen in Defence capability acquisition. Implicit within Figure 1 is the recognition that project scope neither corresponds to, nor predicts project quality. On the contrary – the smaller the project, the less time and cost required to produce a quality result, therefore reducing the consequence of failure. This is an important distinction for the pursuit of bottom-up innovation within Defence for AI, as it is the projects of smaller scope that can accelerate a wider proliferation of R&D. These are not the exciting projects involving drones and robots, but can be as simple as maximising administrative efficiency – such as automating the processes for the filling of forms - rendering the task less menial and time-consuming. Embracing small projects enables improvements in efficiency for the ADF organisation, and allow it to keep pace with AI technological development. Indeed, a case for fostering smaller AI projects within Defence is made with the ‘AI-Search’ detection system. The search and rescue (SAR) portable AI system was designed to rapidly locate vessels at sea through deep learning (DL) algorithms. A junior officer, LEUT Hubbert, developed the visual search algorithm through the use of common off-the-shelf ML tools in a mere two weeks [6]. This effort was supported by the Plan Jericho innovation hub, which helped fund and test the low-cost AI capability on a C-27 Spartan in 2019 [7]. This type of small scale, improvised R&D activity demonstrates exactly what bottom-up AI innovation can rapidly achieve. The ADF needs to professionally develop more personnel like LEUT Hubbert, whose prior knowledge of ML rendered possible his initiative. Personnel need to be given opportunities to acquire this niche skill. How can the ADF develop personnel that can deliver innovative bottom-up AI projects? Two initiatives are needed: Opportunities for AI Professional Military Education (PME), and a dedicated AI developer environment. The latter of these requirements is being established through the Defence Artificial Intelligence Centre (DAIC), but the former is currently very limited and must change. The Importance of Education for Developing AI Innovation Established under the Joint Capabilities Group in 2019, the DAIC serves as a centralised authority for the deployment of new AI capabilities within the ADF. Innovation is fostered through unclassified collaboration between the ADF and a network of industry, academia and allies. R&D efforts are to be focused within a collection of laboratories under the Defence Technology Acceleration ColLab (DTAC), where project proposals will be vetted by a dedicated management team to ensure non-repetition elsewhere. The DTAC plans to enable development of bottom-up AI innovation within the ADF through providing ML development tools on an unclassified network. However, one issue remains: a lack of AI-educated ADF personnel. In order for ADF personnel to effectively contribute to the DTAC, an AI education program needs to be developed which enables uniformed personnel to build the skills to develop prototype AI applications. Specifically, AI literate Defence members need: an understanding of ML techniques, fluency in the Python computer coding language, experience in data wrangling, and practical knowledge of ML tools provided within the DTAC developer environment. These four requirements enable familiarity with the various data structures available for training algorithms, the different solutions that are achievable for a specific problem, and the level of effort required to complete a given undertaking. Armed with such knowledge, uniformed personnel will be able to uncover niche solutions in practical project ideas of smaller scope. More importantly however, it will allow for the horizontal integration of ML algorithms within the ADF through combining the specialist knowledge found in intelligence, aviation, logistics, engineering and other ADF roles with AI configured for each respective domain. Building an ADF workforce that is AI literate will therefore be essential for the DTAC to exploit siloed specialist Defence knowledge within its ranks, without which bottom-up innovation becomes unachievable. The Missing Piece - Education Options for ADF Personnel The skills required to develop AI solutions can be very difficult to learn independently, and there are few options for formal education for Defence personnel. The first step in generating an AI literate workforce is the provision of short courses. These courses should offer a higher-level understanding of what AI actually is, and how Defence could exploit its benefits. Short courses could be provided by DAIC, and be aimed at mid-level and senior officers. General online courses could also be made available to all interested personnel wishing to understand the technology as part of their PME. While this is a first, and interim step, short courses are not enough to develop the skills required to utilise AI development tools and contribute to the DTAC. To produce specialist personnel who can contribute, Defence needs to implement formal education options in AI/Data Science in collaboration with UNSW Canberra. As of writing, there are no AI-focused qualifications available for study through the ADFA postgraduate program. Only one class introduced in 2019, ‘Big Data Analytics for Security’, teaches ML techniques for the purpose of cyber defence. In my personal experience, it was this class that got me interested in the subject of AI and inspired me to pursue a deeper understanding of the technology. However, I have not been able to find another ADF supported program in AI that can realistically be completed part-time. Another option open to personnel is to study outside UNSW Canberra through distance learning. There are currently three Masters of Data Science degrees with online classes on ML available through the DASS program. However, this still makes a postgraduate degree prohibitively expensive for many junior military professionals. The preferred option is a selection courses that offer increasingly complex understanding to those who are interested in specialising. A DAIC led education program open to all roles in the RAN, Army, and RAAF can offer short courses, diplomas and masters via coursework to personnel wishing to specialise. DAIC could follow the education model used by Defence Science & Technology Group (DSTG) within the Joint and Operations Analysis Division for developing military personnel with Decision Analytics skills. DSTG held an annual short course which gave the option for participants to gain a diploma in Decision Analytics upon completion or continue to study via enrolling at UNSW Canberra for the masters via coursework. An equivalent approach for AI could allow members to have flexibility, developing general AI awareness amongst the ADF as well as producing AI specialists within the ADF capable of contributing to the DTAC. Postgraduate education will also support innovation through the option for a research project in the final year of the degree for high performers.This enables personnel to explore options for AI within their own fields; once completed, these projects could directly be supported for implementation by the DTAC. UNSW Canberra already has PhD options available for AI, so ADF personnel could even continue these projects at the PhD level if desired. Conclusion A lack of investment in AI education for ADF personnel will result in DTAC project collaboration being weighted towards industry and academia; thereby ensuring very little innovation will originate from within the organisation. This limits bottom-up innovation; instead, efforts will be disproportionately focused upon problems deemed by industry and academia to be relevant – that is, projects ambitiously scaled for profitability, complexity and academic research interests. That approach risks a continued focus on large projects, or worse, the stove-piping of AI projects with a failure to consider the needs of the end user [8]. To fully mobilise AI development, the ADF will need project ideas that originate from within the organisation – not only outside it. Education is the first step in fostering a bottom-up AI innovation movement and setting the foundations for a bottom-up innovation culture within the ADF. PME focused on AI will allow for personnel to understand the strengths and weaknesses of this technology with a realistic appreciation of how it can be implemented. Knowledge in AI will inspire personnel to find solutions within their own siloed roles across the ADF, leading to new opportunities for AI projects that are smaller in scope and immediately achievable. If the ADF is to rapidly exploit AI, top-down innovation cannot be the only R&D strategy. AI has matured enough to allow for rapid development of tools to support the ADF of today, not just the ADF of tomorrow. Jacob Simpson is a Flight Lieutenant in the Royal Australian Air Force. He holds a Masters in Strategic Studies from the Australian National University and is currently undertaking a Masters in Decision Analytics at the University of New South Wales. References [1] ADBR (2019). Accenture report highlights impact of Artificial Intelligence. [online] ADBR. Available at: https://adbr.com.au/accenture-report-highlights-impact-of-artificial-intelligence/ [2] Shoebridge, M. (2019). AI and autonomous systems are urgent priorities for today’s defence force. [online] The Strategist. Available at: https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/ai-and-autonomous-systems-are-urgent-priorities-for-todays-defence-force/ [3] Moy, G., Shekh, S., Oxenham, M. and Ellis-Steinborner, S. (2020). Recent Advances in Artificial Intelligence and their Impact on Defence. Defence Science and Technology Group. [4] Hulett, D. (2013). Integrated cost-schedule risk analysis. Farnham: Gower. [5] Kuper, S. (2019). Artificial intelligence to enhance Aussie search and rescue capabilities. [online] www.defenceconnect.com.au. 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