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The Imperative for an Independent Deterrent: A Joint Strike Seminar 23 August 2018 Synopsis and Program Download Pdf Handbook Download Pdf Final Report Laird, Robbin The ADF and the Way Ahead for an Australian Deterrent Strategy September 2018 Also available on the Second Line of Defense and the defense.info (ebook version) websites. The Central Blue In the lead up to the conference the Williams Foundation Blog The Central Blue focussed on the seminar theme. The Twitter/FB/LinkedIn hashtag is #jointstrike. To see the discussion, please visit, and possibly contribute, to the The Central Blue. Presentations WGCDR Jo Brick, Royal Australian Air Force and The Central Blue Strike, Deterrence and the RAAF - Speaking Notes Download Pdf Also available on The Central Blue Blog Michael Shoebridge, Australian Strategic Policy Institute The Strategic Implications of Regional Proliferation of Strike Capabilities No presentation available Dr Stephan Frühling, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University Australian Strike Capability and Nuclear Deterrence No presentation available GPCAPT Jason Begley, Headquarters Joint Operations Command The Future of Full Spectrum Strike No presentation available Dr Thomas Bussing, Raytheon Missile Systems Future Strike Systems No presentation available James Heading, Lockheed Martin Long Range Strike Presentation - available on request email info@williamsfoundation.org.au AM Stuart Atha CB, DSO, ADC, Royal Air Force Air Command Modern Deterrence: The RAF’s Contribution No presentation available AIRMSHL Gavin ‘Leo’ Davies AO, CSC, Chief of Air Force Implications for the RAAF No presentation available Michael Tarlton, Northrop Grumman Aerospace Systems Reconceptualising Independent Strike in the Digital Age: A Future Force Perspective No presentation available CDRE Timothy Brown RAN, Submarines, Royal Australian Navy In and From the Maritime Domain: The Royal Australian Navy’s Approach to Future Joint Strike No presentation available MAJGEN Adam Findlay AM, Special Operations Command Beyond the FLOT: The Australian Army’s Approach to Future Joint Strike No presentation available

LTG Michael Oates (Retd) Coalition Warfighting and Pacific AOR Interoperability Errol McCormack Members Lunch, 7 August 2019 Download pdf

Dr Robbin Laird Final Report: The Requirements of Fifth Generation Manoeuvre October 2019 In this report, the major presentations and discussions at the Williams Foundation seminar on the requirements for fifth generation manoeuvre held on October 24, 2019 in Canberra, Australia are highlighted along with interviews conducted before, during and after the seminar as well. What is fifth generation manoeuvre? The definition by Air Commodore Gordon of the Air Warfare Centre: “The ability of our forces to dynamically adapt and respond in a contested environment to achieve the desired effect through multiple redundant paths. Remove one vector of attack and we rapidly manoeuvre to bring other capabilities to bear through agile control.” The Australians are working through how to generate more effective combat and diplomatic capabilities for crafting, building, shaping and operating an integrated force. And the need for an integrated force built along the lines discussed at the Williams Foundation over the past six years, was highlighted by Vice Admiral David Johnston, Deputy Chief of the ADF at the recent Chief of the Australian Navy’s Seapower Conference in held in Sydney at the beginning of October: “It is only by being able to operate an integrated (distributed) force that we can have the kind of mass and scale able to operate with decisive effect in a crisis.” The need for such capabilities was highlighted by the significant presentation by Brendan Sargeant at the seminar where he addressed the major strategic shift facing Australia and why the kind of force transformation which the Williams Foundation seminars have highlighted are so crucial for Australia facing its future. In the future there will be times when we need to act alone, or where we will need to exercise leadership. We have not often had to do this in the past – The INTERFET operation in Timor, and RAMSI in the Solomon Islands are examples. We are far more comfortable operating as part of a coalition led by others. It is perhaps an uncomfortable truth, but that has been a consistent feature of our strategic culture. So I think our biggest challenge is not a technical or resource or even capability challenge – it is the enormous psychological step of recognising that in the world that we are entering we cannot assume that we have the support of others or that there will be others willing to lead when there is a crisis. We will need to exercise the leadership, and I think that is what we need to prepare for now. To return to the title of this talk: if we want assured access for the ADF in the Asia Pacific, then we need to work towards a world that ensures that that access is useful and relevant to the sorts of crises that are likely to emerge. I will leave one last proposition with you. Our assured access for the ADF in the Asia Pacific will be determined by our capacity to contribute to regional crisis management. That contribution will on some occasions require that we lead. The task now is to understand what this means and build that capacity. In short, it is not just about the kinetic capabilities, but the ability to generate political, economic and diplomatic capabilities which could weave capabilities to do environment shaping within which the ADF could make its maximum contribution. Download pdf

The bushfires, floods, and now COVID-19 will change the discussion of national security in Australia. The exact form of that change is still unclear; however, the subject matter experts in the Australian Defence Force must engage in and inform the debate early, consistently, and logically. This post is an example of how. Written before the effects of COVID-19 hit Australian shores, Nathan Thompson responds to calls – made in the aftermath of the bushfires – to divest the ADF of the C-27J Spartan. Recently, Michael Shoebridge from the Australian Strategic Policy Institute called for the Australian Defence Force (ADF) to restructure and divest assets that are not focused on the greatest threat level of conflict with China. Of particular note is Shoebridge’s call to divest the C-27J Spartan; to remove it from the ADF asset mix and place it with another government agency for domestic and regional disaster response. This move would produce an unbalanced force and reduce strategic options for Government, as well as a potential reduction in support from the Australian people. Geopolitical relations are increasingly being viewed as a spectrum; from cooperation to competition and at the far right, conflict.[1] This spectrum presents several challenges to international relations in an age typified by events such as the Crimean conflict,  South China Sea tensions, and ongoing economic development in Africa. Somewhere in the middle of this spectrum is a wide range of possible outcomes associated with competition that is often underestimated. A Royal Australian Air Force C-27J Spartan aircraft lands at Honiara Airport, Solomon Islands, on completion of a maritime surveillance mission during Operation Solania. Shoebridge is right to argue that the C-27J is unlikely to survive in a ‘dense threat environment of a conflict with a peer-level state military’. The C-27J, like other air mobility platforms, was not designed with the attributes that make air combat platforms survivable in high threat environments. The C-27J is, however, designed with a modern electronic warfare self-protection suite that aims to ensure its survivability in conflicts at lower threat levels than those present in a peer state military. This is important because conflict will not just be with a peer-level competitor. Throughout the Cold War – arguably, an extended competition similar to what is presently being observed with China – proxy conflicts were fought between countries with lower levels of capability, thereby presenting scenarios with lower threat levels than is present in direct conflict with China.[2] In this phase of the competition, China is increasingly seeking influence over other countries. A successful method for China to achieve this influence would be contributing militarily to a low-level conflict security mission within another state’s borders. The Australian Government’s decision to retain an ability to contribute to low-level conflict resolution is critical in this age of competition. Military air mobility platforms such as the C-27J permit survivable access to low threat level conflict, as well as survivable logistic support during the conflict, such as that provided in Afghanistan and Iraq over the past 18 years. Divesting assets not focused on the highest threshold of conflict also reduces the ability for the ADF to interact with the Australian people. By design, highly specialised military platforms have restrictive security requirements on both their display and general capability specifications. A military order of battle which features only high-end, specialised and secure capabilities will necessarily be concealed to the public. Reduced interaction with the Australian people will potentially lead to calls for re-allocation of scarce resources, and limit recruiting pools, with longer-term capability impacts. The Australian Defence Force must retain a balanced force. Assets that are part of a ‘balanced force’ are vital to the cooperation end of the spectrum for domestic and regional disaster relief. ‘Balanced force’ assets enable better interaction with the Australian population and achieve reputational benefits for the ADF. Operation Bushfire Assist earlier in 2020 demonstrated this – the C-27J evacuated citizens from Mallacoota ahead of the fire front, among other civilian authority assistance and presence. Focusing only on the highest threshold of conflict removes response options for the Government in the cooperation, competition, and conflict phases of geopolitical relations. ‘Balanced force’ assets give the Australian Government greater strategic options and have positive longer-term capability impacts. Calls to focus only on the highest threat will lead to an unbalanced force, one who struggles to maintain a positive narrative with the Australian people. Squadron Leader Nathan Thompson is a serving Royal Australian Air Force officer. He is currently a C-27J pilot and flight commander at 35 Squadron. The opinions expressed are his alone and do not reflect those of the Royal Australian Air Force, the Australian Defence Force, or the Australian Government [1] See, for example, Accelerated Warfare and The Forge [2] Hugh White, 2019, How to Defend Australia (La Trobe University Press 2019), p. 11, 14, 38. #C27JSpartan #AustralianDefencePolicy #RoyalAustralianAirForce #AirPower #AustralianDefenceForce

Edward Luttwak is a political scientist known for his works on grand strategy, military history, and international relations. Moving to the United States (US) in 1972, Luttwak received a Doctorate in International Studies in 1975 and has served as a consultant to the US National Security Council; the US Department of State; and the US Army, Navy, and Air Force. While working for the Office of the Secretary of Defense/Net Assessment, Luttwak co-developed the manoeuvre-warfare concept. He also introduced the ‘operational level of war’ concept into Army doctrine while working at the US Army Training and Doctrine Command. Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace is a prescribed textbook in US war colleges and has been translated into several languages. In this review of Strategy, David Hood draws attention to Luttwak’s theory of strategy and its paradoxical, ironic, and contradictory logic. Luttwak’s objective is to explain a universal logic of strategy ‘that conditions all forms of war as well as the adversarial dealings of nations even in peace.’ This can be done, he argues, not by examining the often ‘absurd or self-destructive’ acts of statecraft themselves in which ‘no logic can be detected’, but by examining the often unintended outcomes of those actions or inactions. Luttwak suggests that by analysing the consequences of statecraft, the paradoxical, ironic and contradictory logic of strategy becomes manifest. The most important foundation for Luttwak’s theory is that strategy has two dimensions in which its logic unfolds. In the vertical dimension, five different levels—technical, tactical, operational, theatre, and grand strategic—interact but also conflict, because no natural harmony exists between them. In the horizontal dimension, the contest of wills between belligerents plays out through a dynamic interrelationship between action, reaction, culmination, overextension, and reversal. This Clausewitzian struggle is what gives strategy its perverse, paradoxical logic, and it occurs across all five vertical levels. Luttwak provides several illustrations of the paradoxical logic of strategy, including the often-used adaptation of Vegetius (si vis pacem, para bellum; if you want peace, prepare for war). The greatest contemporary example of strategy’s paradoxical logic is nuclear deterrence, where defenders must be ready to attack at all times; where being ready to attack in retaliation is evidence of peaceful intent; where preparing anti-nuclear defences is provocative; and where to derive any strategic benefit, the use of weapons must never occur. Nuclear weapons are therefore necessary, acquired, and maintained at heavy cost, but are strategically unusable. Luttwak organises Strategy around his two dimensions—Part One focusses on the horizontal dimension, while Parts Two and Three address the vertical dimension. The logic of strategy in the horizontal dimension is explored first from the perspective of a single belligerent. Chapter two then evaluates the logic ‘in action’. With little fanfare, Luttwak eloquently frames the paradoxical logic of strategy within the dynamic contest of wills that is statecraft in both war and peace. His description underpins the remaining arguments of the book: there are of course at least two conscious, opposed wills in any strategic encounter of war or peace… the paradoxical logic of strategy [is] an objective phenomenon, which determines outcomes whether or not the participants try to exploit it or are even conscious of its workings… we can recognize the logic in its totality as the coming together, even the reversal, of opposites. And this is a process manifest… in all that is strategical, in all that is characterized by the struggle of adversary wills… when the paradoxical logic of strategy assumes a dynamic form, it becomes the coming together, even the reversal, of opposites. In the entire realm of strategy, therefore, a course of action cannot persist indefinitely. It will instead tend to evolve into its opposite… Without such change, the logic will induce a self-negating evolution, which may reach the extreme of a full reversal, undoing war and peace, victory and defeat. The remaining two chapters in Part One analyse the paradoxical logic of strategy at the technical and grand strategic levels. At the technical level, Luttwak observes that advancements in technology promise much, but in reality provide an advantage only for a short period, as their success and/or vulnerabilities are always countered. Counter-countermeasures then emerge as the contest of wills continues dynamically. The result is that, paradoxically, technological advances do not normally make significant impacts—less remarkable equipment retains its (modest) utility for longer. Luttwak does not draw the analogy, but at the technical level his paradoxical logic plays out as one form of the Red Queen Effect. To avoid being outclassed, competitors must continuously evolve in response to enemy strengths, whilst defending their own weaknesses. Such adaptation is essential, but consumes resources and produces no long-term net benefit: ‘it takes all the running you can do, to keep in the same place.’ Luttwak also makes an observation that should serve as a warning to Western militaries that have in recent times pursued smaller quantities of high quality, often specialised equipment to combat the numerical superiority of traditional and potential future adversaries. Because such equipment costs more, a drive for economy in production, maintenance, and training often results. This should, however, be avoided, because the resultant homogeneity in systems means that military capability will suffer from common and hence easily exploitable vulnerabilities. Furthermore, weapon systems that are highly specialised cannot accommodate broad countermeasures. Joseph Stalin was right—quantity has a quality of its own. At the grand strategic level, Luttwak argues that another paradox becomes evident—political leaders, particularly in democratic states, have great difficulty in acting paradoxically in the manner required by strategy. This is the result of several factors, including the sheer complexity in undertaking strategy at the grand strategic level, that politicians are unskilled in strategy, and the need for politicians to often act astrategically to preserve their power and authority. Luttwak cautions that the pursuit of logical national interests can produce undesired strategic consequences: the consequences of the pervasive contradiction between commonsense [national] aims and [paradoxical] strategic logic… has made history into a record of the follies of mankind… Attempts to project linear logic into the realm of conflict, in search of commonsense cooperative solutions, are fairly frequent. If we want peace, why not simply have it? If we agree that weapons are costly and dangerous, why not simply disarm?… of course it is not intellectual error that induces these attempts… but rather the acute temptation to escape from the cruel paradoxical logic. For Luttwak, the inability of politicians to act paradoxically—and hence strategically—explains why wars are so often won by the belligerent who can apply superior resources. Because the quantity and quality of weapons is not a matter of strategy—a linear, economic logic applies to their use—when politicians fail to understand, or choose not to apply strategy, the belligerent that is able to apply superior resources will likely be the victor. It follows that when neither side acts strategically, the results of statecraft can often be determined in advance by simply identifying who is able to apply the greatest resources. This is a worrying claim for democratic middle-powers like Australia in the current strategic climate. Irrespective of, or in some cases despite, grand strategic behaviour, Luttwak suggests that war must eventually turn into its opposite, because it consumes and destroys the material and moral resources needed to keep fighting. Paradoxically, if measures are applied to end war ‘prematurely’, such as the prevention of military imbalances, humanitarian interventions, and even forced armistices, peace will be driven further from view. In times of peace, the same paradoxical logic conspires to encourage war, for example when a lack of defensive capability invites conquest; or because cultural, economic, social or other changes alter the conditions of strength that previously assured peace. In war, the capacity to wage further war is ultimately limited by war’s own destruction… In peacetime, by contrast, [almost] every form of human progress… tends to increase war-making capacities, and not in a symmetrical way, thus disturbing the military balances that once kept the peace. If peace did not induce war, there would be no war – for war cannot perpetuate itself. Part Two of Strategy deals with the lower four levels of the vertical dimension. Success at each level relies on different factors. At the technical level, weapon systems interact which makes estimating the outcome of any discrete contest relatively easy. These results are, however, the least important strategically because success at one level does not assure success at the next. At the tactical level, skill, leadership, unit cohesion and fortune become important. At the operational level, particular styles of warfare play out. Attrition fails gracefully but can only succeed cumulatively, whereas manoeuvre fails catastrophically but can succeed with little resources being expended. The more manoeuvrist the operational style is, the more important is the operational level. At the theatre level, the mobility of forces takes primacy in shaping strategy. Because ground forces are relatively slow, theatre strategy is more relevant for the land domain than it is for air and maritime domains. Part Three of Strategy is dedicated to the grand strategic level of strategy. This is the only level where ultimate ends and means are both present. Luttwak suggests that grand strategy can be viewed as ‘a confluence of the military interactions that flow up and down level by level, forming strategy’s “vertical” dimension, with the varied external relations among states forming strategy’s “horizontal” dimension.’ Strategy provides a powerful theory through which to comprehend the nature of strategy. It also provides a different way to view strategy, compared to the works of other strategists such as Colin Gray, Lawrence Freedman, and Joseph Wylie. The value of understanding such differences is in broadening our strategic perspective thereby allowing us to interpret circumstances using different lenses. Colin Gray argued that strategy, like war, has an enduring nature but a changing character. Luttwak’s theory suggests that strategy’s changing character is the result of its paradoxical logic. Perhaps the most fundamental paradox of all is also a sombre irony of the human condition. War and peace are intimately connected; one cannot exist without the other. The paradoxical logic of strategy applies to both. Wing Commander David Hood is an Aeronautical Engineer working for the Royal Australian Air Force. He holds a Master of Gas Turbine Technology (Cranfield, UK) and a Master of Military and Defence Studies (Australian National University). Wing Commander Hood is currently Commanding Officer of Air Training and Aviation Commons Systems Program Office (ATACSPO). #BookReview #PME #organisationalculture #PMET #Strategy #ManoeuvreWarfare #ProfessionalMilitaryEducation

Dr Robbin Laird Final Report: The Requirements of Fifth Generation Manoeuvre October 2019 In this report, the major presentations and discussions at the Williams Foundation seminar on the requirements for fifth generation manoeuvre held on October 24, 2019 in Canberra, Australia are highlighted along with interviews conducted before, during and after the seminar as well. What is fifth generation manoeuvre? The definition by Air Commodore Gordon of the Air Warfare Centre: “The ability of our forces to dynamically adapt and respond in a contested environment to achieve the desired effect through multiple redundant paths. Remove one vector of attack and we rapidly manoeuvre to bring other capabilities to bear through agile control.” The Australians are working through how to generate more effective combat and diplomatic capabilities for crafting, building, shaping and operating an integrated force. And the need for an integrated force built along the lines discussed at the Williams Foundation over the past six years, was highlighted by Vice Admiral David Johnston, Deputy Chief of the ADF at the recent Chief of the Australian Navy’s Seapower Conference in held in Sydney at the beginning of October: “It is only by being able to operate an integrated (distributed) force that we can have the kind of mass and scale able to operate with decisive effect in a crisis.” The need for such capabilities was highlighted by the significant presentation by Brendan Sargeant at the seminar where he addressed the major strategic shift facing Australia and why the kind of force transformation which the Williams Foundation seminars have highlighted are so crucial for Australia facing its future. In the future there will be times when we need to act alone, or where we will need to exercise leadership. We have not often had to do this in the past – The INTERFET operation in Timor, and RAMSI in the Solomon Islands are examples. We are far more comfortable operating as part of a coalition led by others. It is perhaps an uncomfortable truth, but that has been a consistent feature of our strategic culture. So I think our biggest challenge is not a technical or resource or even capability challenge – it is the enormous psychological step of recognising that in the world that we are entering we cannot assume that we have the support of others or that there will be others willing to lead when there is a crisis. We will need to exercise the leadership, and I think that is what we need to prepare for now. To return to the title of this talk: if we want assured access for the ADF in the Asia Pacific, then we need to work towards a world that ensures that that access is useful and relevant to the sorts of crises that are likely to emerge. I will leave one last proposition with you. Our assured access for the ADF in the Asia Pacific will be determined by our capacity to contribute to regional crisis management. That contribution will on some occasions require that we lead. The task now is to understand what this means and build that capacity. In short, it is not just about the kinetic capabilities, but the ability to generate political, economic and diplomatic capabilities which could weave capabilities to do environment shaping within which the ADF could make its maximum contribution. Download pdf

Brian Weston 'The Birth of an Australian Air Force – Part 2' Australian Defence Business Review – May/June 2019 p 82 The On Target column in the previous edition of ADBR ‒ written on behalf of the Sir Richard Williams Foundation ‒ provided a brief outline of the man who is regarded as the person responsible for not only establishing an Australian Air Force, but also establishing a sufficient and robust foundation on which the service could later expand into a credible Australian Air Force. This column will expand on the huge task Richard Williams faced when the Australian Air Force was established on 31 March, 1921 ‒ the prefix Royal being added in August 1921. The genesis for the establishment of independent air services lay in the rapid advances in military aviation during World War I, accompanied by much theorising about how military aviation might be used in future conflicts to provide alternative strategies to the stagnant and attritional industrial-scale trench warfare of World War I. But there was no consensus in this debate about the future strategies, roles and organisation of military aviation, with claim and counter-claim vigorously prosecuted; with navies and armies generally showing little enthusiasm, indeed often outright hostility, for the concept of independent air forces. Britain, with massive personnel losses in World War I, was at the forefront of the development of new concepts for air operations with a view to finding new ways of winning future conflicts, without suffering the huge human losses incurred in World War I. In a watershed decision, Britain decided to establish an independent air force by merging the Royal Flying Corps (RFC) and the Royal Naval Air Service (RNAS) on 1 April 1918, to form the Royal Air Force (RAF) ‒ seven months before World War I concluded. Australia, tied into the British Empire and with the experience of raising the Australian Flying Corps (AFC) in 1915 and of its subsequent employment with the RFC in the Middle East and the Western Front, soon gained experience with the employment of military aviation in war. AFC personnel also witnessed the establishment of the RAF as the world’s first independent air service, as well as understanding the reasons why the RAF was established. The debate about the future of Australian military aviation was decided by the Australian Government on 9 September, 1920 when, speaking in the House of Representatives, the Prime Minister, Mr Hughes said: “It may be confidently expected that aviation and those scientific methods of warfare which developed so rapidly during the war, and which, particularly during the latter period of the conflict, were resorted to so freely, may develop still further. No doubt that development will completely revolutionise warfare and let us hope that it will make war impossible… The air, that new element which man has now conquered, is but the sea in another form and it is on the sea and in the air that we shall have to look for our defence…” We believe too that in the air we may hope to create a force which will be of incomparable service in defending us from an enemy. The Government therefore are placing on the estimates a sufficient sum for the building up of an efficient air force. It is proposed to afford such inducements as are hoped will encourage manufacturers to make engines and aeroplanes in this country and the Government will not hesitate to give a very substantial bonus for that purpose.” To give effect to the government decision, the Air Board was constituted on 9 November, 1920 to provide for the governance of the new air force. It comprised four members: First Air Member ‒ Director of Operations and Intelligence Second Air Member ‒ Director of Personnel and Training Third Air Member ‒ Director of Equipment Fourth Air Member ‒ Finance Member Wing Commander Richard Williams was appointed as First Air Member although his position was not as a chief, but as a ‘first among equals’. The task for Williams, and the Air Board he chaired, was immense. There was no legislative governance framework unlike the Navy and Army, to which the Naval Defence Act and Defence Act applied. Then there was the matter of the gifting, by Britain, to the new fledging air force, of 128 aircraft ‒ indeed, the new air force had more aircraft than personnel ‒ including spare parts, engines, motor transport, tenders, motorcycles, tools, ammunition, bombs, cameras, wireless equipment, etc. For which, there was no process to receive, receipt and account for the gift equipment, nor to store and maintain the equipment. A not insubstantial task for the new Air Board led by Wing Commander Richard Williams, then of 30 years of age. The fact that he did succeed is why he is held in such high regard today. Brian Weston is a Board Member of the Williams Foundation and On Target is published as a regular column in the Australian Defence Business Review. Download pdf here

The Australian Government is actively seeking to increase Whole of Government efforts in the South Pacific in a meaningful and consistent way.  In this post, SGT G outlines how the Royal Australian Air Force could contribute to the Australian Defence Force Pacific Mobile Training Team (MTT) through the incorporation of an ‘Air Advisor’ flight. Competition for influence in the South Pacific has increased markedly over the past decade. Debt-trap diplomacy, coercion, and inducements are rapidly challenging the status quo. Australia can no longer assume it will be a default security partner, nor can it simply outspend alternate partners. Australia must articulate a clear value proposition to South Pacific nations as to why Australia should remain the region’s security guarantor of choice. A values-based relationship, founded on mutual respect with demonstrable benefits that build capacity vice dependency is our best point of difference over other regional influencers. The 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper called for increased engagement in the Pacific in support of a more resilient region. Foreign Minister Marise Payne, when addressing the State of the Pacific Conference in September 2018 said: “Stepping up in the Pacific is not an option for Australia, it is an imperative”. Prime Minister Scott Morrison reinforced this sentiment in a November media release stating: “Australia will step up in the Pacific and take our engagement with the region to a new level”. Among the initiatives in this whole of government effort was the establishment of an Australian Defence Force (ADF) Pacific Mobile Training Team (MTT). This paper will outline a recommended Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) contribution to this initiative. One option is for the RAAF to form of an ‘Air Advisor’ flight, staffed with experienced Non-Commissioned Officers (NCO) and Officers from all specialisations. This flight would work in concert with the newly established Office of the Pacific within Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) to identify engagement opportunities through the region and to dispatch/deploy an appropriate ‘Tiger Team’ of advisors tasked to provide training assistance to local organisations. Support to local authorities could range from technical or doctrinal development support through to the deployment of a persistent MTT, complemented where necessary by members are drawn from the wider RAAF. Assistance can range from finance and personnel governance through to delivery of fires, and humanitarian and disaster relief (HADR) responses. The aim of this assistance would be not to impose a RAAF solution, but to analyse the local problem set and constraints, and to devise a culturally appropriate and sustainable product. When not actively employed in an advise and assist task, advisors could develop regional language proficiency, review and improve RAAF tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) and pass on their experience to their parent communities in the wider RAAF. There are several second-order benefits from this proposal. Involvement in a regional MTT could lead to hundreds of personal relationships with a network of professionals across the region, which act as accelerants in time of crisis. With careful maintenance, these relationships would deepen over time and increase in value as individuals progress in their organisations. The formation and deployment of regional MTTs would also improve the ADF’s geographic situational awareness through constant first-hand engagement in the region. For example, the speed and efficiency of HADR responses will be improved if the location of the event had been recently surveyed by an Airfield Engineer or Combat Controller members of an MTT. Several areas within the RAAF already conduct regional assistance work within the region, most notably medical. The concentration of this role into an Air Advisor construct would allow this effort to be more focussed, tailoring the delivery of assistance and centralising the information and relationships developed to ensure they adequately collated, disseminated, and managed. An opportunity to serve as an Air Advisor should appeal to RAAF members who wish to contribute their tactical experience to achieve an operational effect while working with a high degree of autonomy. Years of experience of operating with a variety of coalition members and partner forces in several theatres has exposed RAAF personnel to a plethora of methodologies, TTPs and workarounds. Just as valuable is the experience in building relationships that recognise cultural nuance and differing levels of resourcing: This is precisely the type of effect that government needs from the ADF to support the whole of government effort to build strong values-based relationships across the region. The establishment of an Air Advisor capability within the Tactical Air Wing allows us to retain, leverage and improve upon these vital skills as we adjust to the emerging regional security challenges. SGT G. is a current serving Combat Controller in the Royal Australian Air Force. The opinions expressed are his alone and do not reflect those of the Royal Australian Air Force, the Australian Defence Force, or the Australian Government. #MobileTrainingTeam #DepartmentofForeignAffairsandTrade #RoyalAustralianAirForce #AustralianDefence #foreignpolicy

The Imperative for an Independent Deterrent: A Joint Strike Seminar 23 August 2018 Final Report Laird, Robbin The ADF and the Way Ahead for an Australian Deterrent Strategy September 2018 Since 2014, the Williams Foundation has held a series of seminars, which have looked at the nature of military transformation enabled by new platforms, new technologies and new approaches. Now, the Foundation is focusing on the new strategic context within which this force will operate and the kinds of further changes necessary for Australia and allied forces in facing the challenges posed by peer competitors. On March 22, 2018, the Williams Foundation hosted a seminar which began the process of examining these key questions. This report is based on that seminar. This enhanced version of the report includes the interviews conducted prior to, during and after the seminar. We have published on defense.info, a version with just the seminar report itself. Also available on the Second Line of Defense and the defense.info (ebook version) websites.

Dr Alan Stephens 'On Target: The Firebug Flight Lieutenant Bill Newton, VC ' in Australian Aviation August 2018, p 105 Flight Lieutenant William Ellis “Bill” Newton was the only RAAF winner of the Victoria Cross in the Pacific Theatre during World War II. Born in St Kilda in 1919, Newton was educated at Melbourne Grammar School. A big man, he was a fine AFL player and also played cricket (alongside fellow RAAF wartime pilot and legendary Australian cricketer Keith Miller) for the Victorian Second XI. His schoolmasters regarded him as a future community leader. Newton resigned his job with a Melbourne silk warehouse on the outbreak of war to enlist in the RAAF, graduating as a pilot in June 1940. After employment as a flying instructor, he went on operations in New Guinea in May 1942 flying Boston light bombers with No. 22 Squadron. Throughout his fifty-two operational sorties, ninety per cent of which were flown through anti-aircraft fire, Newton consistently displayed great courage and a remarkable determination to inflict the utmost damage on the enemy. Disdaining evasive tactics even when under heavy attack, he always “went straight at his objective” to try to achieve maximum accuracy with his weapons. He carried out many daring machine gun attacks on enemy positions, flying low through intense and sustained anti-aircraft fire to ensure “devastating accuracy”. On one such occasion his aircraft’s starboard engine failed over the target but Newton completed the attack and then flew two hundred and sixty kilometres back to base. His exploits earned him the nickname of “The Firebug” - wherever he flew he left a trail of fire. While leading an attack against a target near Salamaua on 16 March 1943, Newton dived through intense shell fire. Although his aircraft was hit repeatedly, he held his course and bombed the target from low-level, destroying many buildings and supply dumps, including two 180,000 litre fuel installations. Newton’s aircraft was severely damaged, its fuselage and wings torn, engines hit, fuel tanks pierced and one tyre punctured, but he once again managed to nurse the machine home. Two days later Newton returned to the same locality for another strike. This time his target was a single building, which he attacked through a barrage of fire. At the instant Newton’s bombs scored a direct hit his aircraft burst into flames. With great skill he brought his blazing machine down in the sea. Two of the three crew members were seen by squadron colleagues to escape from the Boston and swim ashore. For his extraordinary fearlessness, courageous leadership and successful operations against the enemy under the most hazardous circumstances, Newton was awarded the VC. Tragically the award was posthumous for, although Newton had been one of the two men to survive the crash landing, he had been captured and beheaded by the Japanese eleven days later. The details of Newton’s murder were subsequently revealed in a captured Japanese diary and deeply shocked Australians when newspapers reported the atrocity. The eyewitness account of his death makes deeply emotional reading; his courage and dignity affecting even his executioners: “We assembled in front of the Headquarters at 1500 hours. One of the two crew members of the Douglas which was shot down on the 18th has been returned to Salamaua. The Commanding Officer of the Komai Tai was to decapitate him with his favourite sword. “The time has come. The prisoner-of-war totters forward with his arms tied. I feel he suspects what is afoot; but he is more composed than I thought he would be. He is put on the truck and taken to the place of execution. The noise of the engine echoes along the road in the hush of twilight. The sun has set. Dusk has descended all around. I glance up at the prisoner and he seems to be prepared. He gazes at the grass, now at the mountains, and the sea. “We arrive at the execution ground. The Komai Tai Commander faces the prisoner and says ‘You are to die. I am going to kill you with this Japanese sword, according to the Samurai Code’. The Tai Commander says he will allow the [pilot] two or three minutes to prepare himself for death. The prisoner-of-war remains unshaken to the last. “The Commander draws his sword, the famous Osamune. The sight of the glittering blade sends cold shivers down the spine. First he touches the prisoner’s neck lightly … Then he raises the sword overhead. His arm muscles bulge. The prisoner closes his eyes for a second, and at once the sword sweeps down. “The body falls forward. ‘Sh … Sh …’ The dark blood gushes from the trunk. All is over. There lies the head like a white doll. There is not a drop of blood left in the man’s body. “The wind blows mournfully and the scene prints itself on my mind. We set off back. Darkness descends. “[Written] at Salamaua observation post, 30 March 1943, 0110 hours, to the sound of midnight waves.” Download pdf

Dr Alan Stephens 'On Target: Devotion to duty - Pilot Officer Rawdon Middleton, VC' in Australian Aviation July 2018 p. 108 The 11,500 men of the RAAF who fought as part of the RAF’s Bomber Command in World War II comprised only 2 per cent of all Australians who enlisted, but accounted for 20 per cent of all combat deaths. It seems extraordinary that only one of those airmen, Pilot Officer Rawdon Hume Middleton, was awarded a VC. Modest and reserved, Middleton worked as a jackeroo before enlisting in the RAAF in October 1940. Following training in Australia and Canada, he was posted to fly Stirling bombers with the RAF’s No. 149 Squadron. On 29 November 1942, Middleton - known to his crew as ‘Ron’ - was tasked to attack the Fiat works at Turin in Italy. The quiet Australian was so highly regarded that three gunners had stayed on with him even though they had completed their tours. By the time Middleton’s Stirling ‘H’ for Harry had climbed to 3660 metres to cross the Alps, it was using an excessive amount of fuel. Weaving through the mountains and unsure of his position, Middleton was on the verge of abandoning the mission when the front gunner called out, ‘[Turin’s] there, look to starboard’. Far to the right the crew could see the city, illuminated by flares and bomb bursts. Aware that pressing on might leave insufficient fuel to get back to England, Middleton nevertheless told his crew, ‘We’re going down’. Flying through heavy flak, Middleton had just identified the target when a shell burst in the cockpit, wounding both pilots. The bomber plunged into a dive, its wings and fuselage continually hit by shrapnel. As the co-pilot pulled the aircraft out of the dive only metres from the ground, Middleton recovered consciousness. He resumed control, pressed on with the bombing run, and successfully attacked the target. Despite dreadful injuries - his right eye had been shot away leaving the bone completely exposed, and his lower body was severely wounded - Middleton remained at the controls while the co-pilot’s wounds were dressed. Middleton considered diverting to North Africa to avoid the return climb over the Alps, but he was determined to get his men back to England and instructed them to jettison everything they could: armour plating, camera, oxygen bottles, ammunition, flares, seats, fire extinguishers, sextant. The navigator used an axe to chop off anything which was not essential and could be thrown overboard. The smashed windscreen exposed both seriously wounded pilots to an icy blast. Standing between them, the front gunner kept a lookout and set the compass. Other crew members checked the dinghies, uncertain whether they would even reach the Channel. Middleton asked the crew not to talk to him unless it was essential, as it was desperately painful for him to reply. Once the plain of France had been reached the crew could have bailed out but Middleton was determined to keep his men out of German hands. ‘H’ for Harry battled on towards England. Still there was no respite: over northern France the Stirling was suddenly coned by twelve searchlights and light flak hit the wings. Although severely weakened by his injuries Middleton threw the aircraft into violent evasive manoeuvres. At last the French coast came into view; simultaneously, the engineer told Middleton he could guarantee five minutes of fuel but not ten. In a voice thick with pain and exhaustion, Middleton instructed his crew to prepare to bail out and asked for his own parachute to be passed to him: in retrospect, his wireless operator believed that that was ‘no more than a gesture to reassure us’ as Middleton must have known that he was ‘too far gone’ to get out himself. Against the odds the Stirling made it over the Channel. As the aircraft crossed the coast of England five of the crew bailed out while two stayed behind to help their grievously wounded captain. Middleton turned the Stirling back over the Channel in an attempt to ditch. The aircraft crashed into the sea, killing all three men. The bodies of the nose-gunner and flight engineer were recovered the following day but Middleton had been incapable of escaping and his remains were not found. Two months later his body was washed ashore near Dover. As the wireless operator later recounted, ‘No-one will ever know what was going on in Middleton’s mind in those last few moments ... During the return home there were many opportunities for us to abandon the aircraft and for Middleton to live. But he preferred that we, his crew, should not fall into enemy hands. That was the kind of man he was’. Middleton was posthumously awarded the Victoria Cross. The citation concluded with an inspiring valedictory: ‘His devotion to duty in the face of overwhelming odds is unsurpassed in the annals of the Royal Air Force’. Download pdf

Dr Alan Stephens 'On Target: The Greatest Lost Battle on the German Side: The RAAF in Bomber Command' in Australian Aviation June 2018 p. 109 Street names at the Australian Defence Force Academy honour notable wartime actions. While every one of those actions was a matter of life or death for the men involved, when measured against the broader sweep of history some scarcely merit the description “battle”. It might seem curious, therefore, that three of the greatest battles in which Australians have fought are not acknowledged. Those three battles all took place in the skies over Germany during World War II and were fought by the men of the RAF’s Bomber Command, some 11,500 of whom were members of the RAAF. The first was the Battle of the Ruhr from March to July 1943, the second the Battle of Hamburg from 24 July to 3 August 1943, and the third the Battle of Berlin from November 1943 to March 1944. Statistics can never tell a story by themselves, but the figures from those three epic clashes reveal a fearful truth. No Bomber Command aircrew who fought in them could expect to survive. An operational tour on heavy bombers consisted of thirty missions. Crews were then rested for about six months, usually instructing at a training unit. (That ‘rest’ was, however, in name only, as more than 8000 men were killed in flying accidents at bomber conversion units.) They might then volunteer for, or be assigned to, a second operational tour of twenty missions. Over the course of the war the odds of surviving a first tour were exactly one-in-two – the classic toss of a coin. When the second tour was added the odds slipped further, to one-in-three. And during the battles of the Ruhr, Hamburg, and Berlin the figures became even more terrible, with the loss rates for each mission flown averaging 4.7 per cent, 2.8 per cent and 5.2 per cent respectively, making it statistically impossible to live through thirty missions. No other sustained campaign in which Australians have ever been involved can compare with the air war over Germany in terms of individual danger. The men of the RAAF who fought for Bomber Command amounted to less than 2 per cent of all Australians who enlisted in World War II, yet the 3486 who died accounted for almost 20 per cent of all deaths in combat. The RAAF’s most distinguished heavy bomber unit, No. 460 Squadron, alone lost 1018 aircrew, meaning that, in effect, the entire squadron was wiped out five times. It was far more dangerous to fight in Bomber Command than in the infantry. The argument is often made that the bombing of Germany was of limited military utility, and that it stiffened rather than undermined German morale. That argument is stronger in polemic than logic. According to the Nazis’ minister of war production, Albert Speer, following the Hamburg raids he “reported for the first time to the Fuehrer that if these serial attacks continued a rapid end of the war might be the consequence”. And the official United States Strategic Bombing Survey concluded in September 1945 that air power had been “decisive in the war in Western Europe ... It brought the [German] economy ... to virtual collapse”. As a direct result of allied bombing, during 1944, the Nazis’ production schedules for tanks, aircraft and trucks were reduced by 35 per cent, 31 per cent and 42 per cent respectively. Additionally, an enormous amount of resources which might have been used to equip front-line troops had to be diverted to air defence. By 1944, the anti-aircraft system was absorbing 20 per cent of all ammunition produced and between half to two-thirds of all radar and signals equipment. More than one million German troops were engaged in the air defence of the Reich, using about 74 per cent of all heavy weapons and 55 per cent of all automatic weapons. Physical destruction and the massive diversion of resources was accompanied by psychological demoralisation. Contrary to conventional wisdom that the bombing boosted morale, the sustained campaign had a crushing effect on people’s mental state. Post-war surveys found that workers became tired, highly-strung and listless. Absenteeism because of bombing reached 25 per cent in some factories in the Ruhr for the whole of 1944, a rate which drastically reduced output and undermined production schedules. When asked to identify the single most difficult thing they had to cope with during the war, 91 per cent of German civilians nominated bombing. The men of the RAAF who flew with Bomber Command made the major contribution of any Australians to the defeat of Germany and, therefore, to victory in World War II. They alone opened a second front in Germany, four years before D-Day; and they alone inflicted decisive damage on the German war economy. As Albert Speer later lamented, Bomber Command’s victory represented “the greatest lost battle on the German side”. Download pdf