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15 August 2018 On 23 August 2018, the Sir Richard Williams Foundation is holding a seminar on #jointstrike to discuss the imperative for an independent deterrent. The aim of the seminar is to build a common understanding of the need for an independent joint strike capability to provide Australia with a powerful and potent deterrent and a means of demonstrating strategic intent. In the lead up to the seminar, The Central Blue will be running a series in order to generate discussion and enable those that cannot to attend to gain a perspective on the topic. In this post, Hugh White explores some of the challenges to posing and sustaining a credible deterrent. If you wanted to sum up America’s (and its allies’) military-strategic posture towards China in Asia today in a sentence, you’d say that we aim to deter China from using force in situations like Taiwan by the threat of a full-scale military response. So it’s worth asking whether we’re really doing enough to deter China. We can illuminate this a little by looking at Europe. In 2016, after Russia annexed Crimea and invaded other parts of Ukraine, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) feared that some of its members—the Baltic states or even Poland—might be next. It responded by deploying multinational combat formations to these frontline member states. This ‘enhanced forward presence’ (EFP) consists of four battalion-sized ‘battle groups’, one in each of the Baltic states and Poland, composed of contingents from a total of 20 different NATO member states. In NATO circles the EFP is seen as a big deal, because it is believed to show the alliance’s resolve to resist with armed force any Russian military move against these new member states. This is thought to be an effective deterrent. NATO’s Enhanced Foward Presence [Image credit: NATO] Of course, these tiny forces are not expected to stop or even slow a Russian advance. Though NATO is reluctant to use the term, they are a classic tripwire. Ensuring that allied forces are engaged by the Russians at the start of any incursion is supposed to make a full-scale NATO military response inevitable. Moscow is expected to calculate that no NATO member could stand back once its own forces had been attacked. That is why so many member states are represented. But is that right? Does the EFP tripwire do much to strengthen Moscow’s expectations that an attack on Latvia, for example, would mean war with NATO? It’s easy to assume that any NATO member would find it hard to refrain from contributing to a full-scale military response once its own forces had been engaged, and soldiers killed. Both domestic and international pressures would be intense. However, things might not play out that way. Much depends on what happens on the battlefield. The pressure on NATO to escalate would indeed be intense if an EFP battalion was rolled over and crushed with many casualties. But things would be different if the Russians were smart enough to encircle the NATO units without doing much damage to them, and then invite them to surrender, offering to send them home with their tails between their legs. This is not an unlikely outcome, when a single battalion faces multiple divisions. Would NATO member governments then order their forces to fight on against hopeless odds, or would they meekly accept Moscow’s offer? And how much resolve for an escalating fight would they have then? So here is one problem with the EFP: the forces are too small to guarantee the kind of fight that would compel NATO to escalate. But there’s a bigger problem too. Imagine that an EFP battalion does get into a serious fight with Russian forces, and takes many casualties. Everyone in NATO agrees that a major military response is required. What would they do? There seems little doubt that Russian forces could quickly seize control of one of the Baltic states or a sizable chunk of its territory, so the only meaningful NATO response would be a major military operation to expel them. That would be a huge and costly business—by far the largest land operations undertaken anywhere in Europe since World War II. Massive forces would need to be deployed long distances—including, presumably, large US forces across the Atlantic—and would need to be protected as they did so. Russian airpower would have to be neutralised with a sustained campaign of strikes on targets within Russian territory, to which Russia would be sure to retaliate. And then a major land campaign would need to be undertaken. In all this, the risk of nuclear escalation would be very real. How credible is it that NATO would take this on, at massive cost and risk, to push the Russians out of Latvia, for example? That’s the key question, because what will deter Moscow, if anything does, isn’t the presence of the EFP tripwire itself, but the military campaign that it believes NATO would launch if the tripwire were crossed. Therefore, in addition to the tripwire, NATO needs to conceive, plan and exercise a credible full-scale campaign to expel Russian forces from frontline NATO member states. Unless Russia can see that NATO has a credible plan for such a campaign, it is unlikely to be deterred. It is more likely to conclude that, faced with a Russian fait accompli, NATO would talk tough but do little. Moreover, Moscow would need to be persuaded not just that NATO had a plan, but that its members were willing to implement it. There would need to be a clear and evident consensus among NATO members and their voters that they would be willing to bear the costs and risks of a major war to rescue Latvia from the Russians. Building that consensus will not be easy. It won’t be enough to appeal to abstract principles of international law or the sanctity of Article 5 of the NATO Treaty. It will be necessary to explain why other NATO members’ security depends on recovering Latvia, rather than stopping Russia from advancing further west and south. It’s not clear how that argument could be made. Without this, the EFP tripwire looks a very feeble deterrent. Indeed, it risks becoming the opposite of a deterrent. Instead of displaying NATO’s strength and resolve, it demonstrates just how far the alliance was weakened when it was extended into the territory of the former Soviet Union itself. This brings us back to Asia. We readily assume that the US and its Asian allies can deter China from attacking Taiwan, for example. But there’s no credible campaign plan which would convince Beijing that Washington and its partners could intervene effectively, or that they would be willing to pay the costs of such a campaign even if they had a plan. Without those, China doesn’t face much of a deterrent. Hugh White is professor of strategic studies at the Australian National University. This article first appeared on ASPI’s The Strategist on 26 June 2018 and is republished here with the kind permission of The Strategist’s editors. #history #lessonslearned #Strategy

12 Aug 18 This post is the second of a two-part series on deterrence. The first sought to define deterrence holistically as an option for national strategy. This post examines how Australian air power has been influenced by the concept of deterrence, and specifically, how this has influenced developing a strike capability. Putting aside considerations as to whether conventional deterrence is the most appropriate strategy for Australia, there has been a long-standing tendency within air forces to equate ‘deterrence’ with ‘strike’. This tendency lends itself to a belief that if we have a fleet of bombers, then we will automatically deter. This conviction endures in the 2016 Defence White paper which states that ‘A potent strike and air combat capability’ is ‘essential to our ability to deter attempts to coerce or attack Australia and our national interests, including the ability to seize the initiative, and defeat potential threats as far from Australia as possible’. But why is this the case? The very beginning… Long before the RAAF had clearly articulated its doctrine, or a Defence White paper as we know them today had been published, Australia was intuitively employing strike aircraft in support of national deterrence. The defence of Australia during World War II serves as a useful example. Australian air power, along with the allies, shaped the minds of future decision makers through the success at The Battle of Bismarck in March 1943. Using USAAF B-17, B-25 Mitchells, P-38 Lightnings and RAAF Beaufighters, the allies sunk 12 Japanese warships, thus eliminating any possibility that Australia might be invaded. In effect, allied air power had applied ‘defensive deterrence’ by dominating the air/sea gap through the northern approaches. ‘Offensive deterrence’ was also being exercised as a national strategy with the RAAF operating 254 B-24 heavy bombers by the end of the war. [1] The acquisition of these aircraft enabled the RAAF to potentially prepare for the use of chemical weapons – that is, weapons of mass destruction – that the Air Force had tested and stockpiled during the war, but which it never used.[2] Post World War II The decade following the Second World War significantly shaped how the Australian government, and specifically the RAAF, viewed deterrence. This was epitomised in 1954 when Chief of the Air Staff (CAS) Sir Donald Hardman told the Air Board that ‘an air force without bombers, isn’t an air force’, a conviction which was held just as strongly by his successors. While Hardman and his senior colleagues embraced the concept of deterrence, it was not always clear that their reasoning has been well thought-out. At the time, bomber aircraft were synonymous with terror because of the experience of World War II. Consequently, ‘people generally thought of bombing in apocalyptic terms, the mere presence of an Air Force with a reasonable bomber fleet might serve as a deterrent.’[3] While valid in hindsight, the flaw in this strategy was its failure to understand how future wars might be fought, a growing concern with collateral damage, and the ability to accept risk while also generating fear. Following the Second World War and against this background, the RAAF looked to bolster its strike force; however, the government was less inclined. A survey of Australia’s triennia Strategic Basis documents between the late 1940s and early 1970’s shows little official inclination to embrace conventional deterrence as an explicit military strategy.[4] This was until the Cold War. The Cold War changed the equation significantly, with conventional deterrence becoming an important factor in strategic debates during the mid 1970’s and 80’s. This was evident in 1976 with the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre (SDSC) suggesting that the principal task for ‘Australia’s defence policy was to develop a posture that would help in establishing credible deterrence which can keep aggressors from her shores without suffering human casualties or physical destruction which inevitably and increasing accompanies the actual use of force.’[5] This resulted in a requirement and prioritisation of a strong maritime strike capability – that is, for a defensive deterrent force – in order to ‘give an enemy pause’.[6] The 1976 White Paper ‘Australian Defence’ followed, and included a discrete section entitled ‘Strike, Reconnaissance and Deterrence’. The core of the RAAFs strike force resided with 24 F-111C aircraft, which supported the RAAFs ability to ‘deter aggression’.  Minister for Air Peter Howson said of the purchase ‘it was the presence of air power and the psychological threat it presented that was the basis of the RAAF’s deterrence, proving the overriding consideration was posture rather than a rational assessment of capabilities.’ Post-Cold War – an official policy By the mid 1980’s, the focus on conventional deterrence once again waned and was replaced by a strategy of denial. The 1987 Defence White paper clearly articulated the defence of Australia’s air-sea gap to the north and rejected the concept of deterrence.[7] This forced the RAAF to conduct an internal review of the concept of deterrence, and to articulate what air power could actually achieve in the defence of Australia. The CAS at the time, Air Marshal John Newham, was troubled by the White Paper’s apparent ambivalence toward strategic strike. Newham argued that regardless of the scale of hostilities, it was essential for the ADF to have the option of striking an enemy force at its source. Consequently, it was suggested that while the RAAF may have lacked the capability for offensive deterrence, it could still be capable of supporting a defensive deterrence strategy. With only a handful of platforms; no matter how capable the F-111’s were, without modern weaponry, the credibility of Australia’s strike capability was questionable. For a defensive deterrence strategy to be accepted, the RAAF had to acquire Precision Guided Munitions; for without precision, the collateral damage and subsequent risk would be problematic. With that said, as India’s leading air power scholar Air Commodore Jasjit Singh (retd), pointed out at the 1991 RAAF Air Power Conference,  the combination of Harpoon-equipped F-111s, P-3s and F-18s, gave the RAAF the most potent maritime strike force in the Asia-Pacific[8] thus highlighting that perception is everything. In this case, defensive deterrence was achieved in the region due to the perceptions of a joint strike capability. It is not a single platform or weapon alone that created a valid threat or deterrent, it was the ability to generate an effect. An undefinable threat and protagonist With a shift away from a single source threat epitomised by the Cold War, a new period of unpredictably was, and is still at play. An ‘unpredictable new international order, which is culturally diverse and prone to both political fragmentation and weapons proliferation’[9] now shapes how the concept of deterrence must be applied. Low level conflict is now more likely than the threat of an all-out nuclear war, and a deterrence strategy must acknowledge this. This is not to say the nuclear threat has been eliminated, but simply that it must be acknowledged that this tactic will not always deter, depending on who the protagonist is. Where nuclear deterrence is not the appropriate choice based on the protagonist, a technological edge may fill the void within the realm of conventional deterrence. In this sense, ‘some analysts suggest that deterrence theory can be emancipated from Cold War thinking to emphasise a more dynamic modality of strategy. ’[10] As such, it could also be reasoned that the supremacy of Western conventional forces rests on new joint strike and precision weapons. Gary L Guertner indeed argues that conventional deterrence requires ‘technological superiority, a form of collective security, forward presence, strategic agility and theatre defence’.[11] To achieve this, a true joint approach is required. The 2016 Defence White paper states that Australia ‘must be prepared to carry out offensive strike operations against the military bases and in-transit forces of a potential adversary’ and that this will be achieved through ‘strategic strike capabilities, including air strike and special operations capabilities’. While an independent strike capability expands the range of options to achieve Australia’s strategic ends, as well as signalling a serious intent and commitment about Australia’s national security, it probably is not optimised. Defining who the potential adversary is – their strengths and weakness as well as their strategic culture – all dramatically shape how Australia might successfully deter. In the interim, as ASPI advises, ‘the single most important task of the RAAF is to raise the costs and risks of threatening Australian territory to any would-be aggressor. A key part of the role of Australia’s future air combat capability will be the way it enables or conducts maritime denial operations.’[12] Squadron Leader Jenna Higgins is an Air Combat Officer in the Royal Australian Air Force and a co-editor at The Central Blue. You can follow her on twitter at @jenna_ellen_. The opinions expressed are hers alone and do not reflect those of the Royal Australian Air Force, the Australian Defence Force, or the Australian Government. __________________________________________________________________________ [1] Stephens, A., 1997, Power Plus Attitude: Ideas, Strategy, and Doctrine in the Royal Australian Air Force 1921 – 1991, Canberra, p82 [2] ibid [3] Stephens, A., 1997, Going Solo: Royal Australian Air Force 1946 – 1971, Canberra, p362 [4] Department of Defence, Key Elements in the Triennial Reviews of Strategic Guidance since 1945, Submission to the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence, 17 February 1987, Inquiry into the Management of Australia’s Defence and National Security, Official Hansard Report, Submissions and Incorporated Documents, Volume II. [5] O’Neill, R (ed), 1976, The Defence of Australia – Fundamental New  Aspects, ANU, Canberra [6] Ibid p131 [7] Department of Defence, 1987, The Defence of Australia, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra. [8] Stephens, A. (ed), 1991, Smaller but Larger, Conventional Air Power into the 21st Century, RAAF Air Power Studies Center, Canberra. [9] Evans, M., 1999, Conventional Deterrence in the Australian Strategic Context, Working Paper No.107, Land Warfare Studies Center, p7 [10] Ibid p9 [11] Guertner, G., 1992, Deterrence and Conventional Military Forces, Strategic Studies Institute – U.S. Army War College, p5 [12] Commonwealth of Australia, 2016, Report: Planned acquisition of F-35 Lightning II (Joint Strike Fighter), Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra.

10 August 2018 On 23 August 2018, the Sir Richard Williams Foundation is holding a seminar on #jointstrike to discuss the imperative for an independent deterrent. The aim of the seminar is to build a common understanding of the need for an independent joint strike capability to provide Australia with a powerful and potent deterrent and a means of demonstrating strategic intent. In the lead up to the seminar, The Central Blue will be running a series in order to generate discussion and enable those that cannot to attend to gain a perspective on the topic. In this post, Chris Buckley explores the challenge of firstly establishing and then re-establishing deterrence if and when initial efforts fail. Deterrence exists in the mind, not necessarily the battlefield. Nations posture against each other attempting to influence actions and perceptions. For many years, airpower has been a powerful tool of deterrence strategies. But what happens when it doesn’t work.  What happens when deterrence fails? Deterrence is the art of influencing adversary actions before they occur, the art of coercing adversaries to choose pathways consistent with your desires.  Simply put, deterrence is the use of threats, either implicit or explicit. Thomas Schelling literally wrote the book on deterrence, and he states the science of military victory is no longer the determinant factor. To deter an adversary, military action must be anticipated, however the action is avoidable if the adversary changes their behavior. That is a key factor most often overlooked. If the military action is unavoidable no matter what the adversary does, the adversary is not deterred. The adversary must be given an out, or an off-ramp, to avoid the military action. Deterrence is normally associated with weapons of mass destruction, specifically nuclear weapons, however don’t be fooled.  Deterrence exists everywhere, in all military action and strategies. The act of publicising the creation of the B-21, or the shadowy operations of the X-37, or the deployment of a Carrier Battle Group enhance deterrence across the spectrum. But it goes both ways.  The pilot retention crisis, lack of a coherent foreign policy, and the failure of new systems degrade deterrence.  In international relations, everything has deterrent value. Much has been said recently about chemical weapon attacks in Syria, and whether deterrence was achieved, failed, re-established or not. When looked at from a larger perspective, it appears that Assad was deterred from using chemical weapons, then he wasn’t, then he was, then he wasn’t, and now he is again. The reality of the situation when looked at in depth may be that Assad was never really deterred at all. Images of the Barzeh research and development centre in Syria from 13 April 2018 and 15 April 2018. [Image credit: BBC] Let’s rewind. By mid-2012, the United States became concerned that chemical weapons would possibly be used in Syria. President Obama attempted to deter that use in August 2012 by calling out chemical weapons use as a ‘red line.’  The use of ‘red lines’ is actually quite common in diplomatic circles and has been shown to be very effective in deterrence strategies. Red lines are always communicated, they have to be or they do not serve any useful purpose. The adversary must know in order to affect his decision matrix. The perception was this ‘red line’ communication firmly established the US position on the use of chemical weapons. Syria was now fully aware that there would be consequences. It was the use of chemical weapons in Ghouta in August 2013 (a full year after Obama’s statement) that called into question the US threat of retaliation. The media was all over this chemical attack, and what the US response would be. Deterrence had failed, how would the US respond?  However, there had already been 15 reported uses of chemical weapons between the President’s remarks and the Ghouta attack. Ghouta had crossed the red line, why didn’t the others? In this case, the US had to respond or risk losing all credibility. The US did so in September 2013 by bringing legislation that would authorise the use of force against Syria. The US Secretary of State publicly stated Syria could avoid this military action if they turned over its entire chemical weapons stockpile. Syria agreed, and the military action was averted. Therefore, in theory, deterrence was re-established. The threat of military action had become very real to Syria, but they were provided an off-ramp (give up your arsenal). They accepted, and the perception of deterrence was re-established. The threat of force coerced Syria into a favorable action. The gnashing of teeth in the media over whether this was the right or wrong move, whether it was good or bad, whether it was strong or weak, was debated on party lines. The political objective was to remove Syria’s chemical weapons and that objective was (supposedly) achieved without the use of force. Therefore the partisan outcry over the manner in which the military threat served the political purpose is irrelevant. UN Resolution 2118 granted permission to any member of the UN to “take action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security” in event Syria makes use of chemical weapons again. Deterrence was re-established. Case closed. The people who didn’t like it, didn’t like it because of their political party. The American public was led to believe that all was well until April 2017 when Khan Shaykhun was attacked with chemical weapons killing dozens and injuring hundreds. Deterrence was never in place, Syria had only gone underground. It was revealed the UN Resolution had not deterred Syria, and they had lied about turning over their stockpile. The problem is, those inside the action already knew about both of those things. There were over 45 separate reported uses of chemical weapons between the UN Resolution and Khan Shaykhun. Obama and Trump both saw chemical use and chose not to respond during this period. Most people are surprised to know there have been over 60 separate reported uses of chemical weapons in Syria since 2012. When President Trump was forced into action, his goal was to re-establish deterrence. He had to convince Assad this type of action is not acceptable, and would be punished. The cruise missile strike on Shayrat punished Syria for their action, and the messaging that took place afterwards cemented the unacceptable nature of such action. We know that his goal was not to remove the threat of chemical weapons. It that were the case Shayrat would not have been struck. This airbase was chosen because the attack on Khan Shaykhun was carried out by Su-22s from Shayrat, even though a majority of past attacks were carried out by attack helicopters. Just as before, the people who didn’t like it, didn’t like it because of their political party. However, the question remains, has deterrence been re-established? Ask North Korea. It is not an accident the strike on Syria took place at the same moment the leader of China was meeting with President Trump. That strike was done to demonstrate US willpower to multiple adversaries, not just Syria. When it comes to North Korea, the US cannot effectively deter anything. When digging through the four instruments of national power, most are not effective in North Korea. Diplomatic ties are weak, there is no real connection to North Korea and the US works through intermediaries who all have their own agendas. The information methods also don’t work very well due to the tight grip the North Korean government has on information in that country. The US’ ability to pierce that propaganda shield is limited. Economic sanction from the US are also ineffective and have been for years. North Korea’s only true economic link to the global system is China, therefore only China can hurt North Korea economically. He only option remaining is military, however it remains unclear if the threat of military force gets through to North Korea. The strike on Syria showed China this threat is credible. This highlights the real key to deterrence: credibility. In response to the Syrian strike, China turned back coal imports from North Korea. That single action told the world China believes the US threat to North Korea is credible. Only China can put enough pressure on North Korea to avert military action and alter their choices. Syria will continue to act with impunity until their sponsor, Russia, puts enough pressure on them. President Trump used a single strike to communicate to 4 different adversaries. But the question remains, did it work?  Russia got the message, and Syria has not executed any further chemical attacks, therefore it appears deterrence has been restored. Or has it? China got the message, but can they coerce North Korea fast enough and long enough to avert another devastating Korean Conflict? While I believe a unified Korea is inevitable, I do not believe military action against North Korea is.  There is time to resolve this conflict without force, but time is running out. While it has not been communicated, I believe the President has created his own internal ‘red line’ with regards to North Korea’s nuclear ambitions. The detonation of another nuclear device is that red line. If that event transpires (and it probably will very shortly), the President will be forced into irreversible action. Chris Buckley is an active duty military officer in the United States Air Force. He has more than 16 years experience in the fields of strategic deterrence, offensive airpower, aerial bombing, and aircraft & systems acquisitions. He is a Master Navigator with 3000+ hours in more than 40 different aircraft types. He is graduate of the USAF Test Pilot School, Air Command and Staff College, Joint Forces Staff College, and the Air War College. This article appeared on Angle of Attack on 13 April 2017 and is republished here with the kind permission of Angle of Attack’s editors. #AirPower #Culture #Doctrine #Strategy

This week The Central Blue welcomes back Flight Lieutenant Joshua Vicino as he asks some 'reasonably challenging' questions about contemporary safety thinking. Balancing mission-readiness with consistent safety was never going to be an easy proposition, but is it time for a rethink of the current dominant approach? Vicino lays out his argument with two case studies, concluding with thoughts about the next stage of safety culture development. How safe is too safe? Some would argue that even asking this could be considered blasphemy from Defence’s Aviation Safety perspective. After all, our airworthiness system, first introduced in the early 1990’s, is regularly described as being written in blood. But our mission is to generate air power, which inherently places our platforms and people in harm’s way. Achieving the right balance, ‘Mission first, Safety Always’, is easier said than done, and so we should be willing to revisit our regulatory system to see whether it is giving us the outcomes we need. This is also easier said than done. While incident and accident investigations often refer to similarities between different occurrences, it is rare to find two situations so similar as to draw direct comparison. Furthermore, to have this occur in a way that allows us to consider different regulatory systems would seem almost impossible. But I am about to outline two almost identical aircraft defects, one of which was managed under the previous aviation safety system, and one managed under the current ‘So Far As Reasonably Practicable’ (SFARP) regime. Having considered their rectification processes and the impact that these processes had on delivery of air power, we can and should ask whether our pursuit of a generative safety culture has caused us to lose sight of our reason for being – generation of air power. And if so, what can we do about it? Back in 2016… A RAAF aircraft and support contingent were deployed on a regional surveillance operation. On return from the second last sortie before it was to return to Australia, a post-flight inspection found a 3.75 inch-long rupture in the wing surface. The rupture was found in an area of secondary structure that did not impact the flight controls. With the diplomatic clearances locked in for the return to Australia, and one operational mission remaining, the deployed maintenance team needed to achieve a solution within 24 hours or drop the last mission. The simplest fix was simply to leave it be. But at 3.75 inches long the structural repair manual defined the crack as outside the safe limits for flight, even for a secondary structure. Moreover, a repair option was unavailable because there were no deployed aircraft structural technicians or associated tooling and equipment. Similarly, the timeline didn’t permit the option of awaiting a novel engineering solution from the engineering support office back home. This left the sole remaining option to be for the deployed engineering officer to authorise a non-standard risk assessment that deferred the repair and allowed the aircraft to continue to fly. This assessment needed to outline the impact and likelihood of the risk as well as provide alternative treatment measures. That treatment was goop[1]. As per the safety framework of the day, the surface rupture was filled with goop – a known mechanism for stopping crack propagation – and informal engineering advice was sought from the engineering support office via email to inform the risk assessment. As an additional control, the technicians were instructed to inspect the rupture after the flight in order to verify that it had not propagated further. Under these conditions, the risk level was evaluated as sufficiently low enough from a technical airworthiness perspective to continue flying. Operational endorsement of the risk assessment was provided by the detachment commander as authorising officer, and the aircraft completed its final operational mission and transited home uneventfully the following day. All up, the whole process took just over six hours to complete. Fast forward to 2021… The same aircraft type, the same region and remarkably, the same problem. This time, a 3.5 inch-long rupture was discovered on an after flight inspection in the same part of the wing. Uncannily, this aircraft also had a single operational sortie left prior to its return to Australia, and had no structural technicians deployed or the tooling and support to affect a repair. This time, however, the deployed maintenance team was working under the Defence Aviation Safety Regulation framework. Under this framework, the ability to conduct a risk assessment and treat the risk with a non-standard process, operationally endorse this and continue flying, was no more. In fact, the new authorised maintenance manual explicitly forbids the use of a risk assessment by the deployed engineering officer as was used in 2016. Filling the rupture with goop and ‘cracking-on’ (pardon the pun) was no longer possible. This time, the solution came from the engineering support office. They had to develop a formal engineering instruction that allowed the aircraft to be transited back to Australia in order to conduct a full structural repair. Their solution was to cover the rupture with aluminium tape, effectively an equivalent treatment to the goop method used in 2016. That resolution process, culminating in the issuance of a formal engineering instruction, took 41 hours to achieve, and led to the cancellation of the final operational sortie. What lesson should we learn? The remarkable similarities between these two scenarios provides us a unique opportunity for comparison. The same problem, addressed under two different regulatory systems, ended with nearly identical technical solutions. However, one did so in a way that enabled the generation of air power, and one that did not. In 2016, the deployed engineering officer and the detachment commander/authorising officer, were able to appropriately consider the operational imperative and weigh that against the aviation safety risks in consultation with appropriately qualified people. In 2021, a conservative application of the new regulatory system in place, they no longer felt empowered to do so. The result of this rigid and prohibitive interpretation of the new regulations was that they were forced down a formal process entirely controlled by a separate engineering organisation. There’s good reason to separate church and state. Keeping the operational element and engineering support office apart by design prevents operational personnel playing fast and loose with their risk assessments and getting back in the air when they shouldn’t. However, the current approach by those who interpret the regulations and sponsor the expositions that detail how their organisation will meet their regulatory requirements, eliminates the ability for both parties to apply agile governance methods to the specific circumstances, as was done in 2016. In removing this, the enterprise as a whole loses the ability to apply reasonable risk treatment methods that maintain a focus on the reason for flying in the first place – the operational context. As such, the result of this inability to rapidly generate defensible technical risk assessments in support of operations was the loss of an operational mission – a direct reduction in air power. But DASR wasn’t meant to be used this way. The SFARP principle was meant to allow reason to prevail. Unfortunately, we are in this position because the new, outcomes based regulatory framework was overlaid with the same process-driven practises that governed the old system. Instead of a system where we should be more capable of generating air power, we are now less effective. It doesn’t have to be this way. DASR can be implemented as the outcomes-based regulatory framework it was meant to be. Engineering support offices across the RAAF have the opportunity to improve their processes, to enable us to once again generate defensible technical risk assessments at short notice, with limited time, and to optimise the generation of air power. If the potential for major conflict is as imminent as some would suggest, this optimisation is a must. Now is the time for Commanders and Managers alike to understand what it means to be reasonably practicable and to drive the cultural change in their organisations necessary for genuine progress. This doesn’t mean we should return to pathological cultures of the early 90’s, but given our reason for being, we simply can’t afford to be so safe that we unnecessarily limit our operational effectiveness. [1] Imagine an aviation version of Selley’s kitchen sealant Flight Lieutenant Joshua Vicino is an Electronics Engineer working in the Royal Australian Air Force. He holds a Bachelor of Science and Master of Electrical Engineering from The University of Melbourne. He is currently the Officer in Charge of Maintenance at No. 10 Squadron.

This week we welcome back Dr. Peter Layton who turns a spotlight to a sometimes-understated aspect of airpower: Airbases. As airpower generation points, airbases are critical enablers of capability, but they face a raft of potential threats – everything from natural weather phenomena, to kinetic strikes during hot conflict, to cyber and other ‘nuisance’ operations during cold peace. Absorbing and recovering from such impacts can look quite different for a range of base contexts. To better characterise and understand these various threat-resilience-capability continuums, Layton identifies 4 base archetypes that help frame clearer thinking about future airbase design and investment. The Chief of Air Force’s strategic intent update makes airbases a priority for future investment. Airbases certainly seem ripe for change. Conceptually, they have barely changed since World War Two when grass runways gave way to concrete ones. In this the Chief has laid out three criteria for the RAAF’s airbases: be fit for purpose, robust and resilient. In terms of purpose, RAAF airbases need to generate airpower from peace into major conflict. For this, they need to be in the right place; geography is important. In that regard, the RAAF’s southern Australian bases are very distant from potential flash points. The Air Force will need to deploy forward to bring air power to bear. In terms of robustness, airbases are large static facilities, easily targeted using kinetic and cyber weapons. In time of war, the most concerning kinetic weapons are precision guided weapons and in particular cruise missiles and ballistic missiles. Their proliferation means hardening an airbase is of little use anymore. Instead dispersion, that is hiding, is the better option. In this, the Iranian ballistic missile attacks on al Asad Air Base are instructive. The Iranian’s apparently used commercial space imagery for targeting and were able to achieve surprisingly accurate attacks. Forewarned, the US moved personnel and equipment from the area. CENTCOM General Frank McKenzie said later that the strike could have killed up to 150 Americans and destroyed 20-30 aircraft if these measures had not been taken. Iran was not a peer competitor; such attacks in a major war would be much larger, more numerous and widespread. Kinetic strikes are a wartime problem but cyber is a clear and present danger. In times of conflict the rate of cyber-attacks will step up but it is already an ongoing threat against any and all RAAF airbases. There is also a new appreciation emerging of natural disasters. Fires and floods are getting bigger, while there are more Cat 4 and 5 cyclones. Moreover, natural disasters can cascade and once triggered set off further events with impacts that can be both non-linear and distant to the triggering event. Southern Australia’s 2020 bushfires almost led to a major wide-area protracted power outage, just as the cold weather did later in Texas. Such an outage could disrupt airbases and communication networks including base personnel and their families. In terms of resilience, airbases need to be able to absorb a shock and continue to operate. In this, the shock needs to be kept to a manageable scale. If it’s very large, resilience measures can be overwhelmed and any recovery during a limited duration conflict is then unlikely. Moreover, it’s necessary to define what an airbase is to be made resilient to, when it needs to be resilient and for how long. In this, an airbase is a large facility; are some parts less important than others? Lastly, the notion of what returning to operations can range from: surviving a shock in some reduced form; continuing operation in the presence of a shock; recovering from a shock to the original form; or absorbing a shock and evolving in response. Which of those four options is desired? Let’s pull these disparate threads together into a simple quad chart. The x-axis line runs from the large southern bases across to deployment air bases, likely offshore. On the y-axis the line goes from today’s cold peace to a hope-not hot war. The chart then covers where, and in what context, airbases will need to be fit for purpose, robust, and resilient. It’s a chart to make us think about what the design of future airbases needs to be, and implicitly where to invest. Lookin’ Out My Back Door The Lookin’ Out My Back Door quadrant is the best of all worlds. The airbase is well practised in carrying out standard flying operations on a regular and ongoing basis. There is ready access to a large workforce and the ability to generate more quickly through using contractors. The airbase is well integrated into national and global supply chains. There are threats however, with cyberattacks prominent. The rise of compound and cascading disasters suggest that the airbase may need to be able to function for a short period independently of the local energy and communication networks. There is also a potential issue from nuisance commercial drones. On such airbases, the primary aim is to improve efficiency. Down on the Corner The Down on the Corner quadrant involves deploying to a northern or offshore base for an exercise that may feature a heavy international engagement strand. There will be considerable reliance on the local infrastructure and support network. RAAF staff will be a scarce asset with few available on the airbase, particularly for protracted operations. Supply will often be using commercial means with specialised maintenance items and stocks brought from Australia, at times on dedicated RAAF air transport. Cybersecurity remains a threat with the possibility of drone interference higher than in Australia. Compound and cascading disasters could still be an issue. The nature of deployed operations though is that when trouble threatens, there is always the pack up and leave option. In such an airbase, the primary aim is effectiveness; each deployed person needs to be as productive as possible. Bad Moon Rising The Bad Moon Rising quadrant involves southern bases in times of war. The main changes from the cold peace would be the higher rates of effort demanded and possibly for an extended period; the sizeable numbers of airbase personnel sent forward to run deployment airbases; the sharp rise in numbers and sophistication of cyber-attacks; and some argue the possibility of kinetic attacks from the occasional submarine launched cruise missile. Such a context means that the airbase might need operating by reservists with limited training or more likely, by newly recruited staff with enthusiasm but not much else. The advances in training that digital technology brings may be really important to bring these new people up to speed. This might be for both maintaining the airbase facilities and in sustaining the airbase’s flying operations. In terms of threats, the airbase will come under significant space-based surveillance using a variety of sensors. Moreover, it must be expected that software malware placed in systems years before will be activated to cause general disruption. This disruption might be on the airbase, but also in local and national energy and communication systems. Independent airbase operation may be necessary. Who’ll Stop the Rain The Who’ll Stop the Rain quadrant is the worst case, particularly in terms of kinetic attack. Activities will need to be dispersed so as to ensure a single attack does not inflict catastrophic damage. Regular movement may also be needed to ensure survival as attacks continue. Accordingly, a primary aim is to keep in front of the adversaries targeting system, so the location of critical items like aircraft, supplies, maintenance support and personnel is always uncertain. Precision attacks then become problematic. To back up dispersion and movement, the airbase will include active measures to fool and deceive an adversary. In this, deployed operations by their nature are always short of people while in a combat situation exposing fewer people to danger is always desirable. There are hard issues of resilience under fire. Let’s sum up. The airbases in the bottom half of the diagram aim to deliver air power as efficiently as possible. Decisions can be driven by cost-benefit analysis. In contrast, airbases in the top half of the diagram need to focus on achieving effectiveness gains. Decisions are driven by how to best increase the airbases’ outputs, hang the costs. Across all quadrants looms the spectre of cyber-attack. Crippling an airbase might cut air operations but even having someone watching online what you’re doing is bad too. Having software experts at hand looks essential, not just a nice to have, especially in the diagram’s top half combat operations. Airbases are central to air power. They need to be as the Chief sets out: fit for purpose, robust, and resilient. If not, others may steal a march. The RAAF might have the better aircraft, but with mediocre air bases might deliver less effective air power than an adversary can. That’s not a war winning place to be in. Dr Peter Layton is a Visiting Fellow at the Griffith Asia Institute, Griffith University and an Associate Fellow at the Royal United Services Institute (UK). He is the author of the book Grand Strategy. His other posts, articles and papers may be found at: https://peterlayton.academia.edu/research.

Dr Robbin Laird, Next Generation Autonomous Systems: A Williams Foundation Special Report, 9 June 2021 In this report, the key themes and presentations at the April 8, 2021, Williams Foundation seminar on Next Generation Autonomous Systems are highlighted. A number of interviews with participants are included as well as insights from earlier interviews from pre-COVID visits to Australia. In addition, selected articles are included in an appendix which address the question of shaping a way ahead with regard to manned-unmanned teaming and the coming of autonomous systems. The original seminar was scheduled for March 2020 but was postponed due to COVID-19. Download the report here From the author On April 8, 2021, the Williams Foundation held a seminar originally scheduled for last March. It was postponed as the COVID-19 pandemic took hold. As Air Marshal (Retired) Geoff Brown, Chairman of the Williams Foundation put it in his prologue to the conference: “Since 2013 the Sir Richard Williams Foundation conferences have focused on building an integrated fifth generation force. Recent conferences have evolved from the acquisition of new platforms to the process of shaping and better understanding the environment in which that integrated force will prepare and operate. Highlighted have been the challenges of making the strategic shift from counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan to higher tempo and higher intensity Joint operations involving peer competitors. “Within this context, the 2021 conferences further develop the ideas associated with an increasingly sophisticated approach to Joint warfighting and power projection as we face increasing pressure to maintain influence and a capability edge in the region. The Williams Foundation will continue to look at the evolution of the Australian Defence Force from the perspective of the sovereign lens and setting the conditions for future success. “This conference will explore the force multiplying capability and increasingly complex requirements associated with unmanned systems. From its origins at the platform level, the opportunities and potential of increased autonomy across the enterprise are now expected to fundamentally transform Joint and Coalition operations. Defence industry can and will play a major part in the transformation with opportunities extending beyond platforms to the payloads and enabling systems which underpin the necessary risk management and assurance frameworks demanded by Defence. The importance of industry is reflected in the design of the conference program and the speakers identified.” The introduction to the program highlighted the focus of the seminar as follows: “The concept of the Unmanned Air System (UAS), or Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV), is nothing new nor is their use in missions which traditionally challenge human performance, fragility, and endurance. Ongoing operational experience confirms unmanned systems on their own are not the panacea and trusted autonomy in manned and unmanned teaming arrangements in each environmental domain is emerging as a key operational requirement. “The narrative has progressed the argument for greater numbers of unmanned systems in a far more mature and balanced way than hitherto. The manned-unmanned narrative is now sensibly shifting towards ‘and’, rather than ‘or’. Manned and unmanned teaming leverages the strengths and mitigates the weakness of each platform and concentrates the mind on the important operational aspects, such as imaginative new roles, and the challenges of integration to generate the desired overwhelming firepower. “This capability will require a complex web of advanced data links and communication systems to make it operate as a combat system. Designing and building the ‘kill web’ so that it can enable the delivery of manned-unmanned firepower across domains will be a huge challenge not least due to the laws of physics. However, the ability to train, test, evaluate and validate tactics and procedures will add a whole new level of complexity to generate the ‘trusted autonomy’ required for warfighting. “The aim of the April 2021 conference is to promote discussion about the future implications of autonomous systems. It will investigate potential roles for autonomous systems set within the context of each environmental domain, providing Service Chiefs with an opportunity to present their personal perspective on the effect it will have on their Service. “The conference will also explore the operational aspects of autonomous systems, including command and control and the legal and social implications that affect their employment. And finally the conference will examine the current research agenda and allow industry an opportunity to provide their perspective on recent developments in unmanned air, land, surface and sub-surface combatants.” The final report is being issued today (June 9, 2021) after there was a chance to review the materials presented, including videos, briefing slides and presentation documents. In addition, a number of interviews with presenters were conducted as well to shape the narrative to pull together the various presentation strands. The ADF is already undergoing a transition to shaping a distributed integrated force. Next Generation Autonomous Systems can provide a further set of capabilities for a more effective, dense, survivable and capable ADF as it builds out for operations in the Indo-Pacific region and enhances its defense of the Australian continent. https://sldinfo.com/2021/06/next-generation-autonomous-systems-a-williams-foundation-special-report/ The e-book version can be found here: https://defense.info/williams-foundation/2021/06/next-generation-autonomous-systems-report-on-the-williams-foundation-seminar-april-8-2021/

Dr Robbin Laird, Defence Industry and Working with Defence in Shaping a Way Ahead for Autonomous Systems, 8 June 2021 Link to the article Defence Industry and Working with Defence in Shaping a Way Ahead for Autonomous Systems - Second Line of Defense (sldinfo.com) The development and incorporation of autonomous systems into the Australian fifth-generation force requires a close working relationship between defense industry and the Department of Defence and the services. But also requires meeting the challenge already seen with regard to the introduction of software upgradeable systems such as F-35, P-8 and Triton. That challenge is for the warfighters to be able to drive advantages through rapid code rewrites and being able to develop and generate with the autonomous systems advances, disposable systems as well. This was well put in the discussion with Jason Scholz. As Scholz put it in our interview, with the Centre’s focus on the “smart, the small and the many”, compared with traditional “complex, large and few” manned systems, code rewriting can be much faster. It is also the case that digital engineering and digital twins is changing how all platforms are designed and supported. But in the case of next generation autonomous systems, the entire life cycle of these “smart, small and many” systems is very different. “They will be attritable; there will be no need to develop and maintain 30 years of systems engineering documentation – some of these might be used only once or a few times before disposal. When you need to adapt to the threat, digital engineering supports fast redesign and T&E in the virtual, and to add a new capability you just download it as software.” Scholz says. At the seminar, there were presentations by six industrial partners. Boeing Australia focused on the development of the Loyal Wingman. With the space which Australia has along with the technical capabilities in the country, Australia is in a good position to be a leader in autonomous systems. According to Andrew Glynn, Boeing Australia, the Airpower Teaming System, which has been established to develop loyal wingman is an important approach to shaping a way ahead. He noted that “the loyal wingman program is an experimentation program with RAAF to provide insights in the use for this type of capability.” Clearly, from Boeing’s perspective, the standup of the program in Australia is not simply about meeting the ADF needs, but provides a launch pad for broader global development. Glynn underscored that the teaming approach is designed to develop capabilities which can work with existing fleets. “Once ATS is operational, it will assist the RAAF to protect and project force by addressing quantity at the right quality.” He noted that the program went from concept to first flight in under three years and that was enabled by the fact that the platform is built on a completely digital foundation. A second presentation was given by Dr. John Best of Thales, Australia. In his presentation, he focused on the opportunity to build or enhance sovereign defence capability built around autonomous systems. But to do is not just an industry challenge, it is in his words “an enterprise challenge.” What is required is defence and industry to shape an ecosystem where they can work together to deliver the desired outcome. He also underscored that Australia has the building blocks in place to deliver such a solution. A particularly important aspect of shaping a way ahead is to shape more effective ways to manage complex systems, and within that context the autonomous piece of complexity. And the continuous learning piece which comes from use in the real world of combat and gray zone operations needs to be fed into the evolution of systems, This means that the “learning piece” needs to be worked into the contractual relationships which industry has with Defence. A third presentation was by Dr. Andrew Lucas of Agent Oriented Software. He provided a very helpful clarification of how autonomous systems are different from automatic or automated systems. For Lucas, an autonomous system is goal directed and capable of rational reasoning with regard to those goals. An autonomous system can perceive its environment, determine if the environment affects its goals and then takes actions in alignment with its goals up against the operational environment. It is able to balance proactive and reactive behaviors. This is in contrast to automated system which simply follows a task list or script. He then provided a way to look at the evolution of autonomy within the context of man-machine operations. His schema is built around the axis of increasing levels of delegation to the system. It moves from the machine simply providing timely advice with the humans making all the decisions; to a semi-autonomous relationship in which the machine is subordinate to a certain level of human authority; and then operating fully autonomous in which the machine operates without huma control or direct oversight. Dr. Lucas then discussed the relationship between AI and autonomous systems. AI is defined by him as the “theory and development of computer systems able to perform tasks normally requiring human intelligence.” AI enables machine learning which is to be understand in terms of “a computer program can learn and adapt to new data without human intervention.” And this then enables to creation of intelligent agents which can be defined as “a computer program that is capable of perceiving and interpretating data sensed from its environment, reflecting events in its environment, and taking actions to achieve given goals without permanent guidance from its user.” He underscored that to achieve the capability for autonomous systems, several trend lines in the evolution of AI and machine learning need to coalesce or synthesize. From this point of view, he noted that there were several AI trends, thrusts and directions which are shaping a way ahead. These included image analysis and recognition, or sensor identification and assessment, speech recognition and the ability of the human and machine enablement of dialogue, intelligent search and assessment, and intelligent software agents able to work through big data. With such capabilities evolving then situate AI and robotics are enabled with the possibility of machine learning. In other words, there is clearly a pathway already being shaped to autonomous systems, but investments, experimentation and development remains. And he argued that Australia needs to invest in this development to deliver on the promise of autonomous systems both for the civil and defence sectors. A fourth presentation was by Northrop Grumman, but done by remote participation from the United States. Northrop is a key player in Australian defence, and in the area of man-machine teaming, clearly the arrive of Triton is part of the way ahead. But the key focus which the company has upon expanding the types and nature of sensor networks and finding ways to leverage those networks to deliver timely decision-making data is a key part of the way ahead. Clearly one way already that Northrop is contributing to such a way ahead is with regard to how the F-35 functions as a C2 and sensor “flying combat system” and enables it to fight in an 8-ship formation as a wolfpack. This was not mentioned at the seminar but clearly is a key enabler of the way ahead for the ADF which also provides a foundation for shaping the broader efforts to shape an integrated distributed force able to work a diversity of sensor and communication networks to deliver the desired combat effects. In the Northrop Grumman presentation, a key point is to shape a way ahead for battleship control where sensors can track operations within that battlespace. Clearly, remote sensors are proliferating and the importance of AI and autonomy for helping the tactical and strategic decision makers to que systems to perform key and dynamic tasks will become increasingly important in the extended battlespace. A fifth presentation by defense industry was given by Air Vice Marshal Bill Henman (Retd), who is currently a strategic advisor Air and Space for Raytheon Australia. His presentation focused on a key issue, namely, the countering of autonomous systems. This subject is a key one both in terms of understanding how adversaries are using their own automated systems, which needs to include not simply the question of technology but concepts of operations, which in turn allows you to examine the vulnerabilities of your own systems. Autonomous systems have vulnerabilities which can be built around spoofing, data corruption as well as braking effective sensor network to C2 communication flows. At the heart of the autonomous system impact is the control challenge. Henman defined control as “enabling friendly manoeuvre while denying adversary manoeuvre. He argued as well that control also involves deconfliction of friendly manoeuvre in terms both of kinetic and non-kinetic fratricide. In his presentation, he highlighted how autonomous systems can be disabled or eliminated in combat. This can happen by disrupting or spoofing the detection and tracking systems. Or this can happen through various softkill options, such as jamming and spoofing, electronic attack or cyber intrusions. He then highlighted a number of hardkill options both kinetic (close in weapons systems) and non-kinetic, notably high energy lasers and directed energy systems. These vulnerabilities clearly provide a realistic cautionary note to how autonomous systems can be introduced and used. And this is why their introduction into infrastructure defense such as extended port security or into logistical support, up to and included logistical management systems, are good places to start and to sort through how to do so enhancing rather than compromising national defense and security. ` He ended his presentation by proposing a number of key actions as the way forward with regard to autonomous systems is worked. First, it is important to create the optimum environment to allow industry, Academia, Research and Development communities to be able to create and field innovative control soltuions. Second, it is crucial to be able to understand the operational implications of an adversary who has greater freedom of manoeuvre with respect to all dimensions of governance of autonomous systems than do the liberal democracies. Third, there needs to be as much focus on the development of superior autonomous decision cycles as there is upon the development of the sense and respond control systems enabling autonomous systems. And finally, he argued for shaping autonomous decision making ‘tutorship’ in roder to build the future confidence needed to send autonomous systems into combat as the force evolves with more agile, multi-domain C2 capabilities. A final defense industry presentation was by Lockheed Martin Australia. Dr. Tony Lindsay, formerly of the Australian Department of Defence’s Department of Science and Technology or DST, provided insights as well. Lindsay provided an overview on the decision cycles for the force and how autonomy might provide both enhancements to such decision making as well as more capability to leverage the proliferating sensor networks. He argued that AI and autonomous systems have the possibility for impacting on all parts of the decision cycle, such as persistent ISR, sensor cuing, scene understanding, and cognitive battle management. They could just as well undercut decision effectiveness if not worked into an effective decision-making cycle. This requires allowing the operator to act using relevant information, be able to align with commander’s intent and provide for system adaptation. The broader shift associated with the fifth-generation force transformation, namely distributed force which can be scalable and integratable provides a solid foundation for managing proliferating sensor networks as well as finding ways to use autonomous systems within distributed decision-making systems. In short, shaping a new enterprise approach already underway driven by software-upgradeable systems, and reworking how platform providers work with the forces and defence, presages the significant changes underway into which autonomous systems will be introduced and integrated within the force. The featured graphic is taken from Dr. Tony Lindsay’s presentation to the Seminar.

Dr Robbin Laird, The Australian Army, Navy and Air Force Shape a Way Ahead for the Inclusion of Autonomous Systems, 5 June 2021 Link to the article The Australian Army, Navy and Air Force Shape a Way Ahead for the Inclusion of Autonomous Systems - Second Line of Defense (sldinfo.com) WGCDR Keirin Joyce noted: “All of the services see robotic autonomous systems as a significant part of the road ahead. It’s just that the services are getting after them differently.” At the Williams Foundation seminar held on April 8, 2021, each of the service chiefs provided their perspective on the way ahead for their service with regard to such systems. Even though the strategic way ahead is shaping a force able to work across service platforms to deliver the desired combat or crisis management effects, each domain has a physical quality to it different from the other domains. And autonomous platforms like any platforms have to respect the domain within which they operate. And so doing, they might well be able to contribute to platforms operating in other domains, but they must first of all work effectively within a ground, air or naval combat force. The Australian Army and RAS With regard to the Army, the ability to experiment is significantly greater than with the other two services. The cost to do so and the fratricide which such systems can introduce into the operational force is much less to do so. There is little doubt that introducing such systems into near term operations, such as logistical support for HADR operations make a great deal of sense and can provide the force with near term learning from which to generate a broader capability to use such systems. In an August 9, 2020 video, the Army put its case succinctly in highlighting an optionally crewed autonomous casualty evacuation vehicle (OCCV): “The Australian Army will increase its experimentation, prototyping and exploration of autonomous vehicles and emerging technologies through Defence industry contracts valued at $12 million, allowing Army to learn, prototype and develop future concepts. Technology such as Robotics, Autonomous Systems, and Artificial Intelligence act as a force multiplier, and the mastery of the technology will make us more effective on the future battlefield and help to keep our personnel safe.” Optionally Crewed Combat Vehicles Link to Department of Defence You Tube video https://youtu.be/tlPdX1s-ZL4 Lieutenant General Rick Burr, Chief of the Australian Army, underscored the work Army is doing to introduce autonomous systems and to integrate them into the force. The Army’s overall approach is described as accelerated warfare within which autonomous systems are developed and assessed as contributors to enhanced capabilities, like all platforms and systems are as well. They are part of being what he calls having a force which is “future ready.” The inclusion of intelligence learning machines will contribute to what the Chief refers to as his approach to shaping the Army as a “force in motion.” He argued that Robotic Autonomous Systems (RAS) can maximize solider performance, improve decision-making, generate mass and scalable effects, protect the force and enhance efficiency. Today, Army is the largest user of uncrewed air systems. The Chief argued that uncrewed ground systems in the future will proliferate in a similar way. “Greater use of autonomous systems will be a feature of future ground forces.” An important point which he highlighted was that in making capability investment decisions are being done with regard to their ability to incorporate or work with RAS. For example, with regard to the future infantry fighting vehicle, the Army is focused on that vehicle able to operate with RAS, including controlling several smaller autonomous vehicles as well. “The vehicle will have the power and computing potential to operate numerous, smaller uncrewed and autonomous systems.” In the Army Chief’s approach, autonomous systems are part of the future force, but part of force being driven by a number of technological developments. “Greater platform collaboration, new power sources, new forms of active and passive protection, more lethal strike weapons, and directed energy weapons, are examples of this way ahead.” He underscored that in the future “Army’s teams will be more connected, protected and lethal so they can achieve their missions against current and emerging threats at the lowest possible risk to Australian soldiers.” He argued that the force as it modernizes is examining throughout this effort new opportunities for the use of RAS in the force. For example, “our aviation crews are examining the opportunities for manned-unmanned teaming, notably as we look forward to the delivery of the new attack helicopter.” The Army chief highlighted the nature of the globally competitive environment where maintaining an edge is both more necessary and more difficult. He argued that such a competitive edge could accrue to the ADF to the extent to which the force can be better integrated, and coordinated than its adversaries. This requires superior training and decision-making capabilities. This is why, he argued, why people is at the “center of our efforts. It is people that get the technology working effectively in the dangerous and contested environments.” The Royal Australian Navy and RAS The Chief of Navy, Vice Admiral Noonan, discussed the Navy’s RAS-AI 2040 strategy which he had introduced last year. As he described that strategy: “The way that we’ve sought to visualize this vision is through five very fundamental effects. Force protection, obviously all about keeping our people safe and out of harm’s way so that they can get on and do their job. Force projection is about how we can achieve mass. Force potential using human machine teaming, ultimately to achieve better and more effective decision-making in the war fighting effort. Partnered force concept around how we will operate as an integrated and joint force by design.” Vice Admiral Noonan then discussed the six principles which underly the RAS-AI Strategy 2040. “The six fundamental principles were built around a user centered design. The system design is user centered. In terms of decision support, we are looking to have systems that significantly reduce the cognitive load on our commanders and operators alike, allowing for them to achieve greater shared situational awareness to deliver effective, efficient, and ethical decision-making. “The joint integration piece is critical. I cannot stress that highly enough in terms of we must ensure that these systems are integrated. Not just integrated into the platforms or their parent platforms but integrated into the force. “And they are capable of being evergreen. This is the new term for spiral development. It’s about ensuring that we have systems that remain contemporary, and I am challenged on a daily basis about capability gaps and about deficiencies in the long lead times that require us in the shipbuilding space. It takes about 10 years to build a submarine, or five years to build a frigate. “And are we incorporating old technologies? Bottom answer is no, in that we are designing future and evergreen in growth into our platforms. And I think that’s a very important concept that we have not always fully grasped. “Finally, is the importance of made in Australia. Our systems must be designed for the very unique circumstances that we operate in, particularly in the maritime environment.” Vice Admiral Noonan then highlighted really the key aspect of using any new sensor networks, whether they be autonomous or not, namely, their integration into a C2 system. “Operating all these systems would simply be too complex, too time consuming and ultimately unmanageable without a common control framework. Therefore, as part of the way that we seek to get after that, the building blocks of that framework, as we see them in Navy, it needs to be a legal and ethical module that allows us to have embedded and encoded regulatory and legal protocols. Clearly a common control protocol that unifies the means of machine control. “We need common control bridges that provide an interface between the proprietary control systems and the combat management systems of the platforms from which they’re housed. We need a common control language that can express C2 in a way that both human operators and RAS-AI machines can understand. And ultimately, we need a common spectrum management protocol, levering and integrating programmed projects to harden and ensure the spectrum in which we operate.” The Royal Australian Air Force and RAS The RAAF has already acquired two flying platforms which are designed to work together in a manned-unmanned teaming effort, namely, the P-8 and Triton. These platforms for the U.S. Navy working with other platforms, such as the Romeo Helicopter are providing important real world operational lessons with regard to shaping a foundation for the future. In addition, with the loyal wingman program underway, the RAAF as one of the most advanced air forces in the world, we introduce the loyal wingman into a force already being reworked with the introduction of the F-35. The challenges to introduce Loyal Wingman and then to use it effectively will be an important part of shaping a way ahead for autonomous systems in the airspace. At the seminar, Air Marshal Mel Hupfeld provided the RAAF perspective on the way ahead in this area of development and operations. At the outset of his remarks, he noted: “Defense can gain significant advantage through leveraging autonomous systems, that’s to make better decisions faster, to more effectively allocate resources, and to discover new ways of delivering military effects. Artificial intelligence and human-machine teaming will play a pivotal role in air and space power into the future.” The RAAF is working a way ahead with regard to integrate manned new and existing aircraft with remotely piloted and autonomous systems. A key case in point is Loyal Wingman. According to Hupfeld: “The true value is indeed hidden inside the airframe of Loyal Wingman. And that is the development of the code and the algorithms which form the artificial intelligence behaviors that will optimize its combat capability. The Loyal Wingman project is a pathfinder for the integration of autonomous systems and artificial intelligence to create smart human-machine teams. “The aim is to provide capability advantage, working alongside existing platforms to complement and extend our air combat platforms and our other systems. And we’re exploring totally new concepts of operations, whereby multiple systems will pair with crude capabilities, such as the F-35, the Growler, the E-7 Wedgetail, with an aim to bolster our relatively small but potent Air Force. “And it’s clear how this changes things for us. Such an asset will change the way we calculate risk. The Loyal Wingman is the giant uncrewed gorilla in the room, but we’ve got many other programs that don’t immediately catch the eye. And these programs, though less visible, will no less revolutionize the way we do business.” He underscored that the Plan Jericho program through the Jericho Disruptive Innovation effort is looking at ways of automation and artificial intelligence that can step in to help pull the weight. There are still jobs in Air Force that we have people performing which are predictable, repetitive, and they don’t require creativity. “But this is not about replacing people with machines. We’ve got a shortage of people and they’re a scarce resource. And our work in this space is really about freeing up those people so that we can employ them in those areas that humans do best. “In my view, one of the best examples of this theory at work is some work we’re doing, once again, through the Jericho program, on quarriable sensors program. Now, while we would probably work on a catchier name, and hopefully one that’s easier to pronounce, what this project is seeking to achieve has the capacity to force-multiply our intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance capability by a factor of two or three…. “I believe that our sensors are currently employed very inefficiently. So for example, most of what our sensors stream is meaningless noise, and even when we do capture important information, it’s not necessarily available to the people that need it. The quarriable sensor program takes care of all this by using artificial intelligence and machine learning to automatically detect when an event of significance occurs. It will then report that directly to commanders and decision-makers in real time, enabling the customer to determine whether the automated response and the intelligence is valid.” Air Marshal Hupfeld provided a good summary to the day and to the presentations of the Service Chiefs. “We’re disappointed in reporting that we see from some of our commentators who still choose to discuss Air Force capabilities in isolation. Qhether or not Super Hornet can breed another capability one on one is really, to me, not a useful conversation. The force of tomorrow will be characterized by those invisible connections across air, land, maritime space and cyber, with masses of data from sensor inputs being fused, using artificial intelligence and machine learning, to rapidly convert data to information, to knowledge, to insight, all at unfathomable speeds. “The entire Defence Force will be one integrated system of systems. My vision for automation is that the joint force will be AI-enabled using robotics to augment roles, and humans working with machines, so they get the best out of both. The days of boring menial tasks will be gone. Our most scarce resource, our people, will focus on higher value and the creative tasks that we need. “And with this vision, we’ll march in lockstep with our colleagues in Navy and Army and across Defense to ensure that we deliver an autonomous future, and the responsiveness and precision of air and space power that we need, into our future joint force.” Appendix: THE ARMY APPROACH: OCTOBER 2018 STRATEGY War, by nature, remains an intense human activity and the use of armed force to compel change remains at its heart. The character of war is changing with the adoption of emerging and disruptive technologies. As these technologies become more available and affordable, the gap between well-equipped militaries and the motivated individual or group with a cause is closing. Therefore, sustaining and maintaining a technological edge over potential adversaries is becoming more challenging. An area where we can maintain an edge is in the large scale integration, synchronisation and coordinated employment of these technologies, coupled with superior training and decision-making. This can be achieved through robotics and manipulation of data through advanced networks (or system of networks) that can improve the speed and accuracy of information sharing. These networks can connect soldiers to other combatants (both human and machine), the broader Army, the Joint Force and partner nations; improving situational awareness, survivability and lethality. However, adoption of emerging technologies should be considered objectively prior to acquisition to confirm the capability offered by the technology is justified and cost effective. Risk, informed through future casting, modelling, simulation and experimentation, should also be considered to ensure the right technology is adopted at the right time. In this context RAS can be viewed as the application of software, artificial intelligence and advanced robotics to perform tasks as directed by humans. Simply “autonomy is the ability of a machine to perform a task without human input. Thus, an autonomous system is a machine, whether hardware or software, once activated performs some task or function on its own”. The term autonomy can be a barrier to understanding as it is, generally, specific to a system or sub-system. Therefore, it can be misleading to refer to an autonomous platform if the entire system of systems is not autonomous. It can be helpful to consider the level of human input, how much discretion the machine has with regard to the task and what aspect of the system has been automated. Within this strategy, RAS will span the full spectrum of human input from remote control through to full autonomy – the level of autonomy required will be determined by the role and also the maturity of the underpinning technologies such as AI. Therefore RAS is a lens through which to describe a system, hardware and software, which has varying elements of autonomy and/or robotics and commonly both. THE ROYAL AUSTRALIAN NAVY RAS-AI STRATEGY 2040 The forward to the strategy by Vice Admiral Noonan: On 1 July 2020, the Prime Minister launched the Defence Strategic Update 2020. This highlighted that we are experiencing the most consequential strategic realignment since the Second World War. Consequently, our Navy must be able to meet the emerging challenges of regional military modernisation, the risk of state-on-state conflict and technological disruption, to maintain our ability to Shape the Maritime Environment, Deter actions against our national interests in the Maritime Domain, and Respond with credible Naval Power to defend our Nation, and our National Interests. Robotics, Autonomous Systems and Artificial Intelligence (RAS-AI) are transforming every aspect of our lives. As a Fighting and Thinking Navy, we must leverage these advances to also transform, and improve, our ability to Fight and Win at Sea. I am therefore pleased to release Navy’s RAS-AI Strategy 2040, which nests within Navy’s capstone strategic documents – Plans MERCATOR and PELORUS, and supports the achievement of each of the five Navy Outcomes. RAS-AI Strategy 2040 sets out the challenges and opportunities that these technologies present and explains to Navy, our Joint Force colleagues, the broader Defence Organisation, our allies and industry the benefits e seek from RAS-AI, and how we aim to realise them. To fulfil our potential we need to engage in constant experimentation, and encourage collaboration and innovation at all levels. This will enable us to leverage RAS-AI to enhance Navy’s capability by strengthening our Force Protection, increasing our Force Projection in the maritime approaches of our near region, improving our Joint Integration through Partnership, maximising our Force Potential, and ensuring Australian Control. Just as our people and machines must operate in teams to enhance their strengths and overcome weaknesses, we must team with Defence as a whole, industry, academia and our international partners, to achieve the potential of these technologies. My vision is for Navy, industry and academia to build upon our established transformational partnerships, allowing us to address the challenges outlined in this strategy, together. Make no mistake; the pace of change is increasing and will challenge us all at some point. To meet that challenge, all that I ask, is that each of us focus on being a little better – every day. In embracing technology, we must remember that warfare is, and will remain, a fundamentally human activity. Our people will be at the core of our technological advances, and we must design systems with them at the centre. RAS-AI will make our people better warfighte s, and will enable us to achieve expanded reach across the region, however it is our people who remain our competitive edge. The race in autonomous warfare has already begun. Doing nothing, or waiting for allies to solve our requirements, is not an option. I commend the RAS-AI Strategy to you all and challenge each of you to think about how you can contribute to it. The featured photo: Chief of the Australian Army addresses the Williams Foundation Conference on April 8, 2021.

Dr Robbin Laird, Perspectives on the Introduction of Autonomous Systems into Combat, 4 June 2021 Link to article Perspectives on the Introduction of Autonomous Systems into Combat | Defense.info The Williams Foundation seminar on Next Generation Autonomous systems held on April 8, 2021, began with two presentations which focused on the nature of the challenges of introducing autonomous systems into the combat force. The first presentation was by Group Captain Jo Brick of the Australian Defence College. Brick frequently opens up Williams Foundation seminar and provides very helpful orientations to the issues to be discussed at that particular seminar. It was no different with regard to the challenging topic of understanding the nature and the way ahead for next generation autonomous systems. She highlighted a number of fictional examples of how the machine-man relationship has been envisaged in the future. But she honed on a key aspect of the challenge: how will data flow in the combat force and how will that data be used to make lethal decisions? She posed a number of key questions facing the way ahead for the introduction and proliferation of autonomous systems into the combat force. Do we trust the systems that we have created? Are we expecting them to be perfect, or to accept that they are flawed just like us? Do we understand autonomous systems enough to information the creation of an effective system of accountability? How would autonomous and intelligent systems make decisions, free from human intervention? Would they reflect the best of humanity or something less inspiring? Does the conduct of war by autonomous and intelligent systems dilute the sanctity of war as a societal function? Who or what is permitted to fight wars and to take life on behalf of the state? What does the use of AI and autonomous systems in warfare mean for the profession of arms? One could add to her questions another one which was discussed directly or indirectly throughout the seminar: What will be the impact of the introduction and proliferation of autonomous systems on the art of warfare? The second presentation, which followed that of Group Captain Brick, was by Professor Rob McLaughlin from the Australian National Centre for Oceans Resources and Security. In his presentation, McLaughlin dealt with the broader ethical and legal issues which autonomous systems raise and which need to be resolved in shaping a way ahead for their broader use in the militaries of liberal democratic states. One should note that another key question is how authoritarian states use and will use them which is not restricted by the ethical concerns of liberal democratic societies. There is always the reactive enemy who will shape their tactics and strategies in ways taking into account how the liberal democratic militaries self-limit with regard to systems, like autonomous ones. McLaughlin started with the most basic question: What is an autonomous weapon system? He turned to a definition provided by the International Red Cross which defines AWS as follows: “Any weapon system with autonomy in its critical functions. That is, a weapon system that can select and attack targets without hum intervention. After initial activation by a human operator, the weapons system – through its sensors, software (programming/alogrithms) and connected weapon(s) – takes on the targeting function that would normally be controlled by humans.” He then added this consideration as well from the International Red Cross as well: ”The key distinction, in our view, from non-autonomous weapons is that the machine self-initiates an attack.” This raises in turn the key consideration of when is the AWS (in legal terms) an independent unit (like a warplane or warship) rather than simply a sensor/weapon? This in turn raises a further consideration: Can a maritime autonomous weapons system be a warship in terms of international law? According to the Law of the Sea: “For the purposes of this Convention, warship means a ship belonging to the armed forces of a state bearing the external marks distinguishing such ships of its nationality, under the command of an officer duly commissioned by the government of the state and whose name appears in the appropriate service list or its equivalent and manned by a crew which is under regular armed forces discipline.” Such a definition quickly raises issues for autonomous maritime platforms. Are they marked with the nation’s identification? Are they introduced such as the Germans in World War II did with merchant “warships” without such markings? What does under command mean specifically as autonomous maritime platforms operate? Is there a mother ship which controls them which is crewed by humans? And if uncrewed then what about the manning issue? He argued that we are not yet at a threshold where these are practical questions impeding development. But we “will meet a frontier at some point – probably with AI and advanced machine learning.” In short, with autonomous systems on the horizon, a number of questions about how they will impact on the force, and how concepts of operations using these capabilities will face ethical and legal challenges as well.

Ed Timperlake and Dr Robbin Laird, Australia Under Attack from China: How the U.S. Can Provide a Near Term Response, 12 June 2021 Link to article Australia Under Attack from China: How the U.S. Can Provide a Near Term Response | Defense.info The Peoples Republic of China has picked a fight with the wrong two allies, Australia and the United States. Just recently, the Peoples Republic of China has just directly threatened Australia with an act of war. Their bellicose conventional attack threat It is now in play and it is time to realize that the Pacific is coming to a boil with Chinese’s state media being very bluntly directly threatening Australia. “China has a strong production capability, including producing additional long-range missiles with conventional warheads that target military objectives in Australia when the situation becomes highly tense.” The great rule often stated that if someone is threatening to kill you is that it is best to believe them. One is immediately struck that the Chinese statement highlighted the word “conventional warheads,” as well as implying an arms race in strike weapons along with escalation pre-emption by highlighting striking “when the situation becomes highly tense.” Stressing a conventional warhead attacks is a strategic goal of China to avoid triggering any discussion inside the Australian political process of that nation developing an independent nuclear strike force. The PRC is well aware that Atlantic nations have nuclear situation in which Russia faces three nuclear powers: the United States, the United Kingdom and France. However in the Pacific, it is reversed with Russia, China and North Korea having nuclear weapons facing the United States as a nuclear power. It is best to always leave stepping into the strategic nuclear deterrence warfighting world to the citizens on the nation considering supporting such a move. However, the great peacetime and wartime combat conventional warfighter alliance between Australia and the United States has historically proven to be strong and lasting. What makes it an equal partnership is Australia is not only always metaphorically “punching above their weight” but they have proven to have invested in an advanced Air Force, and Navy and are working to have a very capable 21st century kill web enabled force. The challenge for Australia’s conventional deterrence strategy is distance and the F-111 answered that need earlier for the Australian Defence Force (ADF) The greatest long distance raid by USAF F-111, was codenamed El Dorado Canyon a successful attack from England, flying around Europe to attack Muammar Qadhafi in Libya, with a total out and back route of flight of over 7000 miles. When looking at Pacific distances from Australia, the distance from Australia to PLAAN Hainan Island sub-pens/and their navy port from Australia is less than 3000 nautical miles the Heavenly Gate in Beijing slightly less than 4000 miles. Consequently, the PRC best note that there is a famous flying event ordered by Admiral Nimitz right after WWII which was the flight of PV2 “Truculent Turtle’ flying non-stop from Perth Australia to Columbus Ohio with a crew of four and a baby kangaroo. The Navy aircraft covered 11,235 miles. That record stood until enter the USAF and B-52s in the early sixties. And as former USAF Chief of Staff Buzz Moseley put it very succinctly that US and Allies shoot back: “There is not a place on the face of the earth that the USAF will not fight their way into.” The current direct PRC threat leads immediate expediency to help Australia in their quest to replace the F-111 by long range strike capabilities. And as the ADF does so, and examines options, clearly the United States is a key partner. Such a US/Australian partnership reaches back to very early in the twentieth century, when sea power ruled the Pacific. In 1908 Australian PM Alfred Deakin invited the U.S .Great White Fleet to make port calls at Sydney, Melbourne and Albany. This was the first time a non-Royal Navy ship was in Australian waters, and history records that “Australia ordered its first modern warships a purchase that angered the British Admiralty.” In the long term, the Australian government is committed to building long range strike and has committed to spending serious money in this area. But that is in the mid-term, what does Australia do now as part of a crisis management approach to such a threat? There has been a growing focus of attention within Australian defence with regard to having longer-range strike options inherent within the ADF. For example, Marcus Hellyar recently posed the possibility of Australia perhaps acquiring the B-21 from the United States, but this is a mid-term option at best. Again, what does one do now to respond effectively to dangerous sabre rattling? Clearly, this is an area where cooperation with the United States can provide both allies with enhanced deterrent options now and shape a more effective way ahead in the future. For Australia, it is about how to build in long range strike into the ADF over the mid-to-long term. For the United States, it is to better understand how bombers and the U.S. Navy fleet can work much more effectively together. In other words, there is an option which provides a building block for the way ahead with regard to a long-range strike enabled ADF and for the United States to learn how to more effectively operate its joint naval and air capabilities in the Pacific both with their own services as well as with allies. In the past, the United States has brought B-1 bombers to participate with the ADF in Northern Australia. Now by deploying a rotational force of B-2s to the North of Australia, a stealth bomber capability could be brought to the defence of Australia. It would be an important input to responding to China, but also, simply underscoring to the Chinese that their military buildup in the Pacific and specifically directed against Australia is not in their own interest. For now, it is a modest response, but already USAF bombers integrated into the ADF has to be taken seriously with regard to any continued direct threats against Australia. By training the Royal Australia Navy and the Royal Australian Navy to work with the B-2s, B-1s and B-52s, those two key Australian power projection forces can train with an operational long range strike asset. What can be demonstrated is that long range strike is not primarily focused on downtown Beijing, but primarily upon enhancing the deployed naval and air force by providing rapidly deployed enhancements to air-naval task forces throughout the Indo-Pacific region. Australia could also determine if the B-21 is the right fit or are their other ways to bring longer range strike to the operating force? It would also help guide the way ahead for building out the kind of sovereign missile industry Australia desires. It is not simply about buying extant U.S. or European kit. For it is also clear that allies like the United States need a different approach then they have followed to date to get a less costly and more effective mix of strike assets as well. And as the United States shapes a more effective support to allies approach in the region, a key part of what the US Navy and the US Air Force clearly need to work on is much more effective integratability of the bomber force with the operating fleet. In our forthcoming book for USNI Press on maritime kill webs, 21st century warfighting and deterrence, we argue that a kill web approach both empowers significantly greater collaboration between the air and sea services but does so in terms of having a more survivable, lethal and distributed force with integration of bomber and fleet operations. And this is not about preparing to fit World War III; it is about effective crisis and escalation management. Part of the way ahead, would be to build reinforced bases from which U.S. bombers could operate in the near to mid-term as Australia builds out its own desired capabilities as well. These clearly would be used for rotation to exercise with the ADF or to reinforce Australian defence in a crisis. It is about taking the U.S.-Australian alliance forward in an effective way to deal with the defence of Australia today and not simply speculate about the long-term options. It is about also demonstrating to the Chinese leadership that bullying is not going to lead to the compliance of the liberal democratic states to the future Chinese global order. The Chinese leaders need to pause and consider what Australia as an arsenal for democracy might mean to their future as well. For a detailed examination of the recent evolution of Australian defence strategy and policies, see link in the article for Robbin Laird's book Joint by Design (30% discount is available for Williams members if purchased directly through Second Line of Defense. Use the code Williams) For an earlier version of this article published on Breaking Defense, see the following: https://breakingdefense.com/2021/06/supporting-australia-to-deter-china-helps-america/

Dr Robbin Laird and Ed Timperlake, Supporting Australia To Deter China Helps America, 11 June 2021 Link to article Supporting Australia To Deter China Helps America - Breaking Defense Breaking Defense - Defense industry news, analysis and commentary Article text As the Biden administration focuses on ways to improve deterrence in the Pacific, reinforcing Australia’s defense against China is a good place to start. Working closely with Australia now can send an important message to Beijing that political intimidation, backed by economic and military threats, is not in its long-term interest. For those not following the Chinese campaign against Australia, Chinese leaders have made it very clear they believe Australia must comply with their plans to dominate the Pacific. The Chinese threat has been stated clearly in the Chinese state media: “China has a strong production capability, including producing additional long-range missiles with conventional warheads that target military objectives in Australia when the situation becomes highly tense.” If someone is threatening to kill you, you’d best believe them. Examining China’s direct threat closely, one is immediately struck that the focus is upon conventional strike, as raising a nuclear threat might lead to a reaction from Canberra that the Chinese might regret — even more than having to deal with the prospect of an Australian defense buildup that includes new long-range strike capabilities. Paul Dibb, a noted Australian strategist and former intelligence official, has argued that China’s moves are significantly reducing the country’s warning time in the face of any attack. “The Chinese have been clearly communicating for some time that it is now time to teach Australia a lesson. They used similar language against Vietnam in 1979 prior to their invasion,” he said in a recent interview. “And there are many ways they could generate force to pressure Australia, without directly striking the country, such as take us on in our 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone, threatening our offshore energy platforms. And by so, doing put the challenge directly to Australia.” In the long term, the Australian government is committed to building long-range strike and has committed to spending serious money in this area. But what should Australia do now as part of a crisis management approach to such a threat? What does one do now to respond effectively to dangerous saber rattling? There is an option which provides a building block for the way ahead with regard to a long-range strike capability for the Australian Defense Force (ADF), and for the United States to learn how to more effectively utilize its naval and air capabilities in the Pacific both with its own services, as well as with allies. The United States has brought B-1 bombers to participate with the ADF in Northern Australia. By deploying a rotational force of B-2s to the North of Australia, a stealth bomber capability could be brought to the defense of Australia. It would be an important immediate input to responding to China, but it would also underscore to the Chinese that their military buildup in the Pacific — especially that directed against Australia — is not in their own interest. By training the Royal Australia Navy and the Royal Australian Navy to work with the B-2s, B-1s and B-52s, those two key Australian power projection forces can train with operational long-range strike assets. There further is discussion in Australia about whether buying the B-21 is the right answer for longer-range strike or are there other options. Thus, rotational US bomber deployments would also help guide the way ahead for building out the kind of sovereign missile industry Australia desires. It is clear that the United States also needs a different approach than it has followed to date to get a less costly and more effective mix of strike assets itself. As the United States shapes a more effective approach to support allies in the Indo-Pacific, a key part of what the US Navy and the US Air Force clearly need to work on is much more effective integration of the bomber force with the fleet. One measure for the near term could be building reinforced bases in Australia from which US bombers could operate, while Australia builds its own capabilities. These bases would be used for rotations to exercise with the ADF or to reinforce Australian forces in a crisis. This is all about taking the US-Australian alliance forward in an effective way to deal with the defense of Australia today. It is about also demonstrating to China’s leaders that bullying is not going make Australia or any other liberal democratic states submit to a Chinese global order. The Chinese leadership needs to pause and consider what Australia, as an arsenal for democracy, might mean to the Peoples Republic of China’s future. Robbin Laird, a defense consultant and member of the Breaking Defense Board of Contributors, is a research fellow with the Williams Foundation. Ed Timberlake, a graduate of the US Naval Academy and former Marine squadron commander, works with Laird. He has worked on Capitol Hill and held senior positions in the Defense Department.

In April this year Group Captain Jo Brick (an esteemed editor at The Central Blue) gave a compelling presentation to the Williams Foundation Seminar discussing Next Generation Autonomous Systems. Specifically, she addressed the history of automation and ‘human-machine’ teaming - but not in a plain or linear approach. Using three popular stories from popular culture, Jo was able to plot the history of automation and its consequences for the conduct of warfare. More importantly however, she was able to highlight the wider questions we face as a human society that has advanced technology to the degree that we can imbue machines with human characteristics. Good morning ladies and gentlemen. It is a very great privilege to be a part of this Williams Seminar on the ‘Next Generation Autonomous Systems’. As you all know, the Royal Australian Air Force commemorated 100 years of service just a few weeks ago. It was an occasion to reflect on the evolution of the Air Force over the last century. I think that this seminar allows us to consider the concepts and capabilities that will impact, not just on air forces, but the joint force, into the next 100 years. I am honoured to be invited to speak and contribute to this discussion. In preparing for this presentation, I discovered that trying to understand automation is impossible if you focus only on the technology and machines. An earnest approach to understanding automation inevitably involves a multidisciplinary approach that includes fields such as anthropology, philosophy and ethics, mathematics and engineering, law, history, economics, and sociology. This is because the history of automation and ‘human-machine’ teaming tells us more about ourselves and our humanity than it does about the machines. The story of automation is one of our desires and fears, and of our drive and determination to exceed the biological and cognitive limits of body and mind. Futurist and inventor, Ray Kurzweil states that ‘technology is the continuation of evolution by other means…’. [1] This idea is consistent with the philosopher Manuel De Landa’s thesis in a book titled War in the Age of Intelligent Machines, where he discusses the transference of human cognition to machines as part of the ongoing development of military capability. My aim in providing this overview is to establish a foundation for the remainder of the seminar by discussing a few of the historical aspects, concepts, and challenges that underpin automation, particularly its impact on warfare. Rather than providing a plain, linear approach to the history of automation, I will take a different approach that uses three stories from popular culture to plot the history of automation and the consequences for the conduct of warfare: Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein. Iron Man from the Marvel Cinematic Universe. Osamu Tezuka’s Astro Boy television series. Frankenstein – warnings about technology and industrialisation Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein conveys several themes. Victor Frankenstein, the creator and not the creature, has violated Nature by assembling various body parts into a new creature that he is disgusted by and rejects. The story is often cited as a warning against human hubris and its blinding focus on the creator’s ego at the expense of truly thinking about the consequences of what we create. It is also a story that incorporates the zeitgeist of the early 19th century. This society did not yet have the word ‘scientist’ but was experiencing discoveries by its ‘alchemists’ and ‘natural philosophers’. Shelley does not describe Victor as a ‘scientist’ as the word did not exist in 1818, when the book was first published. Victor would have been considered as a ‘natural philosopher’ – a person who tried to understand and describe nature. [2] Shelley wrote the story at the time of the Industrial Revolution, characterised by the rapid rate of scientific development that led to the steam engine and the flourishing of the iron, coal and cotton industries. Interestingly, Shelley’s world in the early 19th century, was one of significant social upheaval caused by the pursuit of scientific understanding. During this time, science was performance – with public demonstrations of experiments by natural philosophers expressing their theories or displaying an invention or curio [3]. Automata were some of the items displayed – including mechanical dolls containing elaborate ‘clockwork’ mechanisms and a wood carved chess player called ‘The Turk’. Automation in the industrial era also meant the design of machines to replace human labour. Further, industrialisation meant the design of processes that resulted in the mechanistic behaviour of humans as part of a monotonous and repetitive routine [4]. The work of Frederick Winslow Taylor in creating a scientific and standardised approach to manufacturing effectively removed the individual artisan approach of workers with set procedures to be followed by skilled workers as cogs in a large industrial machine. This was a time of making humans the automatons for industry [5]. It was during this period that Karel Čapek coined the term ‘robot’ (based on the Czech verb robota ‘to work’) in a play, Rossum’s Universal Robots (RUR, 1920), which represented men as machines. Industrialisation impacted warfare in the late 19th century and into the 20th century. Its impact was demonstrated by the horrific results of the collision between Napoleonic era military tactics and mechanised weaponry. Like the industrialisation and standardisation of the factories at the time, this war of the industrial era can be perceived as one of automatons (men) subjected to drill procedures and constant calls of ‘over the top’ at various locales in the French countryside – the Somme, Hamel, Villiers-Bretonneux – where men were pitted against mechanised fire – machine guns and artillery. The contest was determined by which side exhausted its stocks of men and armaments first. In the journey towards automation, the industrialisation of society – including warfare – meant the replacement of human muscle and effort with machines, and the fusion of humans into standardised and repetitive procedures. Iron Man – extending human ability. In the Marvel Cinematic Universe, Anthony Stark develops an armoured suit that allows him to ‘integrate’ with a natural language interface computer system called JARVIS (Just A Rather Very Intelligent System). The suit and its iterations (50 plus variants) feature various weapons, flight systems, and armour. A notable aspect of the Iron Man suits is that it binds the human with the machine, but the human maintains control and uses the computer interface (JARVIS) to assist in decision making. Iron Man represents a change in the relationship between humans and machines. Humans interfaced with the basic machines of the industrial revolution – such as steam engines, furnaces, power looms, agricultural machinery – as part of industrialised processes. The advent of aircraft, motor vehicles (including tanks and other armoured vehicles) provide a further example of human-machine integration, as human operators controlled these machines of war to overcome inherent human limitations in a bid to gain an advantage over the adversary. The human and the machine form a symbiotic system – the human needs the aircraft to fly, and the aircraft needs the human to fly it [6]. The relationship between human and machine is encapsulated by the term ‘cybernetics’; developed by MIT mathematician Norbert Wiener, who also developed its first theory. His book, Cybernetics; or, Control and Communication in the Animal and Machine, was published in 1948 and advanced three ideas that supported his thoughts on human-machine interaction: control (control or shape the environment); feedback (the use of sensors to receive information about actual performance); and merging human and machine to form a single entity [7]. A rudimentary example of these cybernetic ideas in practice is the Sperry Gyroscope, founded in 1910 by American entrepreneur Elmer Ambrose Sperry. The company’s value in developing military products in the 1940s was to ‘extend the physical and mental powers of men in the armed forces enabling them to hit the enemy before and more often than the enemy can hit them’ [8]. The Sperry ball turret was developed for the B-17 Flying Fortress to allow the gunner to use a series of controls for the turret and the two Browning .50-calibre machine guns that gave the gunner a broad vertical and horizontal range of fire against aerial targets. The fundamental theories of cybernetics articulated by Wiener are enhanced in practice through the increased processing power of computers. As the operation of JARVIS in Iron Man demonstrates, advanced computing power has enabled the enhancement or replacement of human decision-making in limited circumstances. The processing of data feeds by JARVIS means that Stark does not have to occupy his mind with parsing data, but can focus on important decisions about how to use Iron Man in a hostile environment. Similarly, systems in modern military aircraft have replaced human air crew (flight engineers, navigators) and are able to manage and process volumes of data that would have overwhelmed the human crew they replaced. The increase in computing power of these systems over time is a vital step towards semi and full autonomous systems. Astro Boy – machines become ‘human’. The 1980s version of the TV series ‘Astro Boy’ or ‘Mighty Atom’, created by Japanese manga artist Osamu Tezuka, is set in the 2030s. Dr Bonyton has been asked to create a robot with a ‘soul’. He ultimately replicates his son, Toby, who died in a car accident. Astro Boy is ‘raised’ by positive influences – Dr Elefun and Daddy Walrus. His treatment and growth as a character is often contrasted with his brother, Atlas, who is made from the same design template. Atlas has negative influences through a criminal, Skunk, who teaches Atlas to commit crimes for him. The interaction between Astro and Atlas throughout the series serves as a running commentary of the impact of human influence and human frailty in the development of artificial intelligence. Meanwhile, Astro Boy is reminiscent of Pinocchio – he just wants to be a real boy – but the world of humans around him struggle with whether he should be a hero or treated with derision like Frankenstein’s monster. ‘Astro Boy’ explores key themes about robotics and consciousness, and what a world of sentient robots would mean – how would they co-exist with humans and what kind of ‘quality of life’ and ‘rights’ would such sentient robots have? Today we have autonomous and semi-autonomous systems, with humans in the loop that maintain the executive function of a system. A simple military example is the unmanned aerial or ground vehicles that incorporates artificial intelligence to enable autonomous operation in limited circumstances. The most recent example is the Boeing Loyal Wingman, which is part of an Airpower Teaming System that allows it to operate independently using artificial intelligence, or in partnership with a manned aircraft. We have yet to realise the level of intelligence or consciousness that ‘Astro Boy’ represents. We face many obstacles in understanding ourselves before we can fulfil Kurzweil’s goal of using technology to further human evolution – or to realise the transference of human cognition to machines. The ability to learn and use data to make decisions is central to realising the level of artificial intelligence that enables the type of autonomy that is close to human decision-making. The capacity of machines to compute and store memory has increased significantly in the last few decades. However, we are yet to understand how humans, and therefore machines can learn [9]. Further, according to Australian AI expert Ellen Broad, current AI systems sold commercially to make important decisions ‘are brittle, error-prone and poorly designed.’ [10] The central thesis of Broad’s work is that we leave our fingerprints on the systems and AI that we design and create. We can create a system of deep learning for AI and simulated neural networks, but these sophisticated systems cannot operate optimally if we build it on a poor foundation of mislabelled, biased, and poor quality data. In this context, it is difficult to countenance entrusting AI with the autonomous decision or whether or not to strike a target. When the current Chief of Defence Force, General Campbell was Chief of Army, he said: ‘I think not just the military but society … is going to go through a period of learning and understanding what is the right point of comfortably accepted machine analysis, integration, filtering, and machine decision… I don't think we have anywhere near the sophistication of understanding at this stage and for many years to be comfortable with human[s] not in the loop’. Conclusion I have given you only an exceedingly small and select overview into the history of automation. We can all do more to understand our relationship with the machines that we have created to assist us extend past our human limitations. As Kurzweil stated, we use technology to further our evolution beyond our inherent biological and cognitive limits. We used machines as muscle, and to help us with processing information and to assist in decision-making. We are now developing our technology to the point of creating machines with artificial intelligence and the ability to operate autonomously, without our intervention or input. We expect such superior technology to satisfy our military requirements to ‘be everywhere, know everything, and… to predict what happens next’ [11]. Yet we face many challenges with the use of such technology and many questions remain to be answered: Do we trust the systems that we have created [12]? Are we expecting them to be perfect, or to accept that they are flawed just like us? Do we understand autonomous systems enough to inform the creation of an effective system of accountability? How would autonomous and intelligent systems make decisions, free from human intervention? Would they reflect the best of humanity or something less inspiring [13]? Does the conduct of war by autonomous and intelligent systems dilute the sanctity of war as a societal function? Who or what is permitted to fight wars and to take human life on behalf of the state? What does the use of AI and autonomous systems in warfare mean for the profession of arms? These issues are ones that should concern us as part of the military profession and defence industry. They are a subset of the wider questions we face as a human society that has advanced technology to the degree that we can imbue machines with human characteristics. Scientists, engineers, ethicists, futurists, and entrepreneurs such as Bill Gates and Elon Musk have urged caution in the development of AI. There are movements that are focused on keeping the development of AI beneficial to society (called AI-safety research) [14]. Strong activism at the United Nations by non-government organisations that advocate against the development of lethal autonomous weapons. While it is easy to shut out such opposing voices, we should take the time to understand the issues they raise. Listening to opposing viewpoints as a means of testing our philosophies and assumptions is essential in avoiding ‘sleepwalking into a dangerous brave new world that is slowly slipping out of our control’ and to understand the risk we take in delegating and transferring more control and autonomy into the hands of more networked and intelligent machines [15]. I said at the start, the story of automation is the story of what it is to be human. As Ellen Broad states: ‘You don’t need to be a technical expert to appreciate the possibilities and pitfalls of using data. You just have to know what it’s like to be human’. After all, we are creating machines to be: Just. Like. Us. FOOTNOTES [1] Ray Kurzweil, The Age of Spiritual Machines (New York: Penguin, 1999), 16. [2] The word ‘scientist’ was not coined until 1834 by William Whewell, a Professor of Moral Philosophy at Cambridge and associate of Charles Babbage – a pioneer of computational machines (the ‘Difference Engine’). National Public Radio. ‘How the word “scientist” came to be’. Talk of the Nation, NPR, 21 May 2010 (accessed 04 April 2021). [3] Burdon, ‘Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein’. [4] Gaby Wood. Living Dolls – A Magical History of the Quest for Mechanical Life (London: Faber and Faber Limited, 2002), xviii [5] See Stanley McChrystal. Team of Teams – New Rules of Engagement for a Complex World (Great Britain: Penguin, 2015), Chapter 2. [6] See Thomas Rid. Rise of the Machines – The Lost History of Cybernetics (Melbourne: Scribe, 2016), 2. [7] Rid, Rise of the Machines, 47-49. [8] Quoted in Rid, Rise of the Machines, 13. [9] Max Tegmark. Life 3.0 (Great Britain: Penguin Random House UK, 2017), 77-79. [10] Ellen Broad. Made by Humans – The AI Condition (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2018), xii. [11] Quote from former Joint Special Operations Command Lieutenant-General Joseph Votel, April 2014. Quoted in Andrew Cockburn. Kill Chain – The Rise of the High-Tech Assassins (New York: Picador, 2015), 244. [12] PW Singer provides a useful definition of ‘trust’ in this context: ‘Trust is having a proper sense of what the other is capable of, as well as being correct in your expectations of what the other will do’. Singer, Wired for War, 134. [1] Question raised by Brad Smith. Tools and Weapons – The Promise and The Peril of the Digital Age (Great Britain: Hodder & Stoughton, 2019), 193. [14] Tegmark, Life 3.0, 316-335. [15] Rid, Rise of the Machines, 5. REFERENCES Broad, Ellen. Made by Humans – The AI Condition. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2018. 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