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We started The Central Blue at the end of 2016 with two goals in mind: to provide a forum for the discussion and debate on issues relating to Australian air power, and to encourage airmen to write about their profession of arms. In 2017, our first full year of operation, we made solid progress towards both of these goals. But there is still much work to be done both in promoting discussion on air power topics, and in actually getting airmen typing. With these challenges in mind we decided that for the final post of 2017 we would review the year that was and outline a plan for the year to come. In so doing we hope that you may be inspired to re-engage with some of the 51 posts we have published this year, and provide comments with your thoughts on what topics we should aim to explore in 2018. A Year in Review Our contributors have explored a range of topics, including: Conference summaries (EW and Middle East Operations) Capability development (C-27J, ISR, and multi-mission augmentation pods) Lessons learned on exercises (Exercise BROLGA STRIKE) Education (Operator-Intellectuals, PMET, and joint education) History (Battle of the Bismarck Sea and generational change in fighter aircraft) But three posts in particular stand-out, two for the interest they generate and a third for the foundation it laid. We opened the year with a post that turned out to be our most popular, and which continues to attract an impressive level of interest and comment: Steve George’s continuation of the debate surrounding putting F-35B’s on the Canberra Class LHDs. It would seem that the heady blend of fifth-generation fighters and the possibility of a return to a carrier navy strikes a chord and polarises opinions across the Australian blogosphere. What was most compelling about Steve’s post was his clear articulation of the issues upon which the fighter-equipped LHD debate hinges. There is no one solution or answer to these issues, they are contingent on a number of assumptions on naval and air power theory, and Australia’s strategic priorities. So in engaging in this debate, Steve’s interlocutors who contributed in the post’s comment section pushed the blog’s broader readership to identify, articulate, and defend their assumptions. It is this cut-and-thrust of intellectual debate that we hope will continue to be a key component of The Central Blue experience. This spirit of generating debate also drove our second most viewed post, which is also one of our most recent. In ‘My Fifth Generation’, Central Blue editor Chris McInnes provided a personal perspective of what it means to be a fifth-generation organisation. This post attracted attention and comment from a diverse array of groups and individuals, both within Australia and abroad. The reason for the interest in this personal reflection on the fifth-generation concept appears to be a thirst for substance in a discussion that has been dominated by catch-phrases and jargon. As it is a defining concept for the future of the Air Force, it is difficult to underestimate the importance of understanding what a fifth-generation organisation actually is. Unfortunately, there are very few forums within which airmen can discuss, debate, and refine their own views on what a “Fifth-Generation Air Force” actually means to them. This is a problem that The Central Blue aims to address. By providing a forum in which individuals can express and develop their personal understanding of air power, we can shore-up the intellectual foundations upon which Australian air power is built. And this brings us to the third stand-out post for the year: our ‘debrief’ with the Chief of the Air Force, Air Marshal Davies. The support of the Chief is critical to the success of The Central Blue, without it we cannot expect airmen to engage in the discussion on air power issues that are so important to the development of their own and the Air Force’s understanding of air power. As this idea of engaging in discussion and debate on air power is so critical to what we do The Central Blue, it is worth quoting the Chief’s view verbatim: “Air power is not a static concept; rather it must be studied, reflected upon, debated, and challenged. As airminded members of the profession of arms, Air Force personnel have a responsibility to participate in this contest of ideas. It is far, far better that we should respectfully engage in that contest than to hide our thoughts, only to find them wanting when it matters most.” We are proud of the debate and the discussion that The Central Blue has been able to foster. Though there is undoubtedly more to be done, we have taken the first steps in providing a forum for the contest of ideas that is so vital to the ongoing development of air power in Australia. But the actual posts are only part of the story, albeit the most visible part. More important than the words on a screen are the connections that are made in the process of developing, expressing, and refining ideas. For that you need a network of engaged and motivated individuals that are actively involved in furthering the discussion. We’ve been fortunate at The Central Blue to have a diverse range of contributors across ranks, specialisations, and services. But at the heart of the enterprise are the editorial staff that are responsible not just for the editing of posts, but also extending the network through social media and personal connections. Realising the importance of having an engaged and proactive editorial group that see the network as being as important as the posts, we have expanded number of The Central Blue editors from two to five. We are fortunate that we have a diverse, engaged, and proactive group of volunteers that are committed to the cause. The editorial team that will take The Central Blue into its third year are: Wing Commander Jo Brick Wing Commander Trav Hallen Squadron Leader Jenna Higgins Squadron Leader Alexandra McCubbin Wing Commander Chris McInnes This team brings passion to the discussion of the air power, and a drive to develop critical thinkers who are able to guide air power into the future. Planning ahead As we plan ahead for 2018 The Central Blue will continue to pursue its core goals of promoting discussion of air power and getting airmen to write. But we will be adding a third goal: expanding the network of air minded thinkers and writers. There are two ways we plan to further these goals in the year ahead: collaborating more broadly with international partners, and engaging directly with Australian airmen to get them writing. The first step will be a collaboration with From Balloons to Drones exploring the employment of air power in high intensity warfare. This six week series of posts commencing in mid-February will be published in the lead up to the Williams Foundation Seminar on high intensity warfare in late March. This collaboration will bring together contributors from around the world to answers questions about the past, present, and future of air power in major conflict. More details will be released early in the New Year. A longer term plan will be to directly engage with airmen to encourage them to develop their ideas and put them out there to further the debate and discussion on the range of issues that affect them and their profession of arms. A number of initiatives are being planned to support this engagement including promoting The Central Blue as an outlet for research and writing completed as part of Air Force PMET, as well as encouraging and supporting airmen’s participation in events such as Defence Entrepreneurs Forum Australia (DEF Aus). Throughout, we will continue to work closely with the broader Australian military writing community through forums such as The Cove and Grounded Curiosity. Closing thoughts 2018 holds great promise for The Central Blue and our efforts to further the discussion of Australian air power, but we also need feedback from our readership to understand how we can improve. Most importantly, we need to hear from you regarding what issues and topics we should be discussing and debating. So while we take a break over the Christmas period, we encourage you to put your ideas on topics in the comments section, tag us with them on Twitter (@TheCentralBlue), or post them to us on Facebook (@TheCentralBlue). These comments will inform our way ahead and let us know what topics and issues our readers think are important. For those who have an idea and want to write and just need a little encouragement, send us an email with your ideas (centralblue@williamsfoundation.org.au); the editorial team will help you transform your ideas into a post that will further the discussions that we need to be having. Thanks for your readership and your support for the work we are doing. We’ll be back posting again on 7 January 2018. We wish you all a happy and safe Christmas and New Year break. #PME #RAAF #organisationalculture #PMET #AirPower #Jointness #Education

In this post, S.C. Collective assumes the role of the ‘devil’s advocate’ and challenges the military’s beatification of the Common Operational Picture (COP) as a concept and technology. The Advocatus Diaboli (Latin for Devil’s Advocate) was formerly an official position within the Catholic Church: one who “argued against the canonization (sainthood) of a candidate … to uncover any character flaws or misrepresentation of the evidence favouring canonization”. In common parlance, the term devil’s advocate describes someone who, given a certain point of view, takes a position he or she does not necessarily agree with (or simply an alternative position from the accepted norm), for the sake of debate or to explore the thought further.Wikipedia First, a definition from doctrine: “Common Operational Picture – A single identical display of relevant information shared by more than one command that facilitates collaborative planning and assists all echelons to achieve situational awareness. Also called COP.” So, what is wrong with this definition? Well, the Common part, the Operational part, and (predictably) the Picture part. The Common part, especially the “single identical” truth concept, sounds good until you examine the unintended consequences. To establish commonality, everyone needs to have all the information. That is clearly problematic when operating in constrained and contested networking environments, but it also implies some centralised decision making and likely centralised fusion to determine what everyone should see. Different crew members on the same jet don’t have identical displays, so why would we want it across commands? The concept of common also conflicts with security compartmentalisation, so we end up with COP-like systems at multiple independent levels of security (i.e. not common). The Operational part is perhaps less problematic if you’re working at the operational level. However, most of us aren’t – we’re working at the tactical level. Those of us conducting the “collaborative planning” work in the Targeting and Master Air Planning processes in the Air and Space Operations Centre (AOC) aren’t really that concerned about what is currently airborne. That makes for a small operational audience (basically only the Combat Operations Division). Further, the current implementation of the COP (notionally based on aggregating Recognised Air Picture, Recognised Maritime Picture, the Wide Area Surveillance Picture and Regional Area Surveillance Picture and a spare plug for the Recognised Land Picture) is completely platform-centric, whereas the operational level should be focused on effects. The Picture part is arguably the worst aspect of the COP because focusing on portrayal constrains our thinking – icons on a digital map is not much progressed from the WWII manual plots. The Operations Room at RAF Fighter Command’s No. 10 Group Headquarters, Rudloe Manor (RAF Box), Wiltshire, 1943. [Image Credit: © IWM (CH 11887)] That ‘icons on the map’ view focusses on platforms rather than effects and does not provide a meaningful way to show communication links, electromagnetic spectrum usage, information operations, or cyber considerations. It also limits what can be displayed to available screen space. The primary COP source (for the ‘as built’ system) could provide significantly more information, but is filtered at the source. As the complexity of the environment and sensor capabilities increase, we will need to throw increasing larger amounts of information away to avoid making the picture opaque. Even a limited display is often hard to understand – turning coordinates into icons on the map doesn’t make it information. Instead, we need that data to drive decision support tools and provide cueing and targeting assistance – ideally autonomous, but not retyping the coordinates would be a step forward. Sample tactical graphics display, with at least one hostile displayed. [Image Credit: Supplied by author] Even et Diabolus would concede that the current COP does support filtering and some analysis – it is not just a picture. However, to the extent that we know how to get something useful out of it, we often don’t. Perhaps that is because of the name – we think of it as a picture to fill half the big display at Joint Operations Command, not a tool, and certainly not as task-relevant information. With these issues in mind, what should we look for instead? As the Advocatus Diaboli, my aim with this post is not to provide a better solution; however, if we want to support collaborative planning and situational awareness, then our priorities might include: Crew and user specific task-related information, rather than commonality. Implications: The system needs to understand each users’ task context and what data would be relevant to those tasks, and to present the relevant data elements in a way that makes sense to the task(s). Data for decision support tools and user views of networks and effects, rather than a single (picture) portrayal of platforms. Implications: We need to agree on open standards for data models, and protocols for exchanging that data, not just a standard set of icons. Prioritising near over distant, and aggregating distant things, rather than treating all information the same way. This is in accordance with Tobler’s law: ‘everything is related to everything else, but near things are more related than distant things’. In geospatial terms, these distances are in metres; in network terms, they are in milliseconds. Implications: We need a system architecture that provides decentralised fusion and aggregation, to support decentralised execution, and to manage throughput in a congested or contested network connection when things are getting emotional. This requires adaptive rules for filtering; policy for when and how aggregation can support security outcomes for “special” capabilities; and detailed understanding of how the filtering and aggregation affect decision support tools. Alerting of exceptions, rather than providing ‘as expected’. Implications: System definition of what is exceptional given the operational context, and the level of alerting that is appropriate given the user needs, network capability and the other alerts. Once we have all that, we can find a better name. The S.C. Collective is a self-synchronising (sometimes only plesiochronous) independent thought activity with a penchant for Old Horizon Fridays. Current focus activities include integration of ISR with non-kinetic effects. #Jointness #situationalawareness #technology

The execution by Daesh of a downed Jordanian F-16 pilot in 2015 highlighted the importance of personnel recovery in combat zones. In this post, Andrew Fisher argues that the Australian Defence Force can already take steps to develop a personnel recovery capability that will provide the force with an insurance policy for its people and capability. “By failing to prepare, you are preparing to fail.” – Benjamin Franklin Nobody likes paying for insurance. We all believe that ‘it won’t happen to me’ or that ‘I’m a defensive driver’. In most cases reason takes over and we part with our hard-earned money to buy some peace of mind that should the worst happen, we will be covered. Take that analogy and apply it to our military personnel and equipment. The Government, through the Defence White Paper 2016 (DWP16), is investing large sums of public money in state-of-the-art training, facilities, and equipment to maintain a capability ‘edge’ over potential adversaries. But where is the insurance policy that gives our personnel at higher risk of isolation and exploitation, such as Special Forces and aircrew, peace of mind that they will be covered in all operational environments– that we have the intent and capability to recover them? DWP16 notes that the Australian Defence Force (ADF) does not have a dedicated combat search and rescue (CSAR) capability and speaks of investigating options from 2023 onwards. It is vital to start confronting the question of personnel recovery (PR) in preparation for the delivery of that capability. It’s easy to ignore the need for an insurance policy when you haven’t needed it in over a generation. The conflicts that Air Force has been involved in since Vietnam have taken place in more or less permissive airborne environments. The moral obligation to recover our people established in joint doctrine since 2006 has not translated to a full-spectrum PR capability in the ADF. Recent experience has resulted in a focus on search and rescue, in permissive environments and a tendency to ‘fight the last war’ rather than prepare for the CSAR that is likely in the next high-end conflict. The example of the Jordanian F-16 pilot ejection and subsequent capture and execution by Daesh in Syria in 2015 serves as a stark reminder to both leadership and operators that something could go wrong on operations. Operations in that theatre also highlight Australia’s dependence on dedicated US PR capabilities in expeditionary operations. United States Air Force Pararescuemen of the 129th Rescue Wing move injured role players to the landing zone for extraction by HH-60 Pave Hawk combat search and rescue helicopter during Exercise Angel Reign 16, a CSAR exercise conducted in Townsville. [Image Credit: Department of Defence] This reminder is timely in the midst of the wholesale capability transition in Air Force, often associated with the term ‘fifth-generation Air Force’. Part of what this means is developing a force that is capable of maintaining a capability advantage rather than a numerical advantage over a range of potential adversaries. Personnel are operating more sophisticated and in most cases highly classified weapon systems. These weapon systems are driving an increased focus on force protection ‘in garrison’. Higher security clearances and higher classification rated facilities are some of the measures that are required to operate these weapon systems. So far, we seem happy to invest in broad force protection when operating at home but not necessarily when deploying forward. The acquisition of the KC-30A has enhanced our ability to project air power, but what happens when we leverage the air power characteristic of reach to penetrate contested or degraded environments? How are these enhanced force protection measures applied in a deployed setting and what if something happens when operating at the edge of that projection? Where is our insurance policy? A principle of search and rescue planning is that the time to rescue should be equal to or less than survival time. A corollary to this should be that in uncertain or hostile environments, the recovery of personnel in possession of highly exploitable information or equipment which provides that capability edge, should be achieved in less than the time that it takes to exploit it. By assuming that we’ll be covered by the United States, we are running the risk of not assuring the security of our advanced capabilities and failing our obligation to look after our people. Additionally, reliance on the United States means that we will not have an organic, expeditionary PR capability for unilateral or minor operations in our near-region that the United States may not support. Where do we start in developing a systemic approach to PR? The ADF has traditionally looked to how the United States does it, which is a useful starting point as it allows us to leverage decades of hard-earned experience. But as a comprehensive model it fails in the Australian context due to the size of our fighting force. It takes significant resources and genuine command commitment to have a dedicated PR force, a difficult proposition for a mid-sized force. This investment has to balance the likelihood of isolation and exploitation that personnel may face in future conflicts and the consequences to personnel and equipment of such events.  A dedicated PR capability is not something that can be stood up from scratch within the rapid deployment timeframe, for which Operation OKRA has become a benchmark. As a medium-term option, we can do everything as an organisation to ensure that our people are prepared for the worst case. We do have the ability to put those personnel identified at higher risk of isolation and exploitation through more robust survival, evasion, resistance and escape training. We have the ability to consolidate the functions of ADF PR into a single body to drive the capability with a single joint voice, rather than the piece-meal approaches that are currently being taken. We have the ability to shape joint and single service doctrine to make PR considerations more prominent and to start to make PR part of our DNA. Equally as important is that we shape our training so that the first time our aircrew experience a PR event either on the ground or from the air isn’t on operations. Royal Australian Air Force staff from the Combat Survival Training School demonstrate a combat search and rescue recovery during the Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape course at the Townsville Field Training Area. [Image Credit: Department of Defence] PR is an insurance policy for a fifth generation Air Force. By investing in a PR system in anticipation of the long-range CSAR options outlined in DWP16 we will be protecting the people and equipment that will ensure we maintain a capability edge into the future. Investing in a PR system tailored to our future PR needs will protect the people and the equipment that will ensure our capability edge into the future. Squadron Leader Andrew Fisher is a serving Royal Australian Air Force Air Combat Officer with experience in maritime patrol and joint personnel recovery operations. The opinions expressed are his alone and do not reflect those of the Royal Australian Air Force, the Australian Defence Force, or the Australian Government. #AirForce #AirPower #CSAR #Training

Is the Spartan a miniature Hercules or an oversized Caribou? Brad Drew argues the Spartan’s unique combination of capabilities means the answer is neither. Instead, the Spartan provides a niche capability that enhances Australian Defence Force (ADF) capabilities across a range of mission sets. The C-27J Spartan’s payload, range, and ability to operate onto soft, narrow, and unprepared surfaces  combined to provide a unique battlefield airlift capability for the ADF. As the platform progresses towards its final operating capability, the key challenge for the Royal Australian Air Force’s (RAAF) Air Mobility Group (AMG) is defining the scope of this capability. While the C-27J can conduct long range movements of cargo between large airfields, the C-27J’s potential will be optimised by focusing on what makes it unique: its ability to operate onto soft, narrow and unprepared surfaces. A Royal Australian Air Force C-27J Spartan from No 35 Squadron takes off from Walcha Airport during a training mission in September 2017. [Image Credit: Department of Defence] The Spartan was procured under a Foreign Military Sales agreement between Australia and the United States in 2012 to replace the already retired DHC-4 Caribou. Shortly thereafter, the United States Air Force elected to remove the platform from service, transferring a number of airframes to the United States Coast Guard (USCG) and United States Army Special Operations Command. This left Australia as one of the principal operators of the C-27J, with the RAAF’s ten airframes second only to the USCG (14) and the Italian Air Force (12). The acquisition effort under Project Air 8000 suffered several  setbacks, including delays in training crews and maintenance as well as a global shortage of spares impacting fleet serviceability. Following this, test and evaluation activities highlighted that the Spartan could not achieve the short field characteristics of the Caribou, nor carry large loads across long distances as efficiently as the C-130. These observations are obvious in hindsight – the C-27J is not a Caribou, nor is it a C-130. As the C-27J capability matured within AMG, the real value of a battlefield airlift asset such as the Spartan began to emerge – the ability to carry moderate loads onto soft, narrow and unprepared surfaces. The C-27J is the only aircraft in the ADF inventory capable of carrying a larger-than-helicopter sized load onto a soft narrow surface. Put a C-130 in a similar circumstance and it will either damage the landing surface or infringe on lateral clearance requirements due to the larger wingspan and wheelbase. Operating a Caribou or a rotary wing platform onto the same landing area will require a commitment to conduct multiple sorties and significantly reduce the range available both in to and out of the field. The acquisition of the C-27J opens up, for the first time, the ability to land on soft, narrow surfaces such as lake beds, roads and beaches whilst carrying a significant quantity of cargo over a large range. A comparison of C-27J range and payload against other ADF airlift platforms. The dashed line indicates reduced payload operations for the C-27J that offer an increase in allowable airframe stresses when manoeuvring in a tactical environment. [Author supplied] There are a number of areas where the unique characteristics of the C-27J enhance existing ADF capabilities. Australia is a widespread and sparsely populated continent and the C-27J provides greater reach to the military in order to effect Government objectives. The ability of the C-27J to access soft, narrow and unprepared surfaces allows an expansion of the current capability envelope around areas such as domestic counter terrorism, aeromedical evacuation and disaster relief missions. The ability to infiltrate and exfiltrate troops and equipment onto unprepared and austere surfaces will vastly improve the reach of domestic counter terrorism teams. Infiltration by airborne insertion with paratroopers is limited to the cargo that is able to be attached to the jumper or safely dropped using cargo parachute techniques. Road insertions can take time, particularly given the vast distances that may need to be covered during an operation in Australia. The C-27J is currently the only platform that allows a rapid infiltration of troops and sensitive or large equipment which cannot be airdropped onto a narrow, unprepared surface – such as a road or river bed – without accepting the increased risk of damage to the surface inherent with a C-130. Visualising terrorist activity in large, populated areas – such as major cities – is discomfortingly easy but there are other possibilities. Consider Banjawarn Station for example: located 350km north of Kalgoorlie, Banjawarn Station was at one time owned by the Aum Shinrikyo, a Japanese terrorist group responsible for the 1995 sarin gas attack on a Tokyo subway. Authorities believe that Banjawarn Station was used as a testing ground and possible production site for the gas used in that attack. An asset such as the C-27J could conduct a precise infiltration of personnel and equipment into a remote area like Banjawarn Station without the range and cargo limitations of a rotary wing asset, and without the risk to public infrastructure associated with using a C-130. Providing medical assistance in remote locations is another key challenge for the Australian Government. While Australia can boast a qualified doctor for around every 350 people within the country, this is heavily weighted towards the urban populace. Several initiatives exist to provide remote medical care – such as the Royal Flying Doctor Service (RFDS) – however all of these are constrained by budget and capability. A remote mass casualty event – such as a large-scale training accident within the Woomera Range Complex – is likely to encounter many logistical difficulties. With an overall size in excess of 122,000km2, the evacuation of multiple casualties from a particular location within the range would traditionally require rotary or vehicular support to deliver patients to an airfield, then a C-130 or other fixed wing aircraft to provide transport to a medical facility. The ability of the C-27J to access unconventional landing surfaces, such as roads and lake beds, offers several advantages. Operating directly to, or nearby, the incident site may remove the requirement for rotary or vehicular transport whilst providing a larger patient capacity than current RFDS aircraft. The C-27J’s ability to operate on soft, narrow surfaces also enhances Australia’s disaster relief capabilities. In the last ten years Samoa, New Zealand, Japan and the Solomon Islands have all experienced a tsunami while Australia and nearly every regional neighbour have been hit by a major tropical cyclone. When large quantities of water erode the underlying strength of a runway surface, it is difficult to anticipate how many movements an airfield can sustain before damage occurs. This is where the low pavement strength requirements for the C-27J excel; under unknown conditions, the C-27J poses the lowest risk for continued operation of any ADF platform that is able to carry a moderate sized load over a large range. Finally, by sharing the burden of air mobility across all available platforms – and focusing the right asset on the right missions – the ADF can maximise use of its air lift capability. The C-27J is not a small, twin-engine C-130 and although technically the successor to the DHC-4, it is not a Caribou. The Spartan has a distinct niche – the ability to quickly carry moderate sized loads a long way and operate onto soft, narrow surfaces. Exploiting this niche is the best way for the ADF to capitalise on the potential the Spartan offers. Squadron Leader Brad ‘Loopy’ Drew is a serving Royal Australian Air Force officer with experience flying the C-27J and the C-130J. He is currently the Executive Officer of No 35 Squadron. Squadron Leader Drew would like to thank Wing Commander Jarrod Pendlebury and Mr Eamon Hamilton for their assistance in producing this post. The opinions expressed are his alone and do not reflect those of the Royal Australian Air Force, the Australian Defence Force, or the Australian Government. #counterterrorism #aeromedicalevacuation #HADR #Joint #airmobility

In his previous post, Brian Weston described the RAAF’s transition from the Avon Sabre to the Mirage IIIO during the 1960s. The Mirage IIIO remained in operational RAAF service from 1965 to 1988. The transition from the second generation Mirage to the fourth generation Hornet began with the Government’s selection of the Hornet in October 1981. This post explores that transition. As Weston highlights, the Hornet transition involved more than simply flying a new jet, the organisational changes resulting from introduction into service of the new capability laid the foundation for the operational success of the RAAF’s air combat capability in 2003. A Royal Australian Air Force F/A-18A Hornet taxies back into the main air operating base in the Middle East Region following a mission in support of Operation Okra. [Image Credit: Department of Defence] Following-on from the Sabre to Mirage transition, after two decades of service, the RAAF replaced the Mirage IIIO with the F/A-18A Hornet. Unlike the preceding transition, the Hornet did not involve the vast broadening of capability conferred by changing from a day-fighter to an all-weather tactical fighter. The Hornet did, however, introduce a far deeper tactical fighter capability than was ever possible with the Mirage. Much of the capability gain came not just from generational and technological developments, but from the size of the Hornet which conferred immediate improvements in payload and sensors, especially radar aperture and power. The Hornet also improved on a major limitation of the Mirage, namely, its short range. Not that the Mirage was any worse than its 1950s peers; simply, the advance of time and technology gave the Hornet a 25 per cent increase. More significantly the Hornet was capable of air-to-air refueling, thus setting right some earlier conceptual thinking, when the RAAF asked Dassault not to equip the Mirage IIIO with single-point pressure refueling, on the basis that pressure refueling facilities would not be available at forward operating airfields. This decision had long term consequences, because even if the RAAF had later sought to modify the Mirage for air-to-air refueling, it could not be done easily as there was no single-point pressure refueling manifold within the Mirage into which to tap an air-to-air refueling probe. To these enhancements, brought about by greater size and an ability to refuel while in flight, can be added aerodynamic advances, digital technology generational advances, and the benefits flowing from the F/A-18A human/machine interface which set a new benchmark in fighter cockpit design. The RAAF had done well, and its promotion into a bigger league of tactical fighters was starkly evident when the first two F/A-18B aircraft were ferried to Australia, non-stop, across the Pacific. Given its 20 years of Mirage operational experience, the RAAF also had a solid foundation on which to introduce the new fighter. That expertise had been gained not only from the permanent deployment of Mirages to Malaysia, but also from an increasing participation in Australian and regional exercises, including deployments to the USAF Pacific Air Forces Exercise Cope Thunder, at Clark Air Force Base in the Philippines, commencing in 1981. Like the preceding transition to the Mirage, that of the Hornet also needed to be accomplished without any loss of operational capability. So when No 3 Squadron returned from RAAF Base (now Royal Malaysian Air Force Base) Butterworth to convert to the Hornet, a new Mirage unit, No 79 Squadron, was formed at Butterworth to meet Australia’s Five Power Defence Agreement obligations. During the Sabre to Mirage transition, No 2 (Fighter) Operational Conversion Unit was over-burdened, but this time it was tasked solely with Hornet training. And rather than establish another fighter training unit to assume responsibility for the ongoing Mirage conversion courses, as had been done for the Sabre to Mirage transition, the conduct of all Mirage operational conversions was transferred to No 77 Squadron–contravening the dictum that military training should always be carried out in training units, not operational units. No 77 Squadron also assumed responsibility for the Macchi MB-326H lead-in fighter training and for the conduct of the last Mirage fighter combat instructor course. All this, while maintaining its status as an operational fighter squadron. This was not a smart decision, as was evident when the unit’s aircraft establishment and annual flying rate grew to more than 40 aircraft and 11,000 hours per year respectively. After No 77 Squadron converted to the Hornet in 1987, No 75 Squadron followed. No 75 Squadron, which had been based in Darwin with its Mirages since 1983, then moved to the newly-constructed base at Tindal. The sole remaining Mirage unit, No 79 Squadron, was concurrently disbanded, thus ending two decades of Australian service by Dassault’s elegant fighter, and bringing an end to 32 years of a permanent RAAF fighter presence in Malaysia. The transition from Mirage to Hornet was completed in May 1989, along with the most significant reorganisation of RAAF operational units since World War II. This change amalgamated all of the RAAF’s tactical fighter units and air defence radars, irrespective of where they were located, into one operational group, the Tactical Fighter Group. The RAAF had successfully brought into service not only an outstanding tactical fighter but also a new system of functional command, changes that without doubt, contributed to the exemplary performance of No 75 Squadron in the Iraq War of 2003, where the unit successfully conducted air superiority, close air support and air interdiction operations. This piece was initially published in the April 2017 issue of Australian Aviation. Air Vice-Marshal Brian Weston (Ret’d) was Commander of the Tactical Fighter Group from July 1909 to July 1993.  He is currently a board member of the Sir Richard Williams Foundation. #AirForce #AirPower #technology

All too often air forces tend to associate solutions to capability problems with the use of high-tech, often expensive, fixes. In this post, Squadron Leader Michael Spencer uses the story of Beatrice Shilling to highlight that this should not be the case. Shilling’s simple yet effective solution to an engine design flaw that limited the performance of RAF Spitfires and Hurricanes during the early World War II air battles over France and Britain stands out as the exemplar of pragmatic problem solving enabled by technical mastery and creativity. The Battle of Britain made the legend of the Spitfire and the Hurricane. But despite the rightfully earned reputation of these exceptional fighters, they were not without their design flaws. One flaw, in particular, placed the British fighter pilots at a significant disadvantage against their Luftwaffe foes; a design flaw in the Merlin engine that limited the aircraft’s’ ability to perform negative g manoeuvres, forcing pilots to adapt to operational limits in their air combat manoeuvres. A technical solution to this problem was found by a scientist at the Royal Aeronautical Establishment (RAE), Miss Beatrice “Tilly” Shilling. Her relatively simple solution, fondly nicknamed “Miss Shilling’s Orifice”, significantly improved the combat effectiveness of the RAF aircraft and their pilots, and helped make a legend of the aircraft and an engineer. Beatrice “Tilly” Shilling [Image via University of Manchester] The performance of a combustion engine is mainly due to the amount of air and gasoline that flows into the engine cylinders, controlled by a float-type carburettor, under the force of gravity. The pistons combust the fuel/air mixture and energy is released to drive the propeller driveshaft. A weakness of the Rolls-Royce Merlin engines, the engines powering the RAF Spitfire and Hurricane, was a sudden loss of power from fuel starvation occurring in the gravity-fed carburettor whenever the aircraft nose was suddenly pitched slightly downwards in a quick negative g manoeuvre. If the negative g was sustained, the engine would stop completely. The ability to rapidly transition into a steep dive to either pursue or escape an enemy fighter was an important attribute for fighter aircraft. The Merlin’s loss of power as it experienced negative g disrupted RAF pilots’ efforts to line-up or escape a pursuing enemy fighter when engaged in mortal combat. This created issues during the Battle of France and the Battle of Britain. Their German foes did not face this same issue. Daimler-Benz engines installed in Luftwaffe Messerschmitt Bf-109s had been configured with fuel-injection systems since 1937. Mechanically or electrically controlled spray nozzles would pressurise the fuel and inject it directly into each of the engine piston cylinders. The pressurised fuel flow in the Messerschmitt engines were unaffected by negative g manoeuvres. This meant that a Luftwaffe pilot could simply “bunt” into a high-power dive to escape a Spitfire or Hurricane attacking them from behind. This provided the Luftwaffe fighter pilots with a critical manoeuvre advantage over the RAF fighter pilots. This RAF engine problem was solved in 1941 by installing a diaphragm, a metal disc with a small hole in the middle, designed by “Tilly” Shilling specifically to address the Merlin engine carburettor problem and stop fuel being forced upwards, away from the piston chambers, during a negative g manoeuvre. This modification enabled RAF pilots to perform steep dive manoeuvres without experiencing a loss of power or the engine stopping. The diaphragm was fitted across the carburettor float chamber to prevent the fuel from draining and starving the engine during a negative g manoeuvre. The simplicity of the diaphragm design meant it could be fitted to an engine while it was still in the aircraft at an operational airfield without needing to remove the carburettor. In early 1941, Miss Shilling travelled around England with a small work team to retrofit the diaphragms, giving priority to front-line combat fighter units. By March 1941 the diaphragm had been installed, as standard, throughout the entire RAF Fighter Command. Tilly became famous for her invention which was fondly nicknamed “Miss Shilling’s orifice.” “Miss Shilling’s orifice” was in service for two years, during which time Miss Shilling is recognised as having contributed to the RAF shooting down many enemy aircraft and also to having saved the lives of many RAF pilots. Improvements to the Merlin carburettor continued until the design incorporating “Miss Shilling’s orifice” was finally superseded in 1942 by the Bendix-manufactured pressure carburettors, which used a pressure system to negate the fuel flow problem completely. Although the Merlin engines are mostly known for powering the RAF Spitfire and Hurricane fighters, they were also used in the de Havilland Mosquito and Avro Lancaster bombers, Bristol Beaufighter, Fairey Battle light bomber, Halifax and Wellington Bombers, Boulton Paul Defiant II, and in the upgraded USAAF P-51 Mustang. Merlin engine production was finally concluded in 1950 after a total of nearly 150,000 engines had been manufactured. Tilly originally started work in 1936 as a technical writer at the Royal Aircraft Establishment (RAE) Farnborough, the research and development agency of the Royal Air Force. Six months later, she moved to the Carburettor Section of the Engine Experimental Department. In 1939, she was promoted to Technical Officer-in-charge of carburettor research and development. Apart from her professional interests in aerospace engineering, Tilly also had a pilot’s licence and raced motorcycles, including a Norton motorcycle that she had stripped down, rebuilt, and tuned herself. She continued to work at the RAE after WWII, working on projects including the investigations into the De Havilland Comet crashes, aircraft refrigeration, and providing scientific advice to the British bobsleigh team on their vehicle design. In 1948 she was awarded the OBE for her contributions to the war effort. Tilly retired from her post as Senior Principal Scientific Officer at RAE Farnborough in 1969 and received an honorary doctorate from the University of Surrey in the same year. Miss Shilling OBE PhD MSc CEng died in 1990. Tilly’s story highlights that solutions to critical technical issues can be relatively simple. The realisation of innovation in tactics and system designs will assist to maintain the viability of capability systems as the future environment unfolds throughout its lifecycle. Even the suggestion of a small hole in a metal disc can improve in capability. Workforces should be trained and educated in a way that promotes and supports innovation and disruptive thinking to constantly evaluate operational capabilities to push them to the limits of viability until new capability change can be justified. Squadron Leader Michael Spencer is currently serving at the RAAF Air Power Development Centre in Canberra, analysing potential risks and opportunities posed by technology change drivers and disruptions to future air power. His Air Force career has provided operational experiences in long-range maritime patrol, aircrew training, and weaponeering, and management experiences in international relations, project management, air and space concept development, air capability development, and joint force capability integration. The opinions expressed are his alone and do not reflect those of the Royal Australian Air Force, the Australian Defence Force, or the Australian Government. #Innovation #technology

The arrival of the RAAF’s first F-35A will see a generational shift in Australia’s air combat capability.  But this is not the first time that the RAAF has undergone a significant generational shift in capability.  In this post, Air-Vice Marshal Brian Weston (Retd.) reflects on the experience in transitioning from first to second generation fighter aircraft in the 1960s. With the fifth-generation F-35A Lightning II waiting in the wings and time soon to be called on the venerable F/A-18 Classic Hornet, it is timely to reflect on how the RAAF effected previous fighter transitions. The transition from the Australian-built Avon Sabre to the French Dassault Mirage IIIO involved a huge advance in capability from a day fighter to an all-weather interceptor, later developed into a (lightweight) all-weather tactical fighter. And while some operational profiles were carried over from the Sabre to the Mirage, especially when the sun was shining and the sky was blue, there was nothing in Sabre operational doctrine which compared with flying intercepts at low level, at night, over the thunderstorm-riddled Malacca Straights. Nor of flying all-weather, low-altitude night strike missions utilising the capabilities of the Cyrano IIB ground mapping radar, the Doppler navigation set, and the aircraft’s grid navigation system–a technology based on the Canadians’ CF-104G Starfighters in their all-weather, low-level, NATO tactical nuclear strike role. Dassault had designed a formidable fighter platform, as RAAF test pilot Squadron Leader Bill Collings demonstrated during tropical trials at Darwin in February 1964, when he took Mirage A3-1 to Mach 2.198 at 53,000 feet and Mach 1.3 at 77,000 feet. A 77SQN Mirage banking away, with a Matra missile underneath. [Image Credit: RAAF] The Mirage had an advanced integrated weapons system, albeit of analogue technology. The heart of this was a twin-gyro platform reference system which in the air-to-air mode linked the Cyrano IIA radar, the Matra R530 all-aspect semi-active radar missile, and the various facilitating (analogue) computers. To this was added the air-to-ground modes of the Cyrano IIB radar and a Doppler-enhanced grid navigation system. The Mirage’s flight controls also included an analogue fly-by-wire mode which when engaged, facilitated attitude hold, height lock, and heading hold, as well as reducing “transonic tuck”, an abrupt nose-up pitch when decelerating from supersonic speed. Ground school for the Mirage was a world away from the simplicity of the Sabre, generating the occasional cry from students, “we only need to learn how to fly the Mirage, not build it”. But their pleas were to no avail as “know your equipment” has always been a hallmark of RAAF aircrew training. Because the first fifty Mirage IIIO(F) aircraft had only an air-to-air capability, the RAAF initially converted Nos. 75 and 76 Squadrons as air defence only units. When No. 3 Squadron began receiving its Mirage IIIO(A) aircraft, with the Cyrano IIB radar, Doppler and supporting ground-attack systems, it was designated as an 80/20 ground attack/air defence unit, with a remit to develop the RAAF Mirage air-to-ground operational doctrine, tactics and weapons expertise. Simultaneously, No. 2 Operational Conversion Unit conducted the largest fighter combat instructor course since the course’s inception, with No. 10 Fighter Combat Instructor (FCI) Course having six students flying the Sabre and six flying the Mirage. The lessons from both 3SQN’s ground-attack prioritisation and 2OCU’s fighter combat instructor course were fed back into the Mirage operational conversion syllabus and the operational Mirage squadron categorisation schemes. The Sabre to Mirage transition placed a huge load on No. 2 Operational Conversion Unit as the unit was also required to conduct the introductory fighter weapons courses on the Vampire trainer/fighter, Sabre operational conversions, and maintain a de facto Sabre squadron known as “2OCU Transition Squadron”. In March 1970, the RAAF concluded such tasking was excessive, and those three responsibilities were spun off into a new unit, No 5 Operational Training Unit, whose heritage traced back to World War II. While the fighter force was in transition, the RAAF was also required to maintain two operational fighter squadrons at Butterworth, Malaysia, as part of the Commonwealth Strategic Reserve, and to convert those units from the Sabre to the Mirage. Additionally, Nos. 75 and 76 Squadrons had to upgrade their Mirages from air defence fighters to all-weather tactical fighters. Further demands were placed on the fighter community through a commitment to train Malaysian and Indonesian personnel prior to the gifting of refurbished RAAF Sabres to Malaysia and Indonesia. And while all this was going on, outside the fighter force, the RAAF was introducing Iroquois helicopters and Caribou STOL airlifters (both of which were immediately committed to the Vietnam War), C-130E Hercules transports, P-3B Orions, and Aermacchi MB-326H advanced trainers, and not too far away was the most complex aircraft the RAAF had ever operated to that time, the F-111C. It’s fair to say that, in the face of considerable institutional challenges, the transition of the RAAF fighter force from the Sabre to Mirage was a job well done. This article was initially published in the March 2017 edition of “Australian Aviation” Air-Vice Marshal Brian Weston (Retd), flew the Jet Provost, MB-326H, Vampire, Hunter, Sabre, Mirage and Hornet during his RAAF career. #Training #AirCombat #RAAF #AirPower #Mirage #Sabre #F35

We are privileged and excited to introduce our first Central Blue debrief with the Chief of Air Force (CAF), Air Marshal Leo Davies, AO, CSC. In his debrief, the CAF discusses the value of public debate and outlets such as the Central Blue in generating the airminded strategists necessary for Royal Australian Air Force to realise its potential as the world’s first fifth-generation air force. Central Blue (CB): Sir, thanks for taking the time to answer a few questions. What role do you think a forum like The Central Blue can play? Chief of Air Force (CAF): I, and the rest of Defence, need airmen that understand air power. But we also need airmen that can take their airminded perspective and think critically and creatively about how to develop, employ, and adapt joint forces to meet the nation’s needs. We need airminded strategists. When I took command in 2015, I outlined a commitment to ‘better enable the development of superior air power strategists and strategic thinking.’ One of the key ways to do that is for Air Force personnel to engage in intellectual and intelligent debate about air power, strategy, and any number of other topics. Developing and implementing strategies is an intellectually demanding task that is quite akin to engaging in thoughtful debate – both require you to think and communicate simply and clearly about circumstances that are anything but. Getting good at anything takes practice and I see things like The Central Blue and other blogs as a great way for people to practise developing and communicating their ideas. I particularly appreciate that The Central Blue provides a more accessible means of debate, for authors and readers, than submissions to formal journals. Thus, The Central Blue provides an important means of developing airminded strategists and strategic thinking. I thank the Williams Foundation for supporting The Central Blue and I encourage serving members to contribute to it and to similar forums. CB: Serving members are often reluctant to engage in public debate for a variety of reasons, including concern about repercussions about stepping out of line or putting an idea out there that might be wrong. What are your thoughts on this issue? CAF: Obviously, members of the ADF need to be mindful about the comments they make in public but I trust my people to exercise their judgement and discretion about what is, and is not, appropriate. You as editors have a role to play in that well but there is nothing that has been published on The Central Blue so far that has given me cause for concern. The posts on The Central Blue that have suggested alternative ways for Air Force to do things have been constructive and thoughtful. No organisation is perfect and there is no single answer to any question so I fully expect there to be different views. As for being wrong, well I have always found that to be a particularly useful way of learning! But more importantly, even something that people might tell you is wrong might just force them to reconsider their assumptions or preconceived ideas. The most important of the five vectors in the Air Force Strategy is the people vector and I have committed to modernising our education and training system. But not all education comes through formalised programs, and I think informal networking, reading, and writing is a critical part of Air Force’s professional development and education efforts. Our investment in formal education and training will be undermined if we prevent people from practising their skills and refining their thinking. I need Air Force people to engage in these discussions because the ideas on how we are going to execute the Air Force Strategy and position our Air Force to meet the challenges of the future can come from anywhere and anyone. Moreover, the strongest ideas are those that have been most thoroughly tested – and public discussion is the most competitive arena for ideas. The Central Blue is an unofficial outlet so nothing on this blog, aside from my own words, is endorsed by the Air Force, Defence, or Government — but that does not mean we won’t borrow from it! CB: That’s a great segue. You have explained how you see The Central Blue contributing to the development of individuals. What organisational benefits do you think the blog can generate? CAF: The organisational benefits of enhancing the public debate around air power and strategy are many. Public discussion increases external organisations’ understanding of the contributions of air power, and encourages Air Force personnel to challenge their own assumptions about air power and its role in national strategy. One of my priorities when I took command was having an Air Force that understood and could explain air power’s role in national security and The Central Blue is deeply engaged in that effort. Enhancing the cognitive capacity of our personnel by developing agility of thinking and individual initiative will be imperative in shaping the organisation’s ability to adapt to change. Future warfare will bring challenges to our way of operating that we must begin to articulate and consider now. Some of these will be unpleasant and difficult for the organisation to address internally – so an unofficial outlet like The Central Blue can provide a really useful avenue to kick ideas around without creating organisational churn. The Williams Foundation seminars have been performing this function for years so I see The Central Blue as a natural extension of that support. The Central Blue also flattens the structure and makes ideas and arguments accessible. There is no shortage of good ideas inside Air Force but we are a hierarchical organisation so it is difficult for people in one Force Element Group to see the ideas coming from another. I think The Central Blue is a really useful means of cross-pollinating ideas between the community of communities that we have in Air Force. I know that you guys are heavily involved with your counterparts at The Cove, and Grounded Curiosity, and are supporting the Defence Entrepreneurs Forum coming up in December. I mention those links because I think it shows The Central Blue is already starting to act as a hub for a professional network that crosses organisational lines. That is a great thing and is fundamental to our future success. CB: Sir, thanks again for your time. Any closing thoughts? CAF: Air power is not a static concept; rather it must be studied, reflected upon, debated, and challenged. As airminded members of the profession of arms, Air Force personnel have a responsibility to participate in this contest of ideas. It is far, far better that we should respectfully engage in that contest than to hide our thoughts, only to find them wanting when it matters most. The Central Blue provides a forum for those ideas to be proposed, evaluated, and debated. I congratulate you, thank the Williams Foundation for supporting the blog, and I encourage Air Force members to read, reflect, discuss and write on this forum and others like it. Air Marshal Leo Davies joined the Royal Australian Air Force as a cadet Navigator in 1979 and graduated to fly P-3B and P-3C Orion aircraft with No 11 Squadron at Edinburgh in South Australia. In 1987 Air Marshal Davies completed pilot training and after completing F-111 conversion course was posted in 1988 to No 1 Squadron at RAAF Base Amberley. His appointments include commands of No 1 Squadron and No 82 Wing, Australia’s Air Attache in Washington, and Deputy Chief of Air Force . He was promoted to Air Marshal and appointed Chief of Air Force on 4 July 2015.

In this post, our first serving Australian Army contributor — Captain David Caligari — argues collaboration across the Australian Defence Force (ADF) is imperative if we are to have the edge to fight and win future conflicts. Collaboration is built into our people — can we harness the potential this offers? The barriers to start a new crowd-powered service are low and getting lower. A hive mind scales up wonderfully smoothly. Kevin Kelly, The Inevitable Our ability to fight and win in a complex world depends on our people. More, in the 21st century, winning will depend on these people collaborating. The ADF must embrace a philosophy of collaboration. This means: collaborating to develop knowledge; collaborating to share and network that knowledge; and collaborating to constantly update and innovate with that knowledge. In short, the ADF must strive to create a Joint “Body of Knowledge”—a shared virtual reservoir of expert knowledge that is the edge to fight and win. The knowledge edge The future operating environment will be dynamic and require innovation to disrupt adversary actions. This disruption will not be determined by the presence of Joint Strike Fighters or advanced submarines, but by the ADF’s ability to ‘crowd-power’ knowledge and wield it to out-innovate the adversary. The ADF is not alone in this challenge. Knowledge is the lifeblood of organisations participating in the digital economy. For these organisations, their knowledge edge is their intellectual property. For the ADF, our knowledge edge will be obtained through the ability to share, access, and adapt the accumulated knowledge of our people. The Joint Body of Knowledge is the ADF’s digital memory. It is the repository of all the organisation’s documented information—including standard operating procedures, doctrine, and other information—hosted by an information management system. The software used for this system doesn’t matter; it could take many forms. However, the optimal information management system will be accessible, searchable, and manipulable. It will enable wide input, and fully leverage the ADF’s ‘hive mind’ so that its content is continually updated, and can be stewarded to indisputable accuracy. Tipping point The world is rushing towards information decentralisation and sharing—a trend Kevin Kelly argues was previously impossible due to technological constraints. The ADF is learning to engage with modern technologies enabled by information decentralisation. These modern technologies include the internet, before which there was no way to coordinate a million people in real time or to bring thousands of workers together to collaborate on projects. The ADF’s own mini-internet—our intranet—now holds the power to bring together our collective brainpower. The ADF is the crowd, or ‘hive mind’, that can be harnessed to develop, refine, and define the future direction of our organisation. The ADF is primed to embrace collaboration. The ADF’s people live in a world of sharing: whether it be what we are thinking (Twitter), what we are reading (StumbleUpon), our finances (Motley Fool), our social lives (Facebook), shopping (eBay), or going anywhere (TripAdvisor), sharing is becoming the foundation of modern life and culture. As the Ryan Report states, the majority of ADF personnel are “Gen Y”—digital natives who never knew a time before the age of the internet and the smartphone. In this sense, the difficult job has been done: the ADF’s workforce is positioned for change. As Major General Gus MacLachlan identified in his Command and Leadership Philosophy: “we sit in a world in which most of the Army’s soldiers [Air Force’s airmen, and Navy’s sailors] are familiar with the world’s largest car company [Uber] owning no cars… The game has changed.” Next gen professionals It is well-known that to remain relevant on the global war fighting stage, the ADF must be innovative. Correctly developed, the Joint Body of Knowledge will provide the launch point for innovation. As Brigadier Chris Field asserted in a recent article, improving collaboration is in fact the foundation of innovation. Collaboration is best done in the digital space. A digital Joint Body of Knowledge allows the basic skills, knowledge and attributes developed by individuals in training to become knowledge which can be accessed and critiqued by all. ADF personnel who learn to fire a weapon, steer a ship, or perform diagnostics on an airframe can use technology to contribute their expertise to the Joint Body of Knowledge. Each small contribution sharpens the knowledge edge needed to out-innovate the adversary. Conclusion The contemporary ADF serviceperson is built for collaboration. The ADF workforce is a hive mind which, in Kevin Kelly’s words, is decentralised power that is “fast, cheap, and out of control”. Modern sailors, soldiers, and airmen also have available intellectual capacity. They are giving to Twitter, Facebook, and TripAdvisor what they could be giving to developing operations within an Air Operations Centre, or helping to determine the size of the future infantry section. This capacity must be harnessed if the ADF is to remain competitive. Otherwise, we will fail to have the knowledge edge needed to fight and win the next battle for the sea, land, air, space, or cyber domain. Captain David Caligari is the Training Officer, Depot Company at the Australian Army School of Infantry. He would like to acknowledge his collaboration with Katherine Mansted, which has informed the perspectives shared in this piece. The opinions expressed are his alone and do not reflect those of the Australian Army, the Australian Defence Force, or the Australian Government. #organisationalculture #technology #Joint #Innovation #Jointness #lessonslearned

Military exercises provide an opportunity to observe how Defence doctrine is put into action in the field. Here, Flight Lieutenant Emily Chapman provides lessons and reflections from her participation in the Tactical Air Control Party on Army’s Exercise BROLGA STRIKE. Exercise BROLGA STRIKE was the 3rd Combat Brigade’s Combined Arms Training Activity (CATA) conducted over the period 01 Jun – 16 Jun, including a Live Fire Exercise (LFX) component. Almost 3 000 personnel deployed to Townsville Field Training Area (TFTA) for BROLGA STRIKE, including 10 Air Force personnel who formed the 3rd Brigade Tactical Air Control Party (TACP). Air Liaison Organisation (ALO) personnel posted to 3 BDE, including the Brigade Air Liaison Officer (BALO), Battlefield Airspace Control Liaison Officer (BACLO) and Operations Officer (OPSO), were augmented by 44 Wing Joint Battlefield Airspace Control Officers (JBACs) and a combination of Permanent Air Force (PAF) and Reserve OPSOs for the duration of the exercise. The ALO represent the Air Commander and Air Force interests within Army and Navy through a permanent presence in Deployable Joint Force Headquarters, 1st, 3rd and 7th Combat Brigade Headquarters and the Amphibious Task Group. One of the capabilities it deploys is a TACP, which has responsibilities to DGAIR and a Brigade Commander, in the case of BROLGA STRIKE. With regards to DGAIR, the TACP executed air C2 and enabled the Theatre Air Control System (TACS). In support of Commander 3 BDE, the TACP ensured air assets were planned, tasked and controlled in a safe and effective manner that met Brigade air support requirements. ALO roles are critical during operations, with a key lesson from Operation FIJI ASSIST confirming the requirement for, and efficacy of ALO personnel as part of an ADF response. [1] [Image credit: Defence] A number of themes observed during BROLGA STRIKE are presented here as learning reflection and opportunity. These themes centre on mounting, integration, employment of Reservists, learning culture, and professional military education (PME). There is much more to the ALO and air-land integration than covered in this personal reflection piece. Mounting The TACP manning model draws together personnel from a disparate range of locations and with varying levels of experience, both within their category and / or working within a TACP. As such, a dedicated TACP mounting period is required to conduct Reception, Staging and Integration.[2] The duration of this period should be based on achieving specified outcomes, including equipment issue, training and safety briefs, vehicle and equipment preparation, communication testing and Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) rehearsals, but balanced with an appreciation of individual competency. A robust and structured program that is distributed prior to an Exercise is essential to the effectiveness of a TACP mounting period. Overall, a dedicated mounting period prepares TACP personnel to interface with Brigade Headquarters in a confident and competent manner while achieving internal TACP training outcomes. Integration A TACP deploys into the field as part of a Brigade HQs. This includes living in the field, and the use of Protected Mobility Vehicles (PMV) as transport and workspace. To fully integrate into a Brigade HQ, a TACP requires interoperable equipment, training, systems and vehicles. Progress made in this area has been considerable, with personal equipment (weapons and combat ensemble) now consistent between Brigade HQs and the TACP. However, there is an ongoing need to maintain technological pace with the supported HQ and this includes having organic assets, such as PMVs, fitted with key command and control systems such as the Battle Management System (BMS). Having dedicated RAAF PMVs equipped with interoperable systems supports the decentralisation of air effects, a key air power tenet. [3] Organic capability enables a TACP to be more self-sufficient, in-turn reducing the current reliance on Army in some areas. Reservists Reservist OPSO are a critical capability within Air Force and especially so within the ALO because they fill the majority of TACP OPSO positions during exercises. To deploy into the field, often with a new team every year in support of the Readying Brigade, these personnel are committed and driven. They also have strengths based on previous experience and areas of interest. During Brolga Strike, it was clear OPSOs were given roles and responsibilities that maximised outcomes for the TACP and the Brigade HQs based on a concept of employing personnel in roles that matched their strengths. Such an approach enhances team- building and morale, and supports ongoing Reserve commitment. Key to the ongoing value of this approach is appreciating Reservists’ strengths and defining roles and responsibilities, including the mentoring and knowledge transfer to permanent OPSOs new to working in a TACP. These defined roles will be essential into the future, especially the need to de-conflict the experience of long-term Reserve ALO OPSOs with permanent Brigade OPSOs who will rotate through the ALO as a posting. Organisational Learning Culture BROLGA STRIKE exercise design provided a learning environment in preparation for participation in TALISMAN SABRE (HAMEL) 2017 which was evident from the outset of augmentation. Subsequent reading of the 3rd Brigade 100 Day Assessment reflects that Exercise BROLGA STRIKE is one point in a broader Brigade culture where learning is Command driven. During Rehearsal of Concept (ROC) drills, Brigade leaders were observed to identify and apply experience from previous exercises. Learning exchange driven in this way visibly brings to the fore the benefits of knowledge capture, analysis and dissemination and supports the institutionalisation of learning practices. Critical to this process is distilling and implementing the knowledge that is transferable to the next exercise, task or operation. This level of analysis is supported by the Centre for Army Lessons (CAL), who was present during Brolga Strike, further reflecting learning culture within the Brigade. It will be interesting to compare the insights they derive from their collection with this opinion piece. A number of other learning activities were observed during BROLGA STRIKE, including mentoring during the planning process and 4 Regiment, Royal Australian Artillery facilitating access to the gunline for observers. In regards to the mentoring observed, it is the manner in which the mentoring was conducted. The environment developed by the mentor was calm, consistent and recognised people’s contribution. While two Courses of Action (COA) were developed by COA Leads, the environment was learning-focused and not competitive to get one plan up over the other. The tempo of the exercise supported this process, with time available for this mentoring to occur in a conducive manner. An example of this learning environment is being provided the opportunity to observe an artillery M777 gunline. This observation period occurred towards the end of the exercise, which provided time to understand the training scenario and how artillery is being used in support of manoeuvre by other Units and Battle Groups (BG). 4 Regiment conducted a 0300h serial and were on task for a 0730h serial. Observation of the gunline demonstrated a side of Army that Air Force rarely gets to see; resilient, skilled, committed and confident in the face of little sleep, no comfort and a lot of spear grass. Taking these opportunities builds an understanding of respective Service capabilities, which is the foundation of effective joint operations. The third learning outcome from BROLGA STRIKE came from within the TACP. Integration into the TACP commenced with the receipt of 3 BDE TACP ‘Commander’s Guidance’ for the conduct of the exercise, which included training lessons learnt. Internal TACP learning culture became evident during the Exercise. ‘No comms no bombs’ is a colloquial Air Force mantra, and in this context means the location of Brigade HQ nodes is critical for a TACP to control the air. The early and ongoing involvement of the TACP in Brigade planning is essential to achieve communications at respective nodal locations and this was identified as a training outcome of a previous 3 BDE exercise, Exercise BROLGA RUN. [4] Secondly, is the need for innovation when things don’t go to plan or when there is an opportunity to test a concept. The specific example during BROLGA STRIKE was the demonstration of a re-broadcast capability, which required a Brigade commitment to enable the TACP to test the concept and an internal TACP drive to achieve a successful outcome. Enabling the implementation of innovate measures reflects a robust learning culture, both within the TACP and 3rd Brigade. Air-Land Integration PME TACP capability is integrated into Brigade HQs, with varying constructs available. [5] To support building knowledge of 5th generation air capability at Unit and BG level, the inclusion of air capability briefs into Army Unit-level Professional Military Education (PME) programs may be beneficial. Such knowledge is useful when conducting BG planning, requesting air effects and integrating assets into manoeuvre during live exercises. Opportunities to work closely with Combat Training Centre (CTC) to further enhance air-land integration training outcomes and achieve a realistic and immersive training environment are being realised. [6] As such, air-land integration PME is one proposal within a much larger body of work. [7] In Conclusion A posting or exercise with the ALO provides a joint learning opportunity that cannot be derived from the current Air Force Professional Military Education Training (PMET) continuum. Working in a TACP develops competence and confidence to input air power subject matter advice in a high-tempo and challenging planning/execution environment. Air Force and Army personnel will take experiences from the Brigade-level into their future roles as leaders within their respective Service. As such, the relationships built and the exposure gained to land force capability is invaluable in an Air Force focused and committed to achieving joint outcomes. Ongoing Air Force involvement in Army exercises brings greater awareness of what we bring to the fight – and we bring a lot. A note of thanks to 4th Regiment, Royal Australian Artillery for hosting FLGOFF Mole and I during a training serial and SQNLDR Barnes for review of an earlier version of this piece. [1] Adaptive Warfare Branch OP FIJI ASSIST 2016 Lesson Collection Activity. [2] See also TACP Brolga Run16 – First Impressions Report [3] See Tactical Air Control Party Concept of Employment [4] See Exercise Silicon Brolga Strike 2017 Post Activity Report [5] See Tactical Air Control Party Concept of Employment [6] See Exercise Silicon Brolga Strike 2017 Post Activity Report [7] See Joint Fires and Effects Training within the ADF and 3 BDE Air-Land Integration Updated (Oct 16-Jun 17) FLTLT Emily Chapman is a RAAFAR Operations Officer posted to the Air Liaison Organisation. She has a broad range of domestic and overseas exercise and operational experience. She is concurrently a PhD Candidate at the UNSW at Canberra researching civil-military interaction during disaster relief operations. #Training #PME #organisationalculture #mentoring #Army #tacticalaircontrolparty #airliaisonorganisation #PMET #airlandintegration #exercise #lessonslearned

This week saw the Australian Defence Force (ADF) undertake its largest amphibious landing since the Second World War as part of its largest and most complex joint and combined exercise, Talisman Sabre. In this post, Wing Commander Paul Hay argues that the Government’s investment in airborne intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities presents the Air Force and the ADF with unprecedented opportunities to enhance land and littoral operations. But, he argues, exploiting those opportunities will take new thinking and new approaches. For a decade in the Middle East the Australian Army elements relied largely on US assets to deliver most of their airborne ISR support. The lack of dedicated capabilities in the force-in-being required the Royal Australian Air Force to provide support through a rapidly developed leased Heron unmanned aerial system (UAS) and the use of AP-3C maritime patrol aircraft in an overland role. Manning the Heron capability created some internal capacity and skill challenges, while AP-3C crews needed to maintain their maritime capabilities in addition to preparing for the overland role in the Middle East. After their operations in Afghanistan, the Heron workforce largely melted back into Air Force and the AP-3Cs largely went back to their core maritime roles. Thankfully, lessons regarding the importance of suitable and integrated ISR systems in supporting the land fight were learned. The Government has subsequently directed significant investment through the Defence White Paper 2016 (DWP16) to remediate this shortfall in the ADF’s organic ISR capability to support to land, and more broadly the amphibious forces. The DWP16 outlines an investment in a tiered suite of airborne ISR capabilities designed to integrate with, and support, land and amphibious elements (Figure 1). The planned suite of airborne ISR capabilities will include the long range ISR and electronic warfare (EW) aircraft operating at high level and long range, a tactical ISR platform providing support to special operations, and an armed medium altitude UAS providing persistent ISR and attack coverage, all integrated to deliver support in the land and littoral environments. The Defence White Paper 2016 outlines an investment in a tiered suite of airborne ISR capabilities to support land and littoral manoeuvre. [Image credit: author] These planned acquisitions present Defence with the opportunity to build and maintain an ‘ISR force by design.’ ISR is largely platform agnostic – rather it is about the combination of sensors, suitable and robust communications networks, processing, exploitation and dissemination systems, and a dedicated workforce of ISR professionals that understands the missions being supported. As such, these new capabilities being acquired necessitate a new way of thinking, not just in terms of operating the capabilities, but how we raise, train and sustain the entire integrated ISR force within a tightly integrated organisational command and control (C2) design. Air Force cannot possibly generate the desired outcomes or exploit these capabilities to their full potential by simply trying to continue to conduct business as usual. These are new capabilities that will provide a massive increase in ISR capacity and effects in the land and littoral environments and necessitate a revolutionary approach to our employment concepts. To be an integral part of our fifth generation Air Force, and effectively support Army and Navy, they cannot be operated in a legacy sense or the investment will be wasted. Army will no doubt be watching how we bring these capabilities into service and may well be asking themselves “is Air Force acquiring these new assets for Air Force, or to support Army?” As Air Force and Navy have learned over the past few decades, you can’t generate and sustain an effective airborne maritime surface and subsurface warfare capability overnight – it takes years. It requires an intimate understanding of Navy’s needs, what they are trying to achieve at different times in varying environments, acquisition of suitable sensors, equipment and weapons, all underpinned by a robust training system and a dedicated workforce. This same philosophy needs to be applied to providing support for land and amphibious elements. The transition from the amphibious task force afloat to the land environment is extremely complex undertaking and will require close integration of a number of assets and an intimate understanding by the Air Force elements to support the myriad of entities effectively. It will require a workforce that understands how special force operate, how Army’s combined arms teams’ manoeuvre and interact, and the different support requirements through the phase of an amphibious lodgement by both air and surface craft. This level of understanding will take years to generate. Supporting these operations will be reliant upon suitable and capable ISR sensors fit for the task and available when needed, appropriate and capable communications networks, and a suitably trained workforce that understands the land commander’s mission aims, scheme of manoeuvre and support requirements without having to be told. This cannot be an afterthought or a secondary task – it must be a primary role for those airborne ISR assets. Where AP-3C crews can readily identify naval vessels and understand the relative threat to a naval task group, the crews operating these new ISR capabilities need to be able to rapidly identify land threat systems and understand what that threat system means to the supported commander and his scheme of manoeuvre. Unfortunately there is no land-focused formation equivalent to Number 92 Wing, which specialises in understanding airborne support to naval operations. Thus, there is no organisation to own the airborne ISR support to the complex land and amphibious manoeuvre problem. Instead, this support is delivered through what essentially amounts to largely uncoordinated ad hoc support arrangements supplied for each discrete task. Exericse Talisman Sabre 17 offers a contemporary and timely activity for Army and the amphibious elements to consider how they would utilise these future ISR capabilities to support them. The planned acquisition of these ISR capabilities provides an opportunity to deliver on the Chief of Air Force’s vision for an integrated, joint Air Force. Given the majority of Air Force’s ISR capabilities will be located at RAAF Edinburgh, consider what we could provide to Army if we designed, from the ground up in consultation with Army and Navy, a dedicated formation consisting of the tiered overland ISR capabilities mentioned above to provide land and amphibious ISR support. This dedicated formation might include tightly integrated Special Operations Command, Army, and Navy personnel who are thoroughly invested in training and optimising the employment of those assets on operations. The Air Force personnel in this joint formation would become our experts in support to land and littoral operations, and would understand special operations, combined arms manoeuvre and amphibious operations. Soldiers from 2nd Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment disembark a landing craft from HMAS Canberra during an amphibious beach landing conducted as part of Exercise Talisman Saber 2017. [Image credit: Department of Defence] The need to train a new workforce offers some additional opportunities to think differently and train differently, and perhaps look outwards at some of the latent capacity that exists in the community to assist. We might want to consider integrating Defence industry and academia into our ISR force design to assist us with experimentation, rapid ISR system prototyping and testing, training our workforce, perhaps even filling some of the ground analytical positions within our weapon systems to provide long term continuity. The collocation of Army’s 7th Battalion and 16th Air Land Regiment, Air Force’s G-550 long range ISREW aircraft, the tactical airborne ISR aircraft, armed MALE UAS, P-8A Poseidon, MQ-4C Triton, No 1 Remote Sensor Unit and Distributed Ground Station – Australia in Adelaide give Defence a potent suite of joint capabilities in one location. The proximity of Cultana, Woomera, and Port Wakefield training areas and maritime approaches offers opportunities for joint training in nearly all environments. This again provides an opportunity for new thinking – that whole region could be utilised as a joint ISR training and proving ground with the services tightly integrated with Defence Science and Technology Group (DSTG), state government, defence industry and academia as integral parts of the ISR system. Designed well, we could not only create a potent integrated ISR force, but could enhance it through these external partnerships essentially creating an integrated “ISR hub” in Adelaide. In a previous post, I offered some thoughts on how a dedicated training establishment for the non-commissioned ISR workforce would be beneficial. This training establishment could be extended to train every member of the precinct to develop a professional workforce, be it aircraft maintainers, information systems personnel or aircrew. Most of the fundamental training could be outsourced or partnered, with common training provided across the workforce and only weapon system specific ISR training required in operational conversion units. The Air Force has a unique opportunity to get it right and create the new structures to exploit integrated ISR forces early and well. Will we try to just fit these new capabilities into our current structures and processes, or will we take the time to review how our fifth generation Air Force needs to be structured, trained and sustained in order to support Army and the amphibious elements? Air Force could, if we take the time to think, grasp the opportunity and actually deliver to the ADF “an ISR force by design” tightly integrated with DSTG, defence industry and academia and a focal point for ISR expertise in Australia. Wing Commander Paul Hay is a serving Royal Australian Air Force officer. The opinions expressed are his alone and do not reflect those of the Royal Australian Air Force, the Australian Defence Force, or the Australian Government. #Training #commandandcontrol #RAAF #P8 #Army #UAS #AirPower #Joint #UAV #EW #ISR #LHD

In her post on joint professional development, Emily Chapman made a powerful argument for closer collaboration between single service outlets, in order to expand intellectual horizons and prevent silos of intellectual excellence. The teams behind Grounded Curiosity, The Central Blue and The Cove agree. We intend to work with Emily to implement some of her ideas and strengthen ties between our forums. We believe that challenging single domain identities and mindsets will help to develop our thinking. We believe that sharing knowledge across services at the junior-leader level, in a less formal way, will improve our individual and collective professional mastery. Opportunities for joint dialogue at this level will complement existing service and joint professional military education. We believe we will be stronger and smarter together. We believe we will be strongest and smartest if we unite in a manner that fosters diverse perspectives so that they may be harnessed to pursue a common goal. We think it is important to critically evaluate the depth and breadth of jointness we want to achieve, and what might be lost in the pursuit of this aim. Homogenous jointery can be harmful. Image credit: National Defense University Press Debate within Services, or sub-elements of Services, will still be required to explore mastery of individual domains, address specific issues, and – crucially – generate alternative views on common challenges. For example, we think the different perspectives on multi-domain operations coming from the US Army and Marine Corps, on one hand, and the US Air Force on the other are invaluable. A number of studies cite diversity of thought as one of the key factors producing quality decision-making, and without single-service mindsets, some of this diversity may be lost when we come together in the joint realm. With that in mind, we turn to Emily’s proposals. Provide visible links to like-minded websites.  The Cove has taken this feedback on board, creating a ‘Partners’ area to share links to like-minded sites, and Grounded Curiosity and The Central Blue plan to create similar pages. The editors will look for opportunities to cross-post each other’s content to broaden readership and increase the variety of issues covered. Create a centralised Australian Defence Force (ADF) website. Emily proposed an ADF website, possibly sponsored by Vice Chief of Defence Force Group, to collate debate across all domains and levels of war. While we feel the proposal has merit, we would like to explore the idea further to understand where it might have value. We are cautious about losing the autonomy and grassroots momentum of the sites in their current format, or discouraging debate on Service specific topics. This proposal also raises consideration of ownership and governance. Arrange a Postern Association workshop. The Postern Association, an Australian Army association which provides an informal and self-organised network for professional development, plans to hold a workshop to discuss inclusion of Air Force and Navy perspectives. In addition, the Postern Association has created an Air Force Liaison Officer position and is seeking Navy representation. Emily has agreed to take up a the position of Postern Association Operations Director, supported by Eli Blair and a great operations team, in order to implement some of her ideas directly – a great outcome for the organisation. Promote the annual DEF Aus Forum. Grounded Curiosity and Postern Association already provide great support to this event. The Central Blue will include a link to DEF Aus on its resources page, and will actively encourage its contributors to pitch their ideas in the annual forum. We thank Emily for her suggestions – they prompted robust discussions across Services and ranks about what we were seeking to achieve and the best way to pursue those aims. We think this kind of back and forth is exactly the sort of exchange that Grounded Curiosity, The Cove and the Central Blue should be fostering. We encourage others to be as forthcoming. #Jointness #PME #PMET #professionaleducation