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In the right circumstances Ground-Based Air Defence can be a game-changer. Given that the Australian Defence Force invariably deploys when it fights, it is a capability our defence planners need to take more seriously. The popular image of the fight to win control of the air is one of scores of fighters locked in swirling dogfights, epitomised by the Battle of Britain in World War II and MiG Alley in Korea. A less well-known method of asserting air control is Ground-Based Air Defence (GBAD), which in certain circumstances has been very successful. GBAD incorporates all or some of surface-to-air missiles, anti-aircraft artillery, early-warning systems, and command and control centres, almost invariably in fixed locations. It has often been the choice of technologically modest and under-resourced forces opposed to superior opponents. The battle of Dien Bien Phu in 1954 was a prime example. Despite not even having an air force, the Viet Minh (North Vietnam) were able to assert control of the air over their technologically-advanced French enemies using an ad hoc GBAD system. Dien Bien Phu was one of a number of remote fortified camps the French established hoping to draw their elusive enemy into “meat-grinder” set-piece battles. Because of the camps’ isolation, their airstrips were vital for resupply, reinforcement, and launching close air attack missions, which in turn made local control of the air essential. The French believed their airstrip at Dien Bien Phu could not be threatened. But the Viet Minh confounded French expectations by using 30,000 peasant labourers to man-handle two regiments of artillery and heavy mortars though the jungle onto the hilltops overlooking Dien Bien Phu. The Viet Minh now dominated the airstrip, which they made almost unusable. With their lifeline cut, the French were eventually over-run. Egypt similarly employed GBAD to negate Israel’s overwhelmingly superior air force during the first week of the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War. In the June 1967 Six-Day War, the Egyptian Air Force had been destroyed on the ground by the Israeli Air Force in a matter of hours. Learning from that experience, in 1973 Egypt’s leaders essentially kept their air force out of harm’s way and relied instead on an intensive GBAD system of missiles and AAA, especially along the Suez Canal. Complacent after its 1967 victory, the IAF was caught unprepared for this different threat and in the first few days lost about 15 percent of its strike/fighters. The loss rate was unsustainable. It was only after Israeli tanks and paratroopers had smashed a gap in the Egyptians’ GBAD barrier through which Israel’s jets could safely fly that the IAF was able to assert its usual dominance over the battlefield. Egypt’s use of GBAD was a clever tactic which succeeded for a week against a technologically and operationally vastly superior force. An even more striking result was achieved by mujahideen guerillas fighting against Soviet invaders in Afghanistan between 1979 and 1989. Initially the Soviets enjoyed uncontested air supremacy, which enabled their Mi-8 and Mi-25 heavy-lift and attack helicopters to play an apparently war-winning role, with the guerillas being unable to cope with the manoeuvre and firepower the helicopters provided. However, the situation changed dramatically in 1986 when the US supplied the mujahideen with Stinger shoulder-launched anti-aircraft missiles. In the next three years the guerillas shot-down some 270 Soviet helicopters, creating a decisive shift of momentum in the war. Australia’s post-World War II experience with GBAD has been slight. The Army has operated small numbers of short-range, point-defence-only weapons which could scarcely be described as a system. The RAAF went much further in 1961 when it established No. 30 Squadron at Williamtown, equipped with Bloodhound surface-to-air missiles and early-warning radars. With an intercept envelope of 45 kilometres range and 9000 to 50,000 feet altitude, the Bloodhound was typical of its generation. It was also typically inflexible. Even with a (dubious) claimed kill-probability of 90 percent for each salvo of four missiles fired, scores of batteries would have been required to defend Australia’s many high-value targets. Following No. 30 Squadron’s disbandment in 1968, the RAAF has shown little interest in GBAD systems. Indeed, applying the maxim that attack is the best form of defence, the RAAF’s approach to the broader issue of control of the air has been active rather than passive. Of note here is the recent acquisition of twelve EA-18G Growler electronic attack aircraft, which can detect and jam most – some commentators say all – known forms of surface-to-air threats. Australia’s 2016 Defence White Paper flagged an intention to acquire a new short-range GBAD system for the Army “by the early 2020s” and a medium-range system by the “mid-to-late 2020s”. These are good intentions but, to state the obvious, the time-frame is relaxed. As the experiences outlined in this article illustrate (and there are more), in the right circumstances GBAD can be a game-changer. Given that the Australian Defence Force invariably deploys when it fights, it is a capability our defence planners need to take more seriously. Cody Stephens is a law graduate who works in technology and innovation research #Afghanistan #IsraeliAirForce #GBAD #AirPower #Stingermissiles

Air Force needs to embrace the potential of fiction in the development of the minds of its airmen. Not only will it make Professional Military Education and Training slightly more enjoyable, it may also give rise to a career-long engagement with professional development that will serve Air Force far beyond the immediate needs of individual promotion courses. Let’s face it, Air Force Professional Military Education and Training (PMET) is boring. This is an unfortunate reality, but a reality nonetheless. Part of the reason for the tedium of professional development is an understandable organisational belief in the importance of doctrine, policy, and history in shaping the mind of the professional airman and future leader. Though these are undoubtedly important, excessive focus on them in the development of an airman’s mind has the negative consequence of associating PMET with a form of purgatory; a necessary period of suffering that must be endured before one can attain the pleasures of promotion. Although it is impossible, at least to my mind, to make the majority of airmen delight in the prospect of PMET, it is possible to make it a little more interesting, engaging, and therefore ultimately more bearable. One way this can be done is through the increased use of fiction in the curriculum. HG Wells’s ‘The War in the Air’ demonstrates the utility of fiction in exploring novel concepts. [Author’s tagged copy] The use of fiction in education is by no means a novel idea (no pun intended). I’d be surprised if any of the readers of this post didn’t have fond (or perhaps not so fond) memories of the fiction they were required to read throughout their schooling. In my case, The Grapes of Wrath, To Kill a Mockingbird, Hamlet, and The Shiralee seem to have left an indelible imprint on me. But in terms of professional military education, the role of fiction is more contested. Recently The Strategy Bridge reposted an article it had originally published in mid-2015 that looked at the role of Fiction for the Strategist. In that article Diane Maye highlighted three roles for fiction in a strategist’s development: enabling a sense of feeling of others’ experience, providing a tool for social experimentation, and improving the understanding of the complexities of decision making. Maye’s post was itself a response to another blogger’s assertion that ‘in the realm of strategy, fiction is far less wonderful than it is dangerous.’ The recent reinvigoration of this debate led me to contemplate the role fiction plays in the development of the professional airman, something that I have not seen nor heard discussed in any of the forums in which I am engaged. I have come to the conclusion that there currently does not appear to be a place for fiction in Air Force PMET. This must change. In looking at the role of fiction in air power education I am not limiting myself to the novel format, nor even to the written word. Fiction takes many forms, from short stories, such as those found on The Art of Future Warfare, to multi-episode film series, the ever expanding Star Wars franchise being the exemplar here, and many things in between. Each style of fiction has its own utility in expanding the mind of the consumer, and each consumer has a preference for different formats. It is therefore important when exploring the role of fiction not to default to a position that classic literature is the only useful fiction in educating the mind; requiring junior airmen to read War and Peace would be unlikely to achieve the desired effect of PMET engagement. The selection of the works to be used must therefore balance appeal, accessibility, and educational utility; not an easy balance to find given the scarcity of fiction relating to air power. But this process will be made easier by bearing in mind the effect that fiction is intended to have on an airman’s intellectual development. Ghost Fleet has become the exemplar of modern military educational fiction [Image Credit: Amazon.com] I see there being two distinct but related effects that should be explored. The first is educational and aligns with the traditional view of PMET. The best way to explore this effect is through the lens of the PMET themes, the five areas that PMET aims to address at each rank level: communications, military management, air power, leadership, and values and ethics. Although there are some areas that are not conducive to the use of fiction (Defence Financial Management being an excellent example) many are. Well written novels or short stories are excellent tools for improving a person’s communication skills, particularly the quality of their writing; sure we don’t want briefs turned into literature, but this does not mean that Defence writing cannot be improved by some exposure to quality narrative writing. Understanding air power is one area where Air Force has actively embraced fiction. Ghost Fleet: A Novel of the Next World War has become the exemplar of military educational fiction due to its examination of the changing character of modern/near-future warfare and its implications for military force development. One of the co-authors, August Cole, was even invited to present at the 2016 Royal Australian Air Force Air Power Conference, where he used his novel as the basis for examining 5th Generation air power concepts.  Similarly, fiction offers a wide array of options to explore concepts of leadership, values, and ethics. Examples here include Ender’s Game (both novel and movie) to explore the many dimensions of leadership and Catch 22 as an interesting medium to explore military values and ethics. These are but a few examples that spring to mind when considering the current PMET construct. A deeper more considered examination of what is available will undoubtedly uncover a wealth of previously underappreciated fiction that could play a role in reshaping the way Air Force develops the minds of its airmen. This leads me into the second, longer term effect and the one that is more difficult to achieve and quantify; changing the attitude of airmen towards continuous professional development. By getting airmen to engage with interesting material and products that require them to think laterally, PMET may actually encourage a career-long engagement in learning. By this I do not mean creating a generation of bookworms (though that is not necessarily a bad goal to have), but rather by making airmen look deeper into the subtlety of fiction and identify leadership, ethical, military or strategic lessons they develop a skill whereby they may well continue to look for these lessons (consciously or subconsciously) whenever they engage with fiction. This form of continual learning holds benefits for Air Force far beyond the immediate understanding of ever-changing policy and doctrine publications. In closing, I’d like to open this topic up and draw on the wealth of experience and diversity of perspective among the readership. I invite readers to provide comment on some of the questions raised in the post above, namely: Does fiction have a role in professional military education? What are the works of fiction that have contributed to their professional development? What works could/should be included at the various rank levels within Air Force? Would fiction indeed make professional military education a more ‘enjoyable’ endeavour? It is my hope that this post and the discussion it generates will lead Air Force to re-examine its approach to PMET. For PMET to be truly effective it must do more than focus on ensuring airmen read policy and doctrine, it must inspire an engagement with career-long professional development. Increasing the use of fiction in the continuum can go a long way to achieving this. The suggestion here is not that policy and doctrine should be excised from PMET, nor that fiction must play a part in every aspect, both would be unwise, but rather to look beyond the dry texts and embrace the potential that the richer and more entertaining world of fiction offers. If nothing else, fiction holds the potential for airmen engage with their own professional development in a way that policy and doctrine cannot hope to compete. That alone justifies the effort involved in exploring a role for fiction in PMET. Squadron Leader Travis Hallen is an Air Combat Officer in the Royal Australian Air Force. He is also a Sir Richard Williams Foundation Scholar and editor at The Central Blue. The opinions expressed are his alone and do not reflect those of the Royal Australian Air Force, the Australian Defence Force, or the Australian Government. #AirPower #Education #Fiction #PMET

Dr Ross Mahoney responds to Robbin Laird’s post referring to the F-35 as a 1st Gen flying combat system. Using a platform to define air power concepts is not a new phenomenon, and while we need to encourage innovative thinking about air power we must be willing and able to critique the rise of new buzzwords and the ideas underpin them. In a previous post, The F-35 and the Transformation of Power Projection Forces, Robbin Laird suggested that rather than describing the F-35 Lightning II as a 5th Generation aircraft, we must think of it as ‘a first generation information and decision making superiority “flying combat system”.’ (Emphasis in original) Arguably, this is an important shift in how we think about the capabilities of this new platform and the implications this has regarding how we think about air power. However, this labelling of platforms and capabilities raises several interesting observations and what follows are some personal opinions on the issue of ‘labels.’ I have heard similar phrases before namely Giulio Douhet’s ‘battleplane’ concept [Public Domain via Wikimedia Commons] First, and while we should always be careful of generating faulty parallels, as a historian, I am quite certain I have heard similar phrases before namely Giulio Douhet’s ‘battleplane’ concept. In short, in the second edition of his seminal work Command of the Air, published in 1926, Douhet argued that the roles of combat and bombing should be combined with a single type of aircraft, the ‘battleplane.’ This was a move away from his thinking outlined in the 1921 edition of Command of the Air, but as Thomas Hippler has noted, at a conceptual level, the ‘battleplane’ was important because it allowed Douhet to reconcile the ideas of war in the air and war from the air.[1] For Douhet, both were synonymous and one, though whether this proposed platform would have solved that challenge remains debatable. This was clearly a lesson derived from Douhet’s views of the First World War. Nevertheless, the problem with the ‘battleplane’ idea is that it was a solution to one set of circumstances and would not have applied to all situations where the use of air power might have been called upon. Could we end up in the same situation if we think of the F-35 in a similar vein? Second, a broader issue with Laird’s description is that of buzzwords or phrases. Buzzwords tend to be created to support someone’s vision of the future, and they are unhelpful if not grounded in some form of intellectual rigour. Indeed, buzzwords and phrases are certainly not something limited to air forces but pervade the military more broadly. For example, in the last few days, it has been reported that the US Navy’s Chief of Naval Operations has decided to shelve the use of Anti-Access/Area-Denial as a ‘stand-alone acronym’ primarily because it ‘can mean all things to all people or anything to anyone.’[2] This is an important point, and the same can be said of effects-based operations, which was fashionable in the late 1990s and early 2000s.[3] Both of these strategies are ideas that have history, and we should be careful about trying to re-invent the wheel. As I recently heard from one colleague, if you want a new idea, read an old book. As such, is the description being applied to the F-35 helpful when thinking about the application of air power? It is indeed being linked to the idea of 5th generation strategy, but we must continually ask the question within the question and seek to understand what is underpinning such statements. For example, is the platform important or the ideas about their use? Also, should we be careful about linking platforms to strategy? Nevertheless, while I would advocate the need to critique statements, such as Laird’s, there is certainly always a case to build new language and ideas to explain future challenges. This is particularly important for air power because, since the end of the Cold War, it has become, arguably, the West’s preferred way of war.[4] Nevertheless, as Tony Mason reflected, ‘while our technology is lifting us into the 21st century, our formative concepts remain rooted in a bygone age.'[5] This comment remains as relevant today as it did in 1998. While today’s core air power roles can be identified in the activities of the First World War, it is perhaps an axiom that as with any field of human endeavour, the language and ideas about the use of military aviation should and must evolve as time goes by and situations change. ‘While our technology is lifting us into the 21st century, our formative concepts remain rooted in a bygone age.’ [A Number 1 Squadron RAAF F/A-18F Super Hornet in formation with an F2B, the type flown by the Squadron during the First World War. Image credit: David White of www.canvaswings.com] This, however, raises my third point of how we improve and encourage the conceptual thinking that underpins many of the statements made by commentators and practitioners. It is ok to have opinions and advocate them; however, they must be derived from the intellectual study of the field. Indeed, while advocacy can create friction, that friction, in turn, can generate innovation, which is important if organisations are to adapt to changing strategic, operational and organisational shifts. However, it should also be recognised and understood that such friction needs to be managed so that it does not become divisive as it arguably did at the strategic level between the RAF and Royal Navy in the inter-service debates of the 1920s. This is clearly an issue of education, and how that process is utilised and retained by air forces. This is difficult for western air forces primarily because they have been involved in sustained operations for at least the past decade. This has not given air forces significant time to think and reflect on their craft as their focus has been elsewhere. Nevertheless, air forces have, where possible promoted thinking. For example, the modern RAF runs a fellowship to encourage study and expand the Service’s ‘intellectual capacity.’ However, this intellectualising of air power needs to filter back into the development of thinking, policy and doctrine and refresh the lexicon while providing the necessary foundations to attempts to redraw conceptual boundaries. Just to conclude, this is clearly a thought piece and does not propose any solutions to the challenges of today; however, we should be very careful about the labels we apply to platforms, capabilities and concepts. Terminology, as the discussion section of Laird’s piece, illustrated, matters and has a tendency to carry cultural baggage. In developing effective thinking about the application of air power as part of the solution to strategic challenges, air forces need to think about their place in the pantheon of options open to policy makers. I would argue that in an age of austerity and uncertainty, this requires air forces an investment in the organisation’s human element to generate the capacity to think effectively about the conceptual component. This post originally appeared on From Balloons to Drones on 9 October 2016. Dr Ross Mahoney is the resident Aviation Historian at the RAF Museum, UK. A specialist on air power, he is currently writing on social and cultural history of the inter-war RAF. He is also researching the culture, ethos and ethics of the RAAF and command and staff training in the RAF. He is the editor of ‘From Balloons to Drones.’ The views presented here do not represent those of my employer, the Royal Air Force Museum, or the Royal Air Force or the Ministry of Defence. [1] Thomas Hippler, Bombing the People: Giulio Douhet and the Foundation of Air-Power Strategy, 1884-1939 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), p. 147. [2] Sam LaGrone, ‘CNO Richardson: Navy Shelving A2/AD Acronym,’ USNI News, 3 October 2016. Also, see: B.J. Armstrong, ‘The Shadow of Air-Sea Battle and the Sinking of A2AD,’ War on the Rocks, 5 October 2016. [3] For a useful discussion of effects-based warfare that takes account of historical and contemporary views as well as a multi-domain approach, see: Christopher Finn (ed.) Effects Based Warfare (London: The Stationary Office, 2002). [4] For useful views on future air power thinking, see: John Andreas Olsen (ed.), Airpower Reborn: The Strategic Concepts of John Warden and John Boyd (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2015). [5] Air Vice-Marshal Professor Tony Mason, ‘The Future of Air Power,’ RAF Air Power Review, 1(1) (1998), p. 42. #AirPower #Battleplane #Douhet #F35

Dr Robbin Laird summarises interviews he recently conducted with the RAAF’s chief of staff, Air Marshal Leo Davies; the commander of the RAAF’s Air Combat Group, Air Commodore Steven Roberton; and the USAF’s commander of Air Combat Command, General Herbert J. “Hawk” Carlisle. Dr Laird: “Your Super Hornets flew for the first time in combat in the Middle East with F-22s. What was the experience and what did you learn from that?” AIRMSHL Davies: “We have flown in Red Flag with F-22s and that training was crucial to operations in the Middle East. The pilots came back and said “it was just like in Red Flag”. For us, at the moment the F-22 is a surrogate for the F-35, although with regard to combat systems and roles the F-35 will be superior to the F-22. But the point is to get the operational experience.” Air Commodore Steven Roberton, who was also the first commander of Australian Air Task Group 630 in the Middle East in September 2014, highlighted the impact of the F-22 on the RAAF and its operations, and noted that his recent combat experience with the F-22 highlighted the transition to a fifth generation-enabled concept of operations as a core contributor to the way ahead for the RAAF: AIRCDRE Roberton: “In broad terms (the F-22s) have the fifth generation sensor package which can help provide information you wouldn’t otherwise get from something standing off. “We’ve got great capabilities in Wedgetail (AEW&C), but sometimes you really need a penetrating capability that can use the full spectrum and pass on information closer to the target. “Operating our Super Hornets with the F-22s and receiving their data allowed us to operate more effectively. Our training with the F-22s in exercises like Red Flag has been crucial not only to prepare ourselves for combat but also to rethink how we operate our own fighter fleet. “We have adapted a lot of our tactics and procedures to do that same sort of leverage that the F-22 practices with the [F-15] Eagle community but clearly at lower levels between our Super Hornet to Hornet. That becomes pretty important for us to get the most out of our classic Hornets. “In other words, we are adapting our concepts of operations anticipating the entry into service of the F-35 and the readjustment of the role of the Super Hornet. We are preparing ourselves thereby for the transition to the F-35 enabled force. The Super Hornets and Growlers are enhancing our current capabilities, and we can work through how the F-35 will redefine their roles in the evolving force. We know we’ve got a lot to learn. “One problem with how people interpret the F-35 is thinking fifth generation is only about stealth; it is about data fusion and the capability to make the other air combat assets more viable and effective. It is a significant force multiplier.” In other words, the RAAF is working a fifth generation warfare transition under the impact of their own experience and that of operating with the F-22 in the Middle East. Although it was interesting to discuss this transition in Australia, it made a great deal of sense to go to where the F-22s are based to generate the Australian operations. Subsequently, during a visit to Langley AFB, I was able to interview General Herbert J. “Hawk” Carlisle, the Commander of the USAF’s Air Combat Command. General Carlisle discussed the implementation of a fifth generation warfare approach, the impact of the F-22, and the coming of the F-35 upon the re-working of fleet ops seen in the Middle East and elsewhere. Throughout our meeting he emphasised the importance of the training transition throughout the fleet, not simply the operation of the F-22 and the coming of the F-35 as in and of themselves. The issue is one of force transformation, not simply the operation of fifth generation aircraft. GEN Carlisle: “It is important to look at the impact of the F-22 operations on the total force. We do not wish, nor do the allies wish, to send aircraft into a contested area without the presence of the F-22. “It’s not just that the F-22s are so good, it’s that they make every other plane better. They change the dynamic with respect to what the other airplanes are able to do because of what they can do with regard to speed, range, and flexibility. “It’s their stealth quality. It’s their sensor fusion. It’s their deep penetration capability. It’s the situational awareness they provide for the entire fleet which raises the level of the entire combat fleet to make everybody better. “The shift is to a new way of operating. “What is crucial as well is training for the evolving fight, and not just remaining in the mindset or mental furniture of the past. “The F-22s … make the Eagles better, and the A-10s better, and the F-16s better. They make the bombers better. They provide information. They enable the entire fight. And it’s information dominance, it’s sensor fusion capability, it’s a situational awareness that they can provide to the entire package which raises the level of our capabilities in the entire fight. This is not about some distant future; it’s about the current fight.” General Carlisle emphasised the need to shift from a fourth generation mentality where a large combat force is moved to enable any single platform, such as the A-10. It entails a change of mentality to fifth generation thought. GEN Carlisle: “It’s the way we train the airman and the crews. It’s the scenarios we put them through. It’s the Red Flags and the integration phase of weapon school. What we teach right now is fifth generation con-ops. That includes the Raptors and what they bring to the fight, and the F-35s and what they bring to the fight, and what the cyber systems bring to the fight. “How do you bring space into that environment? How does C2 operate inside of an information flow that is inside of anything the adversary can do? How do you put the C2 at the point that it can execute at a rate and with information superiority that is far greater than an adversary can react to? “And then it’s the way we train our airmen to think in fifth generation terms, rather than just flying a new platform.” General Carlisle also emphasised that in the current Middle Eastern operations, F-22s because of their multi-mission flexibilities are pressed into duty across the spectrum of operations and perform a variety of missions for the force, ranging from C-2 to ISR to strike to air defense to other tasks. Dr Laird: “How important to the evolution of fifth generation enabled warfare is the ability to fly low observable aircraft against each other?” GEN Carlisle: “We think it is very important. We are shaping tactics and approaches for LO aircraft to fight LO aircraft, and to think in terms of LO enabled forces to fight against LO enabled combat forces. “The F-35 brings incredible EW and other capabilities into the fight and how do we operate those capabilities in a jamming and non-jamming environment for legacy systems or LO-enabled legacy systems? How do we build a realistic threat to be able to do that? We are working on it.” Dr Laird: “Training to leverage fifth generation capabilities is crucial to the modernization and training of the other elements of the air combat force so that those elements are adjusting their thinking and approaches as well. How do you view this challenge?” GEN Carlisle: “With the need to use our training funds to prepare for the threats we are facing and will face, we need our airmen and crews to think forward not backwards towards yesterday’s concepts of operations. Training for the concepts, which enabled the legacy aircraft is simply not what we need to do going forward. “And with our young and innovative airmen, they are going out there and reinventing approaches to warfare. “Fourth generation systems can operate much better and more effectively when enabled by fifth generation SA and information, but that will not happen by itself, and requires rethinking how fourth generation systems will operate going forward. We have young airmen who are flying F-15Es or F-16CJs and they’re going, hey, the Raptor can give me a particular capability. “The Lightning can provide an additional capability, which means I can do something which I could not do before. It’s designed for this but I can make it do something different, and make it even better. “And that thought process really is a fifth generation dynamic of change, but it does not happen if you do not put fifth generation in the driver’s seat driving that process of change. It is not about improving the techniques of what we used to do; it is about rethinking fundamentally how we shape and execute information dominance in a fluid battlespace.” Dr Laird: “How important are key allies like Australia in shaping an innovative approach going forward?” GEN Carlisle: “The F-35 is a global aircraft and will provide significant opportunities for cross-cutting learning. The RAAF is at the cutting edge of rethinking warfare, under the influence of fifth generation capabilities. “I think the RAAF because their size comes with a relative lack of bureaucracy and a more open approach are actually leaning further forward in some areas than we are. “But I think the joint aspect of the F-35 will be a powerful engine of change for the air services in the US as the Marines, the USAF and the USN work through lessons learned going forward from using their F-35s and reshaping on joint concepts of operations. In this sense the F-35 really is a central part of our broader effort to transformation jointness.” Dr Robbin F. Laird is a military and security analyst who has taught at Columbia, Princeton and Johns Hopkins universities, and has worked for the Center for Defense Analyses and the Institute for Defense Analyses.

The shift from analogue to digital technology that started in the late-1950s and gained serious momentum in the 1970s has now reached lift-off speed. Innovations based on this radical development include advanced computing, the internet, robotics, and artificial intelligence. Such is the magnitude of the change that these and similar technologies are driving that many commentators believe we have entered a “Third Industrial Revolution”. Like its predecessors, the Third Industrial Revolution is expected to create dramatic social and economic change, in this instance by hollowing-out workforces by up to 80 per cent as people increasingly are replaced by robotics. Because air power is an intensely technological business, its practitioners are well-placed to prosper in this new environment. Air forces have always substituted machines for manpower. This approach will become even more pronounced as the current industrial revolution continues to enhance the already formidable capabilities of UAVs and other unmanned weapons (for example, loitering ISR and strike systems). The emphasis air forces have placed on technology has created a distinctive employment model. Whereas the nature of land and sea warfare has made it necessary for armies and navies to take large numbers of people into the field or out to sea, only a very small proportion of an air force takes to the skies. The RAAF, for example, has a “warrior” clique of only 700 pilots, less than 100 of whom fly strike/fighters. In other words, compared to armies and navies, air forces will be relatively unaffected by the inexorable replacement in warfare of people by machines. The Third Industrial Revolution has also increased the likelihood that land and sea power will be replaced to an even greater extent by air power. This ongoing process evokes the controversial “substitution” debate in British defence circles in the 1920s and 1930s. When the (British) Royal Air Force was formed as the world’s first independent air force in 1918 it faced bitter opposition from the British army and navy; consequently, the RAF was constantly looking for new ways to justify its existence. The most contentious of these was the proposal made by the RAF’s first chief of staff, Sir Hugh Trenchard, that air power could be substituted for land and sea power. Trenchard won support from the influential politician Winston Churchill, and in 1922 the RAF was “substituted” for the British Army in the task of policing the British mandate of Iraq. Using a strategy known as “Air Control”, the RAF kept watch over vast expanses of territory. If a tribe was detected behaving against British interests, a note would be air-dropped advising them to desist, otherwise aircraft would return at a specified time and destroy crops, herds, water supplies, and so on. The method was remarkably successful. Furthermore, it was economical: by replacing 33 Army battalions with five RAF squadrons, the British Government reduced the annual cost of its garrison in Iraq from £20 million to £2 million. Air Control was subsequently applied successfully in other remote areas of the British Empire. The notion of “substitution” extended into the equally-heated debate of whether aircraft could sink warships. In trials off the US coast in 1921, flimsy bombers commanded by the outspoken American air power advocate William “Billy” Mitchell had sunk the captured German battleship Ostfriesland. But despite that and similar impressive tests, many navy officers refused to accept that aircraft constituted a threat to capital ships. The skeptics were given the most brutal rebuke on 10 December 1941, when land-based Japanese bombers sank the British warships HMS Prince of Wales and Repulse off the coast of Malaya. Six months later near Midway Island, American carrier-based aircraft sank four Japanese aircraft carriers, effectively ending Japanese expansionism. This was one of history’s defining battles: the fleets never came within sight of each other, and all the fighting was done by aircraft. From then on, warships operating without air cover had to be considered at risk, a reality of warfare that remains applicable today. The trend towards substitution has gained momentum as Western political leaders have finally realised that their armies cannot win so-called “counter-insurgency” wars. Fifty years of persistent failure (Algeria, Vietnam, Iraq, Somalia, Afghanistan, etc) and unacceptable levels of casualties have popularised the notion of substituting air power for land and sea forces. Thus, US president Barack Obama’s strategy for combating the Islamic State in Iraq, Syria and Libya is based on advanced (Western) air power and local ground forces (the latter receiving expert assistance from small numbers of Western Special Forces). It’s also noteworthy that Saudi Arabia is employing air strikes as the primary means of attacking Houthi rebels in Yemen. The substitution of technology for human labour has been a dominant feature of previous Industrial Revolutions. As the consequences of the Third Industrial Revolution become more widely experienced and better understood, air power’s standing as the weapon of first choice for developed states is likely to strengthen. Cody Stephens is a law graduate who works in technology and innovation research #Robotics #ThirdIndustrialRevolution #Strategy #AirPower #Substitution #UAV

Anti-access/area denial is not as new as you might think. Commonly known as A2/AD, “anti-access/area denial”  has become a hot topic in recent years. Many have detailed the threats that A2/AD weapons systems pose to the US military, especially its aircraft carriers. But those threats aren’t new; A2/AD campaigns have been waged since the Greco-Persian War. They aren’t even new threats to American aircraft carriers, which faced a similar threat from the Soviet Navy during the Cold War. The Soviet Navy had two main objectives during the Cold War. One was to protect the Soviet Union’s ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) to guarantee their survival as credible nuclear strike platforms. The other was to protect the Soviet homeland from strikes from NATO aircraft carriers and submarines. A glance at a map reveals the challenge faced by the Soviet Navy in achieving these objectives. While the Soviet Union spanned the Eurasian landmass, its access to the Atlantic and the Pacific oceans was limited. Both the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea – each home to a Soviet fleet – had single entrances, creating chokepoints easily monitored by NATO forces. In the north, Soviet Northern Fleet vessels had to sortie through the Barents Sea and Norwegian Sea – areas of intense NATO naval activity – and then pass through the Greenland –Iceland -United Kingdom gap before they could reach the Atlantic Ocean. The Soviet Pacific Fleet had easier access to the ocean from its bases in Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky, but vessels based in Vladivostok had to transit Japanese waters to quickly reach the Pacific Ocean. This was both a blessing and a curse for the Soviets. NATO naval vessels had to travel long distances to the Soviet Union’s littoral region to threaten the Soviet homeland or its SSBN bastions. Those positions were well within range of Soviet Naval Aviation aircraft. On the other hand, the same distances also made it difficult for the Soviet Navy to project power with its surface vessels. Soviet naval doctrine in the early part of the Cold War called for the Soviet Navy to challenge NATO vessels for control of the open ocean. However, various developments forced the Soviet Navy to fall back to an A2/AD strategy. To protect the homeland and to secure its SSBN capability in the event of conflict, the Soviet Navy planned to deny NATO access to its littoral region and SSBN sanctuaries by creating a defensive perimeter up to 3,000 kilometres away from its shores. Defending the perimeter would have involved attacking NATO bases on the Soviet periphery, interdicting NATO submarines attempting to access Soviet SSBN sanctuaries, and attacking NATO surface vessels and carrier battle groups (CBGs) before they could access the Soviet littoral. NATO naval and air bases encircled the Soviet Union, giving NATO naval forces jumping off points to the Soviet littoral. Striking those bases with cruise missiles launched from long range strike aircraft or submarines, as well as attacks by Special Forces, ietwas seen as a good first step in limiting NATO naval access. The NATO submarine threat required a different set of countermeasures. The Soviet Navy deployed maritime patrol aircraft and anti-submarine warfare (ASW) task forces, comprised of ASW surface vessels and aircraft carrying vessels with strong ASW capabilities, to patrol the SSBN bastions while Soviet attack submarines defended their approaches. The bastions were also lined with underwater sensors and heavily mined to further limit NATO submarines access. Tracking CBGs at sea during the Cold War was difficult. To do that, the Soviet Navy created an extensive ocean surveillance system comprised of radar ocean reconnaissance satellites, electronic intelligence ocean reconnaissance satellites, surveillance surface vessels, and maritime patrol aircraft. These platforms were used to create a “kill chain” that fed targeting data to Soviet strike aircraft and submarines, which could then attack NATO vessels with long range anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs) and torpedoes. If that all sounds familiar, it’s because China is currently attempting to do something very similar with its military modernisation programme. It appears to be creating a bastion for its growing fleet of SSBNs by building artificial islands, developing advanced sea mines, deploying underwater sensors, and investing heavily in improved ASW capabilities. It is also developing a variety of long range anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs) and ASCMs to threaten US forces in the Pacific and limit US access to its littoral region. The concept’s the same, though new technologies have changed aspects of the execution. Developments in missile technology and maritime reconnaissance systems have made China’s ASBMs and ASCMs more accurate than their Soviet counterparts. And cyberspace and space-based assets, which were in their infancy during the Cold War, now play an increasingly critical role in modern day conflict. Whether China’s A2/AD strategy will work is something we’ll only find out in the event of conflict. We still don’t know how effective the Soviets’ A2/AD strategy would have been because it was never tested in wartime. That’s not to say it wasn’t tested at all, as various American submarine commanders will tell you over a drink. Let’s hope that close encounters discussed at a Navy bar remain the only way these strategies are tested. Christopher Cowan is a research intern at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute. This post first appeared on ASPI’s blog, The Strategist. #A2AD #China #NATO #SovietNavy #CBG #SSBN

Dr Robbin Laird Rethinking Strategy: Warning Time, Events and Crisis Management Defense Info, 7 June 2021 Paul Dibb, the well-known Australian strategist, has recently published a piece with his co-author on warning time. The focus of his report was on how to defend Australia in an environment with reduced warning time. Although obviously about Australia, the discussion in the report raises a broader set of questions of how to know when an event can set in motion a chain of events which provide a direct threat to a liberal democratic nation and the challenge of responding effectively. It also raises the question of shaping capabilities which can be inserted into a crisis early enough to provide confidence in an ability to have effective escalation management tools available as well. Put another way, the focus of Dibb’s report is upon ways for Australia to enhance the government’s and public’s ability to better understand the events which affect them from the standpoint of providing warning time to deal with those events to prepare for and manage crises. To further discuss his thinking about warning time and crisis management, I followed up with an interview with him. A key example of the interpretation of events and the warning time challenge is the current posture of China towards Australia. It is important to understand what China can and cannot do from a standpoint of pressuring Australia, including the question of the use of military force in terms of what Paul Bracken has labelled exemplary attacks. It is widely understood, that both China and Russia have expanded their ability to operate in the so called gray zone and to conduct hybrid war. But what Is not recognized by using these terms, is that these are attacks to achieve a desired effect in terms of escalation management. According to Bracken: A particular area of focus should be exemplary attacks. “Examples include select attack of U.S. ships, Chinese or Russian bases, and command and control. “These are above crisis management as it is usually conceived in the West. “But they are well below total war. Each side had better think through the dynamics of scenarios in this space. “Deep strike for exemplary attacks, precise targeting, option packages for limited war, and command and control in a degraded environment need to be thought through beforehand. “The Russians have done this, with their escalate to deescalate strategy.” Bracken argued for moving beyond binary thinking, namely, peace or war, and focusing on the use of exemplary attacks to achieve desired political effects or escalation dominance. Dibb and I discussed a particularly noteworthy development in the current Chinese ramp up of pressure on Australia, namely, directly threatening the use of force against Australia. This is how Dibb put it: “The Chinese have been clearly communicating for some time that it is now time to teach Australia a lesson. “They used similar language against Vietnam in 1979 prior to their invasion. “And there are many ways they could generate force to pressure Australia, without directly striking the country, such as take us on in our 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone, threatening our offshore energy platforms. And by so doing put the challenge directly to Australia.” In the long term, the Australian government is committed to building long range strike, and has committed to spending serious money in this area. But that is in the mid-term, what does Australia do now? Dibb underscored that he thought Canberra should have a sense of urgency about being in such a situation and that this was part of the larger argument he is making about warning time and preparing options to have escalation control. It is clearly important not to overstate Chinese military or diplomatic capabilities, for that only distorts the ability to shape effective policy responses. But it is clear that simply coming up with terms like the gray zone grossly distorts the broader challenge, identified by Bracken which are the impact of exemplary attacks on crisis management and deterrence. It is clear that Dibb’s focus on shaping effective means to manage time in a crisis is convergent with Bracken’s thinking as well. For the warning time report, see the following: Warning Time, Events and Crisis Management | Defense.info For my article which highlights the warning time report, see the following: Warning Time, Events and Crisis Management - Second Line of Defense (sldinfo.com)

Despite its futuristic feel, the first space war has already been fought, and by some decades. In 1991, in fact – the Gulf War[1]. While not fought in the physical domain of space, the conflict itself relied heavily upon space-based assets. Such reliance utilised satellites for precision navigation, space situational awareness, global communications, ISR and early warning ballistic missile defence. Even with that characterisation of being the first space war, only eight percent of munitions were guided and none by GPS[2]. Fast forward to the second Gulf War only a little over 10 years later and 70 percent of munitions were guided, mostly by GPS[3]. Further, up to 60 percent of bandwidth in the 2003 Iraq war was provided through commercial (non-military) satellites[4]. Space has become critical for terrestrial military capability. Therefore it comes as no surprise that space is a domain in its own right, and an important one indeed. In 2017 the US Air Force Secretary, Heather Wilson explicitly stated that ‘we must expect that war, of any kind, will extend into space in any future conflict, and we have to change the way we think and prepare for that eventuality’. Subsequently, in 2019, NATO recognized the critical nature of space-based military operations and formally declared space as an operational area[5]. Australia is equally clear in its recognition of the criticality of the space domain, solidifying its intent in the 2020 Defence Strategic Update (DSU). Within this key document, the government specified that ‘assured access to space is critical to ADF warfighting effectiveness, situational awareness and the delivery of real-time communications and information’, and that it will ‘significantly increase investment in Defence’s space capabilities. This includes plans for a network of satellites to provide an independent and sovereign communications network and an enhanced space control program.’ The Defence Force Structure Plan supports the strategic update stating that: Our space services and space control programs, along with the Geospatial Information and Intelligence program, contribute to Defence operations by providing assured access to space capabilities, enabling situational awareness and delivering real-time communications and position, navigation and timing information. Further: Continued investment and development of space capabilities will be required to further improve Defence’s resilience and enhance a large number of space-dependant capabilities across the Joint Force. Investment of around $7 billion in space capabilities over the next decade, which includes investment in sovereign-controlled satellites, will provide assured access to these services when needed. This investment will be critical if Australia is truly serious about protecting vulnerabilities associated with satellite systems – of which there are many; Anti-Satellite Weapons (ASAT), Co-Orbital ASAT, directed energy weapons, cyber weapons, electromagnetic pulse (EMP) or proximity operations are a few. Also critical to protecting our interests in the space domain is the application of space law. Australia is a party to all five existing space treaties (‘space law treaty series’). Perhaps the key treaty – the Outer Space Treaty (‘Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Other Space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies’), came into effect in 1967 and forms the basis of all international space law. This treaty specifies a number of key rules relating to military activities as follows: No Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) in full orbit or stationing WMD in space or installation of WMD on the Moon or other celestial bodies No military installations, bases or fortifications on the Moon or other celestial bodies No military manoeuvres on the Moon or other celestial bodies No weapons testing on the Moon or other celestial bodies. The OST also forbids claiming sovereignty over space, the Moon or other celestial bodies. Interestingly however, mining is allowed or, at least is not prohibited, and several States, including the United States, have started enacting national laws permitting the mining of the Moon, asteroids and other celestial bodies. Such efforts are designed to produce raw materials, including, in particular, water to enable humanity to reach further into the solar system. Indeed, there are multiple projects planned by Governments and private companies in the near future to settle semi-permanently on the Moon and Mars and this inevitably requires planning for mining activity to sustain such endeavours. It is clear that security issues will emerge as humanity starts undertaking mining activity, as well as ongoing exploration and semi-permanent settlement in space. Despite the aforementioned military prohibitions, there is still a lot of scope for military action, and it is indeed increasing. With the increase of military space objects and systems being deployed there is also a corresponding reaction by other States in testing and probing such systems[6]. Recent unclassified reporting points to jamming, close proximity operations, ASAT testing and the use of remotely piloted space shuttles remaining in orbit for over a year. The 2020 DSU notes that the legal frameworks and boundaries underpinning planned activities in space are not as clear as they could be. Moreover, it also notes the likelihood of countries taking advantage of the legal and policy uncertainties to advance their own interests at the expense of others is a real possibility. Within this uncertain operational and legal realm there is a real risk of strategic miscalculation. While the United Nations Charter applies to space and the law relating to the use of force (and its prohibitions) also apply, it is very unclear where the thresholds for crossing lines relating to the Use of Force and Armed Attack apply in space. In the absence of territorial boundaries and even temporary land/use legal rights there is a potential for overreach. Coupled to this is the criticality of space-based systems for existing terrestrial operations in land, sea, air and cyberspace and there is a genuine set of strategic risks that must be navigated carefully. It is also abundantly clear that under existing legal rules concerning the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) that many Global Navigation Satellite Services such as GPS and GLONASS may well be lawful targets in any armed conflict to the extent that they are used in support of a State’s military actions (indeed this is what they were originally created for!). If this were to occur, then the digitalised world in which we all live in at present would generally cease to exist. The world would be plunged back in a 1970’s type analogue world and there would almost certainly be severe impact upon the world’s financial system as well as cognate impacts on transport, communications, agriculture, medicine and a wide range of other services. So ubiquitous has global space infrastructure become to modern living that its loss would have a convulsive impact upon modern living. Remarkably, LOAC provides very few prohibitions on targeting such infrastructure that has military application and where the loss of life to civilians and expected damage to civilian property is not expected, or is not excessive to the military advantage anticipated. To date, the legal positions of States regarding the thresholds and limits of the law in space operations via-a-vis the Space law treaty series are not generally publicly stated, indeed they are probably still evolving. While no doubt there is internal Governmental legal analysis occurring, there is precious little public articulation. To date, only the U.S. in its Law of War Manual[7] has presented any public views and these are general in their scope and short in their application. There is no corresponding statement of legal and policy position from Russia, China, India, the UK or indeed even Australia. Such a void has allowed many academic views to proliferate that are sometimes inimical to Australian security positions and these should be challenged and countered with a principled legal response. At the present time, the current legal and policy realities are these: Space is militarized and is being weaponized Military activity is permitted outside of those specific prohibitions contained in Article IV of the OST (no WMD etc) Mining and human settlement will occur in space in the near future The legal limits and thresholds under the Law relating to the Use of Force in space are not publicly stated or agreed and there is a genuine risk of strategic miscalculation It is unclear how the Law of Armed Conflict would be applied to space to ameliorate the consequences of such armed conflict on civilian society, though under existing rules it is almost certain that the digitally integrated world that we have come to know over the past 30 years will cease to exist. The 2020 DCU is correct in its focus to encourage better understanding of the legal thresholds applicable to military activity in space. Government supported, though University led efforts like the Woomera Manual Project[8], which seek to identify the law currently applicable to military operations in space are helpful and useful in providing a common understanding of what law does apply. However, despite the optimistic efforts of such projects to reliably inform decision making, it is critical for Governments themselves to articulate their own views of what laws apply to condition military activities in outer space. Additionally, there is much to be said for the role of military diplomacy in establishing dialogues and understandings between military counterparts. This currently occurs in the land, sea and air military command environments but has yet to be initiated in the military space environment. It is time that military space commanders of the key space powers and their allies started constructive dialogue to better locate and articulate the accepted legal and policy boundaries of military activity in space. While it may be nostalgic for some to re-live the 1970’s, a return to bell bottomed flares, disco and analogue communications is ‘life Jim’ …’but not as we know it’ (apologies to Spock and Star Trekkin’ music video creators). This post was developed as the output from a recent Adelaide Drink & Think event. Adelaide Drink & Think is an informal, community-based network that holds monthly events in Adelaide to encourage national security discussion & debate. For details on upcoming events check out twitter @DrinkThinkADL or email adldrinkandthink@gmail.com to get on the mail list. Dr Dale Stephens is a Professor of Law at the University of Adelaide. He was previously a permanent Navy Legal Officer and served multiple positions during his time in the ADF, including Director of Operations and International law. He is currently an Editor of the Woomera Manual on the International Law of Military Space Operations. Squadron Leader Jenna Higgins is a Royal Australian Air Force aviator who specialises in ISREW. She has a Masters in Strategy and Security and a Masters in Aerospace Systems. She is an editor of the Central Blue Blog. Follow her on Twitter @Jenna_Ellen_ The views expressed are the author’s alone and do not reflect the opinion of the Royal Australian Air Force or the Department of Defence. Image credit: SpaceX [1] Yasushito Fukushima, ‘Debates over the Military Value of Outer Space in the Past, Present and the Future: Drawing on Space Power Theory in the U.S.’ (2013) 14(1) NIDS Journal of Defense and Security, 42; Larry Greenemeier, ‘GPS and the World’s First Space War’ Scientific American, Feb 8, 2016 found at: https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/gps-and-the-world-s-first-space-war/ [2] See GAO report at 5.2.2 found at: https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GAOREPORTS-NSIAD-97-134/html/GAOREPORTS-NSIAD-97-134.htm [3] http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2950403.stm; see also Peter L Hayes, Space and Security: A Reference Handbook (ABC-CLIO, 2011), 51 [4] https://www.militaryaerospace.com/home/article/16709259/satellite-communication-key-to-victory-in-iraq [5] https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_175419.htm [6] For an outline of current space and counter space capabilities see https://swfound.org/counterspace/ [7] US DoD LoW Manual (Dec. 16) at : https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/DoD%20Law%20of%20War%20Manual%20-%20June%202015%20Updated%20Dec%202016.pdf?ver=2016-12-13-172036-190 [8] The Woomera Manual on the International Law of Military Space Operations, see https://law.adelaide.edu.au/woomera/

This is the third in a series of posts by Air Vice-Marshal Brian Weston (Retd.) describing the RAAF’s transition through five generations of fighter aircraft. In this post, Weston outlines how the RAAF plans to transition from the F/A-18A to the F-35A without the loss of combat capability. Australia’s first Lockheed Martin, F-35A Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter on its inaugural flight on 29 September 2014. [Image Credit: Lockheed Martin] Following the earlier RAAF fighter transitions from Avon-Sabre to Mirage IIIO, then to F/A-18A, the RAAF, as evidenced by the deployment of its first two F-35A fighters across the Pacific for the 2017 Avalon Airshow, has already commenced its transition from a fourth generation to a fifth-generation capability. Like the two previous fighter transitions, each with their unique characteristics, the introduction of the F-35A will pose some new problems especially given the large step-up in capability. Like previous transitions, this change will also require the RAAF to maintain a credible level of combat capability throughout the change, and possibly require it to sustain concurrent operational deployments. But aside from this, most of the issues arising from the transition can be categorized as related to either the management of the increased resources and personnel needed for the transition, or to the introduction of significantly increased levels of technology and capability. Previous transitions certainly have stressed both resources and personnel during the phase out of the preceding fighter, the phase in of the new fighter, and during the period of overlapping operations and sustainment of the two types. However, unlike earlier fighter transitions, the RAAF now can exploit the availability of overseas F-35A training rather than conduct all of the transitional activities in Australia. No 3 Squadron will be the first RAAF unit to convert to the F-35A with some personnel already in the USA for training. This progressively expanding group will further consolidate their F-35A training by remaining in the USA for some time, with some pilots gaining further experience as instructional pilots (IPs in USAF jargon) in the USAF F-35A training unit. Soon after, personnel earmarked for future Australian-based F-35A fighter instructional duties will join 3 Squadron personnel in the USA. As this cohort of Australian F-35A instructional staff builds overseas, 2 Operational Conversion Unit (2OCU), the RAAF’s dedicated fighter training unit, will cease F/A-18A operational training. Once 3 Squadron has built to a critical mass it will return to Australia where it will further mature into Australia’s first operational F-35A unit. Shortly after, the cadre of instructional staff, that had also been building in the USA, will return to Australia to reconstitute 2OCU as the dedicated Australian F-35A training unit. From this US-trained cadre, 2OCU will build its F-35A training capacity and expertise, at a measured rate, until the unit takes on the responsibility for converting pilots from the remaining two F/A-18A squadrons onto the F-35A, as well as commencing the training of pilots direct from the RAAF Lead-in Fighter Program. With the phase out of the F/A-18A, and with 6 Squadron becoming an EA-18G Growler unit, there also will be consequences for the training of Australian F/A-18F and EA-18G aircrew. The option of including a training organization for F/A-18F and EA-18G aircrew, within both 1 and 6 Squadrons, would come at the cost of eroding the operational capabilities of both squadrons. Hence the decision to train future Australian F/A-18F and EA-18G aircrew in the US, with ‘C’ Flight of 1 Squadron being tasked only with the conduct of RAAF F/A-18F refresher and standardization activities. Apart from managing the personnel and resource aspects of the transition, the RAAF must also manage the technological advances which are core to the operational effectiveness of the F-35A. Stealth, sensors, sensor fusion and connectivity, all involve technological leaps which will be periodically advanced through software and hardware upgrades. These evolving technologies will generate substantial changes in roles, operational doctrine, tactics, and procedures which will impinge on not just other air force capabilities, but also on army and navy capabilities. The evolutionary expansion of the unparalleled connectivity of the F-35A to other ADF capabilities will presage an expansion of F-35A roles well beyond the roles traditionally espoused for combat systems with a ‘Fighter’ (F) designation. So the Air Force seems well-placed in its transition to a new air combat capability, which is not surprising given Australia’s long and deep involvement with the JSF program as a Level 2 Partner Nation, as was evident by the presence of the two Australian F-35A aircraft, and their RAAF pilots, at Avalon. The transition from F/A-18A Hornet to the F-35A Lightning II is well underway, with the RAAF on the verge of a new operational era, with its combat force of three F-35A squadrons, an F-35A operational conversion unit, one squadron of F/A-18F Super Hornets and one squadron of EA-18G Growlers. It would seem to be a good time to be a junior air force Australian Defence Force Academy cadet, with the prospect of earning wings on the spirited Pilatus PC-21, followed by lead-in fighter training on the capable Hawk, and then converting directly to the F-35A. This article was first published in the August 2017 issue of Australian Aviation Air Vice-Marshal Brian Weston (Ret’d) was Commander of the Tactical Fighter Group from July 1990 to July 1993.  He is currently a board member of the Sir Richard Williams Foundation. #Training #RAAF #AirPower #technology #AirForce #F35

The last few months have seen a flurry of announcements relating to Australia’s space industry. In July 2017, the Government commenced a review of the Australian space industry, and on 29 September they announced the intention to create an Australian space agency. On the same day, the RAAF and the University of New South Wales announced that a contract had been signed to launch three CubeSats into low earth orbit commencing in 2018. These announcements signal the end of the Australia’s official neglect of space operations. As Australia’s small space community of interest prepare to celebrate the 50th anniversary of the WRESAT launch that marked Australia’s first foray into space, it is worth drawing attention to another little-known aspect of Australian space history. In this post, Michael Spencer tells the story of Australis OSCAR-5,  Australia’s first satellite, built by a group of University of Melbourne engineering students. Australia may have lacked a space industry, but it did not lack the innovative and inspired individuals who had a vision of an Australian role in space. On 29 November 2017, Australia’s space community will commemorate the 50th anniversary of the first Australian-built satellite launched from an Australia launch site. In 1967, the Defence Science Technology Group, previously the Weapons Research Establishment (WRE), partnered with University of Adelaide to develop and launch the WRESAT satellite into orbit. WRESAT was launched from the Woomera rocket range atop a spare rocket provided by the US SPARTA research program. While the WRESAT launch is an important milestone in Australia’s entry into outer space, WRESAT was not the first satellite built by Australians; that honour goes to Australis OSCAR-5. Model of Australis OSCAR-5 [Image Credit: Museums Victoria] Not long after the USSR successfully launched Sputnik I, a group of American amateur radio operators (“Hams”) developed an amateur-built “Orbiting Satellite Carrying Amateur Radio (OSCAR)” to promote public participation in the new field of space-based communications and technology research. Drawing on support from members and volunteers, donated resources, and the assistance of international governments and commercial agencies, Project OSCAR successfully launched OSCAR-1 in 1961. After the US-based Project OSCAR agreed to sponsor environmental testing, space launch, and launch operations a group of University of Melbourne students, mostly undergraduate members of the local “Astronautical Society and Radio Club,” were inspired to build a satellite. These electrical and mechanical engineering students had no qualifications or experience in space mission design. They were motivated to make an Australian contribution to amateur radio and enter the brave new world of orbital space missions, but they recognised that their limitations in space systems expertise and experience would drive a relatively simple satellite design. In 1966, on a shoestring budget, this innovative team of amateur radio enthusiasts built Australis OSCAR-5 — the first non-US built amateur radio communications satellite. OSCAR-5 had four monopole antennas, adapted from commercial-off-the-shelf Stanley measuring spring-steel tapes, extending from its sides for transmitting signals from two beacon transponders. The spring-steel antennas were strapped down during launch and deployed on orbit. It carried horizon sensors for determining the satellite spin-rate and used a magnetic attitude stabilisation control system to adjust the satellite’s spin. A seven-channel telemetry system automatically reported the onboard battery conditions, spacecraft temperatures, and horizon sensor responses, communicated to Ham radio ground stations by using modulations in the beacon signals to represent encoded data. Passive magnetic attitude stabilisation, to control the attitude and orientation of the satellite, was performed by carrying two bar magnets that would move and align with the Earth’s magnetic field, as the satellite progressed in its orbit. Satellite orientation in relation to the Earth is important to be able to orient the antenna with a favourable antenna footprint for the Ham radio operators on the terrestrial surface. The battery-powered OSCAR-5 transmitted telemetry signals on two purposely designed frequency bands and power settings, at 144.050 MHz at 50 mW and 29.450 MHz at 250 mW, which were in popular use among Ham radio operators, at the time. Since solar cell technology was not readily available, the satellite relied on single-use battery power to operate on these frequencies for 23 and 46 days, respectively. The students built the radio system and assembled it into a 9.0 kg satellite payload that was a 43cm × 30cm × 15cm rectangular prism with reflective stripping applied for thermal protection. For comparison with similar modern-day university-level project designs, a standard 1.0 kg CubeSat satellite, such as was built for OSCAR-73 (FUNcube-1) that was launched in 2013, measures 10cm × 10cm × 10cm, less than 1/12th the measured size of OSCAR-5, and can be designed to perform the same mission for much longer, following the introduction of solar panel systems for satellites to generate electrical power. To get these amateur satellites into orbit, the US Air Force and NASA sponsored launch opportunities for university research payloads when spare capacity became available on their space launch vehicles assigned for launching the full-size satellites.  Although OSCAR-5 was built in 1966, a launch opportunity did not become available until 23 January 1970. On that date, the student-built satellite was launched atop a Delta-N6 space launch vehicle from Vandenberg Air Force Base Space Launch Complex as a piggyback payload with the Television & Infra-Red Observation Satellite (TIROS-M), a full-sized Earth observation satellite. After launch, OSCAR-5 was released into a circular low-Earth orbit at about 1450 km altitude and 102-degree orbit inclination angle. The orbit orientation was nearly flying a north-south orbit over the north and south poles, enabling access by amateur radio operators in locations across the globe, as it completed one orbit every 115 minutes. Australis OSCAR-5 in is launch carrying structure. [Image credit: AMSAT] In addition to being the first amateur satellite built outside of the US, OSCAR-5 was also the first to be designed for remote control operations by amateur radio operators. It was designed with an onboard command system to activate the satellite beacon transponder only on weekends, operating between Friday morning to Monday morning, to conserve the battery life and maximise its availability for amateur radio operators, who would normally be operating from their homes on the weekends. The University of Melbourne collected Ham radio contact reports, gained over HF and VHF frequencies, from over 200 operators across 27 countries. During the timeframe that OSCAR-5 was developed and awaiting a US launch opportunity, the Radio Amateur Satellite Corporation (now known as AMSAT) was formed in 1969 as a not-for-profit educational organisation to foster Amateur Radio’s participation in space research and communication. Using volunteer support from its international membership, donated resources, and the assistance of government and commercial agencies. AMSAT has successfully continued to use Project OSCAR to promote public interest in satellite communications and make space accessible to the students and the general public through Ham communities. Project OSCAR has launched over 90 Amateur Radio satellite missions, since 1961. Today, over 20 Ham radio satellites are currently in operation in orbit. The latest Ham radio satellite, RadFxSat (Fox-1B), designated as OSCAR-91, is a CubeSat joint mission of AMSAT and the Institute for Space and Defense Electronics at Vanderbilt University that was launched from Vandenberg Air Force on 18 November 2017. Initiatives like Project OSCAR and CubeSats provide the technical opportunities to that enable creative and innovative minds to experiment and test new designs for exploiting space and inspire the next generations to build on the achievements of previous generations to advance careers and the continuing uses of space. Increased public awareness and involvement in space research and missions, and the miniaturisation and increasing affordability of space technology has improved access to space for researchers and academic students, providing a stepping stone to space-related careers and full-scale space missions. Access to CubeSat technology also increases the options available to military users for experimentation, agile designs, and rapid and affordable access to space for shorter duration space missions when compared to the cost of a full-scale satellite mission.  In September 2017, the Royal Australian Air Force announced that it had joined with UNSW Canberra to invest in the development of CubeSats for three space missions, with the first mission planned for launch in 2018. These satellites will be configured with re-programmable software defined radios, enabling the onboard mission systems to be reconfigured for different missions while deployed on orbit, improving the satellite’s functional capabilities to be adaptable for multiple or changed missions. Artist’s impression of a RAAF CubeSat in low earth orbit. [Image Credit: University of New South Wales] Author’s Note: Although OSCAR-5 has long ago ceased functioning, the global US Space Surveillance Network continues to track it as a residential space object, stable in its low-Earth orbit. OSCAR-5 is identified as Space Catalog number 4321 on a list with an estimated total of about 40,000 tracked orbiting space objects, that listed in chronological order of their launch date. Even though it has expired, OSCAR-5 persists in its low-Earth orbit at about 1450 km altitude as an Australian owned, non-operational, resident space object – awaiting the future intervention of natural environmental forces or an on-orbit event for to it to de-orbit and return to Earth, or not. Squadron Leader Michael Spencer is currently serving at the RAAF Air Power Development Centre in Canberra, analysing potential risks and opportunities posed by technology change drivers and disruptions to future air power. His Air Force career has provided operational experiences in long-range maritime patrol, aircrew training, and weaponeering, and management experiences in international relations, project management, air and space concept development, air capability development, and joint force capability integration. He is also an Associate Fellow and Section Committee member of the American Institute of Aeronautics & Astronautics. The opinions expressed are his alone and do not reflect those of the Royal Australian Air Force, the Australian Defence Force, or the Australian Government. #RAAF #technology #Space #AirForce #Innovation

In this post, Chris McInnes provides some thoughts on what he thinks a fifth-generation force looks like. He is not sure he is right and he is pretty sure some of you think he is wrong. He, and we, would love to hear your thoughts on this topic. The Lockheed Martin marketeers that came up with the ‘fifth generation’ slogan for the F-22 Raptor must be very pleased. The three Services of the Australian Defence Force, led by the Royal Australian Air Force but joined more recently by the Royal Australian Navy and Australian Army, have embraced the goal of becoming a fifth-generation force. It has become the catchphrase of choice to differentiate where the Services are going from where the Services have been. There is enormous value in having such a unifying theme and the habitual use of fifth generation in formal presentations and informal discussion would suggest it has firmly taken root. Despite its widespread use, the characteristics of a fifth-generation force remain ambiguous. Someone invariably asks ‘what exactly is a fifth-generation force and how will we know when we get there? Come to think of it, what were generations one to four?’ These are valid questions, but I tend to think it has been quite useful to not have too much specificity so far. The absence of specifics has prompted each Service tribe, their myriad sub-tribes, and their partners to think what fifth generation means to them in their circumstances. But we are perhaps getting to the point where we need to put some flesh on the skeleton of what it means to be a fifth-generation force. This post is my attempt to do that, or at least prompt a discussion that will help people put meat on the bones of their own version of fifth generation. In my view, a fifth-generation force is an organisational response to the Information Age and the characteristics of fifth-generation systems. ‘Fifth generation’ began as a technology descriptor and assessments of that technology’s impact on warfare has been used derive a notion of fifth-generation warfare. The missing leg of the triad so far has been the organisational change necessary to operate fifth-generation technology most effectively to fight fifth-generation warfare. This appears to be, as Peter Layton points out, a “very complicated way of war” so organisational considerations are important. So as not to stray too far from the origins of the fifth generation nomenclature, I have sought to characterise a fifth-generation force by adapting the characteristics that define fifth-generation systems. The characteristics of fifth-generation fighter aircraft are generally perceived to be stealth, manoeuvrability, advanced avionics, networked data fusion, and multi-role capabilities. Stealth becomes signature aware. Stealth is the combination of low observable technologies and signature optimisation tactics. Similarly, in organisational terms, a signature aware organisation matches an awareness of its physical, electromagnetic, virtual, resource, and social signatures with practices and behaviours that optimise that signature for given scenarios. This is an extension of current practices such as public affairs, operational security, and lean business practices. However, viewing the management of an organisation’s footprint through the operational lens of signature management is an important response to the proliferation of sensors, scrutiny, and threat vectors.  A signature-aware organisation broadens the awareness and pursuit of signature-related objectives beyond specialist staff, such that all personnel can shape their actions and footprint in support of the desired outcome. Manoeuvrability becomes adaptivity. Fifth-generation aircraft manoeuvrability is linked to sustained high speeds, such as the F-22’s super-cruise, and a capacity to rapidly change directions. I view adaptivity as a concept that incorporates organisational flexibility (range of change), agility (rate of change), and a readiness, if not eagerness, for the organisation to change. Most importantly, in adaptive organisations formal leaders do not direct change: they set the conditions that foster change from within the organisation. I think we are relatively well postured for this requirement on an individual level but I’d suggest there a few areas that need focus to shift from being an organisation with adaptive people to a genuinely adaptive organisation. A culture of delegated decision-making, distributed collaboration, and a looser coupling to formal decision systems, such as risk and acquisition processes, are necessary to foster a more adaptive collective. Formal decision systems are important instruments, but they should inform and support while not constraining decision-making flexibility. The character of future warfare drives this requirement — events are simply going to move far too fast for the formal leader- and process-centric decision-making that mark our current organisational constructs. In an adaptive organisation, the worst thing you can do is not make a decision. Advanced avionics becomes a human-machine team of teams. Fifth-generation platforms use hardware and software to optimise the wetware of their crews. A fifth-generation force needs to be founded on human-on-the-loop human-machine team of teams to optimise decisions. This is a step beyond our current human-in-the-loop approach that supports and accelerates, but rarely optimises, decisions. Rather than simply using computers to automate processes — the ‘traffic lights’ in so many command and control systems are essentially a digitised check list — a fifth-generation force will exploit the processing power of computers to ‘roll the dice’ on possible options and present recommendations to a human decision-maker to apply human judgement. The human-machine combination will be critical to the force’s ability to deal with the uncertainty and chaos of a war that is potentially being fought on a pulse-to-pulse basis. And just as Facebook tells you which of your friends are interested in a particular event or page, the human-machine team would capitalise on machine processing to identify and alert teams that are working in a similar area or on a similar problem, fostering a team of teams approach. Any conflict posing human-machine teams against humans with machines will be a very one-sided fight. Networked data-fusion becomes cognition-centric. Fifth-generation aircraft have been designed with the collection, transmission, and processing of information as their defining feature to enhance the cognitive capacity of their crews. Initially, I called this characteristic ‘information-centric’ but I realised that this placed the value in the wrong place. ‘Information-centric’ portends an organisation that considers information as having value in itself. A cognition-centric organisation, by contrast, views information only as a means to an end. Information is simultaneously terrain to be controlled and exploited, a weapon to be targeted and employed, and a supply to be husbanded and secured. The value of the information in all of these perspectives is the impact it can have on the cognition and decisions of actors in the environment. Thus, a cognition-centric organisation values education (how to think) as much or more than training (what to think) so that the potential cognitive value of information can be realised. A cognition-centric organisation recognises the futility of efforts to control information flows or ‘the message’ in an information-rich world and understands that the value of freer information flow in your own organisation, principally through better thinking and superior decisions, outweighs the associated costs. Starting from a basis of control-by-exception also allows the organisation to focus on securing only those things that absolutely must be protected. Multi-role capabilities become outcomes-based. Fifth-generation aircraft can shift from one role to another in single missions, and are less constrained by traditional ‘type’ roles such as fighters or bombers. A fifth-generation air force shifts from effects-based or platform/system/domain/stovepipe-centric views of the organisation, air power, or operations to an outcomes-based view. The shift from effects-based to outcomes-based thinking is similar to the move in Western planning doctrine from centre-of-gravity-oriented planning to objectives-oriented planning. Effects, like centres of gravity, are simply instruments to be used to achieve larger purposes but both of these grew larger and more intricate than the purpose for which they were conceived, namely achieving outcomes. As our organisations avail themselves of a wider array of effects, coming from or through multiple domains, we need to recognise that outcomes may provide the only relatively constant organising logic across time, space, and organisation. Individual effects, their utility and how they are generated will be transient and success may require the orchestration of a myriad effects in potentially non-repeatable combination. A consistent organising logic based on outcomes will be a useful means of providing unity of effort and focus while fostering initiative among people who understand what the boss wants, and have a cunning plan on how to give her exactly that. A fifth-generation force is not simply one that operates fifth-generation equipment or fights fifth-generation wars. It must also be a fifth-generation organisation.  These are my five characteristics of a fifth-generation organisation. I’m not sure they are right and I’m quite certain some of you think they are wrong. I’d love to hear why. Wing Commander Chris ‘Guiness’ McInnes is an officer in the Royal Australian Air Force. The opinions expressed are his alone and do not reflect those of the Royal Australian Air Force, the Australian Defence Force, or the Australian Government. #RAAF #organisationalculture #AirPower #AirForce #F35

The integration of manned and unmanned systems may be the next step in the evolution of air operations. In this post, Donald Woldhuis and Michael Spencer describe the US Army’s approach to integrating tactical unmanned systems with the AH-64 Apache, referred to as Manned-Unmanned Teaming (MUM-T). Is this a capability that smaller forces should be looking to when considering the replacement of their battlefield helicopter fleets? New battlefield helicopter capabilities are being developed by the US Army that will integrate manned and unmanned systems as part of an emerging Manned-UnManned Teaming (MUM-T) capability for its AH-64 helicopters. MUM-T is a standardised systems architecture and communications protocol that enables live video and still images gained from the sensor payloads of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) to be shared across a force to improve battlefield situational awareness. MUM-T will provide the teamed helicopter crews with network connectivity to UAV missions being conducted in the same battlespace, both on a deliberately planned or opportunity basis. The improved ability for helicopter aircrew to receive and share live intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) data will improve their adaptability and responsiveness to changes in the battlespace, thereby enhancing their decision superiority. US Army battlefield helicopters previously teamed with OH-58 Kiowa manned reconnaissance helicopters to conduct attack missions against targets on the ground, such as enemy infantry and armoured fighting vehicles. Apache aircrew typically fly nap-of-the-Earth to evade enemy defences which made targeting difficult for their onboard target surveillance and acquisition systems. The Kiowa was ideal as an agile tactical air vehicle to provide ISR information for targeting. After a 30-year history of teaming, dating back to the Vietnam War, the US Army embarked on a modernisation program and began decommissioning the Kiowa helicopters in 2014, with the last being decommissioned in September 2017. As US Army AH-64 Apache battlefield helicopter units assumed the reconnaissance role from the Kiowas, the US Army began looking for innovative new ways that could provide ISR support to the Apaches in an era when the modern battlefield is being covered by many high-altitude and persistent ISR sensors from many different air missions operating concurrently in the same or nearby mission areas where the Apaches are likely to be flown. US Army looked to MUM-T as a means to connect Apaches with existing UAV systems that are in operational service and being used combat ISR missions, and gain access to real-time UAV ISR data. The traditional systems architecture used for battlefield command, control, and communications to provide options for sharing ISR data between different types of systems using MUM-T. Beyond the simple sharing of data originally conceived for MUM-T, the new MUM-T architecture also makes it possible to transfer the direct control of the UAV sensor, or the total UAV system (including the sensor), to the Apache aircrew. Australian Army operators have described combat experiences from overseas battlefields has taught the importance of organic ISR. From the Battle of Mosul, reported as the largest conventional land battle since the 2003 capture of Baghdad, it was deduced that “the most effective weapon on the current battlefield is a joint and interagency enabled combined arms ground team with an Armed ISR platform flying above… An Army without organic airborne Armed ISR will be at a severe disadvantage on a contemporary urban battlefield.” The observed success in employing UAVs to improve situational awareness has increased demands for more responsive support from ISR systems operating closer to the enemy and the rapid transfer of the latest detailed ISR data over longer communications ranges. One solution is to leverage the direct support missions and independent missions already operating concurrently in adjoining or overlapping areas. MUM-T enables a networked force to share ISR data over a broader area thereby supporting decision superiority of forces in the tactical fight. More informed tactical decisions can be made closer to and over the battlefield by reducing the dependency on rear-echelons to centrally process, exploit and disseminate mission results and situational awareness updates. With MUM-T, task force commanders can choose from a range of integration options for combining assets and perform a single mission or multiple missions concurrently. A team of manned helicopters and unmanned air vehicles, each configured for different mission roles but working as a coordinated team can be tasked to cooperatively achieve a mission objective. Alternatively, MUM-T enables commanders to separately deploy manned and unmanned air vehicles on discrete missions with the capability to share data between them, and also temporarily divert control of an ISR sensor or UAV between operators in the different missions.  Additionally, a networked combat UAV, configured with strike weapons, may also be teamed with a manned helicopter. This teaming provides additional fire support options that extend its fire support mission after its weapons are spent, additional options for weapons effects if the UAV is loaded with different configured warheads, and extend the engagement range in the mission beyond the engagement range of the helicopter. NATO has prepared NATO STANAG 4586 – Standard Interfaces of UAV Control System (UCS) for NATO UAV Interoperability to describe five different Levels of Interoperability (LOI) to cover the five levels of MUM-T complexity and which UAV control functionalities are shared with another user in the mission team, as follows: LOI-1 Pushing ISR Imagery from Network – the receipt and retransmission of secondary imagery (ie imagery that has been processed and uploaded by the source into the battlefield network, for access by a network user) by the manned aircraft; LOI-2 Pulling ISR Imagery Directly from Source – the receipt of primary video imagery that is being directly streamed from a UAV, or relayed from different platforms, into the manned aircraft using Tactical Common Data Link (TCDL); LOI-3 Forward Remote Operations of the UAV Payload – using the TCDL to transfer operational control to enable the manned aircraft to remotely control the operation of the UAV payload sensor (eg remotely pointing and recording the sensor); and LOI-4 Forward Remote Operation of the UAV, excluding take-off and landing – using the TCDL to transfer operational control and enable the manned aircraft to remotely control the operation of the deployed UAV, excluding control of the take-off and landing (eg remotely controlling the UAV flight trajectory and payload operation, including the sensors and weapons). LOI-5 Remote Operation of the UAV, including launch and recovery – using the TCDL to transfer operational control and enable the manned aircraft to remotely control the operation of the UAV, including control of the take-off and landing. NATO STANAG 4586 is useful for operators and systems designers to engage in the development of new and modified systems using a common understanding of MUM-T concepts. However, manned helicopter systems already put its operators in a situation that is demanding, complex, and with a high workload. While MUM-T offers advantages to improving the situational awareness of the helicopter aircrew, it should not be at the expense of the original role for which the helicopter was designed. A major consideration in MUM-T-enabled systems is managing the increase in the operator workload associated with accepting control of the ISR sensor and UAV System designers must give due regard to the impact of MUM-T on aircrew workloads.  The operating concepts for MUM-T must be cognisant of the human factors and capacity to balance the management of the operator’s mission system while concurrently controlling another mission system. Current concepts for employing MUM-T typically focus on the UAV supporting the manned aircraft. However, in the future, a role reversal might occur, and a manned aircraft is configured to provide direct support autonomously to unmanned robotic UAVs. As an example, a large multi-crew and multi-sensor ISR aircraft might be configured to provide force-level ISR over a battlespace in direct support of multiple independent UAV missions. Each deployed UAV might autonomously network with the ISR aircraft receiving data updates, or even temporarily take control of an onboard sensor to gain specific information on the battlefield situation before continuing on its mission. Through operational use and testing by combat helicopter units, MUM-T systems are demonstrating their value and capability. These systems will provide mission commanders with the ability to reliably and quickly inform networked battlefield situational awareness and increase the economy of force in the use of limited combat resources. MUM-T provides operators with the option to exploit manned and Australian Army Tiger Armed Reconnaissance Helicopters. [Image Credit: Department of Defence] unmanned air capabilities deployed on otherwise discrete missions in the same operating area. Having an optional capability to network and produce a new mission synergy provides increased flexibility, adaptability and responsiveness to a dynamically changing battlespace, enabling better decision superiority on the battlefield. The 2016 Defence White Paper states that the Army Tiger armed reconnaissance helicopters will be replaced and that new dedicated light helicopters will be acquired for Special Forces. MUM-T may be an option to provide cost-effective ways to enhance and improve mission-level situational awareness by integrating future helicopter systems with current and planned ISR sensors and UAVs. MUM-T enables the network integration of manned and unmanned platforms operating in the networked joint battlespace. The better that two aircraft can communicate, the better they can share situational awareness data, resulting in more effective and better informed aircrew who can confidently make better and timely decisions on the battlefield. Lieutenant Colonel Donald Woldhuis recently completed a year as a Fellow at the RAAF Air Power Development Centre in Canberra. The focus of his research was the importance and influences of electronic warfare to fifth-generation air forces. He has operational experience as an AH-64D Apache helicopter pilot in the Royal Netherlands Air Force, including multiple operational deployments to Iraq, Afghanistan, and Africa. Besides flying, his previous postings included liaison, tactics development, Head of Operations, Squadron Command, and policy writing at the Netherlands Defence Headquarters. He is also a graduate of the Australian Command and Staff Course. Squadron Leader Michael Spencer is currently serving at the RAAF Air Power Development Centre in Canberra, analysing potential risks and opportunities posed by technology change drivers and disruptions to future air power. His Air Force career has provided operational experiences in long-range maritime patrol, aircrew training, and weaponeering, and management experiences in international relations, project management, air and space concept development, air capability development, and joint force capability integration. He is also an Associate Fellow and Section Committee member of the American Institute of Aeronautics & Astronautics. The opinions expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect those of the Royal Australian Air Force, the Royal Netherlands Air Force, the Australian Defence Force, the Netherlands Ministry of Defence, the Australian Government, or the Government of the Netherlands. #Army #UAS #drones #USArmy #technology #Helicopter #Innovation #UAV