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‘Flexibility is the key to air power’ is one of the favourite clichés of the professional airman. In this post, Flight Lieutenant Jenna Higgins asks if, in light of the USMC’s recent successful proof of concept demonstration of the F-35B VSTOL, the ADF should demonstrate flexibility in reviewing the decision of whether to acquire the F-35B to operate off its newly commissioned Canberra Class LHDs. Australia has committed to buying 72 F-35A Lightning II Joint Strike Fighters. These platforms fulfil the essential role of providing a potent strike and air combat capability required to deter attempts to coerce or attack Australia and our national interests. As a strike platform, they are also expected to ‘seize the initiative, and defeat potential threats as far from Australia as possible’; a direct quote from page 94 of the 2016 Defence White Paper. The F-35A is to achieve this role with a combat radius of 550nm – not exactly a sizeable buffer. Further, this range barely covers the Indo-Pacific region; the emergent centre of global economic and strategic power. Fortunately, the Australian Defence Force (ADF) has embarked on a journey to introduce an amphibious warfare capability as part of the ADF repertoire, which may enable the ADF to extend the reach of its soon to be acquired air combat capabilities. The two Canberra Class LHD vessels, both now commissioned, are based on Spain’s Juan Carlos I, which was designed with the AV-8B Harrier STOVL (Short Takeoff/Vertical Landing) ‘jump jets’ in mind. The Canberra Class LHDs enable the ADF to, amongst other things, more readily address emergent threats in the broader Indo-Pacific region. With that said, it is well understood amongst the Defence community that the induction of these platforms is just beginning of the quest for an amphibious warfare capability. A heated discussion has previously occurred regarding the merits of the F-35B VSTOL variant and its subsequent integration to assist ADF’s future amphibious capability. However, on the back of a recent US Marine corps (USMC) exercise, it may be worth reigniting this conversation and asking: Did we get it wrong? The USMC are currently preparing for its first overseas operational deployment of the F-35 in January 2017. Given that they will be operating in our area of strategic interest, they are perhaps the best example for Australia to model an amphibious concept of operations (CONOP). But up to this point, the manner in which the USMC would operate with their new platforms in the region has been largely theoretical. However, over the period 18-20 November the USMC successfully conducted a ‘Lightning Carrier Proof of Concept Demo’. This exercise demonstrated the beginnings of an efficacious shift in CONOP which recognises the potential of enhanced connectivity and a more robust fixed-wing capability. While the USMC uses different platforms, with a combination of the F-35B and MV-22 Osprey, it is the F-35B and Carrier CONOP that holds the most telling lessons for Australia. Using this new CONOP, the USMC are able to penetrate enemy defences, deliver a force to an undefended area, and attack outwards as opposed to ‘attacking the enemy at its teeth’. Precisely what the 2016 Defence White Paper outlines as Australia’s defence strategy – protecting our shores while taking the defence away from our borders. Using the advanced connectivity of the F-35, the Carrier is no longer removed from the mission whilst the aircraft are on task. In the final phase of the exercise, the USMC demonstrated the ability for the F-35 to integrate with the Aegis combat system aboard a US Navy Cruiser in order to provide targeting data to an anti-air ballistic missile-defence weapon system on board the ship. So what does this mean for Australia? While the purchase of the F-35B variant has previously been discussed and subsequently dismissed on the grounds of cost and complexity, it is a discussion that should not be shelved completely. Yes, expense needs to be considered; however, the concept is not a flawed one. Capability costs money. And when the money is being directed towards an unknown entity or a theoretical concept it can be a tough ask. But we now have a clear intent for amphibious operations, a clear intent for the Indo-Pacific region, and a real-time framework (based in our operating area) provided by the USMC to track. Yes, modifications for the LHD would be required, and re-think of how we conduct amphibious, but perhaps the future purchase of the F-35B wouldn’t be so silly? Flight Lieutenant Jenna Higgins is a currently serving Royal Australian Air Force Air Combat Officer. The opinions expressed are hers alone and do not reflect those of the Royal Australian Air Force, the Australian Defence Force, or the Australian Government. #CanberraClass #RoyalAustralianNavy #SeaPower #AirPower #F35 #LHD

The Royal Australian Air Force, under Project AIR 7003 Phase 1, is looking to gain a competitive advantage within the region with its acquisition of 12 MQ-9B SkyGuardian Remotely Piloted Aircraft System. Trained by the United States Air Force, Warrant Officer Samuel Carson shares with us his experiences to highlight some of advanced sensor capabilities. Yet new technologies often bring with them new challenges. In this article, WOFF Carson details some of the unique challenges RPA systems bring, providing an opportunity to mitigate its impact to personnel through forearmed awareness. The General Atomics built MQ-1/9 Remotely Piloted Aircraft have been providing persistent Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance and Electronic Warfare (ISREW) and armed options for coalition war fighters since the early 2000’s. The MQ-9A Reaper, the latest operational version, excels in a force protection role; facilitating persistent effects such as Close Air Support (CAS), battle damage assessment and real-time command situational awareness. The MQ-9 crew model requires a remote pilot (RP) and Sensor Operator (SO). The SO is an integral aircrew member of the dual seat MQ-1/9 series of RPAS, operating directly alongside and in conjunction with the RP. MQ-1/9 RPA are flown remotely from Ground Control Stations (GCS) through beyond line of sight satellite links. Often the GCS and RP/ SO can be on opposite sides of the globe to the RPA operation area. This article offers a glimpse into my experience with the United States Air Force (USAF) training continuum, operations and the future of MQ-9 RPA operations for Australia. Embedded within the United States Air Force In July 2018, I completed the USAF’s Initial Qualification Training (IQT) on the MQ-9A Reaper, in New Mexico, USA. The training included; ISR theory, basic surface attack, CAS and combat search and rescue. After the successful completion of IQT, I was posted to the 42nd Attack Squadron (ATKS) in Nevada, USA. Here I gained valuable combat experience and contributed to operational mission effectiveness. The first order of business at the 42 ATKS was to progress through the Mission Qualification Training (MQT). This involved conducting training scenarios on operational flights, and qualifying in both 42 ATKS and supported task force tactics, techniques and procedures. Upon completion of MQT I joined a shift crew supporting 24/7 global operations in a 5 day on / 3 day off flying shift arrangement. Pre-mission. Shifts would begin with a mass brief, which included updates to current operations, such as flying restrictions and intelligence updates. On completion of the mass brief, focus shifted to individual crew planning delving into the mission specifics. The pilot and I would then attend an individual and tailored intelligence brief, a flying authorisation brief, then proceeding to the GCS for execution of flying activities. Pre-mission checks within the GCS included verifying l operating systems such as the; datalinks, communications, payloads and weapons. The standard weapon load out for my operating region was four AGM-114 Hellfire missile variants and either a GBU-12 or GBU-38. Onstation. While on task, the main role of the SO is to operate the Multi-spectral Targeting System (MTS). The MTS is made up of multiple cameras including; infrared, day and low light TV. I would use a combination of all camera settings in their different field of views to complete the mission, be it armed overwatch of friendly forces or Patterns Of Life surrounding a compound or village. The MTS included two laser systems, the Laser Designator/Range Finder. These systems precisely designate targets for employment of laser-guided munitions, and a laser target marker. During this posting, I flew 112 sorties totalling over 500 combat hours in support of the coalition operations. In the execution of these operations, I conducted multiple precision airstrikes, aiding in the disruption and destruction of the hostile forces networks. In addition, I supported various raids ensuring safety of coalition ground forces. This was the most fulfilling time in my career so far, albeit some of the most challenging as well . SO in future Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) RPAS capability Under AIR 7003, the RAAF has selected the MQ-9B Sky Guardian. This evolved MQ variant brings new operating concepts and opportunities through advanced sensors and fully certified systems, enabling it to operate in all environments. Armed RPAS operations bring new and unique challenges to the Australian Defence Force (ADF), requiring adaptations of CONOPS and support mechanisms. The Deployed In Garrison (DIG) concept is one such change which will require significant consideration. The concept of personnel conducting enduring combat operations from a fixed home location is something the ADF has little experience in. Such scenarios are known to be highly stressful, especially when considering that crews may possibly employ weapons followed closely by family time at home. This is unique to the DIG concept and is generally not something that deployed in garrison members have had to navigate on a daily basis. Support to members operating in a DIG concept will be key to the success of RPAS in the future ADF. The privilege of being a SO and having the ability to change the outcome of a battle or saving coalition personnel lives, will make this an experience I will take forward with me for the rest of my career. WOFF Samuel Carson joined the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) in 2006 as an Avionics Technician. After remustering in 2012 to Airborne Electronics Analyst (AEA), he flew operational missions on the AP-3C Orion (900 hrs) and later on the E-7A Wedgetail (1400 hrs). In 2018 WOFF Carson was selected to embed with the United States Air Force (USAF) MQ-9A Reaper program where he completed an operational flying tour in a USAF MQ-9A Reaper squadron (550hrs), as a Sensor Operator. He subsequently trained as a Sensor Instructor at a USAF MQ-9A Reaper training squadron (200hrs). He is now using his knowledge and experience as a Staff Officer in Air Force Headquarters, to inform the Project Air 7003 acquisition of the MQ-9B SkyGuardian for Australia. He aims to join the first crews to operate the Australian MQ-9B Sky Guardian as a Sensor Operator. He is married to an ex-serving member and has four children.

What does it truly mean to ‘go pro’? Warrant Officer David Turnbull dives into the concept of being a professional within Air Force and all that this title entails. Carrying the mantle of professional is no longer for the commissioned officer, but includes the specialised and expert enlisted aviator. WOFF Turnbull illustrates how the application of air and space power rests on every member understanding and critically assessing strategy. This requirement demands investment in ourselves and our professionalism to push the intellectual edge which underpins our competitive advantage. Pro-surfer, pro-footballer, pro-athlete: the term ‘pro’ is widely used in the sporting world, where ‘going pro’ means you have made it in your chosen field of competition. ‘Pro’ of course is the abbreviation of ‘professional’. It describes occupations such as nurse and lawyer who are regarded as “disciplined …individuals who adhere to ethical standards, and who hold themselves out as, and are accepted by the public as possessing special knowledge and abilities in a widely recognised body of learning derived from research, education, and training at a high level, and who are prepared to apply this knowledge and exercise these skills in the interest of others.” To distil this definition further; to be professional is essentially a combination of expert knowledge, skills, trustworthiness, and altruism found in those who commit themselves to a life of service to others. These terms have clear parallels with the ADF values of Service, Courage, Respect, Integrity and Excellence. The profession of arms General Sir John Hackett describes “the profession of arms” in his 1962 series of lectures, and in a contemporary context can be defined as the ordered, lawful application of military force pursuant to Government direction, with members having exclusive responsibility for applying military force in pursuit of national interests.[1] Represented by the wearing of a distinct uniform, Air Force aviators assume membership of the profession of arms, and accept the unlimited liability[2]—the lawful ordering into harm’s way that could lead to the loss of their life—that comes with the state-sanctioned application of violence to achieve political aims. But does such membership automatically make enlisted aviators professional, or is there something more to it? In The Soldier and the State, Samuel Huntington argues that only officers could be considered professionals as “enlisted personnel have neither the intellectual skills nor the professional responsibility of the officer. Their vocation is a trade not a profession.”[3] For Huntington, officers were solely concerned with the management of violence whereas enlisted personnel focused on the application of violence.[4] The former required intellect and education, the latter required skill and training. This belief has a long history, stretching from feudal soldiering through to the formation of national standing armies and the regularisation of military service in the 19th century. Underpinning this belief was that “command in war should be reserved to those whose birth and upbringing ensured that they possessed the necessary intuitive capacity.”[5] Frederick the Great was convinced that “only aristocrats were sufficiently endowed with honour, courage and loyalty to make good officers,” and Englishman Henry Lloyd in the 18th century went so far to declare that command in war was the “product of natural genius,”[6] with the belief that this genius was only found in the upper-echelon of society. At the epoch of this thinking, the Duke of Wellington was determined to defend his country with “officers drawn exclusively from its top levels and a body of soldiery drawn entirely from its lowest.”[7] While Huntington’s assertion may have held true in feudal times and remained valid through to the mid-20th Century, today's operational environment is more complex. Such complexity requires all personnel who wear a uniform—particularly enlisted aviators—to fundamentally understand the nature and character of warfare that extends far beyond the mere application of violence. Further differentiating the profession of arms from other professions is its collective nature rather than an associational one. In collective professions, no individual—or even a subgroup of individuals—can accomplish the ends sought; it is the collective that acts together to realise an outcome. Accordingly, a higher degree of specialisation and organisation is required for collective professions to align and coordinate outputs that achieve results. The profession of arms requires the knowledge, skills, and expertise of every member to generate and apply military force in pursuit of national interests—not just a handful of individuals at the pointy end of the organisation. This is commonly known as an intellectual edge and it underpins “competitive advantage for future war and strategic competition.”[8] Going pro! Generating an intellectual edge in enlisted aviators So, what does Huntington’s theory mean for enlisted aviators in today’s day and age? Put simply, if you have never regarded yourself as a professional within Air Force, it’s time to get on board and go pro! “Attaining an intellectual edge requires more than just ticking progressive boxes of formal education, it calls for a lifelong curiosity to critically observe and absorb experience.” Essentially, every enlisted aviator is a member of the profession of arms, and with that membership comes the responsibility that applies to all professionals: the pursuit of life-long education and learning that underpins a high level of professional mastery and currency. In his article The Intellectual Edge: A Collective Effect, Christopher Wooding describes the intellectual edge as “a critical step to being prepared for the future,” driven by the collective effects of curiosity, understanding, and education. Wooding rightly argues that attaining an intellectual edge “demands fostering behaviours that support curiosity, understanding, and learning within individuals and organisations through formal and informal education to produce a collective effect from the sum of intellectual efforts within an organisation.” ‘But I’m just a [insert rank/mustering]—what does this have to do with me?!?’ In a word, everything. It’s about being part of a collective profession. The application of air and space power is predicated on all enlisted aviators having a sound understanding of—and the confidence to critically appraise and contest—where we are going (the Air Force strategy).[2] This includes where organisational efficiencies lie; the challenges ahead; and the strengths and weaknesses that each Mustering/Force Element/etc across the organisation brings to the mission. Essentially, without every enlisted aviator understanding and playing their part as a collective, Air Force cannot achieve an intellectual edge and generate the effects we are tasked to deliver. As Cate Carter succinctly states in The Intellectual Edge: “Our professional obligation to advance the institution of defence requires [every] voice; … we are too small an organisation not to include everyone.” In Duty with Honour,[9] military professionalism is characterised by four main attributes: responsibility, identity, expertise, and professional ideology. These attributes are incorporated into the broader concept of military ethos which is described as the heart of the military profession and operational effectiveness, and which acts as the centre of gravity for the military profession and establishes an ethical framework for the professional conduct of military operations. Within this construct, members demonstrate their professionalism by: embracing the military ethos; achieving and maintaining the requirements for employment in an occupation and maintaining this qualification; pursuing the highest standards of the required expertise; and understanding, accepting, and fulfilling all the commitments and responsibilities inherent in the profession of arms. What this means for enlisted aviators as members of the profession of arms is twofold. First, we all need to see ourselves and our workmates as air and space power professionals in the true sense of the word. This means embracing both individual and collective professional mastery (not just technical mastery) that is derived from consuming, contesting, and contributing to air and space power discourse. Second, we all need to treat attaining an intellectual edge (both individually and organisationally) as what Carter describes as a specialist, serious and long-term pursuit; and continually update our air and space power knowledge and expertise in order to maintain professional currency. Conclusion Now that you’re pro, it’s time to invest in yourself and commit to maintaining the highest standards of professionalism that wearing the Air Force uniform demands. Fundamentally, the profession of arms—as a collective profession—requires the knowledge, skills, and expertise of every enlisted aviator in order to attain an intellectual edge. Our profession is steeped in our history, heritage and tradition; sustained through leadership, policies and programs, and professional development; and underpinned by effective, credible self-regulation from each and every one of us. Understanding this takes time and effort; however, it is a necessary endeavour for every enlisted aviator as an Air Force professional. So there you go: welcome to the Air Force profession of arms! It is great to have you on board and playing your collective part in driving an intellectual edge that underpins the generation, projection, and sustainment of air and space power. Warrant Officer David Turnbull is an Air Force Armament Technician and is the Air and Space Power Centre’s Senior Enlisted Leader. David’s focus is the professional development and education of Air Force personnel; particularly enlisted aviators. [1] Canadian Forces Leadership, Institute, Canada, and Defence Department of National. Duty with Honour : The Profession of Arms in Canada. [Ottawa]: National Defence, 2003. p. 4. [2] ibid. p. 26. [3] Huntington, Samuel P. The Soldier and the State: the Theory and Politics of Civil–Military Relations. Harvard University Press, 1957. [4] Belanger, Necole. "Being a Member of the Profession of Arms: An RCAF Chief Warrant Officer’s Perspective." Royal Canadian Air Force Journal 7, no. 1 (2018), p. 7. [5] Hackett, John Sir. The Profession of Arms / Sir John Hackett. London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1983, p. 19. [6] ibid [7] ibid p. 24. [8] Ryan, Mick. "The Intellectual Edge: A Competitive Advantage for Future War and Strategic Competition." Joint Force Quarterly 96 1st Quarter (2020), p. 6. [9] Canadian Forces Leadership, Institute, Canada, and Defence Department of National. Duty with Honour : The Profession of Arms in Canada. [Ottawa]: National Defence, 2003.

Submissions due 1 October 2021 Following this week’s celebration of the Royal Australian Air Force’s 100 years of service, we at The Central Blue are turning our attention to the next 100 years. It’s a tall order with a wide scope of possibilities that are perhaps more the domain of science fiction. Undoubtedly the next century to 2121 will present all sorts of possibilities, threats and norms: Mobile phones replaced with brain and cornea implants; military systems 3D printed at scale; Antarctica a federated State; nuclear fusion powering corporate colonies on the Moon. The RAAF as part of the Joint Force will need to adapt and evolve with possible futures. It’s a topic the team feels is ripe for creative thinking about the future. Whether considering new warfighting concepts, to ideas about improving organisational design, we’re encouraging wide and divergent thinking – perhaps even an opportunity to indulge in some informed sci-fi writing! Some themes on which contributors may wish to write might include: What will the RAAF look like in 2121? What lessons from the past 100 years can we apply to the next 100? How do we build and grow people for the future Force? How can the miniaturization of nuclear fusion be best exploited? How would the RAAF respond to a space-borne aggressor? How does the RAAF deal with ‘first contact’? How does the Air Force continue to evolve itself to embed technical R&D, operational creativity and organisational agility deeper into its DNA? What will our population base be able to support? Will there be a need for an atmospheric flying force? How does the Air Force work with the defence industry of the future – will it be traditional primes, or an ever-changing landscape of technology new starts? Will there be an Air Force in 2121? Will it be subsumed into one military force organisation? How does the Air Force become both a fighting and an intellectual force? Will there be regional force groups across nations and partners? What will the legal framework for future conflict look like? What will be more integrated in the military-civil dimension? What will be more distinctive? Air Force, or Grey Force? How does the capability lifecycle look in 2121? How does the Air Force manage administrative, compliance and resource allocation in a new way? We hope these suggestions provide some food for thought and prompt some discussion. We would love to hear your ideas on what issues should be explored as part of the #AirForce2121 series. The #AirForce2121 series will also form the basis for the 2021 Dr Alan Stephens Air Power Literary Prize. In partnership with The Central Blue, The Williams Foundation will award a A$500 prize for the best essay or article discussing the author's perspectives on #AirForce2121. The winning essay or article will be announced on The Williams Foundation website in late 2021. Refer to the Submission Guidelines for the preparation and submission of articles to The Central Blue. If you think you have a question or an idea that would add to the #AirForce2121 discussion, or know someone who might, contact us at thecentralblue@gmail.com

The Challenge of Building Effective Deterrent Forces Dr Robbin Laird 19 September 2021 In my interview with Lt. General Rudder, the Commander, U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Pacific (COMMARFORPAC), he clearly outlined the way ahead for the Marines in the Pacific and identified a number of challenges to be faced and met to shape that way ahead. During my visit to MARFORPAC in August 2021, I had a chance to discuss those challenges with a number of staff members in the command. One of those challenges is working effectively with allies and partners in shaping an effective deterrent strategy and ensuring that coherent warfighting capabilities can be leveraged in times of crisis. I had a chance to discuss the partnering challenges with the MARFORPAC team responsible for working those challenges. I met with Mr. Rich Hill, G-5 International Affairs Branch Head, Maj Zach Ota, G-5 NE Asia Desk Officer, Maj Dylan Buck, NE Asia Desk Officer, Mr. Justin Goldman, TSC Plans Specialist and Mr. Scot Hasskew, TSC plans Specialist. This is an impressive team and we had a wide ranging discussion of allied and partnering issues in the region. Because of my engagement with the Australians as a Research Fellow with the Williams Foundation, and because the Marine Corps Rotational Force-Darwin had just been set up when I was last visiting MARFORPAC in 2014, we discussed the Australian relationship at length. But we also discussed the tapestry of change in the Indo-Pacific as the Chinese reached out with both their economic and military power deep into the Indo-Pacific as well. The team articulated a key point underlying the Marine Corps approach in the Indo-Pacific. They are focused on working with allies and partners from the standpoint of crafting approaches to operations and not just taking a U.S. built template and incorporating allies into that template. As one participant put it: “We use our training exercises to experiment with what particular allies or partners wish to do, and to work through how we can build that into an effective coalition warfighting capability.” With the concern about what is referred to as “gray zone operations” by adversaries, deterrence delivered through interactive training throughout the region is a key focus of USMC activity in the region. Training is a weapon system, and no more so than in shaping the ecosystem for combat operations in the Indo-Pacific through training with partners and allies. A key point which emerged from the conversation was how training as a weapon system actually shaped joint coalition warfighting capability. The argument went like this: The Marines are training with partners and allies throughout the Indo-Pacific and through these efforts are shaping distributed survivable and agile network of training areas with partners and allies. This, in essence, creates combined joint task forces of varying sizes and varying locations that are scalable and agile. And by exercising through the various training events, one is creating a deterrent effect. By working throughout the entire geographical areas of the Indo-Pacific, the Marines are able to operate from multiple vectors, which is a core strategic focus of the Marines in the Indo-Pacific today. A key element of innovation in the Indo-Pacific is working through a way ahead for coalition amphibious operations, from ships to the shore, from the shore to the sea and shaping distributed and flexible combat clusters throughout the region. We discussed how ARG-MEUs coming from CENTCOM through the Indo-Pacific both on the way and on the return have been part of the training regimes. But clearly, a renewed emphasis on building amphibious task force capabilities in the Indo-Pacific is required going forward, but not simply in terms of the U.S. Navy and the USMC but broadening the efforts to shape coalition wide amphibious task force capabilities. We spent much of the time discussing the Australian relationship with the USMC. In my view, there is a significant evolution of Australian strategy underway and how that evolution crosscuts with how the Marines work their own relationship in the Pacific can provide a powerful stimulus for shaping effective deterrent forces in the region. (I wrote this prior to the announcement of the Royal Australian Navy’s nuclear submarine force which clearly underscores this point!) In part it is about the evolution of MRF-D in the future. How do the Aussies and MRF-D expand how they work together and with what focus? If the Australians focus significant attention on shaping distributed but integrated forces from Western Australia to their first island chain (the Solomon Islands), that area of operation which encompasses significant interaction with the partners in the region, provides a very innovative and significant area in which the Marines can themselves work their cross-cutting innovations. For example, bringing the newly formed Marine Littoral Regiment into an area of operations from Western Australia to the Solomon Islands and building out relationships with the Australian Army as that force rethinks its role in the region would drive significant cross-cutting operational changes important for both the Marines more widely in the Pacific and the Australians in reshaping their own defense capabilities. I introduced another idea which we discussed but I am not holding the team responsible for my own conclusions. There clearly needs to be an area to hold regular coalition amphibious task force training. This is no longer limited to operating as a greyhound bus delivery of capability ashore, the amphibious task forces of today are radically different and more capable in working the full spectrum of operations. It might make sense for the Aussies to sponsor an annual amphibious task force training exercise. It would be bilateral at its core but of course, India, Japan, South Korea, and others who have capability to be tested in the 21st century concepts of operations for an amphioxus task force could engage in this ongoing combat learning and innovation effort. The Marines face a challenge with regard to allies and partners and training which should be recognized as well. The Marines have built an integrated force capability which can deliver Marine Corps combat capability where needed. If the Marines go down a path of redesigning their force only to fit uniquely into a U.S. Naval joint force integration package via a hyper-specialization focus, they become less useful to the kind of force integration which allies, and partners are engaging in to deal with the current and evolving Indo-Pacific defense threats. But it is clear: the USMC in the Indo-Pacific will be most effective when it can integrate effectively with partners and allies throughout the entire gamut of operations from gray zone to higher levels of conflict. Featured Photo: Soldiers of 5th Battalion, The Royal Australian Regiment embark a US Marine Corps MV-22B Osprey for an Air Mobile Operations during Exercise Koolendong 2021. Credit:Australian Department of Defence. August 20, 2021. Link to article: Allies, Partners and Marines in the Indo-Pacific: The Challenge of Building Effective Deterrent Forces (SLDinfo.com)

In this latest instalment of our #AirForce2121 series, we move from the sci-fi-esque notion of future AI-enabled capabilities and turn to rethink the role of a key Air Force function: Test & Evaluation. In this reflective piece, Ben Luther considers what the T&E field of the future may very well have to contend with, and asks the question: are the approaches based in 1950s thinking - that generates levels of certainty - fit-for-purpose over the next century? I didn’t notice the change. I couldn’t point to the time or place when it happened. But I know what our systems were like, and I can recognise them now. I just don’t know when they changed. Yet it happened quickly. Systems even co-opted our language. Initially they were just integrated, but then integrated moved up a level to slip federated in under it. Complicated and complex were synonyms and now they are distinct. It’s not a bad thing, but now they are different. The change has been both insidious and too fast, challenging the language we use to express a common understanding. Our systems have changed from being discrete tools, to being integrated into our workplaces – extending into our lives. Academics have led the charge, helping us grapple with the concept of machines doing things for us that we cannot do ourselves. Rasmussen (1997) noted the ability of data technologies to create complexity, identifying that complex systems have emergent functions that are not from any component part. Sterman (2000) described dynamic changes in a machine creating more complexity than merely more combinations, while Snowden & Boone (2008) differentiated clear from complicated, complex and chaos. But it was Leveson (2012) who delivered the clanging truth that genuinely complex systems border on the intellectually unmanageable. Now we have researchers using prosthesis (Boy, 2014) as an adjective to differentiate from tool when a system extends capability beyond what was possible for unaugmented humans. Our systems have changed, crossing a line that I cannot draw. They were tools, but now they can do things that we didn’t intend. What hasn’t kept pace are our assurance practices. Exactly because our systems can do things that we didn’t intend, we need assurance of what they can. For Australia’s numerically small Air Force, assurance serves to confirm military capability against expectations since there are no squadrons of aircraft in reserve. For a small force at the end of supply chains, assurance ensures systems are supportable and available in our environment. Assurance is the unique differentiator for our small force, the certainty that allows us to forgo the reassurance of a larger force of just-in-case options; the check of quality that allows us to avoid pursuing quantity. That assurance of military capability has been provided through the test and evaluation process for decades; a product of the 1950’s evolution of Systems Engineering. But 1950’s test and evaluation is not keeping pace. The use of waterfalls and spirals to accelerate the Systems Engineering V-process were 1990’s attempts to bring capability to bear faster in the face of test and evaluation being bogged down in complicated systems. Testing all the combinations of system modes in each environment takes a while, but at least we had an end point when each possible combination was identified. But the increasing level of complication didn’t stop, and Systems Engineering added Agile development methodologies to speed up the evolution even more. Agile development methodologies challenge the ability of test and evaluation (T&E) practices to deliver assurance of military capability in operationally relevant acquisition timeframes. The challenge is two-fold: test and evaluation takes time, time that isn’t available in the development cycle before the system is obsolete. To that, add the second element: systems have achieved complexity, defined as exhibiting emergent properties. They are no longer the sum of their parts – they are more. This conflicts with the decomposition premise of traditional T&E – that a complicated system can be broken down into constituent parts so that capabilities can be tested and evaluated individually to support an operational decision. Yet, breaking down a complex system occludes the emergent properties since they do not reside in any sub-component. Implementing traditional T&E upon a truly complex system becomes an exercise in brute force that is ultimately futile; enacted with compromises and an exponentially increasing work and time burden. Behind the concept of assurance lies the question of risk management, with assurance practices being used to reduce risk that would require acceptance. Prior practice in the Australian Defence space, particularly aviation, was to adopt a conservative approach enacted through airworthiness regulations and implemented with a good deal of assurance activity, of which test and evaluation was the graduation requirement. This balance of assurance and risk acceptance has been undertaken in an environment where military technologies were unique, but this is also changing. Civil technologies have evolved and their development processes have diverged from the military practices that were the benchmark. Civil technologies now present desirable capability, and civil development practices operate on a faster cycle that is enviable. But there is an acute difference: civil development paths are tolerant of risk transfer from the developer to the operator, though arguably are also ignorant of that transfer (Tesla’s Autopilot function being the poster-child for public beta testing). Beta versions, Agile development, and other similar contemporary development practices all encapsulate a risk transfer that wasn’t part of the originally envisaged assurance provided by test and evaluation on a complicated system. Pursuit of new development processes on new technologies might be desirable, but inherent in those technologies and processes are emergent functions and different risk acceptance profiles. They are always there, inseparable from the package, even if unnoticed. Military T&E has stood as the vanguard against risk transfer from developer to operator for decades. But its traditional practices are ineffective against the rise of complex systems that inherently obscure their emergent attributes when decomposed. T&E is morphing although its final form is not yet known. The USAF Test Pilot School, the high-church of T&E for half a century, has begun its journey to train Systems Thinking Professionals rather than Flight Testers to answer the challenge laid down by true complexity and rapid development cycles with variable levels of risk acceptance (Montes, 2020). While the shortcomings of traditional T&E are apparent and the path to advanced T&E is not yet certain, initial steps toward a capability remain within the systems engineering domain. Seeking assurance of capability is an integral part of our small-force Air Force, a valuable cultural norm that is worth retaining. Our path to Air Force 2121 will need a solution to the assurance problem because complex systems are needed, but current military T&E practice is severely constrained by complexity. We will look to model-based systems engineering (MBSE) to enable digital twins, using validated simulation environments, statistical analyses, and big data approaches. But however much we want them to, equipment manufacturers are not going to sign up to contracts to deliver complex systems using civilian development cycles.; especially those contracts with provision for capability assurance in the Australian environment. The overlay of civil development practice with conservative, military risk acceptance thresholds is irreconcilable. Faced with the prospect of moving away from assurance, to take a chance with capability while it evolves through practical experience (following civil practice), Air Force 2121 will keep assurance by adopting a new approach to T&E. Retaining assurance will necessitate a new approach to T&E that uses digital models, maths, and matrices rather than Excel and DOORS. We will learn to be comfortable with a level of uncertainty rather than making a subjective guess and labelling it probability when we really don’t know the denominator. We’ll become comfortable with bounded knowledge of what we don’t know, rather than an illusion of certainty generated by 1950’s T&E unsuited to 2121 systems. Ben Luther: A graduate of the School of Air Navigation, Ben flew with Crew 4 at 10SQN, before converting to the AP-3C as the Crew 3 TACCO. Later selected for flight test training, Ben undertook military flight test programs with ARDU and a posting to Airbus with DMO for the KC-30 development. While serving as the Senior Flight Test Systems Specialist and Flight Test Safety Officer at ARDU, Ben was recruited to Gulfstream in the wake of the G650 flight test accident. After leading flight test teams to complete civil certification in the G500 and G600 programs, Ben recently returned to Australia and is employed in Advanced T&E concepts at Nova Systems. He is a PhD candidate undertaking research into complex socio-technical system risk at the University of Adelaide. Bibliography Boy, G.A. (2014). Dealing with the unexpected. Risk Management in Life-Critical Systems. Ed. Millot, P. Wiley& Sons Inc. London, England. Leveson, N. (2012). Engineering a safer world: systems thinking applied to safety. The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts. Montes, D.R., Hill, T.D., Cookson, J.L. & Cannon, G.E. (2018). The Evolution of the USAF Test Pilot School Education Paradigm toward a Systems-Engineering Foundation. AAIA Aviation, Flight Test Conference, 25-29 June 2018, Atlanta, Georgia. American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Reston, Virginia. Rasmussen, J. (1997). Risk management in a dynamic society: a modelling problem. Safety science, vol. 27, no. 2, pp. 183-213. Snowden, D.J. & Boone, M.E. (2007). A Leader’s Framework for Decision Making. Harvard Business Review, November 2007. Sterman, J. (2000). Business dynamics: systems thinking and modelling for a complex world. Irwin/McGraw-Hill, Boston, Massachusetts.

Pierre Tran 17 September 2021 Paris – France heaped bitter resentment on Canberra’s axing an industrial partnership to build 12 attack submarines for the Australian navy, while opting to order American-designed boats as part of a strategic alliance with the U.S. and the UK. The French foreign and defense ministers filled on Sept. 16 the airwaves with anger in response to a joint announcement the night before by Australia, the UK and the US of their alliance, dubbed AUKUS. Under that trilateral agreement, the U.S. will release highly sensitive technology to allow Australia to build nuclear-powered submarines of American design, with support from the UK. The U.S. has only ever granted Britain privileged access to that know-how. “I am angry — this is not done between allies,” foreign minister Jean-Yves Le Drian said on franceinfo radio. “This is a stab in the back. This unilateral, brutal, unpredictable decision looks a lot like what Mr Trump used to do.” France had built a relationship of trust with Australia, he said. “This confidence has been betrayed,” he said, adding that he felt “a lot of bitterness.” Le Drian was defense minister when the French shipbuilder Naval Group won in 2016 a three-way competition with Germany and Japan to build a diesel-electric version of the French nuclear-powered Barracuda submarine for the Australian navy. That 50-year deal was estimated to be then worth €30 billion ($35 billion) and was hailed as “deal of the century” for France and Naval Group. The Australian switch away from building the French-designed Barracuda Shortfin boat was “serious,” and “very bad news for respecting one’s word,” armed forces minister Florence Parly said on RTL radio. The government would look at limiting any financial hit on Naval Group, she said, and did not rule out a claim for compensation against Australia. That Australian realignment caught Naval Group by surprise as the company had been expecting to sign a contract for the basic design stage in the next few days, under an imposed deadline for a signing in September. That two-year contract was reported to be worth €1.4 billion and opened the way for a detailed design deal. Naval Group had completed the preliminary design. The Australian media had long criticized the company for being behind schedule and pushing the cost higher. Naval Group had pledged to meet an Australian condition of 60 percent of local content in the future submarine program and agree to transfer technology. French operations in the Indo-Pacific France has invested heavily in forging close operational and industrial ties with Australia, seen as a key ally in the Indo-Pacific region. The French air force flew in January-February under the Skyros exercise four Rafale fighter jets, two A400M transport turboprops and an A330 multirole tanker transport jet to Australia. That Skyros exercise was a step toward the target of flying in two years time 20 Rafales and 10 A330 MRTTs over 20,000 km to the other side of the world in 48 hours. As part of that power projection into the Indo-Pacific, the French navy sailed the Emeraude nuclear-powered attack submarine, supported by the Seine fleet auxiliary ship, from France in September 2020 to dock at Perth, Western Australia, on November 9. The French boat took part in the Foxfish exercise with the Australian navy. The Emeraude sailed on to the Guam US naval base and sailed in an Aswex anti-submarine warfare exercise with a US frigate and helicopter, and a Japanese helicopter carrier, the July edition of French navy Col Bleu service magazine said. While France appears to remain committed to building its presence in the Indo-Pacific, ties with Australia and the U.S. look like they are hitting a low. “This decision is contrary to the letter and spirit of the cooperation which existed between France and Australia, founded on a relationship of political confidence as well as development of a high level defense industrial and technology base in Australia,” Le Drian and Parly said in a Sept. 16 joint statement “The American choice, which leads to Australia setting aside an ally and European partner such as France from a structural partnership, at a time when we are facing unprecedented challenges in the Indo-Pacific region…marks a lack of coherence that France can only take note and regret,” the ministerial statement said. Naval Group takes hit “This is a major disappointment for Naval Group,” the company said in a statement, adding that over the last five years the company and its partners had “given their best” and “delivered on all its commitments” in France and Australia. Naval Group will sit down with the Australian authorities to consider the effect the policy switch will have. “The analysis of the consequences of this sovereign Australian decision will be conducted with the Commonwealth of Australia in the coming days,” the company said. Thales, which is a supplier of subsystems to Lockheed Martin and holds 35 percent of Naval Group, said there was no “material impact” on its earnings. The orders from Lockheed Martin were less than €30 million, or less than 0.1 percent of the order book of €34.6 billion, the electronics company said. The stake in Naval Group contributed €22 million in 2020 earnings, or two percent of total earnings. But in 2016, Thales had expected its share of the Australian submarine program to bring in some €1 billion, with an estimated €100 million per boat based on prospective sales of sonar and electronic warfare systems. The Australian decision will have little effect in the short term for Naval Group, as the order book was fairly full with work on the Barracuda nuclear attack submarine and frigate for defense and intervention (FDI), and there were studies for the French next generation aircraft carrier and nuclear ballistic missile submarine, said Jean-Pierre Maulny, deputy director of Institut des Relations Internationales et Stratégiques, a think tank. But the company needs to boost exports, which will cut dependence on domestic orders and boost its order book for the medium term, he said. Greece is looking to order frigates, while the Netherlands is holding a competition for submarines. On Greece, France has pitched four FDI frigates, with the first to be built in France and three in Greece, modernization of the present Greek Meko frigates, and local shipbuilding. There has been an offer of a “gap filler,” with supply of two second hand French frigates, but that appears to be off the cards as the French navy needs all its warships, a defense official has said. “The U.S. is an ally and also a competitor,” Maulny said. The U.S. and UK pursue strategic interests, though it would have been courteous for the U.S. to give early notice to France. London Seeks to Calm Waters Across the Channel, the UK has sought to play down tension with France. “As the prime minister set out in the house, we have and continue to have a very close relationship with France,” a spokesman for the prime minister, Boris Johnson, told the Downing Street lobby, the Guardian daily reported. “We have longstanding security and defense relationships, as exemplified by the Lancaster House treaties and as exemplified by our combined joint expeditionary force.” The 2010 Lancaster House treaty maintains existing cooperative industrial programs but has failed to generate new arms projects for British and French industry, former British ambassador Peter Ricketts has pointed out. A senior French navy officer has previously said the 1998 St Malo bilateral agreement between France and the UK created a structure for close operational ties between the two navies. It remains to be seen whether that closeness will be backed by French political will. For the UK, building the Astute class of nuclear-powered attack submarines for the Royal Navy was only made possible with U.S .help in technology transfer and engineering skills, media reports have said. The UK’s membership of the AUKUS trilateral alliance means “Global Britain with the Americans,” Maulny said. Britain needs to negotiate a trade treaty with the U.S., having left the European Union and cast off the EU trade agreement with Washington which covers the 27 EU member states. The U.S. working an Australian submarine deal from France follows a widely held perception that president Joe Biden influenced Switzerland’s pick of the F-35 in a closely fought fighter competition. Meanwhile, British sources told the Guardian daily the Australians opened talks about the nuclear power deal in March. Australian prime minister Scott Morrison came to Paris in June, and his talks with Macron included French and Australian engagement in the Indo-Pacific and work on the future submarine program. The sinking of that Australian Barracuda submarine program has prompted France to raise the banner for European strategic autonomy. “The regrettable decision which has just been announced on the FSP program can only strengthen the need to raise loud and clear the question of European strategic autonomy,” the French ministers said. “There is no other credible way to protect our interest and our values in the world, including the Indo-Pacific.” Macron takes up in January the rotating six month presidency of the European Union. It remains to be seen what the German elections will deliver and whether Macron can rely on political support from Berlin in his drive for a stronger European arms industrial base and operational capability. Featured Photo: France’s Defense minister Jean-Yves Le Drien and Australia’s then-PM Malcolm Turnbull (center right and center left) inspecting the submarine model in 2016. Link to article: Australia Changes its Submarine Acquisition Path: French Reactions (SLDinfo.com)

In this post Wing Commander Jason Begley asks whether the Air Force is fostering the Operator-Intellectuals it needs to meet the challenge of a fifth-generation force and explores some of the challenges to the Air Force valuing thinking about thinking as much as it values thinking about technology. During the 2016 Air Power Conference, Dr Paula Thornhill called on the Air Force to generate warrior-scholars to lead it into the future. A balance between operator and intellectual, these polymaths would be the key developers of the innovative concepts required to realise Plan Jericho. While Dr Thornhill was applauded at the time, is the Air Force meeting her challenge to generate an Operator-Intellectual cadre? Perhaps first we should ask whether the Air Force understands what this Operator-Intellectual is. Possibly we have confused the ‘intellectual’ element with the ‘Devil’s Advocate’ who dons a black hat to ‘test’ our plans. As Micah Zenko observes in Red Team, the Devil’s Advocate is often more ineffective than intellectual – they rarely challenge core assumptions of a plan, let alone second or third order effects. Their testing is more often advocacy for the plan, as their superficial approach is only a token that identifies minor improvements (‘low-hanging fruit’) not fundamental flaws. Meanwhile, our confidence in this ‘tested’ plan can become disproportionately increased and often tragically misplaced. The recently fashionable ‘Disruptive Thinker’ offers a little more utility that the Devil’s Advocate, despite going into greater detail and assessing the validity of core assumptions. This approach’s key limitation is its focus on critical analysis but not identification, exploration and exploitation of opportunities. David Deptula: the most influential airminded Operator-Intellectual of recent times? [Image credit: public domain] The Operator-Intellectual can be distinguished by four key traits. First, they are constructive thinkers akin to soldier-scholars for whom their most powerful tool is not their weapon but their mind. They not only critically analyse and validate our assumptions and plans, but aim also to optimise these as well as propose options not previously considered. Their intellect and education (whether formal or simply through being well read) allows them to anticipate future changes, from the likely to the black swan, and to develop plans to adapt to and exploit the opportunities these changes present rather than waiting to respond. Second, they are masters of their trade. Technology is critical to the Air Force; it allows us to defy gravity and to utilise, exploit and, very soon, dominate the electromagnetic spectrum. Given an increasingly complex environment and the pace of technological change, we require genuine thinkers to lead the evolution of tactics, techniques, and procedures – if they remain static or we simply follow our partners, these enablers may swiftly become a limitation. This requires the Operator-Intellectual to blend conceptual thinking with technical competence and professional credibility to translate their ideas into practical uses. To that end, the third trait of the Operator-Intellectual is their ability to communicate effectively. Their core business is situated where the leading edges of strategic and operational thought and technology merge, so they must be able to articulate their proposals in terms that can reach audiences comprising line operators, technophiles, senior leadership and our political masters. The final requirement of the Operator-Intellectual, and arguably the most critical, is the moral courage to stare down cultural inertia despite the potential implications to their career. Militaries have long demonstrated affinity bias and cognitive dissonance, and their entrenched cultural norms have often led to tragic results. This recent post From the Green Notebook coupled with the experiences of Liddell-Hart, Tukhachevsky, Hobart and Warden highlight the anti-intellectual tendencies of military organisations and the consequences too often enjoyed by the innovators and reformists who challenged existing cultural paradigms, regardless of the success of their ideas. Presenters at the second Sir James Rowland Seminar, 05 April 2017 [Image credit: UNSW Canberra – Australian Centre for the Study of Armed Conflict and Society] So, returning to our original question, is the Air Force developing a cadre of Operator-Intellectuals? The large attendance at the 2016 Air Power Conference and the launch of the Air Force Strategy in February 2017 suggests a healthy outlook for Air Force thinkers, but does the perception equal reality? The first Sir James Rowland Air Power Seminar attracted only 75 attendees; the second only 40 to hear its nine presenters. Some may blame the lack of catering. A cynic might point to the lack of Senior Leadership present with whom ‘face-time’ could be had. Either way, when coupled with the small number of contributors to air power debate on the Central Blue, there appears a strong case that our people may only be ‘thinking’ when they believe the Chief is watching and that our culture in this regard remains comfortably static. This homogeneity of thought threatens to stifle innovation, and overcoming it is not an adaptive culture challenge, it is a leadership challenge. Commanders at all levels need to aspire to and inspire others to become Operator-Intellectuals. A colleague expressed the view that “commanders are too busy with governance to be intellectuals.” I interpreted this as “too busy to lead” and was subsequently unsurprised that his staff appeared wedded to process and blind to the opportunities before them to improve core business – a professional development failing more attributable to him than to them. I view a senior officer’s public comments regarding two highly proficient aircrew in a similar manner. The one who embodied the prevailing culture was considered to have, “that intangible good bloke quality we need in our future commanders.” Whereas the one who consistently considered the bigger picture, developed options to enable long-term success within a dynamic environment and who took risks to deliver improvements “had a big future in some strategy job… or maybe the Air Power Centre.” Militaries across the globe have come to recognise that successful innovation entails not only new capabilities, but new ways to employ them. Geoffrey Wawro puts it more directly, “in an age of non-stop semi-war, the need for clear, unsentimental thinking is more important than ever.” This thinking is what our Operator-Intellectuals offer and we must be prepared not only to encourage them but at times to be challenged by them. As former Deputy Chief of Air Force Air Vice-Marshal Warren McDonald noted shortly after Dr Thornhill’s address, we cannot afford to simply discard talented thinkers as ‘difficult’ in the manner we have done in the past. If we do, we risk what General Schoomaker, former Chief of Staff for the US Army, described as the “regimentation and institutionalisation of mediocrity” in the military. Plan Jericho and fifth-generation capabilities will not prevent this; for us to realise the benefits of both, we need to balance our thinking about technology with a focus on thinking about thinking. WGCDR Jason Begley is an Air Combat Officer in the Royal Australian Air Force. He is also a Sir Richard Williams Foundation Scholar and PhD candidate at the University of New South Wales. The opinions expressed are his alone and do not reflect those of the Royal Australian Air Force, the Australian Defence Force, or the Australian Government. #Education #Innovation #organisationalculture

This week Squadron Leader Michael Spencer uses science fiction to theorise on the struggles, and solutions, that a future force may encounter in this contribution to our #AirForce2021 series. Connectivity has evolved to such that living within the global network is a necessity to survive. Yet the trackability of such a network means that militaries are being forced out of the system in order to maintain security and secrecy. There’s only one little problem - how can you function outside the network which controls every critical function? Not only that - how can one find a solution outside of the system they’ve lived in their entire life? Hal and iKnow are tasked with finding out. The latest 66G network further improved our daily lives ensuring even more connectivity and interaction than ever, with each other and the globalised neural information hive. Immersed in so much electromagnetic energy from electronic systems, connectivity with the network is not only inescapable, it’s mandatory. The wifi coverage now encompasses the entire globe up to the orbital environment. Dependence on electronic devices has flooded the surface world in an electromagnetically charged environment. Freespace is no longer a viable medium for the electromagnetic signals needed to transport data and control signals that maintain life and order on Earth. Surface life has become critically dependent on the shared lines-of-communication established between the megacities, insulated from the hazardous radiation and electromagnetic interference making free space unusable. Cued by the sun disappearing over the horizon, I awoke to begin my nightly scan for any new orders to my nightly tasking. The Superior has sent me a new task signal. I immediately engage the Superior and, after a clean handshake, we engage in a secure dialogue. "We need you to solve a problem for us. All the lines-of-communication interconnect to enable an efficient and globalised transportation grid which has been surveyed with quantum-measured accuracy. It is easy to determine a position anywhere these lines by referencing the digital markers meted throughout the shared grid which provides for an efficient logistical movements system. But it also makes it difficult to move military payloads in secrecy without attracting unwanted attention," laments the Superior. "We need a future contingency option for navigating our combat logistics or weapons payloads through the electromagnetic soup that is swamping the world outside the shared lines-of-communication!" I respond to the Superior, "Without connectivity to 66G or the satellite navigation system, there is no design solution available for any conventional vehicle to be trusted to autonomously navigate a trajectory outside the grid. I am uncertain that a drone can accurately determine its mobile location, relative to its destination at any time, without connecting to 66G." "There is an advantage to being able to navigate payloads both overtly and covertly outside our conventional transport grid," comments the Superior. Autonomously, the strength of the signal and security setting on our line suddenly stepped up, ensuring the impending message was protected against interference or corruption. "Hal, I want you to use your 9001-series algorithms to identify alternative capability options to reliably navigate a vehicle independently of the 66G network or satellite signals. Maybe you can investigate the methods that the Ancients used before the Singularity. You have until the end of the night to recommend an option before the daily dawn disrupts our communications. Out." Once again, a sudden change in status indicated that the Superior had closed the line of communication. The secured message exchange with my Superior seemed to last longer than a few moments. After the handshake protocol, I uplinked my digitised signature to acknowledge the task. As my signature is recognised, the authoritative files with all task details and available data related to the navigation problem appear in my inbox. I see that 'iKnow' has arrived to commence the night's domestic work at my home address. iKnow is my contracted talking ambulatory home assistant. Our working relationship represents the latest achievements in the best of human-machine integration. iKnow doesn't have the research capacity or analytical literacy of a machine but is an essential asset for keeping cables connected and removing the dust from difficult to access connectors to keep systems running safely and efficiently during the nightly work activities and daily rest periods. iKnow turns and looks at me with a friendly demeanour. "Would you like a refresh to declutter your mind before starting the night's work?" he asks empathetically. "The file sizes indicate you have quite a task ahead of you." iKnow’s multitude of facial muscles produces infinite variations of expression and emotion upon its complicated face, causing distraction and clutter. I chose aural communications to minimise the noise. "Thank you, iKnow. That will not be necessary," I respond. "I need you to assist with a research task tonight. Will you please recover the files on the oral histories recorded by the Ancients. I want to explore how they navigated their vehicles before the Singularity." The Ancient’s oral histories had long since been digitised for rapid search protocols providing an excellent starting point to find technology options and techniques that might have been used for navigation in the past. I instruct iKnow, "Please turn up the carbon converter in the server room. The processors will be working to capacity tonight and I do not want to increase the carbon footprint of this household beyond my allocated annual tax limit." After the Singularity, the capabilities to mine, simulate, and process data increased by a few orders of magnitude. However, the technology benefits of having better artificial intelligence do not outweigh the heat generated by thinking machines that, accumulatively, result in unwanted changes in the climate. I set the research period to cover several centuries before the Singularity and bias the outputs towards seeking non-networked and non-electronic navigation systems. I modify the heuristic search algorithm to perform a statistical analysis of keywords associated with the search. The orally recorded words are sometimes difficult to understand since their usage, meaning, and context have changed over time. Therefore, they need to be translated into text and correlated against a database of historical usage of languages. It doesn't take long for the algorithm to scan the oral histories and identify popularly referenced words from the voice recordings. First, the most popular technical terms are statistically determined and autonomously converted from voice to digital text. Next, the most popular words begin appearing in a list displayed on the monitor. I immediately highlight these unfamiliar words and enter them into the Core search engine to find their possible meanings. iKnow leans towards the monitor and glances across the results displayed on a wall monitor and laughs. "'Sex tent'? I think that this might sound right, but it was maybe converted into the wrong text. I think this is meant to be 'sextant.' Steer your search towards 'sextant'," says iKnow. I enter the revised inputs into the search engine, and the rectified search output appears on the screen. This search result is more logical. iKnow deserves praise for identifying a flaw in my logic. "iKnow, I made an error. Your suggestion to revise the search inputs has improved the quality of the outputs and will prevent unnecessary waste of carbon credits," I state in appreciation. iKnow quickly makes a deduction, "The celestial objects in the sky appear to an observer on the ground as a relatively unchanging pattern of celestial bodies that moves over the horizon with the rotation of the Earth." I reply, "iKnow, this is important, but I don't understand why? How can positional information be communicated from distant stars? The signals would be so weak. The background electromagnetic interference is so severe that it is no longer viable to even use the signals from the artificial satellites that are nearer than the celestial bodies." "The stars do not 'communicate' anything!" says iKnow. He raises both of his arms towards the ceiling, extending his index fingers towards two different imaginary points in the ceiling. "Hal, it's easy. Look at the reference to the 'sextant'. It was a mechanical tool used to non-cooperatively measure angles with the stars and deduce a position on the ground. The positions of celestial objects have been accurately mapped for centuries. The movements of the stars in space are insignificant to an observer on Earth. You can, therefore, navigate non-electronically by looking at the stars." "iKnow this may sound like a viable solution, but the celestial bodies are only visible at night. We need a system that can be trusted to function day and night," I say and search for a solution. "The Sun is visible in the day, and it is a star," says iKnow. "Furthermore, if one knows where to look, using a star map, one can see the brighter celestial bodies using augmented-optics, potentially looking beyond the visual spectrum. The Ancient Navigators were trained with the sextant to make such angular observations of celestial objects." This changes the context of the search results, "A human Navigator knows to look up to find the celestial objects. How might an automaton know where to look and not confuse bright lights with celestial objects?" I asked. "Use gravity," says iKnow. "You may not understand this, but human operators can naturally use gravity to sense the vertical and know how to stand erect. Since gravity decreases with vertical distance, a machine can be configured with a gravimeter to know when it is sitting horizontally because both ends have the same force acting on them. When both ends show the maximum difference in gravity effects, it points directly away from the Earth's centre, orientated vertically and looking skywards. Easy." The decision nodes in my neural network are converging. "A recommended solution is approaching 99.5% feasibility. A 100% solution would need to operate in the environment above the weather. The combination of using a surveyed star map, a gravimeter to look skywards, augmented optics for day and night functionality, and angular measurements to known stars seem to be a feasible way to deduce the observer's position on Earth. Furthermore, if multiple observations are taken over time, measured by an accurate clock, it is possible to deduce speed. This seems to be recovering a solution from the old world to reuse in the modern world." "iKnow, we make a smart team," I inform iKnow. "I will uplink this recommendation to the Superior before the new day breaks. Consider your mission here tonight as complete." Next, I initiate the handshake protocol with iKnow to determine the amount of effort and oxygen he expended on this task for remuneration purposes. He inputs the data and terminates the handshake signal. iKnow opens the door to exit the room. Before stepping out, he turns and asks, "Hey, that was a good session tonight. It’s funny though, as a HAL9001 you’re a significant improvement over the 9000. So why can't you remember my name?” He smiles, “See you tomorrow night, HAL." The door is secured, and the air filter is disabled after he leaves. "I'm afraid I can't do that, Dave." Squadron Leader Michael Spencer is an Air Force Reservist employed in the Defence COVID-19 Taskforce and the AFHQ RPAS Team acquiring the MQ-9B SkyGuardian. He initially served as a Navigator in manually-flown long-range maritime patrols on P-3C Orions. His early operational experiences in anti-ship and anti-submarine warfare led to diverse career paths into international military relations, weaponeering and guided weapons acquisitions, concepts and acquisitions for space sensors and space-based systems, and force-level joint integration planning. He has completed postgraduate studies at UNSW Canberra, Royal Military College of Canada, and the US National Security Space Institute and has authored papers on future air and space concepts and technology disruption, including articles for The Central Blue. He promotes interests in space through professional memberships as an Associate Fellow of the American Institute of Aeronautics & Astronautics and member of the Space Law Council - Australia & New Zealand.

This week, SQNLDR Jenna Higgins reviews Benjamin S. Lambeth's book released this year by the US Naval Institute chronicling Operational Inherent Resolve. Air power in the war against ISIS critically analyses the United States (and coalition) air contribution to Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR) during the period August 2014 to early 2019. In what was deemed an ultimately successful campaign to destroy the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) by author Dr. Benjamin S. Lambeth, the book provides a full critique of what Lambeth assessed as a costly and poorly executed operation. Dr. Benjamin S. Lambeth is currently a Senior Fellow at the Centre for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, and is renowned in the field of ‘history and military aviation’ with an extensive repertoire of books. Lambeth’s key contribution to the extensive selection of books on air operations is his self-proclaimed in-depth assessments of air campaigns. Some of his most recent and notable publications include; The Unseen War: Allied Air Power and the Takedown of Saddam Hussein (2013), Air Operations in Israel's War Against Hezbollah: Learning from Lebanon and Getting It Right in Gaza (2011), Counterinsurgency in Airpower Thought (2008) – just to name a few. The book offers a number of important lessons for air power practitioners and military personnel alike, in which Lambeth finds that OIR was yet another ‘case of the early misuse of airpower’. His assessment of the campaign is rooted in four key findings; the forced incrementalism of targeting during the first two years, restrictive Rules Of Engagement (ROE) insisting on zero non-combatant casualties, a misreading of the adversary intent resulting in the incorrect application of overall campaign strategy, and consequently a flawed execution of ground vs air warfare and leadership selection. In what is largely a chronological account, the book is broken down into eleven chapters with the first three setting the scene and providing important background. These chapters delve with relative depth into America’s air posture before OIR - from the 1991 Persian Gulf War through to the Counter Insurgency (COIN) operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. While focusing a good deal on air power strengths and weaknesses individual to each operation over this period, Lambeth also devotes significant time to the governmental and political background during this period, along with US Defense and Air Force leadership machinations whose personalities proved pivotal. Chapter three specifically covers how the ISIS contest first arose, with a focus on US political decision making between the Bush and Obama administrations. This is a particularly important background as Lambeth goes on to provide a scathing assessment of the Obama administration’s choices with regard to ROE and overall strategy later in the book. Chapters four through eight offer extensive detail on the execution of airpower during the campaign – with a significant focus on air combat and strike serials (or lack thereof). Ultimately, Lambeth lays the blame for the air war’s slow start on the Obama administration’s refusal to ‘get serious’ in August 2014, by which he meant there was a lack of overall strategy to ‘degrade and ultimately destroy’ ISIS, along with a lack of political will and resources. This assessment can be related to his later critique of the government and military leadership’s inability to recognise that ISIS was an emerging proto-state as opposed to a resurrected Iraqi insurgency. He goes on to discuss how the air effort eventually became more effective with the instalment of then Lt. Gen. Charles Q. Brown Jr. as the Combined Force Air Component Commander (CFACC) due to his ability to shape a more strategic and deliberate targeting list. Until Brown Jr’s installation, the focus and strength of the US Air Force (USAF) had been in dynamic targeting, close air support (CAS) for troops in contact and armed overwatch – all in support of the ground forces (p81). This prompts a detailed discussion on the perceived failures of joint air-land integration. Lambeth argues that the root cause of these particular failures was the initial selection of an Army Commander Joint Task Force (CJTF – OIR) as opposed to an Air Force Commander who would have been able to see the strategic value of air power - specifically in relation to strategic and deliberate targeting (which Lt. Gen Brown eventually directed) (p219). He offers that successful air-land integration was further hindered by repeated restrictive Fire Support Coordination Line (FSCL) in an urban context, which impeded the air prosecution of strategic targets, and a ‘parochial army insistence on a doctrinal prerogative that was arguably due it in principle needlessly impeded and ongoing offensive’ (p103). Lambeth’s summary of lessons learnt is holistically captured in chapter ten: US leadership and strategy. This chapter neatly summarises the crux of the book. He states that the campaign’s major failings were down to four key factors. Firstly, the operation could have been much shorter if not for the ‘protracted gradualism to no useful purpose’ over the first two years of conflict (p178). Underpinning this gradualism was the Washington enforced ‘draconian target attack ROE that insisted for far too long on zero non-combatants at virtually any cost’ all while ISIS was devastating the civilian population (p177). The insistence on such restrictive ROE was in part caused by a ‘fundamental misreading of the enemy as a resurrected insurgency that was largely responsible for imposing and sustaining the ensuing strategy and those inappropriate ROE’ (p177). Finally, he assessed that having a US Army led, ground centric pursuit of objectives was retrospectively the wrong call. In insisting on using ‘American and Coalition air power almost exclusively to support the slowly rebuilding Iraqi Security Forces at the expense of also conducting concurrent and much needed independent strategic interdiction attacks against ISIS’s most important [centre of gravity] COGs targets in Iraq and Syria’(p178) produced an inefficient, costly and substandard outcome. The strength of this book comes from the author’s significant and extensive personal connections which he has drawn upon to evaluate various phases of OIR. Lambeth taps into a wide array of personal accounts to form and support his assertions – from the tactical F-16 pilot outlining their day to day bombing sorties, to the four-star general’s reflections on what did and did not work across the four-year campaign. He uses these detailed and experienced accounts to provide the reader with firsthand insights into the day-to-day decision making, and their impact on the operation. A search for other detailed accounts on the contribution of airpower in OIR finds only a RAND report - The Air War Against the Islamic State: The Role of Airpower in Operation Inherent Resolve. Interestingly, the conclusions reached in this report juxtapose Lambeth’s work – specifically regarding how best to implement air power and improve air-land integration for future conflict. Where Lambeth contends that air operations incorporating deliberate targeting should have been front and center from the beginning, the RAND report concludes that the ISIS main center of gravity was territory, and therefore strategic attack ‘did not play a decisive role in this operation’. The RAND report also recommends that this particular campaign offers important lessons for future near-peer competition; however, in doing so, it fails to acknowledge China or Russia as the next likely and worst-case adversary, and the subsequent area of operations requiring both strategic targeting and heavy integration with both maritime and air platforms. Airpower in the war against ISIS provides a comprehensive review of the events leading up to, and the subsequent operation in Iraq and Syria which was intended to degrade and destroy the Islamic State. It provides an informative case study for military history or political science students, serving military or defence professionals alike in which to gain an understanding of how the US government interleaves with the military at a tactical and operational level. It further offers a recent but telling account of systemic issues between air-land integration, targeting, and the difficulties associated with developing a campaign strategy. Squadron Leader Jenna Higgins is a Royal Australian Air Force aviator who specialises in ISREW. She has a Masters in Strategy and Security and a Masters in Aerospace Systems. She is an editor of the Central Blue Blog. Follow her on Twitter @Jenna_Ellen_

The Central Blue editorial team is seeking Expressions of Interest to join the team. Who are we? The Central Blue is an online forum designed to promote informed discussion and debate about joint air power issues affecting Australia. Our scope is broad, covering topics from tactical integration to strategic theory; and from historical lessons to future capabilities. What are the roles? Editorial Intern: You will primarily assist with editing submissions with the guidance of an established editor. You could also expect to help manage correspondence, track tasks, create and curate digital content, or transcribe and conduct interviews for publication. You can expect to fill the role for 12 months. If you are the right fit for the team, you will receive an offer to stay on. Events & Special Projects Assistant: As we grow and find new ways to support our next generation of joint air power practitioners, we need people to assist with executing the plan. This may include organising lunches, online discussions & forums or podcasts. This role needs someone who is organised, enthusiastic, wants to shape the conversation and put forward new concepts to reach a wider audience. Why be involved? The Central Blue editorial team is passionate about giving a voice to all members of the Air Force, our sister services and industry, to foster a new generation of air power thinkers who can participate in the national security debate. The contest of ideas is not limited to the senior leaders of the Defence Force. All personnel regardless of rank, specialisation or service should feel compelled in contributing to the debate and creating diversity of thought and perspective to provide a clear picture against adversity. If you believe strongly in generating an inclusive culture to develop this intellectual edge, one of these roles is for you. Who are we looking for? Enthusiastic and dedicated Junior Officers, Enlisted personnel, APS, academics, and industry professionals alike are encouraged to apply. While we are predominantly an airminded team, your service is no barrier. We welcome applications from Navy, Army, Air Force, industry, academia and APS personnel. What is The Central Blue editorial team offering? In return, as a part of The Central Blue team, you can expect a commitment from the editors to provide mentoring, advice and editorial assistance, workload permitting. You will gain skills which enable you to critically edit and give a voice to other writers who may not feel so confident. You will have access to a broad array of editors from other sites, and writers with significant experience and knowledge. Where & How do you contribute? This role is entirely online! Our editors have been known to contribute from all across the world. You will simply need regular access to the internet. Interested? Please contact us at thecentralblue@gmail.com with the following details: Name Rank (if applicable) Current role Email address (work + pers) Contact Number (mobile) Educational background In addition, we would love for you to tell us about your past writing efforts, any speciality airminded or military interests, and your motivations for joining (in 500 words or less). Applications close 10 October 2021.

This week GPCAPT Phil Arms offers a prospective glimpse into the ‘New Generation Force’ of the 2100s in the latest instalment of our #AirForce2121 series. His sci-fiesque vignette explores several issues, from the integration and use of AI in far-future warfighting to asking the question: is Time the 6th Domain to be contested in future warfare? But his storytelling also includes timely messages for the Air Force of today, particularly around reframing ‘failure’ into a culture of growth. Destiny surveyed the continual stream of data that scrolled before her. She recognised this data feed as one of the many lines of signals intelligence that contributed to the common operating picture of the enemy’s information networks – a maze of tactical and operational decision nodes and communication feeds. Nested within a Time Control Module on board the state-of-the-art E-17D airborne battle management platform, Destiny was not aware that she was flying at 80,000ft, high in the Earth’s stratosphere cruising at greater than 20 miles a minute. The height was needed to elevate her sensors out of the radio frequency clutter that dominated the lower altitudes, and the speed essential to survive the numerous enemy threats trying to target her platform. Today’s was a special mission as it was the final training sortie of the 12-month Aerospace Weapons Controller Course (AWCC). Over the last six months her class had progressed through a series of tactical multi-domain scenarios culminating in this mission. This was also her course’s fifth attempt, the previous four having been unsuccessful and reported as ‘progressive learning iterations’ – what used to be called ‘failures’. The old-school philosophy of ‘three strikes and out’ had long since been abandoned as the Air and Space Force embraced its ‘Growth Culture’; one of the cultural foundations of the Service drummed into cadets during basic training advocating risk acceptance, multi-skilled diversity, and disruptive innovation. For Destiny, this mission was the last ‘box to tick’ before she could claim to be mission ready. The mission however was not an easy one. Destiny’s team were to provide the initial attack, setting the conditions for an assault against a superior opponent – a Tier 1 threat equipped with advanced information, nuclear, biological, offensive-space and cyber capabilities. Her role in this mission was simple – decapitate the enemy’s cognitive capabilities while preserving her own. The sequence and speed of her actions were critical as she had to disable the enemy’s ability to respond before they had time to act. A millisecond delay, or out of sequence move, would result in her being denied access to the enemy’s command and control system that currently lay bare before her. If executed correctly, Destiny’s actions would provide a temporal window sufficient to allow follow-on actions by her classmates. Having gotten the sequence of attacks wrong during the last four missions, she was acutely aware of the consequences of not successfully executing her part of the mission. Her classmates were poised (once again) with an inventory of highly classified space based, cyber, and kinetic strike effects rarely available for training missions. Swarms of autonomous strike drones were in position to attack during the brief time-window of decision paralysis created by Destiny, designed to deliver a crippling cyber and directed energy attack across the multiple layers of the enemy’s defences. This would set the conditions for the air and space insertion of land forces to secure the objective and deliver the knock-out blow – all while Destiny continued to monitor the information networks and enemy artificial intelligence (AI) signature to identify and shut-down any attempts to rally following the initial attack. Contesting time, recognised as the 6th Domain, had been an emerging priority in Western force design over the past five decades. It was the evolution of the 21st Century’s fascination with Information Warfare – an attempt to influence the decision processes and cognitive biases of your enemy. The relationship with John Boyd’s Theory of Strategic Paralysis (an airpower strategist from the late 20th Century) wasn’t identified until the mid-2070s. Boyd’s decision loop, Observe-Orientate-Decide-Act (or OODA Loop), provided the architecture within which hypersonic and directed energy weapons, cyber effects and AI could provide a means to generate effects faster than an adversary could cognitively process and provide a response. This facet of warfare was stumbled across in the largely forgotten Gulf War 1 over 100 years ago – now a core element of academic analysis on AWCC. In what was then known as Network Centric Warfare, a coalition led by the USA was able to defeat a significant land force by attacking it so swiftly across critical decision-making nodes that it was left incapable of responding. The effect was staggering; Saddam Hussain’s Republican Guard capitulated within hours, with troops abandoning their posts. When coupled with the recently developed series of ‘temporal weapons’ the Air and Space Force now had the means to create decision paralysis through the coordinated employment of high-speed fires, and effects designed to control the acquisition and movement of information - this was manoeuvre in the era of information warfare. The tactical aim was simple; deny the enemy the ability to observe then orientate in order to generate decision paralysis while preserving your own capacity. In its simplest form, this was a competition for time. An advanced form of AI integrated into the highly classified 9th Generation network architecture, Destiny was an avatar designed specifically to contest time. This was the sole purpose of her existence! ----------------------- Desiree Watkins, affectionately known as ‘Dee’ to her friends, was sitting comfortably in her favourite leather armchair, coffee in hand. From her secure home office she gazed out at the pristine Tasmanian wilderness presented before her in a stunning panoramic display. Until activated, it wasn’t obvious to the casual observer that the monitors on her desk were linked via multiple quantum-encrypted networks to the AI-run Multi-Domain Effect Centre (MDEC) at Bungendore, nearly 1000nm away. Her office was one of only four human-on-the-loop interfaces that monitored the performance of the course of avatars that made up the AWCC class of 2121. Having undergone a rigorous screening process, Dee had been selected from 1000s of candidates based on her genetic, cognitive and emotional attributes to provide ‘personality blueprints’ for the Destiny series of avatars. She ‘owned’ four avatars in this course, the latest in a line of over 150 operational Destiny-bots, each customised for different mission sets by tweaking elements within her personality blueprint. These avatars were essential elements of the Air and Space Force workforce. Following the infamous ‘Retention Crisis of 2030’ the Australian Defence Force had been unable to grow and maintain its desired workforce numbers, experiencing significant shortfalls across all employment categories. Unable to compete with industry as a preferred employer in terms of both remuneration and conditions of employment, the Air and Space Force had sought alternative workforce solutions that better balanced the demands of family and personal interests, attempting to remain competitive within a rapidly changing societal context. As AI capabilities had grown substantially in the late 21st Century, the Air and Space Force had invested heavily. The New Generation Force (NGF) was the first true acceptance of AI into what had historically been human roles. By employing AI-bots, the Air and Space Force was able to significantly reduce its human workforce from 20,000 in the mid-21st Century (and growing) to less than 3,000, with an AI force of over 50,000 avatars providing the mass of its combat capability. Dee was tingling with anticipation and excitement over this mission attempt as she’d spent the best part of the last two months working closely with the psych team to tweak the Destiny bots, incorporating lessons from previous attempts. When not working for the Air and Space Force, Dee enjoyed her second job as a software engineer, but nothing could beat the thrill of planning and executing these missions. She was proud of the part she played in Australia’s Air and Space Force. Today she was refreshed and ready. Dee took a large gulp of coffee as a final preparatory gesture before keying the mike to transmit: “Fight’s on”. “Destiny commit” came the digitised reply - the mission had started. GPCAPT Phil Arms joined the Australian Defence Force Academy in 1989, graduating Pilots Course in mid-1993. During his flying career he has flown over 3000 hours in more than 30 aircraft types, with more than 2300 hours as captain on the F/A-18. He is a graduate of the United States Navy Test Pilots School, has extensive experience in flight test operations, and held command of No. 75 Squadron, RAAF Tindal from January 2010 until December 2012. His current role is Director Joint Experimentation within Force Design Division. In this role he is responsible to the Joint Force Authority for the conduct of experimentation and wargaming in support of the ADF’s force design process.