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Fight Tonight: Combat Readiness at the Speed of Relevance - Paper #13 By Dr Robbin Laird The strategic landscape facing Australia has fundamentally shifted. For the first time since World War II, the Australian Defence Force is genuinely preparing to defend the homeland rather than simply contributing to distant coalitions. This stark reality was laid bare in a recent presentation by Air Commodore Peter Robinson, Commander Air Combat Group, to the Sir Richard Williams Foundation, where he outlined the Royal Australian Air Force’s current capabilities, limitations, and the unique challenges of potential conflict in the Indo-Pacific theatre. The New Strategic Reality Robinson’s presentation began with an uncomfortable truth: the probability of Australia being drawn into conflict is higher now than at any point in recent decades. This assessment reflects a broader strategic shift that has moved Australia from a mindset of expeditionary operations supporting allies to one of homeland defence and regional deterrence. The “fight tonight” philosophy that Robinson espouses represents a fundamental change in military thinking. Rather than planning for future capabilities or waiting for ideal conditions, it demands readiness with current assets against existing threats. This approach acknowledges that while defence planners may prefer to wait for next-generation systems or perfect training conditions, adversaries operate on their own timelines. The urgency of this perspective is underscored by recent conflicts worldwide. Robinson pointed to the India-Pakistan engagement as an example of how “getting night one right” can set the tone for an entire conflict. The Pakistani air force’s effective performance on the opening night, despite not changing the strategic balance between the nations, demonstrated the importance of seamless integration between training, equipment, and command structures from the conflict’s outset. Geographic Imperatives of the Indo-Pacific Perhaps no factor shapes Australia’s defence challenge more than geography. Robinson’s presentation included a striking comparison: the 2,000-mile span from Perth to Cairns equals the distance from northern Finland to Greece – essentially the entire NATO front line. Yet where Europe offers dense populations, extensive infrastructure, and multiple allied nations within close proximity, Australia faces vast oceanic distances with scattered island chains and limited friendly bases. This slide in Air Commodore Peter Robinson’s presentation superimposed Australia on the entire European theatre and on the lower right he placed the size of Ukraine within the Indo-Pacific region. This “tyranny of distance” creates both advantages and disadvantages for Australian defence planning. The vast spaces provide natural barriers and complicate enemy planning, but they also stretch Australian forces thin and create enormous logistical challenges. Unlike European theatres where reinforcements might arrive within hours, the Indo-Pacific demands self-reliance and forward positioning. The strategic implications are profound. Rather than defending at Australia’s borders, effective defence requires projecting power far forward into the region. As Robinson emphasized, it’s preferable to “kill the ship before it launches missiles” than to intercept those missiles after launch. This forward defence concept demands not only advanced capabilities but also extensive regional partnerships and basing arrangements. The Alliance Imperative Robinson’s presentation highlighted an often underappreciated aspect of modern air power: the critical importance of relationships and trust-building at tactical levels. The RAAF maintains an extensive exercise program across the Indo-Pacific, from Thailand and Indonesia to Japan and the Philippines. These engagements serve multiple purposes beyond simple training. First, they build operational familiarity with regional air forces, creating the foundation for potential coalition operations. Second, they demonstrate Australian commitment to regional security while providing deterrent effects. Third, they offer practical experience in operating from austere or unfamiliar bases – a capability that may prove essential in conflict. The depth of integration with U.S. forces represents a particular strategic asset. Exercises like Red Flag and Green Flag provide Australian aircrew with exposure to high-end combat scenarios at classification levels that offer genuine insight into potential regional conflicts. This integration extends beyond simple interoperability to shared intelligence, planning, and operational concepts. Recent developments, such as taking weapons into Southeast Asia for the first time in decades during Exercise Cope West in the Philippines, represent significant policy and operational milestones. Such exercises test not only tactical procedures but also the diplomatic and logistical frameworks necessary for forward operations. Technological Transformation The RAAF has undergone dramatic modernization over the past decade, transitioning from platforms that had served since the 1970s and 1980s to cutting-edge systems. The replacement of F-111s with Super Hornets, introduction of EA-18G Growlers, and transition to F-35 Lightning II aircraft represents one of the most comprehensive air force modernizations attempted by any nation. This transformation has created capabilities that Robinson describes as exceptional. The Growler electronic warfare aircraft, in particular, has “far outshone what we thought that one platform could have done.” The retention of Super Hornets until 2040, originally planned for much shorter service, reflects their continued relevance as strike platforms capable of carrying weapons that the F-35 cannot accommodate, including hypersonic attack cruise missiles. However, Robinson emphasized that platform acquisition represents only the beginning of capability development. Modern aircraft undergo continuous spiral upgrades, with new software and hardware packages appearing approximately every two years. The pace of these upgrades is not determined by convenient scheduling but by adversary capabilities and threats. The Weapons Equation Perhaps no aspect of “fight tonight” readiness is more straightforward than weapons stockpiles. Robinson’s formula is deliberately stark: “start with a ludicrous number, double it and add a zero, and that’s about right.” This reflects the reality that modern conflicts consume precision weapons at rates that consistently surprise planners. The RAAF currently possesses what Robinson describes as “exquisite weapons” capable of engaging tier-one maritime and land targets throughout the region. The service has demonstrated this capability through live-fire exercises, including the successful employment of LRASM (Long Range Anti-Ship Missile) from Super Hornets. The addition of hypersonic attack cruise missiles adds a capability that Robinson suggests will “put our adversaries on the back foot” due to the extended ranges and speeds involved. However, the weapons challenge extends beyond current stockpiles to production capacity and resupply during conflict. The ongoing war in Ukraine has demonstrated how quickly precision weapons can be exhausted and how difficult rapid replenishment can prove, even for major military powers. Operational Art and Integration Modern air warfare extends far beyond individual platforms and weapons to encompass “operational art” or the integration of multiple capabilities to achieve strategic objectives. The RAAF’s Air Operations Center represents the nerve centre for this integration, bringing together not only air assets but capabilities across all domains and government agencies. This integration reflects a fundamental shift from traditional air power concepts focused on air-to-air combat and close air support to multi-domain operations incorporating cyber, space, electronic warfare, and information operations. The goal is to create asymmetric effects that leverage Australia’s technological advantages while mitigating numerical disadvantages. The development of collaborative combat aircraft, advanced unmanned systems that can operate alongside manned fighters, represents the next evolution in this integration. These systems promise to provide additional mass and capability while reducing risk to highly trained aircrew. Sustainment Challenges While confident about immediate readiness, Robinson acknowledged significant concerns about sustained operations. The transition from “fight tonight” to “fight for weeks” introduces challenges around logistics, maintenance, and force regeneration that currently lack clear solutions. The presentation highlighted several specific concerns. Fuel distribution represents a critical vulnerability, leading to investments in mobile refueling systems and distributed storage to reduce dependence on large, vulnerable fuel farms. Base defence and passive protection measures, including hardened aircraft shelters and dispersed operations, seek to maintain capability even under attack. Perhaps most challenging is the human dimension of sustained operations. The RAAF has invested heavily in developing what Robinson terms “the world’s best tacticians” through the Air Warfare Instructor program. These highly skilled personnel represent irreplaceable assets whose loss would significantly degrade capabilities. Emerging Threats and Unknown Unknowns Robinson’s presentation candidly addressed several areas of concern that extend beyond traditional air warfare. Counter-drone capabilities represent a “known known,” everyone recognizes the threat posed by small unmanned systems, but developing effective countermeasures remains challenging. Cyber warfare represents a “known unknown” for everyone expects cyber attacks, but their precise effects and the most effective responses remain unclear. The integration of cyber effects with kinetic operations could fundamentally alter the character of conflict in ways that are difficult to predict or prepare for. Information warfare, particularly targeting military families through social media, represents another emerging threat. The psychological impact of false reports about casualties or operational failures could significantly affect force morale and effectiveness. Force Protection and Resilience The presentation emphasized that protecting forces extends beyond traditional force protection measures to encompass information security, operational security, and family support systems. Modern conflicts increasingly blur the lines between military and civilian targets, making comprehensive protection more challenging. The RAAF’s approach to resilience includes both technical measures, such as hardened communications and distributed operations, and human measures, such as support systems for military families. The goal is to maintain operational effectiveness even under sustained attack or pressure. Leadership and Human Capital Robinson concluded his presentation by emphasizing the exceptional quality and dedication of Australian Defence Force personnel. He noted that current service members demonstrate “a really clear sense of purpose for the environment that we’re in, more so than I think I’ve ever seen in my career.” This human dimension often receives less attention than platforms and weapons but may prove decisive in conflict. The transition of the RAAF over the past decade, accomplished without additional personnel, demonstrates the adaptability and commitment of the force. However, it also highlights the importance of preserving this human capital through appropriate pacing of operations and training. Conclusion: Ready but Realistic Air Commodore Robinson’s assessment presents a force that is genuinely ready for immediate challenges but realistic about limitations. The RAAF has successfully modernized its platforms, developed advanced operational concepts, and built strong regional partnerships. However, questions remain about sustained operations, emerging threats, and the broader industrial base required for prolonged conflict. The “fight tonight” philosophy represents more than military planning. It reflects Australia’s strategic reality in an increasingly contested Indo-Pacific. While hoping for continued peace, the RAAF is preparing for scenarios that seemed unthinkable just a decade ago. The quality of that preparation, and the realism about its limitations, may ultimately determine Australia’s security in an uncertain future. The featured image: Air Commodore Peter Robinson, Commander Air Combat Group presenting to the seminar. Also published in Defense.info

Fight Tonight: Combat Readiness at the Speed of Relevance - Paper #12 By Dr Robbin Laird The contemporary Indo-Pacific security environment presents a fundamental challenge to traditional alliance structures: how can middle powers maintain strategic autonomy while deepening military cooperation with major power partners? This dilemma is particularly acute for Australia, which faces the competing imperatives of economic integration with China, security dependence on the United States, and growing regional leadership responsibilities. The intersection of these pressures reveals broader tensions about the future of alliance partnerships in an era of major power competition. During my trip to Australia in September 2025, I discussed the dynamics of Australian defence and alliance issues with my colleague Stephan Frühling from the Australian National University. The Erosion of Alliance Certainties The comfortable assumptions of the post-Cold War era are dissolving. Australia’s traditional model of alliance partnership, providing ‘joint facilities’ and political support in exchange for American security guarantees, is proving inadequate for contemporary challenges. As Stephan Frühling observes, “despite the progress made since 2020, U.S.-Australia force posture cooperation remains limited by the lack of alliance institutionalization and political agreement, especially domestically in Australia, on its aims and objectives.” This institutional gap reflects a deeper problem: alliance cooperation is proceeding faster than political consensus. Recent force posture initiatives, including submarine rotational deployments, bomber base upgrades, and combined logistics enterprises, represent significant operational progress. However, as Frühling notes, “there is no sign that this will bring U.S. and Australian national defence postures into closer alignment.” The disconnect between tactical cooperation and strategic integration reveals fundamental tensions in contemporary alliance management. The experiences of Ukraine and Israel, where American support came with significant operational constraints and political interference, have reinforced Australian concerns about maintaining decision-making autonomy in potential conflicts. As one Australian strategic analyst observed to me, “we can’t rule out the possibility that we might actually have to conduct some operations, major operations, to deter and demonstrate capability to deter even China, but also cause enormous damage to the baddies if the United States decides it’s going to sit on its hands.” This stark assessment reflects growing recognition that the reliability of any single patron, even the United States, cannot be taken for granted in an era of domestic political volatility and competing global priorities. The challenge lies not in abandoning alliance relationships but in restructuring them to account for new realities. The Strategic Independence Imperative Australia’s response to this challenge involves moving from alliance dependence toward what can be characterized as strategic independence or developing sufficient autonomous capability to deter aggression while maintaining productive partnerships. This transformation requires abandoning traditional military thinking focused on capital ships and large platforms in favour of what Australian analysts call “high-leverage capabilities.” With a population of 25 million and constrained defence budgets, Australia cannot compete through numerical superiority. Instead, it must invest in systems that can “stop even a major aggressor in its tracks” through technological sophistication. The recently announced $1.7 billion investment in Ghost Shark autonomous underwater vehicles exemplifies this approach. Unlike traditional submarine programs that deliver small numbers of expensive platforms over decades, the Ghost Shark program is designed for rapid scaling and continuous technological evolution. This modular, rapidly deployable approach creates multiple, simultaneous threats that complicate adversary decision-making while avoiding catastrophic loss scenarios associated with traditional platform-centric strategies. The difference between deploying 15 Ghost Shark systems versus 180 represents a qualitative shift in deterrent capability that potential adversaries must factor into their planning. However, strategic independence requires more than advanced weapons systems. It demands industrial capacity to sustain those systems independently of vulnerable supply chains. The Ghost Shark program’s emphasis on domestic battery production illustrates this broader requirement. Producing sophisticated autonomous systems while importing all critical components from potentially hostile nations represents a fundamental strategic vulnerability. Deliberate Incrementalism as Strategic Framework Frühling proposes “deliberate incrementalism” as a framework for managing the tension between deepening cooperation and preserving autonomy. This approach acknowledges that alliance cooperation driven by “bottom-up, practical cooperation has a tendency to overstep political bounds, leading to tensions if such boundaries are then reestablished.” The solution involves carefully managed steps toward greater cooperation that respect political realities and sovereignty concerns. Frühling recommends that allies “try to say a little more each time” in their strategic dialogues, gradually building shared understanding without rushing toward comprehensive integration that may prove politically unsustainable. This approach requires several key elements: gradual development of shared strategic understanding without forcing perfect alignment; focus on overlapping operational needs rather than abstract strategic coordination; and development of graduated response mechanisms that provide decision-making flexibility during crises. For the U.S.-Australia relationship specifically, deliberate incrementalism means focusing on “areas that reflect overlapping national interests in operations closer to Australia, and on strengthening deterrence by facilitating horizontal rather than vertical escalation.” This acknowledges that Australia’s primary strategic concerns centre on its immediate region rather than broader global competition with China. The Economics of Strategic Independence Strategic independence cannot be divorced from economic considerations. The concept of “embedded logistics” offers a framework for addressing supply chain vulnerabilities while serving broader alliance interests. Rather than relying on expensive, vulnerable supply lines stretching from Hawaii to forward deployment areas, the United States could dramatically reduce Pacific logistics costs by supporting Australian industrial capacity development. This approach serves multiple strategic purposes. It reduces Australian dependence on any single supplier, including traditional allies whose domestic politics might disrupt supply relationships. It provides the foundation for supporting regional partners who lack sophisticated defence industries. Most importantly, it enables Australia to maintain military operations during extended periods when great power politics might limit access to traditional suppliers. The Chinese economic coercion playbook, demonstrated globally over the past decade, reinforces the importance of economic resilience. Australia’s experience of Chinese trade restrictions in 2020-2021 illustrates both the vulnerability and the potential for adaptation. Despite Chinese restrictions on coal, wine, and other exports, Australia’s economy proved more resilient than anticipated, finding alternative markets and strengthening partnerships with countries like India and Japan. Operational Integration Without Strategic Subordination Strategic independence does not mean strategic isolation. Australia’s future security depends on deepening operational integration with trusted partners while maintaining decision-making autonomy. The level of operational integration already achieved between Australian and American forces extends far beyond traditional alliance cooperation. Current systems integration means, as one Australian strategic analyst noted to me, “if you’ve got a sensor saying, here’s a PLA task group here, what’s the best asset for actually striking that in 15 minutes time, if it’s an Australian F-35 flight… it’s a joint thing.” This represents genuine operational integration where tactical decisions are made based on capability and positioning rather than national boundaries. Similar integration is developing with other regional partners. Australia’s expanding training relationships, from long-standing arrangements with Singapore to new partnerships with Germany, reflect a diversification strategy that reduces dependence on any single relationship while building interoperability across multiple partnerships. The key insight is that operational integration can coexist with strategic independence when partners maintain genuine capabilities rather than depending solely on a dominant ally’s systems. Australia’s ability to contribute meaningfully to integrated operations depends on having independent capabilities to contribute, not just political willingness to follow American leadership. Regional Leadership and Multi-Alignment Strategies Australia’s evolving strategic role extends beyond self-defence to regional leadership through capability sharing and operational cooperation. The expanding relationship with the Philippines illustrates this potential. Australia’s new treaty arrangements and joint exercises with Manila represent more than bilateral cooperation for they demonstrate how middle powers can create alternative security networks that complement rather than compete with traditional alliance structures. The autonomous systems focus provides particular opportunities for regional leadership. Maritime autonomous systems offer an ideal platform for sharing operational information and coordinating responses to grey-zone activities without requiring massive infrastructure investments associated with traditional military cooperation. Australia could position itself as a regional hub for autonomous systems development and deployment. This regional role serves broader strategic purposes by creating multiple decision-making centres that complicate adversary planning. Rather than focusing solely on potential American responses to regional aggression, potential adversaries must account for Australian capabilities, Philippine responses, Japanese actions, and other variables that cannot be controlled through bilateral pressure on Washington. The Challenge of Institutional Innovation The limitations of traditional alliance structures have encouraged institutional innovation. Frühling points to NATO’s Graduated Response Plans as a model for developing alliance-level operational planning that respects sovereignty concerns while building collective capabilities. These plans identify “what reinforcements might be necessary given the geographic and strategic situations in different parts of the alliance, the logistics of how they could be deployed, the political and military decision points and their timing.” For the U.S.-Australia relationship, this might involve developing contingency plans that outline decision points and operational requirements without predetermining political responses. By identifying when and where decisions must be made, allies can build collective capabilities while preserving decision-making autonomy. However, institutional innovation must account for the reality that “the vast majority of Australian staff officers, defence planners, and public servants who must make myriad practical decisions that collectively shape Australian force posture and structure outcomes do so with less of an explicit policy framework on how Australia’s national objectives align with alliance cooperation than their predecessors had two decades ago.” This institutional gap reflects broader challenges facing middle powers: maintaining the bureaucratic and political capacity for independent strategic thinking while deepening operational ties with major power partners. The risk is that tactical cooperation proceeds faster than political consensus, potentially creating vulnerabilities or misunderstandings during crises. Managing Resource Asymmetries Middle powers face stark resource asymmetries when competing with major powers for influence. China has more than doubled its ballistic and cruise missile arsenal in recent years and possesses the world’s largest shipbuilding capacity. These disparities create fundamental constraints on middle power strategic options, particularly when attempting to balance relationships with competing major powers. However, resource limitations also create opportunities for middle powers to focus on areas where they possess comparative advantages. Rather than attempting comprehensive balancing strategies, countries like Australia can concentrate on specific domains such as technology standards, environmental governance, critical minerals, or regional stability mechanisms where their contributions carry disproportionate weight. Australia’s approach to critical minerals illustrates this strategy. By leveraging natural resource advantages while building processing and value-added capabilities, middle powers can maintain strategic relevance despite overall resource constraints. This requires patient investment in research and development capabilities but provides the foundation for genuine strategic autonomy. The Deterrent Effect of Uncertainty The deterrent effect of strategic independence capabilities depends not only on their technical performance but on adversary uncertainty about their capabilities and employment concepts. The psychological impact of facing an unknown number of sophisticated autonomous systems operating in contested waters may exceed their direct military effect. This uncertainty principle applies more broadly to strategic independence. Adversaries who could previously predict Australian responses based on American decision-making patterns now face genuine uncertainty about Australian capabilities and intentions. This uncertainty serves deterrent purposes regardless of the specific capabilities involved. The Pacific Island “fingerprinting” campaigns by Chinese forces illustrate the importance of distributed response capability. Australia’s ability to respond independently to such provocations, without requiring American approval or support, provides options for graduated responses that might be impossible within traditional alliance frameworks where every action requires extensive coordination. Implications for Alliance Architecture The Australian experience suggests several principles that may guide successful alliance evolution in an increasingly multipolar world. First, economic diversification remains crucial for maintaining strategic autonomy. Countries that become too dependent on single major power relationships risk losing freedom of manoeuvre during crises. Second, institutional flexibility proves more valuable than rigid alliance commitments. Middle powers benefit from arrangements that allow them to contribute to collective security without compromising their ability to make sovereign decisions about force deployment and strategic priorities. Third, regional focus and comparative advantage strategies offer more sustainable approaches than attempts at comprehensive great power balancing. Countries that identify specific domains where their contributions carry disproportionate weight can maintain influence despite resource constraints. The solution requires reframing alliance cooperation from patron-client relationships toward genuine strategic partnerships. This means American acceptance that capable allies will make independent decisions about capability employment, while Australian recognition that strategic independence requires genuine capability development rather than political posturing. Conclusion: The Future of Strategic Partnership Australia’s movement toward more strategic independence represents neither abandonment of alliance relationships nor pursuit of complete autonomy. Instead, it reflects adaptation to a strategic environment where traditional security guarantees are no longer sufficient for national survival. The goal is developing sufficient independent capability to deter aggression while maintaining the partnerships necessary for broader regional stability. This transition requires sustained political commitment to capability development, industrial investment, and regional engagement. It demands American acceptance that genuine partners exercise genuine autonomy in strategic decision-making. Most importantly, it requires recognition that strategic independence and alliance partnership can reinforce rather than contradict each other when properly structured. The stakes extend beyond Australian security to the broader question of whether democratic middle powers can maintain autonomy in an era of great power competition. Australia’s success or failure in developing genuine strategic independence while maintaining productive partnerships will influence similar efforts across the Indo-Pacific and beyond. The path forward involves deliberate incrementalism, carefully managed cooperation that builds collective capabilities while respecting sovereignty concerns and political realities. This approach acknowledges that the comfortable assumptions of the post-Cold War era offered the illusion of permanent security through alliance dependence. The emerging strategic environment demands the reality of security through capability and partnership. Australia’s challenge is managing this transition successfully while contributing to broader regional stability, a transition that is not only possible but essential for long-term security in an increasingly contested world. Also published in Defense.info

Fight Tonight: Combat Readiness at the Speed of Relevance - Paper #11 By Dr Robbin Laird The recent Williams Foundation seminar on military readiness did not really highlight or provide detailed perspectives on how uncrewed systems could empower the fight tonight force and help drive the ongoing operational re-design process which is becoming a key part of military readiness. Australia finds itself positioned to leverage this technological moment. With sophisticated defence systems, experienced operators, and strategic partnerships that provide access to cutting-edge uncrewed platforms, the country can build immediate capability while establishing the foundation for future autonomous operations. The challenge lies not in waiting for perfect technology, but in maximizing the substantial potential that exists within current systems. I have worked for a number of years on various autonomous and unmanned or uncrewed systems. And in so doing, I have talked for a number of years to Australian practitioners of the art in government, industry and the analytical community. Based on those conversations let me provide a supplement to the recent Williams Foundation Seminar on the “fight tonight” force. The Language Problem: Autonomy Versus Reality One of the most significant barriers to effective implementation of uncrewed systems lies in the misuse of language. Defence professionals routinely describe current systems as “autonomous” when they are anything but. This linguistic imprecision creates unrealistic expectations and diverts attention from what these systems can accomplish. True autonomy, as defined in military glossaries, refers to systems capable of sensing their environment, making independent decisions, and fulfilling commander’s intent without human intervention. On a five-level autonomy scale, where level one represents remotely piloted systems and level five represents full autonomy, current military systems operate predominantly at levels two and three. Consider the MQ-9 Reaper, often cited as an autonomous system. In reality, it features a traditional cockpit with throttle, stick, and pedals. It is fundamentally a piloted aircraft with some automated features. Even advanced systems like the MQ-4C Triton operate as a level two automated platforms, executing pre-programmed missions without making independent decisions. The emerging category of Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA), including Australia’s Ghost Bat, represents level three systems requiring external sensing and human oversight. The U.S. Air Force’s decision to call these “collaborative” rather than “autonomous” aircraft demonstrates a more honest assessment of current capabilities. This distinction matters because when defence professionals claim current systems are autonomous, they create dangerous misunderstandings. Policymakers and the public begin to believe that full autonomy has arrived, leading to unrealistic expectations and inappropriate deployment concepts. More critically, it diverts attention from developing practical applications for the technology which we actually possess. The China Challenge as Catalyst for Innovation If we look at the challenge posed by China we get an insight into a key competitor who is driving a way forward with uncrewed systems. China’s approach to uncrewed systems development provides valuable insights into practical applications while demonstrating the urgency of immediate adoption. Beijing has invested heavily in diverse uncrewed platforms, from sophisticated combat air vehicles to converted legacy aircraft equipped with remote control systems. This approach demonstrates how quantity, adaptability, and rapid deployment can create strategic advantage even without perfect autonomy. China’s strategy appears to embrace the philosophy of “good enough” technology deployed at scale rather than perfect systems deployed in small numbers. Their conversion of legacy fighters like the MiG-17 into uncrewed platforms creates substantial asymmetric capabilities using existing airframes and relatively simple automation packages. These platforms may lack sophistication but provide significant tactical options for saturating defences, conducting reconnaissance, or serving as decoys. More concerning is China’s development of hundreds of new uncrewed combat air vehicles designed from the ground up for automated operations. These platforms, while not fully autonomous, can conduct complex missions with minimal human oversight and pose significant challenges to traditional air defence concepts that assume human decision-making timelines. This reality presents Australia with both challenge and opportunity. While China may field large numbers of simpler uncrewed systems, Australia can leverage its technological sophistication and operator expertise to develop more effective employment concepts for advanced automated platforms. The key lies in rapid adoption and iterative improvement rather than waiting for perfect solutions. The Chinese model also illustrates how uncrewed systems can complement rather than replace traditional platforms. Instead of viewing future conflicts through the lens of platform-versus-platform comparisons, Australia can explore how automated systems enhance the effectiveness of existing capabilities like F-35s, Wedgetails, and maritime patrol aircraft. Australia’s advantage lies not in matching Chinese production numbers but in developing superior employment concepts that maximize the effectiveness of sophisticated automated systems. This requires getting current technology into operators’ hands quickly to build the experiential knowledge necessary for tactical innovation. Ghost Bat: A Platform of Immediate Potential At the seminar, the Chief of Air Force, Air Marshal Chappell underscored that Australia’s Ghost Bat program represents an exceptional opportunity to build practical experience with advanced uncrewed systems while contributing to current defence needs. Even in its initial ISR configuration, Ghost Bat offers multiple pathways to enhanced capability that can be exploited immediately rather than waiting for future weaponization. But beyond any initial considerations of the long-term future of such an aircraft, it should be noted that the platform’s sophisticated sensor suite and data processing capabilities position it perfectly for immediate integration with existing ISR networks. Paired with high-altitude platforms like the Triton, Ghost Bat could provide complementary low-altitude surveillance over critical maritime chokepoints, creating layered sensor coverage that significantly enhances situational awareness in contested areas. Integrated with Wedgetail early warning systems, Ghost Bat could extend sensor networks beyond traditional line-of-sight limitations and provide additional data correlation capabilities. This application would be particularly valuable in Australia’s maritime approaches, where the platform could investigate contacts detected by high-altitude sensors while crewed aircraft maintain safe standoff distances. The platform’s collaborative architecture also creates opportunities for innovative tactical applications. Multiple Ghost Bat aircraft could coordinate autonomous sensor sweeps, automatically sharing data and adjusting coverage patterns based on emerging intelligence requirements. This swarming approach to ISR could overwhelm adversary counter-surveillance efforts while providing unprecedented situational awareness. Ghost Bat’s modular design creates opportunities for adaptive employment that accelerate capability development. Rather than waiting for a single system to fulfill all requirements, Australia could explore specialized variants optimized for specific missions. Sophisticated ISR platforms could focus on complex surveillance tasks requiring advanced sensor fusion and data processing, while simpler “arsenal aircraft” could be designed specifically for missile carriage and engagement extension. This modular approach allows parallel advancement in multiple mission areas while building the operational foundation necessary for more advanced applications as technology matures. Each variant would contribute immediately to defence capability while providing lessons that inform future development. The weaponization timeline, rather than being viewed as a limitation, creates opportunities for innovative employment concepts. Current ISR-focused operations would build operator expertise in human-machine collaboration, develop tactics for contested environments, and identify integration opportunities with existing platforms. When weapons integration becomes available, operators would already possess the experiential foundation necessary for effective combat employment. Perhaps most importantly, Ghost Bat’s current configuration allows for immediate experimentation with multi-domain operations. The platform could coordinate with naval systems for maritime surveillance, support land forces through tactical reconnaissance, or enhance air operations through collaborative sensing. These applications would build the joint operational concepts necessary for future autonomous operations while delivering immediate capability enhancement. Learning from Real-World Innovation The conflict in Ukraine demonstrates how practical adoption drives effective uncrewed system employment far more effectively than theoretical development cycles. Ukrainian forces have successfully integrated multiple types of automated systems through rapid deployment, field modification, and continuous operator feedback. This experiential approach has produced remarkably effective tactical applications in timeframes measured in weeks and months rather than years and decades. One could argue that the Ukrainian model reveals several key insights applicable to Australian defence planning. First, operator experience drives innovation more effectively than engineering specification. Ukrainian forces have modified commercial drones, adapted software systems, and developed new tactical employment concepts based on immediate battlefield feedback. This rapid iteration cycle has produced solutions that no amount of peacetime analysis could have predicted. Second, the most effective uncrewed systems often emerge from adapting existing platforms rather than developing new ones. Ukrainian forces have successfully weaponized commercial quadcopters, modified racing drones for reconnaissance, and converted civilian aircraft for military missions. This approach leverages existing technology while focusing innovation efforts on mission-specific adaptations. Third, effective employment often requires combining multiple simple systems rather than developing single complex platforms. Ukrainian operations frequently employ coordinated formations of different uncrewed systems, each optimized for specific tasks but working together to accomplish complex missions. This distributed approach proves more resilient and adaptable than single-platform solutions. The Ukrainian experience also demonstrates the importance of human-machine collaboration rather than complete automation. The most successful operations combine automated platforms with human decision-making, leveraging machine advantages in persistence and precision while retaining human advantages in creativity and adaptation. For Australia, this suggests accelerating Ghost Bat and other uncrewed system deployment to build operator expertise and identify practical applications. Early operational experience will drive innovation more effectively than theoretical analysis, while contributing to defence readiness throughout the development process. The Ukrainian model also suggests opportunities for rapid capability enhancement using existing platforms. Commercial systems could be adapted for military missions, existing crewed aircraft could be modified for uncrewed operations, and software systems could be rapidly modified based on operational feedback. This approach would build accelerated capability while providing the experiential foundation necessary for more advanced development. Beyond Platform-Centric Thinking My own work on maritime autonomous systems suggests that current uncrewed systems offer opportunities to enhance existing capabilities through mission-focused integration rather than platform replacement. This approach recognizes that the greatest immediate value lies not in developing new platforms but in amplifying the effectiveness of current systems through intelligent integration. The F-35’s advanced mission systems exemplify this potential. Through software modifications, these aircraft can coordinate seamlessly with uncrewed systems, creating collaborative networks that multiply effectiveness without requiring entirely new platforms. F-35s could serve as battle managers for uncrewed systems, providing targeting data, coordinating sensor coverage, and enabling distributed operations that complicate adversary response. Similarly, existing ISR platforms like Triton and Poseidon could be enhanced through integration with uncrewed systems that extend their sensor reach and provide additional data collection points. Triton aircraft could coordinate with lower-altitude uncrewed systems to create comprehensive maritime surveillance networks, while Poseidon aircraft could deploy and control specialized systems for underwater detection or electronic warfare. The key insight is that current platforms already possess the computational power, communication systems, and operator expertise necessary for uncrewed system integration. What’s required is focused software development and operational concept refinement rather than entirely new acquisition programs. These modifications can occur rapidly when approached as capability enhancement rather than platform replacement, delivering improved effectiveness on accelerated timelines while building toward more advanced future applications. The timeline advantages are substantial: software modifications can be implemented in months, operator training can be accomplished in weeks, and tactical concept development can occur through immediate experimentation. The SRG Model: Mission-Focused Excellence In my earlier discussions with RAAF officials involved with Ghost Bat, I argued that the Surveillance and Reconnaissance Group exemplifies the problem-solving approach that maximizes uncrewed system potential. SRG personnel focus on mission accomplishment using available tools rather than waiting for perfect platforms. This mindset makes them ideal candidates for pioneering uncrewed system employment concepts while providing a model for broader defence innovation. SRG’s approach centres on understanding mission requirements first and then adapting available technology to meet immediate needs. This methodology contrasts sharply with platform-centric thinking that defines ideal systems and then waits for their development. The SRG model prioritizes practical solutions that deliver capability while building experience for future advancement. This operator-focused approach ensures that system development remains grounded in practical operational requirements rather than theoretical specifications, increasing the likelihood of effective real-world employment. SRG personnel regularly adapt systems for missions beyond their original design parameters, developing innovative employment concepts through experimentation and iteration. The SRG experience with existing ISR platforms provides valuable insights for uncrewed system employment. Their success in coordinating multiple sensor platforms, correlating data from diverse sources, and adapting to dynamic intelligence requirements demonstrates the operational concepts necessary for effective uncrewed system integration. Perhaps most importantly, SRG personnel think in terms of network effects rather than individual platform capabilities. They understand how different systems can complement each other, how data sharing multiplies effectiveness, and how adaptive employment can create capabilities greater than the sum of individual parts. This network-centric thinking is essential for maximizing uncrewed system potential. The SRG model suggests how Australia can accelerate capability development across all domains. Rather than waiting for perfect systems, operators can begin experimenting with current technology to identify practical applications and develop innovative employment concepts. This experiential approach builds the institutional knowledge necessary for future advancement while delivering immediate capability enhancement. The model also demonstrates the importance of empowering operators to drive innovation rather than restricting development to acquisition specialists. SRG success comes from giving experienced operators the authority to experiment, adapt, and innovate based on operational requirements rather than bureaucratic constraints. An Adoption-First Strategy The path to maximizing uncrewed system potential lies through adoption-focused rather than acquisition-focused policies. This approach recognizes that current automated systems offer significant capability that can be enhanced through practical employment and continuous improvement. The strategy emphasizes getting technology into operators’ hands quickly rather than waiting for perfect solutions. Key principles include accepting current automation levels while developing employment concepts appropriate to existing capabilities, prioritizing rapid deployment to build operator experience, and embracing iterative improvement based on operational feedback. This approach leverages uncrewed systems’ inherent advantage: their ability to be modified rapidly through software updates and mission system changes. The adoption-focused strategy recognizes that uncrewed systems derive their greatest value from adaptability rather than initial perfection. Unlike traditional platforms that require extensive modification for capability changes, uncrewed systems can be reprogrammed, reconfigured, and redeployed for new missions in timeframes measured in weeks rather than years. The strategy also emphasizes parallel development streams that allow different organizations to pursue complementary approaches simultaneously. While traditional combat aviation units explore tactical employment concepts, ISR specialists can develop surveillance applications, logistics specialists can explore support missions, and joint practitioners can explore close air and tactical ISR support to the land force. This parallel approach accelerates overall progress while building expertise across multiple domains. Implementation requires institutional changes that empower operators to drive innovation rather than waiting for centralized acquisition decisions. Operators need the authority to experiment with systems, modify employment concepts, and adapt tactics based on immediate feedback. This operational empowerment accelerates innovation while ensuring that development remains grounded in practical requirements. The adoption-first strategy also recognizes the importance of accepting incremental progress rather than pursuing revolutionary breakthroughs. Each improvement in automation, each enhancement in human-machine collaboration, and each advancement in tactical employment contributes to overall capability development while building toward future autonomous potential. Building Toward 2040: The Journey Advantage Viewing full autonomy as a 2040 destination rather than a current requirement creates space for systematic capability building that delivers value throughout the development process. This journey perspective enables honest capability discussions that acknowledge current limitations while working systematically toward greater independence. It allows for realistic operational planning that leverages current strengths while building toward future potential. Each generation of systems can incorporate greater automated decision-making while maintaining appropriate human oversight, building operator expertise and institutional knowledge essential for eventual autonomous operations. The progression from level two to level three to level four automation provides natural development milestones that allow for systematic capability advancement. The journey approach also recognizes that autonomous systems will require different operational concepts, training programs, and institutional structures than current platforms. Building these foundations takes time, but the process can begin immediately using current technology. Operators can develop human-machine collaboration techniques, organizations can adapt command structures, and institutions can build the cultural familiarity necessary for autonomous operations. This progressive development approach offers several advantages over revolutionary transformation attempts. It allows for continuous learning and adaptation, reduces risk by enabling incremental testing and refinement, and maintains operational capability throughout the development process. Rather than waiting for autonomous breakthroughs, defence organizations can build systematically toward autonomous potential while leveraging current capabilities. The timeline also aligns with strategic planning horizons that account for evolving threats and technological development. Rather than rushing toward capabilities that may not be ready, Australia can build steadily toward autonomous potential while maximizing current opportunities. This approach ensures that investment in uncrewed systems delivers immediate returns while building toward future strategic advantage. The journey metaphor also enables more realistic resource allocation and capability planning. Rather than betting everything on autonomous breakthroughs, defence planners can invest systematically in automation advancement while maintaining current operational effectiveness. This balanced approach reduces risk while ensuring continuous capability improvement. Perhaps most importantly, the journey approach recognizes that autonomous operations will emerge from enhanced human-machine collaboration rather than human replacement. The most effective autonomous systems will leverage human creativity, adaptability, and judgment while automating routine tasks and providing superhuman persistence and precision. Building this collaborative foundation requires practical experience that can begin immediately with current technology. Conclusion: Seizing the Moment Australia stands at a unique moment in military technology development. Current uncrewed systems offer substantial capability that can enhance defence readiness immediately, while providing the foundation for more advanced autonomous operations in the future. The convergence of sophisticated platforms like Ghost Bat, proven automated systems like Triton and Reaper, and advanced integration capabilities in existing platforms creates unprecedented opportunities for capability multiplication. The key to success lies in practical adoption that gets systems into operators’ hands quickly and builds capability through experiential learning. This approach recognizes that the greatest advances in uncrewed system employment will come from operators who understand both the potential and limitations of current technology, rather than from theoretical analysis by acquisition specialists. The technology exists today to multiply Australia’s defence effectiveness through uncrewed system integration. Ghost Bat can begin contributing to ISR missions while building toward more advanced applications. Existing platforms can be enhanced through uncrewed system integration that leverages current computational power and communication systems. Operators can begin developing the expertise necessary for future autonomous operations while contributing to current defence needs. The opportunities extend across all domains of military operations. Maritime surveillance can be enhanced through coordinated networks of crewed and uncrewed platforms. Air operations can be multiplied through collaborative combat concepts that leverage both human creativity and machine persistence. Land operations can be supported through tactical reconnaissance and logistics applications that reduce risk to human personnel. Most importantly, Australia can leverage its technological sophistication and operator expertise to develop employment concepts that maximize the potential of current automated systems while building toward the autonomous future. The country’s tradition of military innovation, combined with access to advanced technology and experienced personnel, creates ideal conditions for pioneering effective uncrewed system employment. The strategic implications are substantial. While potential adversaries may focus on quantity over quality, Australia can demonstrate how sophisticated automation, innovative employment concepts, and superior human-machine collaboration can create decisive advantages. This approach plays to Australian strengths while building the foundation for future autonomous superiority. The choice facing Australian defence planners is not between current limitations and future perfection, but between seizing immediate opportunities and waiting for perfect solutions that may never arrive. Current uncrewed systems, properly employed, can enhance defence capability today while building the operational foundation necessary for an autonomous journey towards 2040. The path forward is clear: embrace the potential of current uncrewed systems, accelerate their practical adoption through operator-focused development programs, and build the operational foundation necessary for autonomous excellence. Australia’s defence advantage lies not in waiting for tomorrow’s technology, but in maximizing today’s opportunities while building systematically toward future potential. Also published in Defense.info For a video discussing this article, see the following:

The Williams Foundation advances awareness, understanding and constructive debate about integrated, coherent & sustainable combat power to strengthen Australia’s national security. Through its events & engagement activities with Defence officials and the wider Australian national scientific and industry base, the Foundation shapes and influences policy decisions regarding Australia’s defence with an emphasis on air and space power. We advance awareness, understanding and constructive debate about integrated, coherent & sustainable combat power to strengthen Australia’s national security Our Purpose EXPERT ANALYSIS In-depth thinking by our highly experienced network of non-resident fellows, scholars and active practitioners Australia’s Air Power: Ready for Tonight, Preparing for Tomorrow Oct 6 7 min read MORE EXPERT ANALYSIS NEWS & UPDATES Stay up-to-date with the latest in the Foundation's news and activities > Australia in Era of Strategic Uncertainty: The Defence Dimension - Dr Robbin Laird May 23 3 min read CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS EVENTS Errol McCormack lunches and Conferences are complimentary for financial members of the Williams Foundation. 2025 Errol McCormack Member Lunches Dec 15, 2023 1 min read 2025 Williams Foundation Conferences Dec 13, 2023 1 min read Click for more information and registration Platinum Corporate Partners

About Us Who are we? The Sir Richard Williams Foundation is an independent organisation whose primary purpose is to strengthen Australia’s national security by shaping and influencing policy decisions regarding Australia’s defence with an emphasis on air and space power. The Foundation also promotes national security policies that: promote the generation of coherent and sustainable combat power by Navy, Army, Air Force, Space and Cyber; particularly in an integrated context, including through the wider Australian national scientific and industry support base; and influence the evolving regional strategic environment in a manner favourable to Australia’s security. The Foundation aims to stimulate awareness, understanding and constructive debate on national security policies by supporting research, consulting with senior Defence officials and industry representatives and hosting seminars and events. Our origins and early development After years of discussion, in 2008 a group of retired Air Force officers decided that there was a need for an organisation to support development of Air Force. Possible solutions covered the range from “CAF Grey Beards Advisory Committee” to “Independent Think Tank”. After several formal and informal exploratory meetings, the decision was taken to form a RAAF Association Think Tank to be called the Sir Richard Williams Foundation. The first formal meeting of the Foundation was conducted on 14 October 2008 at the Air Power Development Center with Dr Alan Stephens as Chair. During the meeting Dr Stephens suggested, and the Committee agreed, that AIRMSHL Errol McCormack AO (Retd) take the Chair. Through 2009 the Committee developed the structure required to support the Foundation and decided that product of the Foundation would be “Papers” on topical issues. Workshops were to be used to support development of the papers. “Workshops” soon developed into “Seminars” as a means of gaining company sponsorship. The first seminar, ISR, was held at ADC on 19 April 2011. At a meeting on 14 December 2010 the Committee decided that the Foundation should be independent from the RAAF Association. Thus, on 03 December 2012 the Sir Richard Williams Foundation Incorporated was registered in the ACT as a charity. Since then the Foundation has continued to develop and expand in scope and range of activities. The Foundation is now recognised in the Department of Defence as an influential component of operational development of air power in the ADF. Our founder Air Marshal Errol McCormack AO (Retd) Errol McCormack joined the RAAF as an aircrew cadet in March 1962 after completing an apprenticeship as a fitter and turner. On graduation he was assigned fast jet and completed tours in South East Asia (Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and Borneo) on the F-86 Sabre, Vietnam on the Canberra bomber, US on the F-111A and US on the RF-4C Reconnaissance Phantom. As a senior officer he completed two tours in Operational Requirements, two tours at staff college (RAAF and Joint), one tour in Operational/Air Command and two tours in diplomatic posts (Air Attache Washington and Commander IADS, Malaysia/Singapore). He has commanded at squadron, wing and Air Force levels. Errol McCormack retired from the RAAF as Chief of Air Force in May 2001. Since then he has sat on local company boards and consulted for many local and foreign companies dealing with Defence. In Oct19 he divested himself of all commercial commitments and now conducts pro bono activities only. Who is Sir Richard Williams? Sir Richard Williams The Foundation is named after Sir Richard Williams. In World War I Sir Richard Williams was the Australian Army's outstanding air combat commander. In 1921 he became the first chief of the newly-formed Royal Australian Air Force. Williams is widely acknowledged as Australia's pre-eminent military airman. For more about Sir Richard Williams, Brian Weston and Alan Stephens, wrote a three part series of articles in 2019 published in On Target - a regular column in the Australian Defence Business Review . Brian Weston 'On Target: Who was Richard Williams? ' in Australian Defence Business Review, March-April 2019 p. 82 Brian Weston 'On Target: The Birth of an Australian Air Force – Part 2 ' in Australian Defence Business Review, May-June 2019 p 82 Dr Alan Stephens 'On Target: Richard Williams and the Defence of Australia ' July-August 2019 This column written for the ADBR July-August 2019 an edition that was not published Image Acknowledgement - This photo of Sir Richard Williams was donated to the Williams Foundation from the Wall family private collection. The photo can be found on the front cover of Sir Richard Williams'autobiography 'These are the Facts' , published by The Australian War Memorial and the Australian Government Publishing Service, 1977

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