Dr Robbin Laird, Enhancing Non-Kinetic Capabilities in the Ready Force, 26 May 2025 Link to article (Defense.info) At the 22 May 2025 Sir Richard Williams Foundation seminar, GPCAPT Marija Jovanovich, Chief of Staff of the Vice Chief of the Defence Force, underscored a crucial approach for enhancing the combat capability and success of the ready force. This is the ability of deceiving the adversary to the point whereby they simply do not know where best to strike and to not be confident of their knowledge of your plans and your targeting operations. At an earlier Sir Richard Williams seminar, one held in September 2023, she spoke of the nature of the C2, ISR and Counter ISR dynamic and highlighted her involvement at the NAWDC or Fallon Resolute Hunter exercises. This exercise is run by the MISR officers at the naval ai wing training center, and my recent visit to NAWDC last October highlighted how the U.S. Navy is working hard to accelerate their ISR/Counter ISR capabilities. In part they are doing so because of the priority which the INDOPACOM commander, Admiral Paparo, has placed on these activities. Admiral Samuel Paparo, who assumed command of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command in May 2024, has made counter-Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities the cornerstone of his strategic vision. His stark assessment of future warfare challenges conventional thinking about military priorities and highlights a fundamental shift in how America must prepare for great power competition. Admiral Paparo’s most striking assertion is that modern conflicts will be won or lost before traditional kinetic operations even begin. In his view, counter-ISR operations in space and cyberspace represent “the first battle” that will determine whether U.S. forces can operate effectively or whether adversaries gain the upper hand through information dominance. “If and when conflict comes, it is C5ISR in space and cyber, that shall be the first battle and will be either the enabling capability for the joint force, or the Achilles heel for the PLA if that day comes,” Paparo told lawmakers during his confirmation hearing in February 2024. This assessment reflects a fundamental evolution in military thinking. While previous generations of commanders focused primarily on platforms and firepower, Paparo emphasizes that victory in the 21st century belongs to whoever can “see, decide and act faster” than their opponent. GPCAPT Marija Jovanovich presenting at the 22 May 2025 Sir Richard Williams Foundation seminar. In her presentation, GPCAPT Maria Jovanovich introduced the subject through highlighting historical examples of the importance of kinetic effects. On June 1, 1944, as Allied forces prepared for the most ambitious amphibious assault in history, Japanese Ambassador Hiroshi Oshima sent an encrypted message to Tokyo. The transmission revealed Hitler’s confidence that the real Allied invasion would come at Pas de Calais, not Normandy — exactly where German forces were waiting in strength. What Hitler didn’t know was that his “understanding” was the product of one of history’s most sophisticated deception campaigns, demonstrating the extraordinary power of non-kinetic warfare. Operation Fortitude, the centerpiece of the Allied deception strategy known as Bodyguard, achieved something remarkable. With just 4,500 personnel—including radio operators broadcasting fake traffic, engineers constructing dummy installations, and aircrew flying deceptive sorties—the Allies kept 345,000 German troops pinned down in Norway and elsewhere, away from the actual Normandy battlefield. The operation’s genius lay not just in its scope but in its integration. Fake radio transmissions simulated entire armies preparing for invasions that would never come. Inflatable tanks and wooden aircraft populated Scottish airfields and English ports. Double agents spread carefully crafted narratives. Even General Patton, whom the Germans considered the Allies’ finest commander, was used as unwitting bait to sell the deception. The asymmetry was staggering: less than 1% of the Normandy invasion force managed to neutralize forces twenty times their size. In one subsidiary operation called Ironside, just four double agents kept an entire Panzer division away from the real battle, convinced they needed to defend against a fictional landing near Bordeaux. Fast-forward seventy years, and the principles remain remarkably consistent, even as the tools have evolved dramatically. When ISIS began terrorizing the Middle East in 2014, their sophisticated online propaganda machine proved as dangerous as their conventional forces, recruiting followers worldwide and coordinating attacks across continents. The response came through Joint Task Force Ares, a coalition effort that mapped ISIS’s digital networks and identified ten critical nodes that controlled their entire online presence. Operation Glowing Symphony, launched in 2016, demonstrated the modern incarnation of Fortitude’s principles: comprehensive intelligence, precise targeting, and devastating effect. ISIS communications collapsed, stolen passwords exposed sensitive data, and their propaganda apparatus—crucial to their recruitment and coordination—simply vanished. Like Fortitude, Glowing Symphony succeeded because it integrated cyber capabilities with traditional military operations, creating synergistic effects that amplified the impact of kinetic operations on the ground. Non-kinetic effects—encompassing cyber operations, electronic warfare, and information operations—offer modern militaries unprecedented opportunities for asymmetric advantage. These capabilities can operate simultaneously at tactical, operational, and strategic levels, often with cost-effectiveness that traditional kinetic operations cannot match. Yet despite their proven potential, most militaries struggle to integrate these capabilities effectively. The reasons are both practical and cultural, rooted in institutional biases that favor conventional weapons over more subtle forms of warfare. She argued that military culture celebrates the dramatic: fighter jets breaking the sound barrier, precision missiles finding their targets, elite units conducting daring raids. These kinetic capabilities capture imaginations, drive recruitment, and shape how militaries think about warfare itself. This bias has profound consequences. While most people can name Operation Overlord or Market Garden, few have heard of Operation Fortitude — despite its arguably greater impact on the war’s outcome. The seven-person London Controlling Section that orchestrated the entire Fortitude deception remains largely unknown, their extraordinary achievement overshadowed by more conventional military legends. This cultural preference for “things that fly fast or go bang” influences everything from capability acquisition to operational planning. Training exercises either exclude non-kinetic effects entirely or treat them as afterthoughts. Doctrinal development focuses on the integration imperative without providing practical guidance on implementation. She argued that although current military doctrine acknowledges the importance of integrating kinetic and non-kinetic effects but it stops short of explaining how to achieve this integration effectively. While specific doctrines exist for cyber operations, electronic warfare, and information operations, these remain largely isolated stovepipes rather than integrated capabilities. A 2024 RAND Corporation study of the U.S. Air Force found identical problems: doctrine that lacks explicit integration guidance, training scenarios that inadequately represent non-kinetic capabilities, and assessment procedures that fail to measure non-kinetic effectiveness. Historical successes like Fortitude and contemporary operations like Glowing Symphony point toward five critical requirements for effective non-kinetic integration: Long-term strategic planning is essential. Fortitude’s success built on intelligence assets and deception networks developed over years, not months. The overarching Bodyguard strategy was conceived in July 1943, with consistent objectives maintained through execution nearly a year later. Proactive rather than reactive approaches allow militaries to shape conditions rather than merely respond to them. Non-kinetic effects require extensive preparation and cannot be improvised at short notice. Multi-level integration ensures that tactical actions support operational objectives that advance strategic goals. Fortitude succeeded because individual deception operations reinforced the overall narrative at every level. Centralized planning with decentralized execution balances coherent strategy with tactical flexibility. The London Controlling Section maintained strategic direction while allowing subordinate commands to adapt execution to local conditions. High-fidelity intelligence feedback enables real-time adaptation and effectiveness assessment. Ultra intercepts allowed Fortitude planners to monitor German reactions and adjust their campaign accordingly—a closed-loop system that maximized effectiveness. Integrating non-kinetic effects also raises profound questions that extend beyond traditional military concerns. As societies become more digitally dependent, the technologies that enhance military capability also create new vulnerabilities. The U.S. Navy’s recent decision to resume teaching celestial navigation reflects this reality—recognition that GPS-dependent forces need backup systems when facing adversaries capable of sophisticated electronic warfare. Information operations pose particular challenges for democratic societies. When entire populations become targets of information warfare, traditional boundaries between military and civilian responsibilities blur. Nordic countries’ “inoculation” programs against disinformation represent one approach, but questions remain about the appropriate role of military forces in what amounts to cognitive warfare. Perhaps most fundamentally, democratic militaries must reconcile the use of information operations with their societies’ values. As one scholar noted, disinformation represents a double threat to liberal democracies: being targeted by such operations undermines democratic institutions, but employing them may have similar corrosive effects on public trust and social cohesion. Despite these challenges, the strategic imperative for integrating non-kinetic effects continues to grow. Modern conflicts increasingly feature adversaries who exploit the seams between kinetic and non-kinetic domains, using cyber attacks to complement conventional operations, information warfare to undermine social cohesion, and electronic warfare to degrade high-tech military systems. The asymmetric potential of non-kinetic effects — demonstrated from Normandy’s beaches to ISIS’s digital networks — offers military organizations opportunities to achieve decisive advantages with relatively modest investments. But realizing this potential requires overcoming institutional inertia, cultural biases, and doctrinal gaps that currently limit integration efforts. The lessons of Operation Fortitude remain as relevant today as they were eighty years ago. Success in future conflicts will likely depend not just on the ability to project kinetic force, but on the wisdom to integrate that force with non-kinetic effects that can shape, deceive, and disrupt adversaries in ways that pure firepower cannot achieve. The question is not whether militaries will eventually master this integration — the strategic necessity is too compelling to ignore. The question is whether they will do so before the next conflict tests their capabilities in the crucible of combat, where the price of unpreparedness is measured not in missed opportunities but in lives lost and objectives unachieved. As the ghosts of those seven planners in the London Controlling Section might remind us, sometimes the most decisive battles are won not by those who fight, but by those who think — and who understand that in warfare, as in chess, the most powerful moves are often the ones your opponent never sees coming.

Dr Robbin Laird, A Blueprint for Action for the USAF: How to Enhance Combat Readiness to Meet the Strategic Challenges Facing the U.S. and Its Allies, 26 May 2025 Link to article (Defense.info) The United States Air Force stands at a critical crossroads. After decades of counterinsurgency operations and peacetime bureaucracy, America’s air arm faces an uncomfortable reality: it may not be adequately prepared for the high-intensity conflicts that could define the next decade. This sobering assessment comes from one of the service’s most experienced leaders, retired General T. Michael “Buzz” Moseley, the 18th Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force We asked General Moseley after his comprehensive presentation on airpower at the Sir Richard Williams Foundation seminar on May 22, 2025, to provide a follow up on that presentation to highlight his recommendations for shaping a way ahead for recrafting effective airpower. General Moseley provided a thoughtful response to this request. His central thesis is both urgent and actionable: the Air Force must fundamentally restructure itself from a peacetime organization optimized for stability operations to a combat-focused force capable of deterring—or if necessary, defeating—peer adversaries in an increasingly dangerous world. The strategic environment facing the Air Force today bears little resemblance to the relatively stable post-Cold War period that shaped much of its current structure. Moseley identifies several converging challenges that demand immediate attention: Operational Overstretch: Current operational tempo continues to strain an already aging force structure. Aircraft and personnel are deployed at unsustainable rates while facing increasingly sophisticated threats worldwide. Technological Adaptation: Adversaries are rapidly adopting innovative technologies, creating new vulnerabilities in existing U.S. command and control systems. The comfortable technological superiority America once enjoyed is eroding. Resource Constraints: Despite growing threats, defense spending remains at approximately 3% of GDP—a level Moseley argues is fundamentally inadequate for current security challenges. Cultural Drift: Perhaps most concerning, the Air Force has experienced what Moseley describes as a “minimalization” of warfighting culture through years of non-combat focused policies and peacetime governance structures. Rather than proposing abstract strategic concepts, Moseley offers eleven concrete reforms that could be implemented within a single leadership tenure. These fall into several key categories: Organizational Restructuring The Air Force must align its peacetime organizational structure with wartime deployment requirements. This means building around the squadron—the essential unit of deployed air power—rather than the complex bureaucratic structures that have evolved over decades of peacetime operations. “The essential building block of deployed air/space forces is the squadron and multiples of squadrons,” Moseley writes. “The peacetime template must match the wartime deployed template.” Cultural Transformation Equally important is restoring what Moseley calls the Air Force’s “warfighting ethos.” This requires comprehensive changes to personnel policies, training programs, promotion criteria, and educational curricula. The goal is to advance the “best qualified” personnel for combat effectiveness rather than bureaucratic management. Training Revolution Current training approaches are insufficient for the threats the Air Force may face. Moseley advocates for increased actual flying time and hands-on field training, noting that while simulations and procedural trainers are useful for skill development, they cannot replace real-world exposure to complex combat environments. Resource Reallocation The former Chief of Staff calls for increasing defense spending to a minimum of 5-5.5% of GDP, arguing that current funding levels cannot adequately address personnel needs, infrastructure requirements, operations and maintenance, research and development, and modernization demands simultaneously. Acquisition Reform One of Moseley’s most specific recommendations involves centralizing acquisition, contracting, and sustainment activities at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, leveraging existing capabilities to create a more efficient and responsive procurement system. He also calls for updating the Goldwater-Nichols Act to streamline acquisition timelines and authorities. Beyond organizational changes, Moseley identifies specific equipment and capability priorities that demand immediate attention: Fighter Aircraft: Mid-life upgrades for F-22 Raptors, comprehensive avionics and engine improvements for F-35As, and acceleration of the F-47 program to ensure adequate numbers on required timelines. Support Systems: Resolution of ongoing problems with the KC-46 tanker and T-7 trainer programs, either through fixes or new procurement initiatives. Strategic Systems: Accelerated fielding of the B-21 bomber and investigation of the Navy’s Next Generation Air Dominance program for potential Air Force applications. Legacy Systems: A systematic review of older aircraft for potential retirement, particularly non-survivable fourth-generation platforms that may become liabilities in high-threat environments. General Moseley highlighted concerns with regard to vulnerabilities in global communications systems. He advocates for utilizing the full electromagnetic spectrum to provide forces with “parallel, reliable, resilient, survivable” communication paths. Notably, he identifies upgrades to HF communications as the most available and cost-effective solution—a recommendation that takes on added significance given recent concerns about space-based communication vulnerabilities. The former Chief of Staff also addresses the critical issue of defense industrial capacity, calling for actions to incentivize growth in aerospace, propulsion, munitions, and sensor manufacturing. His recommendations include fuller utilization of multi-year procurement contracts and establishment of dedicated funding streams similar to the Navy’s shipbuilding accounts. Moseley’s analysis extends beyond internal Air Force reforms to broader strategic considerations. He calls for a comprehensive review of service roles and missions, suggesting that an updated “Key West Agreement” may be necessary to address overlapping capabilities and ensure each service’s contributions align with current national security requirements. This recommendation reflects an understanding that effective military reform cannot occur in isolation—it must be coordinated across the joint force and aligned with broader national security objectives. Perhaps most importantly, Moseley argues that these reforms are achievable within the tenure of a single Air Force leadership team. This emphasis on practical implementation timelines reflects his experience with the bureaucratic challenges that often derail military reform efforts. The general’s approach recognizes that perfect solutions implemented too late are less valuable than good solutions implemented immediately. His “doable do’s” philosophy prioritizes actionable steps that can create momentum for broader transformation. General Moseley’s analysis arrives at a critical moment for U.S. air power. The comfortable assumption that American technological and operational superiority will persist indefinitely is increasingly questionable. Meanwhile, potential adversaries continue developing capabilities specifically designed to challenge U.S. strengths. The reforms Moseley proposes represent a return to first principles of military effectiveness combined with practical adaptations to contemporary realities. The question is not whether these changes are necessary, but whether current leadership has the will to implement them before external events force more drastic adaptations. As Moseley concludes, tomorrow’s challenges center on “preparing for potential combat on a theater and global scale against highly lethal opponents in an age of strategic uncertainty and increasing lethality.” The time for incremental adjustments may be passing. What remains is the opportunity—and responsibility—to act on lessons that experience has already taught. The Air Force that emerges from such reforms would be leaner, more focused, and better equipped to fulfil its primary mission: controlling the air and space domains that underpin America’s broader defense strategy. Whether that transformation occurs proactively or reactively may determine not just the future of American air power, but the broader trajectory of U.S. national security in an increasingly contested world.

Dr Robbin Laird, Air Power in an Age of Strategic Uncertainty: The Perspective of General Moseley, 23 May 2025 Link to article (Defense.info) Recently, General (ret) T Michael “Buzz” Moseley KBE, spoke via video link to the May 22, 2025 seminar held by the Sir Richard Williams Foundation in Canberra, Australia. General Moseley was the 18th Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force. Moseley was a distinguished war fighter who lived in the world as it is rather than the world we hoped to see. His entire service was focused on how the USAF could contribute to the deterrence of conflict but win it if you must fight. I knew him when I worked for the Secretary of the Air Force, Michael W. Wynne, and the two of them formed one of the most remarkable pairings of defense leaders in my lifetime. They were fired by the then Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates because of their opposition to the path Gates preferred which was to move from the way ahead for an air force built around air superiority to one that was not. The significance of their firing was historic, a fact not lost on the late Senator Molan, whom I had the privilege to know and to discuss many things with him, including this event with him. This is what the retired Australian General and Senator Jim Molan in his 2022 book on the need for Australia to deal with the China challenge: “The U.S. is surfacing from decades of war in the Middle East with worn-out equipment, understandably having allocated a lot of its funding to ‘today’s wars’ rather than investing in the future. During the Iraq War, for instance, Secretary of Defense Bob Gates wanted more drones to carry on the day-to-day fight in Iraq and found himself in conflict with the U.S. Air Force, which wanted to continue building the fighters and bombers that it thought would be needed in the future. “Gates sacked the chief of the U.S. Air Force and restricted the production of aircraft such as the stealth F-22 fighter and the B-21 bomber, in order to build the drones and other aircraft he needed. “The result was that only a limited number of the extraordinary F-22s were built and the B-21 is still not in production. The impact of diverted spending and focus will be felt for a long time to come. “The likely war with China, if it is ever fought by weapons of this type, is going to be fought by a very small number of modern stealth fighters, but mainly by U.S. fighters and bombers that are 20 to 30 years old. “The result of all this is that the U.S. will not be able to marshal sufficient military power to deter China in the Western Pacific, possibly for years.”[1] I have written about this and many other items related to shaping an effective force for the strategic age we are in in a book about the work of Secretary Wynne entitled: America, Global Military Competition, and Opportunities Lost. The point is we are playing catch up in the face of the rise of he multipolar world, a world in which airpower matters even more than when Moseley was the Chief. In providing the opening remarks to the seminar, General Moseley began his analysis by contrasting today’s threat landscape with the relative simplicity of the Cold War era. “Think about 50 years ago, 60 years ago, there was a major threat. Now there are multiple threats,” he observed, highlighting the emergence of what he sees as an unprecedented coalition of adversaries. Unlike the bipolar world of the past, today’s security challenges involve China’s assertiveness, Russia’s aggression, Iran’s support for global terrorism, and North Korea’s unpredictable behavior. More concerning, according to Moseley, is that “these folks seem to be collaborating and cooperating with each other, sharing munitions, sharing munition stocks.” This cooperation represents a fundamental shift that complicates traditional deterrence strategies. The general’s assessment extends beyond state actors to include transnational criminal organizations affecting border security, particularly along the U.S.-Mexico border. This multi-faceted threat environment, he argues, requires a robust and capable air force to maintain the rules-based international order that has underpinned Western security for decades. General Moseley taking a question during his talk with the Sir Richard Williams Seminar, May 22, 2025. Perhaps the most startling revelation in Moseley’s presentation was the current state of U.S. Air Force readiness. The statistics Moseley presented are concerning: ten different aircraft types that first flew over 50 years ago still comprise approximately two-thirds of the Air Force’s total fleet of 2,600 aircraft. The KC-135 tanker, a workhorse of military operations, began delivery during the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations. This aging fleet problem is compounded by nearly four decades of continuous deployment. Since the early 1990s, when the first aircraft deployed to Saudi Arabia’s eastern province, American air power has maintained a persistent presence in the Middle East. The cumulative effect has been devastating to equipment readiness and personnel morale. The Budget Reality Moseley’s analysis of defense spending reveals a fundamental mismatch between mission requirements and available resources. With defense budgets hovering around 3% of GDP, he argued for a baseline of 4-4.5% under normal circumstances, and closer to 5-5.5% given the current recapitalization needs across all services. The budget structure itself presents challenges. Approximately 50% of Air Force funding goes to personnel costs – necessary and appropriate but leaving limited resources for modernization. After accounting for infrastructure, operations, and maintenance costs for aging aircraft, the investment account that funds new capabilities consistently bears the brunt of budget cuts. Moseley revealed that since 9/11, the Army has received $65 billion annually from Air Force and Navy budgets – representing over a trillion dollars in shifted priorities that he suggests weakened air capabilities during a critical period. Central to Moseley’s argument is the primacy of air and space superiority as the Air Force’s fundamental mission. While the service has five core mission areas – air and space superiority, intelligence/surveillance/reconnaissance, rapid mobility, global strike, and command and control – he emphasized that the first enables all others. “What happens to those service components inside those strategic commons, or those operative domains, if the Air Force does not get air and space superiority?” Moseley asked rhetorically. “What happens to freedom of movement on the surface? What happens to movement to place? What happens to the logistics baseline?” This perspective challenges recent discussions within Air Force leadership about whether air superiority remains affordable or achievable. Moseley’s response is unequivocal: it’s not just affordable, it’s essential for all joint operations. The Drone Debate: Promise and Peril While acknowledging his role in pioneering unmanned systems – he commanded the first drone wing with minimal resources and a squadron commander who had “no people, no money,” just “a folding card table and a blender” for making margaritas while figuring out operations – Moseley expressed concern about current enthusiasm for replacing manned aircraft entirely. His skepticism is grounded in practical experience. Drawing parallels to dropped cell phone calls, he questioned the wisdom of relying on data links for platforms operating at high altitude and speed in contested environments. “I’m not willing to put something 9000 feet [away] in and out of weather at night that’s running with me at 1.4 Mach that I can’t keep a link to.” The general’s vision for unmanned systems is more nuanced. He sees value in “little buddies” that can accompany manned fighters to suppress integrated air defense systems but remains nervous about autonomous air-to-air combat in crowded airspace. His 2005 priorities for the Air Force Chief Scientist, the legendary Mark Lewis, included hypersonic weapons, directed energy systems, and drones that could “run with the fighters” – but as supplements, not replacements. Moseley concluded his remarks by pointing to recent military operations that demonstrate the continued relevance of manned air power. Israeli strikes in Iran, operations in Yemen, and the destruction of Iraqi Republican Guard divisions during Operation Iraqi Freedom all underscore that reports of manned aircraft’s obsolescence are greatly exaggerated. His broader message resonates beyond U.S. borders. The challenges he described – aging fleets, budget pressures, technological transitions, and complex threat environments – face many Western air forces. His emphasis on maintaining service identity while building joint capabilities offers a framework for allied cooperation without losing essential military expertise. General Moseley’s presentation serves as both warning and roadmap. The warning is clear: current trends in force structure, readiness, and strategic thinking threaten the air superiority that has underpinned Western military dominance for generations. The roadmap emphasizes returning to basics – understanding core missions, properly funding modernization, and maintaining the technological edge that air power requires. His closing observation was I think particularly poignant: “Officers and NCOs are not born joint. They become joint. They’re born a soldier, a sailor, an airman.” This insight challenges current thinking that views service identity as an obstacle to joint operations, instead positioning it as the foundation upon which effective joint capabilities are built. The stakes, as Moseley makes clear, extend far beyond military readiness. They encompass the ability to deter aggression, work together effectively as allies, and allows what used to be called the West to deal effectively with the rise of the multi-polar authoritarian world. Note About General Moseley: General “Buzz” Moseley played a significant role in Operation Iraqi Freedom, serving as the Combined Forces Air Component Commander (JFACC). He was responsible for all aspects of aerial operations, including mission planning, air tasking orders, and airspace management, and oversaw a large number of personnel and assets. General Moseley successfully integrated joint and coalition forces, including those from the Royal Saudi Air Force, Royal Air Force, and Royal Australian Air Force, into a cohesive air campaign. He was involved in the planning and execution of numerous missions, including those targeting Iraqi regime leaders and infrastructure, and those supporting ground forces. General Moseley was known for his leadership and vision, and his ability to inspire and motivate his troops. He also served as a role model for other military leaders, and his accomplishments were recognized with numerous awards, including two Defense Distinguished Service Medals. [1] . Jim Molan. Danger On Our Doorstep (pp. 106-107). HarperCollins. Kindle Edition.

Dr Robbin Laird, Enhancing the Ready Force: A Key Imperative for Australia in the Evolving Strategic Environment, 23 May 2025 Link to article (Defense.info) The Sir Richard Willliams Seminar held in Canberra on May 22, 2025, highlighted the challenges facing the ramping up of the ready force in operating in the rapidly evolving strategic environment. After the seminar, I discussed with Air Marshal (Retired) Geoff Brown his takeaways from the day’s seminar regarding key themes raised during the seminar by the speakers from the Australian Defence Force and by the various speakers and panelists who spoke at the seminar. In many ways, what was addressed during the day was how to deal with what the question raised by the Chairman of the Sir Richard Williams Foundation, Air Chief Marshal (Retired) Binskin in his opening remarks: “An affordable force may not actually be an effective force,” What then is an effective force for the evolving strategic situation? How to augment the fight tonight force and to find ways for an affordable path for a sustainable and effective ready force? In other words, a central challenge facing Australian defense planning is the gap between the “fight tonight” force and the promised “future force.” Current strategic circumstances demand a fundamental shift in thinking from building capabilities for future conflicts to maximizing the effectiveness of existing platforms and systems. Australia faces a critical challenge common to smaller defense forces: modernization requirements that temporarily reduce operational capability. For example, upgrading F-35s to Block 4 standard, while essential for meeting current threats, requires taking 8-10 aircraft offline from a fleet of only 72 – nearly an entire squadron’s worth of capability. This paradox underscores the need for larger fleet sizes to maintain operational capability during transition periods but also highlights why strengthening existing capabilities must take priority over wholesale platform replacement. Autonomous systems represent a significant opportunity, but only if approached correctly. Rather than treating drones and unmanned systems as standalone platforms, they should be viewed as tools – similar to missiles – that enhance existing capabilities. Brown cautions that Australia’s historical reliance on U.S. weapons stockpiles has become a critical vulnerability. The assumption that American arsenals would be available in crisis has proven false, as U.S. stockpiles have been depleted by ongoing global commitments and aid to Ukraine. This reality demands urgent investment in domestic weapons production and regional partnerships. South Korea’s combat vehicle manufacturing in Australia provides a model – building more capacity than Australia alone requires while serving regional allies’ needs. Creating a truly ready force requires addressing unglamorous but essential capabilities: increased crew ratios, enhanced maintenance capacity and robust logistics support. These investments lack the political appeal of major platform acquisitions but form the foundation of sustainable military capability. The discussion reveals a fundamental tension in Australian defense planning: the gap between political narratives about future capabilities and military realities about current threats. If conflict occurs within five years – a possibility that cannot be dismissed given current strategic trends – Australia must fight with existing capabilities enhanced through focused modernization and realistic operational planning. This doesn’t mean abandoning long-term capability development but rather ensuring that the transition period between current and future forces remains strategically viable. The “fight tonight” force cannot simply hold ground until future capabilities arrive – it must be capable of decisive action. Air Marshal (Retired) Brown argued that Australia needs a defense strategy grounded in strategic realism which means: Maximizing existing platform capabilities through focused upgrades and training. Developing autonomous systems as force multipliers rather than replacements. Building sustainable logistics and maintenance capacity. Creating domestic and regional weapons production capabilities. Treating the current force as operationally decisive, not merely transitional The strategic environment has fundamentally changed, and Australia’s defense planning must change with it. The luxury of long development timelines and gradual capability transitions no longer exists. For Brown: “Success will depend on how effectively Australia can enhance its ready force while building toward future capabilities – because in the current strategic environment, ready forces matter more than future promises.” Credit Featured Image: A Royal Australian Air Force F-35A Lightning II aircraft flies alongside a KC-30A multi-role tanker transport after air-to-air refueling during Exercise Cope North 25, Guam. February 10, 2025. Credit: ADF

Dr Robbin Laird, Dr. Marcus Hellyer on Breaking the Autonomous Systems Defence Employment Barrier, 24 May 2025 Link to article (Defense.info) On May 22, 2025, I had a chance to talk with Dr. Marcus Hellyer about a key problem which was raised during his presentation yesterday at the Sir Richard Williams Foundation seminar. Australia faces its most challenging strategic environment since World War II, yet its defense establishment remains locked in outdated thinking that could prove catastrophic in a future conflict. Despite having a $59 billion (AD) defense budget and world-class autonomous systems companies operating in its northern waters, the Australian Defense Force (ADF) continues to treat cutting-edge autonomous systems as experimental curiosities rather than essential warfighting tools. While defense officials typically cite legal, ethical, and budgetary concerns as barriers to autonomous systems adoption, Hellyer argues these are largely excuses masking deeper cultural problems. “I think those are excuses. Those aren’t real barriers. You can overcome them because people already have around the world,” he observed. “The real issues are cultural. They’re mental barriers.” The financial argument particularly frustrates defense experts. With $59 billion Australian dollars available annually, the relatively modest investments needed for autonomous systems development pale in comparison to traditional platform costs. The problem isn’t money — it’s mindset. The fundamental issue lies in applying Cold War-era acquisition thinking to 21st-century technology. Traditional defense platforms like destroyers or fighter jets represent 30-year investments requiring extensive development and testing before deployment. Autonomous systems operate on entirely different principles. “We have to regard autonomous systems as consumables, not as 30-year investments,” Hellyer emphasized. These systems function more like sophisticated tools with 5-year lifecycles, designed for specific tasks rather than decades of general-purpose service. This shift demands abandoning the pursuit of perfect requirements before acquisition. Instead of spending years developing ideal specifications, defense forces should deploy systems quickly and learn through operational use. The Ukrainian conflict demonstrates this approach dramatically — their autonomous systems “are nowhere near technological readiness level nine” yet have sunk Russian ships, downed helicopters, and conducted strikes against land targets. Current defense thinking creates a self-defeating cycle: officials claim they cannot acquire systems without understanding requirements, but requirements can only be understood through actual operational experience. This worked for traditional platforms where single acquisitions represented massive investments, but autonomous systems offer the freedom to experiment and iterate. “But one can only understand what works and what doesn’t work if you actually have them in service and you give them to your smart young men and women, and then they’re experimenting with them,” Hellyer added. The key is treating these systems as operational tools rather than experimental projects. Despite institutional inertia, Australia possesses significant advantages for autonomous systems development. While the nation cannot build F-35 fighters or sophisticated submarines, its industrial base excels in areas directly relevant to autonomous systems: mining support, agriculture, construction, and transportation. “The Australian industrial base can actually design autonomous systems. It can build autonomous systems. And it wouldn’t be difficult to be able to build them at scale,” Hellyer observed. This capability becomes crucial when considering extended conflicts where access to American-built systems may be limited. Companies like Ocius already demonstrate this potential, operating autonomous vessels in Australia’s northern waters after overcoming initial bureaucratic resistance. What started as skepticism from harbor authorities has evolved into acceptance of unmanned operations—proof that institutional barriers dissolve once systems prove their value Australia’s geographic challenges make autonomous systems particularly valuable. Traditional ISR assets cannot simultaneously monitor all approaches through the archipelagic regions to Australia’s north. Autonomous systems can maintain persistent surveillance of multiple strategic chokepoints, ports, and transit lanes while freeing expensive crewed platforms for other missions. This creates possibilities for layered defense concepts: autonomous systems provide the sensor grid, identify threats, and communicate with crewed platforms for prosecution. Such approaches offer redundancy, reduced signatures, and decentralized command structures—all essential for modern conflict. While Western defense establishments agonize over autonomous systems ethics, potential adversaries face no such constraints. Authoritarian regimes will deploy whatever works without philosophical hesitation. This reality should inform acquisition strategies, but instead, ethical concerns often become excuses for inaction. The contrast with Ukrainian innovation is stark. Facing existential threats, Ukrainian forces rapidly adapted commercially available systems for military use through trial and error. Their approach demonstrates that sophisticated defense organizations aren’t necessary for effective autonomous systems employment—adaptability and willingness to experiment matter more than perfect doctrine. Every month of institutional delay represents lost operational learning and capability development. Unlike traditional platforms requiring years of development, autonomous systems can provide immediate value while continuously improving through operational experience. More concerning, delay allows adversaries to gain advantages in systems that could prove decisive in future conflicts. The question isn’t whether autonomous systems will transform warfare—Ukraine has already demonstrated that reality. The question is whether Australia will adapt quickly enough to remain strategically relevant. Overcoming institutional resistance requires acknowledging that autonomous systems represent a fundamental paradigm shift, not merely new platforms within existing frameworks. This means: Treating systems as consumable tools rather than generational investments Accepting operational learning over perfect pre-deployment requirements Recognizing task-specific design over general-purpose platforms Embracing rapid iteration cycles instead of extended development programs The alternative is continuing current patterns until a strategic shock forces adaptation—potentially too late to maintain strategic advantage. For Hellyer, Australia’s defense establishment must move beyond treating autonomous systems as experimental curiosities and recognize them as essential capabilities for modern defense. The technology exists, the industrial base can support it, and operational concepts are proven in current conflicts. What’s missing is institutional courage to abandon comfortable legacy thinking and embrace the autonomous revolution already transforming global security. The choice is clear: adapt now through deliberate action or adapt later under the pressure of strategic crisis. History suggests the latter option rarely ends well. Note: Technology Readiness Level 9 (TRL 9) in the Australian Defence acquisition system is defined as: TRL 9: System Proven and Ready for Full Commercial Deployment Definition: Actual system proven through successful operations in operating environment, and ready for full commercial deployment. Description: The technology is in its final form and operated under the full range of operating conditions. Examples include steady state 24/7 manufacturing meeting cost, yield, and output targets. Emphasis shifts toward statistical process control. Context of TRL 9 in Defence Acquisition TRL 9 represents the highest level of technological maturity in the Defence acquisition system. At this level: The technology has completed all development phases It has been proven through successful operations in real operating environments The system is ready for full-scale deployment and manufacturing All technical, engineering, and manufacturing risks have been retired The focus shifts to process optimization and quality control TRLs 7-9 fall within the domain of industry and take promising technologies through to maturity and production, ready for deployment. TRLs are based on a scale from 1 to 9 with 9 being the most mature technology The TRL system is used by the Australian Department of Defence to assess and communicate technology maturity consistently across different acquisition programs, helping to manage risk and make informed decisions about capability development and procurement.

Financial members are invited to attend our Williams Foundation Errol McCormack Lunches. Dates for 2025 are Tuesday 25 February 2025 Thursday 1 May 2025 Tuesday 12 August 2025 Tuesday 18 November 2025 To register for a lunch click here To apply for membership click here Inquiries: events@williamsfoundation.org.au

Dates for 2025 are Financial members and Defence personnel are invited to attend our Williams Foundation Conferences. Thursday, 22 May 2025 The Imperative for Cost Effectiveness in Multi-domain Operations Thursday, 18 September 2025 For conference details and to register click here To apply for membership click here Inquiries: events@williamsfoundation.org.au

Dr Robbin Laird, Shaping a Way Ahead for Airpower in a Contested Region: The Perspective of Air Vice Marshal Glen Braz, 7 October 2024 Link to article (Defense.info) Air Vice Marshal Braz participated in the latest Sir Richard Williams Foundation seminar on September 26, 2024. His presentation and engagement were as part of a panel with Rear Admiral Christopher Smith, Commander Australian Fleet which focused on how to generate mass for the ready force. I had chance to meet with him and to enhance the discussion in a meeting in his office. I had the privilege of interviewing him when he was at Amberley Airbase commanding the Wing which hosted the new Growler squadron. And then again when he presented at the August 23, 2017 Williams Foundation seminar on the future of electronic warfare. Obviously, his experience with electronic warfare put him at the heart of evolving combat realities, namely the core significance of prevailing in the electro-magnetic spectrum. During the discussion in his office, we went over the major elements of his presentation but discussed in more detail his point regarding the need to have a sense of urgency. It is crucial from a ready force perspective to drive change in how one organizationally shapes the force. This is how he put it: We need to enhance a sense of urgency in shaping the ready force. We’ve been very habitualized in managing long lead, large programs with long gestation and comprehensive oversight. We have done so through a slow approval process with rigorous analysis which deliver exquisite systems which allow us to shape a framework around which we can operate and with which we can operate, But such an approach is lacking in terms of providing rapidly what the near-term enhanced force in being sees as immediate needs. Such a system doesn’t naturally deliver the enhancements that I would seek for the ready force in a timely manner. We need to adjust our focus on defense preparedness to encompass organizational change that can quickly deliver near-term solutions identified by our forces in being. It was clear that as Air Commander Australia, Air Vice Marshal Braz has to be prepared for the ready force to support the missions directed by the Joint force commander. And one might put it that adaptation of the force under duress is a key driver of change, and the challenge is organizationally how to build in the capacity to drive force design from such a perspective rather than doing so primarily from the standpoint of the core platforms to be acquired in the future, And this approach underscores the importance of trusting the operational force to identify gaps to be met. Air Vice Marshal Braz put it this way: We talk increasingly about the workforce having a warfighter mindset. The ability and willingness for people to adapt is going to be fundamental to our war fighting effectiveness. I need every human that we have contributing to the effort, and I need them to be contributing in ways that they haven’t even figured out apply to them yet. There’s a trust equation inherent in mission rehearsal. In mission rehearsals, we find gaps, and we look for rapid ways, perhaps imperfect, to remedy the gaps. And then we try to give technology that we think will solve known problems to our workforce, and we let them have the license to integrate it and operate with it in ways that we probably never imagined that they would. But with their creativity and their adaptability they find ways to do so. By then adopting the solutions they find into the ready force, we are incentivizing them to work in an innovative way that makes the ready force better in the near term. I pointed out that when he was working in EW, it is an area which succeeds only by staying ahead of the game. In EW or more generally in Tron Warfare, it is crucial to ensure that the force has transient software advantage. In this graphic developed several years ago and presented to me during a visit to Australia, this challenge was visually imagined this way: Air Vice Marshal Braz further emphasized: One needs to be able to rebuild the force quickly, and that applies across the whole system of capabilities. We need to adapt quickly. And another element that I’m really interested in is our ability to generate tempo despite potentially disaggregating the force for survivability and for maneuver within that disaggregation. But I need to be able to catch the adversary off guard and to punch multiple times in diverse ways and axis of maneuver. We need to be able to maximize our force and do things that will disrupt the enemy’s thinking, and do the unexpected, which is going to be important for us a small force. We need to be a smart force to which can provide technological advantage in the sense of being able to have ongoing and transient advantage. Braz highlighted that collaboration among the Australian, American and British Air Warfare Centers provided an important way for the RAAF to explore concrete ways to get better value out of the ready force, and to cross-learn ways to gain combat advantages through enhanced training and identifying combat gaps that need to be and can be filled by technological or other fixes. He argued: We can find ways to seek asymmetry and apply new technology quickly. I thank such a capability is a key contributor to the deterrence equation.

Dr Robbin Laird, Defence Industry in Australia: Building Strategic Depth and Resilience in Support of the Ready Force, 7 October 2024 Link to article (Defense.info) The September 26, 2024 Sir Richard Williams Foundation focused on accelerating the capabilities of the ready force. Defence industry in Australia is obviously a key player in the ability for the government to find ways to enhance the ready force. A panel of six industrial representatives discussed this challenge lead by Katherine Ziesing of the Sir Richard Williams Foundation as the facilitator. The six panelists in order of providing presentations were as follows: Andrew Doyle, Director, Business Area Lead, Aeronautics from Lockheed Martin Aeronautics; Nick Leake, Head of Satellite and Space Systems, Optus; Derek Reinhardt, Director of Engineering and Operational Excellence, Northrop Grumman Australia; Dr. Brad Ferguson, Joint Battlespace Systems Technical Director, Raytheon Australia; Daniel Reiniger, Engineering Manager MQ-28A Ghost Bat Combat Collaborative Aircraft (CCA), The Boeing Company; and Dr. Gary Eves, Principal Technology Officer of CAE Defense and Security. The first speaker, Andrew Doyle, underscored how he viewed industry and its role in Australian defence resilience. The critical enablers to growth in industry capacity–your experienced workforce, your facilities, and your capital equipment– have lead times of years to establish the scale that Australia will potentially need. We’re already operating in a contested environment in terms of competing with other national priorities. With defence, where government is typically the owner, the operator and the regulator of defence systems, there’s definitely a role for government to play in fostering that ecosystem for defence industry to be able to grow the scale and depth that Australia needs to be calling upon in the future. To do this requires a well-considered investment strategy and in my view, a partnership with industry whereby industry can make investments that lead to capacity for them and capability for the ADF. Any disruption in investment ensures that capability will not be there for the ADF. Doyle put his assessment this way: I will now talk about industry’s role in building a resilient and scalable national defence ecosystem which starts with the basics of depth of industry presence and a close degree of integration between industry and defense. Industry needs to have the appropriate degree of insight into defence plans and capability and preparedness requirements for defence to leverage the additional mass and scale that industry can bring. The key to success is communication and close partnerships to ensure that we’re getting alignment of resources and actions to best affect where industry can contribute to the operational viability of the integrated force… Andrew Doyle, Director, Business Area Lead, Aeronautics from Lockheed Martin Aeronautics, The second panelist was Nick Leake. He underscored that the ADF cannot operate effectively without secure C2 and ISR, and that in today’s world this means secure access to space and to satellites. He noted that Optus currently operates three geo satellites, one of which carries defence payloads. Leake then highlighted the coming of the Optus 11 satellite which he indicated would be the first software-defined satellite in the region. He underscored: With these new spacecrafts you will have fundamental intelligence on board, and you will be able to configure that satellite in terms of its capacity and where you’re actually pointing that capacity. Putting a chip on board the spacecraft obviously then opens up further issues with cyber security, because you’re putting intelligence in space, and you have to protect that asset the best you can. He then highlighted Optus working on in orbit servicing which will allow the satellite service life to be extended as fuel tanks are replaced on the satellite in orbit. He next discussed the LEO revolution which is obviously a significant transformer of the space satellite eco system but indicated that Optus worked with partners to leverage LEO constellations and to shape an adaptive network. Leake highlighted the importance of Dr. Davis’s presentation on the need for enhanced sovereign space capability and indicated that Optus was a key part of any such effort. Nick Leake, Head of Satellite and Space Systems, Optus The third presenter was Derek Reinhardt from Northrop Grumman Australia. His focus was on their work in enhancing the efficacy of sustainment in support of the ready force. NG is involved in the sustainment of the KC-30, the C-27J, the VIP fleet and the Triton. About two years ago, we were trying to bring all of our programs together and have them work in a more consistent way. To do so, we set about building a sustainment delivery model which was really intended initially to align our programs, but it’s providing us interesting insights into the information that moves within a sustainment environment: the speed that that information needs to move, the decisions that hang off that information and how the enterprise combines to be able to do so. He then when on to describe their creation in effect of a digital twin of the sustainment system. He went to argue that through this effort they have enhanced their ability to focus on the critical enablers for managing the information flows for decision making in the sustainment enterprise. He noted: What we’ve really learned to be successful, the architecture, the cyber-worthiness, and the whole concept of the data fabric is absolutely vital. When applied to the challenge of sustainment in a contested environment or contested logistics, this led him to the conclusion: How the data fabric is architected is crucial for it to continue to operate. Derek Reinhardt, Director of Engineering and Operational Excellence, Northrop Grumman Australia The fourth speaker was Dr. Brad Ferguson from Raytheon Australia. He certainly underscored the importance of enhancing the sense of urgency and speed to turn innovations into combat capabilities. This is how he put it: We need to adapt our architectures to support plugins for new capabilities, new technologies to support the rapid growth and leverage those technologies, everything from AI to quantum to hypersonics to directed energy to autonomy, these things will shape the future battlefield. He argued that the challenge and opportunity is to combine international cooperation with Australian delivery of capability. He then provided an example of this approach. We started with the NASAMS system fielded in nine other countries, and then we built it from the ground up, integrating it with Australian innovation. Working with over 30 companies across Australia, we integrated CEA radars, novel electrooptic infrared systems, new tactical data links to integrate with the Australian internet and military teams, integrating new missiles to leverage in service munitions, and ended up with the most capable short range ground-based air defence system in the world. Some of those Australian innovations are now making their way back into the global community, supporting our allies and allowing for export opportunities. Dr. Brad Ferguson, Joint Battlespace Systems Technical Director, Raytheon Australia The fifth speaker was Daniel Reiniger of The Boeing Company. His presentation was short and succinct and focused on a key area of developing and incorporating autonomous systems into the ADF. This is what he highlighted: What we need to focus on is building something that’s built to adapt. That’s in the wheelhouse of the collaborative combat aircraft, because if we don’t build something that’s adaptable, it will be obsolete before we even get it fielded. How do we evolve our thinking, so we actually build something that’s adaptable? The answer that we’re coming to is embracing open mission system standards and embracing not just open architectures, but government defined open architectures. What does that do? It opens up a best of industry ecosystem where everyone can come to the party. It lowers the barrier of entry. When we talk about CCAs, we talk about machine autonomy, we talk about flight autonomy, we talk about crewed and uncrewed teaming. It’s simply too much for any one company to build the platform and then pull all of that together in a coherent manner. By expanding the ecosystem and lowering the barrier to entry, you can get smaller and more companies that have niche skills into the effort. Daniel Reiniger, Engineering Manager MQ-28A Ghost Bat Combat Collaborative Aircraft (CCA), The Boeing Company The final presentation was by Dr. Gary Eves from CAE Defense and Security who highlighted the growing importance in training and innovations in training to enhance the operational capability of the ready force. He started by talking about the challenge for today’s force in terms of training. One of the things we need to understand is that the one size fits all approach just does not work for training. That requires a fundamental change in how we do things. What we are trying to do is evolve the capability of our young people to work with incredibly complex systems. Now it’s not just a question of pure technical proficiency. They are decision makers. They’re operating in a highly complex environment that requires dynamic decision making en masse, in real time, maybe without support. He highlighted the importance of training for effective operation by teams in performing key tasks and missions which not only lead to mission success but to more rewarding experiences which are important in being to retain the personnel which you want and need for the organization. He also underscored the importance of shaping effective ways for training in a coalition environment. This especially challenging because of different historical, linguistic and cultural experiences. CAE has worked and is working on a variety of approaches to succeed in the demanding training environments for the ready force operating in the new strategic environment. Dr. Gary Eves, Principal Technology Officer of CAE Defense and Security There was a Q and A session after the panel presentations but the key focus was on the crucial need to reshape the partnership with government both for defence and commercial firms. As one participant put it: Don’t try to design something in five years, because by the time you get it in five years, it’s obsolete. We need an agile approach whereby we can build a capability, and then, over the years, we can add to that capability. Governments have to take some of the risk, and stop chucking the risk onto industry, because a lot of industries, particularly small business, will just walk away. If we have a shared risk and investment approach, we can have an agile model of delivering capability. And the concept of “relational contracting” was introduced in a discussion of sustainment and support for the ready force, but perhaps has a wider application. As one participant put it: Relational contracting is an environment of defining how we work together, rather than defining specific technical requirements. Our best performing sustainment programs are those where you create the right relationship, you create the right dialog. A shared situational awareness is created and shared understanding of who makes the right decision at the right time and with the right information which builds the trust that’s needed for the desired outcome.

Dr Robbin Laird, Enabling and Defending the National Information Society: The Space Dimension, 7 October 2024 Link to article (Defense.info) Some time ago – more than a decade – I worked with Alan Dupas, the noted French space expert, on a project for a European space company on the future of space in 2020. We focused on the key point that although a space company was most closely identified with launchers and satellites, the future was its engagement in the global information society. Let me say that we were not greeted with cheers and love. Rather the major company we were dealing with shuddered at the thought that its “things” might be overshadowed by a product – data, communications and information. This of course puts a space company into competition with a range of providers of data, communications and information. Space is enabler of much which goes on in earth providing the nodes and networks of an information society. But space is costly, complex and governments are loath to invest more than they have to in such “esoteric” technology whose investments might cut into social spending or green energy or whatever the priority is for a sitting government. This is certainly the case for Australia. Dr. Malcolm Davis at the September 26, 2024 Sir Richard Williams Foundation seminar provided a compelling case for Australian space investments and acceleration of engagement in the space sector. This is how presented and discussed this important subject: Space is contested and congested. When we’re talking about resilience, both being contested and congested are really becoming much more acute as a challenge. Assuring space access for the ADF can be defined in different ways, but I would argue that it’s not just about being able to use a foreign provider. It is also about sovereign space capabilities. Space domain awareness allows space control. If you look at the national defense strategy and integrated investment program, it highlighted space domain awareness. Then importantly made the point that space control is an important task for the ADF.. We can’t have assured access to space if we only rely on foreign launch providers to give us that capability. We need to prioritize our national space capabilities, including sovereign launch. We need to pursue space policy as a whole of nation endeavor. We don’t currently have that. It was started by the previous government. Those efforts were canceled by the current government. I would argue that we need to restore a whole of nation space strategy. Space is an operational domain in its own right… We’re seeing in the arsenals of our adversaries counter space capabilities. And these capabilities do not apply only in hot war scenarios. They could also be used in terms of gray zone operations as well… We need to think in terms of how we defend against what the Chinese call system destruction warfare or how they can utilize counter space capabilities along with cyber attack, electromagnetic operations, and kinetic operations to take down critical Information Infrastructure as quickly as possible… Part of resilience is managing space traffic and that requires a new approach to how we think about space domain awareness, how we manage the increasing amount of material that’s in orbit. Space is increasingly competitive in the sense that it’s no longer just the sole domain of the major powers. It is also about the activity of small to medium powers, including Australia, as well as commercial actors. And space has become democratized through a combination of falling costs that are driven by new technologies which allows more states to do things in space than previously was considered possible or financially viable. That means there is a greater possibility that you could get either non state actors, commercial actors or hostile state actors essentially using space in a way that’s inimical to our interests. But it also brings opportunities in the sense that more states like Australia can actually do things in space that previously were beyond our capabilities… We’re starting to think about space 3.0. Space 1.0 was the Apollo era of big space agencies and the activities were the taxpayer funded and government led. Space 2.0 was the establishment and the emergence of commercial space activities which really transformed the space environment and global space activity, Space 3.0 is that next step that beckons in the future. It’s that opportunity to do space-based industry and a manufacturing capability, a space based economy that exploits space resources and new environments such as lunar space. We have to challenge the orthodox mindsets that I think currently exist within government which primarily thinks about space in terms of satellites and rockets and start thinking about how we can utilize space in radically new and different ways that generate prosperity and growth. He then went on to discuss how adversarial actions in space (war in space) can bring down or dismantle space infrastructure and that this infrastructure is a key part of a functioning information system for Australia. This meant that the Australian government needed to get out of any stoved-piped look at space and take a broader view which would include space policy in the whole of nation concept of defence. A slide from Dr. Davis’s presentation at the September 26, 2024 Sir Richard Williams Foundation. He then added: The democratization of space technology means that space is no longer dominated purely by the major actors, so it’s far more unpredictable as an operating environment. Increasingly, counter space technologies are moving in radically different ways and posing direct threats to space assets. For example, If you think back to the Cold War, there was no such thing as cyber warfare. Now we have the potential opportunity for cyber-attacks on satellites that can create scalable or reversible effects to disable or deny. And so suddenly, space weapons or space warfare or counter space capabilities become far more usable because it’s in the interests of our adversaries to use them. And I think that our adversaries recognize that space warfare and counter space capabilities can generate decisive strategic effect. Space is critical for maintaining how we fight wars and how we undertake joint and integrated operations across multiple domains, but it’s also vital for sustaining our information-based economies and societies… Modern information-based societies depend on space capabilities to function, in particular through satellite communications, but also positioning, navigation and timing services. Everything that we do in a modern society from using information on our mobile phones, to our computers, to stock markets, logistics systems, all of that depends on the space capabilities. That dependency will grow in the future, particularly as we get more and more reliant on processes of change associated with the Internet of Things and pursue the fourth industrial revolution. Such transitions demand that we have continued access to space Dr. Davis then went on the identify the various means of space attack and degradation which adversaries have already demonstrated. And his point was clear – If Australia wants to protect its free and open society, if it wants to support a “rules-based” order which in my view is shrinking globally, how can you do so without an effective space engagement policy? Featured Photo: Dr. Davis speaking too the September 26, 2024 Sir Richard Williams Foundation.

Dr Robbin Laird, The Challenge of Shaping the Way Ahead for the Ready Force and Preparing for Future Threats, 5 October 2024 Link to article (Defense.info) Prior to the 26 September 2024 Sir Richard Williams Foundation seminar which focused on shaping a way ahead for the ready force, I spoke with John Conway to get his perspective on the focus of the seminar. With four decades experience in the business of air combat across operations and industry, John is identified this way on the foundation website: John is the Managing Director of Felix, an independent company providing specialist capability development and operational analysis services to Defence since 2017. He was previously a business development and strategy executive with Raytheon Australia specialising in air combat integration, electronic warfare, advanced weapons systems, test and training ranges, and integrated air and missile defence. John retired from the Royal Air Force as a Group Captain in 2010 having served 24 years in a number flying, staff and senior command roles. His operational experience on F4 Phantom and Tornado F3 aircraft included Cold War Europe, the South Atlantic, the Balkans, and the Middle East. He commanded the United Kingdom’s largest Permanent Joint Operating Base at RAF Akrotiri in Cyprus between 2005 and 2008 enabling the airbridge into Iraq and Afghanistan, and supporting strategic ISR operations in the eastern Mediterranean. Conway underscored that the foundation seminars had most recently focused on the strategic redesign of the government for the ADF. But the future is not yet here, and the question is how lethal and survivable and effective is the ADF now in its operations? How can it be more effective in the near term? And how are the ADF and defence industry focused on doing so? “For defence leadership, there is a very complex challenge of balancing investments in today’s battles and the future ones. But to understand the challenges for the ready force we need to get outside of the Canberra environment and understand how operational commanders and the ready force are addressing current challenges and shaping a practical way ahead. “We have threats squeezing the defence force. We have a challenging fiscal environment. Despite starting from a less-than-ideal situation, how do we operate more effectively in the here and now while keeping an eye on the future? How do we get everybody to work together to create outcomes greater than the sum of the parts?” He then discussed the late Cold War period where the West understood that it was at a disadvantage with the Soviet Union in a number of areas but worked on building its own asymmetric advantages as part of a credible deterrent structure. He argued that we need the same attitude and approach for today’s world as well. By focusing on our competitive advantages and enhancing them, one can build a pathway to reinforce the ready force and build for the future. He identified a number of areas for particular attention where activities today can shape the development of the future force. The first is the sophisticated exploitation of the electromagnetic spectrum in both defensive and offensive counter air missions. Here he discussed the importance of enhancing the resilience and redundancy in our systems and honing a kill web approach which makes the denial of core ADF electromagnetic capabilities very difficult and hence enhancing the overall deterrent effect. The second was the question of shaping credible ways ahead to build combat mass. Here the focus is upon building and operating within the ready force various types of autonomous collaborative systems and working them in as key enablers of the payloads necessary for a significantly enhanced integrated force. The third is strengthening the enablers of a kill web, notably in terms of C2 and distributed ISR and the ability to perform effective counter-ISR against the adversary. Central to this is an enterprise approach to mission data management and reprogramming for the integrated force. Work is being done to enable the ready force now and how it is being done is shaping the future force as well. He concluded with a very important core point about leveraging and building on the ready force and our lessons learned in the Cold War as we build the future force. “I think going back to some of the traditional ways that we’ve done things in the Cold War and making them more contemporary by the exploitation of new radio frequency technologies and putting the money into the back end of the systems, through the networks, the comms architecture, the mission data environment, and start bringing tempo as well to the way we operate. “It sounds a little bit more like an evolution rather than a revolution. And I think that’s fair. We don’t need to destroy everything that we’ve learned in the past. We just need to keep investing in that next stage and accept that the future probably is a smaller available workforce, and this means we need to effectively exploit technology such as autonomous systems for an enhanced ready force.”

Dr Robbin Laird, How Does the Ready Force Deal with a Rapidly Changing Operational Environment? 4 October 2024 Link to article (Defense.info) It is fine to have long-range force structure planning, but what happens when the operational environment is rapidly changing for your operational force? How to adapt the ready force effectively and adeptly in a timely manner? And what consequences does that have for one’s long-range force structure design? The presentation by Jennifer Parker, Expert Associate National Security College of the Australian National University, focused on a key challenge which raises such questions. Her presentation was entitled: “The Contested Maritime Domain: Challenges for an Integrated Force?” What she focused on was the changing nature of littoral maritime operations, the emergence of new technologies and concepts of operations by various actors notably in the Black and Red Seas, and how those shifts in approach affected maritime operations. The bottom line of her analysis was that the new technologies and approaches had a clear impact on capital naval vessels, and with relevant defence measures, technologies and relevant training, capital ships could still operate effectively in the littorals. But the point can be put bluntly: you need to adapt your ready force to deal with new technologies, new con-ops and technologies. And a point outside of her presentation was inherent within it: what is the future of capital ships integrating maritime autonomous systems? For defence? For offense? Or as I would put it, it is not a question of crewed versus uncrewed vessels. It is about how crewed vessels could leverage offboard assets like maritime autonomous systems or air systems for the projection of effect or defence in depth. Jennifer Parker speaking at the September 26, 2024 Sir Richard Williams Foundation. Her first case study was of the Black Sea and contested littoral operations there. She argued that: The range of the littoral is increasing. Ukraine has effectively used uncrewed surface vessels, cruise missiles and UAVs to target ships at greater ranges. Now we don’t know the exact ranges of some of the uncrewed surface vessels that Ukraine has operated, but certainly they managed to hit the Kursk bridge at about 300 nautical miles from Ukrainian controlled territory. That is a dramatic change in terms of the range of the littoral. Ukraine has managed to destroy about 30% of Russia’s Black Sea fleet, and certainly pushed them back from Ukraine and territorial seas and from Crimea, and that’s no mean feat when you look at the USV engagements, But what must considered is how the Russian ships have defended themselves. They have no countermeasures whatsoever. They’re barely maneuvering or defending themselves…As offensive capability evolves, we need to be working hard on what the defensive capability is and integrating it into our platforms. She noted as well that USVs can certainly attack ports and port infrastructure. This means that there need to be countermeasures for this new threat as well. The key takeaways from her analysis were the following: Range of the littoral is increasing Sea denial strategy in enclosed seas Ship preparedness / posture is key Balance between development of offensive / defensive balance (capability / counter capability) Maritime trade does not stop during conflict Importance of port infrastructure protection Her second case study was of the Red Sea and the approach of the Houthis to disruption in the littorals. She argued that: The Houthis have been successful in changing the direction of maritime trade. There have been over 100 attacks now on merchant shipping, and 30 of these attacks have managed to sink a couple of ships. This shows the vulnerability of choke points using the kind of systems and technology available to the Houthis. They have attacked but not damaged surface combatants. She underscored that prepared surface vessels have successfully defended themselves but two problems have been underscored for the ready force. First, the fleet needs to find ways to be rearmed with missiles while at sea. Second, the fleet needs to find much cheaper ways to defeat the unmanned strike force directed against the fleet. She argued that it was necessary for the ready force to be “stressed tested” by engaging in such deployments to evolve its combat edge. The key takeaways from her analysis were the following: Vulnerability of chokepoints Continuing relevance of surface combatants Magazine depth / Replenishment at sea Integration of counter-drone capabilities Importance of stress testing capabilities Continuing relevance of convoy operations Strategic depth in maritime fleet Defence / maritime industry coordination Maritime trade doesn’t stop / it evolves Her third case study was of the PRC actions against the Philippines. The key takeaways from her analysis were the following: Blurring of civil maritime security threats Criticality of maritime domain awareness Effective presence operations require quantity of forces Integration of information operations into wider campaign strategy And finally she addressed the active threats to sea laid cables which are critical to the information flows globally. Here she asked the poignant question: “Whose responsibility for such defense is this in Australia? And what are we doing about it?” This challenge is a key one, which parts of NATO are finally addressing in Europe. For example, in the recent NORDIC WARDEN Exercise, the UK and Northern European nations exercised their forces to shape a con-ops to deal with this, although the exercise indicated important technology and force structure gaps to deal with the challenge. With regard to operations in the Red Sea, she noted: A number of the European navies who have gone through their workups and gone through their test and evaluation have sent ships to the Red Sea and learned very quickly that their combat systems and their missile systems were not up for the fight and had to withdraw them. That is something that we want to learn before we are getting multiple missiles shot at us in the event of a more significant conflict. Parker underscored the really crucial point that when it comes to naval operations, the military and the civilian aspects are intertwined. Australia depends on maritime trade, which will need to continue in times of conflict, and to do so, the military and civilian parts of the equation need to be clearly working together. She noted: We’ve learned that defence and maritime industry need to coordinate now. That’s something that we consistently relearn, and that has been a key point of the defence of merchant shipping in the Red Sea, and something that Australia needs to think about as we try and grow our maritime industry with strategic fleet… Maritime trade does not stop in the event of conflict, so the view that we don’t need to worry about it or that we just need to worry about protecting Australia has not borne itself out in our previous world wars and it is not bearing itself out in the Black Sea or the Red Sea. And what is happening in the west Philippine Sea is a clear blurring of civil maritime security threats. This is something that we need to pay attention to. We currently have a civil maritime strategy. We have a military maritime strategy, and the two don’t connect. It’s not too far to think that an adversary could try to overwhelm Australia’s maritime domain through using what we would continue consider civil maritime threats. And to Parker’s point about “Ship preparedness / posture is key”: