Dr Robbin Laird Rethinking Strategy: Warning Time, Events and Crisis Management Defense Info, 7 June 2021 Paul Dibb, the well-known Australian strategist, has recently published a piece with his co-author on warning time. The focus of his report was on how to defend Australia in an environment with reduced warning time. Although obviously about Australia, the discussion in the report raises a broader set of questions of how to know when an event can set in motion a chain of events which provide a direct threat to a liberal democratic nation and the challenge of responding effectively. It also raises the question of shaping capabilities which can be inserted into a crisis early enough to provide confidence in an ability to have effective escalation management tools available as well. Put another way, the focus of Dibb’s report is upon ways for Australia to enhance the government’s and public’s ability to better understand the events which affect them from the standpoint of providing warning time to deal with those events to prepare for and manage crises. To further discuss his thinking about warning time and crisis management, I followed up with an interview with him. A key example of the interpretation of events and the warning time challenge is the current posture of China towards Australia. It is important to understand what China can and cannot do from a standpoint of pressuring Australia, including the question of the use of military force in terms of what Paul Bracken has labelled exemplary attacks. It is widely understood, that both China and Russia have expanded their ability to operate in the so called gray zone and to conduct hybrid war. But what Is not recognized by using these terms, is that these are attacks to achieve a desired effect in terms of escalation management. According to Bracken : A particular area of focus should be exemplary attacks. “Examples include select attack of U.S. ships, Chinese or Russian bases, and command and control. “These are above crisis management as it is usually conceived in the West. “But they are well below total war. Each side had better think through the dynamics of scenarios in this space. “Deep strike for exemplary attacks, precise targeting, option packages for limited war, and command and control in a degraded environment need to be thought through beforehand. “The Russians have done this, with their escalate to deescalate strategy.” Bracken argued for moving beyond binary thinking, namely, peace or war, and focusing on the use of exemplary attacks to achieve desired political effects or escalation dominance. Dibb and I discussed a particularly noteworthy development in the current Chinese ramp up of pressure on Australia, namely, directly threatening the use of force against Australia. This is how Dibb put it: “The Chinese have been clearly communicating for some time that it is now time to teach Australia a lesson. “They used similar language against Vietnam in 1979 prior to their invasion. “And there are many ways they could generate force to pressure Australia, without directly striking the country, such as take us on in our 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone, threatening our offshore energy platforms. And by so doing put the challenge directly to Australia.” In the long term, the Australian government is committed to building long range strike, and has committed to spending serious money in this area. But that is in the mid-term, what does Australia do now? Dibb underscored that he thought Canberra should have a sense of urgency about being in such a situation and that this was part of the larger argument he is making about warning time and preparing options to have escalation control. It is clearly important not to overstate Chinese military or diplomatic capabilities, for that only distorts the ability to shape effective policy responses. But it is clear that simply coming up with terms like the gray zone grossly distorts the broader challenge, identified by Bracken which are the impact of exemplary attacks on crisis management and deterrence. It is clear that Dibb’s focus on shaping effective means to manage time in a crisis is convergent with Bracken’s thinking as well. For the warning time report, see the following: Warning Time, Events and Crisis Management | Defense.info For my article which highlights the warning time report, see the following: Warning Time, Events and Crisis Management - Second Line of Defense (sldinfo.com)

Dr Robbin Laird, Next Generation Autonomous Systems: A Williams Foundation Special Report, 9 June 2021 In this report, the key themes and presentations at the April 8, 2021, Williams Foundation seminar on Next Generation Autonomous Systems are highlighted. A number of interviews with participants are included as well as insights from earlier interviews from pre-COVID visits to Australia. In addition, selected articles are included in an appendix which address the question of shaping a way ahead with regard to manned-unmanned teaming and the coming of autonomous systems. The original seminar was scheduled for March 2020 but was postponed due to COVID-19. Download the report here From the author On April 8, 2021, the Williams Foundation held a seminar originally scheduled for last March. It was postponed as the COVID-19 pandemic took hold. As Air Marshal (Retired) Geoff Brown, Chairman of the Williams Foundation put it in his prologue to the conference: “Since 2013 the Sir Richard Williams Foundation conferences have focused on building an integrated fifth generation force. Recent conferences have evolved from the acquisition of new platforms to the process of shaping and better understanding the environment in which that integrated force will prepare and operate. Highlighted have been the challenges of making the strategic shift from counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan to higher tempo and higher intensity Joint operations involving peer competitors. “Within this context, the 2021 conferences further develop the ideas associated with an increasingly sophisticated approach to Joint warfighting and power projection as we face increasing pressure to maintain influence and a capability edge in the region. The Williams Foundation will continue to look at the evolution of the Australian Defence Force from the perspective of the sovereign lens and setting the conditions for future success. “This conference will explore the force multiplying capability and increasingly complex requirements associated with unmanned systems. From its origins at the platform level, the opportunities and potential of increased autonomy across the enterprise are now expected to fundamentally transform Joint and Coalition operations. Defence industry can and will play a major part in the transformation with opportunities extending beyond platforms to the payloads and enabling systems which underpin the necessary risk management and assurance frameworks demanded by Defence. The importance of industry is reflected in the design of the conference program and the speakers identified.” The introduction to the program highlighted the focus of the seminar as follows: “The concept of the Unmanned Air System (UAS), or Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV), is nothing new nor is their use in missions which traditionally challenge human performance, fragility, and endurance. Ongoing operational experience confirms unmanned systems on their own are not the panacea and trusted autonomy in manned and unmanned teaming arrangements in each environmental domain is emerging as a key operational requirement. “The narrative has progressed the argument for greater numbers of unmanned systems in a far more mature and balanced way than hitherto. The manned-unmanned narrative is now sensibly shifting towards ‘and’, rather than ‘or’. Manned and unmanned teaming leverages the strengths and mitigates the weakness of each platform and concentrates the mind on the important operational aspects, such as imaginative new roles, and the challenges of integration to generate the desired overwhelming firepower. “This capability will require a complex web of advanced data links and communication systems to make it operate as a combat system. Designing and building the ‘kill web’ so that it can enable the delivery of manned-unmanned firepower across domains will be a huge challenge not least due to the laws of physics. However, the ability to train, test, evaluate and validate tactics and procedures will add a whole new level of complexity to generate the ‘trusted autonomy’ required for warfighting. “The aim of the April 2021 conference is to promote discussion about the future implications of autonomous systems. It will investigate potential roles for autonomous systems set within the context of each environmental domain, providing Service Chiefs with an opportunity to present their personal perspective on the effect it will have on their Service. “The conference will also explore the operational aspects of autonomous systems, including command and control and the legal and social implications that affect their employment. And finally the conference will examine the current research agenda and allow industry an opportunity to provide their perspective on recent developments in unmanned air, land, surface and sub-surface combatants.” The final report is being issued today (June 9, 2021) after there was a chance to review the materials presented, including videos, briefing slides and presentation documents. In addition, a number of interviews with presenters were conducted as well to shape the narrative to pull together the various presentation strands. The ADF is already undergoing a transition to shaping a distributed integrated force. Next Generation Autonomous Systems can provide a further set of capabilities for a more effective, dense, survivable and capable ADF as it builds out for operations in the Indo-Pacific region and enhances its defense of the Australian continent. https://sldinfo.com/2021/06/next-generation-autonomous-systems-a-williams-foundation-special-report/ The e-book version can be found here: https://defense.info/williams-foundation/2021/06/next-generation-autonomous-systems-report-on-the-williams-foundation-seminar-april-8-2021/

Dr Robbin Laird, Defence Industry and Working with Defence in Shaping a Way Ahead for Autonomous Systems, 8 June 2021 Link to the article Defence Industry and Working with Defence in Shaping a Way Ahead for Autonomous Systems - Second Line of Defense (sldinfo.com) The development and incorporation of autonomous systems into the Australian fifth-generation force requires a close working relationship between defense industry and the Department of Defence and the services. But also requires meeting the challenge already seen with regard to the introduction of software upgradeable systems such as F-35, P-8 and Triton. That challenge is for the warfighters to be able to drive advantages through rapid code rewrites and being able to develop and generate with the autonomous systems advances, disposable systems as well. This was well put in the discussion with Jason Scholz. As Scholz put it in our interview, with the Centre’s focus on the “smart, the small and the many”, compared with traditional “complex, large and few” manned systems, code rewriting can be much faster. It is also the case that digital engineering and digital twins is changing how all platforms are designed and supported. But in the case of next generation autonomous systems, the entire life cycle of these “smart, small and many” systems is very different. “They will be attritable; there will be no need to develop and maintain 30 years of systems engineering documentation – some of these might be used only once or a few times before disposal. When you need to adapt to the threat, digital engineering supports fast redesign and T&E in the virtual, and to add a new capability you just download it as software.” Scholz says. At the seminar, there were presentations by six industrial partners. Boeing Australia focused on the development of the Loyal Wingman. With the space which Australia has along with the technical capabilities in the country, Australia is in a good position to be a leader in autonomous systems. According to Andrew Glynn, Boeing Australia, the Airpower Teaming System, which has been established to develop loyal wingman is an important approach to shaping a way ahead. He noted that “the loyal wingman program is an experimentation program with RAAF to provide insights in the use for this type of capability.” Clearly, from Boeing’s perspective, the standup of the program in Australia is not simply about meeting the ADF needs, but provides a launch pad for broader global development. Glynn underscored that the teaming approach is designed to develop capabilities which can work with existing fleets. “Once ATS is operational, it will assist the RAAF to protect and project force by addressing quantity at the right quality.” He noted that the program went from concept to first flight in under three years and that was enabled by the fact that the platform is built on a completely digital foundation. A second presentation was given by Dr. John Best of Thales, Australia. In his presentation, he focused on the opportunity to build or enhance sovereign defence capability built around autonomous systems. But to do is not just an industry challenge, it is in his words “an enterprise challenge.” What is required is defence and industry to shape an ecosystem where they can work together to deliver the desired outcome. He also underscored that Australia has the building blocks in place to deliver such a solution. A particularly important aspect of shaping a way ahead is to shape more effective ways to manage complex systems, and within that context the autonomous piece of complexity. And the continuous learning piece which comes from use in the real world of combat and gray zone operations needs to be fed into the evolution of systems, This means that the “learning piece” needs to be worked into the contractual relationships which industry has with Defence. A third presentation was by Dr. Andrew Lucas of Agent Oriented Software. He provided a very helpful clarification of how autonomous systems are different from automatic or automated systems. For Lucas, an autonomous system is goal directed and capable of rational reasoning with regard to those goals. An autonomous system can perceive its environment, determine if the environment affects its goals and then takes actions in alignment with its goals up against the operational environment. It is able to balance proactive and reactive behaviors. This is in contrast to automated system which simply follows a task list or script. He then provided a way to look at the evolution of autonomy within the context of man-machine operations. His schema is built around the axis of increasing levels of delegation to the system. It moves from the machine simply providing timely advice with the humans making all the decisions; to a semi-autonomous relationship in which the machine is subordinate to a certain level of human authority; and then operating fully autonomous in which the machine operates without huma control or direct oversight. Dr. Lucas then discussed the relationship between AI and autonomous systems. AI is defined by him as the “theory and development of computer systems able to perform tasks normally requiring human intelligence.” AI enables machine learning which is to be understand in terms of “a computer program can learn and adapt to new data without human intervention.” And this then enables to creation of intelligent agents which can be defined as “a computer program that is capable of perceiving and interpretating data sensed from its environment, reflecting events in its environment, and taking actions to achieve given goals without permanent guidance from its user.” He underscored that to achieve the capability for autonomous systems, several trend lines in the evolution of AI and machine learning need to coalesce or synthesize. From this point of view, he noted that there were several AI trends, thrusts and directions which are shaping a way ahead. These included image analysis and recognition, or sensor identification and assessment, speech recognition and the ability of the human and machine enablement of dialogue, intelligent search and assessment, and intelligent software agents able to work through big data. With such capabilities evolving then situate AI and robotics are enabled with the possibility of machine learning. In other words, there is clearly a pathway already being shaped to autonomous systems, but investments, experimentation and development remains. And he argued that Australia needs to invest in this development to deliver on the promise of autonomous systems both for the civil and defence sectors. A fourth presentation was by Northrop Grumman, but done by remote participation from the United States. Northrop is a key player in Australian defence, and in the area of man-machine teaming, clearly the arrive of Triton is part of the way ahead. But the key focus which the company has upon expanding the types and nature of sensor networks and finding ways to leverage those networks to deliver timely decision-making data is a key part of the way ahead. Clearly one way already that Northrop is contributing to such a way ahead is with regard to how the F-35 functions as a C2 and sensor “flying combat system” and enables it to fight in an 8-ship formation as a wolfpack. This was not mentioned at the seminar but clearly is a key enabler of the way ahead for the ADF which also provides a foundation for shaping the broader efforts to shape an integrated distributed force able to work a diversity of sensor and communication networks to deliver the desired combat effects. In the Northrop Grumman presentation, a key point is to shape a way ahead for battleship control where sensors can track operations within that battlespace. Clearly, remote sensors are proliferating and the importance of AI and autonomy for helping the tactical and strategic decision makers to que systems to perform key and dynamic tasks will become increasingly important in the extended battlespace. A fifth presentation by defense industry was given by Air Vice Marshal Bill Henman (Retd), who is currently a strategic advisor Air and Space for Raytheon Australia. His presentation focused on a key issue, namely, the countering of autonomous systems. This subject is a key one both in terms of understanding how adversaries are using their own automated systems, which needs to include not simply the question of technology but concepts of operations, which in turn allows you to examine the vulnerabilities of your own systems. Autonomous systems have vulnerabilities which can be built around spoofing, data corruption as well as braking effective sensor network to C2 communication flows. At the heart of the autonomous system impact is the control challenge. Henman defined control as “enabling friendly manoeuvre while denying adversary manoeuvre. He argued as well that control also involves deconfliction of friendly manoeuvre in terms both of kinetic and non-kinetic fratricide. In his presentation, he highlighted how autonomous systems can be disabled or eliminated in combat. This can happen by disrupting or spoofing the detection and tracking systems. Or this can happen through various softkill options, such as jamming and spoofing, electronic attack or cyber intrusions. He then highlighted a number of hardkill options both kinetic (close in weapons systems) and non-kinetic, notably high energy lasers and directed energy systems. These vulnerabilities clearly provide a realistic cautionary note to how autonomous systems can be introduced and used. And this is why their introduction into infrastructure defense such as extended port security or into logistical support, up to and included logistical management systems, are good places to start and to sort through how to do so enhancing rather than compromising national defense and security. ` He ended his presentation by proposing a number of key actions as the way forward with regard to autonomous systems is worked. First, it is important to create the optimum environment to allow industry, Academia, Research and Development communities to be able to create and field innovative control soltuions. Second, it is crucial to be able to understand the operational implications of an adversary who has greater freedom of manoeuvre with respect to all dimensions of governance of autonomous systems than do the liberal democracies. Third, there needs to be as much focus on the development of superior autonomous decision cycles as there is upon the development of the sense and respond control systems enabling autonomous systems. And finally, he argued for shaping autonomous decision making ‘tutorship’ in roder to build the future confidence needed to send autonomous systems into combat as the force evolves with more agile, multi-domain C2 capabilities. A final defense industry presentation was by Lockheed Martin Australia. Dr. Tony Lindsay, formerly of the Australian Department of Defence’s Department of Science and Technology or DST, provided insights as well. Lindsay provided an overview on the decision cycles for the force and how autonomy might provide both enhancements to such decision making as well as more capability to leverage the proliferating sensor networks. He argued that AI and autonomous systems have the possibility for impacting on all parts of the decision cycle, such as persistent ISR, sensor cuing, scene understanding, and cognitive battle management. They could just as well undercut decision effectiveness if not worked into an effective decision-making cycle. This requires allowing the operator to act using relevant information, be able to align with commander’s intent and provide for system adaptation. The broader shift associated with the fifth-generation force transformation, namely distributed force which can be scalable and integratable provides a solid foundation for managing proliferating sensor networks as well as finding ways to use autonomous systems within distributed decision-making systems. In short, shaping a new enterprise approach already underway driven by software-upgradeable systems, and reworking how platform providers work with the forces and defence, presages the significant changes underway into which autonomous systems will be introduced and integrated within the force. The featured graphic is taken from Dr. Tony Lindsay’s presentation to the Seminar.

Dr Robbin Laird, The Australian Army, Navy and Air Force Shape a Way Ahead for the Inclusion of Autonomous Systems, 5 June 2021 Link to the article The Australian Army, Navy and Air Force Shape a Way Ahead for the Inclusion of Autonomous Systems - Second Line of Defense (sldinfo.com) WGCDR Keirin Joyce noted: “All of the services see robotic autonomous systems as a significant part of the road ahead. It’s just that the services are getting after them differently.” At the Williams Foundation seminar held on April 8, 2021, each of the service chiefs provided their perspective on the way ahead for their service with regard to such systems. Even though the strategic way ahead is shaping a force able to work across service platforms to deliver the desired combat or crisis management effects, each domain has a physical quality to it different from the other domains. And autonomous platforms like any platforms have to respect the domain within which they operate. And so doing, they might well be able to contribute to platforms operating in other domains, but they must first of all work effectively within a ground, air or naval combat force. The Australian Army and RAS With regard to the Army, the ability to experiment is significantly greater than with the other two services. The cost to do so and the fratricide which such systems can introduce into the operational force is much less to do so. There is little doubt that introducing such systems into near term operations, such as logistical support for HADR operations make a great deal of sense and can provide the force with near term learning from which to generate a broader capability to use such systems. In an August 9, 2020 video, the Army put its case succinctly in highlighting an optionally crewed autonomous casualty evacuation vehicle (OCCV): “The Australian Army will increase its experimentation, prototyping and exploration of autonomous vehicles and emerging technologies through Defence industry contracts valued at $12 million, allowing Army to learn, prototype and develop future concepts. Technology such as Robotics, Autonomous Systems, and Artificial Intelligence act as a force multiplier, and the mastery of the technology will make us more effective on the future battlefield and help to keep our personnel safe.” Optionally Crewed Combat Vehicles Link to Department of Defence You Tube video https://youtu.be/tlPdX1s-ZL4 Lieutenant General Rick Burr, Chief of the Australian Army, underscored the work Army is doing to introduce autonomous systems and to integrate them into the force. The Army’s overall approach is described as accelerated warfare within which autonomous systems are developed and assessed as contributors to enhanced capabilities, like all platforms and systems are as well. They are part of being what he calls having a force which is “future ready.” The inclusion of intelligence learning machines will contribute to what the Chief refers to as his approach to shaping the Army as a “force in motion.” He argued that Robotic Autonomous Systems (RAS) can maximize solider performance, improve decision-making, generate mass and scalable effects, protect the force and enhance efficiency. Today, Army is the largest user of uncrewed air systems. The Chief argued that uncrewed ground systems in the future will proliferate in a similar way. “Greater use of autonomous systems will be a feature of future ground forces.” An important point which he highlighted was that in making capability investment decisions are being done with regard to their ability to incorporate or work with RAS. For example, with regard to the future infantry fighting vehicle, the Army is focused on that vehicle able to operate with RAS, including controlling several smaller autonomous vehicles as well. “The vehicle will have the power and computing potential to operate numerous, smaller uncrewed and autonomous systems.” In the Army Chief’s approach, autonomous systems are part of the future force, but part of force being driven by a number of technological developments. “Greater platform collaboration, new power sources, new forms of active and passive protection, more lethal strike weapons, and directed energy weapons, are examples of this way ahead.” He underscored that in the future “Army’s teams will be more connected, protected and lethal so they can achieve their missions against current and emerging threats at the lowest possible risk to Australian soldiers.” He argued that the force as it modernizes is examining throughout this effort new opportunities for the use of RAS in the force. For example, “our aviation crews are examining the opportunities for manned-unmanned teaming, notably as we look forward to the delivery of the new attack helicopter.” The Army chief highlighted the nature of the globally competitive environment where maintaining an edge is both more necessary and more difficult. He argued that such a competitive edge could accrue to the ADF to the extent to which the force can be better integrated, and coordinated than its adversaries. This requires superior training and decision-making capabilities. This is why, he argued, why people is at the “center of our efforts. It is people that get the technology working effectively in the dangerous and contested environments.” The Royal Australian Navy and RAS The Chief of Navy, Vice Admiral Noonan, discussed the Navy’s RAS-AI 2040 strategy which he had introduced last year. As he described that strategy: “The way that we’ve sought to visualize this vision is through five very fundamental effects. Force protection, obviously all about keeping our people safe and out of harm’s way so that they can get on and do their job. Force projection is about how we can achieve mass. Force potential using human machine teaming, ultimately to achieve better and more effective decision-making in the war fighting effort. Partnered force concept around how we will operate as an integrated and joint force by design.” Vice Admiral Noonan then discussed the six principles which underly the RAS-AI Strategy 2040. “The six fundamental principles were built around a user centered design. The system design is user centered. In terms of decision support, we are looking to have systems that significantly reduce the cognitive load on our commanders and operators alike, allowing for them to achieve greater shared situational awareness to deliver effective, efficient, and ethical decision-making. “The joint integration piece is critical. I cannot stress that highly enough in terms of we must ensure that these systems are integrated. Not just integrated into the platforms or their parent platforms but integrated into the force. “And they are capable of being evergreen. This is the new term for spiral development. It’s about ensuring that we have systems that remain contemporary, and I am challenged on a daily basis about capability gaps and about deficiencies in the long lead times that require us in the shipbuilding space. It takes about 10 years to build a submarine, or five years to build a frigate. “And are we incorporating old technologies? Bottom answer is no, in that we are designing future and evergreen in growth into our platforms. And I think that’s a very important concept that we have not always fully grasped. “Finally, is the importance of made in Australia. Our systems must be designed for the very unique circumstances that we operate in, particularly in the maritime environment.” Vice Admiral Noonan then highlighted really the key aspect of using any new sensor networks, whether they be autonomous or not, namely, their integration into a C2 system. “Operating all these systems would simply be too complex, too time consuming and ultimately unmanageable without a common control framework. Therefore, as part of the way that we seek to get after that, the building blocks of that framework, as we see them in Navy, it needs to be a legal and ethical module that allows us to have embedded and encoded regulatory and legal protocols. Clearly a common control protocol that unifies the means of machine control. “We need common control bridges that provide an interface between the proprietary control systems and the combat management systems of the platforms from which they’re housed. We need a common control language that can express C2 in a way that both human operators and RAS-AI machines can understand. And ultimately, we need a common spectrum management protocol, levering and integrating programmed projects to harden and ensure the spectrum in which we operate.” The Royal Australian Air Force and RAS The RAAF has already acquired two flying platforms which are designed to work together in a manned-unmanned teaming effort, namely, the P-8 and Triton. These platforms for the U.S. Navy working with other platforms, such as the Romeo Helicopter are providing important real world operational lessons with regard to shaping a foundation for the future. In addition, with the loyal wingman program underway, the RAAF as one of the most advanced air forces in the world, we introduce the loyal wingman into a force already being reworked with the introduction of the F-35. The challenges to introduce Loyal Wingman and then to use it effectively will be an important part of shaping a way ahead for autonomous systems in the airspace. At the seminar, Air Marshal Mel Hupfeld provided the RAAF perspective on the way ahead in this area of development and operations. At the outset of his remarks, he noted: “Defense can gain significant advantage through leveraging autonomous systems, that’s to make better decisions faster, to more effectively allocate resources, and to discover new ways of delivering military effects. Artificial intelligence and human-machine teaming will play a pivotal role in air and space power into the future.” The RAAF is working a way ahead with regard to integrate manned new and existing aircraft with remotely piloted and autonomous systems. A key case in point is Loyal Wingman. According to Hupfeld: “The true value is indeed hidden inside the airframe of Loyal Wingman. And that is the development of the code and the algorithms which form the artificial intelligence behaviors that will optimize its combat capability. The Loyal Wingman project is a pathfinder for the integration of autonomous systems and artificial intelligence to create smart human-machine teams. “The aim is to provide capability advantage, working alongside existing platforms to complement and extend our air combat platforms and our other systems. And we’re exploring totally new concepts of operations, whereby multiple systems will pair with crude capabilities, such as the F-35, the Growler, the E-7 Wedgetail, with an aim to bolster our relatively small but potent Air Force. “And it’s clear how this changes things for us. Such an asset will change the way we calculate risk. The Loyal Wingman is the giant uncrewed gorilla in the room, but we’ve got many other programs that don’t immediately catch the eye. And these programs, though less visible, will no less revolutionize the way we do business.” He underscored that the Plan Jericho program through the Jericho Disruptive Innovation effort is looking at ways of automation and artificial intelligence that can step in to help pull the weight. There are still jobs in Air Force that we have people performing which are predictable, repetitive, and they don’t require creativity. “But this is not about replacing people with machines. We’ve got a shortage of people and they’re a scarce resource. And our work in this space is really about freeing up those people so that we can employ them in those areas that humans do best. “In my view, one of the best examples of this theory at work is some work we’re doing, once again, through the Jericho program, on quarriable sensors program. Now, while we would probably work on a catchier name, and hopefully one that’s easier to pronounce, what this project is seeking to achieve has the capacity to force-multiply our intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance capability by a factor of two or three…. “I believe that our sensors are currently employed very inefficiently. So for example, most of what our sensors stream is meaningless noise, and even when we do capture important information, it’s not necessarily available to the people that need it. The quarriable sensor program takes care of all this by using artificial intelligence and machine learning to automatically detect when an event of significance occurs. It will then report that directly to commanders and decision-makers in real time, enabling the customer to determine whether the automated response and the intelligence is valid.” Air Marshal Hupfeld provided a good summary to the day and to the presentations of the Service Chiefs. “We’re disappointed in reporting that we see from some of our commentators who still choose to discuss Air Force capabilities in isolation. Qhether or not Super Hornet can breed another capability one on one is really, to me, not a useful conversation. The force of tomorrow will be characterized by those invisible connections across air, land, maritime space and cyber, with masses of data from sensor inputs being fused, using artificial intelligence and machine learning, to rapidly convert data to information, to knowledge, to insight, all at unfathomable speeds. “The entire Defence Force will be one integrated system of systems. My vision for automation is that the joint force will be AI-enabled using robotics to augment roles, and humans working with machines, so they get the best out of both. The days of boring menial tasks will be gone. Our most scarce resource, our people, will focus on higher value and the creative tasks that we need. “And with this vision, we’ll march in lockstep with our colleagues in Navy and Army and across Defense to ensure that we deliver an autonomous future, and the responsiveness and precision of air and space power that we need, into our future joint force.” Appendix: THE ARMY APPROACH: OCTOBER 2018 STRATEGY War, by nature, remains an intense human activity and the use of armed force to compel change remains at its heart. The character of war is changing with the adoption of emerging and disruptive technologies. As these technologies become more available and affordable, the gap between well-equipped militaries and the motivated individual or group with a cause is closing. Therefore, sustaining and maintaining a technological edge over potential adversaries is becoming more challenging. An area where we can maintain an edge is in the large scale integration, synchronisation and coordinated employment of these technologies, coupled with superior training and decision-making. This can be achieved through robotics and manipulation of data through advanced networks (or system of networks) that can improve the speed and accuracy of information sharing. These networks can connect soldiers to other combatants (both human and machine), the broader Army, the Joint Force and partner nations; improving situational awareness, survivability and lethality. However, adoption of emerging technologies should be considered objectively prior to acquisition to confirm the capability offered by the technology is justified and cost effective. Risk, informed through future casting, modelling, simulation and experimentation, should also be considered to ensure the right technology is adopted at the right time. In this context RAS can be viewed as the application of software, artificial intelligence and advanced robotics to perform tasks as directed by humans. Simply “autonomy is the ability of a machine to perform a task without human input. Thus, an autonomous system is a machine, whether hardware or software, once activated performs some task or function on its own”. The term autonomy can be a barrier to understanding as it is, generally, specific to a system or sub-system. Therefore, it can be misleading to refer to an autonomous platform if the entire system of systems is not autonomous. It can be helpful to consider the level of human input, how much discretion the machine has with regard to the task and what aspect of the system has been automated. Within this strategy, RAS will span the full spectrum of human input from remote control through to full autonomy – the level of autonomy required will be determined by the role and also the maturity of the underpinning technologies such as AI. Therefore RAS is a lens through which to describe a system, hardware and software, which has varying elements of autonomy and/or robotics and commonly both. THE ROYAL AUSTRALIAN NAVY RAS-AI STRATEGY 2040 The forward to the strategy by Vice Admiral Noonan: On 1 July 2020, the Prime Minister launched the Defence Strategic Update 2020. This highlighted that we are experiencing the most consequential strategic realignment since the Second World War. Consequently, our Navy must be able to meet the emerging challenges of regional military modernisation, the risk of state-on-state conflict and technological disruption, to maintain our ability to Shape the Maritime Environment, Deter actions against our national interests in the Maritime Domain, and Respond with credible Naval Power to defend our Nation, and our National Interests. Robotics, Autonomous Systems and Artificial Intelligence (RAS-AI) are transforming every aspect of our lives. As a Fighting and Thinking Navy, we must leverage these advances to also transform, and improve, our ability to Fight and Win at Sea. I am therefore pleased to release Navy’s RAS-AI Strategy 2040, which nests within Navy’s capstone strategic documents – Plans MERCATOR and PELORUS, and supports the achievement of each of the five Navy Outcomes. RAS-AI Strategy 2040 sets out the challenges and opportunities that these technologies present and explains to Navy, our Joint Force colleagues, the broader Defence Organisation, our allies and industry the benefits e seek from RAS-AI, and how we aim to realise them. To fulfil our potential we need to engage in constant experimentation, and encourage collaboration and innovation at all levels. This will enable us to leverage RAS-AI to enhance Navy’s capability by strengthening our Force Protection, increasing our Force Projection in the maritime approaches of our near region, improving our Joint Integration through Partnership, maximising our Force Potential, and ensuring Australian Control. Just as our people and machines must operate in teams to enhance their strengths and overcome weaknesses, we must team with Defence as a whole, industry, academia and our international partners, to achieve the potential of these technologies. My vision is for Navy, industry and academia to build upon our established transformational partnerships, allowing us to address the challenges outlined in this strategy, together. Make no mistake; the pace of change is increasing and will challenge us all at some point. To meet that challenge, all that I ask, is that each of us focus on being a little better – every day. In embracing technology, we must remember that warfare is, and will remain, a fundamentally human activity. Our people will be at the core of our technological advances, and we must design systems with them at the centre. RAS-AI will make our people better warfighte s, and will enable us to achieve expanded reach across the region, however it is our people who remain our competitive edge. The race in autonomous warfare has already begun. Doing nothing, or waiting for allies to solve our requirements, is not an option. I commend the RAS-AI Strategy to you all and challenge each of you to think about how you can contribute to it. The featured photo: Chief of the Australian Army addresses the Williams Foundation Conference on April 8, 2021.

Dr Robbin Laird, Perspectives on the Introduction of Autonomous Systems into Combat, 4 June 2021 Link to article Perspectives on the Introduction of Autonomous Systems into Combat | Defense.info The Williams Foundation seminar on Next Generation Autonomous systems held on April 8, 2021, began with two presentations which focused on the nature of the challenges of introducing autonomous systems into the combat force. The first presentation was by Group Captain Jo Brick of the Australian Defence College. Brick frequently opens up Williams Foundation seminar and provides very helpful orientations to the issues to be discussed at that particular seminar. It was no different with regard to the challenging topic of understanding the nature and the way ahead for next generation autonomous systems. She highlighted a number of fictional examples of how the machine-man relationship has been envisaged in the future. But she honed on a key aspect of the challenge: how will data flow in the combat force and how will that data be used to make lethal decisions? She posed a number of key questions facing the way ahead for the introduction and proliferation of autonomous systems into the combat force. Do we trust the systems that we have created? Are we expecting them to be perfect, or to accept that they are flawed just like us? Do we understand autonomous systems enough to information the creation of an effective system of accountability? How would autonomous and intelligent systems make decisions, free from human intervention? Would they reflect the best of humanity or something less inspiring? Does the conduct of war by autonomous and intelligent systems dilute the sanctity of war as a societal function? Who or what is permitted to fight wars and to take life on behalf of the state? What does the use of AI and autonomous systems in warfare mean for the profession of arms? One could add to her questions another one which was discussed directly or indirectly throughout the seminar: What will be the impact of the introduction and proliferation of autonomous systems on the art of warfare? The second presentation, which followed that of Group Captain Brick, was by Professor Rob McLaughlin from the Australian National Centre for Oceans Resources and Security. In his presentation, McLaughlin dealt with the broader ethical and legal issues which autonomous systems raise and which need to be resolved in shaping a way ahead for their broader use in the militaries of liberal democratic states. One should note that another key question is how authoritarian states use and will use them which is not restricted by the ethical concerns of liberal democratic societies. There is always the reactive enemy who will shape their tactics and strategies in ways taking into account how the liberal democratic militaries self-limit with regard to systems, like autonomous ones. McLaughlin started with the most basic question: What is an autonomous weapon system? He turned to a definition provided by the International Red Cross which defines AWS as follows: “Any weapon system with autonomy in its critical functions. That is, a weapon system that can select and attack targets without hum intervention. After initial activation by a human operator, the weapons system – through its sensors, software (programming/alogrithms) and connected weapon(s) – takes on the targeting function that would normally be controlled by humans.” He then added this consideration as well from the International Red Cross as well: ”The key distinction, in our view, from non-autonomous weapons is that the machine self-initiates an attack.” This raises in turn the key consideration of when is the AWS (in legal terms) an independent unit (like a warplane or warship) rather than simply a sensor/weapon? This in turn raises a further consideration: Can a maritime autonomous weapons system be a warship in terms of international law? According to the Law of the Sea: “For the purposes of this Convention, warship means a ship belonging to the armed forces of a state bearing the external marks distinguishing such ships of its nationality, under the command of an officer duly commissioned by the government of the state and whose name appears in the appropriate service list or its equivalent and manned by a crew which is under regular armed forces discipline.” Such a definition quickly raises issues for autonomous maritime platforms. Are they marked with the nation’s identification? Are they introduced such as the Germans in World War II did with merchant “warships” without such markings? What does under command mean specifically as autonomous maritime platforms operate? Is there a mother ship which controls them which is crewed by humans? And if uncrewed then what about the manning issue? He argued that we are not yet at a threshold where these are practical questions impeding development. But we “will meet a frontier at some point – probably with AI and advanced machine learning.” In short, with autonomous systems on the horizon, a number of questions about how they will impact on the force, and how concepts of operations using these capabilities will face ethical and legal challenges as well.

Ed Timperlake and Dr Robbin Laird, Australia Under Attack from China: How the U.S. Can Provide a Near Term Response, 12 June 2021 Link to article Australia Under Attack from China: How the U.S. Can Provide a Near Term Response | Defense.info The Peoples Republic of China has picked a fight with the wrong two allies, Australia and the United States. Just recently, the Peoples Republic of China has just directly threatened Australia with an act of war. Their bellicose conventional attack threat It is now in play and it is time to realize that the Pacific is coming to a boil with Chinese’s state media being very bluntly directly threatening Australia. “China has a strong production capability, including producing additional long-range missiles with conventional warheads that target military objectives in Australia when the situation becomes highly tense.” The great rule often stated that if someone is threatening to kill you is that it is best to believe them. One is immediately struck that the Chinese statement highlighted the word “conventional warheads,” as well as implying an arms race in strike weapons along with escalation pre-emption by highlighting striking “when the situation becomes highly tense.” Stressing a conventional warhead attacks is a strategic goal of China to avoid triggering any discussion inside the Australian political process of that nation developing an independent nuclear strike force. The PRC is well aware that Atlantic nations have nuclear situation in which Russia faces three nuclear powers: the United States, the United Kingdom and France. However in the Pacific, it is reversed with Russia, China and North Korea having nuclear weapons facing the United States as a nuclear power. It is best to always leave stepping into the strategic nuclear deterrence warfighting world to the citizens on the nation considering supporting such a move. However, the great peacetime and wartime combat conventional warfighter alliance between Australia and the United States has historically proven to be strong and lasting. What makes it an equal partnership is Australia is not only always metaphorically “punching above their weight” but they have proven to have invested in an advanced Air Force, and Navy and are working to have a very capable 21st century kill web enabled force. The challenge for Australia’s conventional deterrence strategy is distance and the F-111 answered that need earlier for the Australian Defence Force (ADF) The greatest long distance raid by USAF F-111, was codenamed El Dorado Canyon a successful attack from England, flying around Europe to attack Muammar Qadhafi in Libya, with a total out and back route of flight of over 7000 miles. When looking at Pacific distances from Australia, the distance from Australia to PLAAN Hainan Island sub-pens/and their navy port from Australia is less than 3000 nautical miles the Heavenly Gate in Beijing slightly less than 4000 miles. Consequently, the PRC best note that there is a famous flying event ordered by Admiral Nimitz right after WWII which was the flight of PV2 “Truculent Turtle’ flying non-stop from Perth Australia to Columbus Ohio with a crew of four and a baby kangaroo. The Navy aircraft covered 11,235 miles. That record stood until enter the USAF and B-52s in the early sixties. And as former USAF Chief of Staff Buzz Moseley put it very succinctly that US and Allies shoot back: “There is not a place on the face of the earth that the USAF will not fight their way into.” The current direct PRC threat leads immediate expediency to help Australia in their quest to replace the F-111 by long range strike capabilities. And as the ADF does so, and examines options, clearly the United States is a key partner. Such a US/Australian partnership reaches back to very early in the twentieth century, when sea power ruled the Pacific. In 1908 Australian PM Alfred Deakin invited the U.S .Great White Fleet to make port calls at Sydney, Melbourne and Albany. This was the first time a non-Royal Navy ship was in Australian waters, and history records that “Australia ordered its first modern warships a purchase that angered the British Admiralty.” In the long term, the Australian government is committed to building long range strike and has committed to spending serious money in this area. But that is in the mid-term, what does Australia do now as part of a crisis management approach to such a threat? There has been a growing focus of attention within Australian defence with regard to having longer-range strike options inherent within the ADF. For example, Marcus Hellyar recently posed the possibility of Australia perhaps acquiring the B-21 from the United States, but this is a mid-term option at best. Again, what does one do now to respond effectively to dangerous sabre rattling? Clearly, this is an area where cooperation with the United States can provide both allies with enhanced deterrent options now and shape a more effective way ahead in the future. For Australia, it is about how to build in long range strike into the ADF over the mid-to-long term. For the United States, it is to better understand how bombers and the U.S. Navy fleet can work much more effectively together. In other words, there is an option which provides a building block for the way ahead with regard to a long-range strike enabled ADF and for the United States to learn how to more effectively operate its joint naval and air capabilities in the Pacific both with their own services as well as with allies. In the past, the United States has brought B-1 bombers to participate with the ADF in Northern Australia. Now by deploying a rotational force of B-2s to the North of Australia, a stealth bomber capability could be brought to the defence of Australia. It would be an important input to responding to China, but also, simply underscoring to the Chinese that their military buildup in the Pacific and specifically directed against Australia is not in their own interest. For now, it is a modest response, but already USAF bombers integrated into the ADF has to be taken seriously with regard to any continued direct threats against Australia. By training the Royal Australia Navy and the Royal Australian Navy to work with the B-2s, B-1s and B-52s, those two key Australian power projection forces can train with an operational long range strike asset. What can be demonstrated is that long range strike is not primarily focused on downtown Beijing, but primarily upon enhancing the deployed naval and air force by providing rapidly deployed enhancements to air-naval task forces throughout the Indo-Pacific region. Australia could also determine if the B-21 is the right fit or are their other ways to bring longer range strike to the operating force? It would also help guide the way ahead for building out the kind of sovereign missile industry Australia desires. It is not simply about buying extant U.S. or European kit. For it is also clear that allies like the United States need a different approach then they have followed to date to get a less costly and more effective mix of strike assets as well. And as the United States shapes a more effective support to allies approach in the region, a key part of what the US Navy and the US Air Force clearly need to work on is much more effective integratability of the bomber force with the operating fleet. In our forthcoming book for USNI Press on maritime kill webs, 21st century warfighting and deterrence, we argue that a kill web approach both empowers significantly greater collaboration between the air and sea services but does so in terms of having a more survivable, lethal and distributed force with integration of bomber and fleet operations. And this is not about preparing to fit World War III; it is about effective crisis and escalation management. Part of the way ahead, would be to build reinforced bases from which U.S. bombers could operate in the near to mid-term as Australia builds out its own desired capabilities as well. These clearly would be used for rotation to exercise with the ADF or to reinforce Australian defence in a crisis. It is about taking the U.S.-Australian alliance forward in an effective way to deal with the defence of Australia today and not simply speculate about the long-term options. It is about also demonstrating to the Chinese leadership that bullying is not going to lead to the compliance of the liberal democratic states to the future Chinese global order. The Chinese leaders need to pause and consider what Australia as an arsenal for democracy might mean to their future as well. For a detailed examination of the recent evolution of Australian defence strategy and policies, see link in the article for Robbin Laird's book Joint by Design (30% discount is available for Williams members if purchased directly through Second Line of Defense. Use the code Williams) For an earlier version of this article published on Breaking Defense, see the following: https://breakingdefense.com/2021/06/supporting-australia-to-deter-china-helps-america/

Dr Robbin Laird and Ed Timperlake, Supporting Australia To Deter China Helps America, 11 June 2021 Link to article Supporting Australia To Deter China Helps America - Breaking Defense Breaking Defense - Defense industry news, analysis and commentary Article text As the Biden administration focuses on ways to improve deterrence in the Pacific, reinforcing Australia’s defense against China is a good place to start. Working closely with Australia now can send an important message to Beijing that political intimidation, backed by economic and military threats, is not in its long-term interest. For those not following the Chinese campaign against Australia, Chinese leaders have made it very clear they believe Australia must comply with their plans to dominate the Pacific. The Chinese threat has been stated clearly in the Chinese state media: “China has a strong production capability, including producing additional long-range missiles with conventional warheads that target military objectives in Australia when the situation becomes highly tense.” If someone is threatening to kill you, you’d best believe them. Examining China’s direct threat closely, one is immediately struck that the focus is upon conventional strike, as raising a nuclear threat might lead to a reaction from Canberra that the Chinese might regret — even more than having to deal with the prospect of an Australian defense buildup that includes new long-range strike capabilities. Paul Dibb, a noted Australian strategist and former intelligence official, has argued that China’s moves are significantly reducing the country’s warning time in the face of any attack. “The Chinese have been clearly communicating for some time that it is now time to teach Australia a lesson. They used similar language against Vietnam in 1979 prior to their invasion,” he said in a recent interview. “And there are many ways they could generate force to pressure Australia, without directly striking the country, such as take us on in our 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone, threatening our offshore energy platforms. And by so, doing put the challenge directly to Australia.” In the long term, the Australian government is committed to building long-range strike and has committed to spending serious money in this area. But what should Australia do now as part of a crisis management approach to such a threat? What does one do now to respond effectively to dangerous saber rattling? There is an option which provides a building block for the way ahead with regard to a long-range strike capability for the Australian Defense Force (ADF), and for the United States to learn how to more effectively utilize its naval and air capabilities in the Pacific both with its own services, as well as with allies. The United States has brought B-1 bombers to participate with the ADF in Northern Australia. By deploying a rotational force of B-2s to the North of Australia, a stealth bomber capability could be brought to the defense of Australia. It would be an important immediate input to responding to China, but it would also underscore to the Chinese that their military buildup in the Pacific — especially that directed against Australia — is not in their own interest. By training the Royal Australia Navy and the Royal Australian Navy to work with the B-2s, B-1s and B-52s, those two key Australian power projection forces can train with operational long-range strike assets. There further is discussion in Australia about whether buying the B-21 is the right answer for longer-range strike or are there other options. Thus, rotational US bomber deployments would also help guide the way ahead for building out the kind of sovereign missile industry Australia desires. It is clear that the United States also needs a different approach than it has followed to date to get a less costly and more effective mix of strike assets itself. As the United States shapes a more effective approach to support allies in the Indo-Pacific, a key part of what the US Navy and the US Air Force clearly need to work on is much more effective integration of the bomber force with the fleet. One measure for the near term could be building reinforced bases in Australia from which US bombers could operate, while Australia builds its own capabilities. These bases would be used for rotations to exercise with the ADF or to reinforce Australian forces in a crisis. This is all about taking the US-Australian alliance forward in an effective way to deal with the defense of Australia today. It is about also demonstrating to China’s leaders that bullying is not going make Australia or any other liberal democratic states submit to a Chinese global order. The Chinese leadership needs to pause and consider what Australia, as an arsenal for democracy, might mean to the Peoples Republic of China’s future. Robbin Laird, a defense consultant and member of the Breaking Defense Board of Contributors, is a research fellow with the Williams Foundation. Ed Timberlake, a graduate of the US Naval Academy and former Marine squadron commander, works with Laird. He has worked on Capitol Hill and held senior positions in the Defense Department.

Dr Robbin Laird, Shaping the Way Ahead for Robotic and Autonomous Systems and ADF Force Development, 1 June 2021 Link to article Shaping the Way Ahead for Robotic and Autonomous Systems and ADF Force Development | Defense.info At the April 8, 2021, Williams Foundation Seminar on Next Generation Autonomous Systems, CDRE Michael Turner, Director General of Force Exploration at the Australian Department of Defence, provided an overview on how to conceptualize the way ahead for the ADF and its force development as it adapts to remote autonomous systems. As Director General Force Exploration, CDR Turner reports to Vice Chief of the Defence Force (VCDF) Vice Admiral David Johnston, who is responsible for joint force integration, interoperability, designing the future force, preparedness and military strategy in his role as the Joint Force Authority. The Joint Force Authority is responsible for ensuring the current and future joint force meets the capability requirements directed by Government and preparedness requirements directed by Chief of the Defence Force (CDF). CDR Turner started his presentation by identifying how the force exploration office addresses future force development. “Force exploration branch shapes the future of the Australian defense force by identifying changing trends, and conditions that can become capabilities that provide us with advantage. We do this by seeking to understand the future environment and providing a concept driven pathway to compelling future force options that generate and sustain military advantage out to 2040, and beyond. It’s clear that robotics and autonomous systems will have a disruptive influence in the future operating environment.” He underscored that the force exploration branch released a report in December 2020 which identified how the ADF can “generate military power using robotics and autonomous systems.” Link to video https://youtu.be/BxfBrU8TKYY That report was built around the core concept that the autonomy and the artificial intelligence techniques that enable it should be understood from the standpoint of “the convergence of a broad range of technologies, some much more mature than others. “These technologies include, power generation and energy storage, computation, swarming technology, advanced materials, nano explosives, biometrics, additive manufacturing, sensors and perception, and common control architecture, to name the key components. These technologies need to be harnessed and integrated to provide a reliable and effective capability.” For these technologies to be considered disruptive, they need to be mastered in such a way to give the ADF an operational advantage. And to do so in a way that the adversary’s use can be countered and to do so in a way that gives the ADF an operational advantage. Or put another way, the adversary always gets a vote, and no new technology is introduced without an adversary working to counter it or to introduce new technologies which need to be countered as well. CDR Turner provided a lexicon to understand what the various categories of autonomy are and how best to understand what the different capabilities are in order to understand how they might be used by the ADF. In the chart below, he highlighted how to distinguish between remote, autonomic, autonomic and autonomous systems. He did so by placing these systems on two axis of development. The first context is the technical one or how they worked; the second was the control context or how we use them. The first category are remote systems. These systems are those operated by humans via remote methods. They are already in service or being introduced into service, such as a bomb disposal remotely operated system. The second category are automatic systems, which are preprogrammed to act in a deterministic manner. For example, “if a target is detected heading towards the ship faster than a certain speed and with a certain range, the system will engage it. A human operator may adjust the programming, but such a system will not improve its own behavior based on experience, these systems have been used by the ADF for many years.” The third category are autonomic systems, such as the Aegis combat system. “Autonomic systems achieve human defined tasks by operating with reference to a set of predefined guidelines, respond to stimuli in a probabilistic manner. For example, an image recognition system is provided with the signatures of enemy vehicles…. A human operator can monitor the system to confirm that assessments are correct and provide more signature data to knowledge base. As the data grows, the system can improve its important performance of this task.” The fourth category are “truly autonomous systems that can learn from their data and their own processing to determine the tasks necessary to achieve a human defined goal.” And he added: “An example of a fully autonomous system may not yet exist.” With regard to future force capabilities, CDR Turner argues that “the autonomic and autonomous systems that will generate the greatest disruption systems that can perform tasks not suited to deterministic behaviors and can develop novel tasks and approaches to new tasks. “Such systems will enable us to create capabilities that merge human like characteristics with machine characteristics.” If the ADF is focused on introducing such capabilities, it needs to consider whether such capabilities enhance, augment or replace current platforms and capabilities. With regard to the longer-term future for the ADF, as autonomous capabilities become available, he argued that new approaches to shaping platforms will be required. “Does this mean that we’re looking to design a future force that contains autonomous F-35s, autonomous M1s, and autonomous DDGs? Adding autonomy to these platforms will certainly be part of their lifecycle upgrades, but we will not be able to take full advantage of autonomy if we do not consider how other technologies will converge into platforms that are designed from the outset to operate with less human input. These future platforms will be fast, accurate, stealthy and persistent in applications, not currently able to achieve such characteristics.” Underlying this projected transition is the question of data and its exploitation by the fifth generation evolving force. He did not put it this way, but it makes sense to focus on how C2 and information generated by Information, Surveillance and Reconnaissance systems are evolving within the context of force development now and in the mid-term. The question is about the reliability of data and information and the trust which warfighters can place on data at the tactical edge as well as in providing for accurate tactical or strategic area wide decision making. CDR Turner clearly makes the point that the question of trust in data is the most challenging for future autonomous systems. “Autonomous systems create the greatest challenge for trust.” One could argue that the priority being given to shaping effective mission command for the integration of a distributed force already being shaped with the new generation of platforms, such as F-35s, P-8s and Tritons, lays a foundation for a way ahead. As CDR Turner put it: “With the foundations of data trust and command control in place, we can design capabilities to exploit autonomy by enhancing current capabilities, augmenting planned capabilities and replacing legacy systems with RAS.” He argued as did other speakers at the seminar that for the ADF enhancing the mass of the force to be able to operate over the distances challenging ADF operations was a key advantage of crafting autonomous systems capabilities which can be integrated into ADF concepts of operations. “Autonomous systems are asked to increase their mass while even employing them in forward roles, or employing autonomy in roles that allow us to optimize our workforce. An autonomous Wingman is an example of a system that increases our mass forward, while autonomous resupply vehicles would free up personnel for other roles. “Autonomy has the potential to achieve decision advantage and increase, not just the speed, which we can complete the decision-making cycle, but also improve the quality of decisions. Autonomous surveillance, data processing and decision support will allow commanders to understand and act upon battle spaces of increasing complexity and respond to adversaries also operating at machine speed. Autonomous systems will be part of the targeting process…” But as CDR Turner put it earlier in his presentation: “An example of a fully autonomous system may not yet exist.” What does exist if the transformation underway with regard to building out a fifth-generation force, one in which distributed forces and innovative task forcing is reshaping how the ADF operates. And that force redesign being worked in the operational force can provide the foundation for shaping a way ahead within which autonomous systems can provide ways to enhance, augment or replace platforms operating within the force. And the presentation which followed that of CDR Turner, by Professor Jason Scholz provided further insight into how this transition might work. For a PDF version of the December 2020 report, see below: https://defence.gov.au/VCDF/Forceexploration/_Master/docs/ADF-Concept-Robotics.pdf

Dr Robbin Laird, The Integrated Distributed Maritime Force: The Impact of Maritime Autonomous Systems, 29 May 2021 Link to article The Integrated Distributed Maritime Force: The Impact of Maritime Autonomous Systems | Defense.info At the recent Williams Foundation seminar on Next Generation Autonomous Systems, Vice Admiral Noonan, Chief of the Royal Australian Navy, provided his perspective on the way ahead for maritime autonomous systems in the build out and evolution of the Royal Australian Navy. At the heart of his presentation was an opportunity to discuss the Navy’s new Remote Autonomous Systems-AI 2040 strategy. As he put it: “Our Navy has already begun a journey to shape the maritime environment. “To deter actions against our national interests. To respond with credible Naval power. To use robotics, autonomy, and artificial intelligence. Employing ever more reliable, robust, and repeatable systems. “We will continue to drive our edge to help keep our people safe. “To create mass, tempo and reach at sea and in all the lanes to enhance the joint force and strengthen our coalition with human command and trusted machine control. “Our technologies, enabling our people to thrive. “Our people, using technologies, to make smarter systems and better decisions.” The RAS-AI strategy is focused on enhancing the fleet, not supplanting it. And he underscored that the Royal Australian Navy is working currently to introduce these technologies into the fleet. I have argued elsewhere that that shift in manned platforms to relying on software upgradeability as a key driver for ongoing modernization clearly becomes a central piece in understanding how to build out RAS-AI capabilities for the maritime autonomous systems platforms or assets. The Vice Admiral introduced a very useful term which covers the way ahead for thinking about integratability across the crewed and uncrewed assets in the force. As he put it: “Evergreen, I think is the new term for spiral development. “That’s the way I look at it. It’s about ensuring that we have systems that remain contemporary, and I am challenged on a daily basis about capability gaps and about deficiencies in the long lead times that require us in the shipbuilding space. “It takes about 10 years to build a submarine, or five years to build a frigate. ‘And are we incorporating old technologies? “Bottom answer is no, in that we are designing future and evergreen in growth into our platforms. “And I think that’s a very important concept that we have not always fully grasped.” I had a chance to further discuss how to think about the way ahead for maritime autonomous systems within the fleet with Vice Admiral (Retired) Tim Barrett. I have been in an ongoing discussion about maritime matters with Barrett ever since I first met him in 2015, and as a key architect for shaping the build out of the 21st century Royal Australian Navy,. I wanted to focus on the interaction between the new build strategy for the Navy’s surface and subsurface platforms and the introduction of autonomous systems into the fleet. Vice Admiral (Retired) Barrett is currently on the board of a key player in shaping a way ahead for autonomous systems, both in the civil and military sector. The CEO of that organization, Trusted Autonomous Systems Defence Cooperative Research Centre, presented at the seminar and I am focusing on his overview of the organization and his perspectives in a separate piece. Jason Scholz, CEO of TAS, highlighted the purposes of the organization as follows: “Advance trusted autonomous systems technologies for asymmetric advantage so the ADF can fight and win; Create & foster game-changing research, of world standing, that pushes theoretical & practical boundaries of future trusted autonomous systems; Deliver autonomous systems & robotics technology with clear translation into deployable defence programs & capabilities for Australian Defence; and Build an environment in which Australian industry has the capacity & skills to deliver complex autonomous systems both to Australian Defence & as integral members of the global defence supply chain.” This means that Barrett brings to the discussion a deep understanding of the challenges of building out the RAN’s surface and subsurface fleet with the coming of new autonomous technologies. The challenge of course is to shape an approach which allows for their integration and dynamic processes of change over time. The core point which Barrett drove home in our conversation was the key challenge of building out the integrated distributed force with an open aperture to inclusion of the force enhancement capabilities which maturing autonomous systems can provide. He argued that at TAS the focus was not just on the next big thing as how what developers can bring to the party which can enhance the capabilities of the force. As he put it: “the new technologies need to be fitted into a broader operational environment. “The force has to fight tonight; how can we shape ways ahead which lead to force enhancement?” In focusing on the subsurface domain, he argued that the context for submarines was changing significantly. They are increasingly operating in a broader kill web environment and need to be able to tap into trusted data to aid their operations and focus their efforts. Clearly, autonomous systems can play an increasingly role in mapping and tracking the undersea domain, and the manned assets become much more capable as trusted data networks can be tapped into. As he noted: “Submarines are part of the undersea domain battle. “They are key contributors, but they have to work within an integrated and distributed mode, which provides them with the information and context in which they can best operate and enhance the operational outcome.” Evolving autonomous systems will be able to provide enhanced undersea domain awareness which will then enhance the capability of the force to execute their operational plans more effectively. But this leads as well to reinforcing the broader challenge facing the force: How do you manage and distribute the data being generated to provide information for tactical decision making at the edge and for broader tactical theater wide decision making? And this leads Barrett to his version of Occom’s razor when assessing what a particular autonomous system might contribute to the force: “I’m less interested in what the particular device being proposed – whether it is a swarming device, an undersea array or a sea glider — but I’m more interested in how your device obtains data, and how reliable it is and how to distribute it and how relevant it is or is not to the commander fighting the battle in operational space in which he is operating.” Notably, how do autonomous systems close gaps in the information-decision dynamic within which forces can operate as an effective kill web? Answering this question is not a one-off platform decision; it is an evolving modernization effort in which the challenge identified by Vice Admiral Noonan needs to be met of working an evergreen force. The featured graphic was taken from one of Vice Admiral Noonan’s presentation slides at the seminar. A link to the PDF of The Royal Australian Navy’s RAS-AI 2040 strategy is included in the article.

By Pierre Tran FCAS Next Steps: May 2021 - UPDATE Second Line of Defense 19 May 2021 Paris – France, Germany and Spain have agreed to the industrial organization for development of a future combat air system, including a demonstrator for a new generation fighter to fly by 2027, the defense ministers of the partner nations said May 17 in a joint statement. Full Article in Second Line of Defense

Dr Robbin Laird The Quest for Next Generation Autonomous Systems: Impact on Reshaping Australian Defence Forces , Defense.info 25 May 2021 At the April 8, 2021, Williams Foundation Seminar on Next Generation Autonomous systems, the moderator was WGCDR Keirin Joyce. I had met Joyce at an earlier Williams Foundation presentation on unmanned systems and had a chance to follow up on his take on the issues discussed at the seminar in a phone interview on May 14, 2021. When I first met Joyce he was in the Army working on unmanned systems; now he was working Triton and Sky Guardian. He has served for 24 years in the Australian Army, where he last served as Program Manager of Unmanned Aerial Systems from December 2016-January 2020. Since then, he is serving in the Royal Australian Air Force as Chief Engineer for Royal Australian Air Force Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems / Unmanned Aerial Systems at ISR Systems Program Office, including MQ-4C Triton under Air 7000-1B and MQ-9B SkyGuardian under Air 7003. Precisely because he has been involved with two services and is knowledgeable with regard to the civilian side of artificial intelligence and robotics, he was the perfect choice to be the seminar moderator. During the seminar, he highlighted an example of how current forces can use new unmanned technologies to support the evolving kill web, in which a small team with ISR and C2 capability can inform a firing solution by a virtual task force firing solution provider. mWGCDR Joyce noted that in an Exercise Hamel held in 2018, a two-man Army team using a Black Hornet Nano UAV were able to identify a tank formation, and then with their radio able to pass that information on to the RAAF for a strike opportunity against that tank formation. This example highlights certainly one role which unmanned systems can play in providing ISR better labelled as information than intelligence surveillance reconnaissance because in this case you have the two-man team inside the weapons engagement zone (WEZ) providing input to an external provider not organic for a firing solution. WGCDR Keirin Joyce moderating the Williams Foundation Seminar on Next Generation Autonomous Systems, April 8, 2021. The first issue we discussed was the importance of understanding the challenge of generating innovation associated with autonomous systems into the operational military. The military as an organization is often described as risk averse, but since the military has to be prepared to fight tonight, disruptive change for its own purpose can degrade military capabilities rather than enhancing them. The ADF has been described through Williams Foundation seminars since 2014 as building a fifth-generation force. In my own words, I see this as shaping an integrated distributed force through which kill webs can operate to provide for a scalable combat force. With such a template, the role of next generation autonomous systems can enable either enhanced mass to modular task forces, or enhanced decision-making capability either at the tactical edge or at the wider tactical or strategic decision-making levels. As Joyce put it: “we know that we have to go to war with what we’ve got. When you go to the next big thing in defense, you proceed from what you already have.” The second issue was the key role in which Australia finds itself with regard to working next generation autonomous systems. As Joyce noted: “We are recognized as a global leader in autonomy in the mining and resource sector, both ground and aerial survey autonomy. I think a lot of that technology is able to be brought across to defense or upscaled towards defense applications.” As a key member of the five eyes community, Australian innovations have a wider market for both development and deployment. Australia also can draw upon innovations being shaped by the other five eyes members, and as Canada, the UK, and the U.S. particularly do not have the same geographical defense needs, there will clearly be different approaches to incorporating next generation autonomous systems into their forces. As Joyce underscored: “I think there is a melting pot of technology built in Australia that we’re good at and we have a lot of potential to contribute on a global scale.” The third issue is the cross between the first and second points: Australia is already building a fifth-generation force which enables further innovation as well. With regard to the fifth-generation force, the core role of software has clearly emerged as a key element of change. As forces get more used to how to manage software upgradeability in current platforms, a learning cycle is being shaped whereby systems which are built primarily around software – the next generation autonomous systems – will become key elements for force transformation. With the shift to the digital native generation of warriors, innovation processes are changing as well. WGCDR Joyce used the example of the potential impact of drone racers on military innovation. “The Drone Racing Teams of the Army, Navy, and Air Force are a key force for change. These are kids that have decided to take up drone racing in their spare time. None of them are employed to do this full-time. They have taken it off as a hobby and not through university, not through technical college, but off You Tube videos and collaborative communities that have taught themselves all the skills on how to build a UAV. They literally learn it all on You Tube, and they have this amazing skill set that sits at a peer level and in some cases in advance of our socially qualified engineers. “In Australia we’ve used these drone racing pilots in support of our weapon’s technical investigations and intelligence, in support of rapid prototyping, assisting with ground autonomy trials, and all of these soldiers and aviators are doing this in their spare time. “I think it’s something that we need to tap more and to develop deployable rapid prototyping labs, or deployable space labs. In the future it’s plausible that when we are confronted with the next asymmetric threat that our opposition force comes up with, there is absolutely the possibility that we can design, prototype and manufacture solutions, not by engineers, but by people who just know how to do it and have taught themselves how to do it because it’s fun. I think that is a real skill set that we should be focusing on and tapping: it is an opportunity that costs next to nothing. “Perhaps we should be setting up structures in our organizations where we let these people do their day job one posting, and then on the next posting their whole job is just running or contributing to innovation labs. And then they go back to their job, and then they go back to the innovation lab. We could really foster those skill sets and thought processes and innovative approaches to whatever sixth Gen is, because when we take our Fifth-Gen Force to the next battle, we go with what we’ve got. “And if we want to rapidly uptake that force to a Generation 5.1, or a Generation 6 application, then we are going to need skills to do that. Most of the skills needed are in code, in electronics, software, and in data: drone racers.” The fourth issue is the relationship between the broader ecosystem for robots, AI and autonomy and finding ways for the military to tap into that broader ecosystem. WGCDR Joyce underscored how important being able to do so was for the Australian military and he provided an example of such a case. “One case study in particular is prototyping an aircraft for the eVTOL market for unmanned aerial taxis. There’s a company out of Sydney called AMSL. “They’re doing it for the commercial market. But they have partnered with Defence to take the five-passenger seats out and design a configuration for us to do 500 to 600 kilograms worth of combat resupply. “We have asked them as well to do the design work that when that airplane is otherwise coming back empty from doing a resupply that we could also put in up to two stretchers for casualty evacuations. “They are already doing the collaborative research with telemedicine and automated monitoring of stretcher-bound patients. “All of that technology is coming in from the medical tech field, and that’s being underpinned not necessarily by defense or even the medical field, it’s by our civilian medical evacuation helicopter providers, people like CareFlight who provide some of our emergency response helicopters for our ambulance services.” The fifth point is where the quest for next generation autonomous systems fits into the evolution of the art of warfare. This can be looked at in two different ways: one the specific defense geography of Australia and secondly, the strategic shift from the Middle Eastern land wars to operating in conflict with peer competitors. This first revolves around shaping the distributed integratable force in which combat clusters can operate at the tactical edge with enough capability to achieve their tasks as allocated by mission command requirements. Distribution is about working multi-domain warfighting packages. Next generation autonomous systems can provide increased mass for each combat cluster notably with ISR payloads already on the way. The second revolves around the geography of Australia. Given the importance of Western to Northern Australia to the first island chain of the Solomon Islands, there are a number of ways next generation autonomous systems can provide for capabilities throughout the distributed operational space. For example, port security at a distance is a crucial requirement. Already, autonomous maritime USVs exist with the relevant ISR systems to provide significant inputs to meeting this mission. As the ADF works through how best to build a defense grid over this region for its operations, it makes a great deal of sense to build in new autonomous systems as players in that defense grid. This solves a key problem which is where to add new capabilities without degrading extant capabilities, for as you build out a new approach to an operational area building in new platforms and systems can be done with realism in terms of delivering a desired combat capability, rather than just building prototypes or briefing slides, more likely to put your audience asleep than building capabilities which deter an adversary. And finally, we discussed Triton. WGCDR Joyce has Triton in his portfolio, and I have visited Jax Navy several times as well as RAAF Base Edinburgh where the P-8s and Tritons will be operated from. The point can be made simply: This is a U.S. Navy led effort on manned-unmanned teaming NOW and lessons learned from such teaming clearly inform a way ahead for next generation autonomous systems. In short, next generation autonomous systems are clearly on the way. As WGCDR Joyce underscored: “All of the services see robotic autonomous systems as a significant part of the road ahead. It’s just that the services are getting after them differently.” And this was highlighted during the seminar and will be the focus of later pieces on the seminar. The featured graphic is of a MQ-4 Triton with an LHD in the rear of the graphic.

Dr Robbin Laird The Strategic Shift and the Role of Airpower: A Discussion with Ben Lambeth Second Line of Defense, 10 April 2021 I have been focused for several years on what I see as a clear and dramatic shift from how civilians and the military have looked at the land wars in the Middle East to now dealing with adversaries who have built forces for contested operations across the spectrum of operations. We have a generation of civilian and military leaders who have not lived in the context of dealing with peer nuclear powers with significant conventional capability. It is not surprising that understanding of escalation management has atrophied. The strategic shift has a very dramatic impact on maritime and airpower, which clearly should be the ascendent services in the Pentagon to sort through the way ahead. And integration of air and maritime power is the key to meeting the strategic interests of the United States. But the U.S. Army still predominates with a Sec Def from the Army, a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs from the Army and two 4 Army Four Stars in a theater where the U.S. Army does not have the central, perhaps even a central role to play, namely in the Pacific. So how do we make the transition? How do we shape a relevant concept of operations? And how do we stop ground pounders from thinking that they can put missiles into the first island chain or on allied soil ringing China without even considering their impact on escalation management with nuclear powers? It is useful to remember that the Russians face three nuclear powers in the Atlantic; and the United States and its Pacific allies face three nuclear powers in the Pacific. Recently, I reviewed the new book by Ben Lambeth which provide his assessment of the shift from the pure dominance over airpower of counterinsurgency operations to the fight against ISIS, a fight which required airpower to remove the Army’s shackles on its proper use against a state-like competitor. I followed up from that review to talk with the author about how he came to write the book and his sense of the challenges moving forward beyond the land wars. Question: Why did you write the book? Lambeth: “Looking back on my collected work over the past two decades, I’ve made a productive career of writing in-depth air campaign assessments, starting out with my chapters that revisited both the Vietnam air war and Operation Desert Storm in a book of mine published in 2000 called The Transformation of American Air Power. “In the years since then, I went on to produce even more detailed studies of NATO’s air war for Kosovo in 1999, of Operation Enduring Freedom against the Taliban and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan that followed the terrorist attacks of 9/11/2001, and of the air contribution to the three-week major combat phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom in early 2003 that finally toppled Saddam Hussein. “In light of that background, it seemed only natural that once our initially anemic response to the rise of ISIS in August 2014 eventually expanded into a more effective and sustained air effort, that I should take on a critical assessment of that campaign as well.” Question: I was working for Mike Wynne at the time when the Sec Def and the Bush and then the Obama Administrations clearly cut back on the role of airpower and reduced it to support for the ground operations. Was this legacy finally being shed in Operation Inherent Resolve? Lambeth: “Clearly, as counterinsurgency operations became the predominant American way of war after 2003, the USAF lost a lot of muscle memory for doing much of anything else by way of higher-end force employment. “And the predominant Army leadership at U.S. Central Command continued to apply its long-habituated Army thinking going forward into an entirely different situation that was presented by the rise of ISIS. A more assertive leadership in CENTCOM’s air component at the time would have pressed for a different response to the challenge it was handed in 2014 by arguing for targeting ISIS not as an insurgency, but rather as a self-avowed state in the making. “However, CENTCOM’s commander, U.S. Army General Lloyd Austin III, simply assumed ISIS to be a regenerated Islamist insurgency of the sort that he was most familiar with, which it was not at all, and accordingly proceeded to engage it as just another counterinsurgency challenge. “Eventually, his air component’s second successive commander, then-Lieutenant General C. Q. Brown, finally prevailed in arguing for deliberate strategic air attacks against critical ISIS infrastructure targets in both Iraq and Syria, not just for on-call air “support” to be used as flying artillery for the ground fight. “One must remember that the vast majority of today’s serving U.S. Air Force airmen are only familiar with Operation Desert Storm from their book reading. “And even much of the USAF’s more senior leadership today has never really been exposed to higher-end aerial warfare as we last experienced it over Saddam Hussein’s Iraq in 2003. Only now are we slowly coming to realize the opportunity costs that were inflicted by this neglect for nearly two decades, during which time we fixated solely on less-intense counterinsurgency warfare..” Question: Then how do you see the challenge of transition posed by the strategic shift? Lambeth: “It is clearly a significant one. “And the continued absence of proper understanding where it matters most is suggested by the recent Army bid to deploy long-range missiles into the Pacific as one of their contributions. “This is simply a crass attempted roles-and-missions grab in order to stay operationally relevant, yet in a theater in which airpower – both land- and sea-based –clearly offers the only cost-effective tool for addressing the challenges presented in that arena. “In a way, we find ourselves today much like where we were at the end of the Vietnam War. “While we were consumed then by the eight-year distraction of that self-inflicted experience, the Soviet Union enjoyed essentially a free ride for modernizing its nuclear and conventional force postures without significant offsetting measures by us. “It took nearly two decades of hard work in the force development and training arenas for us to compensate in full for that failure to hold up our end of the strategic competition with Moscow. “Fortunately, we succeeded just in time to pave the way for our eventual success in Desert Storm and for the collapse of Soviet communism that followed shortly thereafter. “I believe we face a similar challenge today looking into the third decade of the 21st Century, with a rising China and a resurgent Russia now dominating tomorrow’s threat horizon. “We need to recognize this and wake up to the fact that the challenges we’re now facing are totally unlike the challenge we faced in fighting yesterday’s land wars in Southwest Asia. “But in order for that to happen, the country needs an amalgam of leadership that sees and understands this newly-emerging big picture correctly. “I have long felt, indeed ever since Desert Storm, that CENTCOM is organized incorrectly. CENTCOM’s area of responsibility has long been air-centric, in my opinion. And yet that organization has been consistently commanded by a succession of Army and Marine Corps four-stars. “That, to my mind, has repeatedly entailed putting a square peg into a round hole. “I’ve often felt that it would have been truly an inspired move after Desert Storm if its commander who largely swung that war’s successful outcome, U.S. Air Force General Chuck Horner, had been appointed CENTCOM’s next commander to replace U.S. Army General H. Norman Schwarzkopf. Or, that failing, had the successful air commander for Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003, U.S. Air Force General Buzz Moseley, been tapped to become the next commander of CENTCOM. “Either move would have finally broken the mold of the ground services’ long-held but increasingly anachronistic monopoly on that key position in today’s world. “That, in turn, might have made a fundamental difference in our subsequent combat experience in that part of the world for the better.” Lambeth’s Mitchell Forum overview on his book is included in the Second Line of Defense article