Fight Tonight: Combat Readiness at the Speed of Relevance - Conference Proceedings #7 By Dr Robbin Laird In an era of growing strategic uncertainty, Australia faces a fundamental question about its defence posture: how does a geographically isolated continent-nation sustain military operations when global supply chains fail? Air Vice Marshal (Retired) Robert Denney, now Country Executive for Northrop Grumman Australia, delivered a compelling answer in a recent presentation that cuts to the heart of Australia’s defence industrial strategy. Speaking from decades of experience in both military leadership and defence industry, Denney’s message was unambiguous: if Australia wants to be ready to “fight tonight,” it must also be prepared to fight “tomorrow night, next week, and next month.” This capability doesn’t emerge overnight. It requires deliberate, long-term investment in sovereign industrial capacity that begins well before any conflict materializes. The Geography of Defence Manufacturing Australia’s strategic geography presents unique challenges that distinguish it from other nations facing security threats. Unlike Ukraine, which despite being under invasion can receive continuous equipment shipments across land borders, Australia sits as an island continent potentially thousands of kilometres from allied support. This geographic reality fundamentally changes the equation for defence preparedness. “The larger the Australian industrial base, the more capacity to manufacture hardware essential for ongoing warfare, week after week, month after month,” Denney emphasized. But the value extends beyond just manufacturing capacity. It encompasses the skills, knowledge, and experience that underwrite innovation under pressure. This industrial base functions as more than just a manufacturing capability; it serves as an arm of national deterrence. The potential of what Australia can become when mobilized may prove as deterrent as its current military posture. Adversaries must calculate not just against Australia’s existing defence capabilities, but against its capacity to rapidly scale production and adapt to changing conflict dynamics. The Historical Efficiency Trap For decades, Australia’s defence procurement has followed a predictable pattern: prioritize efficiency and value for money, rely on market forces to shape outcomes, and expect industry to deliver capability improvements at the lowest possible cost. This approach, while financially prudent in peacetime, has led to a systematic atrophy of Australian defence manufacturing capacity. The logic seemed sound: why maintain expensive domestic production when global markets could deliver the same capability more cheaply? The answer, as recent global events have demonstrated, lies in the fragility of extended supply chains during crisis and the time required to build industrial capability from scratch. “If we want disrupted results, we need a different approach,” Denney argued. The traditional efficiency-focused model assumes peacetime conditions will persist indefinitely. It fails to account for the reality that future conflicts may require sustained industrial output over months or years, potentially without access to traditional supply sources. The Supply Chain Lock-In Effect Understanding how defence supply chains actually develop reveals why Australia has struggled to build sovereign capability. The process is neither simple nor quick. It’s a deliberate, resource-intensive endeavor that unfolds over years. Defence contractors invest heavily in identifying, qualifying, and nurturing suppliers. These suppliers become integral to platform success, with teams matching component needs to supplier capabilities, negotiating contracts, managing production timelines, and adhering to stringent quality standards. The process typically begins during initial production phases, where suppliers climb learning curves, reduce costs, and improve efficiency. By the time a product reaches full production maturity, successful suppliers have developed considerable competitive advantages. They possess the specialized tooling, skilled workforce, and intellectual property necessary to deliver reliably at competitive costs. More importantly, they have established relationships and proven track records that make replacing them both difficult and often unjustifiable. This creates what Denney calls the “lock-in effect.” Once supply chains mature and become entrenched, expecting companies to drop performing suppliers for Australian alternatives becomes unrealistic. After all, if Australia could arbitrarily replace established suppliers, what prevents the same logic from being applied to Australian companies in future competitions? Success Stories: Early Engagement Pays Dividends Despite these challenges, Australian companies have successfully penetrated global defence supply chains, but their success stories share a common thread: early engagement before supply chains crystallize. Consider AW Bell, a Melbourne-based foundry that became a qualified supplier for multiple prime contractors. Their opportunity arose when established suppliers struggled with delivery timelines and quality control. By stepping in when others failed, AW Bell not only secured contracts with Northrop Grumman but expanded to supply Lockheed Martin and other major defence contractors, earning excellence awards in the process. However, relying on other suppliers’ failures represents an unsustainable strategy for building sovereign capability. More instructive are examples where Australian companies gained access through strategic early investment. AME Systems, an Australian cable manufacturer, succeeded because Australia was a co-development partner in the Triton program. This early investment opened doors for AME to enter the supply chain before it became locked in. Today, AME supplies cables to the entire U.S. and Australian Triton fleet, a contract that would be nearly impossible to secure if attempted after the supply base had been established. Similarly, Cable X secured work on the Wedgetail airborne early warning and control system because Australia invested early in the program, again before the supply base crystallized. Cable X has been supplying the program for over 20 years, demonstrating the longevity of these early-entry advantages. The GWEO Model: Signalling Intent The most promising example of how government can facilitate Australian industry inclusion comes from the approach being used for the Guided Weapons and Explosive Ordnance (GWEO) manufacturing centre. Here, the government has signalled its intention to invest upfront in manufacturing before production has even begun, allowing industry to lock in suppliers from the outset. This approach demonstrates the power of early government commitment. As Denney noted, if Northrop Grumman wins the GWEO solid rocket motor contract, their aspirational goal would be 100% Australian supply chain content. While achieving 100% may prove unrealistic, starting with that ambition fundamentally changes the supplier search process. “We don’t know if we’ll achieve 100%, but that’s how we would try to approach it,” Denney explained. This mindset shift, from trying to retrofit Australian suppliers into established supply chains to building supply chains around Australian capability, represents a fundamental strategic reorientation. Mobilization as Capability, Not Switch Perhaps the most crucial insight from Denney’s presentation concerns the nature of industrial mobilization. Too often, policymakers conceive of mobilization as a switch that can be flipped when conflict begins. This fundamental misunderstanding has led to procurement strategies that prioritize peacetime efficiency over wartime resilience. “Mobilization is not a switch you can flip when conflict begins. It’s a capability you build in advance,” Denney emphasized. When local companies participate in supply chains from day one, they gain the experience, tooling, and workforce necessary to deliver at scale. More importantly, they develop the agility to pivot, adapt production, innovate under pressure, and respond to emerging threats during wartime. This agility represents the essence of sovereign capability. It enables rapid adaptation when conflict dynamics shift unexpectedly and ensures Australia functions as a producer of defence capability, not merely a consumer. The ability to “respond, recover and reinforce at speed” becomes the difference between sustained operations and strategic dependence. Redefining Success Metrics Traditional defence procurement measures success through equipment delivery and cost efficiency. Under mounting strategic pressure, these metrics prove insufficient for building the industrial base necessary for sustained conflict. Denney advocates for expanded success criteria that capture the broader strategic value of defence investments. Future acquisitions should be measured on: Workforce Development: The Australian skills, knowledge, and training generated through industrial participation. Infrastructure Investment: Both private and public investment in plant and tooling capabilities. Intellectual Property Creation: The knowledge and manufacturing expertise that remains in Australia. Supply Base Development: The network of qualified suppliers that can support sustained production. This broader measurement framework recognizes that defence acquisitions deliver value beyond the immediate platform or capability. They represent investments in national resilience and strategic autonomy. Strategic Industrial Development The implications of this analysis point toward a more deliberate industrial development strategy. Rather than hoping Australian companies will organically find opportunities in defence supply chains, government should actively seed industrial capabilities in strategically important areas. This might mean funding specific industrial capabilities regardless of their connection to existing platform acquisitions. Just as Australia comfortably invests in war stocks with little peacetime utility, it should invest in industrial capacity purely to have it mature to a level where it can be activated during conflict. “We seem quite comfortable investing in major systems, workforce facilities that do not have substantial peacetime roles,” Denney observed. “We hold significant investments in explosive ordnance war stock that has little utility in peacetime.” If Australia can justify these investments, the logic extends naturally to industrial capability that can transform finite war stocks into potentially unlimited production capacity. The Iceberg Analogy Denney’s most powerful metaphor describes this latent industrial capability as the “submerged part of the iceberg” or the hidden portion that provides stability and resilience to the visible military capability above water. This submerged capacity represents the skills, experience, and industrial base that allow Australian industry to adapt, innovate, and respond to the unpredictable nature of future conflict. By investing early in this submerged capability, Australia builds what might be called “strategic industrial depth.” This represents more than just manufacturing capacity: it encompasses the human capital, technological knowledge, and industrial relationships necessary to sustain complex military operations over extended periods. This strategic approach carries inherent risks. Defence investments in industrial capability might not translate into actual capability acquisitions. Some investments may prove unsuccessful or redundant. However, as Denney noted, “with risk comes reward.” The alternative which would be attempting to build industrial capability after conflict begins carries far greater risks and lower probability of success. The strategic calculus becomes clear: invest in potential industrial capacity that may never be needed, or face the certainty of industrial inadequacy when it is most required. For a nation with Australia’s geographic constraints and strategic exposure, this represents a straightforward choice. Conclusion: Building Today for Tomorrow’s Conflicts Air Vice Marshal Denney’s presentation provides a roadmap for transforming Australia from a defence consumer into a defence producer. The path requires abandoning comfortable assumptions about efficiency-driven procurement and embracing the uncertainty inherent in building sovereign industrial capability. The core insight remains compelling: Australia cannot achieve genuine defence self-reliance without the industrial base to sustain military operations over time. Building this capability requires early investment, strategic patience, and acceptance that some investments may not yield immediate returns. Most importantly, it requires recognition that in an era of strategic competition, industrial capacity itself functions as a form of deterrence. The ability to rapidly scale defence production and adapt to changing conflict requirements may prove as strategically valuable as any individual weapon system. As global supply chains face increasing fragility and strategic competition intensifies, Australia’s choice becomes stark: invest now in sovereign industrial capability or accept strategic dependence when it matters most. The time for building tomorrow’s defence industrial base is today. Also published in Defense.info

Fight Tonight: Combat Readiness at the Speed of Relevance - Conference Proceedings #6 By Dr Robbin Laird Air Commodore Alun Roberts, Head Air to Air Missiles Royal Air Force, outlined in a virtual presentation to the seminar, Britain’s ambitious defence transformation in response to evolving global security challenges. The United Kingdom’s recently published Strategic Defence Review (SDR) 2025 represents nothing sa paradigm shift in British defence thinking. He argued that is one driven by the harsh realities of contemporary warfare and an increasingly dangerous global security environment. The Strategic Imperative: A World Transformed The SDR’s genesis lies in what Roberts described as the definitive shattering of “optimistic notions” about global stability. The illegal Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 served as a brutal awakening, demonstrating that the post-Cold War era of relative peace was over. The review explicitly identifies Russia as the primary threat, noting that Moscow’s aggression has become “more sophisticated and more basic” across all operational domains—land, sea, air, space, and crucially, cyberspace. This threat assessment has driven what Roberts characterised as a “NATO-first approach,” representing a fundamental recalibration of British strategic priorities. However, this European focus should not be misunderstood as isolationist. As Roberts emphasised, “a strong, secure Europe creates greater stability, freeing up capacity and capabilities to contribute to global security challenges.” This philosophy underpins the UK’s continued commitment to global partnerships, particularly with Indo-Pacific allies like Australia. The strategic review acknowledges that modern security challenges extend far beyond traditional military capabilities. Today’s threats encompass cyber warfare, hybrid operations, economic coercion, and what military analysts term “grey zone” activities—those actions that fall below the threshold of conventional warfare but nonetheless pose serious security risks. The recent incidents along Russia’s eastern borders serve as stark reminders of how quickly situations can escalate in this new strategic environment. Historic Defence Investment: Backing Words with Resources The government has announced plans to increase defence expenditure from the current 2.3% of GDP to an ambitious 2.5% by 2035, a trajectory that Roberts described as “clear and irreversible.” More significantly, the UK anticipates core defence spending rising toward 3.5% of GDP, with an additional 1.5% allocated for broader national security investments encompassing cyber defence, counter-terrorism, and critical infrastructure protection. This represents one of the largest defence spending increases in NATO since the end of the Cold War. To put this in perspective, reaching 2.5% of GDP would place the UK among the highest defence spenders in the alliance, demonstrating genuine commitment to burden-sharing that goes far beyond political rhetoric. The sustained nature of this investment signals to allies and adversaries alike that Britain is serious about its security responsibilities. The investment serves multiple strategic objectives beyond simple capability enhancement. It will modernise the Armed Forces with cutting-edge equipment and technology, strengthen the UK’s defence industrial base, and create thousands of high-skilled jobs across the country. As Roberts noted, a robust defence industry is “not just an economic asset for it’s a strategic imperative.” This investment will drive innovation, ensure domestic capacity for equipment production and maintenance, and reduce dependence on potentially unreliable foreign suppliers. Industrial Renaissance: Lessons from Ukraine The conflict in Ukraine has provided sobering lessons about the importance of industrial capacity in modern warfare. Even highly advanced military forces can rapidly deplete their stockpiles during high-intensity operations, making sustained production capabilities absolutely critical. This realisation has prompted a significant expansion of the UK’s domestic munitions production capacity. The SDR announces the establishment of six new munitions factories across the United Kingdom, representing substantial investment in national security infrastructure. These facilities will focus on producing diverse ranges of critical munitions including artillery shells vital for ground operations, anti-tank missiles, and sophisticated air-to-air missiles. The strategic importance of this investment cannot be overstated. It ensures the UK can maintain prolonged operations while contributing to collective defence efforts across NATO. This industrial expansion serves dual purposes: enhancing national security while boosting economic prosperity. The new factories will create thousands of high-skilled manufacturing jobs, supporting local economies and fostering engineering expertise that has strategic value beyond defence applications. Moreover, it positions the UK as a reliable supplier for allied nations, strengthening diplomatic relationships through practical defence cooperation. Royal Air Force Transformation: Next-Generation Air Power The SDR outlines an ambitious transformation of Royal Air Force capabilities, built on what Roberts termed “several interconnected, mutually reinforcing key pillars.” This represents the most comprehensive modernisation of British air power since the jet age, designed to ensure the RAF remains among the world’s most capable and technologically advanced air forces. At the heart of this transformation lies the F-35 Lightning programme. The government has confirmed a crucial enhancement to the UK’s F-35 procurement strategy, deciding to acquire the conventional F-35A variant alongside the existing F-35B short takeoff and vertical landing fleet. This mixed approach offers significant strategic advantages: the F-35A provides greater range and payload capacity while serving as a key component of NATO’s dual-capable aircraft nuclear mission, underscoring Britain’s deep integration into alliance nuclear burden-sharing arrangements. The decision reflects sophisticated strategic thinking about air power requirements. While F-35B aircraft will continue their vital role operating from the Queen Elizabeth-class aircraft carriers and expeditionary bases, F-35A aircraft will enhance land-based combat capabilities and provide improved training opportunities. Crucially, this approach offers greater interoperability with the majority of NATO allies who operate the F-35A variant. Existing Typhoon aircraft will undergo rigorous upgrades to ensure their continued relevance well into the next decade. The most significant enhancement involves integrating the Enhanced Electronic Warfare (EW) system known as ECRS Mark 2, transforming the Typhoon into a formidable electronic attack platform alongside its traditional air-to-air and air-to-ground roles. This capability is increasingly vital in modern warfare, where electronic dominance often determines battle outcomes. Future Combat Systems: GCAP and Beyond The Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP), also known by various names including Future Combat Air System and Tempest, represents one of the most ambitious international defence collaborations in decades. This groundbreaking effort between close partners aims to develop next-generation fighter aircraft designed specifically for highly contested environments expected in future conflicts. GCAP aircraft will embody cutting-edge stealth technology, advanced sensors, and unprecedented connectivity, providing decisive technological advantages against peer adversaries. The programme represents the future of air power projection and deterrence, designed to complement and eventually replace both the F-35 and Typhoon fleets. While ambitious and complex, GCAP demonstrates how international cooperation can achieve capabilities that would be prohibitively expensive for individual nations. Supporting this next-generation platform, the UK is developing advanced standoff weapons including the SPEAR 3 missile and Future Cruise Anti-Ship Weapon (FCASW). The SDR also introduces Britain’s ambition for next-generation air-to-air capabilities through the Future Air Superiority Effects (FASE) programme. FASE will develop advanced air-to-air missiles ensuring British combat aircraft maintain decisive advantages in aerial engagements, covering everything from sophisticated high-threat targets to the high-volume, low-cost threats demonstrated by Russian forces. Autonomous Revolution: Embracing Uncrewed Systems Perhaps no aspect of the SDR is more forward-looking than its embrace of autonomous and uncrewed systems. The conflict in Ukraine has vividly demonstrated the transformative power of drones, artificial intelligence, and autonomous systems in modern warfare. The Royal Air Force is committed to what Roberts called an “autonomous revolution” with ambitious plans for autonomous combat aircraft complementing crewed platforms. The strategic vision involves creating a “high-low capability mix” where uncrewed systems comprise a substantial proportion of air platforms. This approach offers increased agility, enhanced resilience, and critically, the ability to operate in contested environments with reduced risk to human life. It addresses the “mass problem” that has concerned military planners for decades, freeing up expensive crewed platforms for the most demanding and complex missions. To accelerate this transformation, the UK is investing significantly in establishing a new Defence Uncrewed Systems Centre by 2026. This facility will focus on the rapid adoption and seamless integration of autonomous technologies across all services, ensuring Britain remains at the forefront of military innovation. Air and Missile Defence: Addressing Capability Gaps After decades of what Roberts frankly acknowledged as poor policy decisions leading to disinvestment in air defence, the UK is making a decisive reversal. The SDR allocates £1 billion specifically for homeland air and missile defence—a critical investment given increasingly sophisticated aerial threats ranging from ballistic missiles and hypersonic vehicles to the proliferation of low-cost, high-volume drone threats evident along Europe’s eastern borders. This investment will create a layered, adaptive defence system capable of responding to the full spectrum of aerial threats. The urgency of this requirement has been highlighted by recent events, demonstrating how quickly air defence can become a matter of national survival rather than merely military capability. Ukraine: The Defining Conflict Central to the SDR’s strategic framework is unwavering support for Ukraine. Roberts was unequivocal in describing the conflict not as a regional dispute but as “a profound battle for the fundamental principles of sovereignty, self-determination, and the very future of the international rules-based order.” This perspective drives much of the review’s analysis and recommendations. Britain has already committed billions in military and humanitarian assistance to Ukraine, with these commitments set to increase in line with rising defence spending. The UK is actively contributing to international initiatives leveraging seized Russian assets to fund Ukraine’s recovery, ensuring Russia pays for the damage it has inflicted. More fundamentally, the lessons from Ukraine are directly shaping British defence thinking, highlighting the importance of adaptable innovation, robust industrial bases, and whole-of-society approaches to national security. Global Implications and Allied Cooperation While the SDR emphasises European security, Roberts was careful to reinforce that this focus complements rather than detracts from broader international partnerships. The UK’s Indo-Pacific tilt remains intact, with the recognition that global challenges—from state aggression to cyber threats—require coordinated international responses. The review strengthens collective resolve by demonstrating that shared values and common threats can drive effective cooperation on a global scale. For allies like Australia, a stronger, more secure Europe provides stability that enables greater focus on other regions and challenges. Conclusion: Strength Through Unity The UK’s Strategic Defence Review 2025 represents a comprehensive response to an increasingly dangerous world. It demonstrates how nations can adapt to evolving threats while maintaining core principles and international partnerships. Through unprecedented investment, industrial expansion, technological innovation, and unwavering support for allies under attack, Britain is positioning itself not just to deter aggression but to help shape a more secure global future. As Air Commodore Roberts concluded, this transformation stems not from any desire for conflict but from a profound understanding that strength, unity, and unwavering support for those under attack represent the most effective means of deterring aggression and safeguarding shared values. In an era where the international rules-based order faces its greatest challenge since 1945, the UK’s response offers a model for how democracies can adapt, modernise, and prevail against authoritarian threats. Featured image: Air Commodore Alun Roberts, Head Air to Air Missiles Royal Air Force, as seen on the video hookup with the seminar. Also published in Defense.info

Fight Tonight: Combat Readiness at the Speed of Relevance - Conference Proceedings #5 By Dr Robbin Laird In an era of unprecedented global uncertainty, Australia faces a critical question: Can the nation mobilize its industrial base quickly enough to meet emerging security challenges? According to Matt Jones (seen above in the featured photo), Head of Future Business Defence Delivery at BAE Systems Australia, the answer lies not in waiting for crisis to justify action, but in learning from history’s most successful and failed attempts at defence industrial mobilization. Speaking at the Sir Richard Williams Foundation symposium on combat readiness at the “speed of relevance,” Jones delivered a compelling case for immediate action, drawing on lessons from World War II industrialists and Ukraine’s recent transformation to argue that Australia’s defence industrial mobilization cannot wait for bullets to fly. The Urgency of Now Australia finds itself navigating what Jones describes as “the most uncertain and unsettling period of our lifetimes.” Strategic pressures are multiplying from Europe and the Middle East to the Indo-Pacific, where China remains a persistent threat. The required pace of capability development is accelerating while operational risks increase exponentially. In this context, Jones argues, Australian industry must evolve beyond its traditional role as a transactional supplier to become “an enabler of national combat power.” This transformation requires what he calls both urgency and historical perspective which requires understanding not just what needs to be done, but learning from those who have faced similar challenges before. The fundamental lesson Jones extracts from history is stark: “Waiting for crisis to justify investment leaves us with money, but no time.” This principle underpins his entire argument for proactive industrial mobilization, supported by three compelling historical examples that offer both inspiration and warning. Bill Knudsen: The Power of Unified Purpose The first lesson comes from America’s “Arsenal of Democracy” during World War II, orchestrated by Bill Knudsen, the General Motors president thrust into wartime industrial leadership by President Roosevelt in 1940. Knudsen’s approach offers a masterclass in rapid industrial mobilization under pressure. Leading the hastily formed National Defence Advisory Commission, Knudsen harnessed America’s industrial giants —General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler — leveraging their management capabilities, workforce, and production expertise to scale military capability at unprecedented speed. His genius lay in understanding that winning wars required more than battlefield strategy; it demanded mobilizing industry at extraordinary pace. Knudsen’s key innovations were revolutionary in their simplicity. He forged early partnerships between government and industry, creating coordinated efforts that prepared production lines before war arrived. Most importantly, he prioritized mass production and standardization over perfection. His philosophy that “100 good enough aircraft today would save more lives than one perfect aircraft next year” transformed how America approached wartime production. The results speak volumes: America’s mobilized industrial base produced 70% of all Allied military equipment. Knudsen had correctly identified war as fundamentally “a production problem” and solved it through industrial might rather than seeking perfect solutions. Essington Lewis: The Cost of Delayed Action Australia’s own wartime industrial experience offers a more sobering lesson through Essington Lewis, BHP’s managing director who became Director-General of the Department of Munitions and later Aircraft Production. Lewis faced a reality starkly different from Knudsen’s—attempting to mobilize Australia’s industrial base before conflict began, only to be frustrated by governmental inaction. From 1935 onwards, Lewis lobbied increasingly urgently for Australia to prepare for war mobilization. His foresight proved accurate, but his warnings fell on deaf ears in Canberra. When conflict finally arrived, Australia was underprepared despite having adequate funds. The nation lacked the industrial experience needed to build both capability and culture under wartime pressure. Lewis’s experience crystallizes a fundamental truth: “foresight without action is useless.” His later reflection that “money cannot buy lost time” serves as a warning for contemporary Australia. Despite accomplishing remarkable feats such as expanding steel production, building aircraft and munitions plants, innovating under financial constraints, his efforts were continually slowed by bureaucracy and underfunding. The comparison between Knudsen and Lewis is instructive. Knudsen had government backing and urgency; Lewis had vision and capability constrained by bureaucracy. Lewis’s experience demonstrates that industrial mobilization in constrained environments requires exceptional leadership, innovation, and the ability to navigate political obstacles while working “with what you have, not what you wish you had.” Ukraine: Modern Lessons in Adaptive Mobilization Perhaps the most relevant contemporary example comes from Ukraine’s transformation following Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea. Rather than assuming NATO would provide adequate deterrence, Ukraine began modernizing its defence industry and detaching itself from Soviet industrial legacy. Ukraine’s state-owned Ukroboronprom transformed from a corrupt, inefficient Soviet-era concern into a transparent, investor-friendly entity capable of leading large defence projects and full-scale production. Hundreds of small and medium enterprises entered the market, many focused on drones, advanced electronics, and AI-enabled capabilities. Crucially, Ukraine shifted away from Russian supply chain dependence, pursuing joint ventures with countries like Turkey and Poland. The transformation wasn’t perfect, inefficiencies, corruption, and gaps remained. However, Ukraine’s crucial advantage was starting mobilization eight years before Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion. This head start proved enormously valuable when conflict erupted. By 2022, Ukraine possessed engineers and innovators capable of adapting commercial drones into formidable battlefield weapons. The nation had built capacity to sustain artillery fire and manufacture unmanned systems even as Western ammunition supplies fluctuated. Partnerships with Poland and Turkey yielded battlefield-leading systems like the Bayraktar TB2 drone. Most importantly, Ukraine had cultivated “a culture of innovating at wartime speed.” Civilian scientists and small businesses weren’t standing on sidelines but they were integral to the fight. When battlefield problems emerged, solutions were prototyped in days and fielded in weeks, not decades. Australia’s Current Reality These historical lessons frame Australia’s contemporary challenges starkly. The nation’s geography, alliance relationships, and regional change pace mean that if crisis comes, it may arrive fast. Industrial mobilization cannot wait for emergency justification. Australia currently operates what Jones terms “a two-speed economy,” requiring simultaneous investment in immediate readiness and expensive future force structure pillars. This dual demand strains defence budgets significantly, even with projected increases over coming years. The hard truth is that peacetime publics rarely demand higher defence spending. Every dollar faces scrutiny while bureaucracy and oversight, though protecting accountability, slow innovation and mobilization. Markets reward efficiency and shareholder returns, not readiness thereby creating fundamental tension with defence requirements. Australia’s current industrial base, while modernizing, remains underweight, fragmented, and reliant on extended global supply chains. The Defence Strategic Review acknowledges this poses significant risk. If conflict disrupts supply lines, substantial gaps exist in specialized electronics for guided munitions, advanced materials for aerospace and high-speed weapons, and essential machining capabilities for military-grade production at scale. Additional challenges include duplication of effort across multiple organizations conducting similar work, consuming precious resources unnecessarily. Competition often stifles effective outcomes, forcing small and medium enterprises to operate under fragmented demand signals and compliance pressures threatening their long-term viability. Budget pressures risk undermining capabilities built carefully over decades. Once capability is lost, regaining it becomes extraordinarily difficult and time-consuming. This reality demands closer government-industry collaboration, sharing affordability challenges and jointly developing solutions. Building on Strengths Despite these challenges, Jones maintains optimism based on Australia’s demonstrated capabilities. The nation has repeatedly proven that when incentivized, it can advance and build sophisticated technologies quickly. The Counter-IED Task Force supporting operations in Iraq and Afghanistan exemplifies this potential, where Defence, DSTO, industry, and academia collaborated to deliver leading-edge capability into the field, saving soldiers’ lives. This success model demonstrates Australia’s capacity for rapid innovation when organizational barriers are removed. Australia’s industrial base already possesses hundreds of innovative SMEs designing and building weapons and drones, many operational in Ukraine and exported globally. The nation maintains robust munitions capabilities at facilities like Mulwala and Benalla, producing high-quality ordnance reliably at scale. Advanced aircraft sector achievements include projects like the Ghost Bat, showcasing Australian ability to produce high-end aviation systems. Next-generation shipbuilding at 21st-century facilities like Osborne make traditional shipbuilders envious globally. World-leading advanced capabilities exist in hypersonics, over-the-horizon radar, electronic warfare technologies, and underwater sensing and autonomous systems. Underlying all achievements is Australian engineering quality, renowned globally for achieving remarkable solutions efficiently. These strengths provide solid foundations for accelerated growth if properly coordinated and resourced. The Path Forward Drawing from historical successes and failures, Jones proposes specific actions for strengthening Australia’s industrial base rapidly. These recommendations synthesize lessons from Knudsen’s coordination success, Lewis’s bureaucratic struggles, and Ukraine’s adaptive transformation. First, Australia needs a government-led industry steering council with real authority and incentives, similar to what Lewis advocated. This council, ideally led by experienced industrialists, would transcend contract-by-contract decision-making to orchestrate whole-of-nation industrial effort. It would integrate SMEs, advanced manufacturers, software companies, and non-traditional sectors, following models demonstrated by Australia and the U.S. decades ago and Ukraine more recently. • Second, dedicated funding must be carved from the 2026 Integrated Operations Plan to strengthen industrial base capabilities. Following UK experience, budget portions should be allocated top-down, guided by the steering council toward areas of greatest strategic need. This approach mirrors Lewis’s wartime aircraft focus and Ukraine’s drone emphasis. Third, Australia must select and develop capabilities suitable for large-scale manufacturing. This requires identifying what Jones calls “the skipping missile”—capabilities that can be produced efficiently at scale while providing genuine military advantage. Fourth, a strong export strategy is essential for sustaining sovereign capabilities during peacetime. Exports keep production lines running, skills sharp, and innovation alive. They’re not merely about GDP enhancement or export rankings—they sustain sovereign capabilities ready to pivot when domestic requirements arise. The Australian Defence Strategic Sales Office provides a good foundation, but every government official should advocate for Australian industry to secure deals strengthening capability base. Fifth, policy settings must adjust to enable rapid peacetime mobilization. While public money deserves scrutiny, rigid policies can stifle urgent capability decisions. Sole source selections are often justified, yet current policies can prevent them. Rather than viewing audit bodies as barriers, their compliance role should inform policy improvements serving mission requirements. Finally, companies must develop contingency plans for crisis response. This requires streamlined internal governance, minimized bureaucratic hurdles, and maintained agility for when demand signals arrive. Strategic preparation includes stress-testing delivery pipelines, planning manufacturing ramp-ups, and validating alternate Australian suppliers. Effective communication and leadership must align internal and external stakeholders, ensuring readiness to operate under emergency protocols while prioritizing mission-critical outputs over business-as-usual tasks. The Mobilization Culture Perhaps most importantly, Australia must cultivate what Jones calls “a mobilization culture”, one that dials up risk appetites while clearly defining risk ownership in every situation. This culture enables deployment of minimum viable capabilities rather than waiting for perfect solutions that arrive too late. This cultural transformation requires leadership at every level, government officials who understand industrial mobilization urgency, company executives who prepare for rapid scaling, and engineers who prioritize speed and effectiveness over bureaucratic compliance. It demands recognition that in crisis, good enough today beats perfect tomorrow. The Ukrainian example demonstrates this culture’s power. When battlefield problems emerged, solutions appeared within days because the entire system was oriented toward rapid response rather than perfect processes. Australia needs similar agility built into its peacetime industrial preparation. A Decisive Moment Australia stands at what Jones characterizes as “a decisive moment.” The nation possesses ingenuity, talent, and industrial foundations necessary to deliver sovereign capability when required. What’s needed now is urgency, coordination, and leadership to align industry and defence in a truly national endeavor. The lessons from Knudsen, Lewis, and Ukraine’s transformation are clear: early action, wise investment, and clear organizational purpose determine success when crisis arrives. Australia cannot afford to repeat Lewis’s frustration with governmental inaction or assume that crisis will provide sufficient justification for mobilization. If Australia acts early, invests wisely, and organizes itself with clarity and purpose, when the call comes, the nation will be ready to fight tonight, not just in rhetoric, but in reality. The choice is stark: begin serious industrial mobilization now during relative peace, or face the consequences of unpreparedness when strategic patience runs out. History’s lessons are unambiguous. The question now is whether Australia will heed them before it’s too late. Also published in Defense.info Also, see the following: Re-Thinking Australia’s National Security Strategy – Lessons from the 1930s for the 2030s The Australian Defence Strategic Review: Lessons from the Past

Fight Tonight: Combat Readiness at the Speed of Relevance - Conference Proceedings #4 By Dr Robbin Laird From left: AVM (Retd) Zed Roberton DSC, AM, Professor Justin Bronk, GPCAPT Steven Thornton, LTGEN Susan Coyle AM, CSC, DSM The nature of warfare is fundamentally unchanged — it remains a contest of political will between adversaries. However, the character of how wars are fought has transformed dramatically. In an era where conflicts can be decided before the first missile is fired or the first shot is taken, military forces worldwide are grappling with a critical challenge: how to synchronize non-kinetic effects across space, cyber, and electromagnetic domains to achieve decisive advantage? This challenge was the focus of a panel discussion at the Sir Richard Williams Foundation seminar where senior military leaders and defence experts explored the complexities of integrating these invisible yet potentially decisive capabilities. Their insights reveal both the immense potential and significant obstacles facing modern military forces as they prepare for conflicts that may be won or lost in domains most people cannot see. The New Reality of Warfare “Victory in the 21st century belongs to whoever can see, decide and act faster than their opponent,” observed Admiral Paparo, Commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, a sentiment that encapsulates the fundamental shift in modern warfare. The speed of relevance or the ability to generate effects at the pace of contemporary conflict—has become the defining characteristic of military effectiveness.∗ Lieutenant General Susan Coyle, Chief of Joint Capabilities for the Australian Defence Force, put the stakes in stark terms: “My assertion is that the use of non-kinetic effects and our ability to defend against those effects prior to and during conflict will likely be the deciding factor in who prevails.” This isn’t hyperbole; it’s a recognition that in an interconnected, technology-dependent world, the ability to disrupt, deny, or degrade an adversary’s systems without kinetic destruction may prove more decisive than traditional firepower. The shift represents a fundamental evolution from the industrial-age concept of warfare, where victory was measured in terms of physical destruction and territorial control, to an information-age paradigm where victory may be achieved through the disruption of decision-making cycles, communication networks, and the technological systems that enable modern military operations. Space: The Ultimate High Ground Space has evolved from a supporting domain to a warfighting domain in its own right. Modern military operations are utterly dependent on space-based assets for communications, navigation, intelligence gathering, and precision strike capabilities. Yet this dependence creates vulnerabilities that adversaries are increasingly prepared to exploit. “Any escalation into kinetic conflict in space risks denying access to all of our users with devastating consequences,” LTGEN Coyle warned, “not only for national security or the economy, but especially for our defence operations.” The challenge is that kinetic attacks in space create debris fields that can persist for decades, potentially denying space access to all users both for friend and foe alike. This reality has driven military planners toward “scalable, reversible options to deter adversaries and deny them freedom of action in space.” Non-kinetic space operations, such as jamming satellite communications or temporarily blinding reconnaissance satellites, offer the ability to achieve military effects while maintaining the possibility of de-escalation. The dual-use nature of space infrastructure complicates matters further. Unlike traditional military assets that are clearly identifiable and under military control, space capabilities increasingly rely on commercial systems and international partnerships. This creates both opportunities for resilience through diversity and challenges in command and control during crisis or conflict. Cyberspace: The Soft Underbelly Cyber operations represent perhaps the most misunderstood aspect of modern warfare. Popular culture often portrays cyber warfare as instantaneous or “warfare at the speed of light.” The reality, as Professor Justin Bronk noted, is quite different: “Counter military networks type cyber payloads are one of the slowest forms of warfare. You’re actually looking at between 18 months and three years, often to develop and embed a capability in an adversary Air Defence Network.” This temporal disconnect between cyber capabilities and operational needs creates significant planning challenges. Unlike kinetic weapons that can be employed rapidly once available, cyber effects require extensive preparation, reconnaissance, and often pre-positioning of capabilities. The payload that could disable an enemy air defence system on day one of a conflict may need to be developed and embedded years in advance. The classification requirements surrounding cyber operations further complicate their integration into broader military planning. As Bronk observed, “Does the person who’s putting together the campaign plan have the clearances to know that and the compartments to know that that capability exists, let alone the authorities to release it?” Even when cyber capabilities exist, they may not be usable due to legal, operational, or security constraints. Moreover, cyber effects often lack the predictability of kinetic weapons. A cyber attack may work perfectly in testing but fail in operational use due to software updates, changed configurations, or simply because the target system has been replaced. This uncertainty requires military planners to build redundancy into their operations—something that conflicts with the often one-use nature of sophisticated cyber weapons. Electromagnetic Spectrum: The Contested Commons Electronic warfare or the contest for control of the electromagnetic spectrum sits at the intersection of traditional military operations and the new domains of cyber and space. Unlike cyber operations, which may take years to develop, or space operations, which often require complex international coordination, electronic warfare can provide immediate effects across the battlefield. GPCAPT Steven Thornton, Officer Commanding 82 Wing, RAAF, described the electromagnetic spectrum as fundamental to ensuring “survivability and lethality of the joint coalition force.” His former squadron operates electronic warfare aircraft that can jam enemy radars, disrupt communications, and protect friendly forces from electromagnetic attack. However, electronic warfare faces its own unique challenges. The effectiveness of jamming depends on signal processing capabilities that are improving rapidly on both sides. As Bronk noted, “over the medium term, the effectiveness of stand-off jamming, where radar range equations are really working against you, is going to get harder and harder to have the effects that you need.” This evolution is driving military forces toward “stand-in” electronic warfare platforms or systems that can penetrate closer to enemy territory to deliver jamming effects at shorter ranges where they remain effective. This shift parallels broader trends in military operations toward distributed, resilient systems rather than centralized, high-value platforms. The Challenge of Synchronization The complexity of integrating effects across these three domains cannot be overstated. Each operates on different timelines, requires different skill sets, and faces different limitations. Synchronizing them effectively requires not just technical integration but fundamental changes in military culture, education, and organizational structure. One of the most significant barriers to effective synchronization is a basic lack of understanding across the military about what these domains can and cannot do. “There are still people out there that say to me, ‘What do you do in space and cyber? I’ve got no idea,’ and they’ve been in the defence force for decades,” General Coyle observed. “It’s a fail on all of us.” This knowledge gap isn’t merely about technical details. It’s about fundamental operational concepts. The classification requirements that shroud many of these capabilities mean that even senior officers may lack the clearances or compartmentalized access needed to understand what options are available. As a result, non-kinetic effects are often treated as afterthoughts rather than integral components of military operations. The solution requires systematic education reform across military institutions. Officers need to understand not just what these capabilities can do, but their limitations, timelines, and integration requirements. This education must extend beyond specialists to include all military personnel who might be involved in planning or executing operations. Perhaps the most challenging aspect of synchronization is reconciling the vastly different timelines required for different types of effects. Kinetic operations can often be planned and executed within hours or days. Electronic warfare effects can be generated immediately once platforms are in position. But cyber operations may require months or years of preparation, and space operations must account for orbital mechanics that cannot be changed at will. This creates “the day two problem” or the challenge of maintaining effectiveness after initial operations. As Bronk explained, “It’s one thing to deny their kill chain on day one that might stop them from finding, fixing and striking your targets, but all they have to do is not fire. They’ve then seen your electronic warfare effect, or your cyber attack, your payload has been activated, whatever it is. Day two, they’ll have dug it out and they’ll have worked out a counter signal and whatever.” The pace of adaptation in modern conflicts has accelerated dramatically. In Ukraine, both Russian and Ukrainian forces are updating electronic warfare techniques and cyber defences at unprecedented rates, sometimes within hours of encountering new threats. Military forces must be prepared not just to deliver effects, but to sustain them through multiple cycles of adaptation and counter-adaptation. Beyond technical challenges, effective synchronization requires overcoming deeply embedded military cultures that have evolved around kinetic operations. Traditional military planning processes, organizational structures, and even the language used to describe operations all reflect a kinetic-centric worldview. “We traditionally just go for a kinetic action or a kinetic effect. We just don’t think about the other options and availability because people aren’t educated enough,” General Coyle noted. This isn’t simply about adding non-kinetic options to existing plans. It requires fundamental rethinking of how military operations are conceived, planned, and executed. The classification barriers that surround many non-kinetic capabilities exacerbate this problem. Traditional military planning relies on open discussion, war-gaming, and iterative refinement of concepts. When key capabilities cannot be discussed outside of highly restricted environments, it becomes extremely difficult to integrate them effectively into broader operational concepts. Lessons from Current Conflicts The ongoing conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East provide valuable insights into both the potential and limitations of non-kinetic effects in practice. These conflicts have served as testing grounds for new concepts and capabilities, revealing both successes and failures that inform future military planning. The conflict in Ukraine has demonstrated the critical importance of adapting non-kinetic capabilities at the speed of conflict. Professor Bronk noted the acceleration of iterative pace in the European theatre, where “both the Russians and the Ukrainians have to change waveforms, update mission data as more and more of the UAVs, and also conventional targets like flight control radars and target acquisition radars are digitally defined, regularly updated.” This conflict has also revealed the limitations of traditional approaches to electronic warfare and cyber operations. Russian forces achieved significant initial success in the first days of the invasion, essentially disabling Ukraine’s air defence network for two and a half days through a combination of cyber attacks and carefully tailored electronic warfare. However, these effects proved temporary as Ukrainian forces adapted by repositioning systems, swapping components, and implementing workarounds. The conflict has driven both sides toward more distributed, resilient approaches. Rather than relying on large, centralized systems that present attractive targets, military forces are moving toward networks of smaller, more survivable platforms. This trend has implications far beyond Ukraine, suggesting that future conflicts will require non-kinetic capabilities that can operate effectively against distributed, adaptive adversaries. Interestingly, the lessons from Ukraine may not translate directly to other theatres. Professor Bronk observed an “interesting divergence” between the European and Indo-Pacific theatres. In Europe, the focus has shifted toward distributed tactical-level systems with shorter ranges and faster refresh rates. In the Indo-Pacific, the emphasis remains on longer-range capabilities and third-party weapon handoff systems. This difference reflects the distinct characteristics of potential conflicts in each theatre. The compressed geography and high density of systems in Europe favours distributed, short-range approaches. The vast distances and sparse basing options in the Indo-Pacific require longer-range capabilities and greater emphasis on disrupting kill chains rather than individual systems. These differences highlight the importance of tailoring non-kinetic approaches to specific operational environments. There is no one-size-fits-all solution to synchronizing these effects across domains. Australia’s Unique Position Australia occupies a unique position in the global landscape of non-kinetic warfare capabilities. Unlike many allied nations, Australia operates significant airborne electronic warfare capabilities through its EA-18G Growler fleet. As Professor Bronk noted, “You’re in a much better position than almost any other medium-sized Air Force and joint force in the world, in that you have a significant integrated existing electronic warfare capability in the airborne sector.” However, this capability advantage comes with its own challenges. The Australian Defence Force must maintain and modernize these specialized systems while simultaneously developing capabilities in space and cyber domains. This requires not just financial investment but the development of specialized human resources across multiple highly technical fields. The human dimension of non-kinetic warfare presents particular challenges for a military the size of Australia’s. Unlike kinetic platforms where training pipelines are well-established and career paths clearly defined, the non-kinetic domains require highly specialized skills that are in great demand in the civilian sector. The Australian Defence Force has responded to this challenge by implementing specialized pay scales for cyber warfare officers and specialists, using the aviation officer pay scale to compete with civilian opportunities. As LTGEN Coyle noted, “We recognize the skills that they bring and how much they could get outside should they choose to leave.” But compensation alone isn’t sufficient. These fields require long development times. GPCAPT Thornton noted that electronic warfare officers require “three to four years before they become highly proficient in their core trade,” with full proficiency taking up to five years. This creates a significant vulnerability: the loss of experienced personnel can have disproportionate effects on capability. Australia’s approach to non-kinetic warfare must also grapple with questions of sovereignty and control over critical infrastructure. Much of Australia’s space-based communications and cyber infrastructure is civilian-owned and operated, creating challenges for military planning and control during crisis or conflict. LTGEN Coyle acknowledged this challenge: “The vast majority of Australia’s space-based cyber power is civilian in nature and privately owned. How do you manage the challenge of getting that to be ready to fight tonight when you don’t control it?” The answer lies in developing “dual-use” capabilities that combine military and civilian systems, along with robust relationships with industry partners. This approach offers both advantages in terms of resilience and access to cutting-edge technology, but requires careful management of operational security and control authorities. The Technology Imperative Underlying all discussions of non-kinetic effects is the recognition that military advantage increasingly depends on technological superiority. The domains of space, cyber, and electromagnetic warfare are inherently technology-intensive, requiring constant innovation and adaptation to maintain effectiveness. One area where technology offers particular promise is in the application of artificial intelligence and machine learning to non-kinetic operations. Professor Bronk noted that while much discussion of AI in military contexts amounts to “snake oil,” there are specific applications where AI demonstrates clear benefits. “One of the key areas where AI stuff has huge benefits that you can already demonstrate is actually in the mission data and electronic support measures data analysis, and therefore data package update cycle,” Bronk observed. The ability to rapidly process terabytes of electromagnetic spectrum data to identify new threats or changes in adversary systems could dramatically reduce the time required to update defensive and offensive capabilities. This capability is particularly important given the acceleration of adaptation cycles in modern conflicts. Traditional human analysis methods that require days or weeks to identify and characterize new threats cannot keep pace with adversaries who may update their systems daily or even hourly. Maintaining technological superiority in non-kinetic domains requires not just military investment but a robust industrial and research base. Unlike kinetic weapons, where production can be scaled up relatively quickly in crisis, many non-kinetic capabilities require specialized knowledge and infrastructure that cannot be rapidly expanded. This creates strategic vulnerabilities that extend beyond immediate military capabilities. Nations that lack indigenous capabilities in these domains may find themselves dependent on allies or commercial providers whose systems may not be available during crisis or may not meet military requirements for security and reliability. Future Implications and Requirements The panel discussion revealed several critical areas where military forces must continue to develop capabilities and concepts for effective non-kinetic operations. Perhaps the most important requirement is building resilience and adaptability into military systems and operations. The assumption that any particular capability will work exactly as planned is dangerous in an environment where adversaries are constantly adapting and evolving their approaches. This requires what military planners call PACE planning or Primary, Alternate, Contingency, and Emergency options for every critical capability. As LTGEN Coyle noted, “We expect to lose everything at that point in time. The reality of that is unlikely, because it’s not like you can barrage jam the entire Australian Defence Force and expect it to sustain, but we are prepared to have alternates to everything.” Building this resilience requires not just technical redundancy but operational flexibility. Military personnel must be trained not just on primary systems but on backup methods, including potentially reverting to older technologies that may be less vulnerable to sophisticated attacks. This might mean training on celestial navigation as backup to GPS, or understanding how to operate with paper maps when digital systems are compromised. The ultimate goal of non-kinetic effects is not to replace kinetic capabilities but to enhance them through carefully synchronized operations. This requires moving beyond simple coordination to true integration, where the effects of space, cyber, and electromagnetic operations are carefully timed and orchestrated to achieve specific operational objectives. This integration must occur at multiple levels; from tactical operations where individual platforms coordinate their effects, to strategic operations where national-level capabilities are synchronized across entire theatres of operation. Achieving this level of integration requires not just technical systems but new operational concepts, training programs, and organizational Effective synchronization of non-kinetic effects requires command and control systems that can operate across multiple classification levels and integrate input from diverse sources. Traditional military command structures, designed around kinetic operations with clear lines of authority and communication, may not be adequate for the more distributed, time-sensitive nature of non-kinetic operations. The challenge is compounded by the classification requirements that surround many of these capabilities. Command authorities must have access to information about available capabilities without compromising operational security. This may require new approaches to information sharing and decision-making that balance operational needs with security requirements. Beyond technical and organizational challenges, effective synchronization of non-kinetic effects requires a fundamental cultural transformation within military organizations. This transformation must address deeply embedded assumptions about warfare, military professionalism, and operational priorities. The military culture that has evolved around kinetic operations emphasizes visible, measurable effects. The success or failure of a kinetic strike is usually immediately apparent. Non-kinetic effects, by contrast, may be subtle, delayed, or entirely invisible to most observers. This difference creates challenges for military leadership, training, and assessment systems that are designed around kinetic paradigms. How do you evaluate the effectiveness of a cyber operation that prevents an enemy from acting rather than destroying enemy capability? How do you train for operations where the most successful outcome may be that nothing visible happens? These questions require new approaches to military education, training, and professional development. Military personnel must develop comfort with ambiguity, appreciation for subtle effects, and understanding of complex interdependencies that may not be immediately apparent. The development of non-kinetic capabilities also raises questions about military professional identity and specialization. Traditional military specialties are built around platforms or functions, pilots, infantry, artillery, engineers. Non-kinetic domains require specialists who understand complex technical systems but must also integrate their capabilities with traditional military operations. This creates challenges for career management, professional development, and military culture more broadly. How do you develop and retain specialists in highly technical fields while maintaining the broader military skills and perspectives necessary for effective integration with traditional operations? The answer likely requires new models of military professionalism that blend technical expertise with operational understanding. This may mean longer career timelines, more extensive education requirements, and different approaches to leadership development. Conclusion: Preparing for an Uncertain Future The discussion of synchronizing non-kinetic effects across space, cyber, and electromagnetic domains reveals both the immense potential and significant challenges facing modern military forces. These capabilities offer the possibility of achieving decisive effects without the destruction and escalation risks associated with kinetic operations. However, realizing this potential requires fundamental changes in how military forces organize, train, and operate. The stakes could not be higher. As LTGEN Coyle observed, “If you’re zero in one domain, you’re zero in all.” In an interconnected world where military operations depend increasingly on complex technological systems, the ability to operate effectively in all domains—including the invisible domains of space, cyber, and electromagnetic spectrum—becomes essential for military effectiveness. The challenge is not just developing these capabilities but learning to synchronize them effectively with each other and with traditional kinetic operations. This requires not just technical innovation but organizational transformation, cultural change, and new approaches to military education and training. Perhaps most importantly, it requires recognition that the character of warfare has fundamentally changed. The conflicts of the future may be decided not by the side with the most firepower, but by the side that can see, understand, and act most effectively across all domains of military operation. As Sun Tzu observed, “The acme of skill is to win a war without fighting.” In an age of non-kinetic effects, this ancient wisdom has acquired new and urgent relevance. The military forces that master the synchronization of effects across space, cyber, and electromagnetic domains will hold decisive advantages in future conflicts. Those that fail to adapt risk finding themselves outmanoeuvred in domains they cannot see by adversaries they cannot effectively counter. The transformation is not optional. It is an imperative for military effectiveness in the 21st century. ∗ https://defencescoop.com/2024/02/01/counter-c5isrt-samuel-paparo-indo-pacific-command-nomination/ AVM Roberton is current Director, Sir Richard Williams Foundation and was Air Commander Australia in 2017 and then the Head Force Design in VCDF Executive in 2019. Professor Bronk is Senior Research Fellow, Airpower and Technology Military Sciences, RUSI in the UK. GPCAPT Steven Thornton is the Officer Commanding 82 Wing, RAAF. LTGEN Susan Coyle is Chief of Joint Capabilities. Also published in Defense.info

Fight Tonight: Combat Readiness at the Speed of Relevance - Conference Proceedings #1 By Dr Robbin Laird On September 18, 2025, the Sir Richard Williams Foundation held its 2nd seminar for the year which was entitled: “Fight Tonight: Combat Readiness at the Speed of Relevance.” I will highlight the presentations at the conference in a series of articles over the next few weeks. I will conclude the series with an article providing my perceptions of what were the major answers suggested by speakers at the seminar for a way ahead. The Chairman of the Sir Richard Williams Foundation, ACM (Retired) Mark Binskin (pictured in the featured image) opened the seminar by highlighting its key focuse. Let me paraphrase his thoughts which provided a key orientation to the day’s presentations and the subject. The comfortable certainties of the post-Cold War era are dissolving before our eyes. The global rules-based order that has underpinned international stability and prosperity for decades is under unprecedented strain, leaving like-minded democracies to confront an uncomfortable truth: the luxury of time may no longer be on our side. For generations, Western nations have operated under the assumption that conflicts would unfold with sufficient warning time and that diplomatic channels would provide opportunities for de-escalation, that international institutions would serve as buffers, and that the sheer complexity of modern warfare would necessitate lengthy preparation periods. This comfortable paradigm is crumbling as rapidly as the geopolitical landscape itself. In this shifting landscape, the concept of “combat readiness at the speed of relevance” takes on critical importance. It’s not enough to possess advanced military capabilities if they take a decade to develop and deploy. When adversaries can move at the pace of modern warfare, measured in hours and days rather than months and years, our defense industrial base must match that tempo. The question is no longer whether we can build the best equipment, but whether we can build it fast enough to matter. The challenge extends far beyond traditional military preparedness. Future adversaries will not simply mass forces at borders and declare their intentions through formal diplomatic channels. Instead, they will wage sophisticated campaigns designed to fracture our decision-making processes before the first shot is fired. They will exploit divisions within international organizations, whisper to allied nations that “this is not their fight,” and systematically undermine the social cohesion that democratic societies depend upon for effective governance. These adversaries understand that modern conflicts are won as much in the information space as on traditional battlefields. They will flood social media platforms with carefully crafted disinformation, orchestrate social unrest through targeted manipulation of grievances, and probe critical infrastructure, not necessarily to destroy it, but to create doubt about a government’s ability to protect its citizens. The goal is to paralyze decision-making through uncertainty and division. By the time political leaders recognize they are already in a conflict, the adversary may have achieved decisive advantages across multiple domains simultaneously. This reality represents a fundamental asymmetry that democratic societies must address. While authoritarian regimes can pivot quickly from competition to conflict, democratic nations must navigate complex political processes, build public consensus, and maintain alliance cohesion. These are strengths in peacetime but can become vulnerabilities when facing opponents who have already decided on their course of action and are actively working to exploit the deliberative nature of democratic governance. The answer lies in building “strategic depth” but not just in terms of geography or resources, but in time itself. By accelerating the development of critical capabilities now, by strengthening industrial partnerships today, and by synchronizing efforts across all domains of warfare, democracies can compress the decision-making cycle that adversaries seek to exploit. This requires a departure from traditional procurement timelines and bureaucratic processes that were designed for a more stable world. Consider the implications for defense industrial capacity. In previous conflicts, nations could rely on their ability to mobilize and scale production during wartime. Modern warfare may not provide that luxury. The industrial base must be prepared to surge immediately, with supply chains that are resilient, diversified, and capable of rapid expansion. This means maintaining production capabilities even during peacetime, accepting higher costs in exchange for reduced vulnerability and increased responsiveness. The human dimension proves equally critical. Military personnel cannot simply be trained for yesterday’s conflicts; they must be prepared for scenarios that may unfold with unprecedented speed and complexity. This demands not just technical proficiency, but cognitive agility—the ability to adapt rapidly to changing circumstances and make effective decisions under extreme time pressure. Training programs must emphasize not just what to think, but how to think quickly and effectively in chaotic environments. Alliance structures, too, must evolve to match the speed of modern threats. Traditional consultation processes that unfold over weeks or months become irrelevant when adversaries can achieve fait accompli in days. This doesn’t mean abandoning democratic principles or alliance consultation, but rather pre-positioning decision-making frameworks that can respond rapidly to emerging crises while maintaining legitimacy and coordination. This transformation requires that defense discussions cannot remain confined to policy circles and academic conferences. The urgency of the moment demands that military leaders, defense contractors, allied partners, and civilian leadership work in unprecedented coordination. Industrial executives must understand operational requirements with the same clarity as battlefield commanders. Political leaders must grasp the technical constraints of modern warfare. Alliance partners must synchronize not just their strategic objectives, but their tactical decision-making processes. The goal extends beyond merely deterring conflict. Deterrence assumes rational actors making cost-benefit calculations. Some adversaries may not be deterred by traditional means, or may calculate that the benefits of action outweigh the costs, particularly if they believe they can achieve decisive results before effective responses can be mounted. In such scenarios, the ability to respond immediately and effectively becomes paramount. The speed of relevance is ultimately about preserving choice in an era when adversaries seek to eliminate it. By preparing now, with the urgency the moment demands, democratic nations can ensure they retain the initiative in shaping their own security environment, rather than merely reacting to threats already in motion. This preparation must be comprehensive and able to span technological capabilities, industrial capacity, human resources, and alliance coordination, because future conflicts will test all these dimensions simultaneously. The alternative is to cede the initiative to adversaries who have already embraced the speed of modern conflict, leaving democratic societies perpetually reactive and vulnerable to opponents who understand that in the modern era, timing isn’t just important — it’s everything. Also published in Defense.info

Fight Tonight: Combat Readiness at the Speed of Relevance - Conference Proceedings #2 By Dr Robbin Laird For decades, integrated air and missile defence has been synonymous with ballistic missile defence, Patriots and Aegis systems standing guard against incoming rockets. But Professor Justin Bronk of the Royal United Service Institute delivered a stark wake-up call at the seminar: the modern threat spectrum demands a fundamental rethink of air defence, and the timeline for preparation is far shorter than most assume. Speaking to the Sir Richard Williams Foundation seminar on September 18, 2025, Bronk painted a picture of rapidly evolving threats that span the full spectrum from small commercial drones to hypersonic missiles, all requiring different defensive approaches while competing for the same limited resources. His central message was uncompromising: Australia faces a 2-5 year window to prepare for potential conflict, not the 5-10 year timeline many defence planners assume. The Economics of Modern Air Warfare The mathematics of contemporary air defence tell a sobering story. When NATO forces intercept $20,000 drones with $1.2-1.8 million missiles, the economic equation becomes unsustainable almost immediately. This cost-exchange ratio, demonstrated in recent encounters with Russian reconnaissance drones over NATO airspace, reveals a fundamental challenge facing Western air defences. Professor Justin Bronk of the Royal United Service Institute, speaking at the Richard Williams seminar on September 18, 2025. Russia’s mass production of the Shahed-136 drone illustrates how adversaries are adapting to exploit these economic vulnerabilities. Initially costing $150,000-200,000 per unit, Russian manufacturers have driven costs down to approximately $7,000 through simplified production methods, including visible file marks on actuators and hot glue gun assembly. While crude, these systems work effectively as saturation weapons designed to overwhelm defensive systems. Ukraine’s experience provides crucial data points. The country faces 5,000-6,000 incoming drones monthly alongside 200 cruise and ballistic missiles. Yet despite this volume, the primary strategic damage comes from the high-end threats, the cruise and ballistic missiles with their larger warheads and precision guidance systems. The mass of small drones serves primarily to saturate defensive channels, forcing defenders to expend expensive interceptors while the real threats slip through. This reality has forced innovative tactical adaptations. Ukrainian forces have found that helicopters equipped with machine guns and forward-looking infrared sensors represent one of their most cost-effective counter-drone platforms. Meanwhile, crews in light aircraft like Yak-52s armed with assault rifles shoot down hundreds of drones monthly, a decidedly low-tech solution to a high-tech problem. Lessons from the Laboratory of Modern Warfare Current conflicts offer unprecedented insights into air defence realities. Israel, despite possessing the world’s most sophisticated air defence network and the luxury of defending a small geographic area, faces stark limitations. Even with overlapping coverage from Iron Dome to Arrow systems, Israeli defence planners acknowledge they would abandon city defence in a multi-vector attack, concentrating resources on protecting military bases essential for counteroffensive operations. This strategic calculus reflects a harsh truth: no defence system can intercept everything. Countries are large, targets are numerous, and even the most advanced interceptor networks have finite capacity. The Israeli model — focusing on campaign-critical infrastructure while accepting civilian vulnerability — may represent the most honest approach to air defence planning. Ukraine’s adaptation to sustained bombardment offers another instructive case study. Kyiv continues functioning despite hundreds of missile strikes, with civilian life maintaining surprising normalcy between attacks. Air bases subjected to repeated strikes continue generating sorties through aircraft dispersal and rapid runway repair. The lesson is clear: countries can absorb significant punishment and continue fighting if their essential military capabilities remain intact. The Revolutionary Air Defence Solution: APKWS Among the most promising developments in cost-effective air defence is the Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System (APKWS), essentially a laser guidance kit retrofitted to standard 2.75-inch rockets. At $20,000-35,000 per interceptor, APKWS breaks the unsustainable cost curve plaguing Western air defences while providing genuine tactical capability. The system’s effectiveness was demonstrated during the defence of Israel and protection of shipping against Houthi attacks in the Red Sea. A single fighter aircraft can carry 28-49 APKWS rounds in standard rocket pods, providing sustained engagement capability against drone swarms at a fraction of traditional missile costs. For Australia, APKWS represents an opportunity to leverage existing platforms effectively. Super Hornets could serve as interceptor aircraft while F-35s provide sensor coverage, creating a layered defence network capable of engaging threats far from Australian shores. The system’s relative simplicity also makes it a candidate for domestic production, potentially reducing costs further while supporting Australian defence industry capabilities. Australia’s Geographic Advantage and Strategic Vulnerability Australia’s unique geography presents both opportunities and challenges for air defence. Any affordable one-way attack system targeting Australia must traverse enormous ocean distances, likely including New Guinea’s airspace. This provides natural warning time and multiple interception opportunities unavailable to more compressed theatres like the Baltic states or Taiwan. However, this geographic buffer cannot defend against high-end threats. Chinese ballistic missiles and cruise missiles launched from the South China Sea could reach Australian targets, particularly focusing on campaign-critical infrastructure like air bases and ports. The key question becomes: what targets truly matter for Australia’s ability to continue fighting? Bronk’s analysis suggests Australia should abandon any pretence of comprehensive territorial defence in favour of protecting essential military capabilities. Air bases housing F-35 squadrons, major ports supporting naval operations, and critical command infrastructure represent the real targets requiring active defence. Cities, while tragic to lose, do not determine military outcomes, a lesson demonstrated repeatedly in conflicts from World War II to Ukraine. The Accelerating Chinese Threat Perhaps the most alarming aspect of Bronk’s presentation concerned Chinese military development. The People’s Liberation Army Air Force is expanding at a pace that “induces slight panic feelings” in the expert analyst. Current Chinese production includes 120 fifth-generation J-20 fighters annually, with the fleet expected to reach 1,000 aircraft by 2030. This expansion extends beyond raw numbers to qualitative improvements. Chinese air-to-air missiles have demonstrated range and effectiveness exceeding NATO equivalents, with the PL-15 missile achieving the longest successful air-to-air engagement in history during recent Pakistan-India encounters. That missile represented 11-year-old Chinese technology, raising serious questions about current capabilities. The Chinese are simultaneously expanding production across multiple aircraft types: advanced J-16 flankers for long-range strikes, carrier-based J-15 variants, and electronic warfare platforms. They are also rapidly expanding their tanker fleet, enabling power projection beyond the first island chain. Most concerning is the emergence of sixth-generation programs like the J-36, currently in flight testing. This military buildup targets specific American vulnerabilities: tankers, AWACS aircraft, and forward bases within 2,000 miles of China. Fifteen years of focused development and hundreds of PhD graduates annually working on these problems have produced sophisticated solutions to what China sees as the primary obstacle to its regional ambitions. The Compressed Timeline Reality Bronk’s most hard-hitting assertion concerned timing. Rather than the 5-10 year preparation window commonly assumed in defence planning, he argued Australia faces a 2-5 year threat timeline. This assessment stems from multiple converging factors. American military capabilities will improve significantly by 2030, with new platforms like the B-21 bomber and advanced missiles coming online. Chinese leaders likely recognize this window of temporary advantage and may feel pressure to act before American capabilities mature. Similarly, current American political dysfunction hampers intelligence synthesis and decision-making, providing additional incentive for adversaries to act sooner rather than later. In Europe, Russian production has created temporary conventional superiority, with forces engaged in Ukraine now three times larger than the 2022 invasion force despite massive casualties. However, this expansion is economically unsustainable beyond 3-5 years, creating pressure for action before economic constraints bind. The interconnected nature of potential conflicts adds urgency. A Chinese move on Taiwan would likely draw American forces from Europe, potentially encouraging Russian aggression against NATO. Conversely, European conflict could provide China with an opportunity to act while American attention is divided. The Hard Choices Ahead Perhaps the most uncomfortable aspect of Bronk’s analysis concerned resource allocation. Every new capability requires trade-offs in defence spending, personnel, and focus. The Australian Navy has made its choice, prioritizing submarines over other capabilities. The question remains: what is the Air Force prepared to sacrifice? Traditional air force missions, transport, air-to-air refuelling, intelligence collection, all serve important peacetime functions but may become secondary to survival in high-threat environments. Investing in long-range air-to-air missiles, counter-drone capabilities, and defensive systems requires either dramatically increased spending or conscious decisions to reduce other capabilities. The American Marine Corps provides a model for such transformation. Recognizing the need for distributed operations in contested environments, the Marines eliminated their tank battalions, reduced artillery, and restructured around island-hopping operations. Similarly, Australia may need to make painful choices about current force structure to prepare for future threats. The Passive Defence Solution One area where Australia could make immediate progress involves passive defence measures, hardening, dispersal, and early warning systems. These approaches offer several advantages: they use local contractors and materials, supporting domestic economies while improving security; they provide protection against the most likely threats; and they require no complex integration with existing defence systems. The basic mathematics favour passive defence. Most precision missiles have circular error probabilities of 5-10 meters, meaning roughly half will miss even large targets. Hardened aircraft shelters or reinforced facilities dramatically increase the number of missiles required for target destruction, and modern precision weapons are expensive even for major powers. Israel demonstrates passive defence effectiveness through ubiquitous civilian shelters and early warning systems. In Ukraine, civilian populations learn to assess threat levels through smartphone applications showing attack vectors, taking shelter only when genuinely threatened. Similar systems could provide Australian civilians with realistic protection while avoiding the enormous costs of comprehensive air defence networks. Industrial and Technological Implications Australia’s response to these challenges must include industrial considerations. Domestic production of systems like APKWS could provide both cost advantages and supply security. The technology is relatively straightforward — laser guidance packages and standard rocket motors — well within Australian manufacturing capabilities. More broadly, Australia needs to develop industrial capacity for sustained conflict. Current Western stockpiles prove inadequate for extended operations, as demonstrated in Ukraine. Australian industry must prepare for potential isolation from traditional suppliers, requiring domestic capabilities for ammunition, spare parts, and basic military equipment. The timeline pressure makes this particularly challenging. Industrial development typically requires years or decades, but the compressed threat timeline demands rapid adaptation. Australia may need to accept interim solutions and suboptimal systems to maintain capabilities during the critical period. Strategic Recommendations and Realism Bronk’s analysis suggests several priorities for Australian defence planning. First, abandon comprehensive territorial defence in favour of protecting campaign-critical assets. Second, invest immediately in cost-effective systems like APKWS that can address the most likely threats. Third, develop passive defence measures using local resources and contractors. Fourth, prepare for sustained conflict through industrial planning and stockpile development. Perhaps most importantly, Australia must develop realistic expectations about air defence. No system can provide perfect protection; every defensive network has limits; and adversaries will adapt to exploit weaknesses. The goal should be raising the cost of attack while maintaining essential military capabilities, not achieving invulnerability. Conclusion: Facing Hard Truths Professor Bronk’s presentation offered no comfortable solutions or easy answers. Instead, it provided a sobering assessment of contemporary air defence realities and the compressed timeline for preparation. Australia faces unprecedented challenges from rapidly developing threats, constrained resources, and limited time for adaptation. The path forward requires abandoning comforting myths about comprehensive defence in favour of hard choices about priorities and trade-offs. It demands immediate investment in proven, cost-effective systems while developing longer-term capabilities. Most critically, it requires honest assessment of what Australia can and cannot defend, focusing resources on truly essential capabilities rather than spreading them ineffectively across impossible missions. The window for preparation is closing rapidly. Whether Australia can adapt quickly enough to meet these challenges may determine not just military outcomes, but the nation’s future security and sovereignty. The time for comfortable assumptions and gradual adaptation has passed; the era of hard choices and rapid transformation has begun. Also published in Defense.info

Fight Tonight: Combat Readiness at the Speed of Relevance - Conference Proceedings #3 By Dr Robbin Laird The nature of military transformation has fundamentally changed. Where once armed forces could afford to develop new platforms over decades and then figure out how to use them, today’s security environment demands a completely different approach. This shift represents perhaps the most significant change in military thinking since the advent of combined arms warfare itself. In a recent discussion with Lt General Simon Stuart, Chief of Staff of the Australian Army, the contours of this transformation became clear. The conversation revealed not just tactical adaptations to new technologies, but a philosophical reorientation of how militaries must think about capability development, acquisition, and employment in an era of rapid technological change. Beyond Platform-Centric Thinking “Our transformation is no longer self-referential,” Lt General Stuart explained, describing how military modernization has historically focused on platforms first, with tactics, techniques, and procedures developed afterward. Under the traditional model, a new aircraft, ship, or vehicle would be delivered, and military personnel would then spend years figuring out optimal employment methods. Doctrine would follow, eventually leading to new ways of fighting. This sequential approach worked when technological change moved at a measured pace and adversaries faced similar constraints. But today’s reality is starkly different. The pace and scale of technological change, driven by the digital revolution and emerging technologies like artificial intelligence and quantum computing, have compressed traditional development timelines.. The Australian Army’s response has been to adopt what Stuart calls a “threat, terrain, and technology referential” approach. Rather than being dictated to by available platforms, this methodology starts with understanding the specific threats forces will face, the terrain they’ll operate in, and the technologies available to address those challenges. Only then are platforms and systems assembled to meet operational requirements. This represents a return to Clausewitzian fundamentals , acknowledging warfare’s enduring human nature while adapting to its ever-changing character. But the current generation faces something historically unprecedented: the character of warfare is now changing not over decades, but month by month, sometimes week by week. The New Combined Arms Reality The implications extend far beyond individual platform decisions to the very nature of combined arms warfare. Modern military operations increasingly involve what might be called “layered combinations” of crewed and uncrewed systems, each optimized for different aspects of the battlespace. Stuart described a conceptual framework of multiple layers: a forward line of uncrewed ISR systems providing surveillance and reconnaissance while potentially emitting electronic signatures to confuse enemy targeting; a middle layer heavy on uncrewed systems with lighter crewed presence; and more traditional formations with heavy crewed elements supported by uncrewed capabilities. Critically, nothing is replaced in this evolution for everything is additive. Drones don’t replace traditional platforms; they create new combinations with them. Electronic warfare doesn’t supersede kinetic capabilities; it enables them. Artificial intelligence doesn’t remove humans from decision-making; it augments human capabilities while raising fundamental questions about the appropriate level of human oversight, particularly regarding lethal force employment. This additive approach challenges binary thinking about “man versus machine” in military affairs. The question isn’t whether humans or machines will dominate future warfare, but how to preserve human lives while leveraging uniquely human capabilities like creative thinking and moral judgment. As Stuart noted, “the answer, as it ever has been, is both.” Innovation from the Bottom Up Perhaps the most significant operational change is the systematic empowerment of tactical-level innovation. Historically, militaries have been hierarchical organizations where innovation flowed from senior leadership and research institutions down to operational units. Today’s environment demands reversing that flow. The Australian Army has implemented what Stuart describes as “learn by doing” exercises, pairing soldiers directly with industry partners to solve specific mission problems. Units receive defined mission sets, perhaps defeating certain threats in specific terrain under degraded conditions, along with access to various technologies and systems. Their task is to experiment, adapt, and report back on what works, what doesn’t, and how different combinations might be more effective. This approach taps into the creative potential of soldiers, non-commissioned officers, and junior officers at a scale military organizations haven’t attempted historically. For armies that lack mass , a description that fits most Western militaries, maximizing human potential becomes not just beneficial but essential. The feedback loop is deliberately rapid. Units don’t spend months writing formal reports; they immediately feed lessons learned back into the system for broader application. This creates what Stuart calls “continual adaptation” or the ability to evolve tactics and procedures as quickly as threats and technologies change. The Acquisition Imperative These operational changes create unprecedented challenges for defence acquisition systems designed around platform-centric thinking. Traditional acquisition processes, which can take decades to field new capabilities, are fundamentally out of phase with operational requirements that change monthly. The mismatch isn’t merely about speed, though that’s certainly part of it. It’s about the entire conceptual framework. Platform-centric acquisition assumes you can define requirements years in advance, design systems to meet those requirements, and then use those systems for decades. But when software can be updated rapidly and electronic warfare techniques evolve dynamically, that assumption breaks down completely. As observed in the Ukraine conflict, code writing and counter-code writing have become central to military effectiveness. This suggests militaries may need coding capabilities at surprisingly low organizational levels, perhaps battalion level or below. The ability to rapidly modify software, adapt to enemy countermeasures, and exploit newly discovered vulnerabilities becomes as important as traditional military skills. The implications extend beyond just adding programmers to military units. It requires rethinking the entire relationship between industry and the military. Traditional defence contractors, optimized for long development cycles and stable requirements, must now work alongside smaller, more agile technology companies that can deliver rapid iterations and continuous updates. This creates new partnership models where innovation happens through collaborative experimentation rather than formal requirements documents. Moreover, the traditional “valley of death” between research and fielding must be eliminated. When operational environments change weekly, there’s no time for lengthy transition periods between proof-of-concept and operational deployment. Military organizations need the ability to rapidly prototype, test, and field capabilities while maintaining appropriate safety and security standards. This reality demands what might be called “hybrid acquisition” or maintaining traditional processes for major platforms while developing entirely new mechanisms for rapidly fielding and updating software-intensive capabilities. The challenge isn’t choosing between these approaches but integrating them effectively while ensuring that rapid innovation doesn’t compromise safety, security, or interoperability. Lessons from Ukraine The ongoing conflict in Ukraine provides perhaps the clearest example of these principles in action. Ukraine’s effectiveness results not from any single capability but from the combination of Western-trained forces using Western weapons systems integrated with innovative employment of commercial and military drones, electronic warfare capabilities, and rapidly evolving software. Crucially, Ukraine’s success demonstrates that focusing solely on new technologies while ignoring traditional capabilities misses the point entirely. Ukrainian forces need Western artillery, air defence systems, and armored vehicles to create the foundation upon which drone warfare and electronic operations could be effective. Conversely, those traditional capabilities would have been insufficient without the innovative integration of new technologies. This integrated approach extends to something Stuart calls “adaptive reuse” or finding new applications for existing platforms. Vietnam-era M113 armored personnel carriers, for example, can be converted into uncrewed or optionally crewed systems carrying various payloads: sustainment supplies, ISR equipment, electronic warfare systems, or kinetic effectors. The question becomes not whether old platforms are obsolete, but how they can be adapted to contribute to current operational requirements. Platform Design Evolution These operational and acquisition changes will inevitably influence future platform design. New systems must be built with modularity and adaptability as core features rather than afterthoughts. The ability to rapidly integrate new sensors, weapons, or electronic systems becomes as important as traditional performance metrics like speed or armor protection. Consider the example of naval operations in the Red Sea, where sophisticated command and control systems were constrained by having only the weapons physically mounted on individual ships. A more adaptive approach might involve airlift platforms deploying loitering weapons that at sea operational units could employ, dramatically expanding the weapons available to commanders without requiring them to physically carry additional munitions. This suggests platform design must anticipate not just current requirements but unknown future adaptations. Systems need built-in capacity for upgrades, modifications, and entirely new applications that designers cannot currently envision. The Human Element Throughout these technological and organizational changes, the human element remains central. The goal isn’t to remove humans from military operations but to leverage uniquely human capabilities while protecting human lives. This requires careful consideration of where humans remain “in the loop,” “on the loop,” or “out of the loop” for different types of decisions, particularly those involving lethal force. The questions are both technical and ethical: What degree of confidence do we have in sensor systems? How vulnerable are they to spoofing or deception? Under what circumstances, if any, should machines make autonomous lethal decisions? These aren’t just engineering problems but fundamental questions about the nature of warfare and military responsibility. The human dimension becomes even more complex when considering the cognitive demands of modern warfare. Operators must now manage not just traditional military tasks but increasingly complex human-machine interfaces. They must understand when to trust automated systems, when to override them, and how to maintain situational awareness in environments where information flows at unprecedented speeds. Training paradigms must evolve accordingly. Military education can no longer focus primarily on mastering specific platforms or weapons systems. Instead, it must emphasize adaptability, systems thinking, and the ability to rapidly learn and integrate new technologies. This shift from platform-specific training to capability-focused education represents another fundamental departure from traditional military development models. Furthermore, the psychological aspects of human-machine teaming require serious consideration. How do you maintain unit cohesion when some members are physically present while others are operating remotely? How do you build trust in automated systems while maintaining appropriate skepticism? These human factors challenges are as important as technical specifications in determining operational effectiveness. Looking Forward Military transformation in the digital age represents a return to first principles combined with unprecedented technological capability. Success requires understanding that platforms, while still important, are now just one element in complex systems-of-systems that must be continuously adapted to meet evolving threats. The implications extend beyond military organizations to broader defence ecosystems. Defence industries must restructure to support continuous innovation rather than cyclical platform delivery. Military educational institutions must prepare officers for careers defined by constant adaptation rather than mastery of fixed doctrine. Political leaders must understand that defence budgets can no longer be allocated primarily based on platform acquisition schedules but must account for continuous capability development and rapid response to emerging threats. International cooperation becomes more complex but also more critical. When capabilities evolve monthly, traditional approaches to standardization and interoperability through formal agreements and lengthy certification processes become inadequate. New models for coalition warfare must accommodate rapid capability sharing and real-time adaptation to combined operations. The militaries that will succeed in this environment are those that can harness bottom-up innovation while maintaining strategic coherence, that can rapidly field new capabilities while maintaining existing strengths, and that can adapt continuously while preserving essential human judgment and oversight. Perhaps most importantly, success requires cultural change within military organizations. The new paradigm demands comfort with ambiguity, willingness to experiment and potentially fail, and the intellectual humility to learn from soldiers and junior officers who may better understand emerging technologies than their superiors. This represents a profound shift from military cultures traditionally built around hierarchy, standardization, and proven doctrine. As Lt General Stuart observed, this isn’t about choosing between humans and machines, platforms and software, or innovation and tradition. It’s about creating new combinations that leverage the strengths of each while compensating for their individual limitations. In an era where the character of warfare changes weekly, the ability to combine and recombine capabilities rapidly may be the most important military skill of all. The transformation is already underway. The question isn’t whether militaries will adapt to this new reality, but how quickly and effectively they can do so while maintaining the human elements that make military service both effective and ethical. Those organizations that can master this balance will enjoy decisive advantages; those that cannot may find themselves perpetually behind the curve in an environment where falling behind means operational irrelevance. Also published in Defense.info

Dr Robbin Laird, The Imperative for Cost Effectiveness in Multidomain Operations: Final Report, 22 May 2025 Link to ebook (Defense.info)

Dr Robbin Laird, Air Power and the Challenge of Shaping an Effective Ready Force Which Can Deliver Deterrence by Denial, 29 May 2025 Link to article (Defense.info) The first of two panels held at the Sir Richard Williams Foundation seminar on May 22, 2025 was entitled a “Cost Per Effect” panel. It was chaired by Air Marshal (Retd) Darren Goldie and the panelists were: Air Vice Marshal Glen Braz, Air Commander Australia Professor Justin Bronk. Air Vice Marshal John Haly, Head Military Strategic Plans. Air Marshal (Retd) Darren Goldie, Australia’s former Air Commander Australia and Australia’s inaugural National Cyber Security Coordinator within the Department of Home Affairs, opened with a reframing of military cost analysis. “Cost per effect,” he explained, “is far more complex than the old ‘cost per kill’ calculations.” When Australia fires a maritime strike weapon over the horizon — of which the government has invested heavily —the true cost isn’t just the missile itself. It includes a proportional share of pilot training, the targeting enterprise, intelligence systems and everything else required to “render that ship useless.” But the calculation becomes even more complex when considering deterrence effects. “We’re talking about a submarine program that exceeds $300 billion,” Goldie noted. “We will get submarines that ideally will never fire a weapon. The effect you seek there is deterrence.” This distinction matters enormously for how Australia approaches defense spending. As Clausewitz observed, “the value of the object determines the measure of the sacrifices by which it will be purchased.” When the object is Australia’s sovereignty, the acceptable cost ceiling rises considerably. Professor Justin Bronk highlighted the strategic shift of the past decade which can be described as the evolution from “deterrence by punishment” to “deterrence by denial.” The old model — threatening massive retaliation after an invasion— no longer holds credibility against nuclear-armed great powers. “We’re not going to downtown Beijing. We’re not going to downtown Moscow. They’ll nuke us, let’s be clear,” Bronk stated bluntly. Instead, the focus has shifted to preventing initial success. In Eastern Europe, this means stopping Russian advances before they can establish occupation zones. In the Indo-Pacific, it means preventing Chinese forces from gaining a lodgement in Taiwan — because “you’ll never kick them out if you do.” This strategic shift has profound implications for capability development. Rather than building forces optimized for deep strikes against enemy homelands, the emphasis is on systems that can credibly deny an adversary’s initial objectives. The panelists in the cost per effect panel at the Sir Richard Williams Foundation seminar on May 22, 2025. Air Vice Marshal Glen Braz emphasized that air power remains “fundamentally central to the national defense strategy.” Australia’s ability to project force quickly, deliver effects at long range, and provide options to government aren’t future aspirations — they’re current realities that need constant refinement. “We need to find smarter, faster, more agile ways to deliver air power that makes a difference at scale, at range and at speed,” Braz explained. “This isn’t just about buying platforms; it’s about building comprehensive capability through people, preparedness, and integrated systems.” The challenge is particularly acute given Australia’s strategic geography. The National Defence Strategy calls for moving resources north but infrastructure development takes time. In the interim, forces must manage risk while building credible deterrent capabilities with existing assets. Much of the conversation by the panel centered on people rather than platforms. Braz commands approximately 12,000 personnel across Air Force capabilities, and he’s acutely aware that technology alone doesn’t deliver effects. “This is a human endeavour,” he emphasized. “These humans might use tools that are increasingly uncrewed or increasingly autonomous, but it’s a human endeavour.” The Air Force is adapting by developing more flexible personnel who can operate across multiple roles while maintaining core technical proficiency. “We’re typically very specialist and very bespoke,” Braz noted, “but we need to broaden people’s aperture and use their intellect and talent in a myriad of ways.” This isn’t about lowering standards — Air Force personnel remain “incredibly proficient” in their specialist roles. Instead, it’s about accepting calculated risk in how people are employed while building resilience through cross-training and adaptability. The panel spent considerable time examining the seductive promise of cheap mass capabilities. Commercial drones costing $2,500 might seem like an obvious alternative to expensive military systems, but Bronk provided a reality check on the true costs of military-grade capabilities. “You can have a small quadcopter that costs $2,500, but it doesn’t work in icing conditions, high winds, heavy rain, and doesn’t have night-capable cameras,” Bronk argued. Make it capable of all those things, “and it’s no longer $2,500 — it’s now $50,000, and you cannot have thousands of them.” The challenge becomes even more complex for longer-range systems relevant to Indo-Pacific distances. A basic airframe for 1,000-kilometer range costs about $25,000, but adding encrypted data links ($70,000), AI-powered navigation, seekers, and warheads quickly pushes costs above $200,000 per unit. This doesn’t mean cheap systems lack value — they can impose costs on adversaries by forcing them to expend expensive interceptors. But they complement rather than replace high-end capabilities. Space capabilities are becoming more important as Australian and allied forces focus on effective ways to distribute force. As systems become more disaggregated and autonomous, they become increasingly dependent on space-based communications, navigation, and intelligence. “The more you rely on one-way systems, including long-range strike munitions,” Bronk observed, “the more you’re likely to be reliant on that space situational awareness picture.” Air Vice-Marshal John Haly, Head of Military Strategic Plans, emphasized the importance of “minimum viable capability” — systems that are “good enough on time” with the ability to be upgraded, rather than “exotic, wonderful and too late.” The panel discussed as well how to characterize the threat in relation to a realistic approach which Australia can take to the threats in its region and beyond. As Haly noted, “we shouldn’t pretend that what we’re preparing for is Australia against a great power alone and unafraid. That’s not the case.” Rather, Australian forces need to be prepared to prevail against the subset of threats likely to be directed against Australia as part of a broader conflict. This more realistic framing helps maintain confidence while acknowledging the serious nature of potential challenges. The panel’s conclusions suggest several key principles for Australian defense planning: • Integration over independence: Modern military effects require seamless coordination across domains, with space and cyber capabilities as critical enablers rather than separate domains. • People as the foundation: Advanced technology amplifies human capability but doesn’t replace the need for skilled, adaptable personnel who can operate effectively under pressure. • Strategic patience with tactical urgency: Major capability developments take time, but forces must maintain readiness and manage risk in the interim through innovation, training, and smart resource allocation. • Alliance integration: Australia’s strategic challenges are best addressed through deeper integration with allies rather than pursuing independent solutions. As the discussion concluded, Braz offered a note of measured optimism: “I am positive that our great people, well equipped and well trained, can do what the nation needs.” In the context of a significant shift in the strategic framework and constrained resources, smart choices about capability development, force structure, and strategic priorities, a cost per effect framework provides a tool for making those choices The challenge isn’t just building a military that can fight and win, but one that can deter conflict through credible capability and strategic clarity. In that mission, every dollar spent, and every person trained becomes part of a larger equation that ultimately determines whether Australia’s sovereignty can be preserved without having to test it in combat. Success depends on smart resource allocation rather than simply buying cheap or expensive — it’s about understanding what effects are needed and the most efficient ways to achieve them.

Dr Robbin Laird, Shaping a Way Ahead for the Australian Defence Force in the Context of Global Strategic Transition, 3 June 2025 Link to article (Defense.info) At the May 22, 2025 Sir Richard Williams Foundation seminar, Air Marshal Robert Chipman, Vice Chief of the Australian Defence Forces, recently outlined the nation’s evolving approach to national security in a comprehensive address. Chipman describes Australia’s security environment as “complex and deteriorating,” with the international system under strain from great power competition between China and the United States. He emphasizes that hard power has become preeminent again, with the Indo-Pacific as the epicenter of this competition. The risk of conflict is assessed as increasing, with reduced strategic warning time. The comfortable certainties of the post-Cold War era have evaporated. China’s rise and its challenge to the established international order, combined with America’s more selective engagement globally, has created what Chipman describes as a fundamentally different strategic landscape. Unlike the Cold War’s “perverse clarity” of mutually assured destruction, today’s great power competition lacks the stabilizing frameworks of arms control and non-proliferation agreements. This shift has profound implications for Australia. The Indo-Pacific has become the epicenter of great power competition, placing Australia at the geographic heart of rising tensions. The traditional buffer of distance that once provided strategic warning time has been compressed by technological advances and increasingly bold grey-zone activities by state actors. Air Marshal Chipman speaking to the Sir Richard Williams Foundation seminar on May 22, 2025. Conventional military conflict could escalate to nuclear war through what military strategists call “horizontal and vertical escalation.” This possibility demands entirely new approaches to deterrence, coalition management, and strategic decision-making. Australia’s response has been to develop what officials term a “strategy of denial.” This strategy recognizes that Australia’s critical strategic geography lies to its north, requiring the ability to maneuver simultaneously across all five operational domains: land, sea, air, space, and cyber. The strategy is defensive in nature but, as Chipman emphasizes, it cannot be implemented with a defensive mindset. Instead, it requires an active approach that embraces contest and pursues asymmetric advantages to offset the significant imbalances Australia faces in military and economic power relative to potential adversaries. Central to Australia’s evolving defence posture is the concept of asymmetric advantage – achieving outcomes disproportionate to the size of the force employed. This concept has gained renewed relevance following observations from the conflict in Ukraine, where low-cost drones have successfully engaged expensive main battle tanks, fundamentally altering traditional battlefield calculations. However, Australia’s approach to asymmetry extends far beyond simply acquiring cheaper weapons systems. The rapid pace of technological change, demonstrated by development cycles measured in weeks rather than years, demands new approaches to capability development. Australia is establishing foundations for rapid innovation and adaptation rather than attempting to stockpile capabilities subject to obsolescence. The ability to integrate military force across all operational domains, combined with all elements of national power and in concert with allies and partners, represents a key form of asymmetric advantage. This integration capability may prove as valuable as the individual systems being integrated. Australia’s acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines under the AUKUS partnership represents the largest investment in military capability in the nation’s history. These platforms will provide the range, endurance, stealth, and lethality needed to protect sea lines of communication across vast ocean distances – precisely the form of asymmetric advantage a medium power like Australia requires. Modern warfare requires simultaneous operations across land, sea, air, space, and cyber domains. As Chipman notes, air power – long considered decisive in modern warfare – is vulnerable when grounded, can be neutralized through enemy action in space and cyber domains, and requires sea control for sustained operations. This multi-domain reality creates both opportunities and challenges. While it offers multiple avenues for creating asymmetric advantages, it also increases complexity and vulnerability. Weakness in any single domain can compromise the entire force structure, making balanced investment across domains essential. The communications pathways that enable multi-domain operations also increase what military planners call the “attack surface area” – the points where adversaries can target Australian capabilities. This reality makes cyber protection and space access as critical as traditional military capabilities. Australia’s strategic transformation extends beyond military capabilities to encompass defence industry and innovation ecosystems. The Australian Strategic Capabilities Accelerator (ASCA) represents a new approach to rapid capability development, focused on getting asymmetric capabilities into the hands of service members quickly through innovation rather than traditional procurement processes. This approach requires fundamental changes to risk management and funding models. Defence must be willing to share genuine risk with industry partners while rewarding innovation and assuring returns on investment. Success demands what Chipman calls “headroom in our budget to resource innovation” matched by greater public understanding of the imperative for innovation and willingness to accept the inherent risks of investing in unproven technology. The goal extends beyond domestic innovation to building “capable, resilient, competitive and secure supply chains” that include Australian businesses while creating economies of scale through international partnerships. Co-design, co-development, co-production, and co-sustainment with allies can improve resource utilization, strengthen collective industrial capacity, and accelerate technological development. Despite emphasis on sovereign capabilities and self-reliance, Australia’s alliance relationships remain central to its security strategy. The U.S. alliance continues as the foundation of Australian defence planning, providing everything from mission data and command systems to satellite services and advanced platforms. However, the alliance is evolving. Rather than creating dependency, strengthening Australian self-reliance is seen as making the alliance more powerful for both nations. This reflects recognition that successful alliances require genuine stakes in each other’s security rather than one-sided dependency relationships. The challenge lies in balancing self-reliance with alliance integration. Australia’s “way of war” is built on foundations of U.S. cooperation, creating both asymmetric advantages and potential vulnerabilities that must be carefully managed. Traditional defence procurement processes, designed for peacetime deliberation, are proving inadequate for current strategic circumstances. Australia has implemented significant reforms to what it calls the “one defence capability system,” moving from pursuit of perfect solutions to “good enough on time” with iterative improvements. This shift represents a fundamental change in risk tolerance and capability philosophy. Rather than waiting for perfect solutions, the focus has moved to getting beneficial technology to service members as soon as it offers advantage, with improvements delivered through progressive capability upgrades. The approach includes tailored approval pathways for different project complexities and fast-track processes for immediate needs and transient opportunities. However, major platform acquisitions still require deliberate planning cycles, creating a dual-track system for different capability requirements. Looking toward the 2026 iteration of Australia’s National Defence Strategy, several principles are emerging. Australia’s security remains best served by international cooperation and effective institutions, but the reality is a more transactional world where strength and resilience take precedence. The challenge lies in maintaining a strategic culture biased toward cooperation while adapting to circumstances that increasingly reward strength. This tension will shape future capability investments, alliance relationships, and strategic posture. Australia’s defence transformation reflects broader global trends toward great power competition and technological disruption of traditional military advantages. The nation’s response – emphasizing asymmetric advantages, multi-domain integration, and innovation agility – offers insights for other middle powers navigating similar strategic transitions. The overarching theme is Australia’s need to adapt to a more dangerous strategic environment through innovative, asymmetric approaches while maintaining alliance relationships and sovereign capabilities. Featured photo: Vice Chief of the Defence Force, Air Marshal Robert Chipman AO, CSC, with Singapore’s Chief of Staff – Joint Staff, SAF Inspector-General, Chief Sustainability Officer, Brigadier-General Goh Pei Ming, lay a wreath at the Last Post Ceremony at the Australian War Memorial in Canberra. Singapore’s Chief of Staff – Joint Staff / SAF Inspector-General / Chief Sustainability Officer [Brigadier-General Goh Pei Ming], Deputy Secretary (Policy) [Brigadier-General Frederick Choo], and accompanying delegation visited Canberra from 13-15 March 2024. While in Canberra, Brigadier-General Goh Pei Ming and Brigadier-General Frederick Choo met with Australia’s Vice Chief of the Defence Force [Air Marshal Robert Chipman] and Deputy Secretary Strategy, Policy, and Industry [Mr Hugh Jeffrey], and attended the Last Post Ceremony at the Australian War Memorial.

Dr Robbin Laird, Shaping a Way Ahead for Autonomous Defence Capabilities for the ADF by Denial, 17 June 2025 Link to article (Defense.info) Australian Army Drone Racing Team pilots were presented the Inter-Service Championship Team award by Air Vice-Marshal Nicholas Hogan, CSC – Head of Air Capability, during a drone racing event at the Australian International Airshow 2025 at Avalon Airport. March 3, 2025. Credit: Australian Department of Defence On June 5, 2025, I had a chance to talk with Air Vice-Marshal Nick Hogan, the Head of Air Force Capability within the RAAF about the challenges and opportunities of incorporating autonomous systems within the Australian Defence Force and the impact this will have on the force. Australia stands at the threshold of a strategic opportunity that could fundamentally reshape its defense capabilities. Australia faces a paradigm shift that could multiply Australia’s defensive capacity while creating new opportunities for domestic industry. Autonomous systems are not simply unmanned versions of traditional platforms. They are essentially payload carriers that perform specific tasks for operational forces rather than replacing them. They are not multi-mission platforms which is the focus of traditional manned systems. Rather than designing systems to perform multiple roles over 30-year lifespans — like the F-35 fighter jet — autonomous systems are conceived as single-purpose, task-specific tools that can be rapidly developed, deployed, and evolved. This shift requires new concepts of operations and, crucially, different relationships with industry partners. Australia’s investment in the MQ-28A Ghost Bat provides the foundation for this transformation. Hogan sees this not as an end product but as a stepping stone toward a sovereign capability built on open systems architectures. By collaborating with partners and using government reference architectures, Australia can create platforms that allow for rapid digital design and testing with minimal flight-testing requirements that integrate with allies and partners. The key is moving toward what Hogan calls “containerized software” approaches — plug-and-play payloads that work across different platforms, avoiding vendor lock and enabling smaller companies to compete based on payload effectiveness rather than platform integration capabilities. This vision demands a radically different relationship with industry partners. Instead of the traditional vendor-locked arrangements exemplified by programs like the F-35, Hogan advocates for what he calls “intimate relationships” with industry — sharing cost constraints and fiscal targets to enable collaborative solutions. “Opening up the books on both sides, so you can both see the constraints that you’ve got, you can work together to get a common solution,” Hogan explains. This approach has already shown promise in Australia’s work with Boeing Defense Australia, providing insights into what works well and what doesn’t in industry partnerships. This model enables small and medium enterprises to compete on equal footing with large primes, focusing on payload effectiveness rather than platform integration. The result is a more dynamic, competitive environment that can drive rapid innovation and cost-effective solutions. In my view, another key requirement of this approach is to get these systems into operators’ hands quickly for operational evolution rather than being captured by lengthy acquisition processes. My view is that it’s a question of the fighting force being able to get priority to provide operational evolution of these kinds of systems, rather than leaving them captured by the acquisition bureaucracy. The ultimate vision is to shape a mosaic of capability —commanders having access to flexible, changeable, and dynamic combinations of manned and unmanned systems across air, maritime, and ground domains. This approach moves away from relying on single-purpose platforms for decades toward a more adaptive, responsive capability mix. This mosaic approach will enable area commanders to look at specific operational requirements and determine the optimal mix of assets to achieve desired effects. It’s about maximizing effects rather than maximizing platform capabilities. The technology exists, the operational concepts are being proven, and the industrial base is ready to respond. But the path forward requires several key elements: Institutional Reform: Acquisition processes need to prioritize operational evolution over traditional platform procurement approaches. This means getting systems into operators’ hands quickly and allowing them to drive further development. Industry Partnership: New models of collaboration that share constraints and targets while enabling competition based on effectiveness rather than integration capabilities. Cultural Change: Training and organizational development that helps personnel conceptualize and employ these new capabilities effectively. Standards and Architectures: Government-maintained standards that enable interoperability while avoiding the fragmentation that would come from multiple incompatible systems. There is the tremendous potential and the significant challenges inherent in this transformation. Success could multiply Australia’s defensive capacity while creating new opportunities for domestic industry. There is a generational opportunity to reshape defense capabilities for the challenges ahead.

Dr Robbin Laird, Strategic Transformation for a New Era: Reworking the Australian’s Army’s Role in Australian Defence, 16 June 2025 Link to article (Defense.info) The Australian Army is undergoing what its leadership describes as the most significant transformation since World War II, fundamentally reshaping itself for an era of great power competition in the Indo-Pacific. This comprehensive adaptation, driven by the 2023 Defence Strategic Review, represents both a strategic pivot and a return to the Army’s amphibious warfare heritage forged in the Pacific campaigns of the 1940s. According to Lieutenant General Simon Stuart, Chief of the Australian Army, the service stands at “an historic inflection point” necessitated by the most challenging strategic circumstances since the end of World War II.¹ The Defence Strategic Review concluded that Australia faces “the prospect of major conflict in the region” and that the Australian Defence Force must transition rapidly from a “balanced force” to an “integrated, focused force” designed to address the nation’s most significant strategic risks.² This transformation is underpinned by Australia’s adoption of a “strategy of denial” – an approach that aims to deter conflict and prevent coercion through force, with a naturally strong maritime focus befitting an island nation.³ As General Stuart noted, “for the first time in more than 80 years, we must go back to fundamentals… to take a ‘first principles’ approach.”⁴ Rediscovering Littoral Warfare DNA Central to this transformation is the Army’s optimization “for littoral manoeuvre operations by sea, land and air from Australia, with enhanced long-range fires.”⁵ This direction represents what Australian military leaders call a rediscovery of the Army’s “amphibious and littoral-operation DNA,” acknowledging that Australia has always relied on maritime strategy as a nation “girt by sea.”⁶ The material foundations for this capability are substantial. The Australian government is procuring 18 medium landing craft of around 500 tons and 9 heavy craft of between 3,000 and 5,000 tons – representing “the largest fleet of littoral watercraft operated by the Australian Army since World War II.”⁷ These capabilities, operating in conjunction with the Royal Australian Navy’s two 27,500-ton amphibious assault ships, will fundamentally transform the Army’s ability to maneuver, deter, and deny in the littorals of Australia’s archipelagic region. The scale of this transformation becomes apparent when considering the operational requirements. As General Stuart explained to defense industry leaders, “an Australian Division in the Indo-Pacific must be capable of distributed archipelagic operations spanning hundreds if not thousands of kilometres,” referencing how during World War II, “the Australian Army’s frontage stretched from Borneo to Bougainville… greater than the distance from Sydney to Perth.”⁸ Professional Foundations Under Review Beyond physical transformation, the Army is conducting a comprehensive assessment of its professional foundations – what General Stuart describes as “the first time since 1947 that we have attempted a wholesale, holistic review of our profession.”⁹ This review is structured around three fundamental pillars: Jurisdiction – defining the unique service the Army provides to society. General Stuart argues that the Army’s role has become unclear to the nation it serves, partly due to recent “niche wars” that “didn’t touch Australia’s shores, or the vast majority of Australians, in any tangible sense.”¹⁰ The challenge is articulating what sort of Army Australia needs “in the middle decades of the 21st Century” and ensuring this role is clearly understood by both the military and society.¹¹ Expertise – maintaining and developing the Army’s professional body of knowledge. This involves balancing “war’s enduringly human nature with its ever-changing character,” requiring the Army to be proficient in both cutting-edge technology and classical military theory.¹² As General Stuart emphasized, the Army needs “technologists and futurists” but also “historians, philosophers, ethicists and strategists in equal measure.”¹³ Self-regulation – the Army’s ability to uphold professional standards, particularly regarding command accountability. General Stuart identified this as “perhaps the most pressing” challenge, noting that “the command relationship between our Army and the individual has not thrived these last two decades.”¹⁴ Regional Integration and Alliance Cooperation The transformation emphasizes collective deterrence through strengthened alliance relationships. Australian forces now regularly participate in major multilateral exercises including Super Garuda Shield with Indonesia and the United States, Exercise Alon with the Philippines and United States, and the expanding Talisman Sabre exercise that will host nineteen nations in 2025.¹⁵ General Stuart articulated the value of allied land power through five key advantages: presence, persistence, asymmetry, versatility, and value. He argued that allied armies provide “sheer presence” across the region, can “persist indefinitely, regardless of season, weather, or terrain,” offer “asymmetric” capabilities against adversary strengths, demonstrate remarkable “versatility” in mission adaptation, and deliver exceptional “value” for defense investment.¹⁶ This collective approach is particularly relevant given the Indo-Pacific’s geographic challenges. As General Stuart noted, “it is impossible for even the most capable militaries to maintain a continuous presence of platforms across the vast scale of the Indo-Pacific,” but armies “can offset these challenges by our ability to persist indefinitely.”¹⁷ Technology Integration with Human-Centered Warfare While embracing technological advancement, including artificial intelligence and hypersonic weapons, the Army maintains that “technology does not replace the very human aspects of war, it is instead additive.” This represents “very much an ‘and’, not an ‘or’ proposition.”¹⁸ The Army recognizes that “the ability to wield technology in war is a ‘new basic’ requirement in soldiering,” with technology becoming “as ubiquitous for our soldiers as the employment of their weapons.”¹⁹ However, this technological sophistication must be balanced with understanding of war’s enduring human nature, requiring soldiers prepared for “the most demanding of human endeavours, physically, intellectually and spiritually.”²⁰ Trust as the Foundation Underlying all transformation efforts is what General Stuart has identified as the Army’s central strategic priority: trust. “Trust and social license are explicitly linked,” he argued, “lose one, and we lose the other.”²¹ This focus on trust responds to challenges identified in the Royal Commission into Defence and Veteran Suicide and lessons learned from recent conflicts, particularly Afghanistan. The Army’s approach to rebuilding trust centers on strengthening command accountability and ensuring that “the equation must be in balance” between commanders’ accountabilities and the authorities and resources they are assigned.²² This includes fostering a “virtue-ethic” that serves as “the greatest protector against unethical and unprofessional behaviour in war.”²³ Historical Context and Future Direction The transformation draws heavily on historical precedent, particularly the Australian Army’s rapid adaptation for Pacific warfare between 1941 and 1945. As General Stuart observed, “the Army that fought to achieve victory [in 1945] had not even been imagined four years earlier,” yet managed a “remarkable” transformation “in contact.”²⁴ Today’s Army has the advantage of conducting transformation “out of contact,” allowing for more considered planning while recognizing that “time is not on our side.”²⁵ This comprehensive transformation represents more than equipment modernization or tactical adaptation. It constitutes a fundamental reimagining of Australia’s land power for an era where, as the National Defence Strategy concludes, “Australia no longer enjoys the benefit of a ten-year window of strategic warning time for conflict.”²⁶ The Australian Army’s evolution reflects broader questions about how middle powers adapt their military institutions for great power competition while maintaining the professional foundations essential for democratic societies. As Australia approaches the Army’s 125th anniversary in 2026, General Stuart has committed to having “the answers to the questions I have posed today,” ensuring the nation can be “fully engaged in writing the next chapter in the story of your Army.”²⁷ The success of this transformation will likely influence not only Australia’s security but serve as a model for how allied nations adapt their land forces for the challenges of 21st-century competition in the Indo-Pacific. Footnotes: 1.Lieutenant General Simon Stuart, “Strengthening the Australian Army 2.Profession,” Address at the Lowy Institute, 3 April 2025. 3.Major General Ash Collingburn and Colonel Tom McDermott, “Australia’s Army Is 4.Adapting for the Littorals,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, May 2025. 5.Ibid. 6.Lieutenant General Simon Stuart, “The Challenges to the Australian Army Profession,” Address at Australian National University, 25 November 2024. Collingburn and McDermott, “Australia’s Army Is Adapting for the Littorals.” 7.Ibid. 7.Ibid. 8.Lieutenant General Simon Stuart, “Remarks by the Chief of Army to the Land Forces Defence and Industry Dinner,” 12 September 2024. 9.Stuart, “Strengthening the Australian Army Profession.” 10.Stuart, “The Challenges to the Australian Army Profession.” 11.Stuart, “Strengthening the Australian Army Profession.” 12.Ibid. 13.Ibid. 14.Stuart, “The Challenges to the Australian Army Profession.” 15.Collingburn and McDermott, “Australia’s Army Is Adapting for the Littorals.” 16.Lieutenant General Simon Stuart, “The Role of Allied Land Power in Deterring Conflict,” Address at LANPAC, 15 May 2025. 17.Ibid. 18.Stuart, “Strengthening the Australian Army Profession.” 19.Ibid. 20.Stuart, “The Challenges to the Australian Army Profession.” 21.Stuart, “Strengthening the Australian Army Profession.” 22.Ibid. 23.Stuart, “The Challenges to the Australian Army Profession.” 24.Stuart, “Strengthening the Australian Army Profession.” 25.Ibid. 26.Ibid. 27.Ibid. 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