Search Results

The Central Blue is pleased to welcome a first-time Navy contributor, Nate Streher as he considers how Robotics and Autonomous Systems exist within the scope of mine warfare, and the potential impacts on Mine Counter Measure operations for the #ADFRAS2040 series. The rise of Robotics and Autonomous Systems (RAS) in all spheres of warfare has accelerated in recent times to a point where constant revision of tactics and procedures is now common practice.[1] The area of mine warfare, and in particular Mine Counter Measures (MCM), has been no exception. Heavy reliance on RAS has not only replaced proven tactics but has also increased the demand on the autonomous systems to work efficiently at the cost of effective redundancy planning. This leads to two questions; can we exploit the known weaknesses of adversary autonomous systems for maritime aerial denial? Or can we manipulate the adversary's autonomous systems to create an advantage? A natural byproduct of increased scrutiny on MCM has been the divergence of attention from purely mine clearance to offensive/defensive mining operations.[2] As RAS became the new normal in the context of MCM, a focus in identifying and exploiting the known vulnerabilities of these autonomous systems to increase the effectiveness of offensive mining efforts has grown. The critical vulnerability of the MCM system, manned or otherwise, is the dependence on acoustic and magnetic search techniques as a means of location and identification of potential threats. This is in addition to the communications link vulnerability that plagues unmanned technology and leaves it susceptible to electronic attack. Therefore, future opportunities exist to counter autonomous MCM operations through both kinetic and non-kinetic means. Kinetic Attack A simple model for countering autonomous assets is area denial of the minefield through kinetic attack tailored specifically for autonomous assets. This may take the form of underwater guided munitions, sowed amongst a real or distraction minefield, that targets explicitly autonomous MCM assets. This could be achieved relatively simply and inexpensively, due to the small size of the munition required and the simplicity of a sensor package that actively seeks known operating frequency range of enemy autonomous search systems. The cost versus damage ratio would be favourable, and the kinetic destruction of an autonomous asset by a countermeasure does not confirm a mine field’s location, instead, it leaves a sense of ambiguity of threat presence. The psychological effect of an autonomous asset being destroyed seconds after insertion into a possible minefield may also quickly interrupt the decision-making process of the enemy commander. An argument could be made that a simple fishing net placed in the probable path of Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (UUV) could delay the MCM effort. This is somewhat true; however, a lone kinetic countermeasure could serve to provide the illusion of a persistent mine threat where there is none. It may also degrade the adversary’s physical ability to conduct MCM operations through asset attrition at a favourable cost versus damage ratio. This concept is not restricted to underwater RAS, as these countermeasures could also target unmanned MCM Surface Vessels through search frequency identification and targeting. Non - Kinetic Attack Opportunities also exist for non-kinetic and clandestine countering of RAS behaviour models. Like any system that operates on a feedback loop (search/ return/ identify/ locate/ analysis/ action) there exists the opportunity to manipulate the flow of information overtly or clandestinely. One such opportunity would be the manipulation of information, namely the acoustic signature, to delay or prevent entirely the identification and location of sea mines through acoustic jamming or acoustic signal manipulation. This concept can be displayed through the provision of a hypothetical scenario. The Blue force MCM UUV proceeds ahead of the main Amphibious Task Group (ATG), clearing a path through the contested waters surrounding Orange force held littoral regions. The clearance route identified for UUV clearance will allow the Blue ATG to close to an optimal distance to launch Amphibious forces to regain control of the islands. Intelligence suggests the sea approaches have been mined and the MCM forces have already located and neutralised several conventional sea mines. An unknown threat, a sea mine with the ability to subtly manipulate acoustic sonar returns from MCM RAS, waits in the approaches. The UUV proceeds along the clearance route, actively searching for anomalies that may indicate a possible mine, providing a visual representation of the acoustic return to the operator through a mission interface on the surface. The mine lays dormant until the acoustic signal from the UUV reaches it. A module within the mine identifies the frequency of the signal and triangulates the position of the UUV. Instantaneously the mine emits an acoustic signature that is received by the UUVs receivers. This acoustic signal has been created by the sea mine, using the position and movement of the UUV, to alter the acoustic return of the UUV transponder, altering any possible return signal identifying an anomaly. The UUV continues receiving acoustic signals consistent with known sea bottom types, displaying a flat sea bottom with no contacts of interest, or a signal that represents a large submerged wreck that does not present a hazard to surface navigation, back to the operator. No anomalies are detected, and the channel is assessed to be clear by the MCM forces. As the ATG moves through the channel, the sea mine functions, breaking the back of the high-value target critical to Blue force success. A simple underwater weapon has not only managed to intercept and manipulate the behaviour cycles of enemy RAS but has also managed to kinetically function as designed, providing the occupying forces with a relatively cheap mission kill. While this is somewhat beyond the scope of the function of current generation sea mines, the effect of manipulating sonar returns has been shown in nature. The Tiger Moth uses well-timed acoustic signals to evade predation by bats through jamming of the bat’s echolocation method of hunting. Upon hearing the echolocation of the bat entering its terminal attack phase, the Tiger moth emits a series of signals on the same frequency that is expected by the bat. The unexpected clicks emitted by the moth confuses (while not completely jamming) the echolocation receptors of the bat by disrupting its known terminal location behaviour. This creates an error in the bat’s echolocation of the moth and affects the bat’s terminal attack phase. In controlled studies, the ‘silent’ moths (not emitting the disruptive clicks) were ten times more likely to be successfully caught by the bats, than the moths emitting the acoustically disruptive clicks.[3] This behaviour displays the ability of the moths to use acoustics to disrupt the echolocation behavior of the bats successfully. In warfare, this could mean to intercept and disrupt the expected acoustic return and manipulate the information to disrupt the identification behaviour cycle of the RAS. While current military examples of acoustic jamming exist, they are all overt countermeasures which completely block the acquisition of the desired acoustic return; none currently can manipulate the desired acoustic return and disruption of the identification behaviour cycle that is displayed by the Tiger moth. A consideration of this example of the Tiger moth is that it displays an inherently overt method of acoustic manipulation not entirely appropriate for a clandestine weapon such as a sea mine. The overt manipulation of an acoustic signal would provide an exceptionally quick way of anomaly identification, drawing unwanted attention to the mine. More importantly, this concept of information warfare through acoustic manipulation could be developed upon and introduced as a means for countering autonomous technologies and may significantly disrupt the mine warfare sphere if successfully developed. Overall, a significant opportunity exists for RAS to be countered in mine warfare, particularly in MCM operations. From an MCM standpoint, unmanned systems will reduce risk to human operators through the provision of results from a distance and may increase the effectiveness of MCM operations through higher fidelity information. However, while these opportunities exist, so do the ability to manipulate the technology against the owner/user subtly or to remove the RAS asset even quickly from the battlefield altogether through the exploitation of known weaknesses. While RAS will continue to improve MCM operations, treatment of these technologies as a panacea may be highly detrimental if all possibilities of countering and exploitation are not considered. LCDR Nate Streher joined the Royal Australian Navy in 2005 as a Maritime Warfare Officer, before specialising as a Mine Warfare & Clearance Diving Officer in 2011. After service as Executive Officer - Australian Clearance Diving Team Four and multiple operational deployments, LCDR Streher chose to discharge for 18 months where he worked in Commercial Maritime and Unmanned systems. Re-joining in 2018, LCDR Streher has since been selected as the Tactical Underwater Warfare Instructor on exchange with the Royal Malaysian Navy in Lumut, Malaysia. The opinions expressed are his alone and do not represent the views of the Royal Australian Navy, the Australian Defence Force, or the Australian Government. #ADFRAS2040 #FutureWarfare #RoyalAustralianNavy #AusDef [1] Evans, A. William, Matthew Marge, Ethan Stump, Garrett Warnell, Joseph Conroy, Douglas Summers-Stay, and David Baran, ‘The future of human robot teams in the army: Factors affecting a model of human-system dialogue towards greater team collaboration’ in Pamela Savage-Knepshield,, Jessie Chen (eds.), Advances in Human Factors in Robots and Unmanned Systems (Springer, 2017), pp. 197-209. [2] Justin Doubleday, ‘Navy's expeditionary warfare office putting focus on offensive mining,’ Inside the Navy, 29:23 (2016), pp. 1-5. [3] James H. Fullard, James A. Simmons, and Prestor A. Saillant, ‘Jamming bat echolocation: the dogbane tiger moth Cycnia tenera times its clicks to the terminal attack calls of the big brown bat Eptesicus fuscus,’ Journal of Experimental Biology, 194:1 (1994), pp. 285-98.

The Central Blue is pleased to welcome first-time contributor Kristi Adam as she considers the historical developments and military implications of biometrics for the #ADFRAS2040 series. Using biometric technology in security is not a new concept. Something unique to an individual – a fingerprint or a retina – has been used for identification alongside access cards and passwords for some time. Historically, biometric security technology has predominantly focused on facilities and network access and been conducted with the consent of the individual being identified. More recently, there have been significant developments in non-cooperative identification of individuals using biometrics. Using this newer technology, it could be possible to identify an adversary utilising extensive database and targeting systems automatically. While there are significant and promising advancements occurring in biometrics, it is also an ethical minefield. Due to these ethical considerations, it is unlikely that the Australian Defence Force (ADF) will progress to a fully autonomous human-out-of-the-loop targeting system. However, the ADF must understand how other military forces could exploit these technologies in the future. Historical developments Fingerprints were the beginning of biometric identification, but continually advancing technology has enabled significant developments in voice, gait, and facial recognition. Progression has been assisted by common, commercial-access systems like those used for accessing smartphones. As a consequence, there has been a significant increase in accuracy for facial recognition over the past four years, with the failure rate reducing from 4 per cent down to 0.2 per cent in certain circumstances such as passport photo identification. The United States Special Operations Command (SOCOM) have capitalised on this improvement with a project named Advanced Tactical Facial Recognition at a Distance Technology. This project has enabled a portable face recognition device that can operate at up to one kilometre. With the addition of thermal imaging, it is further possible for facial recognition to occur while a person is wearing a face mask, though with decreased accuracy. Biometric identification technology has moved beyond just facial recognition; one example is the use of lasers to measure a person's cardiac signature at a distance of up to 200 metres. The system, also known as ‘Jetson’, was developed in response to another request from US SOCOM. Using laser vibrometry, the device measures the vibrations on the garment fabric sitting against the chest. The technique can be used to add additional unique data to biometric databases as individuals' hearts differ in size, shape, and contraction patterns. The main advantage of this type of identification is that, unlike facial or gait recognition, a heartbeat cannot be altered or disguised. Unfortunately, the technology is currently limited by the thickness of the garment worn by the target as the laser is unable to penetrate heavy fabrics or body armour. Further, it requires 30 consecutive seconds of scanning to make an identification, which means that the target would need to be sitting or standing still. ADF application In contemplating how the ADF could utilise advanced biometric technology to gain a winning advantage, there are several operational concepts to explore. Using a layered approach, friendly forces could simultaneously conduct face, voice, and gait recognition, along with cardiac signature measurements to improve identification accuracy significantly. This data could further feed databases to either enable a positive identification or make connections from the continued use in one area. For example, it could assist in locating an individual from an earlier scan even when the identity of that person had not yet been confirmed. The technology applications are very versatile - from humanitarian and disaster relief to base security. In the conduct of humanitarian missions, the technology could be used to locate missing persons in a natural disaster or war zone, while for base security applications, it offers additional safety through distancing personnel from the potential threat. Biometric technology software integrated onto Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) may be able to positively identify friend from foe, thus pushing boundaries out to circumvent attacks on-base infrastructure. Then there are the potential combat uses. Automatic Target Recognition (ATR) has improved the efficiency of offensive weapon and surveillance systems. An armed UAS may potentially find, fix, and track an individual through biometric recognition. As with many other capabilities, the ADF will require access to common allied databases to maximise efficiencies and opportunity for success. The US has been building a database of biometric data from global operations, and access to this or similar allied databases could assist Australia in fully exploiting biometric capabilities. Ethical considerations Like many of the topics studied within the robotics and automated systems field, there are significant ethical questions to be considered. Regarding biometrics specifically, questions relate to the risk of misidentification as well as data protection. Biometric data collection and storage has raised privacy concerns globally. In China, there is an ongoing legal case concerning the collection of facial recognition data without specific consent. Chinese law has yet to catch up to rapidly advancing technology, with biometric data currently being included as personally identifiable information covered under non-binding guidelines within a broader data protection framework. This is not dissimilar to current Australian law, which has yet to move beyond fingerprint technology. To address concerns, the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO) is developing an Artificial Intelligence (AI) framework. The framework covers important topics regarding both data governance and automated decisions; however, its focus is domestic applications. In covering issues of privacy and democratic freedoms, the framework may serve as a useful foundation from which military applications can be further considered. Conclusion Although technologically possible, utilising AI reliant on biometric data to make life and death decisions and removing the human-out-of-the-loop for efficiency raises significant ethical questions worthy of deep consideration. Until ethical considerations are resolved, or at least further understood, the ADF will likely retain human-in-the-loop processes for targeting; however, the technology has other uses that will be worth exploring. The ADF must consider how and when other militaries could exploit this capability in the future, and what defensive capabilities could be used in response. Pilot Officer Kristi Adam is in the Royal Australian Air Force and currently undertaking a Bachelor in Business through University of New South Wales in addition to a Bachelor in Global Security through Murdoch University. The opinions expressed are hers alone and do not represent the views of the Royal Australian Air Force, the Australian Defence Force, or the Australian Government.

The potential future applications of Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) capabilities in support of everyday military operations are widely acknowledged. Over two parts, SGT William Gill analyses UAS capability through the lens of the force-in-being, objective force and future force, as well as opportunities for technological advancement. This is the second instalment in that series. Part one can be found here. The Future Force Human-out-of-the-loop (HOL) autonomy is expected to grow significantly over the coming decades and could include the full automation of an airbase such that human involvement is minimal. By utilising autonomous vehicles to complete tasks that have traditionally been conducted by human operators, Australian Defence Force (ADF) personnel can be reassigned to more specific, useful roles. Peter Layton explains this concept succinctly in his recent paper Surfing the Digital Wave. Autonomous vehicles could include forklifts, aircraft tow motors, general maintenance vehicles, air operations vehicles and ancillary motored ground support equipment. Fuel trucks, cargo loaders and power units could also be autonomous, positioning themselves as appropriate and then connecting themselves to the aircraft. People could then inspect the setup either at the flight line, or through some remote means, and authorise fuel delivery, cargo loading or power on, respectively. Weapons could also be transported and loaded by autonomous systems. Extrapolating this illustration to include airbase security; UAS could be used to detect anomalies during a base perimeter patrol. The UAS could cue an Automatic Guided Vehicle (AGV) to respond and interrogate the detected anomaly. Through developments in machine learning and artificial intelligence (AI), the above scenario demonstrates the potential of fully autonomous systems. This concept is not limited to base security; potential exists across the whole airbase to incorporate such technology to streamline processes and create efficiencies. While it may seem far-fetched, this concept has already been partially tested by the Australian Army’s Robotic and Autonomous System Implementation Coordination Office (RICO) in collaboration with BAE Systems in the development of the Autonomous M113 Armoured Personnel Carrier. Gabby Costigan, the CEO of BAE Systems Australia, highlighted that the M113 project demonstrates a `commitment to leading the development of new technologies and collaborating across industry and academia to advance autonomous capabilities.’ The Future of UAS Awareness and education are vital to promoting the value of UAS within the Royal Australian Air Force. Recent trial activity conducted by Air Force 3 Security Force (3 SECFOR) involving UAS operations within RAAF air bases highlighted a common lack of knowledge and understanding. Base Command Posts, Air Traffic Control and Base Security Officers each required in-depth education from the project team upon arrival to alleviate security and safety concerns. There was a common perception among personnel that the UAS was a toy, not a tool that could enhance capability outputs for various tasks. In order to gain UAS operating permission, a significant amount of time was spent educating base staff on how safety and governance requirements were being fulfilled. Implementation of standardised base operating procedures would go a long way to increasing understanding on a broader scale, allowing for more efficient and widespread utilisation. Standardised processes across all defence bases would further streamline approval processes and reduce the need for surplus education. To assist in this process, the Air Force could again leverage from the Army's success in implementing a drone literacy program. In 2018, the Army invested in 350 UAS, which enabled Army personnel a hands-on approach to UAS education. As explained by Colonel Gabby Follett, Commanding Officer of 17th Combat Sustainment Support Battalion (CSSB), ‘drone literacy is every soldier and commander understanding what a drone can do for them. What the possibilities are, how to pick the right drone for the mission.’ The 3SECFOR trial identified the significant potential of UAS within a 5th generation Air Force. It is imperative, however, that a positive narrative is provided by leadership to support the implementation of UAS capability. This includes promoting UAS as a capable tool with many diverse applications across all Air Force. There are numerous opportunities across the workforce to streamline everyday tasks, improve surveillance and accuracy, minimise risk exposure and realise time and cost efficiencies. Such an approach supports the Air Force Strategy 2017-2027 which states that Air Force must ‘develop a 5th generation workforce that can quickly and effectively adapt to rapid technological and operational change and exploit the opportunities presented by Australia’s changing workforce demographics.’ Conclusion Introducing new and innovative, technologically advanced methods for completing everyday tasks, while challenging traditional methodologies is crucial to driving innovation in any workforce. A 5th Generation Air Force requires adept and agile thinkers to generate innovation in its approach to applying new and evolving technologies. Through an analysis of UAS capability across the Force-in-Being, Objective Force and Future Force, this two-part series aims to encourage conversation surrounding the potential of UAS capability and emerging technology in the 5th Generation Air Force. Recent Technology advancements have proven invaluable across all spectrums of UAS capability, ground vehicles, artificial intelligence, big data, and analysis. Technology not only improves efficiencies and outputs; it can reduce human error and minimise risk in the workplace. Impressive technological innovation already occurs across Air Force, Army and Navy; however, additional cross-pollination would prove invaluable. Collaboration in trials, research and outcomes across the joint force will generate greater cost efficiencies and streamline engagement with Australian industry. The creation of a joint centre for excellence would further strengthen this collaboration and provide a channel for clear communication and knowledge. The implementation of these recommendations ensure that research and lessons learnt are shared and leveraged for continuous improvement within the ADF as a whole. Indeed, tri-service collaboration is imperative for the 5th Generation Air Force. Sergeant William Gill is an Airfield Defence Guard in the Royal Australian Air Force. He has extensive and diverse operational experience including service on Operations FIJI ASSIST, SLIPPER and MAZURKA. Sergeant Gill is passionate about Small Unmanned Aerial Systems, and how they can deliver enhanced security effects to national support bases and expeditionary security forces. In 2020, Sergeant Gill received a Conspicuous Service Cross for his dedicated work in Small Unmanned Aerial Systems. The opinions expressed are his alone and do not represent the views of the Royal Australian Air Force, the Australian Defence Force, or the Australian Government.

Air Vice-Marshal John Blackburn, AO (Retd) Integrated Air and Missile Defence Study: The Challenge of Integrated Force Design, April 2017 The Williams Foundation conducted an Integrated Air and Missile Defence (IAMD) study between Sep16 and Feb17 to explore the challenges of building Australia’s IAMD capability and the implications for the Department of Defence’s integrated force design function. The study was focussed at the Program level of capability. The study incorporated a visit to the US for a month to explore the IAMD challenge with United States Defense Forces and Agencies, think tanks and Industry. The initial study findings were then explored in Australia in three Defence and Industry workshops on 31 Jan 17 and 1 Feb 17, using a Chatham House model of unattributed discussions. Many of the statements made in this report are not referenced as they are derived from these Chatham House discussions and associated meetings. IAMD is a highly complex issue; comments made in this report should not be construed in any way as being critical of the IAMD approach of the Department of Defence. This report cannot account for the full complexity of the integrated force design process that is being addressed within Defence; however, it may offer some value in providing suggestions based on the study findings. This study would not have been possible without the support and assistance of several areas within the Australian Department of Defence, the US Defense Department, Industry and think tanks. The Williams Foundation deeply appreciates the support of the IAMD Study major sponsors, Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman. Thanks are also due to Jacobs in funding the services of Dr Gary Waters who provided valuable support in the research for the study and in the production of the workshop notes. This report represents the views of AVM Blackburn (Retd), the IAMD Study lead. This study report is intentionally high level and brief; in the author’s experience, long and detailed reports are rarely read by senior decision makers. Download pdf of the report

The potential future applications of Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) capabilities in support of everyday military operations are widely acknowledged. Over two parts, SGT William Gill will analyse UAS capability through the lens of the force-in-being, objective force and future force. These three distinct time periods enable planning and are utilised to forecast strategic development in the Royal Australian Air Force and explore opportunities for technological advancement. In raising awareness of UAS capability potential, this series aims to demonstrate that with more significant investment in UAS capability, Air Force development will be better aligned with future technological advancement. It further aims to encourage greater research and development in the use of UAS to minimise risk, save costs, decrease task timelines, and create human resource efficiencies while simultaneously enhancing joint capability. Characteristics of UAS Remote Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS) range from micro platforms, such as the in-service Black Hornet, to much larger platforms such as the MQ-4C Triton, with each having a unique range of advantages and limitations which require careful consideration for task application. Noting the potential tactical, operational and strategic objectives required of the Australian Defence Force (ADF) as outlined in the 2016 Defence White Paper and 2020 Defence Strategic Update, it is unrealistic to expect that one platform can or will provide a holistic ‘one size fits all’ solution. Fundamental characteristics of air power such as reach, range or manoeuvrability do not apply equally to tasks such as wide-area surveillance or base security. It is, therefore, imperative that each RPAS is tailored to suit the required mission profile. System architecture is equally important and must be flexible and adaptable to exploit industries’ rapid advancement in a timely fashion. Small Unmanned Aerial Systems (SUAS) are relatively low cost, highly capable platforms and therefore easily replaceable by newer technologies if structured in a manner which supports rapid spiral upgrades. Technology is advancing at such a rate that SUAS platforms will likely only remain in service for three to five years. Within that time frame, they will likely require yearly spiral upgrades, such as sensor and software improvements to ensure a technological edge is retained. This concept is echoed by Chris Herd, author of A Brief History of Humanity and the Future of Technology in which he says ‘we need to stop viewing technology as an existential threat and embrace it in partnership. Technology isn’t our biggest threat; our biggest threat is not embracing it to invent the future.’ Appropriate investment in the right technology will ensure that the ADF sustains a current, capable, and superior RPAS capability. The Force-in-Being At present, ADF SUAS utilisation is setting the foundations for the objective and future force. As illustrated below, SUAS range in capability, resulting in potential applications across the tactical, operational, and strategic environments. Their applications can shape and enhance the conduct of everyday tasks while also creating cost efficiencies across Defence. Take, for example, a SUAS coupled with pixel analysis software, which can be utilised to conduct visual inspections of aircraft to detect damage. This application promises to minimise the human requirement to work from heights generates time and resource efficiencies and increases accuracy. Further, the financial outlay required to obtain such a system is minimal when compared to the force-multiplying capability it provides. Like all new technology, the introduction of SUAS is not without issue. Any implementation of such a capability requires due diligence, trials and adequate investment in both resources and manning. If the ADF does not adequately invest in resources and manning, the sustainability of these systems and the ADF’s position as a leader in technological advancement will be jeopardised. As stated in an Air Power Development Centre Bulletin, the SUAS ‘capability needs to be carefully analysed if the full capabilities of these versatile vehicles are to be realised.’ Successful implementation of SUAS in mainstream Air Force is necessary to create the foundations for a positive narrative; both internal to Air Force, and outwardly to the public. An Internal positive narrative aids in increasing workforce literacy and understanding of unmanned systems, while a positive narrative in the general public highlights the benefits of RPAS and their role within Defence, as well as avoiding inaccurate clickbait headlines such as, ‘ADF buys remote killer drones’. Resource considerations During a three year test and evaluation period of the Multi-Rotor Unmanned Aerial System (MRUAS) concept, it became evident that the unit establishment would require review and variation in order to ensure dedicated staff allocation to implement, manage and deliver an enduring UAS capability. Only when units are adequately resourced do, UAS capabilities provide force multiplication opportunities through the creation of time and cost efficiencies, as well as a reduction of safety risks. Efficiencies are lost without suitably experienced and trained personnel to enable the successful implementation and execution. Expecting existing personnel to take on extensive UAS secondary duties in addition to daily roles and responsibilities is setting the capability up for failure and creating a negative narrative. In a highly active and task-driven Air Force, this expectation is not feasible or sustainable. A dedicated workforce structure has been successfully implemented within the Australian Army and Royal Australian Navy, enabling key fundamental inputs to capability, including engineering, maintenance, training, operations, and supply to occur. These models must be emulated in an Air Force UAS structure to ensure ADF wide standardisation and training, capability, mission worthiness and future platform procurement. Air Force Strategy dictates that ‘Air Force must build on the experience and knowledge gained with its current platforms and systems to help inform future force-design decisions. This includes the greater use of unmanned systems.’ Capability Considerations In the context of innovation and capability development, understanding the Fourth Industrial Revolution is a key for the ADF. Brendan Marr, Futurist author, explains: The Fourth Industrial Revolution describes the exponential changes to the way we live, work and relate to one another due to the adoption of cyber-physical systems, the Internet of Things and the Internet of Systems. As we implement smart technologies in our factories and workplaces, connected machines will interact, visualise the entire production chain and make decisions autonomously. The fourth industrial revolution has already had a significant impact on the ADF, particularly within the ongoing development and employment of unmanned systems and capabilities. Investment in new technologies and concepts must continue for the ADF to remain at the cutting edge of technology. This sentiment is further echoed by Klaus Schwab, Engineer, Economist and founder of the World Economic Forum when he highlights that ‘the scale, scope and complexity of how technological revolution influences our behaviour and way of living will be unlike anything humankind has experienced.’ To ensure Air Force remains in lock step with the fourth industrial revolution, UAS capabilities need to be trialled and implemented within short time frames such that the current and most relevant technologies are exploited. In doing so, the chain of command must be willing to accept a higher level of risk for capability failure in order to enable progress. Trials must also consider exploiting opportunities to better understand ADF collection of big data, artificial intelligence (AI) and automation thus driving further efficiencies and building greater corporate knowledge. Objective Force (3-5 years from present) Human-in-the-loop (HIL) systems are currently being implemented effectively within semi-autonomous capabilities across the ADF. For example, the Expeditionary Tactical Automated Security System works to autonomously identify potential ground-based threats and is playing an integral role in ISR and increasing security-in-depth. These interactions currently place a high level of importance on the human as a critical decision-maker throughout the mission profile. This raises the question – what does this concept look like without direct human involvement? Moreover, more importantly, what resources and training are required to ensure its success? As the ADF continues to explore the use of autonomous vehicles and SUAS technology to enhance the force-in-being, the evolution of these capabilities and technologies over the next three years must be examined. What foundational infrastructure does the ADF need to invest in to support the future force? While end-user components of SUAS may have a limited shelf life (approximately three to five), critical investments in IT and airbase infrastructure will provide longevity in support of both current and future capability. One such concept which has the potential to provide a strong return on investment is the utilisation of semi-autonomous vehicles within the objective force. Semi-autonomous vehicles may be used to conduct simple everyday tasks across an airbase at all levels of operation, allowing for increased efficiencies throughout. Conducting ISR of an airbase is imperative to ensuring security and freedom of manoeuvre of friendly force operations. Airbase force protection measures ensure the protection of infrastructure, aircraft, and personnel. Using UAS instead of traditional human methods provides a wider aperture of awareness and an ability to react to threats more quickly with greater situational awareness. UAS mission profiles will continue to evolve as testing with an increased scope towards full autonomy develops. Instead of a security force conducting a perimeter patrol, runway sweep or checking base infrastructure, a UAS or Unmanned Ground Vehicle (UGV) could be tasked to simultaneously achieve these collection requirements in one flight or mission, many times each day. In doing so, the UAS and UGV optimise human resources for employment at the right place, and the right time. This task could be further enabled by an increased application of AI which may enable machines to make decisions and reduce human input during simple tasks. Training Parallel to developing foundational infrastructure, the ADF should consider a joint centre of excellence in order to optimise efficiencies. Currently, Army has successfully adopted 20 Surveillance and Target Acquisition (20STA) Regiment as their centre of excellence, while the Navy has chosen 822 Squadron within their Fleet Air Arm. While each service would continue to champion their individual mission Concept of Operations (CONOPs), developing a joint centre would better highlight opportunities for efficiencies in innovation, Australian industry engagement, capability implementation and funding. In addition to the creation of a joint centre of excellence, a whole of Government approach to the development of AI and autonomous vehicles would prove valuable. Such an establishment would endeavour to share knowledge in areas such as concept development, research, training, procurement, policy and procedures and technical support. Mechanisms for direct access to Australian industry would further ensure effective ADF access to cutting-edge technologies for joint and interagency use. Moving forward, the Air Force must acknowledge and learn from the current systems and processes that have been developed by the Army. In 2018, the Army released the Robotic & Autonomous Systems Strategy (RAS) which explores and promotes concept development and the potential of robotics in a Defence setting. An Air Force UAS strategy should similarly be implemented to ensure that the full potential of the system is exploited. Sergeant William Gill is an Airfield Defence Guard in the Royal Australian Air Force. He has extensive and diverse operational experience including service on Operations FIJI ASSIST, SLIPPER and MAZURKA. Sergeant Gill is passionate about Small Unmanned Aerial Systems, and how they can deliver enhanced security effects to national support bases and expeditionary security forces. In 2020, Sergeant Gill received a Conspicuous Service Cross for his dedicated work in Small Unmanned Aerial Systems. You can follow Will on Twitter @_williamgill #AustralianDefenceForce #RoyalAustralianAirForce #UnmannedAerialSystems #Drones #FutureWarfare

Brian Weston 'On Target - Defending south of Australia’s ‘First Island Chain’ – Part 3' in Australian Defence Business Review, May/June 2020 pp 72-74 The two recent On Target columns in the Jan-Feb and Mar-Apr issues of ADBR noted the strategic importance to Australia’s security of ‘Australia’s First Island Chai’ ‒ the island chain stretching from Sri Lanka to Fiji. The most recent column concluded that, given the geo-political changes taking place in the Indo-Pacific, perhaps it is time for Australia to focus on the preparedness of the ADF to conduct credible operations in this vast theatre. Without downplaying the importance of the Australia-US alliance, global issues might dictate that anticipated levels of US military and logistic support fall short of Australian expectations ‒ a not unreasonable assumption given the commitments the US has in the Indo-Pacific (Japan, South Korea and Taiwan), in Europe (especially in Eastern Europe and the Baltic), in South Central Europe and the Black Sea, and in the Middle East. Across the globe the US ‒ facing a militarised China under the rule of an autocratic, nationalistic, aggressive and belligerent Communist Party of China ‒ might be forced to focus its limited Indo-Pacific military resources on matching China’s capabilities, especially air and naval, from established US bases in Japan, South Korea and the Central Pacific. That could lead to the US leadership ‘delegating’ to Australia, the conduct of all military operations south of Australia’s First Island Chain. The two On Target columns concluded that, although not by desire but necessity, Australia might find itself almost wholly responsible for the defence of its island continent and its approaches, and of the Australian (and US) logistic and enabling bases therein. The columns further concluded Australia should, therefore, pay more attention to the expansive theatre of operations extending outwards from continental Australia to Australia’s First Island Chain. A useful starting point, especially given the pace with which militarisation is occurring in the Indo-Pacific, would be to assess how well the capabilities outlined in the 2016 Integrated Investment Program (IIP) have prepared the ADF for unilateral military operations in the operational theatre south of Australia’s First Island Chain. Second, given the speed with which technology is advancing military capabilities in the Indo-Pacific, this assessment should be a nearer-term assessment ‒ such as 2025 ‒ rather than a longer-term assessment out to 2035. Accordingly, this column will make some observations on how well Australia’s 2016 IIP force structure has prepared the ADF to respond to the challenge of an adversary venturing into Australia’s ‘front yard’ to coerce and intimidate, to ensure Australian deference to a superior military power. Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities are the foundation of national security. But in the past, Australian defence policies have used ISR in the strategic context of ‘Warning Time’ rather than in an operational or tactical context. In this strategic context, the role of ISR is to warn of the emergence of threats as they emerge so that they are recognised and responded to by a corresponding upgrade in national defence capability. Today, there seems little doubt Australia is in Warning Time. Indeed, that realisation appears to have come a little late with some 2016 IIP defence capabilities not scheduled to begin to appear until the mid-2030s. Capabilities that will not begin to materialise until the mid-2030s and later, will be of little use in 2025. Fortunately, many of the ISR capabilities that Australia has prioritised also have immense value in an operational theatre. These include the acquisition of six MQ-4C Triton unmanned surveillance systems and 12 P-8A Poseidon manned aircraft, both recommended in the 2016 IIP. The IIP also foreshadowed an increase to 15 P-8A, which at a mission availability rate of 75%, translates into 11.25 “mission-available” P-8A. The MQ-4C and P-8A capabilities are complementary, and when combined with the four long-range electronic warfare support aircraft based on the Gulfstream G550, the Jindalee OTH Radar Network (JORN), and coalition Australia-US ISR capabilities, Australia will possess a modest but impressive operational ISR capability. But is this ISR capability enough to sustain ongoing operations out to Australia’s First Island Chain? And, is it possible for these ISR capabilities to sustain ongoing operations, simultaneously, in two areas of operations such as in the North Coral Sea and off the North West Shelf? Noting the US Navy allocates five MQ-4C to an operational node from which to sustain 24/7 ISR operations, the Australia MQ-4C capability will support only one node of 24/7 unmanned ISR operations. Whether this is adequate is debatable given long-range ISR operations are asset intensive as illustrated by the heavy AP-3C commitment in the mid-1990s search and rescue operations for round-the-world yacht racers; their heavy tasking in operations against illegal Patagonian Toothfish fishing boats; and in the search for MH370. So, getting the MQ-4C and P-8A operational fleet sizing right and balanced, will be critical to the efficiency and effectiveness of the operational ISR capability. But one positive from the introduction of the unmanned MQ-4C is that it relieves the manned P-8A of most of the long duration and repetitious surveillance activity, freeing the P-8A armed with mines, torpedoes and anti-ship missiles (ASM) to focus on the anti-submarine and anti-surface roles. Given the changing maritime power balance in the Indo-Pacific, this refocus of P-8A operations is timely and, arguably, provides justification for the early acquisition of the three additional P-8A foreshadowed in the IIP. The changing maritime power balance in the Indo-Pacific has also stimulated the development of new, technologically advanced, US ASM capabilities (noting recent US reports of a possible Foreign Military Sale of AGM-158C LRASM to Australia for carriage on F/A-18F Super Hornet). And with the AGM-158C likely to be cleared for carriage by the P-8A in the mid-2020s, there is a strong case to arm RAAF P-8As with the AGM-158C. With both the P-8A and F/A-18F armed with the stealthy, heavyweight, sophisticated and long-range AGM-158C, the ADF will possess a strong deterrent to threatening foreign naval incursions south of Australia’s First Island Chain. Air dominance is the prime role of the F-35A, although the in-theatre distances will make F-35A operations generally reliant on AAR support. The F-35A with its stealth, AIM-120D AMRAAM, long-range targeting ability and networked operations is a potent air dominance capability. As 2025 approaches, the operational capabilities of the F-35A will be further enhanced by the Block 4 upgrades which, apart from system and weapons upgrades, could include the integration of the Joint Strike Missile (JSM) or another ASM, and the possible integration of the follow-on AIM-260 JATM long-range air-to-air missile. The air force operates six E-7A Wedgetail, Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C) aircraft; a world class, critical enabling capability for both air and naval operations. But a fleet of six aircraft translates into only 4.5 mission-available E-7A. But while the 2016 IIP includes a significant upgrade to the AEW&C systems, it’s failure to increase the AEW&C fleet to eight aircraft (which would provide six mission-available E7-A) leaves the ADF deficient in the key operational and tactical co-ordination and control nodes, critical to mission success. The E-7A is also reliant on AAR support. A mission of about 10 hours, for a task at 1,500 km distance, involves five hours in transit and five hours on-station. Therefore, to sustain a 24/7 on-station E-7A presence, 4.8 missions must be tasked ‒ not achievable from the current fleet of six aircraft. But E-7A on-station time can be achieved with AAR support. By increasing mission duration to 15 hours, which also increases E-7A on-station time to 10 hours, AAR realises a 100% increase in E-7A on-station time. With AAR support, only 2.4 missions are needed to sustain a 24/7 on-station E-7A presence. This example also demonstrates that enabling AAR generally flows ‘straight to the bottom line’ of increased on-station presence. AAR support confers similar dramatic increases in on-station presence to the P-8A, EA-18G, F/A-18F and F-35A. The 2016 IIP expanded the MRTT capability to seven aircraft and foreshadowed a further increase to two aircraft, nominally to support P-8A operations. But even a fleet of nine MRTT aircraft ‒ with 6.75 mission-available MRTT ‒ is insufficient to provide the necessary AAR enabling capability to conduct credible air operations, at task force level, in our region. In short, this deficiency in AAR support puts at risk the operational effectiveness of an otherwise potent Australian air combat and sea denial capability upon which successful Australian air and naval operations must be based. In conclusion, the 2016 IIP has provided a framework of complimentary air capabilities that, in 2025, and with some augmentation, will pose a formidable challenge to any hostile air and naval incursion south of Australia’s First Island Chain. But the IIP has not recognised the criticality of the E-7A AEW&C capability to successful air and naval operations in the theatre, and of the necessity of increasing enabling AAR capability to support the range of likely concurrent air and naval activities. Brian Weston is a Board Member of the Sir Richard Williams Foundation. He served tours in Defence’s Force Development Analysis Division and the HQADF Force Structure Development Planning Branch. Download pdf

In June, AIRMSHL Mel Hupfeld AO, DSC (CAF) supported the opportunity to reach our members in a pre-recorded interview. In the interview with me, AIRMSHL Hupfeld provides a deeper understanding on Air Force Strategic Intent as well as insights into future Air Force capability development. The interview has resulted in a 3 part video series. We hope you find the video of interest and look forward to your feedback. View videos here Geoff Brown AO, Chair

The US Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) published an unclassified assessment of Chinese military developments on 15 January 2019. The report, China Military Power: Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win, disclosed that China is developing ‘new medium- and long-range stealth bombers to strike regional and global targets’, thus confirming long-standing rumours regarding a potential regional bomber. The development of a new strategic bomber, the H-20,  had been confirmed by the commander of the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) in 2016. The medium-range bomber is also described as a tactical bomber and a fighter-bomber in the DIA report: significantly, the new aircraft will reportedly possess a long-range air-to-air missile capability. The medium-range stealth bomber programme is indicative of China’s efforts to expand and enhance its air power capabilities, in particular through the pursuit of multiple fifth-generation aircraft (such as the J-20, J-31 and H-20), unmanned air systems, and an aircraft carrier force. It will also constitute a potent addition to China’s growing long-range strike capability. Although the DIA report does not provide detailed information concerning either of China’s stealth bomber programmes, it does offer useful insight, which together with other open-source analyses, enable some discussion of the regional bomber, its potential roles, and the implications both for the PLAAF and more broadly. The Regional Bomber China Military Power states that stealth technology is central to the development of the regional bomber and that it will employ ‘many fifth-generation fighter technologies’ (as will the H-20); the aircraft will include an active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar and be capable of delivering precision-guided munitions. The new bomber is not likely to enter service before 2025, nor has it been disclosed whether the aircraft will be subsonic or possess a supersonic capability. In this regard, if the regional bomber is indeed the JH-XX, a designation noted by observers in connection to a regional strike aircraft programme for a number of years, it will likely be supersonic. The JH-XX is believed to be a relatively large, twin-engine aircraft, possibly around 100 feet long with a maximum take-off weight of 60 to 100 tons, with a combat radius potentially around 1,500 miles (estimates vary between 1,000 and 2,000 miles). A combat radius of 1,500 miles would, for example, be sufficient to cover Japan, the Korean peninsula, (if operating from Hainan) the South China Sea and northern halves of Sumatra and Borneo plus the entirety of the Philippines, and from western or southern China, much of India and the Bay of Bengal. If forward deployed to the airfield on Panganiban Reef in the South China Sea, the regional bomber could threaten, with stand-off weaponry, targets in northern Australia. The JH-XX has been compared in concept to the FB-22 regional bomber project. The armament of the regional bomber is likely to include a variety of precision-guided munitions, stand-off weapons (potentially including air-launched cruise missiles such as the CJ-10), and anti-ship missiles. In terms of the aforementioned long-range air-to-air missile capability, this could include the ramjet-powered PL-XX, a 400 km-range weapon featuring mid-course off-board targeting support and active radar and infra-red terminal guidance, and intended to target large platforms such as intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) aircraft. The integration of a significant electronic warfare capability may be likely, given that the H-20 strategic bomber is described as ‘able to disturb and destroy incoming missiles and other air and ground targets through a range of equipment including radar, electronic confrontation platform, high power microwave, laser and infrared equipment’. Likewise, as with the H-20, the regional bomber may be ‘capable of large-capacity data fusion and transmission. It can serve as a C4ISR node and interact with large sensor platforms like UAV, early warning aircraft and strategic reconnaissance aircraft to share information and target data’. In this respect, the long-range air-to-air capability of the regional bomber may be particularly significant. That is, the aircraft could be employed as an extended-range interceptor utilising targeting support from unmanned air vehicles such as the Divine Eagle counter-stealth airborne early warning system. This would, assuming a 1,500-mile combat radius for the regional bomber, together with the 250-mile range of the PL-XX, enable the PLAAF to target high-value assets such as ISR aircraft and strategic bombers deep within ostensibly friendly airspace. Implications The development of the regional bomber, alongside the H-20 strategic bomber, reflects China’s ambition to develop world-class armed forces. The pursuit of two stealth bomber programmes alongside two known fifth-generation fighter projects – the J-20 and follow-on variants and the J-31, unmanned air systems, and hypersonic technologies provide a clear statement of intent concerning the level of air power Beijing is seeking. In this context, the regional bomber project is noteworthy. Although the US and Russia are working on strategic stealth bombers, the B-21 Raider and PAK DA (‘Prospective Aviation Complex for Long Range Aviation’) respectively, neither are known to be developing a manned sub-strategic bomber (Russia had previously sought to develop a stealthy medium-range bomber, the Sukhoi T-60S, to replace the Tupolev Tu-22M3 Backfire). The regional bomber, given its combination of stealth, precision-guided munitions and long-range air-to-air missiles, AESA radar, and other advanced systems, will provide the PLAAF with a potent ‘day one’ (the ability to conduct operations at the start of a conflict, against an adversary’s strategic targets defended by a still-intact integrated air defence system) capability. The new aircraft will constitute a significant defensive challenge, in particular with regard to the find, fix, track, target, engage and assess (F2T2EA) process. Moreover, the potential for the regional bomber to be employed in a deep, offensive counter-air role would likely necessitate the diversion of allied fifth-generation aircraft from offensive operations to defend high-value assets. Also, is the development of the regional bomber intended to enable the PLAAF to focus its eventual H-20 force on strategic air operations, in particular, vis-à-vis US forces in the Pacific and potentially the continental US? Similarly, the H-20 is believed to be intended to have a nuclear role; will the regional bomber also be dual-capable? It also warrants asking whether an intermediate-range stealth aircraft offering precision-strike and long-range air-to-air capabilities should be considered by, for example, the US, UK, Australia and Japan? Would such an aircraft offer a sufficient level of capability, in particular against high-end anti-access/area denial and advanced air threats, to justify what would likely require considerable investment? The trajectory of Chinese air power development in the coming decades, the options it confers on policy-makers in Beijing, and the implications are likely to prompt too many more questions regarding the direction of Western air power. Dr James Bosbotinis is a UK-based specialist in defence and international affairs, and Co-CEO of JB Associates, a geopolitical risk advisory. Dr Bosbotinis has written widely on   British defence issues, Russian strategy and military modernisation, China’s evolving strategy, and regional security in Europe, the Former Soviet Union and Asia-Pacific. #China #RegionalSecurity #AirPower #5thGenerationAirPower #DrJamesBosbotinis

Following a week that saw many Australians observe the centenary of the Battle of Hamel and debate the significance of that action, Alan Stephens invites us to consider our views on the unseen Second World War battles in the sky. Street names at the Australian Defence Force Academy honour notable wartime actions. While every one of those actions was a matter of life or death for the men involved, when measured against the broader sweep of history some scarcely merit the description “battle”. It might seem curious, therefore, that three of the greatest battles in which Australians have fought are not acknowledged. Those three battles all took place in the skies over Germany during World War II and were fought by the men of the Royal Air Force’s Bomber Command, some 11,500 of whom were members of the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF). The first was the Battle of the Ruhr from March to July 1943, the second the Battle of Hamburg from 24 July to 3 August 1943, and the third the Battle of Berlin from November 1943 to March 1944. Statistics can never tell a story by themselves, but the figures from those three epic clashes reveal a fearful truth. No Bomber Command aircrew who fought in them could expect to survive. An operational tour on heavy bombers consisted of thirty missions. Crews were then rested for about six months, usually instructing at a training unit. (That “rest” was, however, in name only, as more than 8000 men were killed in flying accidents at bomber conversion units.) They might then volunteer for or be assigned to a second operational tour of twenty missions. Over the course of the war the odds of surviving a first tour were exactly one-in-two – the classic toss of a coin. When the second tour was added the odds slipped further, to one-in-three. And during the battles of the Ruhr, Hamburg, and Berlin the figures became even more terrible, with the loss rates for each mission flown averaging 4.7 per cent, 2.8 per cent and 5.2 per cent respectively, making it statistically impossible to live through thirty missions. No other sustained campaign in which Australians have ever been involved can compare with the air war over Germany in terms of individual danger. The men of the RAAF who fought for Bomber Command amounted to less than 2 per cent of all Australians who enlisted in World War II, yet the 3486 who died accounted for almost 20 per cent of all deaths in combat. The RAAF’s most distinguished heavy bomber unit, No. 460 Squadron, alone lost 1018 aircrew, meaning that, in effect, the entire squadron was wiped out five times. It was far more dangerous to fight in Bomber Command than in the infantry. According to the Nazis’ minister of war production, Albert Speer, following the Hamburg raids he “reported for the first time to the Fuehrer that if these serial attacks continued a rapid end of the war might be the consequence”. And the official United States Strategic Bombing Survey concluded in September 1945 that air power had been “decisive in the war in Western Europe … It brought the [German] economy … to virtual collapse”. As a direct result of allied bombing, during 1944 the Nazis’ production schedules for tanks, aircraft and trucks were reduced by 35 per cent, 31 per cent and 42 per cent respectively. Additionally, an enormous amount of resources which might have been used to equip front-line troops had to be diverted to air defence. By 1944 the anti-aircraft system was absorbing 20 per cent of all ammunition produced and between half to two-thirds of all radar and signals equipment. More than one million German troops were engaged in the air defence of the Reich, using about 74 per cent of all heavy weapons and 55 per cent of all automatic weapons. Physical destruction and the massive diversion of resources was accompanied by psychological demoralisation. Contrary to conventional wisdom that the bombing boosted morale, the sustained campaign had a crushing effect on people’s mental state. Post-war surveys found that workers became tired, highly-strung and listless. Absenteeism because of bombing reached 25 per cent in some factories in the Ruhr for the whole of 1944, a rate which drastically reduced output and undermined production schedules. When asked to identify the single most difficult thing they had to cope with during the war, 91 per cent of German civilians nominated bombing. The men of the RAAF who flew with Bomber Command made the major contribution of any Australians to the defeat of Germany and, therefore, to victory in World War II. They alone opened a second front in Germany, four years before D-Day; and they alone inflicted decisive damage on the German war economy. As Albert Speer later lamented, Bomber Command’s victory represented “the greatest lost battle on the German side”. This article first appeared in the June edition of Australian Aviation  and draws on Alan Stephens, The Royal Australian Air Force: A Centenary History (Oxford University Press: Melbourne, 2001); and Richard Overy, “World War II: The Bombing of Germany”, in Alan Stephens (ed.), The War in the Air 1914-1994 (Air University Press: Maxwell AFB, 2001) Dr Alan Stephens is a Fellow of the Sir Richard Williams Foundation. He has been a senior lecturer at UNSW Canberra; a visiting fellow at ANU; a visiting fellow at UNSW Canberra; the RAAF historian; an advisor in federal parliament on foreign affairs and defence; and a pilot in the RAAF, where his experience included the command of an operational squadron and a tour in Vietnam. He has lectured internationally, and his publications have been translated into some twenty languages. He is a graduate of the University of New South Wales, the Australian National University, and the University of New England. Stephens was awarded an OAM in 2008 for his contribution to Australian military history. #RAAF #history #organisationalculture #AirPower #AirForce #lessonslearned

On 23 August, The Sir Richard Williams Foundation is holding a seminar on joint strike to discuss the imperative for an independent deterrent. The aim of the seminar is to build a common understanding of the need for an independent joint strike capability to provide Australia with a powerful and potent deterrent and a means of demonstrating strategic intent. In the lead up to the seminar, The Central Blue will be running a series (similar to #highintensitywar) in order to generate discussion and enable those that cannot to attend to gain a perspective on the topic. What does #jointstrike mean for Australia and its region? We want to hear from you! Australia’s geopolitical circumstances and regional threats are much changed from those which existed in 1963 when Australia committed to acquire the potent F-111 air strike capability. They are now more complex and much less straightforward than the Cold War heritage scenarios of the 1960s. But one aspect remains unchanged: Australia’s geography continues to support the case for an independent strike capability with strategic reach. An independent strike capability expands the range of options to achieve Australia’s strategic ends, signals a serious intent and commitment about Australia’s national security, and has the capacity to influence strategic outcomes short of resorting to armed conflict. Conceiving, planning, programming and delivering a credible strike capability is not easy.  While some elements such as long-range strike weapons can be bought off the shelf, the integration of the various elements of a strike capability is complex and takes time before the conception develops into a mature and credible military capability. But a strike capability without the enabling capabilities such as electronic warfare, surveillance, and air-to-air refueling is of little utility so a potent strike system is far more than weapons and carriage platforms. Doctrine, policy, organisation, training and sustainment arrangements are just a few of the non-materiel aspects that cannot be overlooked. In short, the complexity and time required to build a nation’s strike capability is such that any government wishing to retain an independent ability to ‘reach out and touch somebody’ to shape their behaviour has little option other than to maintain a standing strike capability.  Evolving and emerging technologies such as electronic warfare, cyber operations, space, and unmanned systems do, however, mean that any such standing strike capability will undoubtedly consist of a greater variety of more sophisticated means to strike than the kinetic firepower embodied in something like the F-111. With this background and intent in mind, the editors at The Central Blue have come up with a number of topics to provoke your thinking in the lead up to the seminar. This is by no means an exhaustive list but we hope it prompts mental contact! Questions to : What is the impact of #jointstrike on the national, campaign, operational and tactical levels? Can #jointstrike bring a new dimension to future Australian defence and national security policy? How have partner forces developed and employed #jointstrike capabilities in recent campaigns? What can surface forces bring to the #jointstrike capability What does multi-domain #jointstrike look like and how would it work? How does Australia’s emerging amphibious capabilities contribute to #jointstrike? How do we best understand the #jointstrike options available and of the best way of delivering a balanced range of strike capabilities across the Australian Defence Force? What emerging technologies should be considered to enable support, planning and targeting systems? How do emerging #jointstrike options such as cyber and electronic warfare affect traditional notions of warfare and combat? What are the impacts of emerging #jointstrike capabilities on training and exercise regimens? What is the role of modelling and simulation in optimising and developing a mature and sophisticated #jointstrike capability? Should Australia consider a nuclear #jointstrike option? How would an nuclear strike capability in Australia’s region impact the power structures and relationships? What impacts would prioritising #jointstrike have on Australia’s existing and future force structures? We hope these suggestions provide some food for thought and hopefully prompt some discussion. We would love to hear your ideas on what issues should be explored as part of the #jointstrike series. If you think you have a a question or an idea that would add to the #jointstrike discussion, or know someone who might, contact us at thecentralblue@gmail.com.

Scharre, Paul 2018, Army of None: Autonomous Weapons and the Future of War, 1st edition, W. W. Norton & Company, New York Well-researched and written in clear and lucid prose, Army of None presents a wealth of intriguing detail on the past, present and future of war. The technology intensive subject of AI and robotics as they apply to autonomous weapons is accurately covered in accessible language. The book has six parts. Part I, Robopocalypse Now, discusses the weaponization of swarm robotics and the notion of autonomy. Fundamental concepts commonly used in discussions about autonomous weapons: e.g. human in the loop, human on the loop and human off the loop systems are explained. Part II, Building the Terminator, goes deeper into what autonomous weapons have been built historically and what autonomous weapons are under active development now. Part III, Runaway Gun, describes the kind of errors that are associated with autonomous systems and in particular the vulnerabilities of certain kinds of AI have with image spoofing. It also highlights an as yet unanswered question: how you can test a “learning” system? Part IV, Flash War, focuses on “the need for speed” with reference to financial trading systems. It explores the risks of “machine speed” in finance (“flash crashes”) and in war. Unlike in stock trading where systems which can impose a timeout suspending trade when stock prices move too abruptly as a result of algorithmic mayhem, in battle there are no timeouts. Part V, The Fight to Ban Autonomous Weapons, discusses efforts being made to ban autonomous weapons. It also discusses the moral arguments against autonomous weapons. Part VI, Averting Armageddon: The Weapon of Policy, introduces concepts such as “centaur warfighters” (human-robot teams) and has an informative survey of the mixed history of arms control. It poses the question are autonomous weapons inevitable? Scharre argues for restraint but not a ban. Restraint, “the conscious choice to pull back from weapons that are too dangerous, too inhumane,” he says, “is what is needed today.” He argues that pieces of paper will not stop states building autonomous weapons if they really want to but that “a pell-mell race forward in autonomy, with no sense of where it leads us, benefits no one.”“States,” he concludes, “must come together to develop an understanding of which uses of autonomy are appropriate and which go too far and surrender human judgement where it is needed in war.” Perhaps the most impressive aspect of the book is the range of sources who have given Scharre on-record interviews. These include senior Pentagon figures such as former Deputy Secretary of Defense, Bob Work, and former Undersecretary of Defense, Frank Kendall, DARPA directors such as Bradley Tousley, Aegis commanders such as Captain Pete Galluch and academics such as Dr. John Hawley, an engineering psychologist, who advises the US Navy on achieving high reliability operation of Aegis. These interviews provide great insight as to current thinking on complex autonomous systems based on real world experience. For me the most eye-opening parts of the book were the sections covering Aegis and Patriot. Another attractive feature of the book is Scharre’s ability to link his own military experience as a US Army Ranger in Afghanistan to the broader issues of moral responsibility in warfare. Obviously Scharre is sympathetic to the Pentagon point of view but he gives those seeking to ban autonomous weapons a fair hearing. Figures such Steve Goose and Bonnie Docherty of Human Rights Watch, Australian philosopher, Rob Sparrow, a founding member of the International Committee for Robot Arms Control and Jody Williams, a co-founder of the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, who shared a Nobel Peace Prize for her role in winning public and diplomatic support for the Ottawa Convention banning anti-personnel landmines, are quoted extensively. He covers the three sides of the ethical, legal and policy arguments on autonomous weapons clearly. There are those who favour retaining existing IHL and say there is no need for any regulation specific to autonomous weapons (e.g. the UK). Others favour a ban on autonomous weapons (e.g. Brazil, China, Austria and the Holy See). Others favour some form of regulation specific to autonomous weapons. Scharre covers the “mixed history of arms control” and applies this to the current debates on autonomous weapons that are ongoing at the United Nations in Geneva. Historically, the success of a ban relies on three factors: perceived horribleness; perceived military utility and the number of cooperating actors required. Blinding lasers were relatively easy to ban having a high “ick” factor and limited military utility. Attempts to ban submarines and bombers between the World Wars however failed due the high utility of these weapons. Looking to the future, no one seriously disputes the very high potential military utility of autonomous weapons. He expresses some concern that the campaign to ban autonomous weapons is being led by NGOs rather than by great powers. He is unimpressed, by and large, with those nations that have signed up for a ban. “What the countries who support a ban have in common is that they are not major military powers. … for most of these countries their support for a ban isn’t about protecting civilians, it’s an attempt to tie the hands of more powerful nations.” On this point it should be noted that Army of None went to print before China declared its support for some kind of ban on April 13th, becoming the first of the five permanent members of the Security Council to do so. Also, one could argue the Ottawa Convention banning anti-personnel landmines was led by NGOs appealing directly to public opinion not by great powers. Scharre remains sceptical that a ban on autonomous weapons will be agreed to in the short term. Nations are still struggling to agree on a “common lexicon” to describe autonomous weapons, he thinks. However, recent events have shown there is a general willingness to define such a lexicon. The recent AI report from the House of Lords, for example, admonished the UK Ministry of Defence for its very “non-standard” definition of an autonomous weapon. It so happens China’s definition is somewhat “non-standard” too. Even so, the NGOs were happy enough with China’s position to put them on their tally list as supporting a ban on autonomous weapons. As Scharre makes very clear, “when the starting point for definitions is that some groups are calling for a ban on autonomous weapons then the definition of autonomous weapons instantly becomes fraught.” Scharre does not support a complete ban on autonomous weapons. Nor does he support an ‘anything goes’ approach. He is firmly committed to the view that there are some decisions in war that should continue to be made by humans but realistic about the military imperatives driving nations towards autonomous weapons. So he thinks a line needs to be drawn between acceptable and unacceptable uses of autonomy. Much of the detail of the book explores the detail of autonomy and where and why this line between acceptable and unacceptable autonomy might be drawn. Army of None is a must read for those in the armed services, defence analysts and policy makers. It is detailed without being dense and accessible without being simplistic. There is very little to criticize. My only complaint is that Scharre is a little dismissive of the ability of AI to make moral decisions. (Disclosure: my own research is about AI making moral decisions) but this is a minor criticism of what, overall, is a timely, fascinating and worthwhile book. Sean Welsh (@sean_welsh77) is the author of Ethics and Security Automata: Policy and Technical Challenges of the Robotic Use of Force and a postgraduate student in Philosophy at the University of Canterbury. Prior to embarking on his PhD he wrote software for British Telecom, Telstra Australia, Fitch Ratings, James Cook University and Lumata.

In contributing to The Central Blue’s #ADFRAS2040 series, Jacob Simpson reflects on future intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), and how the ADF can exploit big data and AI for situational awareness. He also highlights potential weaknesses, and how the adversary may apply disruptive technologies. Monitoring the mission in real-time, the commander scrutinises the all-source intelligence picture for signs that the unmanned strike package had been detected. A warning suddenly appears on the display, indicating a previously unknown SAM system has switched on its radar. The element of surprise will be ruined if action is not taken immediately. The commander’s AI system launches a query into a massive dataset of real-time enemy location data. An alternative, optimised flight-path is automatically generated, enabling the unmanned aircraft to swiftly change course. No statistically significant changes in the enemy’s posture is registered by the AI. The strike mission continues undetected through the complex air defence system. When it comes to intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) systems, the exploitation of big data and AI for situational awareness is described as revolutionary for command and control (C2).[1] Future ISR systems, also known as the sensing grid, plan to use AI to autonomously consolidate all-source information into a single operational picture.[2] This all-source, fuzed picture is then used in conjunction with a command grid; a sophisticated AI to rapidly generate enemy courses of action (COA) for commanders and recommend responses.[3] The strategy behind this is clear; if realised, the sensing grid will enable a C2 system to observe, orient, decide and act (OODA) at machine-speeds, improving the chances of gaining a decisive advantage over the enemy. All major powers, including potential adversaries, have development programs aimed at achieving a sensing grid.[4] If the Australian Defence Force (ADF) is to be prepared for conflict against adversaries with a sensing grid, it will be required to develop new capabilities in order to deny the enemy to achieve a machine-speed OODA loop. A counter-AI strategy will enable the ADF to achieve this, significantly lowering the effectiveness of the enemy C2 by exploiting the vulnerabilities of AI. How should the ADF develop these counter-AI capabilities, and what are the vulnerabilities of the sensing grid? Very little has been written about the potential vulnerabilities of AI use within C2 and ISR systems. Most commentators state that AI will herald an unparalleled ability to increase OODA loop speed and open new innovative approaches to warfare for commanders. However, sensing grid systems are not without weakness, nor are they impervious to deception or surprise. AI will not, in the foreseeable future, achieve the ‘general intelligence’ of the human mind, and will therefore not understand the context behind an ISR picture it is observing. Instead, machines will speedily calculate a large number of statistical predictions using a system of complex machine learning (ML) algorithms - a process whereby large data sets are mined for patterns. The system will have been specifically trained to detect anomalies from adversary military systems and to base its predictions solely on probability from the data it has been trained on. Therefore, by focusing intelligence efforts on understanding and manipulating the adversaries algorithm design or training data, the ADF can develop capabilities for targeting specific AI vulnerabilities. To appreciate the potential weaknesses of the sensing grid, we will need to understand the vulnerabilities of its supporting AI. Put simply, AI is the ‘ability of machines to perform tasks that normally require human intelligence.’[5] This is accomplished through the use of algorithms, which in the context of AI, is an attempt to translate human thought processes into computer code. This code outlines the rules that the AI must follow; often a complex system of binary if-then logic. For decades, AI coding rules were built manually, such as DEEP BLUE, where AI designers leveraged the expertise of chess masters to code the AI.[6] This method has limitations, as some tasks are too complex to be coded manually. However, significant advancements in big data and computational power have resulted in ML algorithms becoming viable for more complex human tasks.[7] Unlike traditional algorithms, AI built with ML has code that is learned from datasets; this approach works well if data is available. The problem for the sensing grid AI, however, is that much of the data will need to be simulated; no real data exists for the wars of the future. Therefore, the use of AI does not remove the human factor. Regardless of which AI used, algorithm rules within an adversary sensing grid will be designed by humans and maintain the vulnerabilities of traditional ISR systems; reflecting the beliefs, culture and biases of those that create them. Figure 1: The Sensing Grid OODA Loop. [8] By targeting the vulnerabilities of AI design, the ADF can increase friction into the sensing grid system. Figure 1 depicts a sensing grid at work. The AI will not be a single entity, but will be a complex system of ML algorithms designed to predict enemy behaviour through automated analyses of indicators and warnings (I&W).[9] Starting from the left, the diagram depicts a collection of all-source data being funnelled into a format-specific ML algorithm (image, text, signal, etc.) for analysis. Each algorithm will continuously learn and update itself using real-time data streaming to minimise prediction error. The output from each algorithm is then fused via another ML algorithm to create a single ISR picture for the commander’s use. This advanced AI system will then attempt to generate predictions about the enemy’s COA using the integrated ISR picture, allowing for a final ML algorithm to recommend a response to the commander for action.[10] This means that if one phase in the OODA loop contains inaccuracies, then so too will each phase thereafter. Which phase then is the most vulnerable? Figure 2: The results from a neural network; data is clustered to render predictions and spot outliers.[11] The critical vulnerability in the sensing grid is the orient phase of the OODA loop. Figure 2 depicts the result of an all-source fused data set that trained a ML algorithm for the orient phase. This particular example is a simplified output of a semi-supervised neural network algorithm designed to classify behaviour and detect any changes in activity. The algorithm clusters real-time data according to predefined attributes known as ‘features’, such as the number of enemy flights, movements of naval vessels, detected radar signals, etc. It is the patterns established between the features that provide the algorithm with the information needed to accurately predict adversary actions.[12] Each datum is assigned a probability that marks it as belonging to a specific cluster, thus flagging it for a specific action if required. For a commander observing an operating area, for example, the algorithm will autonomously display flights that constitute a ‘normal behaviour’ cluster, while identifying a long-range patrol elsewhere and flagging it as an outlier requiring attention. By preventing the orient phase ML algorithm from accurately clustering data, it may allow deception or surprise against a sensing grid system; sowing confusion and distrust in the AI recommendations to the commander. The question then becomes: how does the ADF ensure inaccurate data is being utilised by the enemy AI? To answer this, we need to explore adversarial ML techniques such as ‘data poisoning’, ‘evasion’, and ‘model corruption’. All three can be used as counter-AI tactics by the ADF for exploiting the enemies sensing grid. Counter-AI Tactic: Data Poisoning A critical weakness of the sensing grid AI is that it is susceptible to inaccurate predictions during the initial stages of a conflict. That is because the AI can only be as accurate as the parameters and data it was assigned and trained with prior to going live. During the initial research and development stage of a sensing grid, AI designers select the ML models, specify which features to be used for predictions, and then train it accordingly.[13] Since the actual real data for all possible enemy courses of action (COA) does not exist, the datasets used for training the sensing grid are likely to be synthetic - i.e. ‘simulated’. These simulated models will be based primarily on intelligence assessments and beliefs about the enemy. Therefore, if the training dataset or simulation fails to accurately reflect an adversary’s COA during the initial stages of conflict, the AI’s predictions will likely be inaccurate until it updates and adjusts itself to new adversary behaviour.[14] This delay in accuracy may result in less optimal responses from the AI during the critical initial stages of a conflict. Information warfare’s objective of targeting the beliefs and assumptions of the adversary will remain, but in this context the end goal changes to the denial of accurate data for ML training. Therefore, to ensure a slowed OODA loop at the start of conflict, the ADF should focus on encouraging a potential adversary to train its sensing grid on inaccurate data. This will require traditional counterintelligence and strategic deception efforts to shape an adversaries beliefs; essentially encouraging them to poison their own data. Another option, would be through forced data poisoning with cyber-attacks, whereby false data is embedded into an AI’s training dataset to weaken its predictive accuracy. Thus generating inaccurate predictions, even if the enemy beliefs and intelligence assessments are accurate. Counter-AI Tactic: Evasion and Model Corruption Data poisoning may grant an initial advantage, but it will not last long; the sensing grid system will learn from its mistakes and adjust to ADF actions. During conflict, knowledge of the ML’s orient phase algorithm could render the system open to outside manipulation and be more exploitable than a human. By identifying the parameters responsible for triggering an AI’s change detector, one could develop counter-AI tactics to conduct operations beneath the classification threshold of threatening output. For example, we may discover that the number of RAAF air mobility fights per day has been designated as a feature within an enemy’s ML algorithm, with sudden upward trends in activity accorded a high probability of signalling attack preparation. Such intelligence could be used to strategically conduct air mobility flights below the known classification threshold to effectively circumvent the opponent’s I&W system. These tactics could be tested against a simulated enemy sensing gird if we are able to acquire sufficient knowledge of how theirs was built. Alternatively, if the AI is set up to continuously learn from real-time data streaming, we could affect false patterns of life, or lower its sensitivity to certain features, thereby corrupting an adversary’s algorithm into classifying abnormal behaviour as normal. This becomes especially important as a form of long-term preparation for critical operations, examples of which are already occurring in cyberspace today. AI is used for cyber-defence to detect and prevent attacks against security systems by differentiating between normal and anomalous patterns of behaviour within the network. The challenge is when cyber attackers know how cyber defence works, resulting in attacks designed to manipulate the algorithm’s threshold of detection. These include ‘slow attacks’ in which an intruder gradually inserts their presence into a targeted network over time, thereby corrupting the security ML algorithm into perceiving its presence as normal.15 Such deceptive techniques can be implemented against a sensing grid system that has grown overly reliant upon its AI. The sensing grid’s reliance on AI creates a vulnerability that can be exploited through a counter-AI strategy. Encouraging and enabling the enemy’s loss of trust in its own ISR system serves as the central goal for a counter-AI strategy. A single successful operation in deception may be all that is required to permanently impair an adversary’s trust in its AI predictions. With system outputs and predictive accuracy plagued by second-guessing, the adversary’s OODA loop slows down to a degree that eventuates the system’s under-utilisation, thereby providing the ADF with the advantage. Jacob Simpson is a Flying Officer in the Royal Australian Air Force. He holds a Masters in Strategic Studies from the Australian National University and is currently undertaking a Masters in Decision Analytics at the University of New South Wales. References 1. En, T. (2016). Swimming In Sensors, Drowning In Data— Big Data Analytics For Military Intelligence. Journal of the Singapore Armed Forces, 42(1). 2. USAF (2018). Air Force Charts Course for Next Generation ISR Dominance. [online] U.S. Air Force. Available at: https://www.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/1592343/air-force-charts-course-for-next-generation-isr-dominance/. 3. Layton, P. (2017). Fifth Generation Air Warfare. [online] Air Power Development Centre. Available at: http://airpower.airforce.gov.au/APDC/media/PDF-Files/Working%20Papers/WP43-Fifth-Generation-Air-Warfare.pdf. 4. Pomerleau, M. (2018). In threat hearing, DoD leaders say data makes an attractive target. [online] C4ISRNET. Available at: https://www.c4isrnet.com/intel-geoint/2018/02/13/in-threat-hearing-dod-leaders-say-data-makes-an-attractive-target/ [Accessed 10 May 2020]. 5. Allen, G. (2020). Understanding AI Technology. [online] Joint Artificial Intelligence Center. Available at: https://www.ai.mil/docs.Understanding%20AI%20Technology.pdf. 6. RSIP Vision (2015). Exploring Deep Learning & CNNs. [online] RSIP Vision. Available at: https://www.rsipvision.com/exploring-deep-learning/. 7. Whaley, R. (n.d.). The big data battlefield. [online] Military Embedded Systems. Available at: http://mil-embedded.com/articles/the-big-data-battlefield/ 8. DARPA (2014). Insight. [online] www.darpa.mil. Available at: https://www.darpa.mil/program/insight. 9. Pomerleau, M. (2017). How the third offset ensures conventional deterrence. [online] C4ISRNET. Available at: https://www.c4isrnet.com/it-networks/2016/10/31/how-the-third-offset-ensures-conventional-deterrence/ [Accessed 10 May 2020]. 10. Kainkara, S. (2019). Artificial Intelligence and the Future of Air Power. [online] Air Power Development Centre. Available at: Http://airpower.airforce.gov.au/APDC/media/PDF-Files/working&Papers/WP45-Artifical- Intelligence-and-the-Future-of-Air-Power.pdf. 11. Ahuja, P. (2018). K-Means Clustering. [online] Medium. Available at: https://medium.com/@pratyush.ahuja10/k-means-clustering-442ed00ca7b8 [Accessed 9 Jun. 2020]. 12. Richbourg, R. (2018). ‘It’s Either a Panda or a Gibbon’: AI Winters and the Limits of Deep Learning. [online] War on the Rocks. Available at: https://warontherocks.com/2018/05/its-either-a-panda-or-a-gibbon-ai-winters-and-the-limits-of-deep-learning/ [Accessed 10 May 2020]. 13. Yufeng G (2017). The 7 Steps of Machine Learning. [online] Medium. Available at: https://towardsdatascience.com/the-7-steps-of-machine-learning-2877d7e5548e. 14. Mahdavi, A. (2019). Machine Learning and Simulation: Example and Downlaods. [online] Available at: https://www.anylogic.com/blog/machine-learning-and-simulation-example-and-downloads/. 16. Beaver, Justin M., Borges-Hink, Raymond C., Buckner, Mark A., An Evaluation of Machine Learning Methods to Detect Malicious SCADA Communications, Extract behavioral and physical biometrics, in the Proceedings of 2013 12th International Conference on Machine Learning and Applications (ICMLA), vol.2, pp.54-59, 2013. doi: 10.1109/ICMLA.2013.105