Search Results

Dr Robbin Laird 17 August 2021 This is the third article in our series on training and the strategic shift in warfighting and deterrence. In the first article, I focused on how to define the challenge of training for the high-end fight. In the second article, the focus was upon the skill sets which training needs to shape and reinforce for the high-end fight. This article focuses on the evolution of airpower training over the past thirty years, and what changes are required in the legacy approaches to be able to train effectively for the high-end fight. In the last article, I discussed the skill set challenge with Paul Averna of Cubic Mission and Performance Solutions. I continued the discussion with Averna, a veteran Navy pilot and training expert, about the nature of the legacy systems and associated training approaches and the challenges the potential of a Peer fight creates to providing the skill sets now needed. Training still proceeds from the core importance of learning to operate your aircraft and to master the core skills required to operate your platform in demanding combat situations. What is being added is that as the multi-mission capabilities of aircraft expand into multi-domain warfare, the aperture of training needs to expand. And that aperture is wider than what a single or even cross-linked physical training ranges can provide. Additionally, with the adversary’s capabilities to engage the blue side air combat force significantly beyond visual range, accurately replicating those threats is becoming increasingly difficult on training ranges as well. As the blue side works its own capabilities to fight via kill webs, a wide range of the capabilities being shaped, trained, and forged need to be done so in ways that the red side will not get significant information and knowledge about how the blue side wishes to evolve its cross-domain warfighting capabilities. As a Weapons School instructor during his time flying the F-14 in the Navy at NAS Fallon, and later at MCAS Yuma as a MAWTS-1 instructor, Averna noted that Top Gun was set up initially to close a performance gap uncovered in the Vietnam War. “When we got to the Vietnam War, we saw a very uneven level of competency from one squadron to another, and we saw some individual aircrew that were extremely successful at the complex environment the Vietnam air battle presented, including the introduction of technology like radar guided missiles and integrated Surface to Air Missile systems. “With the reliance on Beyond Visual Range (BVR) weapons and tactics, highly perishable Basic Fighter Maneuvering (BFM) skills atrophied and aircrew were making too many mistakes in maneuvering against more nimble opponents. And as a result, the kill ratio went down dramatically. This led to the formation of Top Gun, to deal with the challenge of the inconsistent proficiency in the fleet aircrews. “The focus was upon training the trainer. Select individuals who are very competent in their aircraft, but also have the ability to teach, to help their fellow squadron mates learn how to perform in a building block manner to the point where they can go out and be an effective instrument of national policy when it came to the counter air fight. “And to complement the new focused Air-to-Air training curriculum, new tools were fielded like the Cubic air combat maneuver instrumentation system, or ACMI system. “And why was that important? You needed to understand where everybody was in time and space to be able to reconstruct what happened. We each have a different mental image of what we did in a particular environment because we’re looking through the heads-up display through the canopy bow out over the nose of the airplane. “And to the extent that I can turn my head around that perception is good probably up to about 10 miles with a limited number of participants. “But if I have to keep track of multiple players that are well beyond visual range doing interesting things that I can’t directly see, I have a much more difficult time reconstructing what happened. And it’s in that, the accuracy of what happened that helps us develop the correct learning points out of that flying event. “And that’s the way that we have trained pilots predominantly from the 70s into the 80s and into the 90s, and that is based on understanding the building blocks that it takes to be able to deliver the right effect for particular missions. “For example, in an air-to-air syllabus, one would start out with basic fighter maneuvering, learning how to maneuver and max perform my airplane. “Then one would look at how to max perform my airplane versus an opponent’s airplane. “Then one would start working in sections and learning how to employ as a section, and then as a division against a limited number and then a larger number to an unknown number of potential adversaries. “We were focusing on the skill sets to work the mission against a relatively unsophisticated threat or a near peer threat, but certainly not one that was capable of meeting us in terms of quality and density of a fight.” What Averna described as the training focus was occurring on a physical range, with adversary aircraft or aggressors flying physically against the blue side. With the impact of both what the blue and red side can operate now, physical ranges are a necessary but not sufficient capability, and the red side is not well represented by flying aircraft like F-5s. Averna put his assessment this way: “We face a physical range constraint problem, but there’s also the challenge of using weapons that we want to use. We don’t really want people to know what we’re doing with our weapons nor seeing what our tactics are so that we maintain an element of surprise if we need to operate in combat. “And we have another limitation to our ability today to train well. Even if I was able to find a current contemporary threat system that I might face in a peer fight, I’m not finding it at the local hardware store or the local department store. I’m going to have to acquire it through some means, I might have to decompose it and make sure that I understand all the operating modes on it so that I can present its affects correctly to the aircrew or the team. And that we are interacting the right way in order to defeat it. “We don’t have that luxury of acquiring those things, they’re extremely expensive, very rare when we do get our hands on something like that. So very few people are actually able to work with it.” Expand beyond visual physical ranges are difficult and expensive. Managing training space, ensuring the right kind of training, and getting adequate training time poses the question of resource allocation. How does the DoD and its Collation partners drive down cost and expand capabilities to train effectively? One way to do so is the arrival of synthetic training systems, which can target training time to the skill set levels of individual pilots. The arrival of adaptive training systems allows for calibration of the training time needed for individual pilots. Averna explained this capability as follows: “Let’s say that Pilot A is extremely good at low-level flying, and he doesn’t need to spend all that much time in doing a lot to train for this skill. Pilot B on the other hand has problems with speed rush baseline and needs more time for the low altitude training environment. “Yet the way that we designed the syllabus is that both get the same amount of flying before they get the proficiency check. Where we are going is a recognition that people learn at different rates and people retain skills at different rates. “By moving to an adaptive training environment, we can target the skill sets which those two different pilots have and can tailor training times to generate the required proficiencies.” In other words, it is about making training more targeted and more effective. We then discussed the multi-mission challenge for training. Earlier, aircraft were more narrowly focused on mission sets than the new aircraft. Those legacy aircraft would be used for single or a smaller set of missions than later aircraft which are multi-mission focused. The Super Hornet entered the force as a multi-mission aircraft, but the challenge has been to train pilots to be able to switch missions using legacy capabilities. With the F-35’s new sensor packages, data fusion and 360-degree situational awareness expands the pilot’s capability to operate in a multi-domain environment. But how to adjust training to be able to maximize this skill set? These new capabilities impact many facets of the mission, from the way we mission plan, brief, execute, and debrief. Just take a moment to consider a concept such as mutual support between a flight lead and their wingman. This is how Averna highlighted this change: “We’ve actually started to think differently about concepts like mutual support. If you ask somebody in the early 1990s what’s the definition of mutual support, they’d probably say something along the lines of a mile to a mile and a half and 2000 feet of step up or step down. And that was visual mutual support. You’re not in the same plane but you’re close enough that you could check your lead or your wingman’s tail to make sure there was nobody coming up behind them. That was an integral part of your visual scan of the airspace around you. “Now with F-35 or F-22, mutual support is several miles plus, and the pilots will not see each other’s planes visually. If we can appropriately identify the objects and the space in front of us, and we have the ROE to engage, we’re going to take those shots well beyond visual range. “And that’s where the main training problem exists. We don’t expect to ever get into the kind of dogfights we saw in Vietnam. It’s now much more about targeting, shorting, getting the off-board queuing, processing that and figuring out how to stay low observable, and yet maintain that dynamic sanctuary we talked about the last time. It is about training to different mindset and problem set.” We closed by discussing the coming of Live Virtual Construction (LVC) systems to the training effort. As Averna put it: “When you’re dealing with a peer threat and you’re dealing with national system capabilities, how many operators are actually aware of those capabilities and how to aggregate those in a rapid manner to fight at the speed of a network? “The national means such as space-based assets provide information held at high levels of security and, is this information going to be available or not? Are they going to be applied sequentially or not? How I’m going to be able to create the dynamic sanctuary, deliver an effect, assess, and as the sanctuary window closes, because the threats reacting that I can reposition securely and confidently? How do I train to do this? “Exposure to this level of training is not going to occur on the range but will be put together in a synthetic environment or provided through LVC systems. The LVC environment is the only place that you’re going to be able to train in that environment approximating the physiological and psychological effects in the real world. Because you will not be able to replicate that all live until actual combat starts on night one.” This situation was projected in a 2015 interview we did with the head of N-9 at the time, Rear Admiral Manazir. The ability to share information between decision-makers and staffs that are not all geographically located, is getting better and better. This allows not only dynamic combat learning but provides greater fidelity to the training process as air wings prepare to deploy. In the past, we only sent text reports. Now we are sending full motion video. The EA-18G Growler can send actual data back to the warfighting center and say: “We have not seen this signal before, what is it?” And then the labs can run it through their data libraries and work the problem to ID the signal and send their findings back to the deployed fleet. The F-35s coming to the fleet will add significantly to this process. It is about rapid combat learning in a dynamic warfighting environment. We are shaping the foundation for “learning airplanes” to engage the enemy. LVC will enable us to train in a more robust environment than we are on our current ranges that are geographically constrained, and currently do not have the full high-end threat replicated. LVC will allow us to train to the full capabilities of our platforms across a variety of security environments and do so without exposing our training process to an interested adversary. Featured Photo: Navy Topgun pilots walk from their aircraft after landing Wednesday, May 29, 1996 at Naval Air Station in Fallon, Nev. The Naval aviation top fighter school completed the move from Southern California with the arrival of these pilots and their flying machines. (AP Photo/Reno Gazette Journal, David B. Parker) (David B. Parker / Reno Gazette Journal) Link to article: The Shift in Training: Defining the Challenge (Defense.info)

This week, The Central Blue welcomes ADFA graduate Jack Ryan as he examines the implications of emerging Infrared sensors. While IR sensor use in air-to-air combat is not new, Ryan contends that the continuing development of Long-Wave Infrared (LWIR) sensors poses a significant issue for Australia and its allies. In particular, he explores how advances in such sensors could severely undermine the technological edge held by Western forces that could see stealth assets such as the F35 lose their ‘surprise’ advantages – a situation for which Ryan recommends urgent joint R&D action. Militaries have come a long way in reducing the radio frequency (RF) signatures of their advanced fighter aircraft, but advancements in infrared (IR) detection threaten that stealth. New 5th generation platforms such as the F-35 have been applauded for their enhanced survivability, which is due in large part to a significant reduction in radar signature. Developments in airframe design, material composition and production quality give the F-35 an “unmatched ability to evade enemy detection” according to Lockheed Martin. Despite all this, advancements in IR detection threaten to erode the stealth advantage. Advances in IR technology, specifically the threat that Long Wave IR (LWIR) sensors pose, may be one that cannot be easily rectified. Resultantly, we could be entering an age never before seen, where passive IR systems outperform active RF radars. A Theory Refresh To understand why LWIR advancements may be a game changer, specifically in relation to air combat, it is necessary to first review fundamental electro-magnetic (EM) theory. RF and IR energy both form part of the broader EM spectrum. RF is typically talked about in terms of frequency (GHz, MHz etc), and is associated with radars. The IR component of the spectrum is measured by wavelengths (λ), or microns (µm), and in a military context, is commonly associated with Infra-Red Search and Track (IRST) systems. Figure 1. The EM Spectrum Radar is an inherently active sensor. That is, radars actively transmit an RF signal to be reflected by a target. The reflected signal, captured by a receiver, is able to determine the target’s range, azimuth or velocity. Air intercept (AI) radars on fighter jets typically operate in the X band (between 8-12 GHz). For example,the F-16 APG-68 operating envelope starts at 9.86GHz. This frequency selection offers a favourable compromise between radar size, cost, accuracy and fidelity – all of which are crucial characteristics for air combat. Alternately, an IRST is a passive sensor. Unlike radar, an IRST does not transmit any form of EM energy, it just receives all sources of heat energy (think of a thermographic (infrared) camera), and is sensitive in the 1 – 14µm range. As the IRST detects an IR heat signature, it is capable of tracking it to potentially determine the target's azimuth. In conjunction with other aircraft sensors, it can then also calculate range or velocity. Within the IR spectrum there are two major ‘dead zones’ (illustrated in Figure 2). Within these zones, wavelengths are heavily absorbed by the atmosphere, thus making target detection near impossible. Due to these characteristics, to optimise the use of the IR spectrum, practitioners are best using Mid-Wave IR (MWIR) or LWIR. MWIR has traditionally been the most utilised part of the IR spectrum - it detects heat sources that transmit between 3 – 5µm. Consequently, any such IRST system has been limited to detecting the hottest part of a jet - the area with the most energy and shortest wavelength. This is typically the engine and exhaust fumes. As Figure 3 illustrates, these regions are typically between 2 – 5µm. The ability for a MWIR tracking sensor to detect therefore relies heavily on the target aspect. Targets approaching head on block their engine and exhaust, subsequently preventing IR detection and tracking. Legacy missiles (such as the SA-7) which utilise MWIR sensors to lock and track targets, and are known as ‘tailpipe chasers’ – they can only see and hone in on the hot signatures to the rear of an aircraft. Developments in LWIR sensor systems negate these limitations. Their ability to detect energy in the 8 – 12µm band enables the sensor to see, and potentially track, much cooler targets (illustrated in Figure 3). LWIR provides the most signal for a given difference in temperature between target and background. Skin heat produced by the friction of air over the fuselage and leading edges during flight emits within the LWIR band. The ability to detect these cooler elements offers a solution to the problem of aspect inherent to MWIR discussed above. The use of LWIR enables far greater flexibility in air-to-air tracking, while also countering any RF stealth properties the target might have. Furthermore, LWIR increases the lethality of passive engagement sequences through increased range and fidelity. The application of IRSTs in Air-to-Air Combat Utilising IR sensors in air-to-air combat is not new - the United States have been incorporating IRST technology since the F-101 Voodoo in 1954, while European aircraft have done so since the Saab Draken in 1965 and Russia since the MiG-23 in 1967. Initial MWIR systems were typically used to cue other, more accurate, sensors – namely the AI radar. The engagement process in the early days required the transmission of a radar to successfully employ an active missile, with the use of emissions control (EMCON) tactics not typically relied on. As technology increasingly developed, the desire for stealth also increased. If an aircraft could remain invisible to enemy radars, they would be able to penetrate deeper into hostile territory - possibly preventing an adversary engagement altogether. An aircraft utilising EMCON silent tactics (that is no active RF signals are emitted), forces the adversary to ‘find’ them rather than homing in on radar emissions. For a stealth aircraft, awareness of adversary EMCON posture is vital to maintaining its survivability. Advanced IRST systems are crucial in this regard - as LWIR IRST systems proliferate, situational awareness will improve, and potentially outperform the traditional radar detection of stealth aircraft. Beyond providing increased awareness of enemy movements, LWIR also complicates air-to-air weapon employment. Along with aspect deficiencies, legacy IR missiles also had poor range. Early AIM-9 sidewinder variants for example, had a maximum target detection range of 2.6nm meaning they could only be used strictly for dogfights within visual range (WVR). These legacy missiles and MWIR IRSTs complimented each other. Both sensors had poor range and resolution that restricted completely passive engagements to unrealistically close scenarios. However, alongside the development of LWIR has also come the development of longer-range IR missiles. One of China’s newest IR missiles, the PL-10, allegedly has a range of up to 11nm. If paired with a LWIR IRST which could provide cueing data at extended ranges, a missile such as the PL-10 may now be capable of targeting beyond visual range (BVR) – all while maintaining a completely EMCON silent. 5th Generation Relevance As 5th generation platforms refine their EMCON and RF stealth properties, it is highly likely that adversaries will seek to develop and leverage LWIR as a means of defeat. Russia’s PAK-FA T-50 fighter is known to contain an advanced IRST system that can allegedly detect an F-22 at 13nm. China’s J-20 fighter utilizes a Distributed Aperture System (DAS), similar to the F-35’s, that combines IR detection along with electro-optical capabilities. It is unclear if either of these systems have LWIR capabilities, but it is a logical assumption that both Russia and China would desire this advantage. US reporting suggests that both jets appear to be inferior to platforms such as the F-22 and F-35 in terms of technology and stealth. President of Sukhoi Mikhail Pogosyan said of the J-20’s 5th generation credentials that “China obviously has a long way to go”, while the RAND corporation estimated that the PAK-FA would have “attributes of 4th generation heavy fighter bomber” while “lacking the LO features of the F-35”. Despite this assessment, both aircraft have made considerable improvements over previous 4th generation airframes, with the gap between East and West reducing. This indicates that the previously dramatic technological edge held by the US, and subsequently Australia, is eroding. Practically, this means that extremely permissive environments, such as those encountered in Operation OKRA in which RAAF F/A-18’s participated, are unlikely to exist in the future battlespace. As a standalone sensor, LWIR IRSTs challenge the survivability of the F-35 by mitigating its RF stealth. Detection of F-35 skin returns, which are difficult to engineer against given persistent friction during flight, at significant ranges could allow a J-20 the ability to; manoeuvre away, shoot a PL-10 or call for backup – all of which mitigate the ‘surprise’ factor stealth. Resultantly, the F-35 may transmit its powerful APG-81 AI radar to achieve a ‘first look, first shot’ engagement (illustrated in figure 4). Using an active sensor helps detect the enemy, but coincidently broadcasts the F-35’s location to any system utilising an RWR or passive direction finding. China increasingly employs various advanced radars, which degrade the RF stealth of an F-35. As surface threats become increasingly networked it is possible that an F-35 could be detected from a ground platform which informs airborne J-20s where to target. Figure 2. F-35 Conceptual Engagements against air and surface targets When integrated into a broader sensor suite, the LWIR capability is able to contribute to the immense task of data fusion. A core aspect of being ‘5th Gen’ is an aircraft's ability to collect data, process that data and disseminate as much credible and usable information as possible. The ‘fusion engines’ of advanced fighters require onboard sensors to provide as much data as possible, in order to reduce pilot workload as well as increase the lethality of its other systems. As discussed, LWIR offers these ‘engines’ high-quality data at greater ranges than a similar MWIR sensor. The result is an increase in decision superiority. In Conclusion As China continues to deploy advanced aircraft to surveil Taiwanese airspace and the East China Sea, key Australian national security personnel have indicated that the “drums of war” are starting to echo. The ADF’s ability to maintain a ‘secure, prosperous and inclusive Indo-Pacific’ will likely be challenged by the rise of advanced technologies - LWIR being one of them. LWIR sensors will affect all aircraft, however most seriously threaten the RAAFs latest and greatest weapon - the F-35. As the RAAF’s premier air combat platform, the possible degradation of the F-35s stealth characteristics reduce overall survivability. Increased detect and launch ranges, combined with EMCON silent tactics, would improve the lethality of regional threats such as the J-20 - to the detriment of Australian and allied airpower. Moving forward the ADF, in conjunction with the US and industry, should commit to research that aims to provide a solution to LWIR detection. In the interim, previously held assumptions of tactical warfighting will need to be re-considered, taking into consideration the possibility that RF stealth may have, for now, been countered. About the author: Jack Ryan is a junior officer in the Royal Australian Air Force. He is a Distinguished Graduate of the Australian Defence Force Academy where he studied politics and history. You can follow him on twitter @justjackryan. The views expressed are his alone and do not reflect the opinion of the Royal Australian Air Force, the Department of Defence, or the Australian Government.

We welcome back multiple-time contributor Chris McInnes as he takes inspiration from Star Trek to advocate for decision-makers who can deal with failure, ‘continue to function in impossible situations’ – and then innovate, disrupt and even ‘cheat’ to the right outcome. He contrasts this with the current dominant culture that seldom rewards boldness, and how this needs to change as Australia faces dynamic strategic circumstances. In doing so he issues the challenge: can you cope with failure, and can you find a way around the impossible? What can Star Trek teach the military about survivability? Some might argue quite a lot: defensive shield systems can only be counted on for so long, and wearing a red shirt is a really, really bad move in terms of survivability. Neither of these seem particular relevant to contemporary Australian defence issues, however. But ‘Kobayashi Maru’ is relevant. For those unfamiliar with Star Trek, Kobayashi Maru is a famously difficult decision-making exercise at Star Fleet academy. In brief, the Kobayashi Maru is a crippled civilian freighter stranded in a contested zone. Time is running out for the crew of the ship and the only ship that can reach her in time is that captained by a trainee Star Fleet officer. The problem is that a Star Fleet vessel entering the contested zone will trigger a war between the Federation and one of its usual foes, and the certain destruction of the trainee’s ship and crew. The exercise is famously difficult precisely because it is supposed to be unsolvable. In its original guise, the purpose of the exercise was to test the trainee’s ability to continue functioning in an impossible situation, including confronting them with their own failures and catastrophic outcomes arising from decisions they made. The trainee, instructors, and other trainees learned from these experiences, and frequently debriefed as a group to share lessons and insights. This original and enduring purpose of Kobayashi Maru has been complemented by a second purpose as the exercise evolved in later Star Trek stories. This second purpose arose when particularly enterprising young trainees first managed to successfully solve the Kobayashi Maru conundrum. But how did they solve an unsolvable problem? In an uncharitable word, they cheated. Some reprogrammed the simulation systems running the exercise, while others found ways around the rules. A more charitable word for what they did is innovation, while another would be disruption. The second purpose of Kobayashi Maru has become that of helping trainees recognise an impossible situation and adapt – innovate, disrupt, cheat – their way to an acceptable outcome. Both purposes are highly relevant to contemporary Australian defence because, as the Prime Minister said during his launch of the 2020 Defence Strategic Update in July, Australia faces strategic circumstances reminiscent of the years prior to World War 2. In that conflict, Australia had to quickly develop the capacity to respond autonomously to threats more potent and proximate than it had expected. In this context, Australia’s defence needs decision-makers and processes that are accustomed to failure but can continue to function in impossible situations, with the burden of errors and failures fresh in their minds. Moreover, they need to be capable of recognising the impossibility of those circumstances and finding a way through – potentially by going around the rules. Failures and cheats are rare beasts in defence ecosystems, including Australia’s, and they are not rewarded for their boldness as militaries and public services are hierarchical and conservative organisations. Success is defined as those who play the best within the existing rules, and success is what is rewarded from personnel promotion, to project delivery and the conduct of exercises. Vast sums of money are spent to ensure Australian forces have every possible unfair advantage in a future fight, but the monies must be spent and equipment managed in ways that encourage conformity and compliance. A former Chief of Air Force was notorious for successfully going around the normal processes to get what he thought (and managed to convince sufficient other people) was in the best interests of Australia’s security. His reward was success in many of these efforts, an on-schedule retirement, and perhaps some satisfaction that the subsequent First Principles Review, One Defence reforms, and Capability Life Cycle have each been described as Defence’s effort to prevent someone like him ever happening again. The rules had their revenge. Similarly, exercises are realistic enough to enable the successful achievement of planned training outcomes, but not so realistic that those training outcomes might be threatened. Defence plans for success and, in the main, this is appropriate given the imperative to deliver outcomes as efficiently and reliably as possible. Suggestions that exercises or training activities should be designed to drive people and processes beyond failure do not often pass the efficiency and reliability test. But room needs to be made in the program for more exercises like Kobayashi Maru, lest Australian commanders, crews, and processes grown and groomed in a never-fail environment, confront a real-world crippled freighter stranded in a contested zone. As in Star Trek, much of this can be achieved through simulation and in training environments that encourage failure as learning opportunities and, crucially, enable participants to find ways to innovate and disrupt the test itself. Such activities need to occur regularly and at all levels so that failure-as-learning is normalised, and innovators can be uncovered – for reward, not repudiation! Such activities will also enable deeper exploration of future force considerations and concepts for decision-makers and decision-making. The human mind’s capacity to make decisions is limited in frequency and totality, so the accelerated warfare of the future – light-speed cyber-attacks and hypersonic missile raids – will likely exhaust decision-makers and degrade decision quality very rapidly. Similarly, legacy processes such as targeting and planning cycles need to be tested beyond the point of failure against emerging requirements. This includes realistically exploring whether these processes are sufficiently robust to fail and continue to function. Future enemies are unlikely to permit time for in-depth reviews, and future warfare is unlikely to reward those that further complicate processes to ensure a specific failure never occurs again. The simple questions that Kobayashi Maru poses to Star Fleet trainees are, can you cope with failure, and can you find a way around the impossible? These are questions that the ADF needs to explore as it confronts a dangerous future. This post has been republished with the kind permission of Australian Defence Business Review and appears in the Nov-Dec 2020 issue. You can follow Chris McInnes on Twitter at @guiness_aus

20 July 2018 marked the 49th anniversary of Neil Armstrong and Buzz Aldrin landing on the Moon. To mark that occasion and contribute to the growing discussion regarding Australia’s role, interests, and capabilities in space, we are pleased to host our first cross-post from Angle of Attack. In this post, Ryan Sanford examines the roles and responsibilities of the United States Air Force in space and argues that a clear concept of “space-mindedness” is a critical foundation for advancing the discussion. We think there are many points in Ryan’s article for Australian members of the profession of arms to consider. The United States Air Force has struggled lately in resourcing its National Command Authority assigned missions.[1]  While the immediate focus tends toward material and equipment, a potentially more troubling problem facing the Air Force may be the ever-increasing gap caused by poor pilot retention across multiple platform specialties.[2]  Under-resourced and losing talent, the Air Force would seem to have a sufficient amount of strategic ailments from which to suffer.  Yet, there are some who assert that the Air Force’s biggest strategic obstacle deals not with resourcing its missions, but that the service’s biggest problem is, in fact, teleological.  In other words, for some, the service lacks a true purpose and mission.[3]  Such an assertion quickly engendered rebuttals and counterarguments.[4]  Still, despite hints of a histrionic tenor within their argument, those who questioned the purpose of the Air Force raised a valid question.  What is the mission of the United States Air Force? Major Michael Benitez, in his War on the Rocks article, attempts an answer.[5]  To wit, Benitez explains that the current Air Force mission statement lacks a measurable and readily definable purpose.[6]  As a remedy, Benitez offers that the Air Force mission statement should instead be, “to provide an agile global force capable of providing prompt, sustained, high-domain superiority to deter aggression and jointly win our nation’s wars.”[7]  In arriving at this answer, Benitez asserts that the lack of a meaning-laden mission statement, one that embodies the Air Force’s raison d’être, stems not from the service’s lack of mission.  Indeed, the service is incredibly adept at performing its assigned roles.[8]  Rather, the lack of a purpose-laden mission statement results from a lack of air-mindedness among today’s Airmen.  In other words, because America’s Airmen do not exhibit a well-formed cognizance of the service’s quintessence, they are ill equipped to explain the service’s mission.  Interestingly, the inability to explain the mission stems, in part, from the lack of a codifiable mission statement.  In self-perpetuating style, the want of such a mission statement exacerbates the problem of Airmen not being air-minded.[9] Benitez’s efforts are laudable.  His article challenges today’s Airmen to think of airpower as more than a mere catchphrase.  Benitez urges the reader to “comprehend air-mindedness by…thinking of it as…high-dimensional operations (HDO).”[10]  In defining HDO, Benitez asserts that since the domains of air and space, plus cyber from a cognitive sense, constitute realms above the Terran, an Airman is better suited to think of air-mindedness from a high dimensionality perspective.  In thinking of air-mindedness as HDO, that is, as an amalgamation of the air, space, and cyber domains, an Airman can better understand how the service is “trans-dimensional [and] uniquely multi-domainsional [sic]” thereby enabling better advocacy for the service. Still, Benitez did not go far enough in redefining air-mindedness.  Or rather, his definition was incomplete.  In defining HDO in Benitez’s manner, one makes an assumption that the Air Force in general and its Airmen, in particular, know what it means to be space-minded.  In other words, drawing an isomorphism between air-mindedness and HDO may be correct, or at least provide a useful way for America’s Airmen to understand the quintessence of air power; however, doing so illuminates a conspicuous absence of a certain “mindedness” for each of the sub-domains comprising the service’s “multi-domainsionality.”  Defining “air-mindedness 2.0” as operations among the triune domain of air, space, and cyber, necessarily requires explaining mindedness in the space and cyber domains.[11] The final launch of the space shuttle Atlantis [Image credit: Angle of Attack] Herein lies the problem.  Just as air-mindedness has at times escaped definition because of the “chicken-and-the-egg” problem of grasping what airpower “does” versus what airpower “is,” so too has space-mindedness.  In fact, to this author’s knowledge, no attempt has been made to define space-mindedness.[12]  An admixture of Dale Hayden’s conception of air-mindedness and Brigadier William Mitchell’s definition of air power, both adjusted for space, combined with Benitez’s “high-dimensional operations” may provide a useful starting point.  That is, space-mindedness, in general, is a lens by which the mind’s eye views the vast potential of space, and in recognizing this potential, advocates for the “constant development and experimentation” of space-going capabilities to harness the latent power of space in the continuing pursuit of national power.[13]  More specifically, as “space-mindedness” relates to the Air Force, it is the “lens through which Airmen perceive warfare and view the battlespace,” a battlespace that resides in the “perpetual and rhythmic” domain of space.[14]  Furthermore, like air-mindedness connoted during the interwar years, space-mindedness connotes possessing an awareness of spacepower’s strategic nature.  Unlike the ideations regarding air power, which tended to focus on strategic bombing, sometimes to the detriment of policy aims, such a strategic awareness, for the “space-minded” Airman, should remain anchored to the primary question of how spacepower can serve “some useful purpose.”[15]  This assertion holds true whether that purpose is fulfilled through the military instrument or other space-borne instruments of power.  While donning the uniform necessarily focuses one’s mind frame on military matters, the ubiquitous, all-encompassing, and entangled nature of space and human activity therein suggest that Airmen never forget the larger question of how spacepower and its instruments are used for policy’s purposes. Defining space-mindedness in the manner offered here accomplishes three results.  First, the definition, much as theory does, provides a “systematic order” by which an Airman may contemplate the service and nation’s role in employing spacepower.[16]   While no theoretical definition of “space-mindedness” will “equip the mind with formulas for solving problems,” the definition found here does “cast a light on all phenomena” by compelling one to ask how the myriad elements of spacepower can achieve the policy aims set forth by civilian leadership.[17]  Indeed, by codifying space-mindedness in the fashion espoused in this paper, an Airman may now “trace each action” in space “to an adequate, compelling cause,” which is the harnessing of spacepower and fulfillment of national objectives.[18] The second effect of the definition offered here is a corollary of the first.  Not only does our definition of space-mindedness provide an analytical framework, but it also proves to be aspirational in nature.  The space-minded are those that continually ask if the service and nation are tapping the full potential of space’s capability while advocating for the development of new space technologies, even those not directly beneficial to the military.  The space-minded seek to exploit opportunities in space and always refer to the raison d’être of space capabilities, which is the furtherance of national power in space. Finally, our definition of space-mindedness provides a practical, third effect.  Namely, in trying to cohere the elements of airpower as they relate to the idea of air-mindedness, logic demands an adequate explanation of what it means to be space-minded as an element of overall air-mindedness.  Space-mindedness is a necessary condition for air-mindedness, but only once the former is well defined. While it is doubtful that the definition offered here will satisfy all space power theorists and practitioners, defining space-mindedness in the fashion of this paper will hopefully advance the conversation on space power theory and its application.  By offering an articulation on space-mindedness, this author suggests that Airmen have a structure upon which they may build their thoughts on the employment of air power in general and space power, in particular.  Moreover, they have a goal to aspire toward, to contemplate the potential of space and advocate for the harnessing of such potential in the pursuit of national strategy.  To be an Airmen should entail asking how the application of space power aids in the quest for strategic aims.  Those asking such a question are, in essence, space-minded.  Knowing what it means to be space-minded, the next task is to ascertain whether the Air Force is space-minded, something future studies should attempt.  Furthermore, efforts should be made to find methods for cultivating space-mindedness where it does not otherwise thrive. This post originally appeared at Angle of Attack on 18 March 2017 and is republished with the kind permission of the editors. We recommend our readers check out Angle of Attack! Ryan Sanford is an active duty officer in the United States Air Force. He is a Fighter Pilot and an Experimental Test Pilot. A graduate of the United States Air Force Academy, School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, and USAF Test Pilot School and a published author in the fields of Mathematics, Aeronautical Engineering, Developmental Flight Test, and Tactical Employment, he recently completed a Master of Philosophy thesis analyzing the need for a USAF astronaut corps to support national objectives in space. He is currently performing duties as an Operations Officer. NOTES: [1]. Jim Michaels, “Air Force Chief: Personnel Shortfall is Critical,” USA Today.com, 21 Dec 16, Accessed 9 Jan 17, http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2016/12/21/air-force-chief-personnel-shortfall-critical/95718566/. [2]. W.J. Hennigan, “Air Force Struggles to Add Drone Pilots and Address Fatigue and Stress,” LA Times, 9 Nov 15, Accessed 9 Jan 17, http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-drone-pilot-crisis-20151109-story.html; “Air Force Struggling With Fighter Pilot Shortage Amid Ongoing Air Wars,” Fox News.com, 11 Aug 16, Accessed 9 Jan 17, http://www.foxnews.com/us/2016/08/11/air-force-struggling-with-fighter-pilot-shortage-amid-ongoing-air-wars.html. [3]. Robert M. Farley, Grounded: The Case for Abolishing the United States Air Force, (Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky Press, 2015).  The reader should note that Professor Farley had espoused the idea of abolishing the USAF well before he published his book. [4]. Scott D. Campbell, et al., “Why America Needs an Independent Air Force,” War on the Rocks, 26 Feb 14, Accessed 9 Jan 17, https://warontherocks.com/2014/02/why-america-needs-an-independent-air-force/ ; Michael Auslin, “Why America Needs the Air Force: Rebuttal to Prof. Farley,” Breaking Defense.com, 13 Aug 13, http://breakingdefense.com/2013/08/why-america-needs-the-air-force-rebuttal-to-prof-farley/.  These responses followed Professor Farley’s Foreign Affairs article, “Ground the Air Force,” where he concludes that having a separate service exacerbates the effects of tight budgets and only encourages the services to duplicate efforts with minimal cross-service coordination.  See https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2013-12-18/ground-air-force. [5]. Michael E. Benitez, “Air-Mindedness 2.0: We Need to Do Better Than ‘Fly, Fight, and Win’,” War on the Rocks, 8 Aug 16, Accessed 21 Dec 16, https://warontherocks.com/2016/08/air-mindedness-2-0-we-need-to-do-better-than-fly-fight-and-win/. [6]. “Mission,” AF.com, 2016, Accessed 9 Jan 17, https://www.airforce.com/mission. [7]. Benitez, “Air-Mindedness 2.0: We Need to Do Better Than ‘Fly, Fight, and Win’.” [8]. Eric Schmitt, “Aboard a US Eye in the Sky, Staring Down Isis in Iraq and Syria,” NY Times, 25 Dec 16, Accessed 9 Jan 17, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/25/world/middleeast/aboard-a-us-eye-in-the-sky-staring-down-isis-in-iraq-and-syria.html?_r=0.   Large numbers of weapons employed and enemy body counts do not necessarily equate to strategic success.  Still, the coalition bombing efforts have severely degraded ISIS’ ability to expand its operations as well as placed large portions of its financial support at risk thereby curtailing recruiting efforts. [9]. This seeming tautology hints at the duality of the problem Benitez exposes.  Without air-mindedness, Airmen lack the depth of understanding of what the Air Force “does.”  Conversely, an unclear, and in Benitez’s words, a “narcissistic” motto hinders sharpening an air-inclined mind. [10]. Benitez, “Air-Mindedness 2.0: We Need to Do Better Than ‘Fly, Fight, and Win’.” [11]. To see this assertion, one need only look at the penultimate exercise in categorization, mathematics.  In basic set theory, a collection of items, or a set, is defined by the very elements, which comprise the collection.  Hence, to describe air-mindedness accurately, one must convey what mindedness means for each subdomain that constitutes the overall Air Force domain.  See Joan Bagaria, “Set Theory,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Winter 2016, Accessed 26 Jan 17, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/set-theory/.  Furthermore, ontological arguments also suggest that attempting to define air-mindedness requires defining the subparts as long as those parts are encompassed by the greater whole of air-mindedness. [12]. Compare this claim to the lineage of “air-mindedness” as a term.  While not overtly expressed as such, ideas, which pointed to air-mindedness, first arose during the interwar period with Brigadier General Billy Mitchell’s concept of air-going nations (see Winged Defense).  To Mitchell, air-mindedness equated to taking a whole-of-nation viewpoint regarding the use of the airplane, especially in light of its potential applications.  Lee Kennett’s, The First Air War, also hints at such an ideation albeit with a greater focus towards the use of the air weapon.  More recently, Dale Hayden explained, “air- mindedness is the lens through which airmen perceive warfare and view the battlespace.”  See Dale L. Hayden, “Air-Mindedness,” Air & Space Power Journal 22(4), no. 4 (2008): 44. [13]. Hayden, “Air-Mindedness,” 44; William Mitchell, Winged Defense: The Development and Possibilities of Modern Air Power–Economic and Military, 1st Edition ed. (Tuscaloosa, AL: The University of Alabama Press, 2009), 198. [14]. Benitez, “Air-Mindedness 2.0: We Need to Do Better Than ‘Fly, Fight, and Win’”; Hayden, “Air-Mindedness,” 44. [15]. Mitchell, Winged Defense: The Development and Possibilities of Modern Air Power–Economic and Military, ix; Giulio Douhet, The Command of the Air, 1st ed. (Tuscaloosa, AL: University Alabama Press, 2009), 404; Lee Kennett, The First Air War: 1914-1918, (New York, NY: Free Press, 1999), 288; Richard Overy, The Air War: 1939-1945, (Lincoln, NE: Potomac Books, 2005-09-01), 290.  To see where a focus on strategic bombing undermined policy aims, one should review Tami Davis Biddle’s Rhetoric and Reality in Air Warfare: The Evolution of British and American Ideas about Strategic Bombing. [16]. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Reprint ed. trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989), 578. [17]. Clausewitz, On War, 578. [18]. Clausewitz, On War, 578. #organisationalculture #SpacePower #AirPower #Culture #Space #AirForce

We welcome back our editorial colleague WGCDR Ulas Yildirim as he asks a provocative #AirForce2121 question: is Air Force on a path to irrelevancy? He argues that Air Force must adapt its strategic culture or disappear - Air Force futuring must extend well beyond doing the ‘same things with better tech’ and pursue a strategic culture driven by a contest of ideas that actively seeks out debate. Whilst cultural change may not be pleasant, it’s essential to avoid a grim outlook and Air Force needs to ensure that its strategic culture is sufficiently agile, resilient and imaginative for an unpredictable future. The term ‘Air Force 2121’ conjures up many ideas. These range from the utopian world of Star Trek where mankind has evolved so far that it can travel to other worlds at light speeds through to the dystopian world of Mad Max which depicts the cataclysmic decline of general society. In this light, it may be difficult, even pointless, to try to imagine what the Air Force may look like 100 years from now. But fret not! If the last 75 years are anything to go by, the Air Force will likely look and behave the same way it has in the past and unfortunately become irrelevant in the process. In the absence of an external shock, is there any evidence to suggest that the Air Force’s strategic culture will allow the focus, thinking, and behaviours required to adapt to Australia’s changing strategic environment? To consider this provocative question we need to understand what is meant by strategic culture. From that perspective, history suggests that the Air Force’s strategic culture has been relatively constant since 1945. This indicates that under certain conditions strategic culture may change but at great cost. On that basis, I will conclude by offering some thoughts and provocations for the future. Strategic culture People often refer to strategic culture without any grasp of what it actually means. Strategic culture studies take their foundations from national character, sociology and political culture studies carried out in the 1940s and 1950s as a threat assessment tool during World War Two. Over the years, many definitions have been proposed. American anthropologist Clifford Geertz defines culture as ‘an historically transmitted pattern of meanings embodied in symbols, a system of inherited conceptions… [to] communicate, perpetuate, and develop their knowledge about and attitudes towards life.’ While for Colin Gray strategic culture is the environment within which strategy is debated influencing security policy. After the Cold War, strategic culture related studies appear to have settled on Harvard University’s government department professor of China in world affairs Iain Johnston’s proposal. Based on his investigations on the existence and character of Chinese strategic culture, Johnston proposed that strategic culture is the ideational domain which limits behavioural choices enabling the ability to make predictions about one’s strategic choices. Johnston’s definition suggests that the Air Force’s strategic culture makes it inflexible and predictable. The Air Force’s strategic culture as a force for continuity To what extent is the Air Force’s strategic culture a static concept? One that underlies every decision that the workforce makes to the point of being predictable? Political scientist Jack Snyder, based on his studies of the Soviet Union, characterised strategic culture as a semi-permanent concept. To some, the continuity of strategic culture enables core principles which are unquestionably assumed to be valid to remain in place. Defence’s recent First Principles Review (FPR) disagreed. It highlighted an inflexibility and unwillingness in attitude and culture to adapt to an evolving world as a common theme running through multiple reviews revealing Defence’s resistance to change. The FPR’s summary fits well with Snyder’s characterisation. Air Force’s acquisitions in the last 75 years provide a glimpse into its behavioural choices. An organisational preference for high-end warfighting capabilities with like-for-like replacements, then using these new assets in the same way as their predecessors while assuming away capabilities such as infrastructure and airbases remain prevalent. More importantly, these choices enable potential adversaries to predict the Air Force’s options in the event of a conflict based on its past choices. For instance, Air Force is particularly exposed in the very early stages of a conflict due to its preference for leading edge technology at the expense of mass, and so has to wait for a major power’s assistance and hope for a swift and decisive victory. Any intelligent adversary would therefore simply build sufficient mass to make attrition the deciding factor. Such realities were all too present during World War Two. Air Force’s inclination for like-for-like replacements also limits innovation to what is known and preferred. This makes it more likely that Air Force may be disrupted by innovators able to generate mass as seen during the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, where Azerbaijani forces used expendable drones extensively to target Armenia’s conventional forces and destroy their tanks, artillery and air defence systems. Cultural change may not be pleasant Jeffrey Lantis and Andrew Charlton explored the conditions under which strategic culture might change. They primarily found that ‘changes in geopolitical and geostrategic circumstances, punctuated by external shocks, [prompted] reconsideration of security policy orientations and behavior.’ These geopolitical changes and external shocks included such changes as shifts in relative power of the state with others. The resultant strategic dilemmas would then force a change to both strategic cultural orientations and security policy. Another cause was the recognition by elites for a need to change when a fundamental belief was seen to be in direct conflict with reality requiring the reinterpretation of those long-held beliefs and cultural traditions. Arguably, the combination of China’s rise, coupled with the early shocks of COVID-19 during Trump’s Presidency, challenged long-held beliefs in alliances and represented the conditions Lantis and Charlton describe. As Gray succinctly notes, in the face of new challenges states must either adapt their strategic cultures or disappear. There are countless historical examples that support such grim predictions. The Peloponnesian War led to the demise of both the Athenians and the Spartans, leaving the Persians to collect the spoils of war. Similarly, the French Revolution was a cataclysmic event for the French royal elite. The end of World War One led to the demise of not only the Ottoman Empire, but also Prussia and its military elites. Similarly, World War Two brought the end of military elites in both Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan, completely rewiring their strategic cultures away from military adventurism to this day. Therefore, to avoid a similar fate over its next century, Air Force needs to ensure that its strategic culture is sufficiently agile, resilient and imaginative to not only adapt to shifts in the strategic environment, but to forecast them and act preemptively. Final thoughts and provocations for the future The strategic culture that the Air Force needs is one characterised by a contest of ideas. One that not only engages in debate, but like this piece, actively and continually seeks it out. It may be fun to list the types of technologies that we have seen in science-fiction movies or try to imagine a future operating environment based on some trends that we think we can identify. It is hubris to base our future Air Force upon such assumptions. More important is the willingness to look for and acknowledge that our blind spots, of which the biggest is our strategic culture, affect our approach to every decision that we make. Failure to do so will see us continue down a narrow path towards those things that we like doing rather than the things we must do, with the capabilities we like rather than those we need. Consider the German physicist Werner Heisenberg’s point, ‘what we observe is not nature itself but nature exposed to our particular method of questioning.’ When we imagine the Air Force in 2121, we should aim to understand how our current perspectives are affecting a future yet to unravel ahead of us. Otherwise, we are simply looking through the lens of our current context and planning to do the same things with better technology. ​​Wing Commander Ulas Yildirim is the Deputy Director Force Structure Design in Air Force Headquarters. He is also an editor of The Central Blue blog. Follow him on Twitter @lightningulas The views expressed in this article are the author’s and do not reflect the official position of the RAAF, the Department of Defence or the Australian government.

Dr Peter Layton 25 July 2021 The Chief of Air Force’s strategic intent update makes airbases a priority for future investment. Airbases certainly seem ripe for change. Conceptually, they have barely changed since World War Two when grass runways gave way to concrete ones. In this the Chief has laid out three criteria for the RAAF’s airbases: be fit for purpose, robust and resilient. In terms of purpose, RAAF airbases need to generate airpower from peace into major conflict. For this, they need to be in the right place; geography is important. In that regard, the RAAF’s southern Australian bases are very distant from potential flash points. The Air Force will need to deploy forward to bring air power to bear. In terms of robustness, airbases are large static facilities, easily targeted using kinetic and cyber weapons. In time of war, the most concerning kinetic weapons are precision guided weapons and in particular cruise missiles and ballistic missiles. Their proliferation means hardening an airbase is of little use anymore. Instead dispersion, that is hiding, is the better option. In this, the Iranian ballistic missile attacks on al Asad Air Base are instructive. The Iranian’s apparently used commercial space imagery for targeting and were able to achieve surprisingly accurate attacks. Forewarned, the US moved personnel and equipment from the area. CENTCOM General Frank McKenzie said later that the strike could have killed up to 150 Americans and destroyed 20-30 aircraft if these measures had not been taken. Iran was not a peer competitor; such attacks in a major war would be much larger, more numerous and widespread. Kinetic strikes are a wartime problem but cyber is a clear and present danger. In times of conflict the rate of cyber-attacks will step up but it is already an ongoing threat against any and all RAAF airbases. There is also a new appreciation emerging of natural disasters. Fires and floods are getting bigger, while there are more Cat 4 and 5 cyclones. Moreover, natural disasters can cascade and once triggered set off further events with impacts that can be both non-linear and distant to the triggering event. Southern Australia’s 2020 bushfires almost led to a major wide-area protracted power outage, just as the cold weather did later in Texas. Such an outage could disrupt airbases and communication networks including base personnel and their families. In terms of resilience, airbases need to be able to absorb a shock and continue to operate. In this, the shock needs to be kept to a manageable scale. If it’s very large, resilience measures can be overwhelmed and any recovery during a limited duration conflict is then unlikely. Moreover, it’s necessary to define what an airbase is to be made resilient to, when it needs to be resilient and for how long. In this, an airbase is a large facility; are some parts less important than others? Lastly, the notion of what returning to operations can range from: surviving a shock in some reduced form; continuing operation in the presence of a shock; recovering from a shock to the original form; or absorbing a shock and evolving in response. Which of those four options is desired? Let’s pull these disparate threads together into a simple quad chart. The x-axis line runs from the large southern bases across to deployment air bases, likely offshore. On the y-axis the line goes from today’s cold peace to a hope-not hot war. The chart then covers where, and in what context, airbases will need to be fit for purpose, robust, and resilient. It’s a chart to make us think about what the design of future airbases needs to be, and implicitly where to invest. Lookin’ Out My Back Door The Lookin’ Out My Back Door quadrant is the best of all worlds. The airbase is well practised in carrying out standard flying operations on a regular and ongoing basis. There is ready access to a large workforce and the ability to generate more quickly through using contractors. The airbase is well integrated into national and global supply chains. There are threats however, with cyberattacks prominent. The rise of compound and cascading disasters suggest that the airbase may need to be able to function for a short period independently of the local energy and communication networks. There is also a potential issue from nuisance commercial drones. On such airbases, the primary aim is to improve efficiency. Down on the Corner The Down on the Corner quadrant involves deploying to a northern or offshore base for an exercise that may feature a heavy international engagement strand. There will be considerable reliance on the local infrastructure and support network. RAAF staff will be a scarce asset with few available on the airbase, particularly for protracted operations. Supply will often be using commercial means with specialised maintenance items and stocks brought from Australia, at times on dedicated RAAF air transport. Cybersecurity remains a threat with the possibility of drone interference higher than in Australia. Compound and cascading disasters could still be an issue. The nature of deployed operations though is that when trouble threatens, there is always the pack up and leave option. In such an airbase, the primary aim is effectiveness; each deployed person needs to be as productive as possible. Bad Moon Rising The Bad Moon Rising quadrant involves southern bases in times of war. The main changes from the cold peace would be the higher rates of effort demanded and possibly for an extended period; the sizeable numbers of airbase personnel sent forward to run deployment airbases; the sharp rise in numbers and sophistication of cyber-attacks; and some argue the possibility of kinetic attacks from the occasional submarine launched cruise missile. Such a context means that the airbase might need operating by reservists with limited training or more likely, by newly recruited staff with enthusiasm but not much else. The advances in training that digital technology brings may be really important to bring these new people up to speed. This might be for both maintaining the airbase facilities and in sustaining the airbase’s flying operations. In terms of threats, the airbase will come under significant space-based surveillance using a variety of sensors. Moreover, it must be expected that software malware placed in systems years before will be activated to cause general disruption. This disruption might be on the airbase, but also in local and national energy and communication systems. Independent airbase operation may be necessary. Who’ll Stop the Rain The Who’ll Stop the Rain quadrant is the worst case, particularly in terms of kinetic attack. Activities will need to be dispersed so as to ensure a single attack does not inflict catastrophic damage. Regular movement may also be needed to ensure survival as attacks continue. Accordingly, a primary aim is to keep in front of the adversaries targeting system, so the location of critical items like aircraft, supplies, maintenance support and personnel is always uncertain. Precision attacks then become problematic. To back up dispersion and movement, the airbase will include active measures to fool and deceive an adversary. In this, deployed operations by their nature are always short of people while in a combat situation exposing fewer people to danger is always desirable. There are hard issues of resilience under fire. Let’s sum up. The airbases in the bottom half of the diagram aim to deliver air power as efficiently as possible. Decisions can be driven by cost-benefit analysis. In contrast, airbases in the top half of the diagram need to focus on achieving effectiveness gains. Decisions are driven by how to best increase the airbases’ outputs, hang the costs. Across all quadrants looms the spectre of cyber-attack. Crippling an airbase might cut air operations but even having someone watching online what you’re doing is bad too. Having software experts at hand looks essential, not just a nice to have, especially in the diagram’s top half combat operations. Airbases are central to air power. They need to be as the Chief sets out: fit for purpose, robust, and resilient. If not, others may steal a march. The RAAF might have the better aircraft, but with mediocre air bases might deliver less effective air power than an adversary can. That’s not a war winning place to be in. Dr Peter Layton is a Visiting Fellow at the Griffith Asia Institute, Griffith University and an Associate Fellow at the Royal United Services Institute (UK). He is the author of the book Grand Strategy. His other posts, articles and papers may be found at: https://peterlayton.academia.edu/research. This article was published by The Central Blue on June 19, 2021. Link to article: Tomorrow’s Air Force Airbases (Defense.info)

In April this year, The Sir Richard Williams Foundation's return-from-COVID seminar Next Generation Autonomous Systems (NGAS) offered a stirling line-up of thought leaders from across the air power community, charged with exploring the force multiplying capability and increasingly complex requirements associated with uncrewed systems. I had the honour of being its Master of Ceremony. It was a good event and clearly showed that Australia continues to 'punch above its weight' in getting after autonomy, but I couldn't help but ask myself, "Are we missing an Air Power opportunity?" What we know The NGAS Seminar clearly showed that we know what we could be doing: We have the historical context; We have the legal context; And we have a (loose) Robotics and Autonomous Systems (RAS) concept that could guide us forward to 2040. We are even thinking about how to Counter and Counter-Counter uncrewed tech. To get after the research aspects, the ADF has established the Trusted Autonomous Systems Defence Cooperative Research Centre (TASDCRC) to “develop the capacity of Australia’s defence industry to acquire, deploy and sustain the most advanced autonomous and robotic technology”. The knowledge framework is full spectrum, and equipped with the Subject Matter Expertise (SME) to be successful, but knowledge alone isn’t enough. What we are doing? Project Land 129-3 is scoped to integrate its Tactical Uncrewed Aerial System (TUAS) Ground Control Station into a Bushmaster Protected Mobility Vehicle in order to protect its crews. It will also enable significant C4ISREW capability as the RQ-7B Shadow 200 TUAS is replaced. The project has down-selected two contenders proposing 80%+ Australian Industry Content (AIC). They have also both proposed to integrate the Australian designed Ascent Vision Technologies Australia CM-234 Spitfire optical turret which was prototyped out of a $5.2m Defence Innovation Hub prototyping grant. Project Sea 129-5 has been directed to pursue a high level of AIC, and has recently announced its five down-selected competitors. It'll be another year or so before we understand just how much Aussie content is involved, but the Chief of Navy has assured that it will be high. Project Land 129-4B has teamed with the Defence Innovation Hub to support 10 contracts and invest more than $10million in order to generate a globally leading Australian prototype technology to compete to replace the RQ-12A Wasp AE Small UAS. Sypaq Systems have developed the Corvo-X and Ascent Vision Technologies Australia have developed the CM-62 Micro-Gimbal. These projects illustrate that the Australian Army and Navy along with the UAS technology industry is capable of leading the world. The NGAS Seminar was an excellent opportunity for both the Chief of Army and Chief of Navy to signal that they intend on championing ADF efforts in autonomy. These examples of the ADF “doing” are a firm step forward; however, they are currently all funded project-by-project in piecemeal undertakings. Project-by-project is inefficient and slow. The first efficiency dividend has been claimed by CASG through the Australian Association for Unmanned Systems (AAUS) RPAS at the Australian Skies Conference in March. Here it was briefed that CASG centralised Project and Sustainment Teams for the management of tactical capabilities which were being resourced by separate Service project contributions. Is there a case for a joint multi-domain program here? CASG has signaled such. The situation within Air Force for current UAS acquisitions is not as positive. Project Air 7000-1B is acquiring the MQ-4C Triton via a collaborative program with the United States Navy (USN). Australian requirements are baked in due to the long run partnership (first announced in 1999), but there is very little Australian industry content and little room for Australian development. Project Air 7003 is acquiring the MQ-9B SkyGuardian via Foreign Military Sales through the United States Air Force (USAF). Teamed with the RAF Protector Program, this RPAS will be the world’s first certified (and armed) system to enter service, blazing a path for significantly greater utility of uncrewed aerial systems integrated into all classes of airspace. But, again, there is very little room for Australian industry content or Australian development. What all of the ADF UAS currently in acquisition have in common is that they are remotely piloted; there is no autonomy built in, there are no manpower efficiencies and they do not contribute to generating mass. They do however help ‘Deter’ by detection: no one likes being watched. They will also assist us ‘Respond’ quicker by adding significant ISR into the operating picture. From an Air Power roles perspective, these investments are cornered into ISR (with a sliver of Strike). This is where ADF should have been a decade ago - these systems only put us on the starting blocks of the autonomous aerial systems race. What we are building Launching off the blocks is the Boeing Air Teaming System (ATS) Loyal Wingman; a prototype that could contribute to three Air Power roles (Control of the Air, ISR and Strike). Boeing's Andrew Glynn briefed the NGAS Seminar that the ATS is 70%+ Australian content, with the Chief of Air Force firmly underwriting the importance of the ATS as an experimentation platform that will shape the future of Air Force’s aircraft fleet. The first step is as a partner in Control of the Air; then in ISR, then in Strike; with each step taking the place of a crewed aircraft. Design (and build) of the ATS in Australia is the most positive step taken so far, but it is a long way from reaping an offset dividend down the track. What we are missing Quite famously, the role of Strike and the warfighting function of Force Application were fundamentally changed by the First and Second Offset strategies (Nuclear weapons and Precision Guided Munitions). At the beginning and end of the Cold War, western air power practitioners changed the way air power was defined - reconceiving what aircraft looked like and how they performed, along with rewriting air power doctrine and tactics. Autonomy and AI enable the teaming of human and machine to improve everything from decision-making and accuracy to efficiency and automation. Autonomy and AI have been heralded as the 3rd Offset strategy/technology, however, I'm not sure we're embracing it to generate the offset advantage that we should be seeking: this offset is yet to change how we do air power, or even light a fire under it. The ATS taking the place of crewed aircraft is not enough to generate an offset advantage on its own; we’re missing the offset opportunity. Iterating, not evolving, the Air Power missions Let’s look at the Air Power roles one at a time: Control of the air - The ATS will assist in generating Combat Air Patrol mass by allocating flights of ATS to crewed systems such as JSF, Super Hornet and Wedgetail. Strike - The ATS may assist in autonomous strike in the future. Air Mobility - There is currently no autonomy augmentation of air mobility being scoped. The USN has done some work with uncrewed air to air refuelling (AAR) in the MQ-25 Stingray, which we could follow, but this is simply an uncrewed iteration of AAR capability. ISR - The MQ-4C Triton and MQ-9B SkyGuardian RPAS are being acquired, and will generate additional hours and extended range in support of maritime patrol and land force support, but this is an iteration only in capacity: they are crewed systems with no autonomous functions. Not until project Air 7555 will Air Force get another project-led opportunity to evolve. In the meantime, the ATS may assist in autonomous ISR collection in the future. In sum, the ADF is looking to take humans out of the cockpit offering a safety and risk enhancement - an iteration - but this is a piecemeal approach to evolving an air power advantage. It is no more than making the Second Offset uncrewed: doing air power better. If we are to truly evolve, or revolve, or even game-change our air power advantage, to seek the Third Offset advantage through RAS/AI that has been proposed, we should not be looking to make slices of air power uncrewed. We should be looking to air power as a whole to be renewed. We should do better air power. How do we do that? Australia has to decide if it wants to do this, not just Defence. The successful first and second offset strategies required whole of government national mobilisation toward the proposed end state. The NGAS Seminar had Defence and Defence Industry, but was missing Government representation from outside Defence. Government's weigh in so far on RAS/AI is limited to the 2020 Force Structure Plan (FSP20) which includes a number of uncrewed capability projects across the services: Air Force leading, followed by Army and then Navy; around $30 billion in total. This investment remains in iterative stovepiped projects that do not give the Services direction or freedom to explore an autonomy evolution/revolution: without intervention, we might realise the autonomy revolution just in time for #AirForce2121. We need to lean in as a nation. Australia needs a strategy or roadmap that draws together the 2020 Defence Strategic Update (DSU20), the ADFRAS2040 Concept and the projects that have been approved in FSP20. It must wrap it all up with a whole of government approach to innovation and industry that will mobilise Australia to achieve it. If we don’t get after the offset opportunity properly, Australia will not yield the offset dividend we need to fight and win the contest that the DSU describes. Should we do it? The scaling advantages of autonomous systems are not to be underestimated. Uncrewed systems are orders of magnitude cheaper than the JSF, Submarines, Attack Helicopters and Frigates. TASDCRC's Jason Scholz proposed at the NGAS Seminar that we remove one submarine from the scope of SEA1000 and sink that into autonomy development: the room lifted with an air of positivity, that someone had proposed a bold move like this: not necessarily a submarine, but a (big) slice of IIP funding. Offset advantage requires boldness. Well done Jason. The DSU20 reset Australia's strategic position. The ADF is to now Shape, Deter and Respond. The force-in-being and objective force are built and resourced under FSP20 to shape and deter in the twenty-teens. Many argue that the ADF, even with FSP20 delivered, is short in sovereign response options/ability. An autonomy evolution or revolution would change that. A re-alignment and investment in autonomous systems could significantly add to deterrence and response, much more cheaply and quickly than our usual approach to buying limited quantities of the usual platforms. What does that revolution look like? A good topic for an #AirForce2121 paper or three... Wing Commander Keirin Joyce, CSC is an Air Force officer who has been supporting UAS technology development within the ADF for the last 15 years. Keirin sends his thanks to article collaborators Jo Brick and Chris McInnes. The opinions expressed are his alone and do not represent the views of the Royal Australian Air Force, the Australian Defence Force, or the Australian Government. Other good 3rd offset sources: The third offset: opportunities for Australia | The Strategist (aspistrategist.org.au) The U.S. 3rd Offset Strategy: An Opportunity for the ADF | Australian Army Research Centre (AARC) The Third Offset Strategy and the Army modernization priorities: 17855.pdf (army.mil)

The likely introduction of driverless, autonomous “taxi-drones” in major cities may have implications for the military An EHang 184 taxi drone Picture credit: EHang Officials in the city of Dubai in the United Arab Emirates have announced their intention to have driverless, automated flying taxis operating over the city by July this year. These so-called “passenger drones” will be capable of carrying a single rider with one piece of luggage, up to a maximum weight of 100 kg. The preferred vehicle is the Chinese-built EHang 184 autonomous drone, which can fly for about 30 minutes at 80 kph on a single battery charge. Test flights of the EHang 184 have already been conducted over Dubai and its 2.7 million inhabitants; and more than 100 hours of trials – including some with a human onboard – have been conducted at EHang’s headquarters near Guangzhou. According to the Dubai Roads and Transport Authority, passengers will buckle in and tap their destination on a touch-screen, after which their drone will takeoff and be flown by autopilot, while being monitored via a command centre. Communication between the command centre and its taxi-drones is encrypted, and each drone has its own key. During “extreme” weather, the command centre will prohibit takeoff. And should an in-flight malfunction occur, the drone is equipped with “failsafe multiple backup” technology that, it is said, will “immediately land a vehicle in the nearest possible area to ensure safety”. It is not clear from the manufacturer’s press releases precisely what “failsafe multiple backup” means. The manufacturers do, however, say that up to four of the eight rotors could stop and the vehicle would still be able to land safely. There will be no provision for the passenger to take control of the drone. There are three key issues here: regulation and safety; technology; and popular acceptance. The question of how and to what extent to regulate the rapidly growing number of drones of all shapes and sizes has been perhaps the most troublesome issue faced by aviation authorities in democracies during the past decade. Striking the right balance between public safety and an individual’s right to own and operate drones has been challenging. But no such challenge exists in Dubai, which is an absolute monarchy, and which perhaps partly explains why officials there have been able to press ahead so quickly with this revolutionary transport system. Most specialist commentators seem comfortable with the technology which, consistent with the general trend in computing, communications, composite materials, robotics, battery technology and the like, is almost certain to become even better and cheaper. Furthermore, while caution must be exercised in translating experiences from land-based transport systems to air-based systems, the success of fully automated, complex railway networks cannot be ignored. The Dubai Metro, for example, has been operating a two-line system 75 km long and with 49 stations since 2009, largely without incident. Public acceptance could provide the biggest hurdle. Yet any resistance might be more emotional than rational, noting that the annual General Aviation (light aircraft) accident rate in Australia between 2005 and 2014 averaged 116, with a high of 149 accidents in 2014, and that many GA operations take place from airports inside large urban areas. An airborne taxi service that averaged an accident every three days would be unlikely to stay in business very long. From the military perspective, the story here seems to be not so much one of driverless, autonomous flying taxis, but of the inevitable rise of these kinds of technologies, and what that might mean, if anything, for concepts of operations, force structures, and recruitment policies. #Robotics #driverlesscars #UAS #autonomous #drones #dronetaxi #flightsafety #AI

US Marines fighting in the Middle East are using a variety of methods to counter the growing threat of cheap, commercial-off-the-shelf drones Picture credit Daily Telegraph Islamic State fighters in Iraq are expanding the reach and sophistication of their drone fleet. Among other things, they have used quadcopters to drop grenade-sized bombs on Iraqi security forces. And drones are now so inexpensive and accessible that they can be bought at toy stores or online. According to Lieutenant Colonel Dave Sousa of the US Marine Corps Combat Development Command, the military is wasting no time looking for ways to jam and destroy enemy drones. “This is not just the Marine Corps,” Sousa told Marine Corps Times, “this is all services: Army, Navy Air Force and Coast Guard … everybody is looking at this”. The goal is to find ways to disrupt the link between the operator and drone, rendering it useless, or to blast drones out of the sky. “We’re looking at everything from shotguns to water cannons to other kinetic means,” Sousa said. “We’re looking at lasers. We are looking at anything and everything that can help counter these threats.” The Marine Corps is working with the Office of Naval Research to develop the Ground-Based Air Defense Directed Energy On-the-Move system, which would use a laser to target enemy drones. However, lasers might not be the right weapon in densely populated urban environments, where the Marines expect to fight future wars. Lasers are direct-fire weapons, and if Marines are fighting amid a cluster of buildings several stories high, lasers may not be able to hit drones that suddenly pop-up above rooftops. Furthermore, drones are hard to detect because their radar signature is minuscule compared to manned aircraft, and it is difficult to discriminate between drones and birds. Using “unspecified technical capabilities”, US troops have helped Iraqi security forces down nearly a dozen IS drones over Mosul. It is known that the Marines have conducted operational assessments of the Battelle DroneDefender, which uses electromagnetic waves to jam drones within a range of 400 meters. The drone threat extends far beyond terrorist groups. In January last year, an Iranian drone flew over  the carrier Harrier S. Truman while the ship was in international waters. The requirement to find a counter is “urgent”. As one Marine specialist stated: “If I could something out there today that detects, identifies, tracks, and defeats [drones] … then I’d get it today”. Jeff Schogol is a senior reporter with the Marine Corps Times #COTS #drones #technology #IS #USMarines

On 27 February, Chief of Air Force Air Marshal Leo Davies officially launched ‘Air Force Strategy 2017-2027’, a vision for the Royal Australian Air Force to transition and become a fifth-generation Air Force. The Strategy, aimed primarily at Air Force decision-makers, outlines five strategic vectors that will guide Air Force’s trajectory over the next decade. It was written to address a perceived gap as Air Force, according to its Chief, ‘lacked a coherent document that outlined where we are heading as an organisation’. Chief of Air Force discusses the Strategy The Strategy is closely linked to Plan Jericho, Air Force’s program of initiatives to foster innovative thinking and exploit new capabilities, but aims to embed the Jericho approach across Air Force to become an enduring feature of the organisation. The five strategic vectors identified in the ‘Air Force Strategy 2017-2027’ are Joint Warfighting Capability; People Capability; Communication and Information Systems; Infrastructure; and International Engagement. Of these, Chief of Air Force highlighted Joint Warfighting and People Capability as those areas that would require the most fundamental changes. Joint Warfighting Capability Over recent decades, the Australian Defence Force has made huge advances in its joint warfighting capability. Joint command and control of operational forces is now core practice, particularly with the establishment of Headquarters Joint Operations Command. But differing doctrine, lack of joint training & education, and rivalry for resources can all contribute to a backdrop of tension and misunderstanding between the services. The two central issues limiting joint warfighting, as described in the Strategy, are acquisition and culture. The Strategy outlines Air Force’s intent to maximise integration of its current systems, and achieve full integration of future systems, with other Defence systems and procedures. Rather than individually procure equipment and then reverse engineer solutions to make it work together, the Australia Defence Force will be ‘joint-by-design’ through an improved capability acquisition process. Jointness in non-traditional domains such as space and cyber will also be increasingly important as modern defence forces’ recognise the enormous impact they have on operations in the more traditional domains of air, sea and land. Air Force has traditionally been poor at developing its people to be effective contributors to joint headquarters, instead focusing on highly specialised individual training. Thus the People Capability vector outlines a pathway to ‘promote a commitment to ‘jointness’ in Air Force culture’, with Chief of Air Force outlining his aim that people in the organisation ‘begin to put the joint effect before our own Air Force requirements’. People Capability An emphasis on people has become a focus for modern organisations, which recognise that attracting, recruiting and retaining the right personnel is critical to achieving organisational goals. In Air Force, perhaps more so than the other service arms, investment has previously concentrated on platforms over people. Technology alone cannot be relied on to maintain a decisive advantage in warfare – it is often obsolete soon after being introduced, has become more accessible to our adversaries and is likely to be targeted early on in a major conflict. Instead Air Force members’ cognitive skills can provide a greater capability edge, where they are able to out-think and out-play the adversary. Thus the Strategy aims to create a ‘fifth-generation workforce’ that is ‘comfortable with uncertainty’. This will require major shifts in how Air Force delivers its program of professional military education and training, which has struggled to be effective in its aim of increasing professional mastery. Communication and Information Systems The objective of the Communication and Information Systems (CIS) vector is to increase the compatibility of Air Force’s disparate systems, as well as ensure they are robust and redundant on operations. As with the ‘joint-by-design’ concept, the goal is that CIS should be networked with existing systems when acquired, and not through later workarounds and ‘stitching’ of systems. The Strategy also emphasises the requirement to operate in contested and degraded electronic environments, and the need to increase its members’ technical proficiency in electronics systems. Infrastructure Air Force operates from its bases, but over the years relatively little thought has been given to whether its infrastructure is optimised to support modern operations. The Infrastructure vector seeks to reconsider the role of bases as a capability enabler, and ensure they are hardened and adaptable enough to survive future conflict. The Strategy aims to develop new operating concepts for its bases, to include mobile and agile basing. International Engagement The 2016 Defence White Paper described Defence international engagement as part of a broader Government approach to building international partnerships alongside trade, diplomacy, foreign aid and economic capacity building. Key outcomes of greater Defence international engagement are enhanced interoperability, greater access to information, and provision of opportunities for mutual development. Effective international engagement can also reduce the potential for armed conflict by increasing ‘transparency and trust’ with a range of regional and global partners. The International Engagement vector is based on the person-to-person relationships developed by Air Force personnel, facilitated by improved cultural awareness and language training. International cooperation on Exercise Pitch Black Strategy for change The Strategy deliberately focuses on areas requiring change, and is an important step forward for Air Force in that it implicitly acknowledges shortfalls in how the organisation has previously approached its business. Thus the focus on infrastructure and information systems acknowledges the relative neglect of these ‘unsexy’ elements of capability; and the emphasis on joint warfighting acknowledges that Air Force – perhaps never quite overcoming its late start as an independent service – can occasionally be insular and self-serving. The Strategy is representative of a more mature service that understands where it fits within the Australian Defence Force, within the Department of Defence, within the political and diplomatic toolbox, and within the region. Integration with other services, agencies and foreign partners is not a preference; it is an imperative. ‘Air Force Strategy 2017-2027’ has set out vectors, goals and pathways to become a fifth-generation Air Force – as always, the challenge will be in implementation.

It is widely accepted that military forces increasingly are going to have to fight in vast, dense urban areas. US Army Major John Spencer from West Point’s Modern War Institute presents a compelling case for armies to prepare far better for this extraordinarily demanding environment. The issue also demands the serious attention of air power professionals: throughout this essay, we could substitute “air forces” for “armies” or “land forces” and the message would remain the same. Picture credit: Army Press DoD Live Every year, more and more of the world’s population moves into cities. The number of megacities is growing exponentially. Both of these global patterns and their inevitable consequences for military operations are well documented. Yet we still do not have units that are even remotely prepared to operate in megacities. If we want to find success on the urban battlefields in which the US Army will inevitably find itself fighting in the future, that needs to change. Throughout history, military forces either sought to avoid or simply had no need to engage in urban combat. Most military doctrine, and the strategic theory it is built upon, encourages land forces to bypass, lay siege to or, if required, isolate and slowly clear cities from the outside in. The great armies of the world have historically fought for cities rather than in cities, a distinction with a significant difference. In cases where military forces had no choice but to operate within cities, the environment, almost without exception, proved very costly in both military and civilian casualties. Today, many armies have accepted that global population growth and urbanisation trends will increasingly force military operations into crowded cities, and military forces must therefore be capable of conducting the full range of operations in large, dense urban areas. Army chief of staff General Mark Milley recently remarked that the Army “has been designed, manned, trained and equipped for the last 241 years to operate primarily in rural areas”. But that is about to change. General Milley continued: “In the future, I can say with very high degrees of confidence, the American Army is probably going to be fighting in urban areas … We need to man, organise, train and equip the force for operations in urban areas, highly dense urban areas, and that’s a different construct. We’re not organised like that right now.” But despite the clear recognition that armed forces will increasingly be required to fight in urban areas, no army has committed to train, organise, and equip forces specifically to operate in cities. It is time for the US Army to do just that. A 2016 United Nations report estimated that 54.5 per cent of the world’s population lived in urban areas. By 2030, that percentage is projected to rise to 60 per cent. As a result of this rural-to-urban migration, cities themselves are growing. In 2016, there were 512 cities with at least one million inhabitants globally. By 2030, a projected 662 cities will have at least one million residents. And the number of “megacities” in the world – those with ten million residents or more – is projected to grow from thirty-one to forty-one in the same period. In 2014, the chief of staff of the Army’s Strategic Studies Group (SSG) chose megacities as its organising theme for its yearlong research projects. Concept teams looked at the unique characteristics and challenges of a megacity, future maneuver and mobility concepts, Army force design considerations, personnel talent management, and other topics, assessing the requirements for operating in megacities. The conclusions of the SSG research are clear: megacities are unavoidable, they are potentially the most challenging environment the Army has ever faced, and the Army is unprepared to operate in them. The SSG also recommended that the Army, charged with the mandate of preparing forces for sustained operations on land, take the lead in training, organising, and equipping forces for megacities. As William Adamson noted in his 2015 Parameters article, “Megacities and the US Army,” the research conducted by the SSG was not the first to take a hard look at the challenges of large urban areas. Adamson highlighted a 2000 Government Accounting Office report, which noted that “despite a growing unease that the urban environment is a known vulnerability of US forces, DoD has not made a major commitment to dramatically improve urban capabilities”. Shortly after this, the 2001 Defense Planning Guidance commissioned a study and eighteen-month project that resulted in the Joint Urban Operations (JUO) Master Plan 2012–2017. Interest in the megacities problem did not end after the SSG study. The Army’s 2014 Unified Quest wargames included megacities scenarios in its study of future operational environments. The US Army Training and Doctrine Command’s “Mad Scientist” project continues to look at technological solutions to the challenges posed by megacities. Multiple organisations and agencies continue to assess the Army’s capabilities gaps through the standard Doctrine, Organisation, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel Facilities, and Policy framework. But despite all of this study, no change has been made to the Army of today to prepare for tomorrow’s operations in megacities – a tomorrow that could be here very soon. One ongoing military study of megacities is the NATO Urbanisation Project. Initiated in 2014, it is a conceptual study of potential crisis situations in urban systems, consequences of urbanisation, and the impact on NATO military operations. The project includes seventeen NATO nations, sixteen NATO Centers of Excellence, and representatives of academia and industry. In the project’s most recent experiment, the NATO team conducted a wargame to determine the capabilities needed to achieve the goals of three likely missions in 2035: response to mass migration; natural disaster; and inner-city turmoil. Within these missions, the wargame specified that a brigade conduct three operations in a megacity – joint forcible entry, major combat, and subsequent stability operations – without unacceptable levels of military or civilian casualties. In addition to identifying capabilities gaps in mobility, command and control, and intelligence, the study found that normal employment concepts and force packages for a brigade were wholly inadequate. In future experiments, game participants will be given 5,000 personnel (the high end of a conventional brigade’s manpower) and asked to design a force specifically for the urban environment. Training, manning, and equipping a 5,000-soldier force to specialise in urban operations would be a novel concept; no military force in the world has attempted this endeavor despite the well-documented challenges of military operations in dense urban terrain. The US Army purposely avoids specialisation. The Army’s Brigade Combat Team structure of light infantry, mechanised infantry, and armored formations is specifically designed for global deployment to conduct any and all missions. While these “general purpose” forces may be designed for major combat operations against near-peer adversaries, they are expected to be able to adapt their force structure to any enemy in any environment. But the degree of specialised training, manning, and equipment required to effectively fight in megacities is incompatible with the general purpose approach. Of course, urban warfare is not exclusively a future phenomenon. Much has been learned from urban battles in recent history: the Siege of Sarajevo (1992–95); the Battle of Mogadishu (1993); Russian operations in Grozny (1994–95 and 1999–2000); US operations in Baghdad (2003) and Fallujah (2004); Lebanese operations in Nahr al-Bared, Lebanon (2007); and the Second Battle of Donetsk (2014–15). But the broad lessons of these cases have yet to truly inform Army training for urban combat, which for most units consists mainly of tactical training (e.g., room clearing drills with four-man teams). The Army would be much better served by the creation of an entire unit dedicated to preparing to operate in dense urban environments, particularly megacities. The lessons from recent cases of urban warfare and the many studies on the unique requirements posed by operating in a megacity can be used to design such a unit today. This would be a starting point from which to examine unanswered questions: What are the necessary skills of an urban warrior? What is the right mix of enablers and cross-trained soldiers? What are the best movement and maneuver techniques? If megacities represent a unique unit of analysis, how will that inform this new unit’s mission planning? Recent studies and global trends forecast the unavoidable deployment of military forces to achieve national objectives in megacities. Specifically preparing for such a deployment would be a bold insurance plan, and the right choice. Major John Spencer is a scholar with the Modern War Institute at the United States Military Academy, West Point. A former Ranger Instructor, he has served in ranger, airborne, light, and mechanised infantry units during his 23 years as an infantryman. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the US government. #experimentation #megacities #urbanwarfare

If, as the eminent strategist and military historian Edward Luttwak has argued, the people in our armed services define themselves through their ships, aeroplanes and tanks – a phenomenon he describes as “platformitis” – then the Australian Defence Force’s dominant culture is both obvious and near-impossible to change. As thing stand, for the next twenty years at least, the ADF’s force structure and, therefore, its self-image and the way in which it is able to conduct operations, will continue to be dominated by large manned platforms. The RAAF and the RAN in particular are presently engaged in major re-equipment programs. In strictly institutional terms the Air Force is the more fortunate of the two services because its program is nearly completed and cannot easily be undone. The arrival in recent years of C-17s, Super Hornets, E-7s, C-27s, P-8s and KC-30s, soon to be followed by Growlers and F-35s, has given the RAAF its most potent combination of platforms since the end of World War II. Concurrently, the Navy has commissioned the largest vessels it has operated since that war in the form of its two LHDs-come-amphibious assault ships, which are being joined by three air warfare destroyers. There is also an intention to acquire twelve submarines at a cost of around $50 billion over the next thirty years. In what is an era of dramatic global technological and social change described as the Fourth Industrial Revolution, it is the broader implications of the words “platformitis” and “thirty years” that’s the worry. First, however, let’s deal with the present. By any measure, we live in interesting times. Geopolitics, the balance of power, alliances, treaties, and long-standing props of the international order are the most unsettled they’ve been for decades. We can hope that things will improve but, as the Athenian general and historian Thucydides noted more than 2000 years ago, hope can be an expensive commodity. We need to be able to protect ourselves, and in today’s uncertain world Australians should be grateful that they have a powerful, first-class defence force based on high-quality people and platforms. The question is, though: how much longer will the model that has produced this outcome remain valid? The preceding three industrial revolutions were driven by technological developments in which new machines changed the way we worked and how we lived. Extreme though those changes were, they will be far exceeded in scale and effect by the Fourth Industrial Revolution which, in the words of the World Economic Forum, is being driven by a “fusion of technologies that is blurring the lines between the physical, digital and biological spheres”. This time, change will be neither incremental nor linear, and it will be not merely transformative, but socially destructive. The Fourth Industrial Revolution will change everything, and it will do so in a compressed timeframe. The various technical components of this new model are well-understood: computers, the Internet, robotics, artificial intelligence, 3-D printers, drones, and so on. What is not well-understood is how we can make those components best work together, for our benefit; and what the probable effects will be on the social, political and economic certitudes that have underpinned Western society for the past seventy years. Authoritative sources have suggested that, among other things, the irresistible rise of robotics and artificial intelligence will hollow-out today’s workforces by anywhere from 40 to 80 per cent. The implications of that are, of course, stunning. The military will not be immune from any of this. As it happens, Western defence forces have been leaders in developing technologies such as UAVs, UROVs, bomb disposal robots, self-driving vehicles, stand-off weapons, voice command devices, and so on. The ADF, for instance, has any number of research centres and test and evaluation units conducting valuable work on advanced technologies. But the issue is far bigger than that. At this stage it is necessary to explain the connection between the Fourth Industrial Revolution and so-called “manifold” or “hybrid” warfare. Traditional warfare has been characterised by the use of armies, navies and air forces; direct clashes between those forces; and winning by defeating the enemy on the battlefield. Manifold warfare, however, is challenging that model through the increasing use of non-military and covert means; the open targeting of civilians and their infrastructure; remote strikes using precision weapons; the use of robotic systems; cyber attacks; and winning indirectly by disrupting an enemy’s political, economic and information support systems. The nature of the current fighting in Syria, Iran-Iraq, and the Crimea is cited as evidence of this model. It is, if you will, a model for a “post-platformitis” world. As noted above, numerous official and industry groups in Australia are already working on different aspects of the challenge this presents. But an ad hoc approach does not come close to addressing the magnitude of the task. Who, for example, is seriously studying the acute implications for the ADF’s organisational arrangements, or culture, or workforce, or strategy, or concepts of operations? Given Edward Luttwak’s conclusion regarding the socialisation of Western military forces, it’s unlikely a satisfactory response will come from within the ADF. If Australia is going to confront the profound national defence implications of the Fourth Industrial Revolution, the government needs to establish an independent, authoritative, properly-resourced Office for Robotics to systematically examine every aspect of this phenomenon – technological, institutional, political, economic, social, and military-strategic. Maintaining the status quo cannot be an option. Dr Alan Stephens is a Fellow of the Sir Richard Williams Foundation #RAAF #Robotics #manifoldwarfare #artificialintelligence #4thindustrialrevolution #drones #Strategy #ADF #RAN #hybridwarfare