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Dr Robbin Laird, Air Power and the Challenge of Shaping an Effective Ready Force Which Can Deliver Deterrence by Denial , 29 May 2025 Link to article (Defense.info) The first of two panels held at the Sir Richard Williams Foundation seminar on May 22, 2025 was entitled a “Cost Per Effect” panel. It was chaired by Air Marshal (Retd) Darren Goldie and the panelists were: Air Vice Marshal Glen Braz, Air Commander Australia Professor Justin Bronk. Air Vice Marshal John Haly, Head Military Strategic Plans. Air Marshal (Retd) Darren Goldie, Australia’s former Air Commander Australia and Australia’s inaugural National Cyber Security Coordinator within the Department of Home Affairs, opened with a reframing of military cost analysis. “Cost per effect,” he explained, “is far more complex than the old ‘cost per kill’ calculations.” When Australia fires a maritime strike weapon over the horizon — of which the government has invested heavily —the true cost isn’t just the missile itself. It includes a proportional share of pilot training, the targeting enterprise, intelligence systems and everything else required to “render that ship useless.” But the calculation becomes even more complex when considering deterrence effects. “We’re talking about a submarine program that exceeds $300 billion,” Goldie noted. “We will get submarines that ideally will never fire a weapon. The effect you seek there is deterrence.” This distinction matters enormously for how Australia approaches defense spending. As Clausewitz observed, “the value of the object determines the measure of the sacrifices by which it will be purchased.” When the object is Australia’s sovereignty, the acceptable cost ceiling rises considerably. Professor Justin Bronk highlighted the strategic shift of the past decade which can be described as the evolution from “deterrence by punishment” to “deterrence by denial.” The old model — threatening massive retaliation after an invasion— no longer holds credibility against nuclear-armed great powers. “We’re not going to downtown Beijing. We’re not going to downtown Moscow. They’ll nuke us, let’s be clear,” Bronk stated bluntly. Instead, the focus has shifted to preventing initial success. In Eastern Europe, this means stopping Russian advances before they can establish occupation zones. In the Indo-Pacific, it means preventing Chinese forces from gaining a lodgement in Taiwan — because “you’ll never kick them out if you do.” This strategic shift has profound implications for capability development. Rather than building forces optimized for deep strikes against enemy homelands, the emphasis is on systems that can credibly deny an adversary’s initial objectives. The panelists in the cost per effect panel at the Sir Richard Williams Foundation seminar on May 22, 2025. Air Vice Marshal Glen Braz emphasized that air power remains “fundamentally central to the national defense strategy.” Australia’s ability to project force quickly, deliver effects at long range, and provide options to government aren’t future aspirations — they’re current realities that need constant refinement. “We need to find smarter, faster, more agile ways to deliver air power that makes a difference at scale, at range and at speed,” Braz explained. “This isn’t just about buying platforms; it’s about building comprehensive capability through people, preparedness, and integrated systems.” The challenge is particularly acute given Australia’s strategic geography. The National Defence Strategy calls for moving resources north but infrastructure development takes time. In the interim, forces must manage risk while building credible deterrent capabilities with existing assets. Much of the conversation by the panel centered on people rather than platforms. Braz commands approximately 12,000 personnel across Air Force capabilities, and he’s acutely aware that technology alone doesn’t deliver effects. “This is a human endeavour,” he emphasized. “These humans might use tools that are increasingly uncrewed or increasingly autonomous, but it’s a human endeavour.” The Air Force is adapting by developing more flexible personnel who can operate across multiple roles while maintaining core technical proficiency. “We’re typically very specialist and very bespoke,” Braz noted, “but we need to broaden people’s aperture and use their intellect and talent in a myriad of ways.” This isn’t about lowering standards — Air Force personnel remain “incredibly proficient” in their specialist roles. Instead, it’s about accepting calculated risk in how people are employed while building resilience through cross-training and adaptability. The panel spent considerable time examining the seductive promise of cheap mass capabilities. Commercial drones costing $2,500 might seem like an obvious alternative to expensive military systems, but Bronk provided a reality check on the true costs of military-grade capabilities. “You can have a small quadcopter that costs $2,500, but it doesn’t work in icing conditions, high winds, heavy rain, and doesn’t have night-capable cameras,” Bronk argued. Make it capable of all those things, “and it’s no longer $2,500 — it’s now $50,000, and you cannot have thousands of them.” The challenge becomes even more complex for longer-range systems relevant to Indo-Pacific distances. A basic airframe for 1,000-kilometer range costs about $25,000, but adding encrypted data links ($70,000), AI-powered navigation, seekers, and warheads quickly pushes costs above $200,000 per unit. This doesn’t mean cheap systems lack value — they can impose costs on adversaries by forcing them to expend expensive interceptors. But they complement rather than replace high-end capabilities. Space capabilities are becoming more important as Australian and allied forces focus on effective ways to distribute force. As systems become more disaggregated and autonomous, they become increasingly dependent on space-based communications, navigation, and intelligence. “The more you rely on one-way systems, including long-range strike munitions,” Bronk observed, “the more you’re likely to be reliant on that space situational awareness picture.” Air Vice-Marshal John Haly, Head of Military Strategic Plans, emphasized the importance of “minimum viable capability” — systems that are “good enough on time” with the ability to be upgraded, rather than “exotic, wonderful and too late.” The panel discussed as well how to characterize the threat in relation to a realistic approach which Australia can take to the threats in its region and beyond. As Haly noted, “we shouldn’t pretend that what we’re preparing for is Australia against a great power alone and unafraid. That’s not the case.” Rather, Australian forces need to be prepared to prevail against the subset of threats likely to be directed against Australia as part of a broader conflict. This more realistic framing helps maintain confidence while acknowledging the serious nature of potential challenges. The panel’s conclusions suggest several key principles for Australian defense planning: • Integration over independence: Modern military effects require seamless coordination across domains, with space and cyber capabilities as critical enablers rather than separate domains. • People as the foundation: Advanced technology amplifies human capability but doesn’t replace the need for skilled, adaptable personnel who can operate effectively under pressure. • Strategic patience with tactical urgency: Major capability developments take time, but forces must maintain readiness and manage risk in the interim through innovation, training, and smart resource allocation. • Alliance integration: Australia’s strategic challenges are best addressed through deeper integration with allies rather than pursuing independent solutions. As the discussion concluded, Braz offered a note of measured optimism: “I am positive that our great people, well equipped and well trained, can do what the nation needs.” In the context of a significant shift in the strategic framework and constrained resources, smart choices about capability development, force structure, and strategic priorities, a cost per effect framework provides a tool for making those choices The challenge isn’t just building a military that can fight and win, but one that can deter conflict through credible capability and strategic clarity. In that mission, every dollar spent, and every person trained becomes part of a larger equation that ultimately determines whether Australia’s sovereignty can be preserved without having to test it in combat. Success depends on smart resource allocation rather than simply buying cheap or expensive — it’s about understanding what effects are needed and the most efficient ways to achieve them.

Dr Robbin Laird, Shaping a Way Ahead for the Australian Defence Force in the Context of Global Strategic Transition, 3 June 2025 Link to article (Defense.info) At the May 22, 2025 Sir Richard Williams Foundation seminar, Air Marshal Robert Chipman, Vice Chief of the Australian Defence Forces, recently outlined the nation’s evolving approach to national security in a comprehensive address. Chipman describes Australia’s security environment as “complex and deteriorating,” with the international system under strain from great power competition between China and the United States. He emphasizes that hard power has become preeminent again, with the Indo-Pacific as the epicenter of this competition. The risk of conflict is assessed as increasing, with reduced strategic warning time. The comfortable certainties of the post-Cold War era have evaporated. China’s rise and its challenge to the established international order, combined with America’s more selective engagement globally, has created what Chipman describes as a fundamentally different strategic landscape. Unlike the Cold War’s “perverse clarity” of mutually assured destruction, today’s great power competition lacks the stabilizing frameworks of arms control and non-proliferation agreements. This shift has profound implications for Australia. The Indo-Pacific has become the epicenter of great power competition, placing Australia at the geographic heart of rising tensions. The traditional buffer of distance that once provided strategic warning time has been compressed by technological advances and increasingly bold grey-zone activities by state actors. Air Marshal Chipman speaking to the Sir Richard Williams Foundation seminar on May 22, 2025. Conventional military conflict could escalate to nuclear war through what military strategists call “horizontal and vertical escalation.” This possibility demands entirely new approaches to deterrence, coalition management, and strategic decision-making. Australia’s response has been to develop what officials term a “strategy of denial.” This strategy recognizes that Australia’s critical strategic geography lies to its north, requiring the ability to maneuver simultaneously across all five operational domains: land, sea, air, space, and cyber. The strategy is defensive in nature but, as Chipman emphasizes, it cannot be implemented with a defensive mindset. Instead, it requires an active approach that embraces contest and pursues asymmetric advantages to offset the significant imbalances Australia faces in military and economic power relative to potential adversaries. Central to Australia’s evolving defence posture is the concept of asymmetric advantage – achieving outcomes disproportionate to the size of the force employed. This concept has gained renewed relevance following observations from the conflict in Ukraine, where low-cost drones have successfully engaged expensive main battle tanks, fundamentally altering traditional battlefield calculations. However, Australia’s approach to asymmetry extends far beyond simply acquiring cheaper weapons systems. The rapid pace of technological change, demonstrated by development cycles measured in weeks rather than years, demands new approaches to capability development. Australia is establishing foundations for rapid innovation and adaptation rather than attempting to stockpile capabilities subject to obsolescence. The ability to integrate military force across all operational domains, combined with all elements of national power and in concert with allies and partners, represents a key form of asymmetric advantage. This integration capability may prove as valuable as the individual systems being integrated. Australia’s acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines under the AUKUS partnership represents the largest investment in military capability in the nation’s history. These platforms will provide the range, endurance, stealth, and lethality needed to protect sea lines of communication across vast ocean distances – precisely the form of asymmetric advantage a medium power like Australia requires. Modern warfare requires simultaneous operations across land, sea, air, space, and cyber domains. As Chipman notes, air power – long considered decisive in modern warfare – is vulnerable when grounded, can be neutralized through enemy action in space and cyber domains, and requires sea control for sustained operations. This multi-domain reality creates both opportunities and challenges. While it offers multiple avenues for creating asymmetric advantages, it also increases complexity and vulnerability. Weakness in any single domain can compromise the entire force structure, making balanced investment across domains essential. The communications pathways that enable multi-domain operations also increase what military planners call the “attack surface area” – the points where adversaries can target Australian capabilities. This reality makes cyber protection and space access as critical as traditional military capabilities. Australia’s strategic transformation extends beyond military capabilities to encompass defence industry and innovation ecosystems. The Australian Strategic Capabilities Accelerator (ASCA) represents a new approach to rapid capability development, focused on getting asymmetric capabilities into the hands of service members quickly through innovation rather than traditional procurement processes. This approach requires fundamental changes to risk management and funding models. Defence must be willing to share genuine risk with industry partners while rewarding innovation and assuring returns on investment. Success demands what Chipman calls “headroom in our budget to resource innovation” matched by greater public understanding of the imperative for innovation and willingness to accept the inherent risks of investing in unproven technology. The goal extends beyond domestic innovation to building “capable, resilient, competitive and secure supply chains” that include Australian businesses while creating economies of scale through international partnerships. Co-design, co-development, co-production, and co-sustainment with allies can improve resource utilization, strengthen collective industrial capacity, and accelerate technological development. Despite emphasis on sovereign capabilities and self-reliance, Australia’s alliance relationships remain central to its security strategy. The U.S. alliance continues as the foundation of Australian defence planning, providing everything from mission data and command systems to satellite services and advanced platforms. However, the alliance is evolving. Rather than creating dependency, strengthening Australian self-reliance is seen as making the alliance more powerful for both nations. This reflects recognition that successful alliances require genuine stakes in each other’s security rather than one-sided dependency relationships. The challenge lies in balancing self-reliance with alliance integration. Australia’s “way of war” is built on foundations of U.S. cooperation, creating both asymmetric advantages and potential vulnerabilities that must be carefully managed. Traditional defence procurement processes, designed for peacetime deliberation, are proving inadequate for current strategic circumstances. Australia has implemented significant reforms to what it calls the “one defence capability system,” moving from pursuit of perfect solutions to “good enough on time” with iterative improvements. This shift represents a fundamental change in risk tolerance and capability philosophy. Rather than waiting for perfect solutions, the focus has moved to getting beneficial technology to service members as soon as it offers advantage, with improvements delivered through progressive capability upgrades. The approach includes tailored approval pathways for different project complexities and fast-track processes for immediate needs and transient opportunities. However, major platform acquisitions still require deliberate planning cycles, creating a dual-track system for different capability requirements. Looking toward the 2026 iteration of Australia’s National Defence Strategy, several principles are emerging. Australia’s security remains best served by international cooperation and effective institutions, but the reality is a more transactional world where strength and resilience take precedence. The challenge lies in maintaining a strategic culture biased toward cooperation while adapting to circumstances that increasingly reward strength. This tension will shape future capability investments, alliance relationships, and strategic posture. Australia’s defence transformation reflects broader global trends toward great power competition and technological disruption of traditional military advantages. The nation’s response – emphasizing asymmetric advantages, multi-domain integration, and innovation agility – offers insights for other middle powers navigating similar strategic transitions. The overarching theme is Australia’s need to adapt to a more dangerous strategic environment through innovative, asymmetric approaches while maintaining alliance relationships and sovereign capabilities. Featured photo: Vice Chief of the Defence Force, Air Marshal Robert Chipman AO, CSC, with Singapore’s Chief of Staff – Joint Staff, SAF Inspector-General, Chief Sustainability Officer, Brigadier-General Goh Pei Ming, lay a wreath at the Last Post Ceremony at the Australian War Memorial in Canberra. Singapore’s Chief of Staff – Joint Staff / SAF Inspector-General / Chief Sustainability Officer [Brigadier-General Goh Pei Ming], Deputy Secretary (Policy) [Brigadier-General Frederick Choo], and accompanying delegation visited Canberra from 13-15 March 2024. While in Canberra, Brigadier-General Goh Pei Ming and Brigadier-General Frederick Choo met with Australia’s Vice Chief of the Defence Force [Air Marshal Robert Chipman] and Deputy Secretary Strategy, Policy, and Industry [Mr Hugh Jeffrey], and attended the Last Post Ceremony at the Australian War Memorial.

Dr Robbin Laird, The Imperative for Cost Effectiveness in Multidomain Operations : Final Report, 22 May 2025 Link to ebook (Defense.info)

Knowledge Network Our work is independent, but we don't work alone. We engage with a number of global thinktanks, specialised media and service organisations to promote our research and to contribute to the intellectual life of those in our knowledge network. We invite you to examine and follow their work. Air and Space Power Centre The Air and Space Power Centre provides practical and effective analysis and advice on the strategic development of air and space power to the Chief of Air Force, the Royal Australian Air Force and its partners. The Williams Foundation has an extensive relationship with the Centre and we collaborate across several fronts, including the Air Power Scholars Scheme . International media partner Second Line of Defense & Defense.info is made up of globally based analysts and strategists who work closely together in thinking through the nature of the evolving strategic environment and provides regular interviews with key participants in evolving military capabilities based on global reporting. Second Line of Defense & Defense.info have a special partnership with the Williams Foundation, and has generated a regular set of special reports highlighting the various seminars over the past few years held in Canberra and which have highlighted the military transformation process. An archive of special reports by Dr Robbin Laird, Williams Foundation Fellow, can be viewed on their website here . Forums & Blogs Grounded Curiosity The Cove Defence Entrepreneurs Forum – Australia (DEF-Aus ), as well as the original US DEF and DEF-UK . Air Power Development Centre Logistics in War Over the Horizon – Multi-Domain Operations & Strategies (OTH-MDOS ) The Dead Prussian The Angry Staff Officer The Army Leader War on the Rocks Junior Tactician The Strategy Bridge Balloons to Drones Military Writers Guild Defence in Depth Wavell Room Small Wars Journal Companion organisations and publications Air Power Development Centre Australian Army Australia Defence Association Australian Strategic Policy Institute Defence Force Welfare Association Department of Defence Institute For Regional Security Royal Australian Air Force RAAF Association National Council Royal Australian Navy RSL National US Air Force Magazine

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Air Power Scholars The Air Power Scholars program is a cooperative endeavour between the Sir Richard Williams Foundation and the Air and Space Power Centre . It aims to develop a small group of Air Force Officers with the intellectual skills, theoretical knowledge and practical experience to engage credibly in the global air and space power dialogue. PhD candidates are supported by the Air and Space Power Centre and the Williams Foundation. The Williams foundation supports scholars financially with up to $20,000 per PhD candidate over the course of their research. In December 2019, GPCAPT Jarrod Pendlebury was the first to complete his PhD with the support of the program. The PhD is titled The Dawn Horizon: Constructing an Air Force Identity During Initial Officer Training in Australia, The United States and The United Kingdom . Williams Board members extend their congratulations to GPCAPT Pendlebury. Sir Richard Williams Foundation Scholars Completed PhDs GPCAPT Jarrod Pendlebury The Dawn Horizon: Constructing an Air Force Identity During Initial Officer Training in Australia, The United States and The United Kingdom . Completion December 2019, University of Sydney Abstract: Many of the arguments supporting diversity in the military focus on the instrumental benefits available to an organisation that embraces difference. Viewed through this lens, there is a risk of diversity becoming another ‘to do,’ and prioritised according to available resources. Arguing for diversity primarily from the perspective of a capability-based argument also fails to challenge the tension between a military’s combat effectiveness, and its adherence to the values and laws of the state it protects. This thesis seeks to reframe the diversity debate by arguing that a diverse military reflective of the demography of society is a fundamental requirement in a Western liberal democracy. AIRCDRE Steve Edgeley Creating A Potent Joint Force: The Practical Evolution of Inter-Service Cooperation Completion December 2021, University of Sydney Abstract: That recent changes in the operational environment have required the RAAF to focus on the application of joint effects, this change in operational focus has led to cultural and organisational changes that make it an imperative to embrace jointness. Current Scholars Squadron Leader Andrew Lloyd A Contemporary Study of Aerial Delivery in the Australian Context Expected completion date: 2025 Abstract: A first principles approach to investigate the ADF use of Aerial Delivery Equipment (ADE) has not previously been conducted. Aerial Delivery is a potent capability that is underutilised due to logistical complexities and a lack of defined mission assuredness. In particular, the use of Aerial Delivery methods involving parachutes can be cumbersome and may be unnecessarily complex after considering technical and safety risks. High cost precision airdrop capabilities have had extensive research and their emergence has yielded an expansive literature basis. Conventional airdrop using parachutes is also a well-established research area. There is, however, an opportunity to explore alternate means of Aerial Delivery to achieve the same or similar end states. To date, adopted methods to dissipate energy are limited to the use of cardboard Energy Dissipating Material (EDM). This product is optimised for a particular rate of descent and limited research exists to inform alternative methods of energy dissipation or non-parachute systems to retard the rate of descent. Planned to undertake Williams Foundations Sponsored dedicated study period at ASPC in 2023. Squadron Leader Sally-Ann Knox A new psychology of military leadership Expected completion date: December 2023, University of Queensland Abstract: Elucidating the processes by which catastrophic consequences of military operational errors are reduced and avoided, primarily by exploring the group’s ability to internalise highly reliable behaviour as part of a shared social identity that is cultivated and embedded by purposeful, military-specific identity leadership. Completed Williams Foundation Sponsored dedicated study period at ASPC in 2021 Squadron Leader Kate Yaxley Behaviour shaping and influence of cognitive swarming systems Expected completion date: 2022/23 depending university assessment timelines Abstract: An example of a naturally occurring swarm is a flock of sheep. Together, sheep work together to achieve the goal of survival, relying on high visual and aural acuity to avoid potential risks. By introducing an external agent perceived as a threat, such as a sheepdog or drone, the presence of the external agent induces behaviour changes and influences towards a known goal to the external agent, yet unknown to the flock of sheep. The influence applied by the external agent is a result of triggering a predation risk response, whereby the flock responds to the presence of the dog with behaviours that ensure survival. The purpose of this research is to more accurately reflect the behaviour shaping and influence of cognitive swarms in a simulation environment. Such agent-based models have the potential to support machine education curriculums for autonomous system development. Completed Williams Foundation Sponsored dedicated study period at ASPC in 2021 AIRCDRE Jason Begley Soft Options for a Hard Issue University of New South Wales Abstract: Assess the degree to which Air Force effectively projects soft power and whether there are viable opportunities for it to improve. MORE EXPERT ANALYSIS GPCAPT Trav Hallen The Swedish Profile: The Evolution of the Swedish Air Force in Response to Swedish Cold War Strategic Policy Expected completion date: December 2030, Deakin University/Swedish Defence University Abstract: The Swedish Air Force was the cornerstone of Sweden’s security during the Cold War. The ability to defend Swedish airspace and deny the ability of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact to operate in it was assessed as critical to the credibility of Sweden’s strategy of non-alignment. Between 1945 and 1992, the Swedish Air Force adapted to shifts in Swedish strategic policy. This included the closer integration with Sweden’s aviation industry, the fielding of innovative aircraft designs optimised for Swedish conditions, and the development of new tactics and procedures. By the end of the Cold War, Sweden had one of the most advanced and tactically innovative air forces in Europe. This research explores how this evolution unfolded and identifies the factors that enabled a small, neutral country become a world leading air power nation. Program background Photo: Department of Defence The Chief of Air Force, Air Marshal Leo Davies, AO, CSC launched the five year pilot Air Power Scholar program as part of the 2016 Air Power Conference in Canberra. The Williams Foundation awards a scholarship of up to $20,000 each year of the program to the candidate undertaking the full-time study. This payment assists scholars with expenses associated with their academic program and will contribute to consultancy fees for a program mentor. This five year pilot program will support the five selected Air Force officers to undertake PhD studies. The agreement with the Air Force enables the Foundation to formally support scholars in their further education and strengthen the level of debate on military aviation issues.