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In 2021, the Royal Australian Air Force celebrated 100 years of service - a monumental achievement celebrated all around Australia. The Central Blue marked the occasion by seeking submissions which answered the question; What will the RAAF look like in 2121? What lessons from the past 100 years can we apply to the next 100? And How do we build and grow people for the future Force? Submissions which pushed the creative boundaries and forced the reader to imagine a new future were considered for the Dr Alan Stephens Air Power Literary Prize. The Central Blue received a number of high calibre entries, with many varied and interesting themes. While there can only be one winner, we felt it particularly pertinent to offer two honourable mentions. Honourable mentions Squadron Leader Brendon Bishop made the Case for a Universal Multi-Domain Shipping Container. He highlighted that the standardisation of containers was revolutionary to the global domain, and yet, these successes would not be sufficient for #AirForce2121. Identifying the shortfalls of current technology, Bishop offers the next step for logistics to enhance this essential operational element. As Bishop demonstrates, the integration of information technology and conversion to multi-domain standardisation is not only vital for the Air Force, but for the globe. We also want to highlight Ben Luther’s submission who asked us to re-think the role of a key Air Force function: Test & Evaluation. In his reflective piece, Ben considers what future Test and Evaluation will have to contend with. He asks the question: is the approach, which is based in 1950s thinking fit-for-purpose over the next century? Prize Winner While there are a number of other stellar contributions which you can read on our webpage, we can only have one prize winner. We are pleased to announce the 2021 Dr Alan Stephens Air Power Literary Prize winner is Wing Commander Travis Hallen and his 12 year old, Hamilton-obsessed daughter (who plans to join the RAAF). In his submission Losing Jefferson, Hallen has his readers enthralled from start to finish. He used science fiction to explore an Air Force where autonomous drones are not a reality, but a leading contributor to personnel security. He described a world where humans put their utmost trust in machines, built personal connections and developed the bonds of mateship. We congratulate Wing Commander Travis Hallen, and his daughter, on their winning article.

The first test flight of the ‘Loyal Wingman’ marks an important step for Australia’s first designed and built military aircraft in over 50 years. Squadron Leader Michael Spencer takes a closer look at this exciting disruptive technology and what the project means for Australian air capability. Combining over a century’s worth of pilot experiences with leading autonomous systems and artificial intelligence, Spencer unmasks this dynamic and flexible capability designed for the future operating environment. “The Loyal Wingman project is a pathfinder for the integration of autonomous systems and artificial intelligence to create smart human-machine teams. Through this project, we are learning how to integrate these new capabilities to complement and extend air combat and other missions." - Air Vice-Marshal Cath Roberts, AM, CSC, Head of Air Force Capability, Royal Australian Air Force (2021) First Test-Flight of Australia’s Loyal Wingman On 27 February 2021, the ‘Loyal Wingman’ completed its first test flight. The flight was conducted at the Woomera Range Complex in South Australia under the supervision of a Boeing test pilot monitoring the aircraft from its ground control station sited at the complex. The Loyal Wingman’s first flight marks the first military aircraft to be designed, engineered and built in Australia in about 50 years. It also signifies a potential disruption to the technology used in making decisions and designs for aircraft manufacturing and the delivery of military airpower. The ‘Loyal Wingman’ is Intelligent by Design and in Executing its Air Missions The ‘Loyal Wingman’ (also called the ‘Airpower Teaming System’ by the manufacturer Boeing Australia) is an innovative new semi-autonomous remotely piloted aircraft. It is a prototype development being collaboratively designed and developed in Australia to better understand potential operational requirements for the future Air Force. The air vehicle is a bespoke design measuring 11.7 metres with a 7.3 metre wingspan compared to an F-35A Lightning II that measures 15.7 metres long with a 10.7 metre wingspan. It is designed to be flown in different design configurations dependent on mission requirements. It has a removable nose section that can be optionally loaded with varying combinations of mission-specific payloads, including sensors. Configured with an off-the-shelf jet turbine, it can fly to a range exceeding 2,000 nautical miles (3,700 kilometres). It uses a conventional take-off and landing approach suitable for many missions and runway types. These different configuration options make the Loyal Wingman flexible in generating airpower effects. 50 years since the First Australian-designed and built Military Drone The last military aircraft to have been designed, engineered and manufactured in Australia was the Jindivik more than fifty years ago. The Jindivik design represented a design solution to satisfy military requirements for an uncrewed aircraft that integrated a remotely piloted air vehicle with a telemetered or remotely operated mission payload. The crew could fly the air mission and be deliberately intercepted by a surface-to-air guided missile while remotely operating it at a safe distance from a geographically displaced ground station. The development of Jindivik began in 1948. The British Ministry of Supply issued a specification for a high-speed pilotless target aircraft needed for use with anti-aircraft guided missiles being tested at Woomera under bilateral arrangements with Australia. The Australian Government Aircraft Factories (GAF) responded to the British requirement by developing the bespoke design as a remotely piloted, turbine-propelled, subsonic, high-altitude, telemetered, remotely piloted aircraft. Jindivik remained in operational service as a remotely piloted target and target tow for military exercises and weapons tests. Australian Jindivik operations by the Air Force ceased in 1967, with Navy use ceasing much later in 1998. Jindivik represents an era of technology defined by analogue systems, manual designs, and labour-based manufacturing. Fifty years later, air vehicles and air missions exploit newer technologies to realise better benefits. However, to exploit and realise the maximum potential of these complicated technologies, teamwork between niche industries and technology bases is critical. Loyal Wingman Disrupts Australian Aircraft Design and Manufacturing Methods The Loyal Wingman has been realised from its digital twin. It was not built from a typical prototype aircraft—one which uses a team of engineers to assemble the prototype aircraft manually, performs system testing and evaluation, and uses the results to redesign and modify each prototype manually. This project exploits digital manufacturing technologies, model-based systems engineering, simulation modelling and testing, and manufacture and assembly by robots and other advanced techniques. The prototype development required a team effort through the integration of humans and machines. Digital machines and machine intelligence have augmented the decision-making capacities and speeds of skilled human engineers. In addition to Boeing Australia and Air Force, 35 other companies are cooperating on the project. These companies including BAE Systems Australia, Flight Data Systems, AME Systems, Microelectronic Technologies, RUAG Australia, and Ferra Engineering. The cooperative manufacturing effort realised the first flying prototype after completing its design-to-flight phases in three years reflecting the evolution of teamwork in the design of this innovative design. The Wingman Emerged from Early Experiences in Air Combat and Innovation Throughout the history of air warfare, new aircraft systems have traditionally been evolved to augment and extend the sensor capabilities and reach of combat effects of the human crew. In the First World War, the machine gun was initially integrated into the airframe to increase the firepower mass and reach of the pilot flying a single-cockpit fighter pilot. Air aces such as the notorious ‘Red Baron’ were admired as standout individuals with advanced skills in flying and hunting, high combat scores, and impact on the battlespace. However, aircrew soon learned from their combat experiences the benefits of operating as teams, both as aircrew within the same aircraft cockpit and in separate aircraft. Air combat tacticians used their experiences to influence the designs for a fighter aircraft operated by a pilot teamed up with an air gunner. The teaming of the pilot/gunner multiplied the sensory and firepower capabilities of a single aircraft, as typified in the Royal Aircraft Factory design for its B.E.2 multirole two-seater biplane. The immediate benefit was a second pair of eyes to provide the paired team with persistent 360-degree coverage of the battlespace, especially against rearward attacking fighters. Air combat tactics were necessarily further developed by the Luftwaffe in the Spanish Civil War and widely adopted in the Second World War. Air Forces soon realised the value of teaming aircrew to fight in air combat with improvements in survivability and increased probability of mission success. Air tacticians quickly embraced the 'wingman' role, and fighter pilots were commonly launched into missions in formations based on their assignments as pairs and multiples of these pairs. Each pair had a ‘lead pilot.’ The second pilot in each teamed pair was called the "Wingman", whose primary role was to protect the lead pilot by "watching their back." The force multiplier effect of a teamed pair made air combatants more effective: amplifying situational awareness, enhancing defences and self-protection, and increasing the firepower available to better assure mission successes. The benefits of the teamed approach to air warfare became established as an enduring foundation of air combat tactics. Innovating a Wingman sans Pilot The Loyal Wingman is prototyping an innovative integration of autonomous systems and artificial intelligence into the control system for an air vehicle. Autonomous flight control systems have been in use since the application of the gyroscope and autopilots. However, the new and novel application of artificial intelligence (AI) embedded into aircraft breaks new ground for air combat. The integration of AI pushes the efficacy of autonomous control further upstream into artificially controlling and quantifying the effectiveness of the air vehicle and its mission payload in the mission. A control loop can enable an AI system to compare the resultant effects against the mission requirements and analyse potential change options for improving the situation. The outputs of the feedback loop will be monitored by the AI and used to make calculated changes in the vehicle manoeuvring and trajectory autonomously. Additionally, optimisation algorithms can assist mission performance through self-generated improvements until mission criteria are satisfied, or intervention from a human-on-the-loop overrides control. To increase the efficacy of aircrew who may operate in the future as an element integrated into a smart human-machine team, the aircraft will fly and cooperate with other crewed and uncrewed aircraft, using its artificial intelligence and carried payloads to complement the team’s performance. 'Loyal Wingman' will be a force multiplier in future air missions. Loyal Wingman Disruption to Delivery of Australian Air Power The Loyal Wingman enables airpower strategists and capability developers to better understand how autonomously functioning aircraft can be used as a force-multiplier for airpower. Soon, Autonomy and AI may help air strategists project air power beyond the capacities or operational risks that have limited transitional operating capabilities. Australia is also using the program to explore how autonomous uncrewed aircraft may support and augment the aircraft onboard capabilities for independent decision-making and smarter air combat. The novel approach used in the design-to-realisation of the Loyal Wingman promotes innovation throughout the entire chain of activities needed to generate a new air capability - from the designer, developer, and manufacturer through to the user. Defence has traditionally sought to acquire mature military-off-the-shelf capabilities that are rigid in design and provide an assured margin advantage against the risks forecast in a future operating environment. Embracing innovation earlier in the design process enables Air Force to experience designing disruption into a system that can generate a capability with dynamic and flexible configurations. This in turn can make the final product more responsive to changes in future operating environments. Squadron Leader Michael Spencer is currently serving in the Air Force Reserve. He transitioned after a career in the Permanent Air Force, starting as a Navigator flying in long-range maritime patrol missions on P-3C Orions. The experiences gained from operational flying were transposed into a career in future air concepts, air capability development, and project acquisition management for air and space capabilities. He is currently working with the AFHQ RPAS Team and the Defence COVID19 Taskforce. He has previously contributed articles to The Central Blue and is also the author for the following Air Force publications on similar and related topics: Manned-Unmanned Teaming: “MUM-T’s the Word”. Online at www.williamsfoundation.org.au/post/manned-unmanned-teaming-mum-t-s-the-word-em-donald-woldhuis-michael-s Pseudosatellites: Disrupting Air Power Impermanence (2019). Online at https://airpower.airforce.gov.au/sites/default/files/2021-03/AP37-Pseudosattelites-Disrupting-Air-Power-Impermanence.pdf MQ-4C Triton: A Fifth Generation Air Force Disruption for Maritime Surveillance (2019). Online at https://airpower.airforce.gov.au/sites/default/files/2021-03/AP38-MQ-4C-Triton-A-Fifth-Generation-Air-Force-Disruption-for-Maritime-Surveillance.pdf Bibliography Air Force (2021). Loyal Wingman. Our Mission. Royal Australian Air Force. Online at www.airforce.gov.au/our-mission/loyal-wingman. Accessed 8 August 2021. Boeing (2021). Boeing Airpower Teaming system. Online at www.boeing.com.au/products-services/Research%20&%20Technology/boeing-airpower-teaming-system.page. Accessed 10 August 2021. Department of Defence Ministers (2020). Air Force and Boeing roll out First Loyal Wingman aircraft. Media Releases. Australian Government. Online at www.minister.defence.gov.au/minister/melissa-price/media-releases/air-force-and-boeing-roll-out-first-loyal-wingman-aircraft. Accessed 8 August 2021. Department of Defence Ministers (2021). Loyal Wingman aircraft takes first flight. Media Releases. Australian Government. Online at www.minister.defence.gov.au/minister/melissa-price/media-releases/loyal-wingman-aircraft-takes-first-flight . Accessed 8 August 2021. Department of Defence (2021). First flight for Loyal Wingman. Defence News. Online at https://news.defence.gov.au/media/media-releases/first-flight-loyal-wingman. Accessed 8 August 2021. Navy (2021). GAF Jindivik Pilotless Target Aircraft. Aircraft, Navy. Online at www.navy.gov.au/aircraft/gaf-jindivik-pilotless-target-aircraft. Accessed 20 August 2021.

“Culture is not made up but something that evolves which is human” – Edward T. Hall Jr., American Anthropologist b.1914 – d. 2009 Culture is what defines, unites, and sets a group apart from others. Within the Air Force, culture drives formal and informal rules in how we behave as a fighting force, both on operations and in garrison.  Importantly, culture also promotes a shared sense of identity. While we are bound by a shared Australian Defence Force culture with our soldier and sailor counterparts, as airmen we have also forged our own unique culture. If the way that we outwardly portray ourselves to the public and through recruiting advertisements reflects the culture we pride ourselves with, our culture might be defined as aircrew centric, supported by teams of specialists and leading edge technology. The Air Force’s approaching centenary is an opportune time to reflect on whether the culture that worked for the 20th century Air Force remains relevant today and into the future. Innovative and emerging technologies, mission definitions, internal diversity,  a greater focus on joint warfighting, and the Air Force’s role in warfare are all factors to be considered when evaluating what is appropriate in the 21st century. In short we must examine which elements of our culture should remain as constants and significantly, what we should consider reshaping. Innovation as a Cultural Constant As a Service founded on the cutting edge of technology of its era, we have maintained a desire to be seen as innovators. Arguably, the Air Force is the Service most dependent on technological superiority with it being a decisive factor in who wins on the battlefield. The ‘generation’ of aircraft, the accuracy of our weapons, and the quality of intelligence are essential in fighting and winning. Any complacency and failure to advance are at our peril. The innovation constant has been confirmed over the years with Air Force investing in a highly technical fighting force. Initiatives such as JERICHO and the Air Force Improvement scheme continue to drive this innovative spirit, inspiring a new generation of airmen. Building on this, we should consider how this can be instilled into our airmen at every level; placing the spark of creativity and innovation in our youngest recruits, and stoking this passion through Professional Military Education (PME) throughout their careers. The desire to harness technology and the spirit of innovation are essential elements of our culture and are likely to remain so into the future. One Force, Mission Focused A broader perspective of who we are as a force warrants consideration of how we view our role both as individuals, and as a Service.  Short of strategic bombing or another Battle of Britain-esque air combat campaign, we frequently characterise our role in terms of ‘in support of’ an Army unit, be that through ISR, airlift, or defensive counter air. In contrast, it would be unlikely for an Army commander to use a similar description of their role, regardless of whether it was a communications unit on an airbase or as a logistics enabler. Instead, senior leaders and indeed Army Newspaper routinely highlight units’ roles in terms of executing a mission. Characterising our role, both individually and collectively, in a similar way to Army in executing the Australian Government’s mission may be a more inspiring and appropriate description of the vital function we play, reinforcing our identity as war fighters. Similarly, by viewing each member’s role as an equally valuable cog in the warfighting machine, we create a sense of unity as an Air Force. The simplistic and dated categorisation of those ‘on the tactical edge’ vice ‘the blunts’ unnecessarily divides our force. At the same time, this perspective fails to adequately capture the interdependence between the various categories and musterings that make us one.  As the Air Force increasingly employs platforms that are remotely operated, where aircrew operate in the same facility as Imagery Analysts, Targeteers and Operations Officers, this interdependence will develop further. While our various tribes provide sub-cultures – the maintainers and engineers, the aircrew, the logisticians, AFSEC, and the health professionals to name but a few – should we spend more effort defining ourselves as airmen first, focusing on the combat effects we achieve as a warfighting team rather than by our individual categories or as part of a ‘tribe of tribes’?  It could be argued through doing this, we promote the inclusive one team culture identified in the Australian Airman’s Code. This ‘One Team, Airman First’ culture would also allow us to all become masters of the air/space domain capable of developing and leading air strategy, operations and campaign planning rather than viewing this as the province for a select few. As a litmus test of our current force, can we envisage the A3 in the Air and Space Operations Centre or the J5 actual at Headquarters Joint Operations Command (HQJOC) to be an Operations Officer, Logistics Officer or Engineer? If this appears unlikely or even worrisome, perhaps we should consider whether other categories are given the necessary development opportunities to excel in these roles, embracing all airmen rather than narrowing the aperture to aircrew only. By so doing, we would not only promote a more inclusive culture, but also have a bigger pool from which to select the best strategists and planners. One Force, Mission Focused – Airmen Return Home from Operations in the Middle East [Image Credit: Defence Image Gallery] Diversity Drives Cultural Change Historically, Air Force’s most senior leadership has been quite narrow, largely comprised of aircrew. However, with identity and behaviours broadly driven and promoted by senior leaders, it might be suggested Air Force culture will naturally evolve if the pool of 21st century Air Force senior leaders diversifies. While a number of senior roles, such as roles relating to air safety, should necessarily be undertaken by aircrew members, a number of positions might be viewed as generalist and others more suitably filled by members from other specialisations. Director General Personnel – Air Force for example might be most ably filled by a Personnel Capability Officer whose career has been focused on understanding human resource nuances.  Equally, positions such as the Commander Defence SIGINT and Cyber Command (within the Australian Signals Directorate) and Director Defence Intelligence Organisation may be best served by intelligence professionals with decades of experience in analysis, intelligence policy, and ISR collection management. A second order effect of promoting other categories to senior roles previously reserved for aircrew would be greater gender diversity at senior ranks noting females are more evenly represented in fields such as logistics, medicine, administration, and intelligence. Together, the wider range of categories and diversity in gender would create different perspectives likely to shift what is arguably an aircrew centric culture at present to a culture that represents all members within the Air Force. Creating a Blue Environment in a Purple Force The final changing cultural dynamic we must consider in a 21st century Air Force is an increased focus on joint warfighting.  In recent years, attitudes have shifted from the burden of proof being no longer ‘why should it be joint’ to ‘why shouldn’t it be joint’.  With greater effectiveness and integration in a joint battlespace, we must consider how we define ourselves as Air Force when blended with Army, Navy, and in some cases Defence civilians within the Australian Public Service (APS).  It could be suggested that when our personnel are posted outside of Air Force Group, be that to HQJOC, Joint Capabilities Group, Capability Acquisition and Sustainment Group, or Strategic Policy and Intelligence Group, we see this as a temporary assignment outside the ‘Air Force mothership’. As such, we assume on their return to Air Force Group, they will be refocused back to being airmen. With an increase in roles that are inherently joint – for example cyber operations, information activities, joint fires and intelligence – and an expectation Airmen will spend more time in joint than in the past, we need to consider how we promote Air Force culture and identity to those ‘outside the mothership’.   Fostering a ‘Team Air Force’ environment within other groups could assist in maintaining our own identity, while contributing to greater knowledge about Air Force in a joint and integrated work place.  Encouraging routine informal PME opportunities driven by Air Force leadership serving in the joint environment might be one way of promoting this ‘Team Air Force’ identity. Other opportunities might include establishing a Navy Divisional Officer-like scheme to embrace those serving outside of Air Force Group and the creation of an Air Force-wide mentoring scheme, nurturing members who do not have an Air Force Chain of Command.  Finally, wider recognition across the force that members serving in joint roles directly contribute to air power and Air Force’s overall effectiveness reinforces the ‘Team Air Force’ pride and identity. Maintaining an Air Force Identity in a Joint Force [Image credit: Defence Imagery Gallery] Final thoughts… As the RAAF evolves into a Fifth Generation Air Force and beyond, so to must our culture and how we define ourselves, and the underlying processes to achieve an enhanced culture. Our bias for innovation has been essential in driving our Air Force forward from Sopwith Camels in the Australian Flying Corps through to the Joint Strike Fighter, remotely piloted Tritons, and the emergence of Artificial Intelligence within the military. While innovation unites us, there are opportunities to further strengthen and unify the force. Championing the role we all play in defending Australia’s security and defining ourselves as war fighters is essential to promoting a mission-focused force ready for 21st century challenges and threats. While greater diversity of leadership and an increasingly joint force will understandably challenge our existing culture, it creates an exciting opportunity for the next generation of Airmen to define, exploit and embrace.  In recent years, the term culture has become loaded, used in the binary of ‘good’ or ‘bad’ culture. As the Air Force approaches its centenary, perhaps it is now time to create a new dialogue in the crew rooms, operations floors and hangers, and start a discussion about what Air Force culture means to us. Squadron Leader Claire Pearson is a serving officer in the Royal Australian Air Force.  She is currently posted to Information Warfare Division in Joint Capabilities Group. The opinions expressed are hers alone and do not reflect those of the Royal Australian Air Force, the Australian Defence Force, or the Australian Government. #airmen #diversity #Culture #Joint #Innovation

On Wednesday 23 August, the Williams Foundation hosted a seminar exploring A New Approach and Attitude to Electronic Warfare in Australia. In this post, Wing Commander Travis Hallen reflects on the seminar presentations, outlines the history of electronic attack in the RAAF, and proposes what a new attitude to electronic warfare in Australia may look like. The arrival of the RAAF’s first EA-18G Growler Airborne Electronic Attack (AEA) aircraft at the Avalon Airshow in February this year marked a new era in the Australian Defence Force’s (ADF) involvement in the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS). Historically, RAAF interest in electronic warfare (EW) has been limited primarily to intelligence collection and the electronic support (ES) role. The arrival of the Growler has expanded the RAAF’s view of the EMS and has significantly enhanced the ability of Australian air power to exploit the EMS for tactical, operational, and strategic advantage through the use of the EMS to attack an adversary. But to fully realise the possibilities of this new capability and others that will soon be introduced requires a change in the attitude of Australian airmen towards the relationship between air power and the EMS. Understanding what this new attitude may be and how it can be fostered was the focus of the Williams Foundation EW Seminar held last Wednesday. The seminar brought together operators, industry, and academics to discuss the role of EW in the Asia-Pacific, and importance of integrating EW capabilities across the joint and combined force. In this post, I want to focus on three presentations in particular which reflected the evolving attitude towards EW in the RAAF: Group Captain Andrew Gilbert’s (Director Air Power Development Centre) history of electronic warfare in the RAAF, Group Captain Glenn Braz’s (Officer Commanding No. 82 Wing) operator’s perspective on Growler, and JD McCreary’s (Georgia Tech Research Institute) perspective on the future of EW. A brief history of Australian air power and EA A Mesopotamian Half Flight Farman Pusher, Australia’s first EW aircraft. [Image Credit: Australian War Memorial] In his opening presentation, Group Captain Gilbert highlighted the RAAF’s long but limited history in EW. The involvement of Australian air power in operations to control and exploit the EMS date back to World War I. Australia’s first foray into denying an adversary’s use of the EMS occurred in November 1915 when Thomas White of the Australian Flying Corps’ Mesopotamian Half Flight flew behind enemy lines in a Farman Pusher to destroy Turkish telegraph wires with guncotton charges. Although the use of physical force to disrupt an adversary’s communications does not constitute what we now define as EW, White’s mission behind enemy lines reflects an early appreciation of the importance of air power in interfering with an adversary’s use of the EMS. During the interwar period, the ability to exploit the EMS for tactical and operational advantage continued to grow with advances in radar and radio technology. By the outbreak of war in 1939, the EMS had come to play a vital role in surveillance, navigation, and communication. Developing and implementing ways to deny the adversary the operational advantages of the EMS attracted a growing level of interest across all theatres during the war. The RAAF became involved in the EA role when No. 462 Squadron was incorporated into the RAF’s No. 100 (Bomber Support) Group in December 1944. No. 100 Group played an important role in protecting bomber raids over Germany. Using window, thin strips of aluminium designed to spoof German radar, and conducting radio jamming using specially designed Airborne Cigar aircraft, No. 462 Squadron was actively involved, albeit only for a limited period, in EA operations against German air defences. This would have provided an invaluable foundation for the development of post-war EW capability in the RAAF; however, like other Western militaries, Australian interest in EW declined at the end of the war, and RAAF involvement in EA largely ceased with the disbandment of No. 462 Squadron. A No. 462 Squadron Halifax B. Mk. III Airborne Cigar aircraft [Image Credit: Australian War Memorial] During the Cold War, the lack of a credible electronic threat to Australian air power meant that the opportunity cost associated with investing in developing and maintaining an EA capability could not be justified. This is not to suggest that EA was ignored. Electronic Counter Measures (ECM) pods were developed and acquired for some aircraft including the Mirage, F-111, and the Neptune, but EA remained a lower priority in the battle for scarce resources. This is best illustrated by the fate of the program to acquire the AGM-88 High-Speed Anti-Radiation Missile (HARM) for the F-111. The Aircraft Research and Development Unit (ARDU) F-111 with AGM-88 HARM during trials. [Image Credit: Department of Defence] In the late 1970s, the RAAF began investigating the use of HARM in a maritime strike role. The concept was for the F-111C to carry a combination of HARM and the AGM-84 Harpoon anti-shipping missile. The HARM would destroy the ship’s radars, leaving them defenceless. The Harpoons would then be used to sink the ship. The Harpoon entered ADF service the 1980s; however, prioritisation meant that HARM was not acquired. Resources were instead directed towards air-to-air missiles for the RAAF’s F/A-18 Hornets. The operational implications resulting from the lack of prioritisation given to EW would become manifest in the lead up to the 1991 Gulf War. The United States made a formal request to the Australian Government for the deployment of the RAAF’s RF-111s to support operations against Iraq. The Government assessed the deployment too risky, and the F-111s involvement in the Gulf War would be limited to work up support for the deploying navy ships. It is interesting to note that the F-111s had been wired to carry the ALQ-131 ECM pod, and the United States had offered to loan the pods to the RAAF for the deployment, yet the Government remained unwilling to accept the risk. Since the 1991 Gulf War, Australian interest and investment in EW has grown significantly. This investment was critical to enabling the deployment of Australian aircraft to support operations in the Middle East in 2003 and again in 2014. A new attitude to EW Despite post-Cold War interest, EW in the RAAF has remained a niche capability developed by a small specialist community. This is starting to change. In his presentation, Group Captain Braz highlighted that the placement of Growler within Air Combat Group (the organisational home of the RAAF’s F/A-18s and future home of the F-35s) will assist in bringing EW into the mainstream of air power consciousness in Australia. There is much truth in this statement. The association of EW with fast jet operations that Growler provides has undoubtedly raised the profile of airborne EW both within the ADF and in the broader public sphere. This is a positive thing. But it is just the first step. The acquisition of Growler is important to ADF operations now and into the future, but so too are the ISREW G550s which the Chief of the Air Force has described as the ‘the conductor of the [ISR] orchestra‘. The F-35 is designed to be as comfortable in the EMS domain as it is in the air domain. Beyond the platforms, we may soon see the proliferation of podded EW capabilities in non-traditional platforms, a concept that has been raised previously on this blog. Indeed, Group Captain Braz emphasised the need for the RAAF to move beyond platforms to payloads. As the RAAF continues its evolution into a fifth-generation air force the ability to control and exploit the EMS will see capability adaptation, and tactical and operational innovation occurring across the force. But what does this have to do with a change in attitude towards EW in the RAAF? Put simply, EW is now starting to permeate all aspects of Australian air power operations. No longer is it possible for our airmen to delegate understanding of EMS operations to a small cadre of expert EW operators (EWOs), they must become EMS natives, alive to the criticality of the spectrum to their operations, regardless of the mission they are conducting. To quote Group Captain Braz, ‘the question isn’t who is an EW operator, the question is are you an operator in an age of EW?’ This is not to suggest that specialised EWOs are no longer required, quite the opposite, as the complexity of  EMS operations grows,  ensuring that we have sufficient trained and experienced subject matter experts to guide the development and employment of specialised EW capabilities will be critical. What is required of Australian airmen now is to understand that the EMS is not just an important consideration in their mission planning, but a critical domain that will determine their success or failure in future operations. Concluding thoughts The perspectives on the past, present, and future of EW expressed by the various presenters at the seminar offered a number of useful insights that will hopefully continue to develop as the RAAF’s attitude towards EW evolves. But one perspective in particular bears emphasising, and it is a point on which I will conclude. In his presentation on the future of EW JD McCreary, Georgia Tech Research Institute’s Chief of Disruptive Technology Programs, focused on the relationship between EW and decision superiority in the modern battlespace. To paraphrase, he stated that EW is about how we slow red and accelerate blue to achieve decision superiority. In this simple characterisation, I believe McCready captured the essence of how the RAAF’s attitude towards EW must evolve. EW is not about roles, nor platforms, nor people, it is about effects. The question that the RAAF’s airmen must now be asking is: How does air power integrate with other capabilities to enable the ADF to control of the EMS and deny it to an adversary in order to achieve and maintain decision superiority at the tactical, operational, and strategic level?  This is the question that must be at the forefront of any discussion on Australian air power now and into the future. Wing Commander Travis Hallen is an Air Combat Officer currently serving as Deputy Director – Air Power Development at the Royal Australian Air Force’s Air Power Development Centre. He is also a Sir Richard Williams Foundation Scholar. The opinions expressed are his alone and do not reflect those of the Royal Australian Air Force, the Australian Defence Force, the Australian Government, or the Williams Foundation. #AirPower #EW #history #technology

Chris McInnes explores the role of cognition in warfare and asks whether we understand the types of cognition needed in the future, and what we might be able to learn from other disciplines. On 9 June 1982, the Israel Air Force (IAF) destroyed 87 Syrian military aircraft and 17 out of 19 Syrian surface-to-air missile batteries in the Beka’a Valley, for the loss of almost no IAF assets. The Israelis held several advantages – the initiative, generally superior equipment, and higher quality personnel – but it was the manner in which the IAF combined its forces to fight for, and with, information that produced the lopsided result. In short, the Israeli strike forces could see, communicate, and understand the environment and events, while Syrian forces were blind, dumb, and confused. One observer recalled seeing Syrian fighter aircraft flying figure-eight patterns as the battle raged because they could not communicate with their ground controllers or take their own initiative. The image of Syrian military aircraft orbiting aimlessly while the Israelis dismantled and destroyed their ability to operate is an apt metaphor for the whole battle. Much is made of the Israeli’s total dominance of the electromagnetic spectrum during the battle, but this was only one part of Israel’s success. To be sure, the IAF’s ability to control what could be sensed and communicated via the electromagnetic spectrum during the battle was the razor-sharp tip of the information spear. But the shaft of the spear – which supported and guided the point – was the superior training and education of the Israeli personnel. As one Israeli officer observed, “they [the Syrians] could have flown the best fighter in the world, but if they flew it the way they were flying, we would have shot them down in exactly the same way. It wasn’t their equipment at fault, but their tactics. Through superior training and education, the Israelis were better prepared for the battle. To use John Boyd’s famous OODA cycle, the Israelis were better oriented for the battle and were thus able to observe, decide, and act far better than the Syrians. The same was true of air combat during the Korean War. American pilots’ training was the foundation for their dominance over their opponents; technical differences between the F-86 Sabre and MiG-15 were less important than how those differences were exploited. This is why John Boyd believed ‘orient’, the second ‘O’, was most important in his OODA cycle, and is why a fifth-generation force must be cognition-centric. Cognition is the process or action of acquiring knowledge and understanding through thought, experience, and the senses. The reason a fifth-generation force must be cognition-centric – rather than platform, information, network, or decision-centric – is because it is cognition that determines the quality and utility of each of those things. It is cognition that will determine how well a force functions when the information and network are compromised or denied. It is cognition that will cause a junior pilot stepping through their decision-centric checklist – in circumstances for which the checklist was not designed – to pause before firing the ‘fox 3’ that potentially starts World War III. Conversely, targeting an adversary’s cognition can cause delays, confusion, and – perhaps most effectively – profound misunderstanding of a situation. When the Israelis denied the network-centric Syrian forces access to their networks, it was Syria’s failure to develop the cognitive capabilities of its force that resulted in futile figure-eights. The rise of automation and machine intelligence reinforces, rather than reduces, the centrality of cognition in future warfare. In addition to considering human cognition – which the Israelis exploited so superbly – planners must now account for machine cognition and human-machine cognition, and the interaction between different types of cognition. Algorithms are the ‘orient’ of a machine’s OODA cycle so, what Peter Layton has called “duelling algorithms” will remain as much a contest of cognition as that which occurred over the Beka’a Valley in 1982. In the coming years, the ADF will introduce unprecedented capabilities to target and influence other people’s cognition, while defending its own. A variety of non-kinetic options, including the EA-18G Growler and nascent Australian offensive cyber capabilities will complement and enhance traditional kinetic weapons. Developments in network defences and management, as well as electromagnetic spectrum operations management, will give the ADF a greater ability to sense and display what is happening in non-physical environments. There have been numerous discussions and seminars about the impact that these new capabilities will have on the ADF, and the need for personnel that can understand and exploit them. What has often been overlooked in these discussions is the types of cognition that militaries need to optimise the utility of these capabilities as a whole. This is less about developing specific knowledge, and more about the way in which people process new information so that they can understand enough about all these new capabilities, operating environments, and challenges, to rapidly combine these factors in ways to maximise their likelihood of success. Militaries are good at building specific knowledge, as this is the foundation of technical mastery; technical knowledge can be defined, measured, and tested reliably. And the discussions of new capabilities tend to centre on how the organisation builds more subject matter experts. Efforts to enhance broader cognition tend to centre on appeals to read and engage in debate. These are useful and enjoyable pursuits, but the approach is less than scientific. Considering which types of cognition are best suited for future warfare is important for two principal reasons. Firstly, if the organisation can identify the modes of thinking that are optimally suited to operating in a networked, multi- domain force that fights for, and with information, then it stands a much better chance of being able to educate its people broadly to optimise those skills. Secondly, knowing what cognitive attributes posture an individual to contribute optimally to a force’s OODA cycle may allow the organisation to identify individuals early and groom them for key decision-making and decision-support functions. The option of selecting personnel for key functions based on aptitude would appear to pose quite a disruptive challenge to military workforce models based on hierarchy, time, and experience. But in many ways, applying this approach throughout individuals’ careers is simply an extension of how people are initially selected for roles through the recruiting and training processes. Researchers in multiple disciplines are endeavouring to understand how and why people process information to make decisions. The psychologists Daniel Kahnemann and Amos Tversky demonstrated that human decision-making is not purely rational, and is subject to the whims of often unpredictable and frequently sub-optimal cognition. Efforts to understand those whims and how they apply to economic decision-making have revolutionised the study of economics, and saw Richard Thaler, one of the pioneers of behavioural economics, awarded the 2017 Nobel Prize for economics. Psychologist and social scientist Phillip Tetlock has more specifically explored the cognitive attributes that position individuals best to make decisions, specifically forecasts in Tetlock’s experiments, in environments characterised by dynamism and ambiguity. Tetlock’s work saw him characterise forecasters as foxes – those who know many small things, are skeptical about grand ideas, and adapt to the world around them – or hedgehogs – those who have one dominant conviction and endeavour to make everything fit that theory. Tetlock’s categorisation was not based on an individual’s level of expertise, but rather on the manner in which they processed information. Many experts were indeed hedgehogs as they sought to fit the evidence to their field of expertise, but this was not always the case. Tetlock’s research showed that foxes were, on aggregate superior forecasters than hedgehogs, but his key conclusion was “how you think matters more than what you think.” This conclusion is a vitally important one for militaries as they seek to grapple with the implications of future warfare and the types of cognition needed for optimal outcomes. The question remains open: esteemed historian John Lewis Gaddis argues in his 2018 book, On Grand Strategy, that good strategists should be a combination of fox and hedgehog. Importantly, the cognitive attributes that make a good strategist may not be the same as those needed for other functions. The research outlined above indicates that expertise in a particular area, which remains the foundation of military workforce development, may not be the characteristic most desirable to perform key decision-making and decision-support roles in dynamic and ambiguous environments. Moreover, as algorithms begin to play a greater role, the optimal combination of machine and human cognitions must be considered. Are machines to be the hedgehogs to the human foxes in a human-machine team? Understanding and developing the types of cognition – human and machine – needed to win future wars is critical to optimising the capabilities of the future force. Investment in equipment and training will enable a force to fight, but it is cognition – individual, collective, and machine – that will determine how effectively it fights. A version this article originally appeared in the May-June 2018 edition of Australian Defence Business Review. If you are interested in cognitive warfare, we recommend you check out this short article from our friends at The Cove. Wing Commander Chris ‘Guiness’ McInnes is an officer in the Royal Australian Air Force. The opinions expressed are his alone and do not reflect those of the Royal Australian Air Force, the Australian Defence Force, or the Australian Government. #Training #PME #commandandcontrol #organisationalculture #artificialintelligence #Doctrine #Army #PMET #AirPower #Culture #AirForce #Education #C2 #leadership

Dr Robbin Laird 26 October 2021 The decision by the Morrison Administration to shift from a conventional submarine to a nuclear submarine is part of the strategic reset underway in Australia since 2018. With the Chinese threat ramping up, the Australians have been looking to refocus their defence efforts on the Indo-Pacific region and to find ways to expand the reach of their forces in the region. That re-focus started with an emphasis on building longer range strike weapons and to shape capability within Australia to build out their own capabilities to build guided weapons, including over time, longer range strike weapons. The Japanese when launching the war in the Pacific understood from the outset that Australia was the outlier continent which could influence the outcome significantly. The key was to isolate the continent and deny use of that continent to the United States. The Chinese Communist regime certainly understood this and approached the Australian problem by economic, cultural, and political means to reshape the Australian perspective and to isolate the United States from Australian defence. President Xi has dramatically failed. Now the Australians are working through how best to shape a way ahead to craft an integrated force capable of longer-range reach and providing more credible deterrent capabilities going forward. I have chronicled the ADF journey with regard to building out a joint force over the past few years through the perspective of the Williams Foundation seminars held from 2014 until the 2020 pandemic shutdown in my book Joint by Design published earlier this year. With the new strategy announced in 2020, there is a re-set underway within which the nuclear submarine decision is a key part. But a re-set is not built in a day, and as my former boss, Secretary Michael Wynne, often commented, “you have 80% of your force 20 years from now, right now.” So rebuilding is about re-shifting, it is about leveraging new capabilities that get you where you want to go; but it is not about working from a blank slate. To discuss the transition and its challenges, I recently spoke with Marcus Hellyer of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute about his take on the decision. From Marcus’s perspective, this decision “is the most important one in his lifetime.” It is about putting a stake in the ground, and rescoping the reach of the ADF and how it will operate in the Indo-Pacific region. We both agreed that the head of the Nuclear-Powered submarine task force, Vice Admiral Jonathan Mead, had his work cut out for him, but an essential point is for the government and the Navy to ensure that the effort, although crucial, would not dominate the efforts to re-orient the overall ADF effort itself. As Hellyer put it: “ It is important to let Jonathan Mead, do his work, and everybody else needs to focus on what we can be doing right now. I don’t have an issue with going with SSNs, but we can’t afford to sit back and say the SSNs are coming to save us. There are many, many things we can be doing to make the ADF a much more robust force. The SSNs effort could suck all the oxygen out of the room and taking all the decision makers’ time and energy and headspace. But the focus, while Mead gets on with his job, needs to be on how to get a much faster return on a much more modest investment if we pursue the right things now and figure out the right ways to use them.” A key problem facing the government is the challenge of shaping the defence narrative in a credible and effective manner. Certainly, when looking at the effort surrounding the future submarine program designed to deliver a new conventional submarine, that narrative was largely missing in action. That cannot be repeated if Australia is to make an effective strategic transition. According to Hellyer: “When the defence update came out last year, there was broad agreement that the observations about the strategic environment and the kinds of actions needed to shape new capabilities to deal with that environment were spot on. Notably, the need not to simply sit back and respond to Russia and China, but to shape new capabilities like long-range strike to create problems for them. “But what is missing is a clear relationship between that narrative and force design narrative. When look at the force structure that was attached to new defence narrative, it’s essentially the same force structure that we’ve been working on in an absolutely glacial fashion since the 2009 white paper. There is a major disconnect between the timelines, the threat environment, and the actual capabilities that to date we are acquiring to deal with it. “The government is acquiring new or additional capabilities for sure, but the narrative is not there with regard to how these capabilities are woven together and shaping the strategic relaunch. Tomahawks are being acquired for the fleet. A new squadron of Romeo ASW helicopters are being acquired. A co-operative program with the U.S. on hypersonic systems has been announced as well as one working with the U.S. Army on its ground launched long-range strike missiles. We are acquiring the longer-range JASSM. “There are a number of announcements of new defence efforts, but there is a need for the narrative reflecting and guiding the ADF build out.” It should also be noted that U.S. and allied forces in the Indo-Pacific are themselves in the throes of fundamental change, and one way ahead for Australia clearly is to be a key driver in that reshaping effort. And given its collaborative efforts in the region, those efforts can be key drivers in the transformation process as well. I have identified in my own work, especially with Ed Timperlake, a number of such points involving the United States, namely, the reshaping of the U.S. Navy around a distributed force operating in kill webs. The USAF working how to deliver agile combat employment. The USMC working its flexible basing approach and leveraging its Osprey and F-35 transitions going forward. Clearly, the United States military is a key element in the strategic re-shift but other allies are increasingly important as well, notably Japan. One innovation which Hellyer noted that could be driven by the acquisition of a new squadron of Romeos is the need to find other ship or land-based solutions to hosting the new aircraft, as the inventory will exceed the number of Royal Australian Navy ships which can currently operate the aircraft. He suggested that the two Australian amphibious ships – the HMAS Canberra and Adelaide – might include this among their roles. But the U.S. Navy has been experimenting with such an approach, as evidenced by the Black Widow exercise last Fall. During that exercise, the Navy used the USS Wasp as an ASW or USW platform. Hellyer underscored that this sort of experimentation was what he would like to see the ADF engaged in during the period ahead as it reworks its approach going forward. And he noted that the experimentation which the USMC is doing in the Pacific, is perhaps a good model for how to do so. Of course, there are a number of decisions to be made associated with the ability to operate nuclear submarines by the Royal Australian Navy or to operate them from an Australian support structure. Hellyer highlighted on key one, which is simply ramping up the number of submariners required to operate a nuclear submarine fleet. He cited the recent appearance by Chief of Navy before a Senate Committee where he needed at least 2,300 submariners, which would require an increase by two and half times over the current force. As Hellyer noted: “I think the issue is going to be how do we actually develop the crew for the SSNs and make them effective before the Collins class submarines essentially time out.” He underscored that the challenge already being faced by the ADF, namely, the sunsetting of the Collins class submarine, has not been solved, but actually is worse because the delivery schedule for the SSNs is later than the now-cancelled Attack-class conventional submarine project. So how will the RAN and the ADF deal with this? The answer probably lies not simply in the question of when Australian built nuclear submarines hit the water, or nuclear submarines built for Australia are operational, but with other solution sets as well. But here we are entering the domain of how Australia crafts its working relationships with the United States and UK navies going forward. And that is a final point. Hellyer found the fixation in the press with regard to whether the Australians would pursue a U.S. or UK nuclear submarine, Virginia or Astute, misplaced. If you are going down this route, obviously you are working with the dominant allied submarine force in the Indo-Pacific, the United States Navy. Global Britain may be a nice marketing point, but not one on which to build the future of Australian defence. As Hellyer put it: “The U.S. Navy is grappling every day with the same problems that we’re facing, which is how do you deal with an increasingly capable and aggressive Chinese military. And whatever the benefits or advantages of the Royal Navy, those are not the issues that the Royal Navy is grappling with every day. You want to be able to leverage what the U.S. military and the U.S. Navy in particular is doing going forward.” Royal Australian Navy (RAN) Collins Class submarines have been captured in impressive imagery, whilst exercising off the West Australian coast. Credit: Australian Department of Defence. Also, see the following: Link to article: The Australian Submarine Decision: Challenges and Next Steps (SLDinfo.com)

The 20th century saw some of the greatest and fastest technological advancements. With ever quickening advances, what wonders will the 22nd bring? In this #AirForce2121 piece, John Ruddy turns his eyes to the future, looking at how our complex world will rise to the challenges of contested space, geopolitical alliances, and the conflict between technological advancement and our environment. Ruddy takes the RAAF and throws it into a world that has changed in interesting ways - including new branches to keep pushing humanity forward. It is 2121, several decades after the devastating events of World War III and the biggest population decline in history. The Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) differs greatly from the previous two centuries, which saw advances in aviation fuelled by liberal access to crude oil giving rise to airspace dominance through fast, agile and powerful air vehicles. With Earth’s crude oil stores depleted and a global ban on synthetic oil production, the days of afterburning jet aircraft have gone forever. Instead, the RAAF collaborates with long-term and new allies worldwide to maintain global peace from Earth’s orbit by a Jovian ring defence system. Like the rings of Jupiter, it is made up of trillions of dust sized devices where each device is a fully functional surveillance, defender or actor satellite. Orbiting the Earth, the surveillance devices collaborate to provide a real-time picture of any anomalies, aggressors or non-compliance on Earth below. There is no longer the need to communicate this picture back to Earth, as the on-board Artificial Intelligence (AI) is able to perform the required synthesis and ethical decision-making, passing it onto the defender and/or actor satellites as necessary. Similarly, the defender satellites are able to stop any aggressors on the Earth’s surface. With all Earth’s systems now electrical based, the defenders simply pulse a highly energised precise gamma ray spike to the offending device, rendering it dead. The accuracy of the gamma ray is such that it can disable a handheld device without harming the user. This is quite different from the philosophy used 100 years ago where the local threat environment was simply neutralised; reflecting the advances of ethical AI which above all else, must preserve human life, irrespective of whether or not they are the aggressor. Actor satellites operate in a similar mode to that of the defenders, except they only engage to the benefit of the situation on Earth, for example providing energy to remote areas, aiding search and rescue efforts etc. With the precise gamma ray technology, the actors can energise remote power stations, robots and transport. The actors can also be used to message and de-escalate any potential aggressor to help prevent an attack, long before it starts. The major advantage of a Jovian ring defence system is due to the incredibly small size of each satellite and the volume of the satellites spanning a ring around the entire Earth; any attack on the satellites has no effect on the overall system – missiles and other space debris pass straight through the band. The ring is not visible from Earth, due to the small satellite size and the fact it is always moving, which makes targeting the ring very difficult for any aggressors. As a result of WWIII, many non-alliance countries remain uninhabitable from nuclear war. Consequently, the significant population decline and the fall of many governments has led to nations no longer having the ability or will to challenge each other. Instead, aggressors are typically small groups, dispersed and intermixed with civilised society. In these times, the primary role of the RAAF and new allies worldwide is to collaboratively monitor the outcomes from the automated Jovian ring defence system as a global defence force and develop upgrades to stay ahead of any aggressors. As was in 2021 and 1921, organic human beings still roam the Earth and the RAAF still has operational aircraft. As the Jovian ring system is able to maintain peace, aircraft are no longer designed or used for tools of war, but instead, designed to support humanitarian efforts as the Earth still battles to repair climate damage from the industrial revolution. The aircraft are no longer reliant on crude oil, but are dual powered by anti-gravity and harmonic pulsing drives and look very different to those from 100 years ago. In the early 2100s, scientists were making great discoveries with dark matter, the stuff that makes up 85% of our multiverse. In doing so, they mastered the so-called weak force of gravity by discovering anti-gravity, the polar opposite to gravity that must exist for equilibrium. Identifying a completely new branch of physics, dark physics was born, and anti-gravity engines soon materialised as a result of intense collaborative work with RAAF research and development. These engines trip the balance between gravity and anti-gravity to generate lift such that the energy input is only the energy required to trip that switch. Thrust is provided through harmonic pulsing drives which electromagnetically energise sub-atomic particles to resonate, aligned in the same direction to the thrust vector. Each subatomic particle contributes a very small amount of kinetic energy which accumulated over the entire air vehicle results in thrust. There is no induction, combustion or exhaust and no environmental impact from either the anti-gravity trip or sub-atomic resonance drive. Although the aircraft are much slower than their 2021 counterpart, they are still functional for the job. The RAAF demonstrate this at air shows, which remain a great annual event for the RAAF, demonstrating their technological advances whilst caring intently for the environment. The latest branch of the RAAF is the Multiverse Defence branch, which following the discovery of intelligent life outside of our solar system, strives to find a way to reach that other world. It is hoped further studies in dark physics will provide a breakthrough; however, what awaits the Multiverse Defence branch when they reach that destination remains unknown and a new challenge for power and peace may ensue. The RAAF continues to honour its legacy with the same hierarchy, opportunities, respect and service it has always had. With the addition of the Space Defence branch over 90 years prior followed by the Multiverse Defence branch in 2090, the RAAF continues to be the best air force in the world. Blue Skies and Colourful Verses John Ruddy is Head of Design at Northrop Grumman Australia and holds a holds a MEng in Aeronautical Engineering, CPEng, CEng, & RPEQ. He began his engineering career at a young age, learning how to rebuild engines and repair electrical components before becoming a graduate engineer with BAE Systems at Prestwick Airport, working as an operational performance and aerodynamics engineer on BAE jet and prop aircraft. Since then, he has worked for Aeronautical Engineers Australia, Cobham Aviation and Boeing Defence Australia in a variety of technical roles.

Logistics is the backbone to any operation for every Service where fast, efficient transport is vital to success. Logistic Officer Brendon Bishop highlights how standardisation of containers was revolutionary to the global domain. Yet are these successes sufficient for #AirForce2121? Identifying the shortfalls of current technology, Bishop offers the next step for logistics to enhance this essential operational element. As Bishop demonstrates, the integration of information technology and conversion to multi-domain standardisation is not only vital for Air Force, but for the globe. Air and space mobility planners of the 22nd century will face unprecedented demand to move more things, to more places, in faster cycles. They are going to be challenged with aligning the availability of unique transportation modes to service a growing number of terrestrial and near-Earth destinations. Future Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) logisticians will be challenged to store, secure and move cargo in containers capable of making those journeys. Can our 20th century logistics deliver Air Force 2121? Containerisation - a global phenomenon Through fortuitous circumstances, the 1950’s saw two major innovations in the movement of bulk cargo, first by road, rail and sea, and then by military aircraft. Malcolm Mclean – a North Carolina trucking merchant – changed international shipping forever through his invention of the Twenty-Foot Equivalent Unit (TEU) standardised shipping container. The TEU shipping container realised significant efficiencies in the movement of global freight, and was the catalyst for Globalisation [1]. The second innovation was a US Air Force project to develop a standardised military air cargo pallet labelled the “SS-463L” project. The AAR Cadillac Manufacturing Corporation developed the HCU-6/E 463L Pallet, which became the mainstay for western military air cargo movement. Throughout the early 21st century, every piece of materiel deployed in support of operations in the Middle-East travelled at least part of the journey in a TEU shipping container or on a 463L air cargo pallet. Military logisticians synchronised cargo loads to transportation modes and successfully mobilised significant military resources into the area of operations. The TEU shipping container and the 463L Pallet – as well as innovations in material handling systems – enabled logisticians to cross-load cargo from road, rail and sea freight to air freight and back again. But, these advances to expeditiously move materiel from the national support base to the operational theatre can have unintended consequences. During the US Army deployment to Iraq in 2003, a surge in demand led to the utilisation of 40,000 shipping containers that subsequently overwhelmed the logistics supply chain in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. However, because of the lack of information infrastructure – with cargo manifests predominantly compiled by hand – no common operating picture existed for commanders to understand their available resources. Nearly half of those containers remained unopened and unused. The TEU shipping container and 463L pallet changed the global civilian and military freight landscape in the 20th and 21st Century, but they have only partially solved the multi-domain military logistics requirement. These existing shipping methods still require reconfiguration to interface between terrestrial transportation modes; and neither consider the possibility of transport via space. The US Air Force Research Lab’s rocket cargo vanguard project demonstrates that the goal of movement of bulk cargo by spacecraft in support of terrestrial or orbital operations is no longer an object of science fiction. Delivering a multi-domain logistics solution for Air Force 2121 will require another evolution in the way Air Force moves freight. The “Smart Box” revolution The fourth industrial revolution has seen demand grow for real-time information at all points of the global supply chain. It is no longer acceptable to have a box that simply stores goods for efficient movement from point to point. Command needs to know the exact location of cargo in the supply chain. If delivery of the box is going to be delayed because a cargo ship has blocked a major canal and stalled global shipping as experienced with the Suez Canal’s blockage in March 2021, aviators need to determine what the delay will cost and develop contingencies. The shipping container must become a “smart box”. To get there, the box must be connected: it must incorporate sensors which report on location, internal environment and status of the goods within the container. It must feature enhanced container security measures, self-weighing technology, and ambitiously, must incorporate environmental control systems rather than just refrigeration. Similarly, innovation in military air cargo pallets is required. AAR Corp has developed hybrid shipping containers that have the base of a 463L-Pallet. These custom air cargo boxes are designed to interface with common Western military aircraft materiel handling systems and eliminate the requirement for time consuming air cargo nets. These hybrid shipping containers have been a boon for larger military cargo aircraft where air load teams may load in excess of 16 of them in a single C-17A Globemaster aircraft. However, these hybrid pallets are not smart boxes and they are designed for air transport only. The incorporation of smart box technological developments will enhance the information environment and further ease the aviators’ ability to manage a growing global supply chain. However, these developments only serve to resolve lessons learnt from 2003 and earlier. They do not innovate or fundamentally change the extant global supply chain. At any freight node where road, rail or sea transport interface with air transport, the TEU shipping container must be unloaded or reconfigured to air cargo pallets. The same is true in reverse. As the availability and economics of supersonic flight and space travel improve, aviators will question the economics of applying manual labour to reconfigure cargo at the interface between transport modes. The case for Multi-Domain Shipping The Air Force of 2121 must be able to mobilise and reposition across the competition continuum. Air Force 2121 will offer the Australian government air and space mobility, delivering cargo to terrestrial and near-Earth destinations. From one moment, it may deliver AusAID via an aging supersonic heavy lift aircraft, and the next, repositioning that equipment via orbit to deliver an effect against a competitor. The future Aviators will require a universal shipping container capable of seamlessly transitioning across the physical domains via any transportation mode. The future Air Force air and space points of embarkation will service a growing number of mobility platforms. For a small Air Force to continue to deliver the growing demands of the Australian government, the physical shipping container must evolve. Supply chains must be freed of the constraints of 20th century shipping containers and air cargo pallets. A universal multi-domain shipping container is an answer to the future multi-domain logistics requirements of Air Force 2121. Such a container will be capable of cross-loading without reconfiguration enabling the Joint Force to deploy and redeploy via any transportation mode. Aviators will access real-time information describing the exact location and status of their cargo anywhere in near-Earth space. The universal multi-domain shipping container will enable Air Force 2121 to move anything, anywhere, anytime. Footnote [1] Rodrigue, Jean-Paul., and Notteboom, Theo. “The geography of containerization: Half a century of revolution, adaptation and diffusion”, GeoJournal, Issue 74, 2009. Brendan Bishop is a Logistics Officer in the Royal Australian Air Force. During his time in Air Force, he has gained extensive experience and operational deployments with Air Force air load teams. Brendan has also completed postgraduate study in Project Management. The views expressed are his alone and do not reflect the opinion of the Royal Australian Air Force, the Department of Defence, or the Australian Government.

Why do we have an Air Force? In addressing that question, can we move beyond the “Justification Cycle”? Before you read any further into this post, I’d ask you to think about a response to the question posed in the title: Why do we have an Air Force? With your answer in mind, please read on. Answering the question of why Australia has an Air Force should be a simple matter for most Australian airmen. Were they to be asked, most would answer along one or both of two lines of reasoning: To capitalise on the efficiency and effectiveness gains associated with centralising air power in a single service, and To ensure the development of independent air power roles such as control of the air and strategic strike. Responses along these lines are a reflection of what Williams Foundation Scholar Stephen Edgeley has defined as the justification cycle: “an internal and external process that continuously requires that independent air forces demonstrate their ability to do more than participate in the joint battle”. They are responses that are indicative of an organisation seeking to justify its continued existence. The justification cycle is, in essence, a response to the question of “Why shouldn’t the Air Force be abolished?” Which, to be sure, is a useful response to have when facing existential threats to the organisation. But let’s be honest, within the Australian context at least, the existence of the Air Force is not in doubt. So if we are not required to justify the existence of the Air Force, why haven’t we broken free of the justification cycle? A definitive answer to that question is a worthy research subject in its own right, but it is not the focus of this post. Rather, the aim here is to explore an alternative perspective to the question of the Air Force’s raison d’être. Instead of focusing on what makes Air Force different, thereby justifying its independent existence, I propose that the more useful perspective is to identify what makes Air Force unique, and how that uniqueness makes a vital contribution to an effective joint force. This is an important semantic distinction. To date, the focus of Air Force’s existential self-reflection has been on what it does (the four core air power roles) and how it does is it (command and control). These nicely mirror the logic strands that fuel the justification cycle. But there is a problem: these roles and the organisational structures that are used to manage them are not unique to Air Force. The air warfare destroyer will bring Navy squarely into the control of the air game, Army special forces have the capacity to conduct precision strike missions, Army and Navy helicopters are important air mobility assets, and all three services have organic ISR capabilities. Similarly, the concept of “centralised control, decentralised execution”, the cornerstone of Air Force’s command and control philosophy, is reflected in the Army’s concept of mission command. So what Air Force does and how it does it are not necessarily useful in identifying its unique contribution. What is useful, however, is an appreciation of how the features of the Air Force’s primary operating environment necessitate a unique way of thinking. This is a concept known as “airmindedness.” It is important here not to conflate airmindnesses with an inherently strategic mindset; the former in no way implies the latter. Airmindedness is a product of operating in a multi-dimensional domain that forces a change in perspective, extends the reach of potential influence, and demands flexibility in application. Exploiting these and the other characteristics of air power are the core tactical trade of the Australian airmen. But there is more to it than this. Air Force’s contribution to the joint fight is not limited to the highly visible presence of aircraft, it also permeates the planning and decision making process before, during and after the fight. The development and analysis of strategies, options, and courses of action undoubtedly benefit from the diversity of perspectives that are involved. Soldiers, sailors and airmen see the world differently, and this is not a bad thing. Joint should not become synonymous with homogeneity, but should be viewed as a form of operational and strategic diversity. For too long we have focused on persistent inter-service rivalry as a battle for budgets and not seen it for what it truly is, the natural consequence of a difference of perspective, opinion, and approach. Such differences should be encouraged not suppressed. One of the ways in which it is encouraged is by providing airmen with an organisational environment that promotes the development of airmindedness. Adopting this view, the answer to the question of why the Air Force exists can explore a different line of reasoning: Air Force exists as much to cultivate the minds of airmen so that they may exploit the unique characteristics of the air domain as it does to develop the machines that they use to do so. Without doubt, some who have read this post will disagree with my assertions based on their own thoughts regarding the way Air Force and its members define their role. In which case, my objective has been achieved, as this is the necessary first step in Air Force evolving its self-awareness from the justification cycle to a true understanding that its unique contribution to the joint fight lies not only in its machines but also in the minds of its airmen. Squadron Leader Travis Hallen is an Air Combat Officer in the Royal Australian Air Force. He is also a Sir Richard Williams Foundation Scholar and editor at The Central Blue. The opinions expressed are his alone and do not reflect those of the Royal Australian Air Force, the Australian Defence Force, or the Australian Government.

The decline in USN and USMC non-deployed flying rates are a cause for concern, as demonstrated by increased home station accident rates. Fixing the problem will take time. Concern has arisen over an increase in aircraft crashes in 2016, particularly USN and USMC F/A-18C Hornets and F/A-18E/F Super Hornets. Since May, four Hornet or Super Hornet crashes involving non-deployed units killed two pilots and destroyed five aircraft. Reporting indicates that these crashes are part of a sharp increase in military aviation accidents overall for non-deployed squadrons, which have absorbed the bulk of budget cuts through reduced training and delayed maintenance at home so the best aircraft and personnel can be used on deployment overseas. A major accident is defined as an incident that causes at least $50,000 in damage and in some cases leads to injury, death or the loss of the aircraft. Since 2012, the number of major Navy and Marine Hornet and Super Hornet accidents has increased 44 percent, according to data collected by the Naval Safety Centre in Norfolk, Va. As a result, there are calls for funding to be significantly increased in order to restore airframe availability and pilot proficiency, and support current operations, or for operational tempo to be drastically reduced. The Navy and Marines rank the top three most damaging aviation accidents as Class A through C. Class A is the highest level of crash and means a pilot was killed or permanently disabled or the aircraft sustained at least $2 million in damage. Since sequestration (automatic federal spending cuts contained in the Budget Control Act of 2011, which started to take effect from March 2013), the number of Class A through C accidents involving Hornets or Super Hornets has increased from 57 in fiscal year 2012 to 82 as of 2 August in the current fiscal year (2016), according to data from the Naval Safety Centre. Not only Hornets or Super Hornets have been affected. Across the board, the number of Navy and Marine aircraft lost in accidents has doubled during the first 11 months of fiscal year 2016 compared to the same time in 2015. Twenty aircraft had been destroyed as of 29 August, compared to 10 aircraft during the same time in 2015, according to Naval Safety Centre data. A recent set of crashes has focused attention. On 2 August, a Navy pilot safely ejected after the F/A-18C he was flying experienced an engine fire at Nevada’s Naval Air Station Fallon. A Marine pilot was killed on 28 July when the F/A-18C he was flying crashed near Twentynine Palms in California during a night-time training mission. A crash in June of another F/A-18C during a Blue Angels practice flight killed another Marine pilot. Two Super Hornet F/A-18E/F aircraft collided in May during a training mission off the coast of North Carolina. The four crew-members ejected and were rescued. According to data from the Naval Safety Centre, the overall number of flight hours for the Marines and Navy has been relatively steady over the past few years. However, deployed operations have taken up an increasing share of those flight hours over home training operations, which means non-deployed pilots are not flying very much. The minimum number of hours a Navy/Marine pilot needs to fly each month to stay safe is 11. The Marines reached a low point for F/A-18 Hornet flight hours last summer, when it averaged 8.8 hours per month per pilot for non-deployed squadrons. Increased funding and an emphasis to improve readiness has increased that average to 11.1 as of August 2016. The average flight hours for the Navy for the non-deployed squadrons is 12 to 14 hours a month, although there are probably some whose average is down to 9 or less. Experience indicates that a pilot needs to fly at least three times a week to maintain readiness. Twice a week isn’t enough. A lack of flying time does add to the rise in accidents. Increased use of aircraft has required more repairs, or aged some beyond their useful lives. In mid-2016, of the Marines’ 276 Hornets, only 87 were available for missions. Out of those, 30 were allocated to the training squadron and 40 were allocated for deployment. That left only 17 for the units to train with during the day. Of the Navy’s 259 Hornets, 55 were mission-capable (able to perform at least one and potentially all of its missions). Of the Navy’s 544 Super Hornets, 290 were mission-capable. The Navy planned to stop buying Super Hornets in anticipation of the arrival of the F-35C. As the F-35 program faced delays and setbacks, it was unable to relieve pressure from the F/A-18. As a result, the older Hornets are reaching the end of their service life faster, and newer Super Hornets are aging more quickly than the Navy planned. To address that, the Navy is extending the aircraft to last 8,000 hours of flight time, and in some cases, 10,000 hours. The F/A-18 Hornet was originally designed for a 6,000-hour service life. A fix won’t be quick, as the Navy and Marines deal with the limitations caused by funding cuts. It will take time to recover from the significant challenges they have faced in recent years. Gary Waters spent 33 years in the RAAF, resigning as an air commodore and joining the Australian Public Service at the Senior Executive level. After four years in the public service, Gary became head of strategy for the Australian arm of a global defence company, retiring seven years later. He now consults on a part-time basis. He has a PhD in political science and international relations and has written extensively on defence, air power and cyber issues.

“Strategy” is one of those words that’s used so widely and in so many different contexts that it often seems to generate confusion. That doesn’t need to be the case, as the nature of Australia’s long-running involvement in the wars in the Middle East can be used to illustrate. Writing in the Fairfax media several months ago about the West’s 15-years-and-counting war in Afghanistan, former chief of Army, now University of Canberra professor, Peter Leahy stated that, “Over time, our politicians did not tell us much of our strategy. There is a good excuse – we didn’t have one”. Professor Leahy’s assertion warrants examination at several levels. First, at the national (grand) strategic level, Australia unquestionably had a strategy, which was to serve our perceived interests by supporting our major ally, the United States. Indeed, that approach has been a constant in our defence policy for more than one hundred years, since federation. In the case of Afghanistan, it could also reasonably be argued that it was in our interest to oppose the danger represented by the Taliban and, more generally, by Islamic extremism, as far away from home as possible. Second, at the military (operational) level, we also had a strategy, namely, the theory of counter-insurgency warfare. Promoted zealously by Western generals since World War II, Coin operations were supposed to secure victory by “isolating” the enemy, “pacifying” hostile populations, “winning hearts and minds”, and so on. But in wars in Algeria, Somalia, Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan, Coin has been exposed as an intellectually unsustainable theory: as nothing more than a series of hollow slogans. In every case, the end result was a gradual slide into military failure, which in turn caused the gradual loss of public and, therefore, political support at home. The reason for that failure is not difficult to identify. Again in every case, Western strategists were extraordinarily dismissive of the values of the countries their forces invaded. What was their history? What did their dominant religious beliefs imply? What did their thousands of years of distinctive social morés indicate? How had previous invasions fared? How did they regard the West? And so on. The fact is that it is very hard to “fight amongst the people” when most of those people don’t want you there. In short, the West, including Australia, did have a strategy in Afghanistan, it’s just that it wasn’t a very good one. Professor Leahy also criticised the Australian government for not identifying an “end-state” for the war in Afghanistan. But the dogma that strategy must have a clearly-defined end-state is another questionable proposition. In an ideal world, establishing an optimal end-state is a good thing. But “ideal” scarcely describes the situation in Afghanistan, or Iraq-Syria, which by any measure is complex in the extreme. And in the real world, it is infinitely better to be flexible than to cling to a thoroughly bad plan. Thus, the end-state defined by the second Bush Administration prior to the invasions of Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003 of to “win” (whatever that might mean) and to “establish democracy” were unrealistic. Ideology had usurped rational analysis. It should not have been a surprise that West’s strategy failed in both instances, as it had thirty years before in Vietnam. Under the Obama Administration, since about 2010, the West’s military strategy in Afghanistan and Iraq-Syria implicitly has changed to one of containment; that is, of containing the damage at an acceptable cost to the US and its allies while the core issues that are now driving those conflicts – civil war, religious war, and regional power struggles – play themselves out. In the circumstances, that is a reasonable objective. Indeed, such is the extent of the mess on the ground that restraining what’s happening is not merely the West’s best option, it’s pretty well the only one. It’s consistent with the objective circumstances in the Middle East; and it’s realistic in terms of what the West can do, as opposed to what it might like to do. There’s a clear message here for the people who determine Australian defence strategy. Dr Alan Stephens is a fellow of the Williams Foundation.

US President Barack Obama recently suggested that the leaders of Islamic State “know they will lose in Syria and Iraq”, and that consequently they’re already “shifting their strategy” to accommodate that impending battlefield defeat. President Obama’s assessment was later repeated by the commander of Australia’s training mission in Iraq, who predicted victory by August 2017. This is a remarkable turn of events. Only two years ago IS seemed to be carrying all before it as it swept aside local armies, made vast territorial gains, declared the establishment of a geographic “caliphate”, and threatened to occupy Baghdad. Islamic State’s unforeseen rise was precipitated by the West’s ill-considered series of invasions of the Middle East over the past twenty years, and the social, political, economic and religious tensions unleashed by the disruption of established orders and the (resented) presence in the region of large numbers of foreign troops. IS’s impending demise as a geographic entity has been in part attributable to the US’s abandonment of the failed cult of counterinsurgency warfare, and to the implementation by the Obama Administration of a fundamentally different approach to military operations in the Middle East. Two aspects of that approach have been critical. First, most of the occupying soldiers have been withdrawn. This means that the fighting on the ground, which has remained savage and intense, has become the responsibility of local armies and militias; that is, of forces that actually can “fight amongst the [their] people”. It has been an exceptional achievement by the armies of the US and its allies, including Australia, to revive and to train those local armies and militias to the point where IS’s military defeat is likely. Second, having rejected Coin, the US has turned to what has arguably been its most successful model for the application of military force for the past two decades, namely, the combination of Special Forces and air power. SoF (whose operational characteristics in many respects mirror those of air power) contribute expert front-line assistance for local forces, real-time intelligence, target marking, and rapid precision strike. Air power, both manned and unmanned, hits strategic targets and provides near-on demand close attack for local ground forces. Air severely limits IS’s ability to mass or to move in vehicles, and strikes at the head of the IS snake through the controversial but highly effective campaign of decapitation of the enemy leadership. That approach in turn has allowed anti-IS forces to contain, then degrade, then take the initiative. It is a model distinguished by its emphasis on information dominance, decision-making superiority, and controlling the tempo of operations. Maximising the West’s greatest military comparative advantages, it is the antithesis of strategy based on mass, close-up fighting, the presumed need to hold ground, and implausible social engineering. However – and it’s a big however – the SoF/airpower model of force application is situation-specific. Thus, as IS slides towards geographic defeat and increasingly turns to the wider use of terrorist attacks in Western cities, our defence forces will need to develop new attitudes. Which raises the question: as Australia’s involvement in wars in the Middle East at last seems closer to the finish than to the start, what comes next for the ADF and our defence strategy? For some twenty years we’ve been fighting as junior partners with little, if any, voice in the military strategy/ies we’ve been trying to execute. Will that change? Will we actually have an officially articulated military strategy? Do we even need one? You’d hope that the answer to all three questions would be “yes”, and that we’d move beyond the era of strategic drift that has characterised ADF operations since the invasion of Vietnam in the early-1960s. Some commentators would contend that Australia hasn’t had an independent defence posture since Federation in 1901: that we’ve simply followed the lead of the UK and then the US. Others might point to the brief period in the late-1980s when the so-called “Defence of Australia” strategy required the ADF to focus on “controlling” events in the air and sea approaches to our north and north-west. That strategy was vigorously opposed by the Australian Army, presumably because its innate maritime nature implied a diminished role for land forces. Army’s equally vigorous promotion of counterinsurgency warfare, which by definition entailed expeditionary operations, might be seen as an opportunistic corollary to its dislike of a maritime (air and sea) strategy. Recently the Director-General Army Modernisation for the Australian Army seemed to endorse the development of an anti-access/area denial strategy for Australia, an approach which in practice bears a strong resemblance to the Defence of Australia concept. Perhaps Army’s apparent change of heart is related to the ADF’s acquisition of two very large “Amphibious Assault Ships” (which started life with the entirely different role descriptor of “Landing Helicopter Dock”); perhaps the generals who opposed the Defence of Australia policy in the past were wrong; or perhaps there’s another reason altogether. Whatever that reason may be, the point to take away here is that as the ADF starts to transition towards a post-IS, post-Coin posture, the development of military strategy must be both objective and genuinely joint. Dr Alan Stephens is a Fellow of the Sir Richard Williams Foundation