Robbin Laird and Ed Timperlake Featured Article in Second Line of Defense 28 March 2021 Last Fall, 2nd Fleet hosted the 2020 version of Black Widow, an Atlantic-focused USW exercise. But to be completely accurate, although the term ASW is most commonly used, what we are discussing is undersea warfare. USW is an integrated fight against all undersea threats, with submarines being a key, but not the only threat. ASW is part of USW. As one Naval officer put it: “When we tend to discuss an integrated fight, we try to use the term USW, but when we are specifically hunting for just a submarine, ASW is the correct term.” This is not classic USW, but one in which new capabilities are being woven into shaping a 21st century version of USW to deal with a 21st century threat posed from the sea. USW is becoming reshaped by the interactive kill web approach of multi-domain assets focused on a core warfighting capability and set of relevant skill sets. U.S. Navy aircraft, surface ships and submarines will participate in Exercise Black Widow 2020 in the North Atlantic Sept. 12-18. During Exercise Black Widow our Fleet warfighters employ, hone, and evaluate tactics, techniques, and procedures to enhance our readiness for real world operations, with specific focus on advancing our theater undersea warfare advantage in a multi-domain environment. This exercise will allow us to develop new doctrine and innovative tactics that address the capabilities of our near-peer competitors across the range of missions we expect to encounter in major combat operations. This year’s participants include the amphibious assault ship USS Wasp (LHD 1), the Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyers USS Arleigh Burke (DDG 51) and USS McFaul (DDG 74), a Virginia-class fast-attack submarine, a Los-Angeles class fast-attack submarine, Patrol and Reconnaissance Wing 11, and Helicopter Maritime Strike Squadrons 46 and 72. This marks the first time U.S. 2nd Fleet (C2F) and Commander, Submarine Group (SUBGRU) 2 will lead the force. “The reestablishment of Submarine Group 2 enables the Navy and our Allies to finely tune our efforts in this resurgent battlespace, and reinforces the critical trans-Atlantic link,” said Vice Adm. Andrew Lewis, Commander, U.S. 2nd Fleet. “Exercises like Black Widow give the undersea force a venue to showcase how we are agile, persistent, flexible, interoperable, and resilient.” Participating units will refine communication techniques between platforms and simulate real-word application to enhance the lethality of the team as one cohesive fighting force. Black Widow also provides a chance for an increased focus on training in anti-submarine warfare on multiple platforms to enhance strategies and heighten the combat readiness of the fleet. Vice Adm. Daryl L. Caudle, Commander, Submarine Forces. “We train like we fight, and strive for innovation, development, and improvement across all spectrums of warfare. To maintain superiority, we must be more agile in concepts, geography and technology.” We had a chance to get further insights into the evolving “team sport,” from Rear Admiral Jim Waters, Commander Submarine Group Two (SUBGRU2) during our visit to Norfolk in March 2021. The Admiral has a distinguished career with significant operational experience in both the Pacific and the Atlantic (see biography at the end of the article.) When SUBGRU2 celebrated its first anniversary of its establishment in September 2020, the Commander was quoted in a story published by the command on September 30, 2020. Submarine Group 2 (SUBGRU 2) celebrated its first anniversary after reestablishment on Sept. 30, 2019. SUBGRU 2 was reestablished a little more than a year after the reestablishment of U.S. 2nd Fleet in August 2018, and was aimed at enhancing the Navy’s capacity to command and control its undersea warfare (USW) forces in the Western Atlantic. Rear Adm. Jim Waters, SUBGRU 2 commander and Ellington, Connecticut native, highlighted the importance of reestablishing the command. “We are tasked with advancing the art of undersea warfare through the combined efforts of our air, surface, submarine, and other underwater capabilities and to provide exquisitely trained forces to ensure undersea dominance in the Atlantic…I am honored to be a part of developing and leading this command into the future of integrated undersea warfare.” SUBGRU 2 serves as the Theater Undersea Warfare Commander (TUSWC) for 2nd Fleet and 4th Fleet in response to increasing near-peer competition in the Atlantic. SUBGRU 2 has the authority to command and control air, surface, and undersea forces to execute integrated multi-domain undersea operations in defense of the homeland. In our discussion, a number of themes emerged and what clearly was especially hammered home was a significant focus on innovation in working a wide variety of platforms to deliver the desired combat effect. In fact, the Rear Admiral underscored that for Vice Admiral Lewis, many Navy platforms maybe considered an USW platform since they all have the ability to see, to communicate, and as necessary provide weapons as contributors to what is now known as the USW Team Sport. Clearly, the submarine remains the number one sub killer with weapons deployed for this purpose. But with the expanded capability of surface and air-borne assets to find, track and kill submarines, the role of the underwater U.S. Navy force changes as well. It can be the cutting-edge stalker or killer or work through the kill web force to get the desired result. In fact, having a wider range of options for prosecution and destruction of adversary submarines than in the past is a key element for 21st century maritime operations and warfare. Over the past few years in interviews with aviators in the transformed Maritime Patrol community with the P-8 and the Triton., along with a more focused integration of the Romeo helicopters we saw the U.S. Navy reshape airborne forces working together to deliver a desired kill web combat effect. Along that journey we saw the establishment of fleet level Maritime ISR (MISR) officers reflect the importance of the Information (note we are calling it “I” for Information vice Intelligence), Surveillance and Reconnaissance capability availability for maritime warfare, including ASW in particular. Command guidance reflected in what is known as the “Commanders Intent” side of this effort is the key focus of Vice Admiral Lewis and is clearly seen in the work of Submarine Group 2. Mission command is crucial and Command guidance intent is clearly distributed to the fleet to shape and task forces that can deliver the desired combat effect. Obviously, how communications and how ISR is shared between an undersea, surface and airborne force varies in terms of operating theaters and is a challenge; working interactivity across the domains is a key part of exercising an ASW team approach. Rethinking how to use platforms is an essential part of the process because the U.S. Navy can practice like Black Widow demonstrated, employing amphibious platforms as part of sea control and sea denial. In Black Widow 2020, they did so in the form of the USS WASP. The WASP was used as an ASW helo platforms, and the Rear Admiral underscored that the seaworthiness of the WASP and its deck space allowed for the team to use the Romeos operating off of the WASP to provide a key capability for the integrated fight. Another driver for change in USW operations in the Atlantic is clearly new capabilities being operated by our allies, whether they be new diesel submarines or nuclear attack submarines in the case of the French and British, or new USW frigates, or new maritime patrol aircraft capabilities, whether they be the new P-8s as in the case of Britain or Norway, or new capabilities on older aircraft, as in the case of Canada. As Rear Admiral Garvin, then the MPRA commander, put it last year; “In effect, we are shaping kill web “matesmanship.” “Our policy frameworks simply need to catch up with our technologies.” “Our allies understand the fundamental nature of their region better than we do. “If you have properly maintained these important working relationships, both interpersonal and technological, then you will have access to the cultural knowledge and human geography that might otherwise would not be available to you. “We clearly have closer relationships with some allies than with others, which shapes policy and data sharing. However, the technology is now out there which can allow us, within the right policy framework, to provide data at appropriate security levels much more rapidly than in the past. “Those partnerships need to be nurtured and exercised now to help shape our interactive webs into a truly effective strike force over the extended battlespace.” Rear Admiral Waters certainly reinforced this point, as in the Atlantic, we have a number of key partners who work ASW and anti-surface warfare as a core competence for their national navies, and their domain knowledge is a key part of the equation in shaping enhanced warfighting capabilities and re-enforcing deterrence. “ Because of the complexity of the underwater domain, it is necessarily a team sport. There are people that would love to say, “It’s the submarines. And they do ASW and that’s what they do.” “And certainly, it’s a major mission for the submarine force. But the threat is so complex, and the environment is so challenging, that you can’t rely on one particular platform to do this mission. “We as a navy have evolved a very robust structure of training and assessing and preparing and innovating. We’re really good at carrier-centric integration. “But our ability to integrate a non-carrier-centric force, like a theater undersea warfare task force, needs to be enhanced. And that was what Black Widow represented. We operated as a fleet or a task force to deliver the desired combat effect.” Finally, there is the question of the coming of maritime autonomous systems and how they might fit into the concepts of operations which the Rear Admiral is shaping and executing. Recently, the Navy released its plan for developing and then integrating maritime autonomous systems into the force. Clearly, one domain where this may well happen is in the ISR side of providing information for both ASW and anti-surface warfare. The promise is there, but also the question of the readiness of the networks to handle data and where that data will go remains a work in progress. This is how Rear Admiral Waters put it : “ Unmanned systems will play an important role in the future. “The fact that they can dwell for long periods, and we don’t have to worry about feeding the people on board, will provide an important contribution in the undersea warfare area. “Unmanned systems have the ability to stare for a long time and if you could put a platform out there that can either stay in the air a really long time or stay in the environment with acoustic sensors for a really long time, that gives you the ability to sense the environment. “The challenge comes with regard to how what information you have gathered becomes useful. “We have to have the place where they plug in, and how to use that information in the area of interest?” It is clear that the undersea domain which is the focus of attention of Rear Admiral Walters is best understood not only in terms of its own dynamic, but how it interacts with the threats and challenges across the multi-domain theater of operations which C2F and Allied JFC Norfolk focus upon. As Vice Admiral Lewis noted the change in his March 2021 Proceedings article: “Both JFCNF and C2F are shifting their mind-sets from predominantly operating from the sea to fighting at sea—which requires mastery of the domains below, on, and above the sea. We are executing high-end maritime operations from seabed to space. Our collective security and interconnected global economy depend on open shipping lanes, unhindered air travel, and uninterrupted flow of data., C2F and JFCNF are natural partners—each advocating for the other and working in unison. “ Russia has increased its military posture during the past decade, to signal its ability to threaten allied capabilities, infrastructure, and territory. Russia has invested in capability versus capacity—it knows it will never have more ships, aircraft, or submarines than all of NATO—with an eye toward asymmetric capabilities. So, we carefully monitor Russian investments in force multipliers such as hypersonic weapons, submarine quieting, extended-range missile systems, and information warfare.” “Russia’s activity in the gray zone notably includes its underwater reconnaissance program and information operations. In recent years, Russia intensified its submarine activity around the undersea cables, which are essential for global communications—including the internet. The ability of an American user to access a website in Europe or vice versa largely depends on a network of several hundred fiber-optic communication cables that run across the ocean floor—and Russia has deployed submarines to map out the cables, likely in preparation for nefarious activity.” In short, the undersea domain is a key field of action, where dominance is best ensured by having a 360-degree operational capability encompassing the surface, air and space domains. Clearly, Rear Admiral Waters not only understands this, but is leading the way in shaping the kind of innovation crucial for the defense of the homeland and U.S. interests abroad. Rear Admiral James Waters III , Commander, Submarine Group TWO Rear Adm. Waters is a native of Ellington, Connecticut and 1989 graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy with a degree in Systems Engineering. He completed graduate studies at Oxford University in 1991. His sea tours include various division officer assignments onboard USS Henry M. Jackson (SSBN 730G), engineer officer onboard USS Philadelphia (SSN 690) and executive officer onboard USS Alabama (SSBN 731B). He commanded USS Virginia (SSN 774) and Submarine Squadron Four. Rear Admiral James Waters III, Commander, Submarine Group TWO His staff assignments include operations officer at Submarine Squadron Two, engineer at Submarine Squadron Three, submarine executive officer detailer, deputy commander of Submarine Squadron One, battle watch commander and chief of staff for U.S. Strategic Command’s Director of Global Operations (J3), CNO Strategic Studies Group 35, and as deputy executive director for the Chief of Naval Personnel. He most recently served as director, Maritime Headquarters, U.S. Pacific Fleet. Waters assumed his current duties in August 2019 as commander, Submarine Group Two in Norfolk, Virginia. His decorations include the Defense Superior Service Medal, Legion of Merit, Meritorious Service Medal, Navy-Marine Corps Commendation Medal, Navy-Marine Corps Achievement Medal, and various other individual, unit, campaign and service awards. He is most proud of those awards that reflect the hard work and success of the many teams he has been privileged to serve. Dr Robbin Laird is a Williams Foundation Fellow. See his bio here . Reference: Second Line of Defense

Robbin Laird Second Line of Defense 23 March 2021 A year ago, I was in Australia and working on my Australian OPV report. I visited Western Australia and then returned to Canberra to discuss the acquisition with a number of DoD officials. That report highlighted how the new-build OPV set in motion the new shipbuilding strategy for Australia, one which highlighted the need for integratability across the distributed fleet. A year later, an the Arafura class OPV enterprise has been launched. And since my visit, the formal decision has been reached to use the OPV hull design to build other variants of the ship as well. A story published on March 8, 2021 by the Australian Defence Business Review provides further details. The Commonwealth has launched the Arafura class Offshore Patrol Vessel (OPV) Enterprise and has opened the OPV System Program Office at Henderson in WA. The OPV Enterprise consists of Commonwealth and defence industry teams working together to build and sustain the 12 new Arafura Class OPVs being acquired under Project SEA 1180. “It is great to see the co-location of Commonwealth shipbuilding and sustainment personnel and Luerssen, CIVMEC and Raytheon industry partners delivering outcomes for our Navy,” Deputy Secretary National Naval Shipbuilding, RADM (Ret) Tony Dalton said in a statement. Head Maritime Systems, RADM Wendy Malcolm added, “The launch marks a critical step towards the implementation of Plan Galileo, an ambitious Future Maritime Sustainment Model which ensures our sustainment organisation engages with acquisition teams early in the build process.” “Evolution of our asset management, supply chain, infrastructure, improved commercial models and professionalisation across the enterprise will be key to success,” she said. “This process ensures sustainment needs are considered during the design phase, and brings together Defence, primes, small business and service providers to facilitate sustainment of our naval vessels from strategically located ports around the country.” Based on the Luerssen OPV90 design, the first two Arafura class vessels are currently being constructed at Osborne in Adelaide, while the remaining vessels plus additional mine countermeasures and survey vessels of a similar design will be built at Henderson. Dr Robbin Laird is a Williams Foundation Fellow. See his bio here . Reference: Second Line of Defense

The Future of Unmanned Military Systems by Arthur H. Barber III Chief Analyst, Systems Planning and Analysis, Inc. 19 February, 2021 Systems Planning and Analysis (SPA) Australia Pty Ltd is a contributor to The Sir Richard Williams Foundation. Here, the company’s Chief Analyst provides a brief introduction to the topic and it’s effect on future war fighting capability as a preamble to our upcoming seminar.

Dr Robbin Laird, Joint by Design: The Evolution of Australian Defence Strategy. 24 December 2020 Link to book details Joint by Design: The Evolution of Australian Defence Strategy - Second Line of Defense (sldinfo.com) Available on Amazon. You can also purchase directly through the SLDINFO website for 30% off if you use the code: Williams. This is the second book in our 21st Century Global Change Series. In the midst of the COVID-19 crisis, the prime minister of Australia, Scott Morrison, launched a new defense and security strategy for Australia. This strategy reset puts Australia on the path of enhanced defense capabilities. The change represents a serious shift in its policies towards China, and in reworking alliance relationships going forward. As one senior RAAF officer put it: “The Prime Minister of Australia, the Honorable Scott Morrison, has launched the Defense Strategic Update, which moved Australia’s defense policy away from a globally-balanced approach under our Defense White Paper of 2016, towards a more regionally focused posture, founded in the principles of shape, deter, and respond. The new policy approach places great emphasis on the need for our forces to be well integrated, both internally to Australia, and across our strategic partners. ” Joint by Design is focused on Australian policy, but it is about preparing liberal democracies around the world for the challenges of the future. The strategic shift from land wars to full spectrum crisis management requires liberal democracies to have forces lethal enough, survivable enough, and agile enough to support full spectrum crisis management. The book provides an overview of the evolution of Australian defence modernization over the past seven years, and the strategic shift underway to do precisely that. Although this is a book about Australia, it is about the significant shift facing the liberal democracies in meeting the challenge of dealing with the 21st century authoritarian powers. In this sense, the volume is very complimentary to our book the return of direct defense in Europe, a book that concludes with a chapter that highlights the Australian contribution to the rethinking going on in Europe about direct defense. The book is based on the bi-annual Williams Foundation seminars held since 2014, and include insights and presentations by Australians and several key allies of Australia. In that sense, the book provides an Australian-led allied rethink with regard to how to meet 21st century defense challenges. The two books read together provide a good overview of where key allies are with regard to rethinking defense certa 2020. As Anne Borzycki, Director of the Institute of Integrated Economic Research – Australia, has highlighted: “Dr Robbin Laird brings a unique perspective to his analysis of the journey the Australian Defence Force (ADF) has been on over the last six years. As an American, and also a European resident, he understands the military and strategic realities of Europe and the United States and is therefore able to place Australia, as a modern middle-power, into the spectrum of Western Liberal Democracies. And importantly, this book highlights the lessons that Europe and the United States could learn from Australia as the first quarter of the 21st century draws to a close. “This book is a modern history that begins in 2014. The year 2014 might seem recent – however given the upheavals wrought upon the world by changing global power dynamics, national domestic political challenges, military transformations and finally, the pandemic – it could just as well be 60, not 6, years ago.” And Andrew Carr, Senior Lecturer, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University noted in a recent review: “Joint by Design offers a valuable overview of how Australia’s defence force has been evolving, innovating and adapting. It tells a story that is typically only ever seen by the public in piecemeal. A new piece of equipment here, or training and doctrinal changes there. In Joint by Design, Robbin Laird shows, through dozens of interviews with the main participants, how these various parts all fit together. “This book is therefore an important contribution to our understanding of both Australian defence policy now operates, but also how western armed forces are changing in light of the growing threat of the new authoritarians such as Russia and China. As such, it should be of interest to those concerned with the nature of modern warfare, security trends in Asia, and the evolution of western armed forces.” The book can be found in hardback, paperback and e-book versions on most book sellers worldwide.

Recently, Dr Laird continued his discussion with Brendan Sargeant, the well-known and well-regarded Australian strategist about how best to understand the challenge posed by the regime of President Xi to Australia and the Indo-Pacific region. Dr Laird focused on how Brendan Sargeant would characterize the nature and focus of the strategy of the Xi regime as a Communist Authoritarian state and then focused on how Australia was responding to this strategy. This raised the question then of how the allies of Australia, notably the United States, and Europe and most significantly the states of the Indo-Pacific were responding to the Xi regime policies and strategy. Link to full article in Second Line of Defense Dr Robbin Laird is a Williams Foundation Fellow

Second Line of Defense have published our latest book which is entitled, Joint By Design: The Evolution of Australian Defence Strategy. In the midst of the COVID-19 crisis, the prime minister of Australia, Scott Morrison, launched a new defense and security strategy for Australia. This strategy reset puts Australia on the path of enhanced defense capabilities. The change represents a serious shift in its policies towards China, and in reworking alliance relationships going forward. As one senior RAAF officer put it: “The Prime Minister of Australia, the Honorable Scott Morrison, has launched the Defense Strategic Update, which moved Australia’s defense policy away from a globally-balanced approach under our Defense White Paper of 2016, towards a more regionally focused posture, founded in the principles of shape, deter, and respond. The new policy approach places great emphasis on the need for our forces to be well integrated, both internally to Australia, and across our strategic partners. ” Joint by Design is focused on Australian policy, but it is about preparing liberal democracies around the world for the challenges of the future. The strategic shift from land wars to full spectrum crisis management requires liberal democracies to have forces lethal enough, survivable enough, and agile enough to support full spectrum crisis management. The book provides an overview of the evolution of Australian defence modernization over the past seven years, and the strategic shift underway to do precisely that. Although this is a book about Australia, it is about the significant shift facing the liberal democracies in meeting the challenge of dealing with the 21st century authoritarian powers. In this sense, the volume is very complimentary to our book the return of direct defense in Europe, a book that concludes with a chapter that highlights the Australian contribution to the rethinking going on in Europe about direct defense. The book is based on the bi-annual Williams Foundation seminars held since 2014, and include insights and presentations by Australians and several key allies of Australia. In that sense, the book provides an Australian-led allied rethink with regard to how to meet 21st century defense challenges. The two books read together provide a good overview of where key allies are with regard to rethinking defense certa 2020. As Anne Borzycki, Director of the Institute of Integrated Economic Research – Australia, has highlighted: “Dr Robbin Laird brings a unique perspective to his analysis of the journey the Australian Defence Force (ADF) has been on over the last six years. As an American, and also a European resident, he understands the military and strategic realities of Europe and the United States and is therefore able to place Australia, as a modern middle-power, into the spectrum of Western Liberal Democracies. And importantly, this book highlights the lessons that Europe and the United States could learn from Australia as the first quarter of the 21st century draws to a close. “This book is a modern history that begins in 2014. The year 2014 might seem recent – however given the upheavals wrought upon the world by changing global power dynamics, national domestic political challenges, military transformations and finally, the pandemic – it could just as well be 60, not 6, years ago.” This book was released on Amazon, Barnes and Noble, and Kobo on December 22, 2020 in e book form with the paperback and hardback to be released in two months. Links Second Line of Defense Dr Robbin Laird is a Williams Foundation Fellow

Recently, Dr Laird had a chance to talk with Ross Babbage, a leading Australian strategist about the pressure Beijing is applying down-under. Australia and its close partners are looking to build a regional coalition to reinforce national resilience, better protect national sovereignty and encourage a change of course in Beijing. See full article in Second Line of Defense Dr Robbin Laird is a Williams Foundation Fellow

Brian Weston 'On Target - ' A new challenge - operational presence and persistence!' in Australian Defence Business Review, Nov/Dec 2020 p 84 A theme emerging from recent On Target columns is that while the RAAF has evolved into a potent middle-weight air force suited to operations in the nearer Indo-Pacific region, the current capability ‒ and indeed the broader ADF capability ‒ may be stretched if required to sustain a high tempo of operations for lengthy periods. Yet, the need to maintain such operations for lengthy periods is typical of the nature of military operations in times of great power competition and tension. First, in times of great power competition, competing nations often find it useful to place markers ‘in the sand’ which clearly identify the issues and interests considered to be a vital national interest. Second, by placing such markers, a nation can issue unambiguous warnings to strategic competitors which indicate that actions or expansion beyond those markers will violate a nation’s vital strategic interests, and are unacceptable. Indeed when, in a speech in January 1950, US Secretary of State Dean Acheson failed to include Korea within its strategic interests, both China and the Soviet Union concluded the US would not go to war over Korea. Soon after, South Korea was invaded. So, placing markers without clear messaging or resolve may not deter further confrontation, while messaging of resolve alone also might achieve little – unless the messaging is reinforced by more substantial actions such as precautionary military activities. Typically, these activities will be non-provocative, such as by committing to a low-key but persistent military presence, accompanied by patrol and surveillance operations. These operations not only signal resolve, but might also provide the information upon which appropriate intelligence assessments can be made to ensure a nation might not be strategically deceived or operationally out-manoeuvred. But while these persistent presence activities may deter further open transgression and confrontation, they may not deter a strategic competitor from initiating activities such as a ‘grey zone’ conflict, or asymmetric warfare, as a means of prosecuting a strategic agenda. In the Indo-Pacific, it is not difficult to conceive of scenarios that must be confronted with not only determined and skilled diplomacy, but also by the deployment of operational military forces that lay down the markers in the sand. A further characteristic of these operations is that they may be required for extended periods across a vast operational theatre on a scale larger than the deployment of one frigate or one AEW&C aircraft, as has been sustained until recently by Australia in the Middle East. Forward-deployed presence and patrol forces alone may be inadequate to signify both the resolve and capability of a nation to defend its vital national interests. Therefore, some military ‘stiffening’ may be required to ensure a nation’s concerns are not lightly dismissed. That stiffening usually requires more substantial combat capabilities being brought on to a heightened alert state and deployed to supporting locations sufficiently well-located to provide a credible deterrence. This column has outlined in detail why Australia ‒ hopefully supported by regional allies ‒ should be well-prepared to sustain substantial military presence and patrol operations in Australia’s nearer, Indo- Pacific region. The On Target column in the Sept-Oct 2020 issue of ADBR also noted the critical role Australian defence industry has in supporting and bolstering the RAAF’s ability to sustain significant, lengthy, possibly intense, presence and patrol operations. That column identified some questions: How best can Australian industry assist defence, especially air force, in generating the substantial and sustained increases in operational effort required in a nearer-term contingency in the Indo-Pacific? Is air force and industry so well integrated that industry can seamlessly shift gears when the air force tempo rises? How best can industry support sustained operational presence activities at forward and overseas bases? How can an Australian-based industry satisfy logistic shortages when global supply chains are stressed? What policy/legislative changes are needed to ensure defence industry civilians can deploy in the course of their duties to forward/operational areas? The next On Target column will move on to asking similar questions – how air force and navy can augment their sparse operational personnel establishments which would be sorely stretched in sustaining any significant, possibly intense, presence and patrol operations for any period of time. Brian Weston is a Board Member of the Sir Richard Williams Foundation. He served tours in Defence’s Force Analysis Division and the HQADF Force Development Planning Branch. Download pd f

With the European Commission spearheaded a closer relationship with China, the gap — not just geographical — between Australia and Europe is clearly growing. Robbin's own recently published book on the evolution of Australian defence strategy highlights the shift from the away game to the home game for the Aussies. The focus is clearly upon the Indo-Pacific and the Chinese reworking of the global rules of engagement and stepping up a wide ranging challenge to the liberal democracies. See the full article in Second Line of Defense

In the release of the new Australian defence strategy on July 1, 2020, Prime Minister Morrison highlighted the important role which Senator Jim Molan plays in his thinking about defence. Recently, Senator Molan has launched a podcast series looking at the way ahead and how Australia might address the challenges which its faces. For the full article see Second Line of Defense Robbin Laird is a Williams Foundation Fellow

Brian Weston 'On Target - ' Go hard, or go home!' in Australian Defence Business Review, July/Aug 2020 pp 70 One of the themes of recent On Target columns has been how recent force structure decisions have shaped the evolution of the RAAF into a potent middle-weight air force, well-suited to operations in the Indo-Pacific region. But there is a substantial difference between having a capable force-in-being, and being able to sustain a creditable tempo of operations for lengthy periods. This is not a new a new issue. Indeed, in 1944 in the South- West Pacific Area theatre, RAAF operational units were confronted with such an issue which, expressed bluntly, was to either go hard, or go home. At the time, the Commander-in-Chief of the South-West Pacific Area, Gen Douglas MacArthur was pursuing a strategy of by-passing substantial Japanese-occupied territory to expedite his rapid advance towards and through the Philippines. The strategy largely rendered the by-passed Japanese forces ineffective, expedited the advance, and also avoided incurring the large numbers of casualties that would have resulted had Allied forces been tasked with clearing every concentration of Japanese forces. But MacArthur’s strategy depended heavily on the effective employment of air power by the air forces commanded by Lieutenant General George Kenney (USAAF). At the forefront of MacArthur’s advance was No 10 Group, the RAAF tactical strike group which evolved into the RAAF First Tactical Air Force. No 78WG – comprising 75, 78 and 80 SQNs equipped with the P-40N Kittyhawk (picture below) – was the largest unit within No 10 Group which was commanded by AIRCDRE (later AVM) Frederick Scherger. With the pace of the allied advancement largely tied to the operational capacity and tempo of the allied air forces, and with limited availability of airfields, Kenney did not wish to allocate any airfield space to units that could not sustain a high operational tempo. That policy soon had the RAAF’s obsolete Vultee Vengeance units returning to Australia. With the assault on the Admiralty Islands pending, Scherger was called to a meeting with Major General Ennis Whitehead, Commander of Kenney’s Allied Air Forces, Advanced Echelon Headquarters, in Port Moresby. Whitehead bluntly informed Scherger that 78WG was to be broken up, with its three squadrons dispersed to Dobodura, Finschhafen, and Nadzab – a decision which would have effectively transferred the Kittyhawk squadrons to the rear. Scherger strongly objected and, after some hours of argument, Whitehead reluctantly agreed 78WG could remain on the front line, but only if its squadrons could generate 1,000 flying hours per month the flying rate of an equivalent USAAF squadron. RAAF operational squadrons were organised in accordance with RAF doctrine, and that organisational construct allowed a RAAF Kittyhawk squadron to generate 600 flying hours per month. Scherger, noting the differences between RAF and USAAF operational organisation and doctrine, set about radical change following a visit in March 1944 by Deputy Chief of the Air Staff, AIRCDRE John McCauley. The most obvious change was an increase in the establishments of the Kittyhawk squadrons to 24 aircraft and 30 pilots, but many other changes were also implemented. Scherger also noted the disruptive impact of the RAAF practice of rotating pilots continually through the squadrons, a consequence of the RAAF setting the length on an aircrew operational tour at nine months. In contrast, the USAAF set the length of their aircrew operational tours at 18 months, interspersed with two three-week breaks for rest and recuperation. Scherger thought the American system was “infinitely superior with spirit, morale, and operational efficiency increasing all the time. (In contrast) our efficiency graph was like the serrated edge of a saw … with none of the peaks very high”. On this, it is useful to note that George Odgers, the RAAF Historian, noted, “there was by no means unanimity in the RAAF on the question of tours of duty”. But it is unclear whether this was debate between a highly-experienced and respected operational commander and staff officers residing well away from the operational front. There can be no doubt Scherger’s initiative achieved the desired change as, in June 1944, 75, 78 and 80SQNs flew 1,318, 1,405, and 1,614 hours respectively. But while it is appropriate to reflect on 78WG’s remarkable achievement the point of this column is to ask how will the 21st century RAAF generate the significant and sustained increases in operational effort that will be required should a nearer-term contingency arise in the Indo-Pacific? Brian Weston is a Board Member of the Sir Richard Williams Foundation. He served tours in Defence’s Force Analysis Division and the HQADF Force Development Planning Branch. Download pdf

On behalf of the Board of the Williams Foundation, it saddens me to have to write to our members on the passing of one of Australia's most decorated Air Force officers, Air Marshal David Evans AC, DSO, AFC (Ret'd). As many of you are aware, Air Marshal Evans was a great supporter of the Foundation and a regular attendee to our events. I had a deep respect for him both professionally and personally and he will be missed greatly.  Air Marshal Evans' career in the Air Force was remarkable.  Most notably, he served in World War II, as a member of the Australian contingent operating transports in the Berlin Airlift, and in the Vietnam War. He remained active following his RAAF career in Defence, academia, industry and politics. His autobiography, Down to Earth , was published in 2011 and is a fascinating read.  His life and many achievements are probably best highlighted on his David Evans (RAAF Officer)Wikipedia page , which I encourage you to read.  Air Marshal Evans' celebration of his life will be held today 15 September 2020 at 1.30 pm and will be live steamed on the following link vimeo.com/455996382 .  The legacy.com  guest book is also available for signing. Our thoughts are with his family. Best regards,  Geoff Brown AO Chair