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Fight Tonight: Combat Readiness at the Speed of Relevance - Conference Proceeding s #3 By Dr Robbin Laird The nature of military transformation has fundamentally changed. Where once armed forces could afford to develop new platforms over decades and then figure out how to use them, today’s security environment demands a completely different approach. This shift represents perhaps the most significant change in military thinking since the advent of combined arms warfare itself. In a recent discussion with Lt General Simon Stuart, Chief of Staff of the Australian Army, the contours of this transformation became clear. The conversation revealed not just tactical adaptations to new technologies, but a philosophical reorientation of how militaries must think about capability development, acquisition, and employment in an era of rapid technological change. Beyond Platform-Centric Thinking “Our transformation is no longer self-referential,” Lt General Stuart explained, describing how military modernization has historically focused on platforms first, with tactics, techniques, and procedures developed afterward. Under the traditional model, a new aircraft, ship, or vehicle would be delivered, and military personnel would then spend years figuring out optimal employment methods. Doctrine would follow, eventually leading to new ways of fighting. This sequential approach worked when technological change moved at a measured pace and adversaries faced similar constraints. But today’s reality is starkly different. The pace and scale of technological change, driven by the digital revolution and emerging technologies like artificial intelligence and quantum computing, have compressed traditional development timelines.. The Australian Army’s response has been to adopt what Stuart calls a “threat, terrain, and technology referential” approach. Rather than being dictated to by available platforms, this methodology starts with understanding the specific threats forces will face, the terrain they’ll operate in, and the technologies available to address those challenges. Only then are platforms and systems assembled to meet operational requirements. This represents a return to Clausewitzian fundamentals , acknowledging warfare’s enduring human nature while adapting to its ever-changing character. But the current generation faces something historically unprecedented: the character of warfare is now changing not over decades, but month by month, sometimes week by week. The New Combined Arms Reality The implications extend far beyond individual platform decisions to the very nature of combined arms warfare. Modern military operations increasingly involve what might be called “layered combinations” of crewed and uncrewed systems, each optimized for different aspects of the battlespace. Stuart described a conceptual framework of multiple layers: a forward line of uncrewed ISR systems providing surveillance and reconnaissance while potentially emitting electronic signatures to confuse enemy targeting; a middle layer heavy on uncrewed systems with lighter crewed presence; and more traditional formations with heavy crewed elements supported by uncrewed capabilities. Critically, nothing is replaced in this evolution for everything is additive. Drones don’t replace traditional platforms; they create new combinations with them. Electronic warfare doesn’t supersede kinetic capabilities; it enables them. Artificial intelligence doesn’t remove humans from decision-making; it augments human capabilities while raising fundamental questions about the appropriate level of human oversight, particularly regarding lethal force employment. This additive approach challenges binary thinking about “man versus machine” in military affairs. The question isn’t whether humans or machines will dominate future warfare, but how to preserve human lives while leveraging uniquely human capabilities like creative thinking and moral judgment. As Stuart noted, “the answer, as it ever has been, is both.” Innovation from the Bottom Up Perhaps the most significant operational change is the systematic empowerment of tactical-level innovation. Historically, militaries have been hierarchical organizations where innovation flowed from senior leadership and research institutions down to operational units. Today’s environment demands reversing that flow. The Australian Army has implemented what Stuart describes as “learn by doing” exercises, pairing soldiers directly with industry partners to solve specific mission problems. Units receive defined mission sets, perhaps defeating certain threats in specific terrain under degraded conditions, along with access to various technologies and systems. Their task is to experiment, adapt, and report back on what works, what doesn’t, and how different combinations might be more effective. This approach taps into the creative potential of soldiers, non-commissioned officers, and junior officers at a scale military organizations haven’t attempted historically. For armies that lack mass , a description that fits most Western militaries, maximizing human potential becomes not just beneficial but essential. The feedback loop is deliberately rapid. Units don’t spend months writing formal reports; they immediately feed lessons learned back into the system for broader application. This creates what Stuart calls “continual adaptation” or the ability to evolve tactics and procedures as quickly as threats and technologies change. The Acquisition Imperative These operational changes create unprecedented challenges for defence acquisition systems designed around platform-centric thinking. Traditional acquisition processes, which can take decades to field new capabilities, are fundamentally out of phase with operational requirements that change monthly. The mismatch isn’t merely about speed, though that’s certainly part of it. It’s about the entire conceptual framework. Platform-centric acquisition assumes you can define requirements years in advance, design systems to meet those requirements, and then use those systems for decades. But when software can be updated rapidly and electronic warfare techniques evolve dynamically, that assumption breaks down completely. As observed in the Ukraine conflict, code writing and counter-code writing have become central to military effectiveness. This suggests militaries may need coding capabilities at surprisingly low organizational levels, perhaps battalion level or below. The ability to rapidly modify software, adapt to enemy countermeasures, and exploit newly discovered vulnerabilities becomes as important as traditional military skills. The implications extend beyond just adding programmers to military units. It requires rethinking the entire relationship between industry and the military. Traditional defence contractors, optimized for long development cycles and stable requirements, must now work alongside smaller, more agile technology companies that can deliver rapid iterations and continuous updates. This creates new partnership models where innovation happens through collaborative experimentation rather than formal requirements documents. Moreover, the traditional “valley of death” between research and fielding must be eliminated. When operational environments change weekly, there’s no time for lengthy transition periods between proof-of-concept and operational deployment. Military organizations need the ability to rapidly prototype, test, and field capabilities while maintaining appropriate safety and security standards. This reality demands what might be called “hybrid acquisition” or maintaining traditional processes for major platforms while developing entirely new mechanisms for rapidly fielding and updating software-intensive capabilities. The challenge isn’t choosing between these approaches but integrating them effectively while ensuring that rapid innovation doesn’t compromise safety, security, or interoperability. Lessons from Ukraine The ongoing conflict in Ukraine provides perhaps the clearest example of these principles in action. Ukraine’s effectiveness results not from any single capability but from the combination of Western-trained forces using Western weapons systems integrated with innovative employment of commercial and military drones, electronic warfare capabilities, and rapidly evolving software. Crucially, Ukraine’s success demonstrates that focusing solely on new technologies while ignoring traditional capabilities misses the point entirely. Ukrainian forces need Western artillery, air defence systems, and armored vehicles to create the foundation upon which drone warfare and electronic operations could be effective. Conversely, those traditional capabilities would have been insufficient without the innovative integration of new technologies. This integrated approach extends to something Stuart calls “adaptive reuse” or finding new applications for existing platforms. Vietnam-era M113 armored personnel carriers, for example, can be converted into uncrewed or optionally crewed systems carrying various payloads: sustainment supplies, ISR equipment, electronic warfare systems, or kinetic effectors. The question becomes not whether old platforms are obsolete, but how they can be adapted to contribute to current operational requirements. Platform Design Evolution These operational and acquisition changes will inevitably influence future platform design. New systems must be built with modularity and adaptability as core features rather than afterthoughts. The ability to rapidly integrate new sensors, weapons, or electronic systems becomes as important as traditional performance metrics like speed or armor protection. Consider the example of naval operations in the Red Sea, where sophisticated command and control systems were constrained by having only the weapons physically mounted on individual ships. A more adaptive approach might involve airlift platforms deploying loitering weapons that at sea operational units could employ, dramatically expanding the weapons available to commanders without requiring them to physically carry additional munitions. This suggests platform design must anticipate not just current requirements but unknown future adaptations. Systems need built-in capacity for upgrades, modifications, and entirely new applications that designers cannot currently envision. The Human Element Throughout these technological and organizational changes, the human element remains central. The goal isn’t to remove humans from military operations but to leverage uniquely human capabilities while protecting human lives. This requires careful consideration of where humans remain “in the loop,” “on the loop,” or “out of the loop” for different types of decisions, particularly those involving lethal force. The questions are both technical and ethical: What degree of confidence do we have in sensor systems? How vulnerable are they to spoofing or deception? Under what circumstances, if any, should machines make autonomous lethal decisions? These aren’t just engineering problems but fundamental questions about the nature of warfare and military responsibility. The human dimension becomes even more complex when considering the cognitive demands of modern warfare. Operators must now manage not just traditional military tasks but increasingly complex human-machine interfaces. They must understand when to trust automated systems, when to override them, and how to maintain situational awareness in environments where information flows at unprecedented speeds. Training paradigms must evolve accordingly. Military education can no longer focus primarily on mastering specific platforms or weapons systems. Instead, it must emphasize adaptability, systems thinking, and the ability to rapidly learn and integrate new technologies. This shift from platform-specific training to capability-focused education represents another fundamental departure from traditional military development models. Furthermore, the psychological aspects of human-machine teaming require serious consideration. How do you maintain unit cohesion when some members are physically present while others are operating remotely? How do you build trust in automated systems while maintaining appropriate skepticism? These human factors challenges are as important as technical specifications in determining operational effectiveness. Looking Forward Military transformation in the digital age represents a return to first principles combined with unprecedented technological capability. Success requires understanding that platforms, while still important, are now just one element in complex systems-of-systems that must be continuously adapted to meet evolving threats. The implications extend beyond military organizations to broader defence ecosystems. Defence industries must restructure to support continuous innovation rather than cyclical platform delivery. Military educational institutions must prepare officers for careers defined by constant adaptation rather than mastery of fixed doctrine. Political leaders must understand that defence budgets can no longer be allocated primarily based on platform acquisition schedules but must account for continuous capability development and rapid response to emerging threats. International cooperation becomes more complex but also more critical. When capabilities evolve monthly, traditional approaches to standardization and interoperability through formal agreements and lengthy certification processes become inadequate. New models for coalition warfare must accommodate rapid capability sharing and real-time adaptation to combined operations. The militaries that will succeed in this environment are those that can harness bottom-up innovation while maintaining strategic coherence, that can rapidly field new capabilities while maintaining existing strengths, and that can adapt continuously while preserving essential human judgment and oversight. Perhaps most importantly, success requires cultural change within military organizations. The new paradigm demands comfort with ambiguity, willingness to experiment and potentially fail, and the intellectual humility to learn from soldiers and junior officers who may better understand emerging technologies than their superiors. This represents a profound shift from military cultures traditionally built around hierarchy, standardization, and proven doctrine. As Lt General Stuart observed, this isn’t about choosing between humans and machines, platforms and software, or innovation and tradition. It’s about creating new combinations that leverage the strengths of each while compensating for their individual limitations. In an era where the character of warfare changes weekly, the ability to combine and recombine capabilities rapidly may be the most important military skill of all. The transformation is already underway. The question isn’t whether militaries will adapt to this new reality, but how quickly and effectively they can do so while maintaining the human elements that make military service both effective and ethical. Those organizations that can master this balance will enjoy decisive advantages; those that cannot may find themselves perpetually behind the curve in an environment where falling behind means operational irrelevance. Also published in Defense.info

Dr Robbin Laird, The Imperative for Cost Effectiveness in Multidomain Operations : Final Report, 22 May 2025 Link to ebook (Defense.info)

Dr Robbin Laird, Air Power and the Challenge of Shaping an Effective Ready Force Which Can Deliver Deterrence by Denial , 29 May 2025 Link to article (Defense.info) The first of two panels held at the Sir Richard Williams Foundation seminar on May 22, 2025 was entitled a “Cost Per Effect” panel. It was chaired by Air Marshal (Retd) Darren Goldie and the panelists were: Air Vice Marshal Glen Braz, Air Commander Australia Professor Justin Bronk. Air Vice Marshal John Haly, Head Military Strategic Plans. Air Marshal (Retd) Darren Goldie, Australia’s former Air Commander Australia and Australia’s inaugural National Cyber Security Coordinator within the Department of Home Affairs, opened with a reframing of military cost analysis. “Cost per effect,” he explained, “is far more complex than the old ‘cost per kill’ calculations.” When Australia fires a maritime strike weapon over the horizon — of which the government has invested heavily —the true cost isn’t just the missile itself. It includes a proportional share of pilot training, the targeting enterprise, intelligence systems and everything else required to “render that ship useless.” But the calculation becomes even more complex when considering deterrence effects. “We’re talking about a submarine program that exceeds $300 billion,” Goldie noted. “We will get submarines that ideally will never fire a weapon. The effect you seek there is deterrence.” This distinction matters enormously for how Australia approaches defense spending. As Clausewitz observed, “the value of the object determines the measure of the sacrifices by which it will be purchased.” When the object is Australia’s sovereignty, the acceptable cost ceiling rises considerably. Professor Justin Bronk highlighted the strategic shift of the past decade which can be described as the evolution from “deterrence by punishment” to “deterrence by denial.” The old model — threatening massive retaliation after an invasion— no longer holds credibility against nuclear-armed great powers. “We’re not going to downtown Beijing. We’re not going to downtown Moscow. They’ll nuke us, let’s be clear,” Bronk stated bluntly. Instead, the focus has shifted to preventing initial success. In Eastern Europe, this means stopping Russian advances before they can establish occupation zones. In the Indo-Pacific, it means preventing Chinese forces from gaining a lodgement in Taiwan — because “you’ll never kick them out if you do.” This strategic shift has profound implications for capability development. Rather than building forces optimized for deep strikes against enemy homelands, the emphasis is on systems that can credibly deny an adversary’s initial objectives. The panelists in the cost per effect panel at the Sir Richard Williams Foundation seminar on May 22, 2025. Air Vice Marshal Glen Braz emphasized that air power remains “fundamentally central to the national defense strategy.” Australia’s ability to project force quickly, deliver effects at long range, and provide options to government aren’t future aspirations — they’re current realities that need constant refinement. “We need to find smarter, faster, more agile ways to deliver air power that makes a difference at scale, at range and at speed,” Braz explained. “This isn’t just about buying platforms; it’s about building comprehensive capability through people, preparedness, and integrated systems.” The challenge is particularly acute given Australia’s strategic geography. The National Defence Strategy calls for moving resources north but infrastructure development takes time. In the interim, forces must manage risk while building credible deterrent capabilities with existing assets. Much of the conversation by the panel centered on people rather than platforms. Braz commands approximately 12,000 personnel across Air Force capabilities, and he’s acutely aware that technology alone doesn’t deliver effects. “This is a human endeavour,” he emphasized. “These humans might use tools that are increasingly uncrewed or increasingly autonomous, but it’s a human endeavour.” The Air Force is adapting by developing more flexible personnel who can operate across multiple roles while maintaining core technical proficiency. “We’re typically very specialist and very bespoke,” Braz noted, “but we need to broaden people’s aperture and use their intellect and talent in a myriad of ways.” This isn’t about lowering standards — Air Force personnel remain “incredibly proficient” in their specialist roles. Instead, it’s about accepting calculated risk in how people are employed while building resilience through cross-training and adaptability. The panel spent considerable time examining the seductive promise of cheap mass capabilities. Commercial drones costing $2,500 might seem like an obvious alternative to expensive military systems, but Bronk provided a reality check on the true costs of military-grade capabilities. “You can have a small quadcopter that costs $2,500, but it doesn’t work in icing conditions, high winds, heavy rain, and doesn’t have night-capable cameras,” Bronk argued. Make it capable of all those things, “and it’s no longer $2,500 — it’s now $50,000, and you cannot have thousands of them.” The challenge becomes even more complex for longer-range systems relevant to Indo-Pacific distances. A basic airframe for 1,000-kilometer range costs about $25,000, but adding encrypted data links ($70,000), AI-powered navigation, seekers, and warheads quickly pushes costs above $200,000 per unit. This doesn’t mean cheap systems lack value — they can impose costs on adversaries by forcing them to expend expensive interceptors. But they complement rather than replace high-end capabilities. Space capabilities are becoming more important as Australian and allied forces focus on effective ways to distribute force. As systems become more disaggregated and autonomous, they become increasingly dependent on space-based communications, navigation, and intelligence. “The more you rely on one-way systems, including long-range strike munitions,” Bronk observed, “the more you’re likely to be reliant on that space situational awareness picture.” Air Vice-Marshal John Haly, Head of Military Strategic Plans, emphasized the importance of “minimum viable capability” — systems that are “good enough on time” with the ability to be upgraded, rather than “exotic, wonderful and too late.” The panel discussed as well how to characterize the threat in relation to a realistic approach which Australia can take to the threats in its region and beyond. As Haly noted, “we shouldn’t pretend that what we’re preparing for is Australia against a great power alone and unafraid. That’s not the case.” Rather, Australian forces need to be prepared to prevail against the subset of threats likely to be directed against Australia as part of a broader conflict. This more realistic framing helps maintain confidence while acknowledging the serious nature of potential challenges. The panel’s conclusions suggest several key principles for Australian defense planning: • Integration over independence: Modern military effects require seamless coordination across domains, with space and cyber capabilities as critical enablers rather than separate domains. • People as the foundation: Advanced technology amplifies human capability but doesn’t replace the need for skilled, adaptable personnel who can operate effectively under pressure. • Strategic patience with tactical urgency: Major capability developments take time, but forces must maintain readiness and manage risk in the interim through innovation, training, and smart resource allocation. • Alliance integration: Australia’s strategic challenges are best addressed through deeper integration with allies rather than pursuing independent solutions. As the discussion concluded, Braz offered a note of measured optimism: “I am positive that our great people, well equipped and well trained, can do what the nation needs.” In the context of a significant shift in the strategic framework and constrained resources, smart choices about capability development, force structure, and strategic priorities, a cost per effect framework provides a tool for making those choices The challenge isn’t just building a military that can fight and win, but one that can deter conflict through credible capability and strategic clarity. In that mission, every dollar spent, and every person trained becomes part of a larger equation that ultimately determines whether Australia’s sovereignty can be preserved without having to test it in combat. Success depends on smart resource allocation rather than simply buying cheap or expensive — it’s about understanding what effects are needed and the most efficient ways to achieve them.

Dr Robbin Laird, Shaping a Way Ahead for the Australian Defence Force in the Context of Global Strategic Transition, 3 June 2025 Link to article (Defense.info) At the May 22, 2025 Sir Richard Williams Foundation seminar, Air Marshal Robert Chipman, Vice Chief of the Australian Defence Forces, recently outlined the nation’s evolving approach to national security in a comprehensive address. Chipman describes Australia’s security environment as “complex and deteriorating,” with the international system under strain from great power competition between China and the United States. He emphasizes that hard power has become preeminent again, with the Indo-Pacific as the epicenter of this competition. The risk of conflict is assessed as increasing, with reduced strategic warning time. The comfortable certainties of the post-Cold War era have evaporated. China’s rise and its challenge to the established international order, combined with America’s more selective engagement globally, has created what Chipman describes as a fundamentally different strategic landscape. Unlike the Cold War’s “perverse clarity” of mutually assured destruction, today’s great power competition lacks the stabilizing frameworks of arms control and non-proliferation agreements. This shift has profound implications for Australia. The Indo-Pacific has become the epicenter of great power competition, placing Australia at the geographic heart of rising tensions. The traditional buffer of distance that once provided strategic warning time has been compressed by technological advances and increasingly bold grey-zone activities by state actors. Air Marshal Chipman speaking to the Sir Richard Williams Foundation seminar on May 22, 2025. Conventional military conflict could escalate to nuclear war through what military strategists call “horizontal and vertical escalation.” This possibility demands entirely new approaches to deterrence, coalition management, and strategic decision-making. Australia’s response has been to develop what officials term a “strategy of denial.” This strategy recognizes that Australia’s critical strategic geography lies to its north, requiring the ability to maneuver simultaneously across all five operational domains: land, sea, air, space, and cyber. The strategy is defensive in nature but, as Chipman emphasizes, it cannot be implemented with a defensive mindset. Instead, it requires an active approach that embraces contest and pursues asymmetric advantages to offset the significant imbalances Australia faces in military and economic power relative to potential adversaries. Central to Australia’s evolving defence posture is the concept of asymmetric advantage – achieving outcomes disproportionate to the size of the force employed. This concept has gained renewed relevance following observations from the conflict in Ukraine, where low-cost drones have successfully engaged expensive main battle tanks, fundamentally altering traditional battlefield calculations. However, Australia’s approach to asymmetry extends far beyond simply acquiring cheaper weapons systems. The rapid pace of technological change, demonstrated by development cycles measured in weeks rather than years, demands new approaches to capability development. Australia is establishing foundations for rapid innovation and adaptation rather than attempting to stockpile capabilities subject to obsolescence. The ability to integrate military force across all operational domains, combined with all elements of national power and in concert with allies and partners, represents a key form of asymmetric advantage. This integration capability may prove as valuable as the individual systems being integrated. Australia’s acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines under the AUKUS partnership represents the largest investment in military capability in the nation’s history. These platforms will provide the range, endurance, stealth, and lethality needed to protect sea lines of communication across vast ocean distances – precisely the form of asymmetric advantage a medium power like Australia requires. Modern warfare requires simultaneous operations across land, sea, air, space, and cyber domains. As Chipman notes, air power – long considered decisive in modern warfare – is vulnerable when grounded, can be neutralized through enemy action in space and cyber domains, and requires sea control for sustained operations. This multi-domain reality creates both opportunities and challenges. While it offers multiple avenues for creating asymmetric advantages, it also increases complexity and vulnerability. Weakness in any single domain can compromise the entire force structure, making balanced investment across domains essential. The communications pathways that enable multi-domain operations also increase what military planners call the “attack surface area” – the points where adversaries can target Australian capabilities. This reality makes cyber protection and space access as critical as traditional military capabilities. Australia’s strategic transformation extends beyond military capabilities to encompass defence industry and innovation ecosystems. The Australian Strategic Capabilities Accelerator (ASCA) represents a new approach to rapid capability development, focused on getting asymmetric capabilities into the hands of service members quickly through innovation rather than traditional procurement processes. This approach requires fundamental changes to risk management and funding models. Defence must be willing to share genuine risk with industry partners while rewarding innovation and assuring returns on investment. Success demands what Chipman calls “headroom in our budget to resource innovation” matched by greater public understanding of the imperative for innovation and willingness to accept the inherent risks of investing in unproven technology. The goal extends beyond domestic innovation to building “capable, resilient, competitive and secure supply chains” that include Australian businesses while creating economies of scale through international partnerships. Co-design, co-development, co-production, and co-sustainment with allies can improve resource utilization, strengthen collective industrial capacity, and accelerate technological development. Despite emphasis on sovereign capabilities and self-reliance, Australia’s alliance relationships remain central to its security strategy. The U.S. alliance continues as the foundation of Australian defence planning, providing everything from mission data and command systems to satellite services and advanced platforms. However, the alliance is evolving. Rather than creating dependency, strengthening Australian self-reliance is seen as making the alliance more powerful for both nations. This reflects recognition that successful alliances require genuine stakes in each other’s security rather than one-sided dependency relationships. The challenge lies in balancing self-reliance with alliance integration. Australia’s “way of war” is built on foundations of U.S. cooperation, creating both asymmetric advantages and potential vulnerabilities that must be carefully managed. Traditional defence procurement processes, designed for peacetime deliberation, are proving inadequate for current strategic circumstances. Australia has implemented significant reforms to what it calls the “one defence capability system,” moving from pursuit of perfect solutions to “good enough on time” with iterative improvements. This shift represents a fundamental change in risk tolerance and capability philosophy. Rather than waiting for perfect solutions, the focus has moved to getting beneficial technology to service members as soon as it offers advantage, with improvements delivered through progressive capability upgrades. The approach includes tailored approval pathways for different project complexities and fast-track processes for immediate needs and transient opportunities. However, major platform acquisitions still require deliberate planning cycles, creating a dual-track system for different capability requirements. Looking toward the 2026 iteration of Australia’s National Defence Strategy, several principles are emerging. Australia’s security remains best served by international cooperation and effective institutions, but the reality is a more transactional world where strength and resilience take precedence. The challenge lies in maintaining a strategic culture biased toward cooperation while adapting to circumstances that increasingly reward strength. This tension will shape future capability investments, alliance relationships, and strategic posture. Australia’s defence transformation reflects broader global trends toward great power competition and technological disruption of traditional military advantages. The nation’s response – emphasizing asymmetric advantages, multi-domain integration, and innovation agility – offers insights for other middle powers navigating similar strategic transitions. The overarching theme is Australia’s need to adapt to a more dangerous strategic environment through innovative, asymmetric approaches while maintaining alliance relationships and sovereign capabilities. Featured photo: Vice Chief of the Defence Force, Air Marshal Robert Chipman AO, CSC, with Singapore’s Chief of Staff – Joint Staff, SAF Inspector-General, Chief Sustainability Officer, Brigadier-General Goh Pei Ming, lay a wreath at the Last Post Ceremony at the Australian War Memorial in Canberra. Singapore’s Chief of Staff – Joint Staff / SAF Inspector-General / Chief Sustainability Officer [Brigadier-General Goh Pei Ming], Deputy Secretary (Policy) [Brigadier-General Frederick Choo], and accompanying delegation visited Canberra from 13-15 March 2024. While in Canberra, Brigadier-General Goh Pei Ming and Brigadier-General Frederick Choo met with Australia’s Vice Chief of the Defence Force [Air Marshal Robert Chipman] and Deputy Secretary Strategy, Policy, and Industry [Mr Hugh Jeffrey], and attended the Last Post Ceremony at the Australian War Memorial.

Dr Robbin Laird, Shaping a Way Ahead for Autonomous Defence Capabilities for the ADF by Denial, 17 June 2025 Link to article (Defense.info) Australian Army Drone Racing Team pilots were presented the Inter-Service Championship Team award by Air Vice-Marshal Nicholas Hogan, CSC – Head of Air Capability, during a drone racing event at the Australian International Airshow 2025 at Avalon Airport. March 3, 2025. Credit: Australian Department of Defence On June 5, 2025, I had a chance to talk with Air Vice-Marshal Nick Hogan, the Head of Air Force Capability within the RAAF about the challenges and opportunities of incorporating autonomous systems within the Australian Defence Force and the impact this will have on the force. Australia stands at the threshold of a strategic opportunity that could fundamentally reshape its defense capabilities. Australia faces a paradigm shift that could multiply Australia’s defensive capacity while creating new opportunities for domestic industry. Autonomous systems are not simply unmanned versions of traditional platforms. They are essentially payload carriers that perform specific tasks for operational forces rather than replacing them. They are not multi-mission platforms which is the focus of traditional manned systems. Rather than designing systems to perform multiple roles over 30-year lifespans — like the F-35 fighter jet — autonomous systems are conceived as single-purpose, task-specific tools that can be rapidly developed, deployed, and evolved. This shift requires new concepts of operations and, crucially, different relationships with industry partners. Australia’s investment in the MQ-28A Ghost Bat provides the foundation for this transformation. Hogan sees this not as an end product but as a stepping stone toward a sovereign capability built on open systems architectures. By collaborating with partners and using government reference architectures, Australia can create platforms that allow for rapid digital design and testing with minimal flight-testing requirements that integrate with allies and partners. The key is moving toward what Hogan calls “containerized software” approaches — plug-and-play payloads that work across different platforms, avoiding vendor lock and enabling smaller companies to compete based on payload effectiveness rather than platform integration capabilities. This vision demands a radically different relationship with industry partners. Instead of the traditional vendor-locked arrangements exemplified by programs like the F-35, Hogan advocates for what he calls “intimate relationships” with industry — sharing cost constraints and fiscal targets to enable collaborative solutions. “Opening up the books on both sides, so you can both see the constraints that you’ve got, you can work together to get a common solution,” Hogan explains. This approach has already shown promise in Australia’s work with Boeing Defense Australia, providing insights into what works well and what doesn’t in industry partnerships. This model enables small and medium enterprises to compete on equal footing with large primes, focusing on payload effectiveness rather than platform integration. The result is a more dynamic, competitive environment that can drive rapid innovation and cost-effective solutions. In my view, another key requirement of this approach is to get these systems into operators’ hands quickly for operational evolution rather than being captured by lengthy acquisition processes. My view is that it’s a question of the fighting force being able to get priority to provide operational evolution of these kinds of systems, rather than leaving them captured by the acquisition bureaucracy. The ultimate vision is to shape a mosaic of capability —commanders having access to flexible, changeable, and dynamic combinations of manned and unmanned systems across air, maritime, and ground domains. This approach moves away from relying on single-purpose platforms for decades toward a more adaptive, responsive capability mix. This mosaic approach will enable area commanders to look at specific operational requirements and determine the optimal mix of assets to achieve desired effects. It’s about maximizing effects rather than maximizing platform capabilities. The technology exists, the operational concepts are being proven, and the industrial base is ready to respond. But the path forward requires several key elements: Institutional Reform: Acquisition processes need to prioritize operational evolution over traditional platform procurement approaches. This means getting systems into operators’ hands quickly and allowing them to drive further development. Industry Partnership: New models of collaboration that share constraints and targets while enabling competition based on effectiveness rather than integration capabilities. Cultural Change: Training and organizational development that helps personnel conceptualize and employ these new capabilities effectively. Standards and Architectures: Government-maintained standards that enable interoperability while avoiding the fragmentation that would come from multiple incompatible systems. There is the tremendous potential and the significant challenges inherent in this transformation. Success could multiply Australia’s defensive capacity while creating new opportunities for domestic industry. There is a generational opportunity to reshape defense capabilities for the challenges ahead.

Dr Robbin Laird, Strategic Transformation for a New Era: Reworking the Australian’s Army’s Role in Australian Defence, 16 June 2025 Link to article (Defense.info) The Australian Army is undergoing what its leadership describes as the most significant transformation since World War II, fundamentally reshaping itself for an era of great power competition in the Indo-Pacific. This comprehensive adaptation, driven by the 2023 Defence Strategic Review, represents both a strategic pivot and a return to the Army’s amphibious warfare heritage forged in the Pacific campaigns of the 1940s. According to Lieutenant General Simon Stuart, Chief of the Australian Army, the service stands at “an historic inflection point” necessitated by the most challenging strategic circumstances since the end of World War II.¹ The Defence Strategic Review concluded that Australia faces “the prospect of major conflict in the region” and that the Australian Defence Force must transition rapidly from a “balanced force” to an “integrated, focused force” designed to address the nation’s most significant strategic risks.² This transformation is underpinned by Australia’s adoption of a “strategy of denial” – an approach that aims to deter conflict and prevent coercion through force, with a naturally strong maritime focus befitting an island nation.³ As General Stuart noted, “for the first time in more than 80 years, we must go back to fundamentals… to take a ‘first principles’ approach.”⁴ Rediscovering Littoral Warfare DNA Central to this transformation is the Army’s optimization “for littoral manoeuvre operations by sea, land and air from Australia, with enhanced long-range fires.”⁵ This direction represents what Australian military leaders call a rediscovery of the Army’s “amphibious and littoral-operation DNA,” acknowledging that Australia has always relied on maritime strategy as a nation “girt by sea.”⁶ The material foundations for this capability are substantial. The Australian government is procuring 18 medium landing craft of around 500 tons and 9 heavy craft of between 3,000 and 5,000 tons – representing “the largest fleet of littoral watercraft operated by the Australian Army since World War II.”⁷ These capabilities, operating in conjunction with the Royal Australian Navy’s two 27,500-ton amphibious assault ships, will fundamentally transform the Army’s ability to maneuver, deter, and deny in the littorals of Australia’s archipelagic region. The scale of this transformation becomes apparent when considering the operational requirements. As General Stuart explained to defense industry leaders, “an Australian Division in the Indo-Pacific must be capable of distributed archipelagic operations spanning hundreds if not thousands of kilometres,” referencing how during World War II, “the Australian Army’s frontage stretched from Borneo to Bougainville… greater than the distance from Sydney to Perth.”⁸ Professional Foundations Under Review Beyond physical transformation, the Army is conducting a comprehensive assessment of its professional foundations – what General Stuart describes as “the first time since 1947 that we have attempted a wholesale, holistic review of our profession.”⁹ This review is structured around three fundamental pillars: Jurisdiction – defining the unique service the Army provides to society. General Stuart argues that the Army’s role has become unclear to the nation it serves, partly due to recent “niche wars” that “didn’t touch Australia’s shores, or the vast majority of Australians, in any tangible sense.”¹⁰ The challenge is articulating what sort of Army Australia needs “in the middle decades of the 21st Century” and ensuring this role is clearly understood by both the military and society.¹¹ Expertise – maintaining and developing the Army’s professional body of knowledge. This involves balancing “war’s enduringly human nature with its ever-changing character,” requiring the Army to be proficient in both cutting-edge technology and classical military theory.¹² As General Stuart emphasized, the Army needs “technologists and futurists” but also “historians, philosophers, ethicists and strategists in equal measure.”¹³ Self-regulation – the Army’s ability to uphold professional standards, particularly regarding command accountability. General Stuart identified this as “perhaps the most pressing” challenge, noting that “the command relationship between our Army and the individual has not thrived these last two decades.”¹⁴ Regional Integration and Alliance Cooperation The transformation emphasizes collective deterrence through strengthened alliance relationships. Australian forces now regularly participate in major multilateral exercises including Super Garuda Shield with Indonesia and the United States, Exercise Alon with the Philippines and United States, and the expanding Talisman Sabre exercise that will host nineteen nations in 2025.¹⁵ General Stuart articulated the value of allied land power through five key advantages: presence, persistence, asymmetry, versatility, and value. He argued that allied armies provide “sheer presence” across the region, can “persist indefinitely, regardless of season, weather, or terrain,” offer “asymmetric” capabilities against adversary strengths, demonstrate remarkable “versatility” in mission adaptation, and deliver exceptional “value” for defense investment.¹⁶ This collective approach is particularly relevant given the Indo-Pacific’s geographic challenges. As General Stuart noted, “it is impossible for even the most capable militaries to maintain a continuous presence of platforms across the vast scale of the Indo-Pacific,” but armies “can offset these challenges by our ability to persist indefinitely.”¹⁷ Technology Integration with Human-Centered Warfare While embracing technological advancement, including artificial intelligence and hypersonic weapons, the Army maintains that “technology does not replace the very human aspects of war, it is instead additive.” This represents “very much an ‘and’, not an ‘or’ proposition.”¹⁸ The Army recognizes that “the ability to wield technology in war is a ‘new basic’ requirement in soldiering,” with technology becoming “as ubiquitous for our soldiers as the employment of their weapons.”¹⁹ However, this technological sophistication must be balanced with understanding of war’s enduring human nature, requiring soldiers prepared for “the most demanding of human endeavours, physically, intellectually and spiritually.”²⁰ Trust as the Foundation Underlying all transformation efforts is what General Stuart has identified as the Army’s central strategic priority: trust. “Trust and social license are explicitly linked,” he argued, “lose one, and we lose the other.”²¹ This focus on trust responds to challenges identified in the Royal Commission into Defence and Veteran Suicide and lessons learned from recent conflicts, particularly Afghanistan. The Army’s approach to rebuilding trust centers on strengthening command accountability and ensuring that “the equation must be in balance” between commanders’ accountabilities and the authorities and resources they are assigned.²² This includes fostering a “virtue-ethic” that serves as “the greatest protector against unethical and unprofessional behaviour in war.”²³ Historical Context and Future Direction The transformation draws heavily on historical precedent, particularly the Australian Army’s rapid adaptation for Pacific warfare between 1941 and 1945. As General Stuart observed, “the Army that fought to achieve victory [in 1945] had not even been imagined four years earlier,” yet managed a “remarkable” transformation “in contact.”²⁴ Today’s Army has the advantage of conducting transformation “out of contact,” allowing for more considered planning while recognizing that “time is not on our side.”²⁵ This comprehensive transformation represents more than equipment modernization or tactical adaptation. It constitutes a fundamental reimagining of Australia’s land power for an era where, as the National Defence Strategy concludes, “Australia no longer enjoys the benefit of a ten-year window of strategic warning time for conflict.”²⁶ The Australian Army’s evolution reflects broader questions about how middle powers adapt their military institutions for great power competition while maintaining the professional foundations essential for democratic societies. As Australia approaches the Army’s 125th anniversary in 2026, General Stuart has committed to having “the answers to the questions I have posed today,” ensuring the nation can be “fully engaged in writing the next chapter in the story of your Army.”²⁷ The success of this transformation will likely influence not only Australia’s security but serve as a model for how allied nations adapt their land forces for the challenges of 21st-century competition in the Indo-Pacific. Footnotes: 1.Lieutenant General Simon Stuart, “Strengthening the Australian Army 2.Profession,” Address at the Lowy Institute, 3 April 2025. 3.Major General Ash Collingburn and Colonel Tom McDermott, “Australia’s Army Is 4.Adapting for the Littorals,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, May 2025. 5.Ibid. 6.Lieutenant General Simon Stuart, “The Challenges to the Australian Army Profession,” Address at Australian National University, 25 November 2024. Collingburn and McDermott, “Australia’s Army Is Adapting for the Littorals.” 7.Ibid. 7.Ibid. 8.Lieutenant General Simon Stuart, “Remarks by the Chief of Army to the Land Forces Defence and Industry Dinner,” 12 September 2024. 9.Stuart, “Strengthening the Australian Army Profession.” 10.Stuart, “The Challenges to the Australian Army Profession.” 11.Stuart, “Strengthening the Australian Army Profession.” 12.Ibid. 13.Ibid. 14.Stuart, “The Challenges to the Australian Army Profession.” 15.Collingburn and McDermott, “Australia’s Army Is Adapting for the Littorals.” 16.Lieutenant General Simon Stuart, “The Role of Allied Land Power in Deterring Conflict,” Address at LANPAC, 15 May 2025. 17.Ibid. 18.Stuart, “Strengthening the Australian Army Profession.” 19.Ibid. 20.Stuart, “The Challenges to the Australian Army Profession.” 21.Stuart, “Strengthening the Australian Army Profession.” 22.Ibid. 23.Stuart, “The Challenges to the Australian Army Profession.” 24.Stuart, “Strengthening the Australian Army Profession.” 25.Ibid. 26.Ibid. 27.Ibid. The featured image was generated by an AI program.

Dr Robbin Laird, Australia and the Way Ahead with Autonomous Systems, 15 June 2025 Link to article (Defense.info) During my visit to Australia in May-June 2025, I have focused significantly on the coming of autonomous systems and how to incorporate them effectively into the Australian Defence Force and for security operations. I have published a new book which looks specifically at the paradigm shift in maritime operations and how maritime autonomous systems are key drivers in that shift. The point is that such systems are not simply uncrewed variants of crewed systems: rather they follow a very different logic and purpose. They operate to perform tasks which would otherwise not be done, or they do a mission driven task differently from a crewed system. I had a chance to talk with my friend and colleague Keirin Joyce during my visit. Joyce is really a true knowledge source on such systems given his experience in the Australian Army and the Air Force with such systems and his recent work and writing in the maritime domain. He currently is the Sir Richard Williams Scholar at the Air and Space Power Center and I am a senior research fellow at the foundation, so a perfect opportunity to collaborate and to think through ways to consider these systems for use within a broader Australian strategy. And to be clear, we are talking as much about security operations as we are about defense operations. Many of the pressing threats facing our nations are in the security domain, and without credible security of our territories, defense capabilities will matter much less. Certainly, the recent Ukrainian attack WITHIN Russia using various packages of forward deployed drones makes that point rather obvious. Current Australian maritime autonomous systems operate at what Joyce referred to as “level 2 autonomy” — essentially sophisticated remote-controlled vehicles with humans firmly in the decision-making loop. While impressive technological achievements, they fall short of the transformative capability that true autonomy could provide. Joyce underscored: “Right now, Tesla’s autopilot is operating at about level four autonomy. “Our maritime systems need to take that next evolutionary step to be equipped with the sensing and computation power to reach similar levels of independence.” This autonomy gap represents more than just a technological challenge — it’s a strategic limitation that prevents Australia from achieving the “mass dividend” that autonomous systems promise. Without one-to-many or many-to-many control capabilities, the ADF cannot deploy these systems at the scale necessary for effective deterrence across the Pacific’s enormous distances. Aerial autonomous systems have made significant progress in solving the twin challenges of sensing and security. Collaborative combat aircraft are already incorporating infrared search and track systems and detect-and-avoid capabilities that operate continuously without human intervention. The MQ-9B drone or SkyGuardian, for instance, features certifiable detect-and-avoid radar providing 120-degree coverage at all times. These aircraft represent an evolution toward systems that can sense their environment and adapt their behavior accordingly, rather than simply following pre-programmed instructions. Enhanced autonomy requires upgraded security frameworks, moving these platforms from their current “official and protected” classification levels to secret and top-secret operations. This transition demands onboard encryption, zeroization equipment, and robust cybersecurity measures — capabilities that current maritime autonomous systems largely lack. Rather than viewing security requirements as obstacles, Australia could leverage its maritime autonomous systems to strengthen regional partnerships while building operational experience. Lower-classification missions like fisheries patrol, border surveillance, and maritime domain awareness offer ideal testing grounds for these emerging technologies. Traditional Australian naval engagement in the Pacific involves periodic patrol boat visits and occasional maritime aircraft surveillance — valuable but inherently limited by the intermittent nature of crewed operations. Autonomous maritime systems could provide persistent presence, offering partner nations continuous surveillance capabilities rather than fleeting support. This approach offers multiple strategic benefits. Partner nations gain enhanced maritime security capabilities, Australia builds deeper defense relationships across the Pacific, and the ADF accumulates crucial operational experience with autonomous systems in challenging maritime environments. Most importantly, this persistent presence contributes to “deterrence by detection” — the principle that visible surveillance capabilities can deter malicious actors in gray-zone conflicts. I have argued in my new book that maritime autonomous future operates very differently from capital ships. Capital ships operate in task forces which are increasingly learning to operate in terms of distributed operational approaches. Maritime autonomous systems, dependent on how they are configured in terms of C2 and ISR payloads, can operate as “mesh fleets.” They are carriers for the payloads onboard and have significant capability to perform several maritime tasks currently. But they need to be deployed, not treated as science experiments for the distant future. There is a need and opportunity in deploying platforms primarily to gain operational experience while gradually upgrading their capabilities through advanced payloads and sensors. Unlike traditional naval platforms that deploy with their full capability suite from day one, autonomous systems can evolve their mission sets over time. This evolutionary approach offers significant advantages. Adversaries cannot easily assess the true capabilities of a mesh fleet, as individual platforms may carry different sensor and payload configurations. The fleet can adapt to changing mission requirements by swapping payloads rather than building entirely new platforms. Most importantly, operational experience gained through lower-stakes missions provides the foundation for more advanced capabilities when tensions escalate. The strategic value of maritime autonomous systems extends beyond their immediate tactical capabilities. In an era where gray-zone conflicts challenge traditional deterrence models, the ability to persistently monitor and document activities across vast ocean areas becomes a powerful tool for maintaining rules-based order. China’s approach to the South China Sea demonstrates how incremental actions below the threshold of armed conflict can gradually shift strategic balances. Effective deterrence in this environment requires consistent observation and documentation of rule-breaking behavior. Autonomous maritime systems, operating at scale across the Pacific, could provide this persistent surveillance capability. The psychological impact of known surveillance should not be underestimated. When potential adversaries understand that their actions are being continuously monitored and recorded, they face difficult choices about escalation. This “deterrence by detection” becomes particularly powerful when combined with transparent sharing of surveillance data with partner nations and international bodies. The transition to truly autonomous maritime systems faces several technical hurdles that must be addressed systematically. Link 16 data link systems, essential for secure communications, currently cost $100,000-200,000 per unit — prohibitively expensive for attritable autonomous platforms. Future communication systems must provide equivalent security and interoperability at dramatically reduced costs. Sensor integration represents another critical challenge. Maritime autonomous systems need the same environmental awareness capabilities being developed for aerial platforms: radar systems for threat detection, infrared sensors for target identification, and collision avoidance systems for safe navigation. These sensors must operate reliably in harsh maritime environments for extended periods without human intervention. Security frameworks must evolve to protect increasingly sophisticated autonomous systems without compromising their operational effectiveness. This includes not just cybersecurity measures, but also physical security features that prevent technology compromise if platforms are captured or recovered by adversaries. Australia’s geographic position and strategic commitments across the Pacific make autonomous maritime systems not just advantageous but essential for future defense planning. The distances involved in Pacific operations, combined with the need for persistent presence rather than intermittent patrols, align perfectly with the capabilities that autonomous systems can provide. Success requires more than technological development — it demands new operational concepts, revised training programs, enhanced partner nation cooperation, and evolved command and control structures. The technology exists to make this vision reality. What remains is the strategic commitment to deploy these systems, gain operational experience, and build the partnerships that will define Pacific security for decades to come. In an era where presence enables influence and power, autonomous maritime systems offer Australia the opportunity to maintain persistent influence across distances that would otherwise prove prohibitive. Featured image: The AI-generated image depicts a map of Australia, showcasing its geographic position and strategic commitments across the Pacific Ocean. It highlights the use of autonomous maritime systems, illustrating the vast distances involved in Pacific operations and the significance of persistent presence for defense planning.

Dr Robbin Laird, Reshaping Combined Arms Operations: Lessons Learned from Drone Warfare Operations, 14 June 2025 Link to article (Defense.info) We have a growing experience with drone warfare and its impacts. The best way to understand their impact is how they have already re-shaped combined arms operations. Notably when combined with payload revolution and fifth generation warfare operations, as seen in the recent Israeli operation in Iran, drones are becoming a key part of the evolution of combined arms. Analysis of the Ukraine-Russia war, Houthi drone campaigns, and Israeli precision operations provides insights with regard to the dynamics of con-ops changes. The Ukraine-Russian Case The Ukraine-Russia war has generated the most comprehensive battlefield laboratory for drone warfare in modern history, with documented lessons that challenge fundamental assumptions about military effectiveness and cost structures. Ukrainian forces achieved 70-80% casualty rates against Russian forces using $400-500 FPV drones to destroy targets worth millions, demonstrating revolutionary cost-exchange ratios that have forced both sides to completely restructure their tactical approaches. Russian electronic warfare capabilities initially dominated the battlefield, with sophisticated layered defense systems covering 10-kilometer front sections and tactical-level “trench EW” systems carried by individual soldiers. However, Ukrainian adaptation through AI-enhanced terminal guidance, frequency-hopping communications, and fiber-optic control systems has created an ongoing technological arms race where innovation cycles compress from years to months. The conflict has revealed that permanent aerial surveillance now creates 25-kilometer “gray zones” where traditional military movement becomes difficult forcing fundamental changes in operational planning. Both sides have learned that electronic warfare density across frontlines makes GPS-dependent systems largely ineffective, driving rapid development of autonomous navigation and AI-powered target recognition systems. Mass production has emerged as the critical capability, with Ukraine establishing 500+ manufacturers producing millions of drones annually through decentralized networks resistant to strategic strikes. This contrasts with Russia’s centralized approach dependent on Iranian technology transfer and Chinese components, creating strategic vulnerabilities that sanctions have effectively exploited. The Houthi Case Houthi drone operations in the Red Sea have achieved strategic effects far exceeding their military investment, forcing the diversion of 2,000+ ships and affecting 12% of global trade while costing under $1 billion annually in operational expenses. Their campaign demonstrates how determined non-state actors with state backing can achieve strategic objectives through sustained, coordinated operations that exploit the economic vulnerabilities of conventional military responses. The tactical evolution from basic RPG attacks to sophisticated multi-domain operations combining ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, explosive drones, and unmanned surface vessels shows rapid adaptation under pressure. Houthis achieved 40+ vessel attacks by February 2024 with 21 direct hits, while simultaneously conducting precision strikes against land-based infrastructure over 2,600 kilometers away. Iranian technology transfer has enabled Houthi production facilities to manufacture domestic variants of Shahed systems while establishing supply chains utilizing components from six countries. The integration of Iranian intelligence assets , particularly the Behshad surveillance vessel, with Houthi operational capabilities demonstrates effective proxy warfare coordination that maintains plausible deniability while achieving strategic objectives. Cost asymmetry has proven decisive, with $2,000-$50,000 drones forcing $2-27 million interceptor responses from coalition forces. This unsustainable defensive equation has forced recognition that current approaches to drone defense must prioritize cost-effective solutions over technical sophistication. The campaign’s success stems from strategic patience and economic warfare doctrine, targeting commercial shipping to impose maximum costs while avoiding escalation that would trigger overwhelming military response. Insurance premiums for Red Sea shipping increased 250% for Israeli-linked vessels, demonstrating how military actions can achieve political objectives through economic pressure. The Israeli Case Israeli drone operations against Iran represent the technological pinnacle of precision warfare, with covert pre-positioning of assets within Iranian territory demonstrating unprecedented operational security and strategic planning. Mossad operatives successfully established drone bases “in the heart of Tehran” while maintaining complete operational security, enabling precision strikes that eliminated senior IRGC commanders and caused significant damage to nuclear facilities. The integration of intelligence operations with precision strike capabilities has compressed sensor-to-shooter timelines to minutes while maintaining operational security that confounds traditional attribution methods. Operation Rising Lion demonstrated coordinated employment of over 200 aircraft with ground-based drones to strike 100+ targets using 330+ munitions, showcasing advanced multi-domain integration. Israeli innovations in cost-effective precision have led to development of the Iron Beam laser system, offering $3 per interception compared to $50,000-100,000 Iron Dome interceptors. This revolutionary cost reduction addresses the fundamental economic challenges of defensive systems while maintaining effectiveness against swarm attacks. The Refaim (Ghosts) unit’s integration of infantry, armor, air force, engineering, and intelligence into cohesive formations represents doctrinal evolution toward permanent multi-domain operations rather than exercise-based cooperation. No ground operations occur without drone oversight , with continuous surveillance enabling pattern recognition and optimal strike timing. Technological integration includes AI-powered target identification systems that enable autonomous engagement while maintaining human decision-making authority for strategic targets. The successful deployment of systems without identifying markings or transponders maintains strategic ambiguity while complicating adversary attribution and response. Reshaping Combined Arms Doctrine All three conflicts demonstrate that successful drone integration requires fundamental changes to command and control structures rather than simple addition of unmanned platforms to existing formations. Ukrainian forces developed the Kropyva targeting system integrating multi-source intelligence with tablet-based control systems, enabling real-time coordination between drone operators and artillery that converts “dumb” artillery into precision weapons. Russian adaptation included drone-mounted jamming platforms and “drone-on-drone” aerial combat, while developing fiber-optic control systems immune to electronic warfare. Their integration of strategic electronic warfare systems like Krasukha with tactical Repellent systems creates layered defense that Ukrainian forces counter through distributed production and rapid innovation cycles. Houthi integration of Iranian intelligence assets with domestic operational capabilities demonstrates effective proxy coordination that maintains strategic objectives while avoiding direct confrontation. The combination of sustained intelligence gathering, precision targeting, and strategic patience has created a new model for proxy warfare that achieves strategic effects through operational persistence. Israeli multi-domain integration represents the most sophisticated approach, with Mossad-IDF coordination enabling operations impossible through traditional military channels alone. The permanent integration of intelligence, special operations, and conventional forces creates capabilities that transcend traditional organizational boundaries. Why Giving it to the Warfighters Matters Combat experience has accelerated innovation cycles from years to months, with successful adaptations rapidly spreading across military organizations. Ukrainian success in integrating commercial components with military applications has democratized precision strike capabilities, while Russian mass production focus demonstrates alternative approaches emphasizing quantity over individual platform sophistication. Houthi integration of off-the-shelf components with Iranian technology creates effective weapons systems that challenge traditional technology control regimes. Their ability to maintain production capabilities despite international sanctions demonstrates the limitations of supply chain interdiction against determined adversaries with state backing. Israeli emphasis on cost-effective precision solutions addresses the fundamental economic challenges of defensive systems while maintaining technological superiority. The rapid transition from experimental concepts to operational deployment within months demonstrates agile development processes that traditional military procurement cannot match. Electronic warfare has emerged as the critical domain determining operational success, with all three conflicts showing that GPS-dependent systems become largely ineffective in contested environments. This has driven rapid development of autonomous navigation, AI-powered target recognition, and communications systems resistant to jamming. Lessons Learned and Shaping a Way Ahead for Combined Arms The fundamental lesson across all three conflicts is that cost-effectiveness has become more important than individual platform capabilities. Ukrainian success with $400 FPV drones destroying million-dollar targets has forced reconsideration of military economics, while Houthi operations demonstrate how sustained economic pressure can achieve strategic objectives without decisive military victory. Defensive systems face unsustainable cost ratios, with Israeli Iron Beam development representing the most promising approach to achieving cost-effective defense. The $3 per interception cost addresses the fundamental challenge of defending against mass, low-cost attacks that have characterized modern drone warfare. Supply chain lessons demonstrate that distributed production networks prove more resilient than centralized manufacturing, while rapid innovation cycles become more valuable than initial technological advantages. Ukrainian volunteer networks supporting production and innovation have proven more effective than traditional military-industrial approaches. The conflicts show that training requirements have compressed dramatically, with traditional flight training reduced from hours to minutes through simulator-based programs using commercial gaming equipment. This democratization of operator training has strategic implications for force structure and personnel requirements. All three conflicts demonstrate that drone warfare represents evolutionary rather than revolutionary change, but with profound implications for military doctrine, procurement, and operations. The emergence of “robots first” strategies prioritizing unmanned systems reflects recognition that traditional combined arms must integrate autonomous capabilities to remain effective. NATO adaptation includes European drone training centers and Germany’s “drone wall” concept for border defense, while Pentagon acknowledgment of the need to learn from Ukrainian experience has shifted procurement priorities toward mass, low-cost systems rather than individual platform sophistication. These three case studies establish that modern warfare has fundamentally shifted toward persistent, precision-enabled operations where cost-effectiveness determines strategic success. The combination of mass production, rapid innovation, and effective integration with conventional forces has created new paradigms for military effectiveness that reshape considerations of future force design. Having acquisition planners envisage a future platform centric force has been overtaken by the operational realities of 2025. Future force planning is increasingly interactive with how the fight tonight force reshapes its capabilities in the near to mid-term.

Dr Robbin Laird, The Autonomous Revolution: How Australia Could Transform Defense Through Maritime Robotics, 13 June 2025 Link to article (Defense.info) On May 28, 2025, Michael Shoebridge, Director of Strategic Analysis Australia, and I travelled to Melbourne, Australia to visit C2 Robotics which is described on its website as follows: “C2 Robotics specialises in the rapid development of cutting edge robotics and autonomous systems for Defence applications across the maritime, land and air domains. As a 100% Australian owned and operated company based in Melbourne, we work closely with local partners and suppliers to advance the sovereign capability of our nation.” Our visit was hosted by the Chief Techonology Officer of C2 Robotics, Tom Loveard, and our colleague and friend Marcus Hellyer who is dual hatted as Head of Research at Strategic Analysis Australia and Strategic Advisor to C2 Robotics. My own interest in going was to learn more about C2 Robotics Large Uncrewed Underwater Vessel (LUUV), the Speartooth. Last year I published a book on maritime autonomous systems and I just released my latest book on the subject entitled, A Paradigm Shift in Maritime Operations: Autonomous Systems and Their Impact . The Speartooth is described on the C2 Robotics website as follows: “Speartooth is a Large Uncrewed Underwater Vehicle (LUUV) designed for long range, long duration undersea operations. It brings a combination of highly advanced capabilities together with a modular, rapidly reconfigurable design specifically focused on manufacturing scalability and a revolutionary cost point that enables high volume production and deployment.” There is much that can be said about the Speartooth about which we learned a great deal. But for me the most important question is how to understand what such capability represents. Usually, one sees a single photo of such a system and that completely misses the point – they operate as a network or a term I introduce into my latest book, a mesh fleet. A Speartooth is not a submarine; it is a submersible platform which performs a task in concert with its mates. It can be deployed in terms which create a situation in which the adversary faces a large number of assets delivering a key effect and simply destroying some of these systems cannot shut down, say an ISR grid, if that is the payload which the Speartooth is deploying. It is not so much to be understood to be attritable as it is about laying down a grid which remains operational even if some systems are lost and the overall capabilities are attenuated not eliminated. You lose a single submarine, and you can be out of business. You lose a single Speartooth, and your capability is attenuated not eliminated. Moreover, by destroying a single Speartooth the adversary has revealed key information about themselves. In a world where Ukrainian drones sink Russian warships and Houthi rebels challenge the U.S. Navy with asymmetric technologies, traditional defense thinking is rapidly becoming obsolete. At the heart of this transformation is a fundamental shift in how we think about defense systems. Tom Loveard, CTO of C2 Robotics, explains that his company isn’t really building maritime platforms — they’re creating AI software capabilities that happen to manifest in products like their Speartooth autonomous underwater vehicle. “We didn’t start building Speartooth as a maritime platforms company,” Loveard explains. “We started developing Speartooth as an asymmetric, agile engineering company with a very high focus on autonomy.” This distinction matters because it represents a move away from the traditional model of building fixed platforms toward creating adaptable core capabilities that can evolve with rapidly changing technology. The implications are profound. Whereas traditional defense systems lock militaries into specific configurations for decades, these new autonomous systems are designed for continuous adaptation. If a breakthrough in quantum navigation emerges tomorrow, it can be integrated into existing platforms within weeks rather than waiting for the next major upgrade cycle. This technological shift comes at a crucial moment for Australian strategy. As Marcus Hellyer noted, there’s been a fundamental change in defense thinking: “If you’re an ADF that’s thinking about deploying to fight land wars against insurgents in the Middle East, there’s not a lot of space for autonomous systems. But if you are thinking about defending Australia against a major power adversary, you now have conceptual space for these systems.” The numbers tell the story starkly. Even Australia’s most capable forces run into limitations quickly. Operating fighter aircraft with tankers and long-range missiles might reach 1,500-2,000 kilometers, but Australia has only seven tankers in service and 80 JASSM missiles on order. “That’s a couple of days usage,” Hellyer observes. “We just run out of scale, of mass, really quickly.” This is where autonomous systems offer a different calculus. Instead of a few exquisite platforms costing billions, Australia could deploy a large number of autonomous vehicles that create persistent coverage of the northern approaches. It’s not about replacing submarines — it’s about creating a defensive network that complicates any adversary’s calculations about where and how to operate. Perhaps most intriguingly, this approach could transform Australia’s defense industrial base. Unlike traditional defense manufacturing, which relies on specialized contractors and boutique production, C2 Robotics has designed Speartooth to leverage existing commercial supply chains. “Much of the core manufacturing can be done by existing manufacturers that are already here today in Australia,” Loveard explains. “We’ve really chosen systems, technologies, and components that are highly available in commodity markets.” This means drawing on Australia’s automotive, oil and gas, mining, and agricultural sectors—industries that already exist and have scale. The comparison to electric vehicles is revealing. “Speartooth actually has a lot of commonality” with modern electric cars, Loveard notes. “When you look at what’s in a current, modern-day car that you go and buy for anywhere from $20,000 to $100,000, the technology you get is actually very impressive.” The key difference is scale — those systems cost $50,000 per unit because they’re produced in huge volumes using broad industrial networks. This manufacturing approach addresses what Loveard calls the “chicken and egg problem” in defense procurement. Traditionally, you start with expensive, exquisite platforms, which means the payloads and effects must also be expensive and highly specialized. Low numbers and high costs become self-reinforcing. “Speartooth tries to break that chicken and egg problem by saying we want to provide essentially a marketplace for very low cost, high volume payloads and effects,” Loveard explains. By creating a delivery platform designed for mass production, it becomes economically viable to develop cheaper sensors and weapons systems. The sustainment model is equally revolutionary. Unlike traditional platforms that operate continuously and require constant maintenance, autonomous systems operate more like munitions. “If you had 1,000 Speartooths, you’re not using all 1,000,” Hellyer notes. “Most of them are going to sit in a container. You just want to check them every now and then to make sure they’re ready to go.” This technological shift also addresses Australia’s military recruitment challenges in unexpected ways. As Michael Shoebridge f observed, “If I was an 18-year-old kid coming out of high school, the last place I want to be is on a frigate or inside a tank, because all I’m doing is going on YouTube and seeing videos of Russian ships sinking, of tanks being destroyed by drones. I want to be a drone operator.” The Australian Defense Force once recruited with the tagline “smart people, smart machines,” promising young people access to the world’s most exciting technology. But as Shoebridge points out, telling someone they might get a ride on a nuclear submarine in 20 years isn’t motivating. The two-to-four-year development cycles of autonomous systems offer something much more immediate and exciting. Beyond immediate military capabilities, this approach offers Australia a path toward greater strategic independence. The conversation reveals deep concerns about Australia’s current trajectory which I characterized as too dependent on American defense while increasingly integrated into Chinese manufacturing supply chains. I put it this way: Australia needs to “hug my American brother but build more independence for myself.” The autonomous systems approach accomplishes both goals —strengthening the alliance with the United States while reducing dependence on both American exquisite platforms and Chinese manufacturing. The geopolitical context makes this urgent. As Hellyer noted, America’s military is smaller, more under-capitalized, and older than it’s been in decades. Even with increased defense spending, the structural problems won’t be easily resolved. Australia can’t assume American forces will always be available to fill capability gaps. The ongoing conflict in Ukraine provides a real-time laboratory for these concepts. As Loveard observes, “The great revolutions from Ukraine have not just been technical revolutions. There have also been procurement revolutions and tactics and procedures revolutions.” The tight coupling between industry, procurement, and users has enabled rapid adaptation and innovation. But the technology is spreading beyond major conflicts. “There was footage on the internet last week of rebels in Myanmar taking out a government helicopter with a quadcopter drone,” Hellyer notes. “If we somehow think that in the Indo-Pacific, we’re quarantined from what’s going on, we’re mistaken. Drug dealers and non-state actors are already adopting these technologies. This democratization of advanced capabilities means Australia faces threats not just from major powers but from a range of smaller actors who can now access disruptive technologies. The Houthis’ impact on Red Sea shipping with relatively simple systems demonstrates how small actors can create strategic effects. Our conversation underscored both the promise and the challenges of this transformation. The technology exists right now, the manufacturing pathways are clear, and the strategic logic is compelling. The main barriers are institutional and conceptual. As Shoebridge suggests, the solution may not be to abandon existing programs like the Hunter frigates or AUKUS submarines, but to pursue parallel tracks. “Within the time frames that those programs are operating, you need this faster delivery,” he argues. The budgets required for mass autonomous systems are “pretty small by comparison to many of these other systems.” The key is recognizing that the world has changed fundamentally. The comfortable assumptions of the post-Cold War era — American dominance, rules-based order, predictable threats — are breaking down. In this new environment, the ability to adapt quickly becomes more valuable than having the most exquisite platforms. What emerges from this discussion is a vision of defense transformation that goes far beyond new weapons systems. It’s about creating an adaptive ecosystem that can evolve with changing technology and strategic circumstances. This isn’t science fiction or distant future thinking — it’s happening now. The autonomous revolution offers Australia a chance to achieve greater security, strategic independence, and industrial sovereignty simultaneously. But it requires abandoning comfortable assumptions about how defense systems are developed, manufactured, and employed. In a world where the pace of change is accelerating, the biggest risk may be standing still. Featured photo: The Speartooth as seen in a C2 Robotics video But for me, such capability is best understood in kill web or mesh fleet terms, so I generated an AI image of the Speartooth “fleet” being launched for deployment to create an ISR grid.

Dr Robbin Laird, The Maritime Revolution: How Autonomous Vessels Are Reshaping Naval Strategy, 12 June 2025 Link to article (Defense.info) The era of autonomous maritime operations has quietly arrived, moving beyond experimental trials to become operational reality. A recent conversation with Robert Dane, CEO of OCIUS, underscores how autonomous vessels are fundamentally changing naval operations—and why traditional naval thinking must evolve to harness their potential. OCIUS’s journey from startup to operational service provider illustrates the broader transformation occurring in maritime defense. The company currently operates 12 autonomous vessels continuously from Darwin, with deployments averaging 60 days and reaching as long as 107 days. This isn’t experimental anymore — it’s sustained operational capability. The operational tempo speaks for itself: OCIUS has maintained 24/7 operations since July 2024, supporting anti-submarine warfare demonstrations and providing persistent surveillance across vast ocean areas. Three additional vessels equipped with radar systems are planned for deployment, while international programs in Japan and the UK are following Australia’s lead. This reminds of my experience with the Osprey as it gained acceptance in what was an uphill battle. In a 2012 interview I conducted at Marine Corps air station New River with LtCol Brian McAvoy, the Commanding officer of VMM-264, he underscored the progress they were having this way: “In 2006, it felt like we were a bar act. It was challenging to get there and we were seen as oddities. In 2012, we were flying a plane with years of combat experience. We no longer were a bar act, but war fighters flying and maintaining a key combat capability.” Central to this transformation is what I have called a mesh fleet in my new book focused on the paradigm shift in paradigm operations—a distributed network of autonomous vessels working collaboratively rather than relying on expensive capital ships. This represents a fundamental departure from traditional naval thinking. The goal is to get them to work together for whatever task you’ve got to deploy in terms of a payload. It’s task orientation we’re talking about. You’re putting a payload on your USV to do a specific task. This approach offers several advantages over traditional naval operations: Distributed Risk: Instead of risking a billion-dollar vessel with hundreds of crew members, naval forces can deploy multiple smaller autonomous assets. If one malfunctions, the mission continues with the remaining fleet. Personnel Efficiency: A mesh fleet requires only a handful of operators for monitoring and control, compared to the personnel required for traditional naval vessels. Operational Flexibility: Autonomous vessels can be deployed for extended periods without the human factors that limit traditional operations—no crew fatigue, no need for food supplies, and no requirement for crew rotation. Perhaps the most compelling argument for autonomous maritime systems lies in their economic impact. Traditional cost analyses fail to capture the true expense of manned operations. Dane underscored: “If you look at an all-manned operation versus partial autonomous operations, the cost includes salary, medical, retirement—these factors add up to a significant bill to be paid by naval forces. When patrol boats cost significant amounts of dollars per day on station but operate limited schedules due to crew requirements, the true cost per operational day becomes substantially higher.” Autonomous systems eliminate many of these hidden costs. There are no retirement benefits for a Blue Bottle vessel, no medical expenses, and no requirement for extensive shore-based support infrastructure. The maintenance burden shifts from large crews to small technical teams, and vessels can operate continuously rather than following traditional deployment cycles. Despite operational success, autonomous maritime systems face institutional resistance rooted in traditional naval culture. The challenge extends beyond individual attitudes to procurement philosophy. Current Australian plans to develop large unmanned surface vessels armed with missiles misses the strategic advantage of distributed, flexible systems that can mask capabilities and confuse adversaries about fleet composition and intentions. Maritime autonomous systems enable entirely new operational concepts. Traditional naval forces must choose between expensive, multi-mission platforms or accepting capability gaps. Autonomous systems offer a third option: task-specific deployment of distributed assets. This shift requires new command structures and operational thinking. The information warfare implications are particularly significant. Admiral Paparo’s concept of information warfare as “the first battle” aligns perfectly with autonomous systems’ persistent surveillance capabilities. These platforms excel at providing continuous intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance without the human factors that limit traditional operations. OCIUS’s flexible business model addresses another challenge: how naval forces can adopt autonomous systems without developing entirely new maintenance and operational capabilities. The company offers everything from complete end-to-end operations to mission-area handover, allowing navies to focus on their core competencies while leveraging commercial expertise for platform management. The global nature of autonomous maritime development creates both opportunities and challenges. Japan’s keen interest in Australia’s autonomous operations reflects similar strategic challenges, while UK programs demonstrate parallel development paths. The company’s evolution from experimental developer to operational service provider represents a template for the broader industry. Autonomous maritime systems succeed not by replacing traditional naval capabilities but by enabling new operational concepts that were previously impossible or prohibitively expensive. The question isn’t whether autonomous systems will transform naval operations — that transformation is already underway. The question is whether naval institutions will adapt quickly enough to harness their potential, or whether they’ll be constrained by capital ship thinking in an era that demands distributed, flexible operations. For naval forces facing personnel shortages, budget constraints, and expanding operational requirements, autonomous systems offer a path forward. But realizing their potential requires more than technological adoption—it demands fundamental rethinking of naval strategy, operations, and economics. The maritime revolution has begun. The challenge now is ensuring that institutional adaptation keeps pace with technological capability.

Dr Robbin Laird, Training for Modern Airpower Operations: How to Address the Challenges, 9 June 2025 Link to article (Defense.info) On June 3, 2025, I had a chance to meet with Air Vice-Marshal Glen Braz, Air Commander Australia, to follow up on his participation in the Sir Richard Williams Foundation seminar held on May 23, 2025. What I specifically wanted to talk with him about is the key challenges facing training an air combat force which is fifth-generation enabled. As I have described the F-35 in my work with the aircraft since 2004, the aircraft is a “flying combat system” which works in wolfpacks. Secretary Michael W. Wynne the architect of the concept of fifth generation airpower has focused on how these aircraft – F-22s and F-35s – operate as sensors identifying targets rather than shoot first fighter jets. This has been part of driving significant change in how an integrated high-end air force operates in terms of shaping an end-to-end ecosystem that enables the various platforms to deliver effects as an integrated force. Obviously, integration is a dynamic process, which changes as new capabilities are added to the force, and software upgrades come to the platforms within the air combat system taken as a whole. How then to train pilots from the outset and then through their lifecycle as air warriors to work in such a dynamic system? “This is not about me being the best F/A-18F pilot I can be,” Braz explains. “It’s about me being a contributor to an ecosystem that is a vast team that generates effects chains across the battle space.” This mindset shift represents perhaps the most significant challenge facing modern air force training systems. The F-35, with its advanced sensor fusion and networking capabilities, operates fundamentally differently from traditional fighters. Rather than individual aircraft engaging in classic dogfights, fifth-generation platforms function as nodes in a broader network, sharing sensor data and coordinating effects across multiple domains. This “wolf pack” mentality requires pilots to understand not just their own aircraft’s capabilities, but how those capabilities integrate with ground-based systems, maritime platforms, space assets, and increasingly, autonomous systems. The Training Bottleneck Australia’s experience illustrates the complex interdependencies that make scaling modern air combat training so challenging. Braz describes what he calls the “temporal discipline model” – a carefully structured progression where pilots spend three to four years developing both platform proficiency and ecosystem integration skills during their initial operational tour. The challenge isn’t simply producing more pilots. “If I uplift the numbers of aircrew, they’ve got to fly more. They’ve got to have more technicians to help them fly more. They’ve got to have more sustainment and sparing,” Braz notes. The entire system must scale proportionally, or imbalances emerge that can compromise the training pipeline’s effectiveness. This reality forces difficult choices. In a resource-constrained environment, adding more pilots without corresponding increases in flying hours and training capacity can actually reduce the quality of training each individual receives. The result is a delicate balancing act between quantity and quality that has no easy solutions. Synthetic Solutions The answer, increasingly, lies in sophisticated synthetic training environments. Live, Virtual, and Constructive (LVC) training systems are becoming essential tools for providing the complex, networked training scenarios that fifth-generation operations require. “Our integrated advanced training environment and synthetic training environment becomes really important,” Braz emphasizes. These systems allow pilots to practice the “really difficult reps and sets” required to master fifth-generation operations without the prohibitive costs and logistical challenges of live training exercises. The U.S. Air Force is investing heavily in high-fidelity synthetic training environments, but smaller air forces like Australia’s must find the right balance between capability and cost. The goal is to create systems that can integrate with allied training networks while remaining affordable for nations with more modest defense budgets. The Software Variable One of the most underappreciated aspects of modern air combat training is the challenge posed by continuous software upgrades. Unlike previous generations of military aircraft, fifth-generation platforms are essentially flying computers that receive regular capability updates throughout their service lives. This creates a persistent training challenge: pilots and maintainers must continuously adapt to evolving capabilities, and training systems must account for aircraft operating at different software block levels within the same unit. The F-35’s block upgrades, for instance, can significantly alter the aircraft’s capabilities, sensor performance, and weapons integration options. Force Integration Leadership Australia has developed an innovative approach to this challenge through its Air Warfare Instructors Course, a highly selective program that runs every two years. This intensive six-month course produces what Braz calls “force integrators” – officers who become experts in air power integration and serve as leaders for the next generation of aviators. These instructors play a crucial role in bridging the gap between platform-specific training and ecosystem-wide thinking. They help junior pilots understand that mastering their individual aircraft is just the foundation for operating in a networked, multi-domain environment. The Maritime Dimension For nations like Australia, the integration challenge extends beyond air-to-air combat to encompass maritime operations. “Air is intrinsically maritime capable,” Braz argues, pushing back against the tendency to view air and naval capabilities as separate domains. The F-35’s sensor capabilities, combined with platforms like the MQ-4 Triton, create intelligence and targeting capabilities that are “highly sought after by our Navy counterparts.” This integration becomes even more important as autonomous maritime systems proliferate, creating new opportunities for air-sea coordination. Looking Forward The training challenges identified by Australia’s experience reflect broader issues facing air forces worldwide. The fundamental shift from platform-centric to network-centric operations requires new approaches to everything from initial pilot training to advanced tactical instruction. The solution isn’t simply adopting new technology but rethinking the entire approach to air combat training. This includes: Mindset transformation: Moving from individual excellence to ecosystem contribution. Synthetic integration: Leveraging virtual environments for complex, networked training scenarios. Continuous adaptation: Building training systems that can evolve with rapidly changing technology. Cross-domain thinking: Preparing aviators for multi-domain operations from the beginning of their careers. The Bottom Line As Air Vice-Marshal Braz’s insights make clear, the transition to fifth-generation air combat represents more than a technological upgrade — it’s a fundamental reimagining of how air power operates. Training systems developed for previous generations of aircraft are inadequate for preparing pilots to operate in networked, multi-domain environments. The air forces that successfully navigate this transition will be those that embrace the complexity of ecosystem-wide training while finding practical, cost-effective solutions to the resource challenges it presents. Australia’s approach offers valuable lessons, but each nation must find its own path through this transformation. Featured Image: (L-R) Commodore Training, Royal Australian Navy officer Commodore John Stavridis, CSC, RAN, talks with Air Commander Australia, Royal Australian Air Force officer Air Vice Marshal Glen Braz, AM, CSC, DSM, during the inaugural Australian Maritime Weapons and Tactics Conference at HMAS Watson in Sydney, New South Wales. May 9, 2025. Credit: Australian Department of Defence

Dr Robbin Laird, Training for Modern Airpower Operations: How to Address the Challenges, 3 June 2025 Link to article (Defense.info) I had the opportunity to meet with Lt. General Simon Stuart, Chief of the Australian Army in. his office on 19 May 2025. We discussed a specific aspect of the way ahead for the Australian Army, namely its role in Australian littoral operations. In an era where geopolitical tensions in the Indo-Pacific region are significant, the Australian Army is undergoing a fundamental transformation designed to meet the challenges of great power competition. Leading this evolution is a recognition that tomorrow’s conflicts will be won not by the strongest force, but by the most adaptable one. “War has always been a contest to see who can adapt the fastest,” explains Lieutenant General Simon Stuart, Chief of Army. This philosophy underpins Australia’s shift from traditional change management approaches to a model of continual adaptation. The stark difference between these paradigms isn’t merely semantic. Stuart points to Ukraine as a real-world laboratory demonstrating how adaptation cycles for technologies like unmanned aerial systems and counter-UAS capabilities are now “measured in days, not weeks, months, and years.” This represents a clean break from previous military transformation efforts based on civilian change management theories — where organizations moved from one comfortable, well-defined state through a planned period of change to another stable configuration. “That may have been appropriate for the day,” Stuart notes, “but it doesn’t reflect the world we live in today.” Comprehensive Transformation: The Four Cs Australia’s approach to Army transformation is comprehensive, built around what Stuart calls “the four Cs”: Concepts, Command and Control, Capabilities, and Culture. Concepts: Integrated Thinking The Army has developed new land domain operating concepts aligned with joint force “integrated campaigning.” Stuart highlights four key integrating concepts: integrated air and missile defense, multi-domain strike, special operations, and logistics—with a fifth concept focused on littoral combat currently under development. “It’s about understanding how you best leverage the terrain, the maritime environment, for positional advantage for the combined and joint force,” Stuart explains. Command and Control: Restructuring for Joint Operations The Australian Army has elevated the division to the “unit of action” and aligned divisions and commands with the Chief of Joint Operations’ theater missions. The headquarters structure has been reorganized to function effectively during wartime. Forces Command has undergone perhaps the most significant transformation, taking on dual responsibilities: managing the Army training enterprise and developing contingency plans for scaling the Army during mobilization. Stuart emphasizes the importance of this capability: “In a fight, the rest of the Army will be committed to operations. I need some capacity to be able to force-generate out of contact.” Capabilities: Building the Future Force The Army’s capability development focuses on several critical programs of record: The Littoral Maneuver Program, delivering 26 ships (18 medium and 8 heavy landing craft) Long-range strike capability centered on the newly established 10th Fires Brigade Combined arms fighting systems The land C4 digital network system connecting all components at machine speed These capabilities address the functional question Stuart poses: “How do I contribute to my teammates in the air and on the surface and subsurface of the ocean by contributing to or achieving sea denial from the land?” Culture: Professionalism Under Pressure The fourth pillar addresses the human dimension. Stuart has commissioned a formal assessment of the Army profession, focusing on jurisdiction, professional knowledge, and self-regulation — ensuring the force has the values, skills, and mindset needed for continual adaptation. The Littoral Focus: Geography Drives Strategy The emphasis on littoral operations stems directly from the Indo-Pacific’s geography. The Australian Army aims to “unlock and access the maneuver space in the littorals either side of the beach and the airspace above it” to support joint operations. “If you look at the map, it’s about understanding where the strategic geography is, where the key terrain is, and which straits are more important than others,” Stuart explains. “What is the contribution of the land force to the joint fight? How do I access and exploit the maneuver space that we haven’t been able to do before?” Racing Against Time Stuart doesn’t hide the urgency driving these changes. “Time is not on our side,” he states plainly, identifying a “strategic threat window” between 2025 and 2030. With 2025 already here, the Army has adopted a “fight tonight” mentality—focusing on maximizing current capabilities while rapidly integrating new technologies. “Do what you can with what you’ve got,” as Stuart puts it. While awaiting delivery of capabilities from long-term programs of record, the Army is working with allies and partners, including the U.S. Army Pacific and the Australian Navy. Two years ago, they successfully deployed combat forces, including armor, to the Philippines and Indonesia as part of multinational exercises. Innovation in Action: The Tech-Scaled Battle Group One of the most innovative initiatives is the creation of a “tech-scaled battle group” from the first armored regiment. This unit teams soldiers with industry partners and scientists to rapidly evaluate new equipment, develop tactics, and determine what technologies should be adopted across the force. “We learn fast,” Stuart says, describing how the battle group helps “operationalize the big idea of continual adaptation.” Acquisition Challenge Remains Stuart acknowledges that traditional acquisition processes remain a challenge — a sentiment shared among his counterparts from 27 nations at a recent Land Forces of the Pacific conference. “There is a stunning correlation between the challenge we all have… acquisition systems that have been designed and developed for the last wars and are not yet fit for purpose for the next.” The Army is experimenting with new program designs that deliver capabilities in incremental “target states” rather than monolithic blocks — particularly important for rapidly evolving software systems. Looking Ahead As tensions in the Indo-Pacific continue, Australia’s Army transformation represents a significant shift in military thinking — one that prioritizes adaptability, joint operations, and practical capacity building over traditional force structure planning. The next few years will test whether this approach can deliver the capabilities needed to address regional challenges. But one thing is clear: the days of comfortable, predictable military transformation are over. In the contest of adaptation that defines modern warfare, Australia is determined not to be left behind. Featured photo: Chief of Army, Lieutenant General Simon Stuart, AO, DSC, talks with Defence Members & Family Support network volunteers at Karrakatta House in Irwin Barracks, Perth. April 16, 2025. Credit: Australian Department of Defence.