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Russia’s testing of an SSC-X-9 Skyfall hypersonic weapon has rekindled interest in a largely forgotten Cold War technology: nuclear-powered air power. In this article, Peter Layton looks at the history of US development of nuclear-powered weapons in the 1950s and 1960s. In doing so, he highlights that successful innovation does not necessarily require a system to be operationally fielded. In March 2018, Russian President Vladimir Putin unveiled five new nuclear delivery systems including the Burevestnik subsonic nuclear-powered cruise missile (NATO reporting name SSC-X-9 Skyfall).  Seeing this Russian media-dubbed супероружие (‘superweapon’) some may have felt a certain sense of déjà vu. In the 1960s the United States Air Force (USAF) also seriously investigated building such a missile, although this one was planned to be ramjet-powered and sprint at Mach 3. Skyfall has rekindled interest in such nuclear-powered missiles, but equally the USAF project is of interest as it was run deliberately to support decision-making about long-range nuclear strike weapons. It is an example of innovation in action and how success does not necessarily mean the innovation enters service. Many innovations fall short, but that does not mean they are failures. In the 1950s the USAF had a keen interest in a manned nuclear-powered bomber, but the technology was developed, trialled, and evaluated as seriously inadequate. Moreover, there were inherent radiation hazards associated with nuclear energy. The heavy shielding required for human safety was inherently incompatible with the lightweight materials needed for aircraft structures. Furthermore, a serious accident with a nuclear-powered aircraft or missile could have left the crash site uninhabitable for many years. Given this worry over manned systems, USAF interest shifted to considering the possibilities nuclear-powered missiles might offer. In 1957, studies suggested that a nuclear-ramjet powered missile could be built that could fly at low altitude at speeds of about Mach 3 and deliver a 3-4 tonne payload at intercontinental ranges.[1] This Supersonic Low Altitude Missile (SLAM) was envisaged as being about 27m long and weighing around 27.5 tonnes (about 60,800lb). There were hopes that with development the missile could be fired from road-mobile launchers, enhancing system survivability. Nuclear-ramjet propulsion systems were attractive primarily because of their very long range compared to conventionally powered ramjets of the same weight, including fuel. However, the Project Director cautioned that: Contrary to popular belief, this range is not infinite. Several factors can limit the life of a reactor for ramjet applications to periods of time from a few hours to a few days depending on the methods of construction. The most obvious limit is actual [uranium] fuel consumption. For a fully developed SLAM, the range was estimated at about 20,000nm (37,000km). To reach the ramjet’s operating speed, SLAM would be launched using a cluster of conventional rocket boosters. When at its cruising altitude of 35,000ft and distant from populated areas, the nuclear reactor would be turned on and go critical – preferably over enemy territory or the ocean. Since nuclear power gave it extended range, the missile could cruise in circles over the sea until ordered by radio signal to descend and fly at 1000ft above ground level for a Mach 2.8-3.0 dash to the target areas. SLAM’s high speed at low altitude would have made the contemporary defensive systems ineffective, and so the missile could use its long-range to overfly and drop thermonuclear bombs on 16 widely separated targets.[2] In that regard, it was as much an unmanned bomber as a missile. The key was the engine: a ramjet that used nuclear fission to superheat incoming air instead of using hydrocarbon fuel. This heat came from a 600-megawatt air-cooled reactor, a squat cylinder 1.5m in diameter and 1.5 m long. Initially intended to have a ten-hour life, the reactor core would comprise tens of thousands of ceramic fuel elements incorporating a homogenous mixture of beryllium oxide and highly enriched uranium dioxide. Ceramics were required to withstand the design operating temperatures of up to 1,400°C.[3]  As it was intended for unmanned use, the in-service reactor was planned not to include radiation shielding for the fission products of neutrons and gamma rays.[4] Missile subsystems and in particular the avionics needed designing accordingly. The Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory won the contract to create the engine, code named ‘Pluto’, which also became SLAM’s nickname.  Project Pluto produced two working nuclear ramjet engine prototypes: the Tory-IIA and the Tory-IIC, both successfully tested in the Nevada desert. Tory II-A’s first operation was in mid-May 1961. The test-firing lasted 45 seconds at 40 megawatts (roughly 25 per cent of maximum power), equivalent to about 2,000 pounds of thrust.  Upgrading test facilities for full-power tests took several months, but in September and October, three tests in rapid succession at 150 megawatts made Tory II-A “a resounding success” albeit it was far too large for the intended purpose.[5] Three years later, the follow-up flight-ready size and weight Tory II-C was installed and tested in the rig. Tory II-C’s full-power run in late May 1964 produced 513 megawatts and the equivalent of over 35,000 pounds of thrust.  Tory-IIC ran for as long as five minutes during test runs in 1964 and, in offering a realistic design, appeared close to being ready to fly.[6] Airframe design had not though kept up with the ramjet engine trials. The environment at Mach 3 at sea level was particularly harsh with skin temperatures of 500°C and sound pressure levels of around 162db. Some 1600 hours of wind tunnel testing had resulted in a canard configuration design with a scoop type inlet, but further detailed design was needed. Of interest, the forward sections of the missile were envisaged as being gold-plated to dissipate heat by radiation.[7] However, if SLAM had been built, there was real uncertainty about how to test-fly a missile with a highly radioactive propulsion system safely. SLAM did not use radiation shielding to lower overall missile weight and maximise performance. Accordingly, the reactor, when it went critical emitted intense radiation beyond the missile itself. However, it was considered that the missile would fly too fast to expose humans underneath to the prolonged radiation necessary to induce radiation sickness. Only a relatively low neutron population would reach the ground per kilometre, for a vehicle travelling at several hundred meters/ second. In 1964, at the Pluto Facility of the Nevada Test Site, the Tory II-C nuclear ramjet engine was tested for 5 minutes. (Source: Wikimedia) There was an additional problem in that in-flight the nuclear ramjet would have emitted fusion products in its exhaust. In being widely distributed as the missile cruised, these products were considered likely to present only marginal dangers to humans. Even so, there were definite safety concerns, particularly when missile flight-testing over US territory was considered. Moreover, the pressure wave from a low flying Mach 3 missile would have been significant, probably sufficient to damage light structures on the ground underneath. The surface noise levels of a passing Pluto were estimated at 150 decibels also potentially posing human hearing risks. To avoid these issues, one idea was to fly Pluto in a figure-of-eight pattern around the US Pacific territory of Wake Island, finally diving the missile with its highly radioactive reactor into an adjacent 20,000ft deep oceanic trench when testing concluded. On July 1, 1964, after seven and a half years of work, Project Pluto was cancelled by the US Atomic Energy Commission and the USAF.[8] Not by coincidence, numerous Minuteman I ICBMs in their hardened launch silos became operational across several northern-tier US States at about the same time. It is quite possible that the Pluto concept could have been made to work. What killed it was not the technical or even operational challenges such weapons created. Pluto competed for funding with ICBMs and when these were proven able to be fitted with miniaturised thermonuclear warheads they were seen as better weapons for waging Armageddon. ICBMs were reliable, almost unstoppable, flew intercontinental distances in half an hour and were relatively affordable. In using the technology of the time, Minuteman I missiles weighed about as much as Pluto was envisaged to; Pluto simply could not compete. Other ‘seemed a good idea at the time’ innovations also fell by the wayside, including the B-58 bomber after a very short service life; the WS-110A chemical bomber (that would become the XB-70); the WS-125A nuclear-powered bomber; the subsonic Snark cruise missile; the Navaho Mach 3 cruise missile; the Dynasoar hypersonic skip-glide spacecraft, the Thor and Jupiter IRBMs and the Atlantis SLBMs.[9] In terms of strategic innovation, Project Pluto was a successful project in that, while costly, it produced the technical information needed to allow prudent decisions to be made as to which kind of weapon system was best for end-of-the-world warfare.  Even if ultimately a technological dead-end, this innovative but rather scary project succeeded through being demonstrably a failure. And what of today’s Burevestnik aka SSC-X-9 Skyfall missile? A good technical and operational analysis of the weapon can be found in the aptly named Nuclear Engine Air Power. This post draws on the author’s Chapter in Michael Spencer (ed.), Nuclear Engine Air Power (Canberra: Air Power Development Centre 2019). This book discusses contemporary nuclear-powered propulsion systems for both aircraft and missiles. Dr Peter Layton is a Visiting Fellow at the Griffith Asia Institute, Griffith University. His PhD is in grand strategy, and he has taught on this at the US National Defense University. He is the author of the book Grand Strategy. [1] Barton C. Hacker, ‘Whoever Heard of Nuclear Ramjets? Project Pluto, 1957-1964,’ Icon, 1 (1995), pp. 85-98, p.87. [2] Gregg Herken, ‘The Flying Crowbar,’ Air & Space Magazine, 5:1 (1990), p. 28. [3] Hacker, ‘Whoever Heard of Nuclear Ramjets?’, p. 87. [4] Vought Heritage, SLAM – Supersonic Low-Altitude Missile: Radiation and Reactor. [5] Hacker, ‘Whoever Heard of Nuclear Ramjets?,’ p. 89. [6] Herken, ‘The Flying Crowbar,’ p. 28. [7] Vought Heritage, SLAM – Supersonic Low-Altitude Missile: Airframe. [8] Herken, ‘The Flying Crowbar,’ p. 28. [9] Albert Wohlstetter, ‘The Delicate Balance of Terror’, Survival, 1:1 (1959), pp. 8-17, p. 9. #ColdWar #Hypersonics #AirPower #AirPowerHistory #DrPeterLayton

Call for Submissions: Robotics and Autonomous Systems 2040 – The Central Blue, The Forge, and Grounded Curiosity How will the future Australian Defence Force (ADF) exploit robotic and autonomous systems (RAS) to gain and maintain advantage across the continuum of competition and conflict? And how can the ADF counter threats to the future force posed by adversary RAS? These are the questions currently being asked by the ADF’s Force Exploration Branch as they prepare to draft the ADF’s Concept for Robotic and Autonomous Systems 2040. In a first for the Australian military blogosphere The Central Blue, The Forge, and  Grounded Curiosity are collaborating to support the development of the ADF’s Future Joint Concepts.  This will be achieved through our reader and contributor networks and using our platforms as an outlet for the resulting ideas. Our #adfras2040 series will inform debate and contribute to the Concept for Robotics and Autonomous Systems 2040, which aims to describe how the future ADF will implement RAS to achieve strategic advantage from the end of this decade RAS has been touted as a disruptive technology with the potential to usher the world into a 4th Industrial Revolution. Technologies such as artificial intelligence, swarming, alternative energy, additive manufacturing, and advanced materials are converging into RAS. Systems are already being developed with high levels of autonomy, stealth, and persistence; as systems such as the Sea Hunter and the Boeing Air Power Teaming System (Loyal Wingman) move beyond design documents into testing, they are focusing attention on how RAS can improve current military capabilities. The ADF’s future concept developers want to look beyond the immediate and consider how the ADF of the future should embrace RAS so that it can succeed in 2040. In addition to the opportunities RAS present, Force Exploration is also looking at the threats they pose. The ADF will not be the only actor seeking strategic disruption using RAS. State and non-state actors are pursuing this technology for their own advantage against our strategic interests. The adversary gets a vote. So, in addition to determining ADF requirements to employ RAS, it is vital that force designers also explore how the ADF will counter the threat of RAS? Do RAS have unique vulnerabilities that can be exploited? The Central Blue/Forge/Grounded Curiosity #adfras2040 series will explore these questions and consider how the future ADF can use RAS to pursue and assure a strategic advantage over potential adversaries. We encourage submissions from students, academics, policymakers, service personnel of all ranks, industry, and from others with an interest in these issues. We (the editors) encourage potential contributors to engage the editorial teams early in their writing process! To help get you started, we pose the following topic suggestions: Countering highly autonomous systems. How can the ADF exploit weaknesses in autonomous systems to counter the threat that they pose? Will the ADF need to adapt existing activities (like camouflage) to counter RAS, or are there new weaknesses to exploit? Meaningful human control. How does the ADF determine what is meaningful human control of RAS, and how should its current command and control arrangements change for RAS? RAS For Information Warfare. How can the ADF utilise non-physical systems to challenge the information environment? Innovative Capabilities. Current RAS strategies use the ‘enhance/augment/replace’ mentality for implementing RAS into military forces. Could RAS provide the opportunity for entirely new capabilities, not just the replacement of existing capabilities? Trusting autonomy. How does the ADF develop trust in autonomous systems? How does it adapt its current engineering processes to understand how RAS perform and generate trust in systems that may not perform as predictably as deterministic systems? Training RAS. How does the ADF develop collective training so that it trains with RAS to gain trust in their capabilities? As well as training a human audience, how does the ADF provide training and experience to RAS in future exercises? Personnel. What skills will the future workforce need to operate RAS? How could RAS change the structure of the ADF workforce? Data. What does the ADF need to do now to ensure that we have relevant datasets that RAS can utilise in 20 years? This series is the first of what we hope will be more collaborative efforts to support the ADF’s concept developers. Although #adfras2040 is a collaborative series, there is no plan to cross-post submissions between sites. However, collaboration will be occurring behind the scenes, and on social media. Submissions close 17 July 2020. We encourage you to take the chance to have your voice heard by submitting your ideas to: The Central Blue (thecentralblue@gmail.com) The Forge (https://theforge.defence.gov.au/contribution_hub), or Grounded Curiosity (groundedcuriosity@gmail.com). The Concept for Robotic and Autonomous Systems 2040 author’s brief can be found here. Articles should be between 500 to 1500 words. Writing guidelines can be found here. #Robotics #RoyalAustralianNavy #artificialintelligence #AutonomousWarfare #futurewarfare #AustralianArmy #RoyalAustralianAirForce #AustralianDefenceForce #CallforSubmissions

We are very pleased to welcome you to our new website. We trust you will find the new website informative and the new look and structure easy to navigate . Over the coming days, membership and events will be offline while we will make some final changes. We thank Chief of Air Force, the Air Power Development Centre, members, Corporate Partners and event sponsors for their continued support of the Foundation.

Brian Weston 'On Target The evolution of Butterworth: How the Suez crisis saw the RAAF take the lead in SE Asia' in Australian Aviation January-February 2019 Previous On Target columns have traced the ten-year evolution, from 1948, of the RAAF presence in Malaya/Malaysia and Singapore which, by 1958, had grown to a permanent presence of two Sabre squadrons and one Canberra squadron. This presence represented 50% of the RAAF operational fighter force and 33% of the RAAF operational bomber force ‒ by any measure, a national commitment of impressive proportions. But not unexpectedly so, given the instability in South-East Asia, which had led to the establishment of the South-East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO), and the threat posed by Indonesian ‘Confrontasi’. The RAAF expansion also included, from 1962, a permanent six-year Sabre fighter deployment at Ubon, Thailand, constituted as No 79 Squadron. In April 1967, the composition of the RAAF operational presence at Butterworth changed when No 2 Squadron deployed to Vietnam, leaving its ‘C’ Flight of Dakota transports in Malaysia; reconstituted as Transport Support Flight, Butterworth. Further change occurred following the replacement of the CAC Sabre by the Dassault Mirage IIIO ‒ selected by the RAAF ahead of the Lockheed F-104 Starfighter ‒ when No 75 Squadron and its Mirages arrived at Butterworth in May 1967. No 3 Squadron and its Sabre fighters then returned to Australia. In February 1969, No 77 Squadron returned to Australia handing its Sabres to No 2 Operational Conversion Unit where the Sabres continued to serve as the RAAF lead-in fighter. After a 21 month absence, No 3 Squadron, now equipped with Mirage fighters, returned to Butterworth. The base also gained an RAAF UH-1B Iroquois search-and-rescue helicopter capability which replaced a previous RAF helicopter presence. But by far the most significant development for the RAAF presence at Butterworth since the outbreak of the Emergency in 1948, was the announcement in January 1968, that Britain would withdraw from its interests ‘East of Suez’ by 1971. The decision was of monumental importance to the UK which marked a step back in its status as a world power, with the decision leading to Australia assuming a prime role in the interim post-withdrawal Australia, New Zealand and United Kingdom (ANZUK) organisational arrangement. Subsequently, Australia took the lead role in the definitive follow-on Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) comprising Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore and the UK. Australia’s decision to remain engaged with South-East Asia also involved deploying, on a permanent basis, 50% of its operational Mirage fighter force to RAAF Base Butterworth. Australia also took a role in the development of the regional air forces when, in September 1969, Australia gifted 10 refurbished Sabre fighters to Malaysia; a gift that also came with substantial support, training and deployed RAAF personnel, who served with No 11 Squadron, RMAF to assist in the assimilation of the Sabre fighter capability. The writer has several colour slides taken from the cockpit of A94-362, a CAC Sabre Mk 32, flying as ‘Number 10’ from Williamtown to Butterworth via Amberley, Mt Isa, Darwin, Den Pasar and Tengah on Operation Regimen, over the period 16 to 19 September 1969. Two years later, six additional Sabres were gifted, together with the two ground training airframes, making 18 Sabres in all. Australia also deployed RAAF personnel to support the development of the Singapore air force; and, in February 1973, with Confrontation having ended, Australia gifted 18 Sabres to Indonesia with similar support packages to those provided to Malaysia. But in August 1973, as a consequence of the post-Vietnam War defence cuts, No 76 Squadron at RAAF Base Williamtown was disbanded. This disbandment resulted in Australia having two of its three fighter squadrons, 67% of its operational Mirage fighter force, permanently deployed at Butterworth – an obviously unbalanced and difficult proposition from operational, organisational, training, logistic and personnel viewpoints. But there was good reason for the RAAF to sustain the imbalanced basing as, subsequent to the withdrawal of British forces from ‘East of Suez in 1971, there was a pressing need to fill the capability void that had been left ‒ a void that could not yet be filled by the nascent air forces of Malaysia and Singapore. Apart from the void left by the withdrawal of the Lightning F6 fighters of No 74 Squadron RAF and of the two RAF Control and Reporting Units (CRUs), there was also the dissolution of the Headquarters Far East Air Force (HQFEAF), which had provided the operational command and control framework under which Australian, New Zealand and British air forces operated, with RAF, RAAF and RNZAF personnel all serving in HQFEAF. A further consequence of the British withdrawal was Australia’s commitment to the maintenance of a permanent deployment of one-half of a RAAF Mirage squadron, in Singapore. As well, following a period under an interim ANZUK command and control arrangements, Australia took the lead role in the new command arrangements implemented under of the Five Power Defence Agreement. Next month’s column will review the period 1971 to 1983, during which the RAAF sustained a continuing deployment of Mirages in Singapore. Brian Weston is a Board Member of the Williams Foundation and this On Target article appears in Australian Aviation magazine. Download pdf

Brian Weston 'On Target: The Building of Butterworth: Australia’s Strategic Commitment to South-East Asia' in Australian Aviation December 2018 The previous two On Target columns traced the decade-long evolution of an expanding Australian commitment to South-East Asia commencing with the outbreak of the Malayan Emergency in 1948; the signing of the “Manila Pact”, which established the South-East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) in September 1954; and the establishment of the British Commonwealth Far East Strategic Reserve ‒ a permanent military force aimed at countering external communist aggression against countries in South-East Asia, especially threats against the former British-colonial territories of Malaya and Singapore. The culmination of these developments saw, by 1959, 50% of Australia’s operational fighter force (two squadrons of CAC Sabre fighters) and 33% of Australia’s operational bomber force (one squadron of Canberra bombers with an embedded flight of supporting Dakota transports) stationed permanently at RAAF Base Butterworth; a commitment of around 1500 RAAF personnel, plus their families. The scale of this commitment is even more imposing when considering the effort and investment needed, by Australia, to transform a modest RAF airfield into a modern RAAF air base capable of sustaining a large operational air force. Although Britain handed the RAF base at Butterworth to Australia on free loan, Australia also paid Britain a fee roughly equal to 50% of the capital cost of the existing RAF facilities at Butterworth. Australia then assumed responsibility for the development and funding of the base expansion. No 2 Airfield Construction Squadron (2ACS) RAAF arrived in late 1955 to commence a construction/refurbishment program which extended and strengthened the main runway to 2,400 metres; constructed hardstands, taxiways, hangars, fuel storages and armament storage facilities; power supplies, an air traffic control tower and supporting operational facilities; and water and domestic facilities. Of particular difficulty was the extension and strengthening of the north/south runway into water-logged paddy fields. But the RAAF airfield construction squadrons had retained much of their World War II expertise and had an enviable reputation for getting difficult jobs done well. 2ACS was up to the task. On 1 July 1958, as eight Canberra bombers from No 2 Squadron touched down, the expanded and refurbished base was transferred from RAF command to RAAF command; becoming RAAF Base Butterworth. In November 1958 and February 1959, Nos 3 and 77 Squadrons, with their Sabre fighters, arrived. RAAF Butterworth soon settled into an operationally focussed modus operandi including supporting various RAF fighter, bomber, transport and helicopter operations as the Malayan Emergency slowly ground to an end. The RAAF base also came with significant logistic support requirements with No 36 Squadron’s new C-130A Hercules transports – Australia was the first non-US purchaser of the Lockheed four-engine military transport – proving their worth in maintaining regular support services to Butterworth from the east coast of Australia. By late 1962, tension with Indonesia increased as Britain planned to progress the territories of British North Borneo, Sarawak and Singapore to independence, by federating with Malaya and creating an expanded Malaysia. In January 1963, Indonesia escalated the tension into military “Confrontation”, raising the operational tempo at Butterworth. RAF and RAAF strike aircraft prepared for conflict, preparing target folders and rehearsing strike missions. While RAAF Sabres, by day, and two-seat Gloster Javelins of No 60 Squadron RAF with their Westinghouse AN/APQ-43 radar, by night, stood an ongoing air defence alert, fully armed. Confrontation ceased in September 1965, after a failed coup set in chain events that elevated General Suharto to the presidency of Indonesia. In June 1962, an additional demand was placed on the RAAF when SEATO called for assistance with the air defence of Thailand. Australia responded by deploying a RAAF Sabre squadron, No 79 Squadron, to Ubon, Thailand. The new deployment, while nominally a squadron, was in reality a half-squadron and although not publicly acknowledged was mounted and supported from RAAF Butterworth involving some innovative arrangements when aircraft and pilots were rotated between Ubon and Butterworth. The routine involved a No 2 Squadron Canberra flying a navigational exercise to the north. As the Canberra taxied for departure from Butterworth, one or more Sabres could be seen taxying, in radio silence, departing closely behind the Canberra. Once airborne, the Sabres joined into close formation with the Canberra, so as to offer only one radar return. The Canberra was duly intercepted by Sabres operating from Ubon and returned to Butterworth. Only a close observer could see the returning Sabres had different tail numbers to those that had departed Butterworth some two hours earlier. The six-year RAAF deployment to Ubon ended in August 1968, soon after No 2 Squadron deployed from Butterworth to Vietnam and No 75 Squadron arrived at Butterworth with their Mirage IIIOF interceptors. But by far the most substantial change regarding the nature of the RAAF presence at Butterworth was soon to come following the declaration, in January 1968, Britain would withdraw from its interests “East of Suez” by 1971. Brian Weston is a Board Member of the Williams Foundation commanded No 75 Squadron at Butterworth from 1980 to 1982. This On Target article appears in the Australian Aviation magazine. Download pdf

Brian Weston 'On Target: The Singapore deployment - Australia fills the 'East of Suez' void' in Australian Aviation March 2019 The announcement in January 1968, that Britain would withdraw from its interests ‘East of Suez’, by 1971, was to have long-reaching consequences as it led to Australia electing to play the prime role in the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA), subsequently negotiated between Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore and the UK. Britain commenced its rundown of forces East of Suez by disbanding three RAF fighter squadrons: Nos 60 and 64 Squadrons operating Gloster Javelin all-weather fighters and No 20 Squadron operating Hawker Hunter ground attack fighters. When Headquarters Far East Air Force was disbanded on 6 November 1970, only the two RAF control and reporting units (CRUs), and No 74 Squadron, with BAC Lightning F6 interceptors at RAF Tengah, remained. The RAF CRUs were located on an excellent radar site at Bukit Timah, Singapore and at Western Hill, the prominent peak on Penang Island. Singapore decided to retain the Bukit Timah site for its use but as RAF Western Hill was difficult to support logistically, Malaysia elected to establish a new radar at what was now Air Base Butterworth (not RAAF Base Butterworth). RAF Western Hill which had been integral to the air defence of the Penang region, and with a number of RAAF personnel on strength, was disbanded on 31 August 1971. Four days previously, the writer flew A3-85 on the last mission controlled by RAF Western Hill – callsign ‘Barat’. Later that day, No 3 Squadron RAAF flew a formation of six Mirages over the unit to salute its service. Over the next few weeks, RAF Westland Whirlwind helicopters ferried equipment from Western Hill to Butterworth for shipment to the UK. With Singapore having no national air defence capability, Australia filled the void left by the disbandment of No 74 Squadron RAF on 31 August 1971, by deploying, on a continuing basis, a half-squadron of Mirages to Singapore. The permanent Mirage deployment operated from what was now RSAF Tengah and was supported from Butterworth with domestic and logistic assistance provided by the newly established RAAF Support Unit, Tengah (RAAFSUTG). With the nascent RSAF fighter capability of ex-RAF Hawker Hunters taking over the expansive tarmac, facilities and hangarage of No 74 Squadron RAF, Australia negotiated the dedicated use of a hardstand at RSAF Tengah, with a double Bellman Hangar and suitable adjacent facilities for operations and maintenance personnel. Very quickly, the Mirage deployment at RSAF Tengah evolved into a pattern where each of Butterworth’s two Mirage squadrons took turn and turn-about to support the Tengah deployment for a period of three months. Typically, within the three-month deployment period, one-half of the squadron was deployed to Tengah for the first six weeks with the other half of the squadron deploying for the second six-week period. Hence, during a six-month period, a Mirage squadron pilot at Butterworth could expect to spend six weeks at RSAF Tengah. This pattern continued until June 1982, when the extensive redevelopment of the RSAF base at Tengah saw the RAAF Mirage deployment move from Tengah to RSAF Paya Lebar, with the writer having the privilege of commanding the last Mirage detachment to operate from RSAF Tengah. But the permanent Mirage presence at RSAF Paya Lebar was short-lived as following the repatriation of No 75 Squadron to Darwin in October 1983, No 3 Squadron had the capacity to mount only periodic deployments to RSAF Paya Lebar. With a new fighter looming ‒ the F/A-18 Hornet ‒ the permanent RAAF fighter presence in South-East Asia was coming to an end, and a timely end with both Malaysia and Singapore having steadily developed their respective national air capabilities. In 1986, No 3 Squadron returned to Williamtown to re-equip with the F/A-18 leaving their Mirages at Butterworth, for the newly stood-up No 79 Squadron. When No 79 Squadron disbanded in 1988, 30 years of continuous RAAF fighter/strike presence in South-East Asia ended. But the RAAF did not depart entirely with some 50 personnel and their dependants remaining at RMAF Butterworth to support FPDA exercise commitments and RAAF AP-3C aircraft carrying out essential maritime ISR operational commitments. A new era of another 30 years of the RAAF at RMAF Butterworth commenced. This long Australian presence was recognised on 25 June 2018 when the Minister for Defence, Senator the Hon Marise Payne, visited RMAF Base Butterworth to participate in the inaugural Malaysia-Australia High Level Committee meeting on Defence Cooperation. The meeting also marked the 60th anniversary of the RAAF presence on the base. Around 100 former ADF members travelled to Butterworth where Minister Payne noted “Generations of ADF personnel and their families have worked and lived at Butterworth. The number of former personnel attending the anniversary is testament to the special place it holds in many people’s hearts.” Many who served there would agree. Brian Weston, a Board Member of the Sir Richard Williams Foundation, commanded No 75 Squadron at Butterworth from 1980 to 1982 Brian Weston is a Board Member of the Williams Foundation and this On Target article appears in the Australian Aviation magazine. Download pdf

Brian Weston 'On Target: Who was Richard Williams?' in Australian Defence Business Review, March-April 2019 p. 82 After several mutually supportive years with Australian Aviation, the On Target column, written on behalf of the Sir Richard Williams Foundation, is now to be published in the Australian Defence Business Review. As background, the Sir Richard Williams Foundation is an independent research organisation whose purpose is to promote the development and effective implementation of national security and defence policies, as they impact on Australia’s ability to generate air power appropriate to Australia’s unique geopolitical environment and values. The Foundation aims to strengthen Australia’s national security by advocating the need for forward-looking policies which take full advantage of the potential for air power to shape and influence regional security and by promoting constructive debate regarding the implementation of such policies. The Foundation is pleased to take the opportunity offered by the Australian Defence Business Review. An appropriate topic for this first On Target column would be to outline who was Richard Williams, and why is there a foundation bearing his name. Richard Williams was born at Moonta Mines ‒ roughly halfway up the eastern coast of the Spencer Gulf in South Australia, on 3 August 1890. After enlisting in the Australian Military Forces, he was commissioned in 1911 and attended the first ‘war-flying’ course at the Central Flying School, Point Cook in 1914. Following the raising of the Australian Flying Corps (AFC) in 1915, Williams was posted as a Flight Commander in No 1 Squadron, AFC and accompanied the squadron to Egypt where the unit was to serve with the Royal Flying Corps (RFC). For the next two years Williams served with distinction and gallantry, rising to command No 1 Squadron, AFC. In June 1918, shortly after the merging of the RFC and the Royal Naval Air Service to form the Royal Air Force (RAF), Williams was appointed to command the 40th (Army) Wing, RAF; comprising No 1 Squadron, AFC and Nos 111, 144 and 145 Squadrons, RAF. To enable him to command the RAF wing, Williams ‒ already commissioned as a lieutenant colonel in the AFC ‒ was also commissioned into the RAF. At the end of World War I, after spending time in London investigating how Australia might follow Britain in establishing an independent air force, Williams returned to Australia where he was the driving force behind the merging of the aviation elements of the army and navy into the Australian Air Force, on 31 March, 1921. Soon after, the Australian Air Force become the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF). Wing Commander Williams was appointed to head the RAAF and it fell to him to establish the new service, aided considerably by the gifting of a quantity of war surplus aircraft and equipment from Britain. For the next 17 years, apart for periods of absence to serve with the RAF, Williams fought tenaciously to keep the small independent Australian air service alive in an atmosphere of hostility and severe financial stringency. Inevitably, during those years, Williams made some powerful enemies, especially in 1929 and 1932, when he convinced government not to abolish the RAAF as had been proposed. Subsequently, Williams went on to lay the foundation on which the RAAF, in World War II, built to a mighty air force of almost 175,000 personnel. Richard Williams never got the opportunity to command the RAAF in war as following Prime Minister Menzies decision, in 1939, to appoint Englishmen as the chiefs of the three Australian services ‒ a decision Menzies justified on the basis no Australian officer had leadership experience of a service in war. Williams was duly despatched to London and then to Washington to see out World War II. Williams autobiography bluntly records Williams view on this: “Menzies himself was facing a task beyond his experience but he was not calling for an Englishman to solve it”. But after the war, Williams was not done with Australian aviation as, following his retirement from the RAAF in September 1946, he assumed the appointment of Director General of Civil Aviation and led the department until 1955. As all Australian aviators know, our country is a nation made for aviation – both military and civil. But who was to build the essential, widespread national aviation support infrastructure on which Australia’s civil aviation could prosper? Certainly, Australia’s infant civil aviation operators could not. It was a task beyond them but one the Department of Civil Aviation undertook, under Williams leadership. Sir Richard Williams is the greatest figure in Australian military aviation history and someone who stands tall in the pantheon of great Australians. His autobiography, These are Facts, The Autobiography of Sir Richard Williams, KBE, CB, DSO, written in 1977, is a must-read for any Australian aviator with an interest in the history and development of Australian aviation. Brian Weston is a Board Member of the Williams Foundation and On Target is published as a regular column in the Australian Defence Business Review. Download pdf

Dr Alan Stephens 'On Target: Richard Williams and the Defence of Australia' July-August 2019 This column written for the ADBR July/August 2019 an edition that was not published The two previous “On Target” articles have outlined the unsurpassed contribution made to Australian air power by Sir Richard Williams. This article continues that story by describing Williams’ strategy for defending Australia. The ultimate consequence was that, when Japan launched the war in the Pacific in December 1941, Australia was dangerously unprepared and vulnerable. Yet had one-quarter of naval expenditure been invested in next-generation technology, Australia might have fielded some 500 strike/reconnaissance aircraft armed with bombs and torpedoes.. In 1923 Williams went to England to attend the British Army staff course and then the RAF course, stopping-over on his way home for further study in Canada and the United States. On resuming command of the RAAF in February 1925 he was deeply disturbed by the government’s lack of interest in air power. Williams immediately began drafting a concept of operations, and by May had completed a “Memorandum Regarding the Air Defence of Australia”. “Memorandum” was something of an understatement because the document contained sixty-eight pages and a great deal of detail, analysing such issues as Australia’s strategic setting, Japan’s war economy, a proposed RAAF force structure, technical and personnel matters, logistics, costs, local aircraft production, and training. The lack of support for the Air Force was, Williams argued, inconsistent with modern theories of warfare, which postulated that the aeroplane would decide future conflicts. Drawing on the inherent qualities of air power, he pointed to his service’s unique ability to “pass over defences, armies and fleets and penetrate into those portions of a country and attack [targets] which previously have been immune”. While geography and the modest range of existing aircraft made the European strategy of bombing an enemy’s homeland impracticable for Australia, air power could still provide the key to national security by controlling the sea lines of communication. Williams suggested that the main justification for maintaining an army and navy was to prevent an enemy from occupying Australia, yet that was an outlook which more than any other demanded the use of aircraft. Command of the sea was a prerequisite for an invasion. Given Australia’s defensive challenge of immense distance, small population and limited infrastructure, the other two services could never be expected to provide the necessary level of security against invasion (a judgment which was implicitly acknowledged in the so-called Singapore strategy, under which Australia relied on the British Royal Navy to defend it). Aircraft, with their speed, range, and reconnaissance and striking power, were the obvious solution. It was also reasonable to assume, Williams continued, that no enemy could expect to secure a lodgement in Australia without first establishing air superiority, and fighter aircraft were the best means of defence against air attack. Williams identified five roles for the RAAF: air superiority (which would be limited to specific locations, such as overhead an invasion area); army cooperation; navy cooperation; long-distance reconnaissance over land and sea; and attacks against enemy targets on land and sea. There was no prevarication about which country might threaten Australia. In calculating the number of aircraft the RAAF needed, Williams based his figures on Japan’s military capabilities. Taking into account training, operational reserves, and the wide dispersion of the vital areas which might have to be defended, Williams proposed a force structure of thirty squadrons and 324 aircraft. Special emphasis was placed on the attack force, which he described as the component most relevant to Australia’s needs. Because aircraft were able to strike harder, faster, and at greater distances than any other weapon system for the same cost, a well-equipped and well-trained strike force would attack the enemy at sea “long before he reaches the coast”. But institutional biases and faith-based thinking could not, like battleships, easily be made to change direction, and Williams’ plan was ignored by the government. During the inter-war years, the RAN received about 60 per cent of all defence appropriations, the Army about 30 per cent, and the RAAF 10 per cent. Despite that financial largesse, the RAN amounted to little more than an auxiliary squadron of the RN, with no capability to defend Australia without major reinforcement. The ultimate consequence was that, when Japan launched the war in the Pacific in December 1941, Australia was dangerously unprepared and vulnerable. Yet had one-quarter of naval expenditure been invested in next-generation technology, Australia might have fielded some 500 strike/reconnaissance aircraft armed with bombs and torpedos. Almost fifty years later, in arguably what was the most significant Defence White Paper ever published, The Defence of Australia 1987, the superseding importance of protecting Australia by controlling the maritime approaches to our north and north-west was formally endorsed. This was, in effect, yet another acknowledgement of Richard Williams’ extraordinary legacy. Dr Alan Stephens is a Research fellow of the Williams Foundation and a visiting fellow at UNSW Canberra. On Target is published as a regular column in the Australian Defence Business Review. Download pdf

Brian Weston 'On Target: Australia's First Island Chain: Part 2' in Australian Defence Business Review March-April 2020 p 76 In the January-February 2020 issue, On Target identified the growing importance of Australia’s First Island Chain to Australia’s national security. It outlined that, while Australia’s security strategy has many elements, military operations in the theatre extending south from Australia’s First Island Chain to continental Australia need much closer attention in national security planning. The column also noted that military operations south of Australia’s First Island Chain could credibly be sustained and conducted from Australia and executed under Australian national command – unlike operations beyond Australia’s First Island Chain which would involve access to forward basing, the concurrence and support of allies and neighbours, and difficult operational scenarios. This theatre also would assume elevated national security importance to Australia should global issues cause levels of political, strategic, military and logistic support from the US to fall short of Australian expectations. This is not an unreasonable assumption given US commitments in the Indo-Pacific, especially to Japan and South Korea. The US also might find itself pressured on other fronts, particularly by Russia which is seeking to advance its territorial ambitions. All this, without even factoring in the complications of US commitments to the Middle East So, although not by desire but necessity, Australia might find itself almost wholly responsible for the defence of its island continent, its approaches, its national interests, and of Australian (and US) logistics and enabling bases. But there are some positives in facing this security challenge. First, operations south of Australia’s First Island Chain play more to Australia’s advantage than to an enemy which would be required to sustain challenging military operations at long distance from home bases. Second, Australian military operations, especially maritime, play to Australia’s high levels of professional military mastery and the nation’s aptitude for the exploitation of technologically advanced capabilities. This is particularly the case with ISR and with information and intelligence, which will hopefully be assisted by continued support from off-board coalition capabilities. The ability to operate with situational awareness and to target accurately at long ranges while denying an enemy that capability will be key to favourable operational and tactical outcomes in the maritime domains. These factors, together with the ability to conduct credible, long-range operations from Australian bases in a familiar environment, add to what should be a significant ‘home ground advantage’. So how does Australia’s force structure shape up to the challenge of operating against an adversary seeking to venture into Australia’s vast front yard? The answer is not immediately obvious from Australia’s Defence White Papers which are expressed in abstract terms such as: decision-making superiority; enabled, mobile and sustainable forces; and capability streams, etc. For example, the 2016 Integrated Investment Program (IIP) recommends the acquisition of both seven Triton maritime UAS and 15 Poseidon manned aircraft, with no reference that these two systems are essentially complementary with a combined effectiveness considerably greater than the sum of the two individual systems. More critically, the IIP makes no mention of whether these two capabilities provide an operational capability in only one area of operations, or are sufficient to conduct operations simultaneously in two areas. This is fundamental to any assessment of the strength and preparedness of the ADF’s capability. This should not be taken as criticism of past Australian force structure policy when it was – in more benign times – probably the best basis on which to plan a national defence capability. But the world has changed. Long-standing rules-based international processes have been disregarded, propaganda and proxies are being used as vehicles to advance nation states’ interests, and nation state militarisation is escalating. In this environment, Australia now needs to assess more critically just how well its planned defence capabilities can cope with emerging threats. A good start would be to assess how well Australia’s IIP military capabilities can deter, neutralise and, if necessary, defeat assertive foreign military action in the expansive theatre south of Australia’s First Island Chain. Brian Weston is Williams Foundation Board Member and 'On Target' is a regular column appearing in the ADBR magazine. Download pdf

Brian Weston 'On Target 'SA Forgotten Campaign: The USAAF 49th Fighter Group over Darwin' in Australian Aviation' September 2017 This year has seen many 75th anniversaries of battles and campaigns from the darkest hours of 1942 with the Battle of the Coral Sea (4 to 8 May) prominent. But in all these commemorative activities there has been no mention of the air campaign over Darwin conducted by the United States Army Air Forces (USAAF) 49th Fighter Group from March to September 1942. The prelude to the 49th Fighter Group campaign over Darwin, covers some of the darkest days of the Pacific War: the fall of Singapore on 15 February; the bombing of Darwin on 19 February, during which the Japanese shot down nine of the ten P-40s of Major Floyd Pell’s 33rd Pursuit Squadron; and the sinking of the USS Langley (CV-1) on 27 February, taking with it thirty-two P-40s and thirty-three pilots from the USAAF 13th Pursuit Squadron. With the Netherlands East Indies and Philippines lost, American re-enforcements of three USAAF fighter groups ‒ two with the Bell P-39 and one with the Curtis P-40E ‒ were reconstituting in Australia. In March, the most advanced group, the 49th Fighter Group, commenced its move to the “Top End” where US and Australian units were feverishly constructing airfields and associated facilities. By April, the 49th, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Paul Wurtsmith, was in situ, with its three squadrons, the 9th, 8th and 7th, located at Livingstone, Strauss and Batchelor respectively. Wurtsmith was a career officer, specializing in “pursuit” operations. He was a graduate of the US Army Air Corps Tactical School, with 4,800 flying hours. His Executive Officer, Major Don Hutchinson, was another pursuit specialist with 2,500 flying hours. The 49th Fighter Group was fortunate to have such experienced leaders plus a handful of veterans from the Philippines campaign, but that only masked the inexperience of the group as out of its initial strength of 102 pilots, ninety-five had never flown the P-40. Supported by the RAAF No 5 Fighter Sector with its radars at Dripstone Caves (No 31) and Point Charles (No 105), and with the sector now including personnel from the USAAF 49th Fighter Interception Squadron, the 49th’s sixty P-40s provided Darwin with its only fighter defence from March to September 1942, against a threat comprising mainly fast and well-armed Mitsubishi G4M “Betty” bombers escorted by Mitsubishi A6M “Zero” fighters. Darwin’s 3.7 inch anti-aircraft artillery forced the G4Ms to ingress at high level ‒ generally between 25,000 to 27,000 feet. Such a high ingress altitude sorely tested the P-40E fighters as their Allison V-1710 engines suffered from an inadequate mechanically-driven supercharger. The Allison, while rugged and reliable, lost considerable power at higher altitudes, with the operational ceiling of the P-40E limited to around 27,000 to 28,000 feet. With “time-to-height” and operational ceiling limitations, Wurtsmith scrambled his squadrons in small maneuverable formations of four aircraft, with each flight leader listening to the No 5 Fighter Sector broadcast. This ensured each raid was subject to multiple interceptions by flights of P-40s, which effectively tied the escorting Zeros to the bomber formation to ensure unchallenged flights of P-40s did not slip through to engage the G4Ms. But with the intercepting P-40s unable to climb above the Zeros, Wurtsmith’s pilots remained at a tactical disadvantage as the escorting Zeros invariably dived down upon them. Acknowledging the threat posed by the higher and more maneuverable Zeros, Wurtsmith exhorted his pilots to avoid dogfighting and immediately disengage when challenged by Zeros. Over the period March to August 1942, Japanese records reveal nineteen Japanese aircraft were lost in the raids on Darwin. Losses comprised one reconnaissance aircraft, seven fighters and twelve bombers, plus several more aircraft damaged. In turn, the 49th Fighter Group lost nineteen fighters, including four pilots, with another eight pilots lost in non-combat related accidents. Given the limitations of the P-40E as a high altitude interceptor, and the low experience level of the bulk of the USAAF pilots, the 49th Fighter Group can rightly claim to have done its job well. But in August, with the Japanese diverting their air forces to the Guadalcanal campaign, the Darwin campaign tailed off and the 49th Fighter Group commenced their move to Papua and New Guinea. The air defence of Darwin was passed to No 77 Squadron, which moved to Batchelor in August, and No 76 Squadron which, having returned from Milne Bay, moved to Strauss in October. As for Paul Wurtsmith, he continued to serve with distinction in the South-West Pacific. As a brigadier general he commanded V Fighter Command in 5th Air Force, and then as a major general commanded 13th Air Force. His contribution, and that of the USAAF 49th Fighter Group and supporting units, deserves far greater recognition than it has received. This column largely has been sourced from the paper “Darwin 1942: The Missing Year” by Anthony Cooper Air-Vice Marshal Brian Weston (Retd) was CO No 75 Squadron in 1980, CO Base Squadron Richmond in 1986, OC Base Support Wing Richmond in 1987, and CDR Tactical Fighter Group from July 1990 to July 1993. Brian is a Board Member of the Williams Foundation and this On Target article appears in Australian Aviation magazine. Download pdf

Hi-Intensity Operations and Sustaining Self Reliance National Gallery of Australia 11 April 2019 Dr Robbin Laird, Final Report: Hi-Intensity Operations and Sustaining Self-Reliance, May 19 The latest Williams Seminar held in Canberra on April 11, 2019 focused on the strategic shift for Australia within the context of the evolving global situation. Facing the rising challenge posed by the 21st century authoritarian states, and by the changing nature of alliances in the Pacific and in Europe, Australia needs to enhance its sovereign capabilities to operate within a regional or global crisis. And this requires, Australia to have more capability to sustain its evolving integrated force and to do so in the service of the direct defense of Australia. Download pdf of the report Laird, Robbin Enhancing Australian Options in a Crisis: Shaping a More Sustainable Force, Second Line of Defense Website May 19 The Central Blue #selfsustain

Hi-Intensity Operations and Sustaining Self Reliance National Gallery of Australia 11 April 2019 Final Report Dr Robbin Laird, Hi-Intensity Operations and Sustaining Self-Reliance, May 2019 Download pdf Synopsis and Program Download pdf Handbook Download pdf Presentations Dr Alan Stephens OAM, University of NSW, Canberra Defence self-reliance and plan B - Paper Download pdf Dr Andrew Carr, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University Defence self-reliance in Australian foreign policy: why and so what? No presentation Prof Brendan Sargeant, Australian Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, ANU College of Asia and the Pacific Defence policy in flux No presentation LTCOL David Beaumont, School of Logistics Operations Australian Army From tail to tooth: sustaining a self-reliant ADF Note: this presentation is the personal work of LTCOL Beaumont Download pdf Donna Cain-Riva, Future Logistics Capability – Air Force, Royal Australian Air Force Far from sanctuaries: sustaining a fifth-generation fight in the Indo-Pacific Download pdf LTCOL Keirin Joyce, Army Unmanned Aerial Systems Army Headquarters Alternative sustainment: Army’s approach to drones Download pdf WGCDR Alison MacCarthy, Heavy Airlift Systems Program Office, Capability Acquisition and Sustainment Group Platform stewardship: a CASG perspective Download pdf Chris Stevens, Air Domain MBDA The UK Weapons Portfolio – successfully providing freedom of action and operational advantage Presentation - Email request to info@williamsfoundation.org.au Jerome Dunn, Counter Hypersonics, Northrop Grumman Countering hypersonics and self-reliance through architecture design Presentation - Email request to info@williamsfoundation.org.au Background Since 2013 the Sir Richard Williams Foundation seminars have focused on building an integrated fifth generation force. Recent seminars have evolved from the acquisition of new platforms to the process of shaping and better understanding the environment in which that integrated force will prepare and operate. In doing so they have, among other things, highlighted the challenges of making the strategic shift from counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan to higher tempo and higher intensity operations involving peer competitors. Within this context, the seminar in August 2018 focused on the importance of a joint approach to building an independent and potent regional strike capability. The topic broadened to begin an examination of new ways and means of enhancing sovereign options as part of an evolving deterrent strategy. The August seminar began a process of looking at the evolution of Australian defence capabilities through an increasingly sovereign lens and concluded there are some important choices to be made if we are to maintain our capability edge and influence in the region. Allies are crucial to the Australian concept of defence; however, the emerging strategic circumstances demand it is vital we reconsider the ways and means of enhancing Australian sovereignty to better contribute to our relationships and ensure a more sophisticated and independent defence of Australian interests. During the 2019 seminars, the Sir Richard Williams Foundation will develop this theme and address more broadly the question of how to look at the evolution of the Australian Defence Force from the perspective of the sovereign lens and setting the conditions for future success. Aim of the Seminar The first seminar will examine the question from an historical standpoint and focus on the importance and challenges of sustaining an Australian Defence Force that can autonomously contribute to the pursuit of Australia’s national interests in an increasingly challenging environment. A key element of our thinking is to focus on the importance of our natural strategic strengths and reconsider Australian territory and geography, as well as the near region, as an integral part of our deterrence posture. This entails building the infrastructure and partnerships necessary to enable more effective mobility so that Australian and partner territory can be used as a chessboard on which we are able to move Australian forces, and upon which allied forces could operate in times of crisis as part of a broader coalition engagement and sustainment strategy. Enhanced Australian industrial sovereignty and sustainability is a core requirement of a secure and sustained force in times of crisis, where the normal functioning of the global supply chain will be deliberately targeted and disrupted. This will require an integrated strategy for preparedness, operations and sustainment of the force enabled by appropriate industry policy to ensure the delivery of a sovereign defence capability. Seminar Outline This industrial policy must be closely aligned with defence policy, concepts and doctrine and will require a new approach and attitude to partnerships and an increased emphasis on the combat support and combat service support functions of the fifth-generation force. This will further develop the Australian manoeuvre approach to warfighting but set in a much broader context than simply the force elements. The seminar will address the evolving Australian approach to building new capabilities and systems with an expanded role for Australian industry as part of a broader alliance structure. A contemporary example is how Army is building its unmanned aircraft capability through an innovative partnering strategy with industry. Similarly, the seminar will address how Defence can be a better steward of its major platforms by partnering with industry. One such sector worthy of consideration by Australia is in emerging technologies and how these might disrupt traditional concepts of supply chains and enhance Australia’s sovereign capabilities. The development of an Australian-based research, design, manufacture, test and sustainment capability is a realistic aspiration and provides sovereign capability which contributes significantly within a broader alliance structure. In particular, Australia can play a significant role in the development and production of 21st century missiles and at the same time support the needs of core allies who could leverage evolving Australian science and technology, test and experimentation ranges, and advanced manufacturing capabilities within a sophisticated and diverse global supply chain. Above all, this will add diversity, complexity and resilience to the Australian defence and security posture and provide additional choice in the selection of the most appropriate ways and means of delivering a balanced suite of defensive and offensive independent strike capabilities. Download pdf