On 21 March the Williams Foundation was proud to welcome Dr Robbin Laird as a Williams Foundation Fellow. The Board thanks Dr Laird for his continued contribution to the core goal of the Williams Foundation; to promote the development and effective implementation of national security and defense policies as they impact on Australia’s ability to generate air power appropriate to its unique geopolitical environment and values. The Board and members of the Foundation greatly value the support Dr Laird has provided in the past and looks forward to continuing your involvement in future Williams Foundation programs. For bios of our Research Fellows, AVM John Blackburn AO (Retd), Dr Alan Stephens and Dr Robbin Laird visit our webpage . Also see link Second Line of Defence

Brian Weston 'On Target ' Function over Geography: The End of Area Commands: Combat Power through Organisation – Part 2 ' in Australian Aviation November 2017 p.2 The October On Target column in Australian Aviation discussed the importance of organisation as a discriminating factor between the combat power of air forces and outlined the evolution of RAAF organisational policy up until the end of World War II. The column noted the introduction of the operational air group structure by the RAAF, in the South-West Pacific theatre, as a seminal step in the evolution of Australian air power. Following the conclusion of World War II, it was therefore not surprising the RAAF included the notion of an operational air group in its post-war plan; comprising a force of 16 squadrons organised into five “home defence” area commands and a “mobile air task force” comprising fighter, bomber and transport wings, a reconnaissance squadron, an operational wing headquarters and organic maintenance support. But with government prioritising a massive post-war demobilization which saw the RAAF downsize from 191,337 personnel in August 1945, to 7,897 personnel at the end of 1948, the RAAF had neither the resources nor personnel to implement its plans. The RAAF mobile air task force remained unfunded and the organisational concept of five area commands became the basis of post-war air force organisation. In 1952, the RAAF signalled a small departure from its RAF heritage by designating its “stations” as “bases”, stations being an RAF term. But subsequently, and perhaps with a touch of irony, it was an RAF officer who went on to implement fundamental change in RAAF post-war organisation. Air Marshal Sir Donald Hardman, an RAF officer of high regard, was appointed Chief of Air Staff of the RAAF following the 12 year tenure of Sir George Jones, and it was Hardman who set about organising the RAAF on a functional basis, rather than on a geographic basis; the change taking place on 1 October 1953. The changes, which coincided with the abolition of Air Force Headquarters and the establishment of the Department of Air ‒ a Department of State of the Commonwealth ‒ saw the five area commands folded into a Home Command under one commander. Two further functional commands were established: Training Command and Maintenance Command which were soon merged into a single command: Support Command. Later, Home Command was retitled Operational Command. But the organisational concept of the World War II operational air group had been lost as, at base level, the principle of functional command had not been adopted. On Operational Command bases the mobile wings and squadrons of the RAAF reported to the officers commanding of their respective bases. The RAAF attempted to remove any notion of a geographic restriction on commanders by titling the base officer commanding as a “Formation Officer Commanding”, such as “OC RAAF Williamtown” rather than as a “Base Officer Commanding”, such as “OC RAAF Base Williamtown”. But with fighter squadrons at Butterworth and Williamtown, and maritime squadrons at Townsville and Richmond, all reporting through their respective “formation officers commanding”, it was clear there was no single commander oversighting either the RAAF fighter force or the RAAF maritime force. A further command discontinuity occurred when a flying squadron deployed and the command chain varied from the officer commanding of the squadron’s home base to the officer commanding the squadron’s deployment base ‒ “chopped”, in the jargon of the day. For example, if No 1 Squadron deployed from Amberley to Darwin, CO 1SQN would report to AOC Operational Command through OC RAAF Darwin, not OC RAAF Amberley. This could result in CO 1SQN reporting through a commander who may not have flown a jet aircraft, let alone an F-111C. In an attempt to simplify command chains and save resources, the RAAF also disestablished its operational wings with commanding officers of flying squadrons reporting directly to a “formation OC”. But the group captain, who was previously an “OC Wing”, remained on the RAAF bases and morphed into the Air Staff Officer (ASO). But, now as a staff officer, although the ASO reported to the “formation OC”, the ASO had no command authority over the units the “Formation OC” commanded (staff officers are not commanders). The RAAF now had a “staff versus command” issue as ASOs, officers generally of group captain rank, were effectively interposed between the “formation OC” and the various “squadron COs”. ASOs and squadron COs worked through this “staff versus command” issue in various ways but it was often messy; especially as “formation OCs” often delegated differing degrees of authority to their respective ASOs. Clarity of command, and command accountability issues, at RAAF bases were not uncommon. The introduction of functional chains of command by Sir Donald Hardman was a seminal change in RAAF organisation although, the principle of functional command did not flow down to RAAF bases and their operational units thereon, until the concept of the “Force Element Group” was introduced. Next month, On Target will discuss the evolution of RAAF Bases into RAAF Force Element groups, introduced on a trial basis, on 1 February 1987. Air-Vice Marshal Brian Weston (Retd) was CO No 75 Squadron in 1980, CO Base Squadron Richmond in 1986, OC Base Support Wing Richmond in 1987, and CDR Tactical Fighter Group from July 1990 to July 1993. Brian is a Board Member of the Williams Foundation and this On Target article appears in Australian Aviation magazine. Download pdf

Brian Weston 'On Target ' Structuring Air Power: Combat Power through Organisation – Part 1 ' in Australian Aviation' October 2017 p.2 Recent On Target columns in Australian Aviation have focused on the aeroplane and its evolution from airborne platforms to airborne weapons systems, an evolution which has seen lessening incremental gains in platform performance but huge leaps in weapons system capabilities. Unsurprisingly, these advances in the combat capability of airborne platforms have become the focus of much interest, and often debate. But there is much more to air combat power than just airborne platforms and systems, with even the seemingly mundane subject of organisation becoming a discriminating combat factor between air forces. As one of the world’s oldest air forces, the RAAF has some interesting history in how it has organised its elements of air power. Initially, as a very small air force developing within the sphere of influence of the British Empire, the RAAF simply took what was RAF organisational policy and adopted it as RAAF policy. It was a practical option, especially in its first 20 years when the fledgling air force was under-resourced and struggling for institutional survival. It also allowed Sir Richard Williams, the founding father of the RAAF, to allocate the scarce resources he could secure from government, to the building of several stations – as the RAF called its bases – upon which Australia’s small air force could consolidate and develop. What a shrewd move that was, for when World War II came the RAAF was able to use its combination of “area commands” and “stations” as the foundation upon which it could execute its prodigious expansion; not so much as a combat air force but as a training air force, a role determined by government which fed Australian airmen into RAF combat organisations in Britain and North Africa. When the Japanese entered World War II, with ferocity and success, the RAAF had to evolve its organisational model into something more appropriate for combat operations in the vast theatre of the South-West Pacific. But the speed of events in the Pacific war quickly overtook the capacity of the RAAF to respond and, given Australia’s dire military situation, the Curtin government soon handed over the command of all Australian combat operations in the South-West Pacific to General Douglas MacArthur, with RAAF combat units falling under the operational command of General George Kenney, US Army Air Forces (USAAF). RAAF combat units were grouped into a command called RAAF Command, commanded by Air Vice-Marshal William Bostock who reported to General Kenney, Commander, 5th Air Force USAAF. But Kenney had underlying concerns about the organisation of units within RAAF Command, especially their leadership, mobility, coordination, flexibility and effectiveness. Largely in response to Kenney’s concerns, the RAAF established No 9 Operational Group on 15 June 1943. The group, then located on Goodenough Island, was re-organized on a functional basis comprising two operational wings, one works wing, and one radio location (radar) wing. Air Commodore Joe Hewitt was appointed commander of No 9 Operational Group with a charter to better coordinate and concentrate the assets of the group to meet the demands of the theatre. It was noteworthy the change substantially reflected USAAF practice. A second operational group, No 10 Operational Group, under the command of Air Commodore Scherger, was soon formed. In November 1943, No 10 Operational Group evolved into the RAAF First Tactical Air Force; an operational entity still smaller than a USAAF “numbered air force”, but nevertheless a large, powerful and mobile fighting air force. These seemingly minor World War II organisational changes were significant changes in RAAF organisational policy for three reasons. First, the South-West Pacific theatre provided the main opportunities for senior RAAF officers to command large operational entities as, in the European and North African theatres where RAAF personnel were dispersed among RAF operational entities, few senior RAAF officers were granted command at levels higher than that of a squadron commanding officer – a tactical level command. Second, the South‒West Pacific theatre exposed senior RAAF officers to the functional operational command model employed by the USAAF. Third, the performance of RAAF commanders in the South-West Pacific generally demonstrated the RAAF had, within its ranks, officers with the ability to command large aggregate groupings of operational units. Given General MacArthur generally chose not to use Australian operational units in his advance to the Philippines, the RAAF did not have too many more opportunities to gain further experience at the operational level of war. Hence, the decision to structure RAAF tactical units into operational groups in the South-West Pacific, was a significant milestone in RAAF organisational policy in that it added to the depth of experience the RAAF was gaining as it matured into a more credible and more powerful air force. The question was; how would the air force translate this operational experience into the post-World War II air force? Air-Vice Marshal Brian Weston (Retd) was CO No 75 Squadron in 1980, CO Base Squadron Richmond in 1986, OC Base Support Wing Richmond in 1987, and CDR Tactical Fighter Group from July 1990 to July 1993. Brian is a Board Member of the Williams Foundation and this On Target article appears in Australian Aviation magazine. Download pdf

Dr Robbin Laird, Second Line of Defense The Future of Electronic Warfare 23 August 2017 Final Report Dr Robbin Laird, Second Line of Defense The Future of Electonic Warfare Final Report: A New Approach and Attitude to Electronic Warfare in Australia, 15 September 2017 In this report, the major presentations at the Williams Foundation seminar on the evolution of electronic warfare, notably from the standpoint of shaping an integrated force, are outlined and discussed. The seminar was held on August 23, 2017 in Canberra, Australia. Additional materials provided during interviews prior to or during the seminar are included as well as relevant background and analytical materials building out key themes introduced and discussed in the seminar. Download Pdf 08/26/2017 Robbin Laird The Williams Foundation Seminar on Electronic Warfare

Brian Weston ' On Target ' Fourth to Fifth Generation: Enter the F-35A Lightning II ' in Australian Aviation' August 2017 p.25 Following the earlier RAAF fighter transitions from CAC Sabre to Dassault Mirage IIIO, then to the McDonnell Douglas F/A-18A, the RAAF, as evidenced by the deployment of its first two F-35A fighters across the Pacific for the 2017 Avalon Airshow, has already commenced its transition from a fourth generation to a fifth generation fighter capability. Like the two previous fighter transitions, each with their unique characteristics and challenges, the introduction of the F-35A will pose some new problems especially given the large step-up in capability. Like previous transitions, this change will also require the RAAF to maintain a credible level of combat capability throughout the change, and possibly require it to sustain concurrent operational deployments. But aside from this, most of the issues arising from the transition can be categorized as related to either the management of the increased resources and personnel needed for the transition, or to the introduction of significantly increased levels of technology and capability. Previous transitions certainly have stressed both resources and personnel during the phase out of the preceding fighter, the phase in of the new fighter, and during the period of overlapping operations and sustainment of the two types. However, unlike earlier fighter transitions, the RAAF now can exploit the availability of overseas F-35A training, rather than conduct all of the transitional activities in Australia. No 3 Squadron (3SQN) will be the first RAAF unit to convert to the F-35A with some personnel already in the US for training. This progressively expanding group will further consolidate their F-35A training by remaining in the US for some time, with some pilots gaining further experience as instructional pilots (IPs in USAF jargon) in the USAF F-35A training unit. Soon after, personnel earmarked for future Australian-based F-35A fighter instructional duties will join 3SQN personnel in the US. As this cohort of Australian F-35A instructional staff builds in the US, No 2 Operational Conversion Unit (2OCU), the RAAF’s dedicated fighter training unit, will cease F/A-18A operational training. Once 3SQN has built to a critical mass it will return to Australia where it will mature into Australia’s first operational F-35A unit. Shortly after, the cadre of instructional staff that had also been building in the US, will return to Australia to reconstitute 2OCU as the dedicated Australian F-35A training unit. From this US-trained cadre, 2OCU will build its F-35A training capacity and expertise, at a measured rate, until the unit takes on the responsibility for converting pilots from the remaining two F/A-18A squadrons onto the F-35A; as well as commencing the training of pilots direct from the RAAF Lead-in Fighter Program. With the phase out of the F/A-18A, and with No 6 Squadron (6SQN) becoming an EA-18G unit, there also will be consequences for the training of RAAF EA-18G aircrew and RAAF F/A-18F aircrew at No 1 Squadron (1SQN). As the option of establishing a training organization for F/A-18F and EA-18G aircrew would come at the cost of eroding the operational capabilities of the squadrons, a decision to train future Australian F/A-18F and EA-18G aircrew in the US has been made ‒ with ‘C’ Flight of 1SQN being tasked only with the conduct of RAAF F/A-18F refresher and standardization activities. Apart from managing the personnel and resource aspects of the transition, the RAAF must also manage the technological advances which are core to the operational effectiveness of the F-35A. Stealth, sensors, sensor fusion and connectivity, all involve technological leaps which will be periodically advanced through software and hardware upgrades. These evolving technologies will generate substantial changes in roles, operational doctrine, tactics, and procedures which will impinge on not just other air force capabilities, but also on army and navy capabilities. The evolutionary expansion of the unparalleled connectivity of the F-35A to other ADF capabilities will presage an expansion of F-35A roles well beyond the roles traditionally espoused for combat systems with an ‘F’ designation. So the air force seems well-placed in its transition to a new air combat capability, which is not surprising given Australia’s long and deep involvement with the JSF program as a Level 2 Partner Nation, as was evident by the presence of the two Australian F-35A aircraft, and their RAAF pilots, at Avalon. The transition from F/A-18A Hornet to the F-35A Lightning II is well underway, with the RAAF on the verge of a new operational era, with its combat force of three F-35A squadrons, an F-35A operational conversion unit, one squadron of F/A-18F Super Hornets and one squadron of EA-18G Growlers. It would seem to be a good time to be a junior air force Australian Defence Force Academy cadet, with the prospect of earning wings on the spirited Pilatus PC-21, followed by lead-in fighter training on the capable Hawk, and then converting directly to the F-35A. Air-Vice Marshal Brian Weston (Retd) flew Sabre, Mirage and Hornet fighters during his air force career. Brian is a Board Member of the Williams Foundation and this On Target article appears in Australian Aviation magazine. Download pdf

Dr Alan Stephens ' Meteor versus MiG: Challenging the Myth ' in Australian Aviation' July 2017 A story board in the Korean War display at the Australian War Memorial asserts that, “after the first encounter between [RAAF] Meteors and [Chinese] MiGs … it was clear that the MiGs outclassed the Meteors in nearly every way”, a judgment that has become received wisdom. It is, however, inconsistent with the facts. For the first five months of the Korean War, the RAAF’s No 77 Squadron, flying P-51 Mustangs, made a vital contribution in the ground attack role. However, in November 1950, the appearance of Chinese Air Force MiG-15s indicated that the air war had entered a new and more dangerous phase. The MiG-15 was an advanced technology fighter, its swept-wing aerodynamics and 2470-kilogram thrust engine giving it an excellent rate-of-climb, service ceiling and maximum speed. The RAAF decided to replace its Mustangs with jets as soon as possible. Because the United States’ best fighter, the swept-wing F-86 Sabre, was unavailable, the twin-engine, straight-wing British Gloster Meteor Mk VIII was chosen. In the circumstances the Meteor was the best the RAAF could do. The question was whether that “best” would be good enough. The Meteor had been designed to intercept high-flying bombers under the guidance of ground radar. Air combat in Korea, however, involved the classic “dog-fight”, in which speed, manoeuvrability and acceleration were the critical qualities. Doubts about the Meteor’s ability to compete against faster swept-wing aircraft were eased when it performed reasonably well against a USAF F-86 during trials in Japan. In particular, the Meteor demonstrated a better rate-of-climb and a tighter turning radius at altitudes below 7600 metres. After six months training in Japan, in July 1951, No 77 Squadron deployed twenty-two Meteors to Kimpo airfield northwest of Seoul. The Americans had only two squadrons of Sabres in Korea, so the arrival of a third squadron of jet fighters was keenly anticipated. The RAAF was confident the Meteor would be effective as an air-to-air fighter: the challenge would be to employ tactics which maximised its advantages and minimised the MiG-15s. On 29 July, sixteen Meteors conducted the RAAF’s first jet fighter mission, a sweep up to the Yalu River (nicknamed “MiG Alley”). Given the findings of the trials in Japan, it was curious that the Australians patrolled between 9150 and 10,700 metres, flying top-cover for USAF F-86s at 6100 to 7600 metres. The reverse would have made more sense. The first combat occurred on 29 August, when eight Meteors and sixteen F-86s clashed with twelve MiGs at 10,700 metres. One Meteor was shot-down and another sustained major damage. A week later the second clash took place, with one Meteor being badly damaged while the enemy escaped unscathed. The inference was immediately drawn that the results “proved” the Meteor’s inferiority, and No. 77 Squadron was restricted to operations away from MiG Alley. A number of RAAF pilots considered the decision hasty believing that with a little more experience, tactics would have been developed to maximise the Meteor’s positive qualities, and that unrestricted air combat operations could have been successful. Then-pilot officer, later air vice-marshal, Bill Simmonds (who subsequently shot-down a MiG-15) believed the Meteor was much underrated, and that the Australians’ problems were related primarily to inadequate training and poor tactics. Simmonds’ opinion was shared by the RAF, who privately criticised the RAAF for making its decision after only two “short sharp ... inconclusive engagements”. A senior RAF pilot attached to No 77 Squadron argued that no Meteor pilot should ever be shot-down by a MiG-15 below 9150 metres unless he made a mistake, because the Meteor was more manoeuvrable. And the commander of the USAF in Korea considered the British aircraft’s “good rate-of-turn ... excellent climb and excellent armament” had not been used to full effect by the Australians. No 77 Squadron was taken off fighter sweeps and was tasked with protecting bombers and ground attack aircraft. The squadron generally flew at an altitude of 7000 to 7620 metres. If attacked, pilots immediately descended to their optimum fighting altitude of 5500 metres and jettisoned external stores. At that height and in a clean configuration, the inferior thrust of the Meteor’s engines was less pronounced and its superior turning qualities were enhanced. Nevertheless, there was a limit to the Meteor’s competitiveness, which was determined by the speed differential. The MiG-15 was capable of Mach 0.9 in level flight, compared to the Meteor’s Mach 0.82. That differential almost invariably allowed enemy pilots to decide when a dogfight would start and when it would end, a critical tactical advantage. RAAF and USAF pilots were almost invariably outnumbered. On 24 October, eight B-29 bombers attacking a railway bridge south of MiG Alley were escorted by sixteen Meteors and ten USAF F-84 Thunderjets. The formation was “relentlessly” assailed by sixty MiG-15s. Three days later, sixteen Meteors and thirty-two F-84s flying cover for eight B-29s were “overwhelmed” by ninety-five MiGs. Notwithstanding the intensity of those attacks, one of No 77 Squadron’s senior pilots reported that the protective screen established by the Meteors was never penetrated. On 1 December, fifty MiGs made a “vicious” attack on fourteen Meteors, shooting-down three. But in turn, No 77 Squadron shot-down two MiGs, a highly creditable performance given the numerical disparity. However, the following day, the squadron was told that it would no longer fly air combat sorties over North Korea; and, for the rest of the war, the Meteors were used in the ground-attack role. Yet in total, only four Meteors were ever shot-down by MiG-15s; by contrast, the Australians scored five confirmed MiG kills. There is no question that most air combat pilots would prefer the MiG-15 to the Meteor. But the belief that the MiG-15 “outclassed the Meteor in nearly every way” is inconsistent with the facts. Dr Alan Stephens is a Research fellow of the Williams Foundation and a visiting fellow at UNSW Canberra. On Target is published as a regular column in the Australian Defence Business Review. Download pdf

Brian Weston ' On Target ' The F-111C: A Technological Leap for the RAAF ' in Australian Aviation' June 2017 Soon after WWII a new “Cold War” descended and Australia’s regional geostrategic environment rapidly deteriorated, especially after 1949 when Mao Zedong’s Chinese Communist Party established its rule over mainland China. The deterioration continued with the Korean War (1950 to 1953), the defeat of the French by the Viet Minh in Indo-China in 1954, and the rise of the communist insurgency in Malaya from 1948. Closer to Australia, the newly independent Indonesia lurched in an increasingly uncertain direction under President Sukarno who had assumed largely autocratic power and whose relationship with the Indonesian Communist Party was causing great concern in Australia. At a time when Australia’s population was less than 8 million (1949), and just nudging 10 million (1959), it was not surprising Australia sought to augment its combat power with a long-range strike capability, with the English Electric Canberra coming into RAAF service in 1953. It was also not surprising that, for some time, Australia seriously considered acquiring a nuclear strike option. The nuclear option did not eventuate but with the Canberra bomber lacking a radar and electronic warfare capability – possessing only a Doppler navigation set – the lack of a credible strike capability continued to weigh on government and air force. Thus with hindsight, it is easy to understand the train of argument leading to Prime Minister Menzies, on 24 October 1963, announcing the acquisition of two squadrons of the General Dynamics TFX as a replacement for the Canberra – aided no doubt by the imminent Federal election and some criticism of Australia’s lack of defence preparedness. Aviation occasionally experiences technological leaps, and the TFX, later the F-111, was one such leap. Its combination of a variable-geometry wing, an afterburning turbofan, a high fuel fraction and a comprehensive suite of radar, navigation and electronic warfare equipment, produced a new long-range, low-level, all-weather strike capability able to penetrate air defences of the day. Although conceived by US Secretary of Defence, Robert McNamara, as a strike/fighter to serve the US Air Force and US Navy, the F-111 was also a unique solution to Australia’s need for strategic reach. It was also to be the greatest step-change in capability the RAAF has ever undergone. A contract for 24 F-111A aircraft was soon signed with Australia planning to take delivery of its first aircraft in July 1968. But as the program evolved, a myriad of problems emerged including a range deficiency which caused the RAAF to add the longer wing and heavier undercarriage from the USN F-111B – giving rise to the Australian F-111C variant. The first contingent of RAAF personnel (two pilots, two navigators and an aircrew simulator specialist) arrived in the US in July 1967, to serve as line instructors at the USAF 4527 Combat Crew Training Squadron. A RAAF test pilot followed, and RAAF maintenance personnel were sent to various USAF bases and to General Dynamics. By early 1968, the first cohort of six operational crews had arrived in the US for conversion and for the ferry of the initial six F-111C to Australia, with the RAAF having already thoughtfully provided the Sabre pilots with a Canberra conversion and the Canberra pilots a Sabre conversion. But serious concerns about the maturity and airworthiness of the F-111 surfaced. As well, the longevity of its airframe was in doubt, especially regarding the wing carry-though box and the swing-wing pivot pins constructed of D6ac steel. These concerns led Australia to defer the hand-over ceremony to 4 September 1968, and then, prompted by two further F-111 accidents, place the acceptance of the F-111C on hold. It was then the sizeable investment made by the RAAF in developing a strong uniformed Technical Branch paid dividends, with the air force engineering expertise – augmented by the specialist aircraft metal fatigue knowledge resident in the Aeronautical Research Laboratories – played a key role in recovering the F-111C program. The subsequent inspect and repair as necessary program, as agreed by the Australian and US defence ministers (the Fraser-Laird Agreement) was not quick, taking until June 1973. But the delay proved an astute decision, as when the F-111C finally arrived it came with a redesigned wing carry-through box, a Cold Proof Load Testing regimen, and the inclusion of numerous Engineering Change Proposals. The RAAF had finally acquired the long-range strike capability it had long sought. The F-111C represented a technological watershed for the RAAF with huge implications for capability, doctrine, personnel, logistics and industry. It was a seminal event on the history of the RAAF and readers with an interest are referred to Going Solo – The Royal Australian Air Force; 1946-1971 by Alan Stephens, and From Controversy to Cutting Edge by Mark Lax, for two comprehensive accounts of the F-111C acquisition. Air-Vice Marshal Brian Weston (Retd) was CO No 75 Squadron in 1980, CO Base Squadron Richmond in 1986, OC Base Support Wing Richmond in 1987, and CDR Tactical Fighter Group from July 1990 to July 1993. Brian is a Board Member of the Williams Foundation and this On Target article appears in Australian Aviation magazine. AVM Brian Weston (ret’d) acknowledges the contributions of Dr Alan Stephens, Wing Commander Lance Halverson (ret’d), and others, in drafting this column Download pdf

Brian Weston ' On Target ' TA Fast Caravan Indeed: The Mirage goes to Butterworth ' in Australian Aviation, May 2017 In October 1958 and February 1959, Nos 3 and 77 Squadrons ferried their Sabre fighters to Malaya to join No 2 Squadron’s Canberra bombers at RAAF Butterworth. For the short-range Sabres this was a demanding exercise as the pilots had to circumnavigate a hostile Indonesia. Once at Darwin the squadrons flew to Biak in Dutch New Guinea, and then to Labuan in British North Borneo, refueling enroute at Guiuan on the southeastern tip of Samar in the Philippines, before completing the final leg to Butterworth. These deployments were exciting affairs, with the alien topography and rapidly changing tropical weather generating moments of intense anxiety in many cockpits. When the Mirage IIIO replaced the Sabre in RAAF service (see Australian Aviation, March 2017), No 3 Squadron returned to Australia in 1967 and was replaced by No 75 Squadron, the first RAAF squadron to convert to the Mirage. Any long-range deployment of short-range jet fighters, with minimal navigation aids and few suitable diversion airfields through potentially dangerous and unpredictable tropical weather, is no milk run. Indeed, these early fighter deployments were so demanding that they rank as significant operations which contributed much to the development and maturing of the RAAF as a modern fighting service. With this year marking the 50th anniversary of No 75 Squadron’s deployment from Williamtown to Butterworth, it is appropriate to recall the circumstances of Operation “Fast Caravan” conducted over 15-18 May 1967. Given that the Mirage was officially described as an “all-weather fighter”, why was the deployment so challenging, especially as it had a range advantage of about 20% over the Sabre? The reality was, that even with its two 374-gallon external fuel tanks, all bar 130 gallons of the total of 1420 gallons on board was needed to travel some 1,200 nm. Holding fuel was just as non-existent in a Mirage as it was in a Sabre. Navaids and radios? A single TACAN and two UHF radios were not much help in a region where TACAN beacons and UHF radios were almost unknown. Furthermore, the first fifty Mirage IIIO(F) aircraft lacked the ground mapping radar and Doppler navigation set that were installed in the subsequent upgrade to the IIIO(A) standard. The routing was also complicated by Dutch New Guinea having been ceded to Indonesia in 1962, and with Nadzab airfield in Papua New Guinea being overgrown with Kunai grass, combined with security concerns in the Philippines, a similar routing to the Sabre ferry of 1958 was ruled out. Fortunately, Australia’s relations with Indonesia thawed somewhat in mid-1966 and a more direct routing from Darwin to Butterworth was negotiated. A visit to Djuanda, near Surabaya in East Java, revealed an excellent runway, but the airfield had no facilities, no communications, and was littered with derelict MiG fighters. Tactful diplomacy secured approval to deploy through Djuanda, although continuing sensitivity dictated the refueling location was never publicly identified – it became known as “that place”. Wing Commander “Jim” Flemming assumed command of No 75 Squadron – “Australia’s First Mach 2 Fighter Squadron” – in April 1966. It was not Flemming’s first stint as CO of 75 Sqn, the Korean War veteran having commanded the squadron in its Meteor days. He was also a Sabre fighter combat instructor, having graduated from No 2 FCI Course in 1955, and had served on exchange with the USAF flying the Lockheed F-104C Starfighter. The RAAF could have picked no better man to take its new supersonic, but short-range, fighters from Williamtown to Butterworth. Flemming had one year to work up the squadron and what a busy year that was. Not one to tolerate bureaucracy or officious staff officers, Flemming stepped-up to the plate, winning a battle to remove his jets from the impersonal (some would say inefficient) centralised maintenance “garage” at Williamtown, while simultaneously working his unit into its new all-weather fighter role. He was also central to planning the coming deployment, including the administrative and logistics aspects. All this paid off when on 15 May 1967, No 75 Squadron ferried 23 Mirages – three aircraft were spares – to Darwin via Townsville. On 18 May, 20 Mirages flew on from Darwin to Butterworth without incident, refueling en route from rudimentary facilities at Djuanda. On arrival at Butterworth, Flemming immediately embarked on another fight to prevent his Mirages disappearing into another centralised maintenance “garage”. Several months later the unit’s disassembled two-seat Mirage IIID trainer arrived by sea, bringing the squadron up to its establishment strength of 21 Mirages and 21 pilots, and elevating the combat capability of the Far East Air Force to a new level. Air-Vice Marshal Brian Weston (Retd) ferried a Sabre and a Mirage to Butterworth, and led the first Mirage deployment to Exercise Cope Thunder, from Butterworth to Clark AFB in the Philippines, in 1981. Brian is a Board Member of the Williams Foundation and this On Target article appears in Australian Aviation magazine. Download pdf

Brian Weston ' On Target Mirage IIIO to F/A-18A Hornet Lightweight to Light-heavyweight fighter transition' in Australian Aviation, April 2017 Following-on from the CAC Sabre to Dassault Mirage transition, after two decades of service, the RAAF replaced the Mirage IIIO with the F/A-18A Hornet. Unlike the preceding transition, the Hornet did not involve the vast broadening of capability conferred by changing from a day-fighter to an all-weather tactical fighter. The Hornet did, however, introduce a far deeper tactical fighter capability than was ever possible with the Mirage. Much of the capability gain came not just from generational and technological developments, but from the size of the Hornet which conferred immediate improvements in payload and sensors, especially radar aperture and power. The Hornet also improved on a major limitation of the Mirage, namely, its short range. Not that the Mirage was any worse than its 1950s peers; simply, the advance of time and technology gave the Hornet a 25 per cent range increase. More significantly the Hornet was capable of air-to-air refueling, thus setting right some earlier conceptual thinking, when the RAAF asked Dassault not to equip the Mirage IIIO with single-point pressure refueling, on the basis that pressure refueling facilities would not be available at forward operating airfields. This decision had long term consequences, because even if the RAAF had later sought to modify the Mirage for air-to-air refueling, it could not be done easily as there was no single-point pressure refueling manifold within the Mirage into which to tap an air-to-air refueling probe. To these enhancements, brought about by greater size and an ability to refuel while in flight, can be added aerodynamic advances, digital technology advances, and the benefits flowing from the F/A-18A human/machine interface which set a new benchmark in fighter cockpit design. The RAAF had done well, and its promotion into a bigger league of tactical fighters was starkly evident when the first two F/A-18B aircraft were ferried to Australia, non-stop, across the Pacific. Given its 20 years of Mirage operational experience, the RAAF also had a solid foundation on which to introduce the new fighter. That expertise had been gained not only from the permanent deployment of Mirages to Malaysia, but also from an increasing participation in Australian and regional exercises, including deployments to the USAF Pacific Air Forces Exercise Cope Thunder, at Clark Air Force Base in the Philippines, commencing in 1981. Like the preceding transition to the Mirage, that of the Hornet also needed to be accomplished without any loss of operational capability. Hence when No 3 Squadron returned from Butterworth to convert to the Hornet, a new Mirage unit, No 79 Squadron, was formed at Butterworth to meet Australia’s Five Power Defence Agreement obligations. During the Sabre to Mirage transition, No 2 Operational Conversion Unit was over-burdened, but this time the Fighter Conversion Unit was tasked solely with Hornet training. And rather than establish another fighter training unit to assume responsibility for the ongoing Mirage conversion courses, as had been done for the Sabre to Mirage transition, the conduct of all Mirage operational conversions was transferred to No 77 Squadron – contravening the dictum that military training should always be carried out in training units, not operational units. No 77 Squadron also assumed responsibility for the MB-326H lead-in fighter training and for the conduct of the last Mirage fighter combat instructor course. All this, while maintaining its status as an operational fighter squadron. This was not a smart decision, as was evident when the unit’s aircraft establishment and annual flying rate grew to more than 40 aircraft and 11,000 hours per year respectively. After No 77 Squadron converted to the Hornet in 1987, No 75 Squadron followed. No 75 Squadron, which had been based at Darwin with its Mirages since 1983, then moved to the newly-constructed base at Tindal. The sole remaining Mirage unit, No 79 Squadron, was concurrently disbanded, thus ending two decades of Australian service by Dassault’s elegant fighter, and bringing an end to 32 years of a permanent RAAF fighter presence in Malaysia. The transition from Mirage to Hornet was completed in May 1989, along with the most significant reorganisation of RAAF operational units since World War II. This change amalgamated all of the RAAF’s tactical fighter units and air defence radars, irrespective of where they were located, into one operational group, the Tactical Fighter Group. The RAAF had successfully brought into service not only an outstanding tactical fighter but also a new system of functional command, changes that without doubt, contributed to the exemplary performance of No 75 Squadron in the Iraq War of 2003, where the unit successfully conducted air superiority, close air support and air interdiction operations. Air-Vice Marshal Brian Weston (Retd) was Commander Tactical Fighter Group from July 1990 to July 1993. Brian is a Board Member of the Williams Foundation and this On Target article appears in Australian Aviation magazine. Download pdf

Air / Sea / Land: Integrated Force 2030 11 April 2017 Final Report Dr Robbin Laird Final Report: Designing the Integrated Force: The Australian Defense Force Repositions for the Next Phase of 21st Century Force Structure Development

Brian Weston ' On Target: RAAF Fighter Transitions: From Sabre to the Mirage' in Australian Aviation, March 2017 With the fifth-generation F-35A Lightning II waiting in the wings and time soon to be called on the venerable F/A-18 Classic Hornet, it is timely to reflect on how the RAAF effected previous fighter transitions. Subsequent articles will examine the shifts from the Mirage to the Hornet, and from the Hornet to the F-35A Lightning II. The transition from the Australian-built CAC Sabre to the French Dassault Mirage IIIO involved a huge advance in capability from a day fighter to an all-weather interceptor, and later developed into a (lightweight) all-weather tactical fighter. And while some operational profiles were carried over from the Sabre to the Mirage, especially when the sun was shining and the sky was blue, there was nothing in Sabre operational doctrine which compared with flying intercepts at low level, at night, over the thunderstorm-riddled Malacca Straights. Nor of flying all-weather, low-altitude night strike missions utilising the capabilities of the Cyrano IIB ground mapping radar, the Doppler navigation set, and the aircraft’s grid navigation system – a technology based on the Canadians’ CF-104G Starfighters in their all-weather, low-level, NATO tactical nuclear strike role. Dassault had designed a formidable fighter platform, as RAAF test pilot Squadron Leader Bill Collings demonstrated during tropical trials at Darwin in February 1964, when he took Mirage A3-1 to Mach 2.198 at 53,000 feet and Mach 1.3 at 77,000 feet. The Mirage had an advanced integrated weapons system, albeit of analogue technology. The heart of this was a twin-gyro platform reference system which in the air-to-air mode linked the Cyrano IIA radar, the Matra R530 all-aspect semi-active radar missile, and the various facilitating (analogue) computers. To this was added the air-to-ground modes of the Cyrano IIB radar and a Doppler-enhanced grid navigation system. The Mirage’s flight controls also included an analogue fly-by-wire mode which when engaged, facilitated attitude hold, height lock, and heading hold, as well as reducing “transonic tuck”, an abrupt nose-up pitch when decelerating from supersonic speed. Ground school for the Mirage was a world away from the simplicity of the Sabre, generating the occasional cry from students, “we only need to learn how to fly the Mirage, not build it”. But their pleas were to no avail as “know your equipment” has always been a hallmark of RAAF aircrew training. Because the first fifty Mirage IIIO(F) aircraft had only an air-to-air capability, the RAAF initially converted Nos 75 and 76 Squadrons as air defence only fighter units. When No 3 Squadron began receiving its Mirage IIIO(A) aircraft, with the Cyrano IIB radar, Doppler and supporting ground-attack systems, it was designated as an 80/20 ground attack/air defence unit, with a remit to develop the RAAF Mirage air-to-ground operational doctrine, strike tactics and air-to-ground weapons expertise. Simultaneously, No 2 Operational Conversion Unit conducted the largest fighter combat instructor course since the course’s inception, with No 10 FCI Course having six students flying the Sabre and six flying the Mirage. The lessons from both No 3 Squadron’s ground-attack prioritisation and No 2 Operational Conversion Unit’s fighter combat instructor course were fed back into the Mirage operational conversion syllabus and the operational Mirage squadron categorisation schemes. The Sabre to Mirage transition placed a huge load on No 2 Operational Conversion Unit as the unit was also required to conduct the introductory fighter weapons courses on the Vampire trainer/fighter, Sabre operational conversions, and maintain a de facto Sabre squadron known as “2OCU Transition Squadron”. In March 1970, the RAAF concluded such tasking was excessive, and those three responsibilities were spun off into a new unit ‒ No 5 Operational Training Unit, whose heritage traced back to World War II. While the fighter force was in transition, the RAAF was also required to maintain two operational fighter squadrons at Butterworth, Malaysia, as part of the Commonwealth Strategic Reserve, and to convert those units from the Sabre to the Mirage. Additionally, Nos 75 and 76 Squadrons had to upgrade their Mirages from air defence fighters to all-weather tactical fighters. Further demands were placed on the fighter community through a commitment to train Malaysian and Indonesian personnel prior to the gifting of refurbished RAAF Sabres to Malaysia and Indonesia. And while all this was going on, outside the fighter force, the RAAF was introducing Iroquois helicopters and Caribou STOL airlifters (both of which were immediately committed to the Vietnam War), C-130E Hercules transports, P-3B Orions, and Aermacchi MB-326H advanced trainers; and, not too far away was the most complex aircraft the RAAF had ever operated to that time, the F-111C. It’s fair to say that, in the face of considerable institutional challenges, the transition of the RAAF fighter force from the Sabre to Mirage was a job well done. Air-Vice Marshal Brian Weston (Retd), flew the Jet Provost, MB-326H, Vampire, Hunter, Sabre, Mirage and Hornet during his RAAF career. Brian is a Board Member of the Williams Foundation and this On Target article appears in Australian Aviation magazine. 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In accordance with the Constitution, Air Marshal Errol McCormack (Ret'd) was required to step down as the Chair of the Foundation at the AGM held 25 Oct 16. Air Marshal Geoff Brown (Ret'd) was elected to replace him. Air Marshal McCormack was elected to fill the position of Deputy Chair. The following were also elected to the Board at the AGM. Rear Admiral Mark Campbell RAN (Ret'd) Mr John Conway Mr Ken Moore Ms Nicole Quinn Air Vice-Marshal Brian Weston (Ret'd)