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With the Air Force’s Space Command going live this year, it’s worth kicking off 2022 with a timely piece by Air Force Reservist SQNLDR Michael Spencer. In this analysis, he delves into the known details of the Russian Anti-Satellite (ASAT) mission in November last year, examining how it was done and the ongoing ramifications of such an engagement. By doing so, he makes plain the enormous challenges that lie ahead for Space Powers to protect their orbital infrastructure and avoid a ‘scorched orbit’ policy. My house is at the end of the street - so I don't know anything. - Russian proverb[1] Figure 1. A belligerent space actor's indifference to generating a significant amount of uncontrolled space debris might be considered as a 'Scorched Earth' policy against the orbital space environment as a resource. The Scorched Earth Policy The 'scorched-earth policy' has its origins in early 20th-century military strategy thinking to weaken an attacking army's progress by tasking the retreating army to "destroy or devastate whole towns, facilities, agriculture, transport routes, and general infrastructure in order to deprive the advancing enemy forces or the belligerent population of food, shelter, fuel, communications, and other valuable resources that may be useful for them."[2] The scorched earth strategy also presents uncontrolled risks and damages to the civilian population, and sustainability of the environment it depends on for critical infrastructure for many generations. Similarly, a state's indifference to conducting activities without debris mitigation might be viewed by other states as promoting a 'Scorched Earth-Orbit Policy' that wastes useful orbital altitudes and consumes the energy and efforts needed for space surveillance and orbital collision avoidance. The Russian A-235 Nudol Anti-Satellite Missile On 15 November 2021, the Russian military launched an A-235 PL-19 Nudol direct-ascent anti-satellite (DA-ASAT) interceptor missile. The DA-ASAT was launched in a test to verify its performance against the defunct Soviet-era Kosmos-1408 (COSMOS 1408) communications satellite. Space observation and tracking sensors have detected more than 1,500 new trackable debris objects in low-Earth orbit (LEO) resulting from the on-orbit destruction of the COSMOS 1408 satellite that may now threaten numerous satellites and the International Space Station. [3] General J Dickinson, US Space Command head, stated that the debris field would "likely generate hundreds of thousands of pieces of smaller orbital debris" beyond the 1,500 pieces that are too small to be detected and tracked.[4] The DA-ASAT missile was reportedly launched from a transporter erector launcher (TEL) located near the Plesetsk Cosmodrome, a Russian spaceport situated about 800 km north of Moscow and initially built by the Soviets as an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launch site.[5] The ASAT mission requires a complicated integrated system of discrete systems covering different functions including space surveillance, target tracking, target intercept calculation, missile launch, missile guidance, and network systems integration (i.e. including uplinks for missile command signals). These sensors also measure the missile and satellite target positions (i.e. relative geometry), monitor range safety, and detect the post-attack results. The Nudol DA-ASAT is a two-stage, long-range and trans-atmospheric rocket booster. It was launched from a mobile TEL in northern Russia to boost an exo-atmospheric hit-to-kill payload designed to intercept and disrupt a ballistic missile or a satellite in a LEO altitude.[6] The success of the satellite intercept depends on the mission planning efforts needed to synchronise the time and location of the launch, the missile reaching the target, and the payload functioning correctly at the target. The Earth's rotation determines the launch event location and timing to align the missile's ascent trajectory with the satellite's orbit. Space surveillance provides the calculated predictions of when a missile trajectory can converge with the satellite orbit, and the missile can intercept the satellite speeding overhead at about 28,000 km/h. Space surveillance systems may not immediately characterise a rocket launch as an ASAT mission or a benign spacelift event when both events appear to follow similar ascent trajectories to reach orbital altitudes. Similarly, both tasks need to follow a course and perform manoeuvres to rendezvous with an existing object already resident in orbit. It is only the broader understanding of the orbital space situation where the trajectory of a high-value satellite is predicted to overfly within reach of a launch site. When observations indicate a space launch event at that site, concerns will be triggered to assess the potential risk of an accidental orbital collision by a satellite rocket booster on a satellite rendezvous mission or a deliberate intercept by an attacking ASAT mission. A remote observer to a rocket launch cannot readily know if the launch is supporting a spacelift event or a direct ascent attack. The target for the DA-ASAT was the Soviet military communications satellite of the type known as Tselina-D and catalogued as COSMOS 1408. It was a 1,750 kg satellite launched into LEO in 1982. Initially, it formed one component of a two-satellite Tselina electronic intelligence satellite reconnaissance system. Tselina-D was used to gain more detailed observations of radiofrequency sources initially detected by a smaller-sized Tselina-O satellite. [7] The Soviets launched 137 Tselina satellites, including 63 Tselina-D variants. [8] For the DA-ASAT trial, COSMOS 1408 was an appropriate choice as a representative target for a large-sized non-cooperative satellite travelling in a polar low-Earth orbit. [9] The period when Tselina-D and -O were designed was still in the early orbital space operations. There was little regard or appreciation for the risks of accumulating debris to space sustainability. There was no recognition for space debris mitigation to influence satellite designs, and satellites remained in situ on-orbit if they failed or their mission system expired. Today, satellites are designed to carry a reserve fuel to de-orbit after their mission expires to clear the orbital trajectory for re-use. Thus, the Soviets had initially intended for COSMOS 1408 to be abandoned on-orbit as uncontrolled space debris after it expired. The TEL is a valuable tactical manoeuvring advantage to relocate the launch event, increasing the challenges for observers seeking to monitor and predict where and when the launch event might occur. The TEL does not signify a manoeuvre to engage any satellite on-demand quickly. The mission planner needs to predict an opportunity for the missile and satellite trajectories to converge and the satellite transit within the missile engagement range. The satellite may not be visible for several orbital passes. The mobile TEL crew needs to deploy and wait until the orbiting satellite comes into range. The satellite overflights or 'revisit period' depends on the observer's location and the design of the orbit. A satellite following a polar orbital trajectory might be visible about every 90 minutes to an observer near the north pole or approximately every 24 hours to an observer near the Equator. Figure 2. The A-235 PL-15 Nudol DA-ASAT missile and transporter erector launcher.[10] The Space Debris Legacy of an ASAT Test The A-235 Nudol can hit an exo-atmospheric target (e.g. satellite or ballistic missile) at a range of up to 1,500 kilometres.[11] The test missile is estimated to have been launched to intercept the overflying satellite from behind. The design of solid-propellant booster rockets does not allow for speed to be controlled during the ascent; the rocket functions to accelerate the warhead to an orbital speed faster than the satellite. The orbital intercept occurred above the North Sea at the height of about 480 kilometres. The attack is likely to have been controlled from the ground tracking station sending missile guidance commands to steer the command/inertial-guided missile.[12] The ground station is critical to using the missile-target relative positions and speed vectors for calculating the flight corrections needed to steer the missile towards the intercept position. When the missile closes within the sensor range of its target, it breaks from the command guidance from the ground station and switches to using its onboard short-range seeker to self-guide directly to impact the orbiting target. The physics of orbital dynamics dictate that the object's speed determines its kinetic energy that equates to a unique altitude. A missile travelling slower than the satellite will not reach the same height. Conversely, a missile travelling faster than the satellite will pass through the satellite's altitude to achieve a stable orbital trajectory at a higher altitude. Thus, if the missile travels faster than the satellite (e.g. greater than Mach 23), it will fly a course that ascends through the orbital trajectory of the satellite and, if synchronised correctly, can intercept the satellite. The payload can rapidly manoeuvre at high hypersonic speeds without air and aerodynamic resistance. The boosted Nudol payload intercepts its target at a closing speed equivalent to high hypersonic at about Mach 10.[13] The overmatch in speed provides the kinetic energy for the attacking payload to destroy the target satellite. Little is publicly known about the payload designs and their damage mechanism. Although the debris resulting from high-speed interaction with the target suggests a direct hit, this may result from a self-guided unitary warhead travelling at high hypersonic speed to impact a single orbiting target or a fragmenting payload increase the probability of a hit by a single-shot missile attack. The customary use of a combined sensor-fuzed explosive warhead is challenged when considering the lead-time needed for the payload to sense, detonate, and distribute a fragmentation pattern with a density adequate to strike a unitary target approaching at high hypersonic speed. The Soviets had previously developed 'Shchit-2 (translation: Shield-2)" as a self-guided spinning projectile for the active space defence system. Shield-2 was a self-guided payload with a 'hedgehog' configuration of projectiles fired outwardly in a radial pattern to increase the size and volume of the attack effect against a single, high-speed small-sized unitary target. The Soviets were motivated to develop Shield-1, a projectile firing space gun, and Shield-2 as self-defence options in a conceptual design for the orbiting military Almaz OPS-4 space station.[14] Shield-1 and -2 were likely designed to defend a spacecraft against relatively slow-moving co-orbital objects on an incoming attack trajectory rather than chasing passing orbital targets. Figure 3. A Soviet-era Shchit-2 anti-spacecraft guided weapon designed for deployment from an orbiting space station.[15] There is no useful analytical model to predict the consequences of the hittile-target interaction or the resulting breakup of the target, distribution of space debris, or their separate mass and velocity vectors needed to validate the implications for the orbital environment and other orbiting satellites. The size and shape of the space debris fields resulting from an on-orbit impact are determined by the momentum imparted from the two colliding objects to each piece of debris. Since the tail-chasing DA-ASAT follows an intercept trajectory that closely aligns with the target's trajectory, it follows that the centroid of the space debris field will generally be split into two main groups following along the original orbits of the satellite and the interceptor missile. Following Newtonian physics, fragments that are slowed by the impact will have a decreased momentum, naturally descend to a lower orbital altitude, and move ahead of the satellite datum with a faster radial velocity. Fragments with the same speed after the impact will continue at the same speed and altitude as the original satellite datum. However, the fragments accelerated to a higher momentum after the impact will ascend to a higher altitude and begin to lag behind the satellite datum with a slower radial velocity. The velocity of the debris object determines its orbital altitude, which remains unchanged until an external unbalanced force acts to change that velocity (e.g. on-orbit collision, solar wind, gravity anomaly, aerodynamic drag, etc). The sizes and shapes of the two new debris fields are dynamic. The debris is generated instantly from the missile intercept, and each debris piece quickly settles on separate orbital trajectories corresponding to their speed and kinetic energy. Once stable on orbit, the debris field is subjected to environmental effects that slowly retard the objects to descend at different rates, further dispersing the size and shape of the debris fields. There is air in the thermosphere, the region above the atmosphere, extending up to about 1,000 km.[16] The atoms and molecules of different gases are thoroughly mixed in the atmosphere by atmospheric turbulence. In the thermosphere, the air density is so thin that gas particles rarely collide. Space objects in LEO collide with these gas particles, causing aerodynamic drag and retarding their speed. The accumulative effect of this drag, extended over months and years, will cause the debris object to slowly descend until it is eventually captured by the denser atmosphere at the lower altitudes and burned up on re-entry. The lower-altitudes of the LEO environment are popular with space actors deploying low-cost nanosatellite missions, assured they will slowly descend and clear the orbital environment after their short mission life has expired. As the orbital altitude decreases, the debris objects will cross the trajectories commonly used by other satellites. The LEO environment is also more readily accessible than the higher altitudes and popular with crewed space stations (i.e. International Space Station and Tiangong-2), and a growing number of new satellite constellations such as WebOne, Amazon, led by the SpaceX Starlink (about 1,800 deployed for a planned total of 42,000). Also, spacelift rockets must necessarily ascend through the LEO environment to ascend to the higher orbits and interplanetary space missions. ASAT Mission 'Scorches' Earth Orbital and Terrestrial Resources Coming back down to Earth, the DA-ASAT test may have been necessary to verify the correct functioning of a complex integrated system and space mission. Attacking a satellite may be useful for an immediate tactical effect for a period spanning until the opposing force replaces the damaged satellite or adapts to function without it. However, the unwanted new space debris generated as collateral from the attack impacts different space actors. Space users, military and non-military, will be affected by the new orbital space debris for years beyond the cessation of the hostilities that initially inspired the attack against the satellite. The Russian military may have thought it adequate to manage safety by restricting activities within a volume of air and space situated over a controlled sea area at a specified time and location to address potential damage risks from a failed missile and falling debris. However, the orbital space environment cannot be subdivided or physically separated from the space commons accessed and used by all space actors, including military, commercial, scientific, and amateur space actors. The new space debris occupies a volume of space that clutters the orbital altitudes above and below the original target satellite's altitude, introducing unknown risks of on-orbit collisions with current and future satellites and ascending spacelift rockets. Many satellite orbits are deliberately designed for the mission payload to perform optimally from a particular altitude and travel along a specifically oriented trajectory to access Earth stations and mission target(s). The competition and congestion of the orbital environment give value to an orbital trajectory where some are more in demand and more valuable than others. Space actors might view the orbital environment as a valuable and finite resource and that the debris contamination of an orbit is destroying a valued shared resource. The lead-time needed to detect and determine the potential risk of a catastrophic collision requires an observation system that measures both physical and temporal characteristics of the Earth orbital environment as an ecosystem. The space surveillance system measures the orbital trajectories of satellites and debris to understand the state of the ecosystem at the time of observation. Temporal surveillance is then used to support calculations to project forward in time to predict future conditions of the ecosystem and the potential for catastrophic on-orbit collisions. The speed of satellite motion is too fast, the orbital trajectory is too curved, and the satellite size, weight and power constraints limit the viability of using an onboard 'seek and avoid' flight control system. Satellite collision avoidance relies on the space surveillance network (SSN) and processors to understand the orbital ecosystem. However, there are system limitations to the numbers and frequencies of observations that can be achieved and processed by the SSN when it has limited coverage of the orbital ecosystem. The SSN relies on a network of sensors spread around the globe that has gaps in its skyward looking coverage – there are not enough sensors to provide continuous coverage for all of the orbital ecosystem nor the availability to see all space events. Satellite collision risks need to be constantly re-evaluated, necessarily using a priorities list for tasking the sensors and updating satellite track data. Space surveillance and understanding the situation in the orbital ecosystem are resource-intensive activities. Space surveillance and collision avoidance predictions are valuable resources for safeguarding the continued safe use and availability of orbits and satellites. However, the unnecessary introduction of a significant number of space debris objects will unnecessarily increase the demands on these finite resources, potentially degrading the level of protection previously provided to protect valuable satellites. The space debris risk is further exacerbated by the introduction into orbit of more objects that are too small to be detected and tracked to support collision risk assessments. The burden of space debris on SSN resources has follow-on consequences that bring additional resource burdens. A satellite must burn fuel from its limited onboard fuel supply to perform a collision avoidance manoeuvre. The fuel is a finite resource that determines the satellite mission's life based on its ability to hold its orbit. Additionally, suppose the satellite does manoeuvre to avoid a collision. In that case, it changes the status of the orbital ecosystem, and the new state of the ecosystem needs to be recalculated for the new risks of on-orbit collisions, burning resources to keep these calculated predictions up-to-date. Indifference to Generating Space Debris equates to "Scorched Earth Orbit" Policy The Russian proverb quoted at the beginning of this paper indicates when a person is indifferent about their situation by denying their relationship to the world. The expression describes a person who is not caring about the happenings around them or the consequences of their actions or inactions. This Russian expression encourages people to be proactive and interested to engage in the important issues arising within their social environment. This proverb aptly depicts the Russian military as the protagonist displaying indifference to the global community's efforts to control the generation of unwanted space debris in the shared orbital space commons. The consequences of the DA-ASAT test performed on 15 November 2021 served to validate the system's functioning, in a momentary event, to the satisfaction of the Russian military. It also served to validate to the rest of the world the realisation of collateral risks to the continuing availability and viability of orbital trajectories that are valuable resources to global space actors. The new debris contamination of the orbital ecosystem has increased burdens on the finite limits of resources needed to monitor and support space situational awareness and space safety. Together, the Russian attitudes to the results of the Russian DA-ASAT test and the follow-on consequences to the orbital environment that endure for years to come are analogous to a scorched Earth policy being applied to critically valuable Earth orbital resources. The irony is that the DA-ASAT might provide an immediate tactical advantage for those who launch it. Still, they will not be divorced from sharing the increased risks and burdens resulting from the 'scorched' orbital ecosystem that affect all space users for many years, including the Russian people. Squadron Leader Michael Spencer is currently serving in the Air Force Reserve. He transitioned after a career in the Permanent Air Force, starting as a Navigator flying in long-range maritime patrol missions on P-3C Orions. The experiences gained from operational flying were transposed into a career in writing future air concepts, air capability development, and project acquisition management for air and space capabilities. He is currently working with the AFHQ RPAS (MQ-9B SkyGuardian) Team and the Defence COVID-19 Taskforce. Additional readings on space debris issues can be found in the papers contributed to Project Asteria 2019: Space Debris, Space Traffic Management and Space Sustainability by a team of writers, including the author. Available at https://airpower.airforce.gov.au/publications/project-asteria-2019-space-debris-space-traffic-management-and-space-sustainability Biography [1] Teacher Finder (2018, March 24). 25 Essential Russian Proverbs and Idioms. Teacher Finder Ltd, UK. . https://blog.weareteacherfinder.com/blog/25-essential-russian-proverbs-idioms/ [2] Griga, M & Schwarz, A (2015, September). Scorched Earth Policy. The Law of Armed Conflict and the Use of Force: The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law. Oxford University Press. Published 2017. p1113. https://books.google.com.au [3] Dutton, P (2021, November 17). Russian anti-satellite testing. Joint media release. Department of Defence Ministers. www.minister.defence.gov.au/minister/peter-dutton/media-releases/russian-anti-satellite-weapons-testing. [4] Clark, S (2021, November 15). U.S. officials: Space station at risk from ‘reckless’ Russian anti-satellite test. Breaking News, SpaceFlight Now. https://spaceflightnow.com/2021/11/15/u-s-officials-space-station-at-risk-from-reckless-russian-anti-satellite-test/. [5] Hoffmann, F (2021, November 16). Russia Tests PL-19 Nudol Direct-Ascent ASAT System. www.iiss.org/blogs/analysis/2021/11/russia-conducts-direct-ascent-anti-satellite-test. [6] Kelley, B & Chow, B (2021, November 17). Op-ed | Lessons to learn from Russia’s Nudol ASAT test. SpaceNews. https://spacenews.com/op-ed-lessons-to-learn-from-russias-nudol-asat-test/ [7] Zak, A (2021, November 16). The Tselina signal-intelligence satellite family. Spacecraft: Military. www.russianspaceweb.com/tselina.html [8] Next Spaceflight (2020). Cosmos 1408. Launches. https://nextspaceflight.com/launches/details/1787 [9] Peat, C (2021). Cosmos 1408 – Orbit. Heavens Above. www.heavens-above.com . [10] GlobalSecurity.Org (2021). 14Ts033 Nudol PL-19 Anti-Satellite. Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/russia/a-235-asat.htm. [11] Ibid [12] Top War (2018). Cover Moscow from a nuclear strike! Interceptor missile PRS-1M / 53Т6М hit another target. Military Review. https://en.topwar.ru/139202-raketa-perehvatchik-prs-1m-53t6m-v-tretiy-raz-porazila-cel.html [13] GlobalSecurity.Org (2021). Loc cit [14] Zak, A (2021). Soviet space rocket-propelled grenade revealed. www.russianspaceweb.com/almaz-shield2.html. [15] Trevithick, J (2021, April 21). This Is Our First Ever Look At A Top Secret Soviet Space 'Missile'. The WarZone, The Drive. www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/40285/this-is-our-first-ever-look-at-a-top-secret-soviet-space-missile. [16] UCAR (2021). The thermosphere. University Corporation for Atmospheric Research. https://scied.ucar.edu/learning-zone/atmosphere/thermosphere.

Dr Robbin Laird 2 January 2022 At the December 1, 2021, Williams Foundation seminar on shaping a way ahead for the Australian space enterprise, a key theme was how the Australian Defence Force (ADF) works with that enterprise and shapes a way ahead for military space. AIRCDRE Nick Hogan, Director General Space Domain Review, provided on overview on the emerging approach to how the RAAF and Defence are addressing military space. In an interview which he provided to the Williams Foundation separate from the presentation at the seminar itself, he highlighted the way ahead. “The space organization that we’re starting up in January 2022 is a whole of defense organization. While Air Force will host space, it certainly does not own it. Space is a multi-domain capability, so certainly not owned by anybody in particular… “The space organization we are setting up will be a flat structure by necessity. And when I say by necessity, we will have a two-star lead with three, one star or band one equivalents that sit underneath her and then underneath that it’s a pretty skeleton like structure. “We will also bring in other organizations like the Australian Space Operation Center inside the organization…We are literally quite lean by design so that not only do we have a requirement to keep it lean so that we don’t have as much of a resource burden across the services because of course we’re doing this within our resources right now, as well as doing everything else that we normally do. “But also, we want to be able to get the lower ranks engaged who have more experience in space. We’re in an unusual situation here where we are standing up an organization where the person who leads it isn’t the most experienced person in the organization. We are standing up an organization where the lead of the organization doesn’t know as much about space as some of the junior people who have been in it for a long time. Having those junior people come into the headquarters provides us with that experience. It’s a great opportunity to be a lean and agile organization and I think that’s what you’ll see at the organization next year.” He noted that on October 12, 2021, the defense space enterprise concept was presented to the Chiefs of Service Committee. That document focused on the roles, responsibilities, and authorities for the Defense Space Commander. As the ADF shapes and interacts with the evolving Australian space enterprise, they are doing so in the context of a broader set of space developments affecting their partners and allies as well. This means that they can take account of broader allied efforts as they shape their own as well. He highlighted that a key focus of their space effort was upon supporting the joint warfighter. This is also part of shaping a broader national security strategy for whole of government. “We need to understand the effects of space on our security.” The workforce needs to have the flexibility to get full value from the evolving space work force, inside and outside of government. “What does that mean in the defense context? It means allowing people to go into industry, come out of industry, work back inside the fence. That will allow us better understanding as we move forward, truly moving forward.” He underscored the need for new training regimes, including the formation of a space warfighter course. And it is important to ensure that such a perspective fits into the evolving integrated force approach or concept. Such a focus would lead to a conclusion suggested by David Ball, regional director, Australia/New Zealand for Lockheed Martin Space. The investments being made in satellite communications need to ensure that real world warfighting needs are met. “We need to make sure that it’s military-grade and it does provide the resilience that we need to have in such an important system. We see increasing counterspace activities by adversaries in this region, we’ve seen anti-satellite attacks recently, we’ve seen co-orbital attacks from another spacecraft. Those technologies are advancing rapidly, and we need to be very cognizant of those changes as we build up our network. It’s something the satellite industry needs to take care of in all facets in the space segment as well as the ground segment and the control segment.” And in Ball’s assessment this means that space although a distinctive domain is embedded in a wider information warfighting environment facing the ADF. “In addition to the physical risk I just talked about, there’s always a cyber risk, and we’ve seen government recently make announcements in this regard about critical infrastructure in this country. That applies to civilian networks as well as to military networks, so industry as a whole needs to respond and be aware of these as cyber risks and make sure that we have bulletproofed our systems to ensure that people can’t get in to attack.” When one focuses on defence, it is always crucial to remember that it is an entity which is engaged in the ongoing defence of the nation. And as the major authoritarian powers are engaged in my view in ongoing limited war with the liberal democracies to seek to gain escalation control dominance, the focus is upon the future is now. It is important to have long-term objectives, but one must just think back to 2019 to look at how good the forecasts were for the world in 2020 to understand the need for modesty when making long-term projections. The presentation by the commander of the Air Warfare Centre, AIRCDRE Ross Bender provided an assessment of the way forward grounded in this reality. “If we need to go and conduct an operation in the next 12 months to two years, what do we know of the environment? “What do we know of the options we have available? “What are our vulnerabilities? “What are our key support requirements from our coalition partners to enable us to provide options to the joint force? “That’s the focus that I have in my current role. We need to work with industry, academia, and the coalition partners to identify those options and then explore them, so that day zero, I can be prepared to fight. Rather than day one, trying to make it up on the fly while we understand what we can and can’t do.” AIRCDRE Bender underscored a core point for today’s operating force which is crucial to focus upon and to work solutions. “Space domain awareness is critical for today’s fighting force. The reason can be reduced to one word and that is dependency. Dependency in joint operations translates to military vulnerability, which in turn may identify opportunities for an adversary. “Australian defense-based capabilities and operations are significantly dependent on the U.S. for access to space-based capabilities, along with the provision of accurate and validated observations of objects in space…. “The U.S. operates and maintains a space surveillance network that consistently collects observations on all observable space objects from multiple sensors, spreading around the globe, to extrapolate and validate orbital elements, which then form a space object catalog. The U.S. space catalog is maintained at different classification levels, and one of the primary contributors to developing space domain awareness. “Therefore, continued access to these catalogs is a critical vulnerability that the government plans to mitigate through the development of a sovereign space domain awareness capability. “It is important to note that with the focus on developing sovereign defense space capability, it might be perceived that defense may be disconnecting somewhat from our allies and partners. This could not be further from the truth. Australia holds a unique geographical position to contribute significantly to collective space domain awareness with our allies and partners, as evidenced by Defence currently hosting a U.S. ground space-based surveillance sensor. “Defence space capability delivers desired effects in supportive joint operations through the use of space as an operational domain. The desired effects are provided through space battle management, missile warning operations, access to and management of space services, including SATCOM and GPS, and access to space-based intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems. And underpinning all of this is developing and maintaining consistent and comprehensive space domain awareness.” When considering a realistic and effective way ahead for the ADF in space, Malcolm Davis sensibly focused on how Australia can work the high-low mix or focus really on the new space approach to satellite build and launch, and craft capabilities to work, in effect, ISR constellations. He argued at the seminar that by using small satellite systems Australia could shape sovereign space-based targeting for strike capabilities. Combined with innovations in reusable launch, small sats can provide the ADF with significant new capabilities. Such capabilities are part of the kind of resilience which the ADF is broadly seeking. As Davis put it: “Why should we do this? Why should we invest in sovereign capabilities? It’s all about resilience. It’s all about having the ability to maintain operations and maintain capability in a contested environment. We are responsible for this, not the Americans, not anyone else, it’s down to us to deliver this capability. “At the same time as we develop these resilience capabilities, we need to expand our ability to contribute towards deterrence, because that gives towards the common good of preventing a Pearl Harbor in space.” A Navy perspective on space was provided by CDRE Matthew Doornbos, RAN Director General Navy Intelligence and Information Warfare. He argued that “The ability to access services and benefit from space related war fighting effects and synchronizing and coordinate them with other kinetic, non-kinetic effects and physical maneuver is critical to vitality and survivability of a deployed maritime task group. Controlling the seas and projecting power from the sea complicates the strategic situation for adversaries and competitors. “As Director General Navy Intelligence and Information Warfare, I have responsibility for the oversight over the Maritime Commander Control Communications, Computers, Cyber, Intelligence, Surveillance, Electronic warfare program, or more simply the MC5ISR program, which include Navy’s endeavors in the space domain. “The creation of the program was approved by government late last year and brings together all of Navy information warfare projects under one overarching program. It includes several projects that are already delivering and several projects which deliver over the next 20 to 30 years. “A notable endorsement by government of the program is the adoption of a continuous capability development system that enables defense the ability to maintain tactically relevant, technically advanced, in fit for purpose systems that enable the maritime force to maneuver within the electromagnetic spectrum in a degraded, denied, intermittent or limited environment. At the same time, it allows us to the capability for degrading or denying adversaries freedom maneuver. “The requirement for the program was driven out of a growing realization that the current rate of technology advancements, and our contrasting inability to deliver new capability at a similar rate. It was realized that our limitations for providing rapid responses to emerging threats was derived from our process of implementation and not necessarily our capacity to develop the technology. “The future of warfare is being shaped by the world advancements in technology. And we must stay at the forefront. The rapid pace of technology development means that Navy’s mission is now only achievable through the nexus of maritime, air, land, cyber, and space domains. Navy gains several critical information advantages through space, position, navigation, and timing. B&T such as GPS provides precise geolocation, navigation, time reference services. Information essential for all Navy’s networks, sensors, weapon systems including future non-kinetic effects to be delivered through the program…. “This network provides the central warning for counter advanced ballistic missile capabilities. Intelligence surveillance reconnaissance, space based optical radar and RF sensors have been long used to support military operations. Such platforms may previously be beyond the reach of potential adversaries. Contemporary counter space authorities can’t hold these assets at risk. As soon as we leave the wharf, these space-based communications are being placed at risk in a congested and contested spectrum environment.” Operating within the dynamic war fighting environment relies on access to space and doing so requires in his view the ability to shape, support, and leverage the wider evolving Australian space eco-system. “We cannot rely on our major primes and institutions alone. Therefore, we must identify the importance of implementing the smaller players within the industry to contribute and develop our key resource, and that is our people. My goal is to develop and build and nurture the relationships between defense industry and academia. In doing so, I seek to build that academic base and give depth and breadth to support Navy’s, C5ISR needs. This partnership, where we’re all able to understand each other’s needs and pressures, will lead to a better outcome for all of us collectively. He then added that: “Navy may need to leverage commercial capabilities that reduce the cost of access to space and increase the utility and the availability of space-based systems. Navy needs to establish processes for developing and managing space expertise for our sailors. In information warfare related work groups, current career streams do not provide a path to upscale individuals, who would form the core of professional workforce in our Navy to stay abreast of rapid developments in tactics, techniques, procedures, and capability. Concurrently, Navy needs to train its officers with specialist space effects and information warfare knowledge to generate, integrate and synchronize space capabilities into maritime task group operations. He added: “In order for us to predicatively move forward with the necessary research and development and basic science and technology to meet our capability needs, there needs to be a level of funding behind the research. It’s a simple fact. That’s why we need to fully utilize the funding opportunities available to us through the defense innovation hub. “And for instance, the DSTGs next generation tech fund, these collaborative ambitions serve to rider a solid foundational relationship and can enable defense industry and academia to establish corporate process in a practical sense.”[1] An Army perspective on military space was provided by BRIG Ian Langford, Director General Future Land Warfare. “As part of the joint force, the Australian Army must contribute to orchestrating effects across all domains, to include space with our like-minded partners and allies. The more cohesive, integrated, and network force that we generate as part of the joint force, the more effective we will be in leveraging this domain. “Army’s contribution to space power is obviously not new. And as the ADF recapitalizes, to include its diverse space workforce, it’ll require expertise to be drawn from across army, navy, air force, the public service, contractors, academics, and industry, if we are to realize this ambition and the responsibilities that we have towards safeguarding the nation. “For our army, they exist inside our sixth brigade, which is that part of army which raise, trains, and sustains our air defense, our ISR electronic warfare, and our long-range fires community. That organization and those people within will need to be skilled, and in some cases re-skilled, across the decade as the ADF space strategy becomes realizable. It becomes less important of the fact that individuals join the army navy and air force rather than the fact that they’re now part of the ADF and the uniform they wear will be less important than perhaps the domain that they operate in… “The generation of space power for army will require more than just the employment of space systems. It will demand a coherent joint and integrated culture in space domain, increasing the awareness of space power within army and across defense. We must understand how each of the constituent parts of military power are enabled by the other. “And this prepares our people for roles across the department, outside of this service, expands our thinking, and ultimately contribute to our ability to be successful both in single, unified, and multi-domain operations. Army’s access to terrestrial and orbit satellite assets, for example, provide a spectrum of offensive and defensive capabilities to protect and defend the space domain.” Finally, AIRCDRE Phil Gordon, Director General Air Defence and Space underscored with regard to the Australian space effort: “We are on a journey, but we’ve got a long way to go to achieve professional mastery. We need at all levels of defense, leadership, and government to be informed and understand what it means when someone cozies up to one of our satellites, starts fiddling around, well, what does that mean? What should we do about that? We need to take an integrated commander control approach. “This is a key part of the joint force. We’re not just making space versus space decisions. Space is not just a special domain but one which impacts on all other warfighting domains.” Certainly, as Australia looks to add long-range strike, space capabilities are a key part of such a system. And that really is the point. Shaping sovereign space capabilities is a key part of the ability of Australia to have the kind of decision making appropriate to operate in the gray zone, hybrid war or what I prefer to call it engaging effectively in the ongoing limited wars and escalation control challenges being posed by today’s authoritarian peer competitors. As Gordon put it: “If we are going to make a decision to go to war, we probably shouldn’t just take someone else’s word for it. What happened? You could look back to the decisions around the invasion of Iraq and the fallout of that and weapons of mass destruction. Do we want to just rely on other people’s assessments of why our satellite just stopped communicating with us? Or do we want to have a way to independently collaborate and corroborate that information.” We put it this way with regard to defense in our book on European defense: “But it is clear this is not the 19th century in that no Western state can directly defend itself and its interests by itself. We are in a situation where even powerful Western states can only pursue defense and security strategies from a position of semi-sovereignty. “The fundamental reality is that defense is national but executed in a situation of semi-sovereignty. It is not only shaped by semi-sovereign relations with other liberal democratic states but also in terms of sorting through the kind of relationships liberal democratic states will have with 21st century authoritarians which now operate both internally and externally with regard to the liberal democracies themselves. “Alliances are crucial but not definitive in solving the direct defense challenges facing today’s liberal democratic states. National goals and objectives need to be clearly identified, stated and pursued but done so with regard as well to ensuring ensuring that those liberal democratic states most willing to act in support of your nation’s more enlightened objectives are on the same page with regard to how best to handle full spectrum crisis management. “Nations remain the focus for defense and security, even though what has emerged is clearly semi-sovereignty even for larger nations. Part of shaping the way ahead for a nation is to have tool sets which not only can defend its interests but also trigger collaboration with core partners to ensure that the overall result is more capability on the basis of “enlightened” nationalism to act, rather than on simply more agreement to discuss, but with little ability to be able to act during a crisis.”[2] The featured photo shows AIRCDRE Gordon speaking at the Williams Foundation seminar on space. [1] https://www.dst.defence.gov.au/nextgentechfund [2] Robbin Laird and Murielle Delaporte, The Return of Direct Defense in Europe: Meeting the Challenge of XXIst Century Authoritarian Powers (2020), chapter five. Link to article: The ADF and the Australian Space Enterprise (Defense.info)

Dr Robbin Laird 2 January 2022 Sovereign Australian space requires an Australian industrial space eco-system to be shaped and enhanced. How might this be done? Crafting, shaping, and building out an Australian space industry able to provide for sovereign capabilities for the Australian government decision makers is based on the enhanced opportunities in commercial space. Nick Leake, head of satellite and space systems Optus, provided a comprehensive look back at the company’s experience in the space business. Optus is one of the largest telecommunications companies in Australia. It has operated satellites as part of its business since 1985. Currently, the company operates 10 satellites with Optus 10 being the latest of their satellites. As noted by the company: “In 2003, Optus successfully launched the world’s largest hybrid commercial and military communications satellite Optus C1, together with the Australian Defence Forces. Optus C1 is the Australian hotbird with twenty four commercial Ku-band transponders operating in beams covering Australia, New Zealand, the nearby offshore islands, Papua New Guinea, Hawaii and South East Asia. Optus C1 carries subscription TV services and Aurora Free-to-Air radio and television services to remote areas in Australia." [1] All of this means that Leake spoke from the standpoint of several years of operating experience as an Australian firm with real-world experience in working a commercial telecoms satellite fleet. His discussion focused on the challenges of operating a satellite network in the growing presence of space junk and in the face of powers that believed they had the right through ASAT systems to place deliberate “junk” to disrupt or destroy a perceived adversary’s satellites. Leake underscored a number of key points about the interaction between commercial space and the need for government to focus on maintain some kind of order for space operations. “We are looking towards the future. We are looking for some cohesion within Australia with Defence and the Australian Space Agency to develop tools to give us better safety in operating our geostationary spacecraft. “The C1 spacecraft is 18 years old. We operate that satellite in what they call inclined orbit. So we operate spacecraft at 36,000 kilometers in a 70-kilometer box. We fly it in a figure of eight because it has the pull of the earth, pull of the moon, pull of the sun, so it is never static. We try to keep it in this box, pointing at earth and if you don’t have a spectrum filing, you’ve got nowhere to put your spacecraft. It’s incredibly important that you keep your spacecraft, at your orbital slots and that you maintain those spacecrafts. “If you move a spacecraft away, you’ve got three years to put that spacecraft back to keep your finding in use, so it’s called bringing into use. That’s an important part of a commercial operator, but it’s even more important for our Defence forces that they maintain their orbital filings across the orbital arcs that they want to use their spacecraft.” The impact of evolving commercial space for defence and security operations could not be more clear than in the domain of ISR. In his presentation to the seminar, AIRCDRE Richard Keir (Retd.) Strategic Advisor for National Security and Intelligence to Geospatial Intelligence Pty. Ltd, provided a targeted presentation on how the ISR demands for the civil, security and military sectors can benefit from commercial geospatial efforts. There are a number of conclusions one can draw from the emergence of a robust commercial space enabling ISR Market. Notably, since 2002, the commercial space-based earth observation market has become very dynamic and global. Essentially, Australia is involved in this market and there are clear opportunities for the Australian government to get better value out of this market for it national security requirements. In effect, commercial imagery and data from that imagery can be used along with classified sources and methods and thereby enhance the scope and quality of the data collected. By taking advantage of the growing number of commercial satellite capabilities and constellations, the Australian government can enable a whole of government strategy in defence and security. Because commercial space based ISR data and information is unclassified, it can form a solid foundation for information sharing with a wider array of allies and partners than highly classified imagery. This can prove very useful in terms of crisis management and escalation control, notably as information war is a core reality today. For example. in discussions I had during my past visits with the Maritime Border Command, it is very clear that such capabilities fit right into their evolving approach to working from maritime domain awareness shared with partners and allies. The Maritime Domain Awareness dynamic is an arena where shared information s crucial for both whole of government and working with partners and allies. In the recently released White Paper which Keir referenced in his presentation which his company just released, the nature of the MDA market for commercial space is explained in the following terms: “MDA is enhanced by space-based Earth observation as it has unique capabilities to image large swathes of the ocean and complex littoral environments using a mix of EO, IR and SAR imaging sensors – fused with AIS – and increasingly assisted by RF sensors. The latter assistance provided by RF sensors is especially useful in cases where a vessel has not enabled its AIS or has deliberately mis-characterised itself. RF sensors may provide enough of a clue to tip and cue an all-weather SAR capability or a good weather/daylight hours EO capability to classify or identify the vessel. “The use of more novel sensors can also prove valuable in MDA. For example, the Visible Infrared Imaging Radiometer Suite (VIIRS) is a sensor on board the Suomi National PolarOrbiting Partnership (Suomi NPP) and United States National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) NOAA-20 weather satellites. The sensor has the capability to detect lights on vessels at sea that are often used to attract fish.15 “Because MDA is an international issue that transcends national borders and spans issues of national security through to economic interests, information sharing is often fundamental to its success. No nation can sustain 24/7/365 full situational awareness of the oceans in isolation, so the most efficient way to achieve the desired level of knowledge is to share information with partner nations. Indeed, counterintuitively, national sovereignty frequently depends on the sharing of data, information, and intelligence between likeminded nations to achieve MDA. “Commercial space-based ISR data is unclassified, has high resolution, and is capable of 24/7/365 availability across the gamut of EO, IR, SAR, AIS and RF. It is therefore of great value to nations such as Australia in its efforts to facilitate the MDA of developing nations because it will generally have fewer constraints on its use.” [2] The main presentation outlining the current state of the Australian space eco-system and the projected way ahead was provided by Anthony Murfett. Deputy Head of the Australian Space Agency, which was launched in 2018. The purpose of the Space Agency is “ to transform and grow a globally respected Australian space industry that lifts the broader economy, inspires and improves the lives of Australians – underpinned by strong national and international engagement.” And “the Australian Space Agency aims to triple the size of the Australian space economy (from A$3.9B to $12B) and create an additional 20,000 space jobs by 2030.” The current situation finds the Australian space business operating at a level of AU$4.6 billion with 11,560 jobs existing across the Australian space industry. The investment in space capability growth is AU$7 billion with AU$800+ coming from investment by the Australian government in civil space and AU$2 billion coming from a pipeline of investment across all the Australian federal states and territories. Growing civil space provides a significant opportunity to expand the capabilities for the Australian defence sector as there are a number of key areas alignment between the two sectors. Murfett identified four key areas: satellite-based capability and services, Space Domain awareness, Position, Navigation and Timing and Earth Observation. In the following slide from Murfett’s presentation, the extant capacity in adjacent industries within the Australian space industry eco system were identified: He highlighted as well key infrastructure investments being made in Australia which can be leveraged as well to enhance the evolving Australian space industrial eco system. This includes the AU$1.3 billion in the modern manufacturing initiative of the Australian government, the establishment of a robotics, automation and AI command control centre (Fugro Marine), a space data analysis facility (Pawsey supercomputing Centre) and a missional control at Lot Fourteen (Saber Astronautics). There is an agreement with NASA which is part of the way ahead for Australian space as well. The agreement with NASA means that Australia is part of the Trailblazer program of the Moon to Mars initiative. A semi-autonomous, Australian-made rover is to be included in future NASA mission to the Moon. This effort draws on Australia’s world-leading remote operations capability and the Rover will collect lunar regolith and NASA will extract oxygen from this. Shaping a way ahead for Australian space launch capability is a key part of the way ahead. And in this slide from his presentation, Murfett highlighted the perceived way ahead: A number of international agreements are being worked to open the doors internationally for the Australian space sector. The first is a technology safeguard agreement with the United States which is establishing principles under which U.S. spaceflight technology can be licensed for export to Australia for use in spaceflight activities. The Australians are working with India on India’s first human spaceflight program where the Australian Government and ISRO are working together to track the Gaganyaan mission from Australia’s Cocos (Keeling) Islands (CKI). And finally, there is an Australian-UK space bridge framework arrangement which Increases connection, exchange, and investment across AU-UK space sectors. Murfett concluded his presentation by identifying what he saw as the next phase for the Australian civil space effort: Deliver the remaining technical roadmaps to highlight opportunities for investment; support industry to scale; connect across government to highlight how space can support growth, safety, and security; connect with the Australian community and show the value of space to our everyday lives and to inspire the nation and support the future workforce. This last point was underscored in other presentations as well, for example, in the presentation by David Ball, regional director, Australia/New Zealand for Lockheed Martin Space. “The young folks these days aren’t coming into space as we would need them to. In numbers, the Space Agency has some very aggressive numbers from government in terms of the numbers of jobs they need to create. To do that we need to inspire our younger generation and give them the path and show them there are real, tangible jobs in the space sector in this country.” Murfett provided a fitting comment to highlight the way ahead for defence working with the evolving Australian space industrial eco system: “There is an Australian industry here that can actually deliver on Defence’s future ambitions.” I would add that the challenge is to ensure that this happens in the way which fits as well into the evolution of the ADF, its forces, its strategy and its concepts of operations. The featured photo is Anthony Murfett, Deputy Head of the Australian Space Agency speaking the Williams Foundation seminar on space. [1] https://www.optus.com.au/about/network/satellite/fleet [2] Commercial Space-Based Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance and Australia’s National Security (Geospatial Intelligence Pty Ltd (December 2021). Link to article: Shaping an Australian Space Industrial Eco-System for Defence and Security (SLDinfo.com)

Dr Robbin Laird 31 December 2021 Sovereignty is a tricky term, notably when it comes to global economies and to allied based national defense. The COVD-19 crisis and the conflict with the 21st century authoritarian powers, notably China, have reminded the liberal democracies of how vulnerable they are. And when American allies talk sovereignty what they are talking about are two interrelated dynamics: the first that they have as much independence in decision making from Washington as feasible and retain necessary alliance links; and the second is to ensure that they have as much capability to act decisively against authoritarian adversaries to ensure that escalation control is possible to defend that nation’s interests. I have a lifetime of dealing with the French, who are the U.S. allies who talk the most about sovereignty and their freedom of action vis a vis the Americans. But what is sovereignty for a state like France when embedded in the European Union, dependent on a U.S. led Alliance for their ultimate security, and embedded in the global supply chain? I dealt with this question of what sovereignty in the current period is even for a large power like the United Sates in my edited book 2020: A Pivotal Year. Several of the essay’s deal with this question or theme. Essentially what we are talking about is shaping decision making capabilities for the nation to make choices within the shared sovereignty of modern defense and economic relationships facing the major liberal democratic nations. It is about getting allies and adversaries alike to go down paths favorable to a particular nations policies or identities. But how did the speakers at the space conference define what sovereignty meant to them regarding Australia and its way ahead in the space domain? The core point was relatively straightforward. And that point was made by Malcolm Davis from the Australian Strategic Policy Institute: “For the first time in a major policy document, the 2020 strategic update emphasized the importance for Australia to have our own capabilities in the operational space domain. That update made clear there is a requirement for space control that is not only about space domain awareness from the ground, but also about an ability actually to assure access to space and counter threats to our space systems and boosted the funding to do so.” One member of the key panel was very aware of how important the sovereignty focus is regarding how to focus what Australia does in the space domain and this is how he put it: “Exactly how do we define sovereign? Sovereign means different things to different people. We need to decide what degree of sovereignty we need to do the job. That might not be total ownership from start to end. It might be sovereignty of decision making. It might be sovereignty of the networks. It might be sovereignty of the data. I think there’s no one size fits all approach to sovereignty, and it really just depends on what is required actually to do the job in an assured way.” It is an interesting exercise to go through the presentations and to carefully look at how the speakers defined or used the word sovereignty to shape what course of action they then advocated. It is interesting above all because how one defines the focus of sovereignty indicates what a realistic course of action for Australia might be, given the high cost of space, the relatively limited skill sets in Australia in this industry, the tradeoffs between working in a globalized commercial space sector, or a targeted Australian funded effort tailored for the ADF. The moderator for the day highlighted the importance of sovereignty as referring to Australian-based firms, but whether these are outposts of foreign primes or Australian-generated firms is an interesting question. This is how Darin Lovett put it: “The impact of COVID has fundamentally reenergized the discussion around sovereignty and resilience, especially as it pertains to space. Do we divest and, again, rely on a foreign provider or do we invest and build sovereignty? We have an opportunity to leapfrog the old operating system, which we’ve relied on and gain traction against emerging issues, but we need holistic capability development in Australia to bed in the seeds that we’ll provide for the future.” AIRCDRE Nicholas Hogan, Director General of the Space Domain Review, identified various concrete manifestations of new capabilities which Australia needs to achieve to have sovereignty. The first is clearly on the launch side of space. The second is to build out a sovereign space industry, but again one of the challenges here is that companies in the commercial sector and the defense sector do not operate in the same manner and there is the key challenge of foreign primes and local companies in terms of what they build for the global market or for the ADF. This impacts directly on the question of the workforce and the skill sets to be developed to build out an Australian based space industry. There is clearly growing overlap between the commercial and military space sectors, but it is more of Venn diagram than single workforce, notably because of the requirement for security clearances in the national defense arena. Terry van Herren, the former Air Attaché in the United States, focused on the challenge of building an effective sovereign space industry. Here he cited the experience of Australia in building indigenous fighter aircraft from 1921 to 1939 which resulted in not very good fighters, but it did generate the infrastructure which then allowed Australia to license build Spitfires and Hurricanes. He pointedly used this example to underscore that sovereignty is not about “designing, developing and building everything but it is about doing what you can do well and take advantages of working with partners and allies around the world to work on what you’re not so good at doing.” He then cited a concrete example, namely of a company doing very innovative work in space domain awareness. LeoLabs is building a network of ground-based, phased array radars that provide a unique capability, and have approached space domain awareness from a perspective different from partners and allies. [1] CDRE Matthew Doornbos, RAN Director General for Navy Intelligence and Warfare. Made a very similar point to that of van Herren. “In our endeavors to set the conditions for long term success in the space domain, we must remain cognizant of maximizing efficient use of our resources, because the reality here in Australia, unsurprisingly, is we only have a limited number of resources. If we are to achieve our goals and ambitions, we’d have to really understand what our sovereign capability should be. But more importantly, we have to work efficiently. We have to work collaboratively, across defense, industry and academia. It’s our relationships through all aspects of our capability development, that will enable us to achieve our goals.” But the most comprehensive examination of the relationship between a realistic definition of sovereignty with how Australia should proceed was by AVM Chris Deeble, now CEO Northrop Grumman Australia, but when serving with the RAAF had extensive experience with working with advanced programs, such as the F-35. His experience clearly guided his judgements on how to achieve both enhanced sovereignty but to do so with a regard to a practical way ahead. “What is sovereignty? The pursuit of sovereignty shouldn’t be an excuse for wanting to do everything. Sovereignty and resilience go hand in glove from my perspective and how we build that strategy. When we think about space, we often think about the things that make for great photo opportunities. A launch, a satellite, those great pictures of a satellite orbiting around. They make the great photo opportunities. These are going to be important that supply chains that underpin that, will remain important for us. But we must prioritize our effort and investments. “We must ensure that from the get-go, we create that viable, scalable, innovative, and sustainable space ecosystem. And it must be underpinned by business cases that can goes to the viability and sustain sustainability at the end of the day “This will be a significant challenge for us as we move forward. Defining things in requirements terms is going to be difficult. We will have to be thinking about that in outcomes terms. As a space nation, we must have a clear strategy that articulates our sovereign security and resilient space capability outcomes. We must develop a cohesive and aligned national strategy that meets both the civil and defense needs now and into the future. “We must ensure that we prioritize and align our investments. We cannot lose sight of the underlying business cases. We can’t do it all. We have to create a sustainable viable outcome for us as we’re moving forward. The lexicon is changing, it’s a great first start. “But if we want to be a space nation, if we want to create space ecosystems for the nation, if we want to have a viable, enduring, sustainable, scalable industry, from now and into the future, we have to turn that rhetoric into reality.” BRIG Langford brought up a really key point about the impact of having sovereign space or bits of sovereignty within an overall allied space enterprise: “Does a hostile act against a space-based asset, or indeed a cyber intrusion against national infrastructure constitute an act of war under international law? And noting that blood has not been spilled, which is the traditional sort of convention around a hostile act, hostile action, hostile intent, is that now in international law, is it an act, a license, indeed a mandate to prosecute war on the physical domain. To some, it seems obvious, but like most things in life, it’s not that simple. “What is the policy framework, when an Australian owned commercial or military space-based space asset is potentially interfered or destroyed as it relates to an attack on Australian sovereignty, and what we might do about it, in terms of our obligations to assert the security versions of ourselves in that sort of environment.” The Featured Photo: AVM (Retired) Chris Deeble, now Executive Director, Strategy, Northrop Grumman, Australia [1] https://www.leolabs.space Link to article: Sovereignty and the Australian Space Effort (SLDinfo.com)

Dr Robbin Laird 30 December 2021 Recently, the Williams Foundation held its latest bi-annual seminar, this one focused on the way ahead for the Australian space enterprise. Since 2014, the Williams Foundation has held bi-annual seminars on the transformation of the ADF as it embraced fifth generation warfare and working joint force integration. Since 2018, the focus has been increasingly with regard to how to extend the reach of the ADF given the changing nature of the challenges facing Australia in the Indo-Pacific region. The discussions really began with a 2018 seminar which focused on the importance of long-range strike and was followed by seminars which focused on ways to enhance Australian resilience and sovereign capabilities. The first seminar of 2021 focused on next generation autonomous systems, and the December 1, 2021, seminar on where autonomous systems, namely satellites, have been a regular feature for both military and commercial purposes for many decades. I will publish a report on the seminar early next year, but in this article would simply wish to highlight some key elements of the discussions. The first point made throughout the presentations by speakers was that Australia has a long involvement in space activities through its working relationships with its core allies, first Britain, and then the United States. The Australians have been engaged in several support activities for the American space enterprise and that domain knowledge and engagement will continue to be critical in shaping Australia’s own efforts for enhanced sovereignty In space. The second point is the need to indeed enhance Australian independent space capabilities. As AIRCDRE Phil Gordon, Director General Air Defence and Space put it: “I would compare our position in space with being a frequent flyer who uses that service. And as we in defense are on the journey from being a consumer of other people’s space products to a contributor owner and operator in our own right.” The need for shaping sovereign capabilities comes not only from the enhanced importance of space payloads for both commercial and military activities, but from the nature of crises and the nature of allies. Gordon put it succinctly: “It’s relatively easy to have access to space capabilities from alliies when there’s plenty to go around. But if times are tough, if assets are under attack, if bandwidth is reduced, if satellites and ground stations are targeted and there’s just not enough capacity to do all the things we want to do, then where are those priorities going to lie?” This then means for Gordon: “we have to be able to have control and access of our space capabilities without needing to ask someone else’s permission.” The third point was embedded in various presentations but put most directly by BRIG Ian Langford. Director General Future Land Warfare. Even though space clearly has its own specific requirements, skill sets and capabilities, it is part of the overall transformation of the ADF and of the next round of the revolution in military affairs, or perhaps we could go back to the term used throughout the Williams Foundation Seminars, namely, a fifth-generation force but now with greater reach. Langford put it this way: “ Two years ago, I was talking to a US Air Force retired four-star general, and we were talking about the revolution of military affairs, which was demonstrated in 1991 during the first Gulf War. And that was demonstrated in that context through the effectiveness of GPS and the use in application of precision strike and advanced munitions, as it related to the ability of US-led coalition forces to be so effective and so profound in the context of that capability overmatch. Now we are on the edge of a significant defence recapitalization are we now on the edge of the next round of the RMA? And what are we to do about it?” The fourth point is that shaping of a new Australian space enterprise which started with the 2018 standup of the Australian Space Agency and will see a new ADF command to be stood up in January 2022 is occurring in the context of evolving strategic environment. And that environment as I noted in a recent discussion with Dr. Paul Bracken, the well-known strategist, is characterized by ongoing limited war with the authoritarian powers and the challenge of escalation control and management. Space assets are crucial to be able for Australia to shape effective crisis management in the ongoing conflicts with the authoritarian powers. Several speakers spoke about the militarization of space and space war. The challenge is to know when it starts. Both the cyber and space domains are domains within which conflict is ongoing, signaling difficult, but the need to be resilient crucial. Dougal Robertson of the Williams Foundation highlighted the interaction between space and the various dimensions of the evolving strategic environment. And he underscored this crucial point: “Gray-zone traditionally means we are not at war, but we’re not at peace. The gray-zone actor might be pursuing national objectives, certainly in relation to nation states, and when we talk about gray-zone activity, they’re often pursuing objectives that are linked to military advantage or political or strategic advantage.” If this is the case then, Australia certainly needs space capability which can give the ADF and the government decision making tools to evolute conflicts and crisis management options, occurring in space and cascading out to the entire combat force. The fifth point, and a major part of the day’s discussion, was on the nature of the space eco-system which Australia needs to shape going forward to have enough sovereignty to have decision making capabilities for both security and defense needs. Space is expensive and payloads are dynamically changing under the impacts of new initiative sand capabilities generated by the major space powers. So, what can Australia realistically do and how best to do it? That discussion was a significant part of the seminar and will be a major focus for the upcoming report on the conference. But in general terms, the focus was upon several key aspects which Australia can or needs to clearly do. One aspect is leveraging the dynamics of change with regard to new versus old space, which means new ways to launch space payloads, and to leverage the various ways to shape new satellite payloads and constellations. That effort will be generated as the major space powers refigure how they are working GEO, MEO and LEO payloads, and as they shape various kinetic and non-kinetic ways to shape warfare in space capabilities. That is why working with the United States and enhancing working relationship with the UK as they have launched a new space command, or with India, or Japan or ESA all will become parts of shaping the space ecosystem for the Australian space enterprise going forward. Malcolm Davis of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute provided a particularly robust and clear discussion of what Australia’s way ahead in space might look like. “We need to think about space resilience, and we need to think about space deterrence, and they should complement the existing projects in space. Sovereign launch is clearly going to happen, and I’ve always been an advocate for a high, low mix, where Australia contributes a low end in terms of small satellites that can complement the large geo birds. These small satellite systems could contribute new types of capability and new missions for the Australian defense force.” The sixth point is the central role which Australia’s geography has and will play going forward. The cooperation between the United States and Australia in part is based on Australia’s location and its extensive geography. The establishment of Pine Gap is a case in point. This location is strategically significant because of the ability of the facilitates there to work various high value satellites as they pass over one-third of the globe, including China, the Asian parts of Russia and the Middle East. And going forward launch locations and ground-based space capabilities will grow in importance as Australia builds out its own capabilities and works with partners and allies in the liberal democratic world going forward. In the panel, the former air attaché to the United States, Terry Van Herren noted: “If I was a Chinese general, I’d be worried about three things from Australia. First, I would be worried about nuclear powered submarines. Second, I would be quite concerned about long range replenishable strike. The third thing that would worry me would be a robust counter space capability developed and supported in Australia. Why? Because Perth and Beijing are on the same longitude. They would hate to see us develop real space power in this country.” Speaking of geography, there is the broad question of the changing nature of Australia’s defence geography. When I was last in Australia in March 2020, I started my return to the United States as the COVID wave started to pass over Australia in Perth visiting the subbase and a major shipyard. When you combine the need to operate from Western Australia to the first island chain, with the coming of a nuclear attack submarine, almost certainly to operate from Western Australia, and the already extant space capabilities in the region, which will be expanded, the thin population belts in the West will need to see growth in order for many of Australia’s defense plans to be realized. A good way to conclude this initial look at the seminar was a comment made by the moderator of the seminar, Darin Lovett, who is the Director of the South Australian Space Centre. “Most of us are here as professionals in the business. We understand the importance of Sovereign Defense Capability in the mission statement of the ADF to defend Australia and its national interests. “A Sovereign Defense Space Capability is somewhat harder to articulate. And there are two reasons for this. First, the Defense Space Capabilities we still rely on are largely to many people, largely still highly classified and unknown to the general populace. And secondly, our human capital, the professional cadre who underpin any capability are relatively few and they’re new. And compared to the rich heritage of land, maritime and air, we just don’t have that depth and that backbone and strategic thought that has permeated the other domains. “But space is no longer just viewed as a conduit for three things, comms, imagery, and Positioning, Navigation and Timing (PNT). It’s now seen as a domain in and of itself, to be monitored for belligerent activity and an essential element of a complex society and a way that, and a domain that underpins our way of life on earth in ways we actually don’t understand. The system is too complex to unravel. “The impact of COVID has reenergized the discussion around sovereignty and resilience, especially as it pertains to space. Now it’s a pivotal moment, billions of dollars are slated for defense capability. And we’ve got a small but dynamic space industry growing, but also large primes who are investing in this kind to build capability. “We’re unencumbered by the legacy approach to space. This is an advantage we’re not pushing 20 tons to GEO. We’re not a big player like Airbus, Boeing, Lockheed, L3, et cetera. We can move relatively fast. We’re changing the paradigm that space is primarily the playground of big powers.” Link to article: Shaping a Way Ahead for the Australian Space Enterprise (SLDinfo.com)

Dr Robbin Laird 30 December 2021 At the recent Williams Foundation seminar focused on Australian space held on December 1, 2021, the conference started appropriately enough with a look back at the history of Australia’s engagement in space activities. The Australians have been involved in the space activities of their key allies, first Britain, and then the United States from the dawn of the space age. That involvement has been based on Australia’s key geography and strong alliance relationships. As Australia moves to the next phase of its space efforts, the focus is upon being proactive and shaping the new space efforts which have generated by Australia’s key allies. But by being deeply engaged, notably with the United States, Australia can shape its own capabilities with knowledge of how the United States is shaping its way ahead in space as well as providing interactive knowledge with the United States and Australia’s allies of the evolution of adversarial space efforts as well. In other words, a proactive Australian space effort is informed not only by leveraging new commercial opportunities generated by the new space enterprises globally, but by understanding of how the United States and Australia’s key allies are evolving their own military space efforts as well. It can be an informed innovative leveraging and insertion capability within the evolving space enterprises for the liberal democracies. And within such a context, Australia can expand its role going forward. In part, this opportunity is based on Australia’s geographical location vis a vis the core space competitors for the liberal democracies. The history of Pine Gap is a case in point. The noted Australian strategist, Paul Dibb, in his book Inside the Wilderness of Mirrors provided the most complete look to date on Pine Gap and its role in the Australian-U.S. working relationship with regard to space and intelligence. As Dibb noted about his first encounter with this site: “We are going to patch you through to listen to the Soviet Northern Fleet Commander in Severomorsk talking to Naval headquarters in Moscow’. It was 1974 and I had just been appointed Head of the National Assessment Staff and I was on my first visit to Pine Gap near Alice Springs. You can imagine how impressed I was to be on the receiving end of this intelligence from a Rhyolite satellite that was 35,000 km away from Earth and with an intercept antenna more than 20 metres in diameter. Later second-generation Orion satellites had an antenna exceeding 40 metres in diameter.”[1] Even though the numbers of Australians involved in Pine Gap has been clearly very limited, this type of engagement by Australia puts it at the head table of evolving U.S. capabilities and thinking, a key aspect for shaping any forward leaning proactive Australian space policy going forward. At the seminar, Amy Hestermann-Crane of the Williams Foundation and an analyst with the Royal Australian Air Force provided the historical overview.[2] She noted that the main thrust of Australian space policy has been regarding the military side and that was based on working with Britain and then with regard to the United States. Notably, Britain used Australian territory for its nascent ICBM program and then the Americans with regard to the use of Australian geography for space tracking and control. But over the past decade, there has been more Australian involvement in civil space, as realization of the role which such space plays in the national economy and society has grown. She noted: “Although Australia has been involved in various space endeavors since the 1940s, it cannot be said that we were a proactive participant. Just a short look at our space history shows that we were motivated in strengthening relationships with historic and emerging allies, as well as gaining access to potential national security benefits from developed project capabilities” Britain after World War II shaped the Woomera Research Establishment in 1946 to establish a highly classified location for the British ICMB and Rocket Development Project that lasted nearly three decades. She underscored that “the Establishment remained under the control of Defence through the Department of Supply and is now under RAAF control as the Woomera Range Complex” With the British essentially abandoning the Blue Streak program, the United States then became the key space partner for Australia. “In 1956, a request was made to the Australian government to assist in the tracking of U.S. rockets and satellite launches. This request stressed the scientific benefits of the partnership, yet with Woomera being suggested as the first location for a facility, it was the Defense Committee which was asked for comment. “The Committee recommended approving the ground tracking station due primarily to the military significance if the United States managed to find success in their satellite program. And by 1957, the station was operational and supported the launch of the first U.S. satellite, Explorer 1, in 1958. A second facility was built in nearby Woomera in 1969 and continued to support the U.S. Defense Surveillance Program until its closure in 1999.” The NASA Deep Space Communication Centre in Tidbinbilla gained fame by supporting the Apollo landing in 1969 just a few years after its establishment. And “the United States also supported the development and assembly of Australia’s first satellite alongside British and Australian organizations, and WRESAT was launched in 1967. It was designed to increase the understanding of upper atmosphere effects on the weather and the climate, as well as gaining physical data for U.S. research programs.” “Australia further signed an agreement in 1966 to establish the joint defense space research facility known as the Joint Defense Facility of Pine Gap. And at the time, the Australian government promoted the military and scientific benefits that this facility would bring but failed to reveal the project’s support for United States intelligence collection.” The next major development for Australian space was involvement with the British when the moved on from Blue Streak to a program to develop civilian launchers. “Britain went to Commonwealth and European nations with a proposal for a civilian launch program. Australia was the only Commonwealth nation to join this program, and it was under the condition that Australia only provide facility support. Australia wasn’t excited by the civilian research prospect, but instead was motivated to recuperate financial investments in Woomera and the Blue Streak program. “Several nations did, however, answer Britain’s call and formed the European Launch Development Organization, otherwise known as ELDO. It was formed with Britain, Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, and the Netherlands, all of whom were responsible for various rocket segment development. Australia as a full partner only provided access to Woomera, and thus the Blue Streak Project founded the Europa 1 launch vehicle. “From 1964 to 1970, the project culminated in a total of 10 launches for Europa 1. However, there were five launch failures. However, by 1970, ELDO members no longer wanted to continue using Woomera as its launch facility and Australia provided Darwin as a secondary launch facility. However, this was also rejected by the organization. “As such, ELDO moved to French Guiana, offering Australia the possibility of remaining as a full organization partner despite no financial contribution. However, the Australian government saw little value in this civilian research program, especially once it moved offshore, and it declined to remain part of the ELDO organization.” “Australia’s quiet space years can be considered from the late 1970s all the way through to the 1990s. The use of foreign satellite capability for military use was still beneficial for our needs and it didn’t place any undue financial burden on the government. Australia was still motivated by national security and had not yet realized the commercial benefits that space offered. There were several attempts at establishing a commercial launch facility. However, none succeeded.” in this period,. the Space Activities Act of 1998 was written and promulgate. “This legislation, which has undergone several amendments in recent years, still forms the basis for Australian and international organizations to obtain various licenses for space-based objects, launch activities, and reentries.” She concluded that Australia is now shifting to a more proactive space effort, and one which highlights both commercial and military space. This period can be dated from 2018 with the establishment of the Australian Space Agency which is tasked with growing Australian space industry. “We have relied on foreign satellite capabilities because it was cheaper for our government to do so. We were able to progress forward as a military in that manner. And it’s only been in the last few years that we’ve understood that the space industry and civilian research is fundamental and integral to Australian life. “The militarization of space has allowed space to be cheaper. We are experiencing a booming startup industry with universities and industry and military, all being able to get involved in different space capabilities and creating greater possibilities for a sovereign capability. “And such capability is critical so that if something goes wrong in the future or our alliances change, we’re going to be able to still rely on our own capabilities that are integral to every facet of Australian life. This ranges from education to water control and in the bushfires that happened last year earth observation satellites were an important part of the effort to deal with brushfires, and obviously the military and its ability to used space for communication, for guided kinetic systems and for intelligence and national security.” [1] Paul Dibb, Inside the Wilderness of Mirrors (MUP Academic, 2018). [2] https://www.linkedin.com/in/amy-hestermann-crane-1403b81b5/?originalSubdomain=au Link to article: A Look Back at the Australian Space Effort (Defense.info)

As 2021 draws to a close, it seems a perfect time for TCB editors to reflect upon another big year. This year's focus on autonomous systems,space capabilities and future-force insights offered the perfect opportunity to encourage submissions which explored, questioned, and challenged the future of these capabilities. #Airforce2121 It perhaps goes without saying that a highlight of the year was the Air Force 2121 series which resulted in the award of the 2021 Dr Alan Stephens Air Power Literary Prize. The #AirForce2121 series challenged writers to question what #AirForce2121 looks like for which we received several high caliber entries. The prize was awarded to a brilliant science fiction piece by Wing Commander (WGCDR) Travis Hallen and his daughter. Hallen’s submission, Losing Jefferson, used science fiction to explore the future of autonomous drones while challenging humans ability to trust and connect with machines. Honourable mentions were given to Squadron Leader (SQNLDR) Brendon Bishop and his Case for a Universal Multi-Domain Shipping Contain and to Ben Luther’s Assuring 2121 which challenged Test and Evaluation thinking. Events Another highlight for The Sir Richard Williams Foundation was the ability to hold in-person seminar events . The Next Generation Autonomous Systems Seminar in April saw TCB editor Group Captain Jo Brick present an overview of automation and warfare, while the December seminar Requirements of a Sovereign Defence Space Capability had TCB editor Sergeant Amy Hestermann-Crane present the historic perspective on Australian space capability. These seminars always offer TCB an opportunity to encourage online debate WGCDR Keirin Joyce summarised the first seminar succinctly, while also questioning the advantage of autonomy and if the ADF is missing an opportunity. Offering a unique personal experience, Warrant Officer (WOFF) Samuel Carson provided his insight into the MQ-9 Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems Sensor Operator advantages and potential risks. WOFF Xavier Sherriff also used his experience to warn of the risks associated with Automation Blind Reliance in the coming years . Meanwhile,the Loyal Wingman’s first successful test flight spurred SQNLDR Michael Spencer to discuss disruptive designs for aircraft with autonomy and artificial intelligence(AI). Key author themes Space also featured heavily in 2021. While the topic generally elicits visions of futuristic environments, Dr Dale Stephens and our own TCB editor SQNLDR Jenna Higgins discussed how space is applicable right now in their introductory post Space law and military operations 101, offering a basic foundational knowledge. The successful NASA landing of the Remote Piloted Aircraft Ingenuity on Mars, gave SQNLDR Michael Spencer an opportunity to explore this helicopter in a two-part series. Looking to the future, Dr Graham Wild explored the Need for an Australian Space Force in the years to come. But it wasn’t all AI and space – TCB also recognises the critical importance of the people who drive capability, maintain systems, and innovate solutions. Flight Lieutenant (FLTLT) Samantha Hewitt kicked us off by delving into the critical requirement of developing, retaining and re-investing talent in the ADF. The need for the right people in the right place and time was explored by Corporal Dylan Williamson through the lens of motivation. Other notable people centric pieces were offered by SQNLDR Kate Yaxley, Flying Officer Patrick Helsing, and Luke Webb. Central Blue developments Speaking of people, TCB team was fortunate to take on an additional three talented individuals. Leading Aircraftwoman Rebecca Durbin will join TCB Editorial team to increase our capability for offering quality content, while FLTLT Ross Tindale and FLTLT Grace Scholl will head the new TCB Special Projects team, enabling TCB to bring exciting new virtual and in-person events next year. The Central Blue would like to thank all of its contributing authors for their insight and dedication to continuing the air and space power debate. There were too many amazing submissions to adequately cover in a wrap up, but they are all available at TCB website. Thank you to our committed readers, for we would not be here without your continuing support. It's been yet another extraordinary year, and from the entire TCB Team, we wish you and your families a very happy holiday period. The team is taking some precious time to rest and recharge over this time and are looking forward to joining you in the New Year. The team has some major plans for 2022, so stay tuned for announcements on social media - and, be sure to check out our most recent call for submissions on #FutureChiefs! Until then, take care! - TCB Editorial Team

Since WW2, effective airpower integration into land forces has been a recurring theme. But as Western air superiority faces a new era of contestability, the lessons of the last 20 years need to be reexamined in the light of new threats, new technologies, and new ideas. Responding to this gambit, Steve Burr, Mark Cowin, Richard Kohn and Cole Freeman present a vision of future all-domain control teams, exploring how it can bring a scalable solution to future force integration challenges. ‘If you knit up the power of the army on the land and the power of the air in the sky, then nothing will stand against you and you will never lose a battle.’ - General Sir Bernard Montgomery From El Alamein to Afghanistan, the importance of effective air power integration into land forces is extensively documented. Ever since General Montgomery and Air Marshal Coningham set up their headquarters side by side and defeated Rommel’s Afrika Corps, western doctrine has underlined the importance of air-land integration at the tactical level. Indeed, since that point, lessons from conflict have underlined failings caused by lack of joint command and control and failure to integrate effects. Throughout the Global War on Terror, the pinnacle of tactical air-land integration has been the preserve of the Joint Terminal Attack Controller (JTAC). One of the great successes of the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan was the scale in which airpower contributions including strike, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance and mobility were integrated by these trained service personnel. This tactical level support was then reinforced by air command and control structures emplaced throughout the chain of command to enable wider theatre co-ordination. Air-land integration lessons learned over the last 20 years of conflict, while meaningful, are marred by the air superiority enjoyed by the coalition and the relative plethora of air assets available for tasks. The challenge for future conflict will be to adapt the structures that have enabled effective air-land integration into methods which acknowledge novel and heightened threats in Australia’s near region. Such methods must be able to integrate capabilities across electronic, space and cyber domains to achieve advantage against the enemy. This challenge is compounded due to the limited resource base for tactical air command and control in Australia. It is acknowledged across the coalition that future conflicts will require personnel to demonstrate increased flexibility in their application of force and an ability to adapt operating capability seamlessly across the spectrum of warfare.[1][2] The US Army describes the operating environment as one that is trending toward ‘a multi-polar international system with a wicked mixture of state-sponsored proxy, non–state actor (NSA) fomented, and cyber oriented low-level conflicts’ and ‘competitive interactions . . . that fall between traditional war and peace.’[3] Modern revision of Charles Krulak’s ‘Three Block War’ indicates that commanders at the lowest level will not only have to work in the spectrum between peace support and general war; but will also be required to operate within the electromagnetic and information environments to achieve tactical and strategic effect. Increasingly, personnel will be required to specialise across multiple fields and be proficient in a wide range of areas to achieve the desired effects. For command and control agencies, the free passage of information enjoyed over the last 20 years has long disappeared. Effectively functioning in a congested, contested and competitive environment will require greater ingenuity and flexibility. Coalition partners are already embarking on new and novel ways to support future integration. Dewees et al. in the article To Build Joint Command and Control, First Break Command and Control outline that ‘In our professional community we have built an example of what these future command and control nodes can look like. Called “all-domain control teams,” we have brought together small groups of people — fewer than 10 — from multiple backgrounds, and given them equipment that can communicate with the most commonly used assets in the military. Our teams have experts in air, ground, cyber, space operations and integration.’ The proposition of “all-domain control teams” presents a significant opportunity for the ADF. Small teams that are capable of creating asymmetry across the battlespace, must be linked into integrated networks. These teams need to be strategically placed to integrate effects across multiple domains such as in standoff attack, electronic warfare, merged surveillance and reconnaissance, data-driven targeting and digital long-range fires. At the tactical level, these teams can operate to support multiple ground commanders simultaneously, and extend the arm of the Joint Task Force multi-domain effects capability into the tactical battlespace. Flexibility and the ability to achieve effective integration will be paramount. Effective capability requires permanent and integrated structures that allow for multi-disciplined training and personnel drawn from a range of specialisations. To deliver these effects, bespoke small teams designed to balance agility and expertise can deploy via air, protective mobility, on foot, by boat or in civilian vehicles, depending on the task. Communications can be established through a variety of waveforms and hidden through the use of civilian internet and telecommunications or hardened through frequency variation and waveform management. Once established, teams would provide a conduit for mission data, connecting targeteers with effectors, updating and relaying command and control information, providing enhanced threat cueing for air defence and decentralised control for air packages. Teams will be able to draw data from ground electronic warfare detachments and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets to enhance threat awareness across the battlespace. In achieving these effects, the team extends the reach of the Joint Force Commander – executing and integrating their intent in the constantly changing brigade and divisional battlespace. The expertise to achieve this capability is already available and established within the current Air Force tactical air command and control capability. A combination of air support controllers, JTACs, force protection specialists and combat communicators make up a cadre staff in the Tactical Air Control Party capability. These personnel are already experienced in the integration of effects, and offer an ideal launch pad for developing an all-domain control capability. Additionally, inclusion of subject matter experts in datalinks, cyber and space effects offers increased potency of the team and may be tailored to suit mission objectives. Developing this capability alongside coalition partners, namely in the AUKUS coalition would serve to further embed interoperable command and control concepts that our commanders will increasingly rely upon in the future. What about the cost? To develop and trial this capability will require a control team of 4-8 personnel and will largely use in-service equipment. Once validated, these teams offer a scalable solution dependent on the complexity of the mission set and desired mission outcomes. The greatest risk presents through the challenge of the status quo. The future orientated solution challenges established processes and necessitates experimentation of flexible command and control arrangements and operating models. Senior commanders can empower these decentralised control teams through delegation of authorities and promotion of a mission command philosophy. They must foster the development of modernised, relevant tactics and techniques, and enable liaison across services and nations. They will be required to challenge our personnel to solve our emerging command and control problems as they appear, with safe and operationally effective solutions. The development of a ground-up, innovative command and control capability that binds together joint and coalition tactical effect is an overdue and critical requirement for operational success. Our force must realise a distributed low-cost high-value command and control capability that gets to the heart of the Air Force’s Jericho Disruptive Innovation program and enables the next generation of Montgomery and Coningham’s great realisation for the modern battlespace. Steve Burr is a ground defence officer in the Royal Australian Air Force and previously in the Royal Air Force. He has operational experience as a JTAC, tactical air control party (TACP) commander, air liaison officer and as a force protection specialist. Mark Cowin is an air traffic control officer who has specialised in aviation command and control. He has operational experience in TACP, expeditionary ATC deployments, and has instructed JTACs for the RAF, USMC, and US Army. He has completed postgraduate study in management and is currently completing additional postgraduate study in space operations. Richard Kohn is an air traffic control officer in the Royal Australian Air Force. During his time in Air Force he has gained experience in various air liaison functions, including air traffic control, mobile air operations teams, TACP, and as a JTAC. Cole Freeman is a United States Marine Corps Officer currently on exchange with the Royal Australian Air Force. As a weapons and tactics instructor, he has operational experience in air power integration across the multinational environment. The views expressed are that of the authors and do not reflect the opinion of the Royal Australian Air Force, United States Marine Corps, the Department of Defence, or the Australian Government. [1] ADF Concept for Command and Control of the Future Force, page 9 (para 5) [2] Joint All-Domain Command and Control for Modern Warfare, Lingel (et al.) 2020, RAND Corporation [URL] [3] David Ellis, Charles Black, and Mary Ann Nobles, “Thinking Dangerously: Imagining US SOCCOM in the Post-CT World,” PRISM 6, no. 3 (2016): 115

The Central Blue recently sought expressions of interest from passionate and dedicated Junior Officers, Enlisted and Australian Public Service (APS) to join The Central Blue Team. TCB Editorial Team were so impressed by the number and caliber of candidates, we decided to select three! First-up; meet Ross Tindale! FLTLT Ross Tindale joined the RAAF in 2009, graduating as an Airborne Electronics Analyst on the AP-3C Orion aircraft. Since then, Ross has commissioned, initially as a Sensor Employment Manager (ACO) on the Orion, and then training as a Co-Tactical Coordinator (COTAC) on the P-8A Poseidon aircraft. Currently Ross is the SO3 PLANS at 92WG, a leadership and coaching facilitator, and is also a sessional lecturer at the University of South Australia in the aviation program. Ross will bring planning and coordination experience to the Central Blue role, as well as another perspective on the RAAF and wider defence communities." Ross will lead the new TCB Special Projects team. Keep an eye out in the new year for exciting new in-person and virtual events! Assisting Ross in this new team is Grace Scholl. FLTLT Grace is an Air Combat Officer in the Royal Australian Air Force who specialises in Air Battle Management. In 2019 she was patched as an Air Warfare Instructor, and is highly skilled at execution and integration at both a tactical and strategic level. She has been awarded a Bachelor of Arts and Master of Strategy and Security from UNSW@ADFA. Her interests include airpower, the civil-military relationship and national security. Grace hopes to bring some unique experiences to The Central Blue team and represent the junior voices of the ADF. Last, but by no means least, we introduce Rebecca Durbin as the new Editorial Intern. Leading Aircraftwoman Rebecca Durbin is an Air Intelligence Analyst in the Royal Australian Air Force. She holds a Bachelor of Laws and a Bachelor of Arts from Griffith University and is currently completing a Graduate Certificate in Cyber Security and Networking. Her interests are in international relations, tactical military technology, and Australian military history. Rebecca expects to use her previous experience to assist The Central Blue in facilitating air power-focused discussion Welcome to the team Ross, Grace and Rebecca!

Air power discourse is The Central Blue’s core focus. In this two-part series, Gary Waters provides an in depth commentary on likely increases to the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter engine costs. This discussion continues the conversation of a recent Breaking Defense article, providing an Australian perspective around important air domain elements of sustainment. In Part 1, Waters takes us through the Breaking Defense article and highlights some of the challenges the F-35 faces. Here in Part 2, he explores what can be done and how sustainment efforts for the aircraft and its engine are likely to play out. Broad Observations from the Breaking Defence Article With that discussion as background, a number of ex-RAAF aerospace engineers came together online to consider these engine affordability challenges and made several relevant observations. First, there are several pertinent points that are evident in this F135 cost increase, which should be noted: This engine is an outgrowth of the F119 engine fitted to the F-22. The F135 is a 40000 lb thrust engine, whereas the F119 is a 30000 lb thrust engine. Given the size of the F135 is almost the same as the F119, the engine has to work harder to produce the thrust. Working harder means higher temperatures, pressure and vibrations throughout the engine, increasing wear and tear, and the chances of parts failing earlier than predicted (e.g., the turbine blade coatings not surviving as long as expected in dry and dusty environments). Additionally, this engine produces potentially damaging low frequency vibrations when in afterburner that have yet to be dealt with. Second, RAAF engineers experienced similar engine reliability issues in the mid-1980s, with the TF30 engine in the F111s. In Australia, engine failures required the removal of the engine around every 500+ hours, which caused significant disruption to operational availability, and overwhelmed the RAAF engine repair / overhaul facility at Number 3 Aircraft Depot. Comparably, in the United States, the USAF F111 units reported engine failures that required their return to Tinker at a significantly higher rate. This difference was quite marked, and was due to cost pressure on the US repair / overhaul facility that meant engines were repaired and tested to ensure they met only the minimum acceptable performance level on release to the unit. Engines that failed this test were further ‘tweaked’ to meet the target. The RAAF approach was to repair and test to ensure the engine met as close to the maximum level of performance as possible, thereby providing the potential to be installed for longer periods with normal ‘wear and tear’. The different approaches were driven by the budget that the USAF operational unit allocated to engine repair / overhauls (each unit was allocated a flying hour rate, an operational readiness target, and a budget to achieve it – breaching any of these had serious consequences), whereas RAAF Squadrons simply requested an engine repair / overhaul and did not need to concern themselves with the cost. As a general comment, this highlights an underlying problem with any budgeting system that allocates an arbitrary budget – making it almost impossible for an operational unit to prepare for high-end operations. Certainly, there is no way any commercial organisation can address such a self-imposed constraint, especially as they address their own challenges of performance and cost optimisation. Third, with these F135 challenges in mind, and noting that the F-35 will need an improved engine (more power and cooling) to support upcoming Block 4 enhancements to make the F-35 more lethal, a significant increase in engine capability at a more affordable price is very enticing. Thus, it will be interesting to see if the JSF Program Office re-introduces competition, noting that the Pentagon stopped funding General Electric’s F136 engine in 2011. Competition would also likely see re-energised efforts at reducing engine maintenance costs. General Electric Aviation would offer its XA100 adaptive-cycle engine, which the company is developing as part of the US Air Force’s Adaptive Engine Transition Program (AETP). There are two prototypes under test so far. General Electric anticipates that the XA100 will increase the F-35’s range by 30 percent, increase thrust by 10 to 20 percent and improve fuel burn by 25 percent when compared to current engine performance. In addition, its thermal management capability would be doubled due to the third stream of air flowing through the XA100, which acts as a heatsink for electronics, avionics and mission systems. That would give the F-35 the cooling it needs to accommodate the upgrades planned as part of Block 4, with margin for additional advances. However, the XA100 — like other adaptive engines — is still moving through development and won’t be ready until 2027 at best. Pratt & Whitney also has an adaptive engine in the works (the XA101), which it is developing as part of the AETP effort. It is important to point out that a new engine would require considerable Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E) before acceptance. Additionally, a new engine would potentially require structural modifications to accommodate it, as well as mission system software changes to accommodate change in fuel flow management, and weight and balance issues. A 2027 date would seem optimistic. Pratt & Whitney is also proposing an upgraded version of the F135 that would provide an increase in thrust and power management, offering a more economical improvement plan for the F-35’s engine. This most expansive suite of upgrades would increase the F135’s range and thrust by as much as 10 percent, while doubling the engine’s thermal management capability. An upgraded version of the F135 would mean that a new engine does not come into the mix, with its attendant costs, nor is there a mixed fleet of adaptive engines and F135s. The performance improvements of these various options are discussed in Valerie Insinna, ‘F-35 Engine Rivals Prepare for Another Clash’, Breaking Defense, 15 October 2021. As a point of clarification, engines built for fighters prioritise thrust, whereas commercial airlines prioritise fuel efficiency. Adaptive engines can shift between the two modes — allowing a fighter to use less fuel as it cruises and hence improving its range, but also affording it the thrust it needs during combat. Fourth, and related to the OT&E comment above, it appears that industry is expected to take all the risk on Test Equipment and stand-up costs for deeper level maintenance of the components of the aircraft, noting that the RAAF bought all the test equipment for the F/A-18s and other aircraft and supplied it as GFE (Government Furnished Equipment) to the commercial providers. The RAAF was the contracting party in these cases, whereas with the F-35, the US Joint Program Office is the contracting party. On the current trajectory, it is difficult to see much of the component work being done in Australia. Fifth, while sustainment issues always arise as new aircraft are operated, and effects flow through from limited-rate production contracts, the slow-rate production of spare parts, a slow-rate production for depot stand-up, and demanding customers, the US government and the F-35 partners did sign up to the memorandum of agreement. With no other viable contender, there was always going to be a challenge if a large company like Pratt & Whitney did not take a calculated risk to initiate long-term contracts with its suppliers and also invest in early set up of depots. Finally, engines may not be the only area that will be of concern for the F-35. Most of the costs will be in the software and the reprogramming laboratories for the mission data files, so it will be important to optimise these costs. Sustainment cost increases might also arise with the stealth performance. Notwithstanding design efforts to ‘bake in’ stealth coatings to composite parts, like any aircraft system, the F-35 is subject to wear and tear associated with environmental and operational issues. There will be ongoing costs associated with monitoring, measuring and conducting repairs, as well as improving the F35’s stealth capability. Conclusion While this Commentary has focussed on JSF engine affordability, it has also pointed out that the challenge of cost optimisation extends beyond engines. Challenges around F-35 sustainment will increase as the aircraft accumulates mission hours, and it is incumbent on the RAAF to prepare for this, to ensure that this jewel in the crown of Australia’s defence capability (the JSF), remains just that. Gary Waters spent 33 years in the RAAF, resigning as an air commodore and joining the Australian Public Service at the Senior Executive level. After four years in the public service, Gary became head of strategy for the Australian arm of a global defence company, retiring seven years later. He now consults on a part-time basis. He has a PhD in political science and international relations and has written extensively on defence, air power and cyber issues.

Air power discourse is The Central Blue’s core focus. In this two-part series, Gary Waters provides an in depth commentary on likely increases to the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter engine costs. This discussion continues the conversation of a recent Breaking Defense article, providing an Australian perspective around important air domain elements of sustainment. In Part 1, Waters takes us through the Breaking Defense article and highlights some of the challenges the F-35 faces. Introduction This Commentary below refers to likely cost increases in the Joint Strike Fighter engine. A recent article in Breaking Defense noted that scheduled maintenance for the F-35's engine in the mid-2020s will drive up the price of engine sustainment, just as the Pentagon expects cost reduction goals to be achieved. While the Breaking Defence article describes the challenges around engine cost containment, and offers a number of observations, the experience of a number of ex-RAAF engineers is worth noting. This Commentary below, therefore, outlines the key observations from the Breaking Defence article before discussing the key messages that provide insights into broader maintenance approaches and other options that could lead to improved engine performance and affordability. The Breaking Defence Article The Breaking Defence article indicated that the first F135 engines used by the F-35 will reach 2,000 hours and will be sent to the depot for a scheduled overhaul in the mid-2020s. While Pratt & Whitney, the engine manufacturer, is taking steps to minimise the cost of that maintenance work as much as possible, it’s unavoidable that engine sustainment costs will increase during the mid-2020s, according to the engine manufacturer. This will make it more difficult for the F-35 program to meet a long-time goal: reducing the cost per flight hour to $25,000 by 2025. This difficulty should not be surprising; after all, sustainment is the largest portion of the life-cycle cost of platforms, and scheduled maintenance is the largest portion of sustainment cost. Pratt & Whitney has been at pains to point out that there are several factors at play here that are not the company’s fault: unexpected wear and tear due to operational usage; inconsistent funding of spare parts; repeated delays in standing up maintenance depots; and the normal churn of engine overhauls, which typically ebb and flow as engines meet usage milestones. The Pentagon noted in early 2021 that the F-35 was facing an engine shortage, which resulted in arguments to open a competition for more advanced engines to replace the F135. However, the engine shortage issues are multifaceted and not easily resolved. As the Breaking Defense article indicates, the F135 Heavy Maintenance Centre at Tinker Air Force Base, Okla., has not been able to repair power modules as quickly as projected, creating a backlog of work. Furthermore, some aircraft that frequently operated in hot, sandy environments were grounded after the coating on engine rotor blades cracked and degraded. While Pratt & Whitney developed a new coating that has now been incorporated on about 25 percent of the F-35 fleet, it could take until 2030 for all fielded F-35s to be retrofitted. In July, reports from the Joint Program Office indicated that 41 F-35As flown by the US Air Force were grounded and awaiting engine repairs, with an additional five other F-35s also inoperable due to engine-related problems. Fast forward to October, and we see little improvement, with reports indicating that there were 42 F-35As grounded due to propulsion issues. Notwithstanding these affordability challenges, Pratt & Whitney is meeting program requirements in terms of the number of F-35s grounded for engine issues. The current contract obliges Pratt & Whitney to ensure that no more than 10% of F-35s are grounded due to engine issues, with 6% being the objective number. Historically, only 4% of the fleet has been typically non-mission capable because of engine problems. With about 9% of F-35s currently grounded due to engines, Pratt & Whitney is still technically within the levels of its agreement with the Pentagon. Increased funding to expedite work at the F135 depot at Tinker, standing up additional maintenance hubs elsewhere, buying additional engines, and changing the F135 sustainment architecture, will take time to flow through to reduce the current backlog in engine maintenance and availability. Pratt & Whitney has indicated that the depot network is about five years behind, largely because funds were diverted earlier in the program to meet other needs. In other words, sustainment did not receive the budget required in a timely manner. There are some signs of improvement at the Tinker depot, which only produced 14 power modules last year, but is on track to exceed its target of 40 modules in 2021. Furthermore, while it took more than 200 days on average to repair a power module in 2020, that has been reduced to 120 days, and this will remain the goal for the future. However, the pressure on the depot will be even higher once engines begin coming in for scheduled overhauls in 2023. The biggest drivers of cost during maintenance events are parts and materials, so Pratt & Whitney’s focus has been on conducting engineering work and developing repairs that enable maintainers to replace fewer parts during overhauls. Another long-term effort is making continual improvements to parts and managing the fleet so that engines can be installed for longer periods of time without having to be sent to the depot for scheduled or unscheduled repair work. However, even if the company finds ways to reduce maintenance expenses, Pratt & Whitney anticipates added costs in the mid-2020s. Join us for Part 2 and Water’s insights into maintenance and alternative options for improved engine performance and affordability. Gary Waters spent 33 years in the RAAF, resigning as an air commodore and joining the Australian Public Service at the Senior Executive level. After four years in the public service, Gary became head of strategy for the Australian arm of a global defence company, retiring seven years later. He now consults on a part-time basis. He has a PhD in political science and international relations and has written extensively on defence, air power and cyber issues.

With senior leadership movements on the horizon within Air Force, we’re turning our attention to thinking about the role of its primary leader. In particular, we’re asking the question: What should #FutureChiefs of Air Force look like, and why? We’re opening up the scope of response to this topic fairly wide: what do you think will be required of future Chiefs of Air Force? We welcome perspectives from the future role of CAF, to what educational backgrounds, personal experiences and leadership characteristics a future CAF will need, to conversation on the future structure of CAF’s office. And of course, we invite your thoughts on the notion that ‘the Chief of Air Force does not need to be a pilot’! We are not looking for long, essay-style submissions but rather shorter, pithy responses - no longer than 350 words. Contributions will be accepted until mid-February with submissions published in early 2022.