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Building a capacity for junior leaders to ask deep questions and possess a greater integrated view of Air Force specialisations is central to Isaac Stephenson’s argument about improvements to the Officer Training School (OTS) regime. In this piece, he offers several actionable recommendations for improvement to the initial training framework for Air Force Officers, including opening the aperture in timing and curriculum to empower Junior Officers with a greater understanding of the why behind their mission. In Stephenson’s mind, such adjustments would better position the RAAF for the future. 2022 is my fifth year of service in the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) and consequently I am due for my time-based promotion to Flight Lieutenant. I am yet to complete the required course for this promotion and so I thought I’d reflect on my initial experience as an Air Force Junior Officer. As an eager twenty-year-old with a keen interest in all things military, I couldn’t wait for my moment to engage in discussions about doctrine, strategy and military history. However, due to the compressed time period granted to Officer Training School (OTS) I found all these topics had to be left by the wayside. I would like to use this article to start a discussion around improving RAAF initial military training. I propose three big changes which I believe can set the RAAF’s officer core up for future success and enhance tactical and strategic thinking. Step One. Introduce and encourage open discussion on doctrine, history and strategy to every specialisation to build awareness of how every role in the RAAF contributes to a wider military strategy from Officer Training School. History is the foundation of who we are today. Understanding military history and the origins of military doctrine is the cornerstone of today’s Royal Australian Air Force. It’s the platform to learn from past mistakes and advance military tactics so the Air Force’s Officer Corps is well equipped to contribute effectively at every level. It also introduces respect and understanding between different roles and functions of the RAAF. YouTube Channels such as one named Military History Visualized that broadly document various case studies can be used to teach the importance of a whole-of-team approach to military strategy. In one particular case study Military History Visualized looks at the relationship between logisticians and engineers and the United States and German Air Force’s in conflict. In this video “Logistics of the German Air Force in World War 2,” a few examples of Luftwaffe logistics and doctrine are compared to that of the United States Army Air Corp in the Second World War. The key lesson I drew from this case was the understanding in the integration of logistics and aircraft design in military strategy which appears to have been taken into consideration by the United States Army Air Corp and not so by the Luftwaffe. Instead, the Luftwaffe’s doctrine stated “...supply chain management is always servant of operational and tactical leadership and must never become its stumbling block.” (Logistics of the German Air Force in World War 2, time 3:00) Looking at this statement alone, it is clear the Luftwaffe didn’t have an appreciation for the importance of logistics in its culture and decision-making. This demonstrates the dangers of having an Air Force that doesn’t respect the gravity and prominence of including these critical support roles in decision-making and strategy. This way of thinking limited the Luftwaffe severely as the war deteriorated and the supply situation became more limiting and critical. Today, to avoid these pitfalls the RAAF must understand the significance of support roles in developing military strategy. By providing Junior Officers with the context and the history behind why the symbiosis between support and warfighting roles is so essential will assist in cultivating respect and understanding between specialisations from day one. Step Two. A cultural shift must occur to encourage personnel from all specialisations to become instructors at Officer Training School. I found during my initial Officer training, many of my directing staff were from select specialisations, such as; logistics, personnel capability, environmental, ground defence and engineering. Although this offers a strong spread of different musterings and perspectives, there was a distinct lack of aircrew, medical and intelligence representatives, just to name a few. As I continue along my pilot path, I have noticed few aircrew have a desire to instruct at OTS or the Australian Defence Force Academy (ADFA). Some factors that contribute to this include; a lack of flying and allowances that follow, perceived hindrance to career progression, a seemingly undesirable location and an overall lack of interest in becoming an instructor at OTS. To generate the cultural shift required, the Air Force could consider offering the following incentives; shorter posting lengths to OTS, a financial bonus to all instructors, a Pay and Conditions Manual update to include Sale as a regional area for regional bonuses, a clear posting plan to a location or position of their choice. Similar to Royal Military College (RMC) Duntroon for Army, OTS or ADFA should be honourable and desirable postings for anyone in the Air Force to contribute to OTS. This in turn will provide greater perspective, inclusion, and understanding across all the various specialisations. I have found in my short career that very few specialisations have an understanding of what other specialisations do and everyone appears to work in their respective roles and not look outside their lane. This can create confusion and misunderstanding of job allocation and responsibility. I hope by incentivising all personnel to teach in our initial training schools we will push to bridge the gap between specialisations from day one. With this experience in OTS, instructors can provide personal insight from their careers and deliver briefs that explain how their specialisation contribute to developing and operationalising the wider Air Force strategy. Furthermore, they can tailor their operational experience to include how other specialisations enabled them to complete their role. This will provide inspiration, context and real world experience to Officer students and provoke discussion. Step Three. Allocate more time and resources to the Officer Training Course. The Royal Air Force and the Royal New Zealand Air Force allocate six months to initial Officer Training courses to develop their Air Force Officers. During these extra two months they add more emphasis on military history and doctrine as well as more time allocated to the current curriculum. I suggest an additional two months for OTS to include extra content tailored to military doctrine, strategy and history. A longer OTS course with a larger cohort will also provide more diversity in specialisations. OTS is the best time in an Officer’s career to have such a wide variety of specialisations working together. Extra time in this environment not only provides time for military content to be taught, it also enables the creation of established relationships and networking that will carry into their careers in the wider Air Force. During my training at OTS, I was told that many of the topics I have previously mentioned would be introduced to me during my initial pilot training. However, I have found that throughout the Pilot Training Continuum (Basic Flying Training School, Advance Flying Training School, P8A Poseidon Operational Conversion), and now a year into being a Co-Pilot on the P8A, there is no time for these subjects to be introduced and taught. Immediately after my conversion, I deployed on OP GATEWAY within the South China Sea. If it wasn’t for my own interest in geo-politics and strategy, I believe I would’ve felt embarrassed to ask the purpose of what we’re doing. By the time I finished my conversation on the P8A, I felt I should’ve already known. I believe we shouldn’t rely on people’s interest in these important military topics, but rather give everyone an introduction from the start. Many people may not continue to engage in the material. Notwithstanding, the Air Force should give Junior Officers the tools to encourage them to ask questions early in their careers. I don’t believe we should wait for professional military education (PME) courses as part of promotion or Staff College to introduce people to these ideas, because by then I feel it is too late. These suggestions will cost the Air Force time, money and resources; however, it has been my experience that for Officer Aviation Candidates at least, there are significant periods of waiting for their respective courses. I have often found that the experience of other colleagues who have gone into the wider Air Force directly after OTS have often felt “undercooked” and their respective Initial Employment Training courses don’t cover the subjects mentioned in this post, the same as my pilot training experience. Likewise, many of my ADFA colleagues found that throughout their ADFA training there were similar shortfalls and therefore these changes will need to be implemented into the ADFA Single Service Training which is primarily conducted at OTS. Furthermore, it will likely take some time to adjust to the scheduling changes, but once it has settled it will become the new norm. Improving our initial Officer training is a pivotal component that will place the Royal Australian Air Force in good stead in defending Australia and our national interests. This begins at Officer Training School. Isaac Stephenson graduated pilots course in November of 2019, on the final CT4/PC9 course and is posted to 11 Squadron as a Co-Pilot on the P8A Poseidon. References: Military History Visualised, “Logistics of the German Air Force in World War 2,” YouTube Video, 4:05, January 15, 2016, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZgGXRJg-NNU&ab_channel=MilitaryHistoryVisualized Military History Not Visualised, “Why were Wehrmacht Logistics so Bad?” YouTube Video, 11:23, July 20, 2019, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3n0BpQj9jqc&ab_channel=MilitaryHistorynotVisualized Produced by Media Services Royal Air Force College Cranwell, 2017, A Guide To Initial Officer Training https://www.raf.mod.uk/recruitment/media/2337/20170804-iot_course_info_booklet.pdf US Air Force Officer Training School Website https://www.airforce.com/education/military-training/ots/overview David Turnbull, 2021, PME is NOT a Dirty Word! https://airpower.airforce.gov.au/blog/pme-not-dirty-word

The Royal Australian Air Force is the principle air and space force of Australia, and yet each branch exclusively conducts its own air power projection operations. Squadron Leader Stephen Bell leads the #FutureChiefs discussion by considering the possibility that the role of future CAF could be opened to all services as ADF moves further into an increasingly joint approach in building an integrated force. Submissions in this #FutureChiefs series will likely focus on broadening the Chief of Air Force (CAF) position to all Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) officers, not just pilots. However, I propose that if we are to truly embrace the Joint / All-Domain operating concept, then the ‘Head of Air & Space Power’ should not be limited to a subset of the Air & Space workforce who wear blue. To consider the requirements for future CAFs, it is important to understand what the role of the Service is within Defence and therefore what functions the CAF performs. The recently released Australian Military Power doctrine defines the role of the RAAF as the generation of Australia’s Air and Space Power. To lead the RAAF in this role, CAF has three primary responsibilities: raise, train and sustain (RTS) Australian Air (fixed wing) and Space military capabilities; be the ADF capability lead in the Air and Space Domains; and act as the Defence Aviation Authority. Being able to lead, and advise government, across these responsibilities with credibility and legal defensibility is fundamental to any choice for future CAFs. Underpinning credibility and defensibility is relevant experience in the Air and Space Domains, including in operations, sustainment and administration. However, that experience is not exclusive to the aviators of the Royal Australian Air Force. Army Aviation Command and the Fleet Air Arm also produce Air Power specialists with a variety of experience that could meet all the responsibilities of CAF and bring diversity to Australia’s Air Power senior leadership. Fundamentally, this question is about ‘what is the role of the single services’. The logical conclusion from recent doctrinal and policy changes is that the mission of the Services is to be domain leads. Therefore, there is no reason a future CAF couldn’t be a Lieutenant General (LTGEN) or Vice Admiral (VADM) as fixed wing RTS remains blue through the RAAF Air Commander. Extrapolating this further, if the RAAF is doctrinally the Air & Space domain lead, then why doesn’t it own Army Aviation Command and the Fleet Air Arm, further justifying a tri-service CAF. But that’s another debate entirely… Squadron Leader Stephen Bell is an Officer in the Royal Australian Air Force. An Aerospace Engineer by qualification, he has held a variety of Joint, Capability and Operations experience including flying squadrons; capability project & sustainment offices; and headquarters experience at the operational and strategic levels. He has also gained exposure through operational deployments both domestically and overseas. He's on Twitter at @Wigles5 More information on this #FutureChiefs series can be found here.

Chris McInnes takes a look at Flying Camelot: the F-15, the F-16, and the Weaponization of the Fighter Pilot Nostalgia by Michael W. Hankins. McInnes is quick to highlight that this book is about so much more than the platforms on the cover, exploring fighter pilots, aircraft, and the broader culture. In particular, Dr. Hankin takes a look at John Boyd and his followers’ contribution to the development of fighter aircraft. Using additional analytical layers of historiography Dr. Hankin challenges ideological views of Boyd and shines a light on the failings, as well as successes, of Boyd’s contributions. McInnes’ comprehensive review will not only show why this air power historical book is worth your time, but excite you to getting your very own copy. Dr Michael Hankins, the curator of United States Air Force (USAF) history at the Smithsonian National Air and Space Museum, has produced an insightful, engaging, and highly accessible account of how a small group of people with a particular worldview sought to influence American military development in the post-Vietnam era. I highly encourage readers of The Central Blue to join Dr Hankins’ 200-page guided tour through the machinations of the United States (US) military-industrial-congressional complex, and to reflect on the insights for those working in analogous Australian environments. But fair warning: this is not a book about the F-15, the F-16, and fighter pilots despite the title. Instead, Dr Hankins has produced a well-researched and argued analysis of the ideas and influence of John Boyd and his acolytes in, firstly, the Fighter Mafia in the USAF and, latterly, the Reform Movement across the wider US military establishment. I can see where the title came from (although I speculate that it might not have been the author’s first choice). Boyd was a fighter pilot, his experiences as such profoundly influenced his ideas and approach (for good and ill), and he took some stereotypical ‘knights of the sky’ fighter pilot cultural characteristics to extremes. He and his worldview played a role in the design and development of the F-15 and F-16 fighter aircraft. All of this is in the book, but there is much more to Dr Hankins’ analysis than fighter pilots and fighter aircraft - and it is the better for it. The fighter pilot cultural aspects, which Dr Hankins describes in some depth in the opening chapters, are used as a sort of ‘golden thread’ throughout the book tying everything to a central theme. The YF-16 prototype - the Flying Camelot of the title - is held up as the purest expression of Boyd’s knights of the sky vision. For me, the fighter pilot nostalgia arguments were not sufficiently compelling to be the central theme and the ‘golden thread’ seemed increasingly inelegant and forced as the book moved beyond fighters to broader issues. There are stereotypical fighter pilots and Boyd did, in some respects, embody some of those stereotypes. But like all stereotypes, the ‘knights of the sky’ paradigm is narrow and misleading. As Dr Hankins himself argues, Boyd was simply one of many fighter pilots - among many other contributors - involved in the development of the F-15 and the F-16 and each of these people brought their own experience and expertise to the table. Indeed, it is interesting that Boyd's long-term impact on the US military services appears to be roughly inversely proportional to the number of fighter pilots in those services. As the book demonstrates in multiple places, few people are better placed to counter or balance the over-zealous ideas of fighter pilots than other fighter pilots. Nonetheless, Dr Hankins does a terrific job of framing and capturing the originality and impact of Boyd and his followers in the Fighter Mafia and Reform Movement. I have read multiple books on Boyd and his ideas and I found this analysis of the man, his thinking, and his contributions to be well founded and well argued. Unlike some other Boyd scholars, Dr Hankins explores not only what was said by and about Boyd and his ideas, but also who said it and when they said it. Through this additional layer of analysis, Dr Hankins argues that much of the acclaim for Boyd and his ideas, the Fighter Mafia, and the Reform Movement flows from a small group of self-referential people (usually members of the Fighter Mafia or Reform Movement) with a vested interest in advancing ‘Boyd the Messiah’ and his ideas. Dr Hankins is forensic in dissecting the inconsistencies, contradictions, and limitations in the ideas propounded by Boyd and his followers. In many cases, Dr Hankins is careful to show they did make valuable contributions, but these were not as profound, unique, or unorthodox as is often portrayed. For example, Dr Hankins shows that Boyd’s synthesis and articulation of a range of existing works on energy manoeuvrability theory did make a valuable contribution to fighter aircraft development but only in a narrow field, and with the support of others who shared similar views based on existing theories. In other cases, Dr Hankins is less restrained and argues, with solid evidence, that Boyd and his followers were zealots who selectively misused historical examples to further arguments, contradicted themselves to bolster post-event credibility, and behaved in ethically and legally dubious ways. This culminated in the Reformers claiming credit for the US military’s success in the 1990-1991 Gulf War, despite previously arguing against many of the complex technical systems that enabled that success, such as the book’s title fighters. Nonetheless, Dr Hankins is at pains to credit Boyd and his followers with some positive impact on US military reform, such as improving operational test and evaluation. Dr Hankins is particularly effective in illustrating the limitations and narrowness of Boyd’s thinking, from his early work on air combat and energy manoeuvrability through to his later efforts to capture broad patterns in conflict and competition, including the (in?)famous Observe-Orient-Decide-Act Loop. This is important because Boyd’s emphasis on tempo, manoeuvre, and dilemmas as means to cause paralysis and collapse in opponents has influenced Western military thinking, sometimes unhealthily. Frequently referring to the arguments of those refuting Boyd and his followers at the time allows Dr Hankins to deftly show that their thinking was often astrategic, ahistoric, and narrow. Boyd and his collaborators argued for lots of simple, agile combat platforms with a minimum of complex systems like sensors or defensive aids, as opposed to fewer complex platforms. The YF-16 prototype was indeed optimised for daylight dogfighting in accordance with Boyd’s energy manoeuvrability ideas and knights of the sky ethos. But, as the book relates, it is hard to conceive of that airframe or its pilot lasting very long in the cloudy, densely-defended skies of Cold War Europe, or democratically-elected governments condoning the heavy attrition of highly-trained pilots from all-volunteer militaries. Dr Hankins notes the group’s tendency to cherry pick from history to support their arguments, including idolising the German militaries of the first half of the twentieth century. But he misses the biggest critique of this seemingly widespread fascination with these German militaries. They lost. Comprehensively. Twice. Flying Camelot is a good book and well worth your time. Dr Hankins provides extensive notes and a comprehensive bibliography. He writes in an engaging and accessible way that makes some occasionally highly-technical discussions quite lucid and illuminating. The book is, however, not what it says on the cover: it is better. Michael W. Hankins. 2021. Flying Camelot: the F-15, the F-16, and the Weaponization of Fighter Pilot Nostalgia. Cornell University Press; Ithaca, NY.

By Robbin Laird FEATURED STORY Remembering Brendan Sargeant: Australia's Premier Strategist | Defense.info This is a piece I never wanted to write and certainly did not anticipate having to do so. This weekend Australian friends informed me of the untimely death of my friend and colleague Brendan Sargeant, who would often point out that I misspelled his name. Hopefully I got this right my friend. I first met him many years ago when he was serving in the Australian embassy in Washington DC. He was introduced to me by a mutual American friend and his Australian wife. I can remember that meeting clearly as my last. During our initial meeting we had a wide ranging discussion about the world, but then honed in on the issue de jure which was the joint strike fighter. By the time I had met him, I had met many of the pioneers in standing up the aircraft and the program and we discussed what I had written and what I thought about the coming of the program and its impact. Having had the chance to work with Secretary Wynne, first as head of acquisition and then as Secretary of the Air Force, it was clear that the program was founded to create a new global capability for the United States and its allies. Brendan had honed on this aspect of the program and early on got it and its importance for Australia. We had many conversations through the years, but they always we very similar to the first one — wide-ranging, blunt, and always left me with more to think about and to puzzle over. I am sure his many friends would say the same. Because that was the thing about Brendan — he would ignite reflection and curry thoughts, whether you agreed with the particular point or not. When I finally got to Australia in 2014, and kept coming back because of my involvement with the Williams Foundation, my twice a year visits — at least until I left in a hurry on March 2020 — I would have the chance to meet with him and to visit his home and be hosted by his wife and he and be in the presence of his friends, and we would have a wonderful meal and have a wide ranging conversation about Australia, the United States and the world. The fact that this will not happen again truly saddens me. But whatever the loss for me personally, it is an even greater loss for Australia. Australia, like the other liberal democracies, is entering a new historical era and sorting out our way ahead is more than challenging. This was the topic we discussed frequently by phone since my last visit to Australia, and I was very much looking forward to my next visit and meetings with Brendan. But in a way my last published interview with him is a very good epitaph for him. That discussion was about the need for strategic imagination for a period of historical change such as we are clearly. This is how he described what was needed: “We need to be ruthless in our self-analysis, about our strengths and weaknesses, and who we are. We need to have a clear sense of the range of possible futures and the various responses that we may need to make. That is why I say a crisis is a challenge to imagination, a challenge to identity before it becomes a policy or a strategy challenge.” This was what Brendan brought to the table. He met this challenge and provided constant insight and guidance. To think that he is no longer here is very hard to contemplate. I have lost a friend; and Australia has lost a leader.

Failure carries a stigma. In mature cultures gripped by the Curse of Efficiency, failure is bad. Very bad. The learning derived from experimentation and exploration does not outweigh the perception of wasted effort - a thing to be frowned upon. 'This is a results-focused organisation!' To demonstrate this, those who successfully adhere to established metrics are rewarded and celebrated. The message is clear: we want you to innovate (of course!) - but don't you dare innovate. - Dr. Jason Fox in How to Lead a Quest A new series: #FailureWins 2022 is shaping up to be a year that offers a multitude of exciting opportunities for discussion, debate and learning. The year starts with a bang with the The Air and Space Power Conference on 23-23 March held in Canberra. The conference seeks to explore resilient and innovative approaches to achieve national and regional advantage in air and space power. Later the same week, the Sir Richard Williams Foundation is hosting its first seminar of the year; Accelerating the Transition to a Networked, Integrated Force. The aim of the 24 March seminar is to examine progress in the establishment of the 5th generation force and identify lessons which further inform and accelerate Government and industry efforts to design, build, operate, and sustain increasingly lethal and survivable air and space capability. Big picture, we can see the major crossover between these two events is the theme of innovation, iteration and lessons learned. Plan Jericho, launched in 2015, aims to support these core themes by providing a framework to Air Force personnel and give Air Force the edge to protect Australia from technologically sophisticated and rapidly morphing threats. However, having a framework in place is only one piece of the puzzle to innovation. A culture that acknowledges risk and embraces failure is critical; such a culture inherently promotes innovation. In the TCB post Effective risk management in an era of strategic competition: An alternative view WGCDR Yildirim highlights that: relying solely on a rules-based system as a ‘one size fits all’ to try to manage all manner of risk to prevent failures must be avoided. To achieve this there must be a cultural shift regarding risk within Defence requiring a concerted effort from every part of the institution. Only when Defence’s culture recognises that risk management is a means to an end, rather than an end in itself, can it take on higher-risk, higher-reward opportunities than its competitors. This notion was further explored in a sci-fiesque vignette Fighting for Time: Conflict in the 22nd Century by GPCAT Phil Arms. His storytelling includes a timely message around reframing ‘failure’ into a culture of growth. To successfully innovate we need to build the right culture; one that embraces learning and jettisons old cultural beliefs and stereotypical notions of success by embracing lessons from failures. So let's normalise failure! We want to talk about the good, the bad and the ugly of failure. What is it? Can it be done? Tell us about your experiences of implementing culture change, the acceptance of failure within the workforce, lessons learned (and implemented) - both successfully and poorly and your suggestions for strategies that can be put in place to support the Jericho framework. Check out the submission guidelines here. Submission close on 01 April 2022. And if you’re keen to discuss an idea with us first, be sure to email us at thecentralblue@gmail.com

The Requirements of a Sovereign Defence Space Capability National Gallery of Australia 1 December 2021 Final Report Dr Robbin Laird Synopsis and Program Download PDF Handbook Download PDF Presentations Welcoming Remarks and Formal Close AIRMSHL Geoff Brown AO (Retd) Sir Richard Williams Foundation Introduction and MC Darin Lovett South Australian Space Industry Centre Australian Space Capability - Historical Perspective Amy Hestermann-Crane The Central Blue Threats to Space Operations Dougal Robertson Sir Richard Williams Foundation Presentation availability to be advised. Sovereign Defence Capability and Space Dr Malcolm Davis Australian Strategic Policy Institute Not available - email info@williamsfoundaiton.org.au to request a copy Space Domain Research & Development Prof Tanya Monro Defence Science and Technology Group Commercial Space-based ISR AIRCDRE Richard Keir AM, CSC (Retd) Sir Richard Williams Foundation Presentation availability to be advised. Sovereign and Resilient Space Battle Management AVM Chris Deeble AO, CSC (Retd) Northrop Grumman Australia Presentation availability to be advised. Space Domain Awareness Nick Leake Optus Presentation availability to be advised. Space Control AIRCDRE Phil Gordon Director General Air Defence and Space Resilient Satcom in a Counterspace Age David Ball Lockheed Martin Space Presentation availability to be advised. Sovereign Defence Space Considerations Terry Van Haren Former Air Attaché Washington The Requirements of a Sovereign Defence Space Capability AIRCDRE Ross Bender Commander Air Warfare Centre National Perspective Anthony Murfett Australian Space Agency Pre-recorded video AVM Cath Roberts AM, CSC Head of Air Force Capability Video not available Navy Perspective CDRE Matthew Doornbos RAN Director General Navy Intelligence and Information Warfare (representing Chief of Navy) No presentation Army Perspective BRIG Ian Langford DSC and Bars Director General Future Land Warfare (representing Chief of Army) Defence’s Vision for Space Capability AIRCDRE Nicholas Hogan CSC Director General Space Domain Review (representing Chief of Air Force) Seminar Outline When the United States Air Force conceived and established the Space-based Global Positioning System in 1973 to enable more accurate military navigation, few would have imagined the impact it would have on modern society, the Western national security apparatus, and the Australian way of life. Fast forward to 2021, global economic security is now dependent on Space-based capabilities, and Defence must play an increasingly prominent role given the quantum of global trade which passes through the region, a third of which transits through the South China Sea. There are now over 2,600 satellites in orbit and the Australian Defence Force has become increasingly dependent on a sophisticated blend of Space-related technologies which must now develop and accelerate to meet the demands of integrated multi-domain operations to counter new threats and new risks. These demands include resilient long-range communications, and greater levels of situational awareness with the ability to sense, track and identify targets in and from Space in all orbits. On the supply side, current Space capacity is insufficient to meet these demands, and the need for a sovereign capability must be driven by a better understanding of the full spectrum of Space-related requirements across policy, process, infrastructure and technology. The imperative to develop Space capability must consider the people and organisational aspects which leverage Australia’s relatively small but highly skilled population. It will require a national effort to leverage people, technology and Australia’s vast geographical area of interest and highly favourable environmental conditions to conduct activities in and from Space. Space is becoming increasingly congested and contested and likely to become a warfighting domain in future high intensity conflicts in the Indo-Pacific region, as well as an essential campaign enabler for Shape Deter and Respond missions and tasks. This will drive the need for increased survivability of Space-based systems and the ability to counter and deny competitors across the spectrum of conflict.

Dr Robbin Laird, Conference: The Requirements of a Sovereign Defence Space Capability 1 December 2021: A Williams Foundation Special Report, 8 January 2022 In this report, the key themes and presentations at the December 2021, Williams Foundation seminar on The Requirements of a Sovereign Defence Space Capability are highlighted. A number of interviews with participants are included. Download the report here Introduction Recently, the Williams Foundation held its latest bi-annual seminar, this one focused on the way ahead for the Australian space enterprise. Since 2014, the Williams Foundation has held bi-annual seminars on the transformation of the ADF as it embraced fifth generation warfare and working joint force integration. Since 2018, the focus has been increasingly with regard to how to extend the reach of the ADF given the changing nature of the challenges facing Australia in the Indo-Pacific region. The discussions really began with a 2018 seminar which focused on the importance of long-range strike and was followed by seminars which focused on ways to enhance Australian resilience and sovereign capabilities. The first seminar of 2021 focused on next generation autonomous systems, and the 1 December 2021, seminar on where autonomous systems, namely satellites, have been a regular feature for both military and commercial purposes for many decades. The Williams Foundation program announcing the seminar highlighted the purpose and focus of the seminar: The Requirements of a Sovereign Defence Space Capability When the United States Air Force conceived and established the Space-based Global Positioning System in 1973 to enable more accurate military navigation, few would have imagined the impact it would have on modern society, the Western national security apparatus, and the Australian way of life. Fast forward to 2021, global economic security is now dependent on Space-based capabilities, and Defence must play an increasingly prominent role given the quantum of global trade which passes through the region, a third of which transits through the South China Sea. There are now over 2,600 satellites in orbit and the Australian Defence Force has become increasingly dependent on a sophisticated blend of Space-related technologies which must now develop and accelerate to meet the demands of integrated multi-domain operations to counter new threats and new risks. These demands include resilient long-range communications, and greater levels of situational awareness with the ability to sense, track and identify targets in and from Space in all orbits. On the supply side, current Space capacity is insufficient to meet these demands, and the need for a sovereign capability must be driven by a better understanding of the full spectrum of Space-related requirements across policy, process, infrastructure, and technology. The imperative to develop Space capability must consider the people and organisational aspects which leverage Australia’s relatively small but highly skilled population. It will require a national effort to leverage people, technology and Australia’s vast geographical area of interest and highly favourable environmental conditions to conduct activities in and from Space. Space is becoming increasingly congested and contested and likely to become a warfighting domain in future high intensity conflicts in the Indo-Pacific region, as well as an essential campaign enabler for Shape Deter and Respond missions and tasks. This will drive the need for increased survivability of Space-based systems and the ability to counter and deny competitors across the spectrum of conflict. https://sldinfo.com/2022/01/the-requirements-of-a-sovereign-defence-space-capability/ The e-book version can be found here: https://defense.info/williams-foundation/2022/01/the-williams-foundation-seminar-on-building-sovereign-defence-space-capability/

Brian Weston 'On Target - 'Then Now Always ‒ Centenary of the RAAF' in Australian Defence Business Review, Mar/Apr 2021 p.84 The Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) celebrated its centenary on 31 March 2021, with the underlying theme of Then Now Always. Then traces the growth of the RAAF from its heritage of the Australian Flying Corps, through peace and war, to the potent middle-weight air force that is the RAAF of today. The Now is the RAAF of today ‒ an exemplary and respected national institution of trust, esteem, service and sacrifice, all of which provides the RAAF with a sound base to meet the challenges of the future ‒ the Always. As much has already been written about the Then and Now, this column will focus on the Always. There seems little doubt the commencement of the second 100 years of the RAAF will be dominated, possibly for decades, by a challenging and deteriorating geo-strategic scenario in the Indo-Pacific, where an increasingly assertive and belligerent China is determined to expand its power and influence over much of the region. Past prognostications of the progressive development of China into a valued international player of substance ‒ the consequence of enhanced education, free international trade, greater international capital flows, a growing economy, adherence to post-World War II international protocols, accompanied by an expanding democratisation ‒ are distant memories as the reality is that such a development will put the Chinese Communist Party’s hold on power at risk. The Chinese Communist Party has learnt well from how these developments unleashed internal forces which led to the fracturing of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and fellow- traveller European communist nations, some 30 years ago. All of which has resulted in a Chinese Communist Party consolidating its iron rule over its citizens, while China’s leader, Xi Jinping, has entrenched himself as leader of China. Xi Jinping concurrently occupies the following powerful appointments: General Secretary of the Communist Party of China; Chairman of the Central Military Commission (Commander-in-chief of the People’s Liberation Army); President of the People's Republic of China; and Chairman of the National Security Commission of the Communist Party of China. Also, Xi Jinping, in 2012, was designated as China’s Paramount Leader and, in 2018, he removed the presidential limits which previously limited the duration of occupancy of the office of President of the People's Republic of China. With Xi Jinping entrenched as the autocratic leader of the People's Republic of China, the Chinese Communist Party has put in place comprehensive monitoring and surveillance, and control and propaganda systems, to suppress any emergent democratic or populist initiatives especially with regard to free speech. The prospects of the Chinese Communist Party conceding power seem remote. Internationally, Xi Jinping has initiated an expansion of China’s power and influence, especially regionally, by pursuing initiatives that extend beyond the bounds of accepted post-World War II norms, while marking itself as a global strategic competitor to the United States. Every indication is that Australia will need to contend with the Chinese Communist Party’s rising hegemonic aspirations for years to come ‒ and in that context, the future theme for the RAAF, Always, needs to be set. In this environment, Australia’s first strategic response will be diplomacy ‒ skilled, professional and astute, comprising both unilateral and multinational initiatives with the emerging Quadrilateral Dialogue between Australia, Japan, India and the United States a prospective, powerful diplomatic tool, notwithstanding the alliance with the United States remains core to Australia’s future national security. A second response must include the development of Australia’s cyber capabilities as in grey-zone confrontation, cyber-attack by state-sponsored actors is an attractive weapon of choice. A third response is the strengthening and diversification of Australia’s economic base with less reliance on China as a trading partner and with the rebuilding of selected, vital Australian economic and industrial capabilities to ensure enhanced levels of Australian self-reliance; both of which will need to be done in partnership with Australian business and industry. But all three responses will achieve little unless backed by credible, regional military presence and power; a role well-suited to a potent, middleweight air force with reach, speed, presence, spatial awareness, flexibility, regional responsiveness and strike power ‒ all appropriate attributes of an air force with a future theme of Always, but which raises the question of how the RAAF should further evolve to meet this challenge. Presently, the capability of the RAAF has been much enhanced with the introduction of the F-35A and its support enablers of the Wedgetail airborne early warning and control capability and the KC-30A air-to-air refuelling capability; plus, the emerging complementary team of the P-8A Poseidon and MQ-4C Triton platforms, together with the EA-18G Growler and the MC-55 Peregrine ‒ all augmented by a capable regional air mobility force of C-17A, C-130J and C-27J platforms. The question is how should the RAAF evolve further in accordance with its theme of Always in the face of increasing future challenges. Brian Weston is a Board Member of the Sir Richard Williams Foundation Download PDF here

Brian Weston 'On Target - 'Operational Presence and Persistence ‒ Personnel' in Australian Defence Business Review, Jan/Feb 2021 p.72 The previous On Target column noted that while the RAAF has evolved into a potent middle-weight air force well-suited to operations in the nearer, Indo-Pacific region, the current air force capability ‒ and indeed the broader ADF capability ‒ will be sorely stretched if required to sustain a high tempo of operations for lengthy periods. The column also noted that in times of great power competition, competing nations will often place markers ‘in the sand’ to identify those issues and interests that involve a nation’s vital national interests. In that way, a nation can issue unambiguous warnings to strategic competitors which caution competitors to restrain their activities and expansions so as not to violate a nation’s vital national interests. But placing markers ‘in the sand’ without clear messaging of resolve may not deter further confrontation as messaging without resolve will likely achieve little. Strategic messaging must therefore be reinforced with actions that indicate resolve, commitment and capability. One avenue for a nation to indicate resolve is through pre-emptive military activities. Typically, these military activities, while pre-emptive, should be non-provocative and conform to international protocols. Presence and patrol operations, and of the conduct of surveillance and reconnaissance operations, are one such use of a nation’s military capabilities. In some circumstances, forward-deployed presence and patrol forces alone, may be inadequate to signify both the resolve and capability of a nation to defend its vital national interests, which could require the precautionary deployment of more substantial combat capabilities. The deployment of these forces to supporting locations, probably towards the rear of the theatre but on heightened alert levels, should provide a credible deterrent to escalation. Given these scenarios, and the distances and strategic disposition of Australia’s interests in the nearer Indo-Pacific, it is timely to enquire about the preparedness of Australia’s defence forces to sustain these operations; the nature of which should not be confused with past patterns of deployments, of one frigate or one airborne warning and control aircraft or one tanker, to the Middle East. Of particular concern given the scale of Australia’s theatre of interest, the nature of military presence and patrol operations, and of the open-ended timescales involved, is the preparedness of the RAAF, and of the wider ADF, to meet such a challenge ‒ especially regarding the numbers of trained defence personnel necessary in the sustainment of continuing, precautionary, presence and patrolling operations across a vast theatre. In such a scenario it is not just the need to sustain a higher tempo of operations, but that the increased tempo may have to be sustained for lengthy periods of time which will necessitate the augmentation of front-line operational personnel with qualified and experienced ‘reserve’ operatives, something that is not presently in the air force order of battle. The introduction of long range, long endurance, unmanned systems will assist, but even unmanned systems require operational augmentation as the numbers of unmanned human operatives increase dramatically once open-ended 24/7 operations are commenced. Similarly, tactical and operational level control centres will require augmentation to sustain 24/7 operations‒something that was not necessary when the RAAF, and the ADF, avoided this workload by ‘piggy-backing’ limited numbers of operational personnel into coalition‒mainly US‒tactical and operational level control centres. Further to the rear, command and control centres, data analysis and dissemination centres, and communication centres will need augmentation, together with critical supporting national level agencies including cyber and space. Where will these specialist personnel come from, given neither the air force, nor navy, has an extant large ‘reserve’ component, and neither are these specialist skills readily available in Australia’s civilian population‒apart from a small pool of recently retired air force and navy personnel. Unlike the Australian Army, which has a long tradition of using militia, citizen and reserve forces to augment the Regular Army, Australia’s air force and navy have not established credible and substantial ‘institutionalised’ air force and navy reserve forces. Compounding the limited availability of personnel is that few will have the required level of security clearance to operate and support ADF operations given the high security classification levels of ADF systems‒a seemingly simple issue but, in reality, a far more complex problem. In conclusion, in the strategic circumstances currently evolving in the Indo-Pacific, it is not difficult to conceive of scenarios that must be confronted with not only determined and skilled diplomacy but also the deployment of operational military forces that lay down the markers ‘in the sand’; such as, a sustained military presence, the conduct of continuing surveillance and patrol operations, and of the precautionary deployment of combat capabilities. Yet how is this to be achieved when neither air force, nor navy, has the personnel augmentation policies and capabilities necessary to sustain the 24/7 operations of such forces over long periods of time. Brian Weston is a Board Member of the Sir Richard Williams Foundation Download PDF here

Brian Weston 'Time for New Capability Acquisition Strategies' Australian Defence Business Review – July/August 2021 p 62 For more than four decades, Australian Defence capability acquisitions have been conducted in a benign national security environment guided by the concept of Warning Time which premised defence planning proceeds on the basis of no national security threat emerging for the next 10 years. In this environment, defence capabilities were often acquired undersized, or on a ‘fitted-for-but-not-with’ basis; or with insufficient logistic support; or lacking essential capability upgrades‒all justified on the basis that capability augmentation, if needed, could be undertaken within the 10-year Warning Time period. That acquisition policy changed in 2016 when Australia’s geo-strategic environment began to deteriorate and, progressively, the concept of Warning Time was replaced with a new prerogative outlined in Australia’s Force Structure Plan 2020. The 2020 Plan advocated defence planning be guided by the strategic objectives of Shape, Deter and Respond and listed the priority capability acquisitions for each operational domain. As an example, the 2020 Plan listed an expanded air-to-air refuelling ‘enabling’ capability be acquired to support Australian aerospace operations. The 2020 Plan specifically stated: An expanded replacement fleet for the KC-30A air-to-air refuelling aircraft including crewed and/or remotely piloted platforms, to enhance the capacity of the Air Force to operate at long range and sustain operations. The 2020 Plan noted this program will require an investment of between $17.5 to $26.2b, commencing from around 2035. Implicit in a period when there is no Warning Time, the replacement air-to-air refuelling fleet will need to enter service and effect a seamless transfer of operational capability from the existing KC-30A fleet. As some might judge an air-to-air capability is a relatively uncomplicated acquisition, the avoidance of an air-to-air refuelling capability gap should be manageable. But history suggests not. Already the air force has experienced developmental and schedule issues with what appeared to be the straightforward acquisition of the Airbus A330-200 and its conversion to the Multi-Role Tanker Transport (KC-30A). And Boeing, with over seven decades of air-to-air refuelling experience, has struggled to deliver the KC-46A Pegasus tanker capability (developed from the Boeing B767-200) to the USAF. The fact is defence acquisitions are rarely straightforward, especially defence programs costing between $17.5 to $26.2b. And with the 2020 Plan noting a remotely piloted platform might be in the mix to replace the KC-30A, development risk, capability risk, cost risk and schedule risk are all heightened. Although the US has developed the unmanned, carrier-launched, Boeing MQ-25A Stingray air-to-air refueller to extend the range of USN Super Hornet strike aircraft, the Stingray falls well short of the payload/range, dual boom/drogue capability required by Australia. Hence, the MQ-25A unmanned, system is unlikely to be an option for Australia’s ‘heavy-weight’ air-to-air refuelling capability. Indeed, some observers argue the USN could achieve a far greater stand-off range for its aircraft carriers by equipping them with unmanned, long-range, stealthy strike platforms rather than Super Hornets supported by the MQ-25A. But should Australia choose to go along the unmanned ‘heavyweight’ refuelling path; capability, development, certification, schedule, cost and operational risks should all be anticipated which, likely, will lead to a significant gap in Australian air-to-air refuelling capability. This will need to be mitigated by extending the life of the KC-30A or by the procurement of an interim capability. A more likely acquisition strategy might involve the procurement of an air-to-air refuelling capability solution from the marketplace. But such a strategy is hampered by the small size of the international market for long-range air-to-air refuellers, with few companies/nations prepared to commit the capital investment required. Hence, air-to-air ‘market offerings’ are likely to be few, with these ‘market offerings’ more of an incremental or evolutionary development of earlier air-to-air refuelling programs. But these incremental or evolutionary development programs are programs that could be expected to involve lesser risks, a consideration of considerable importance when there is no ‘Warning Time’ buffer. Currently, only two candidate air-to-air capability solutions appear relevant to Australia. They are incremental developments of either the Airbus MRTT or the Boeing KC-46A. Although, the USAF has released a Request for Tender for between 140-160 ‘Bridge Tankers’ to allow retirement of its KC-135 fleet. The Bridge Tanker program stipulates first delivery in 2029 and concludes with final deliveries around 2043. But, in all likelihood, the program will involve incremental developments of either the Airbus MRTT (with partner Lockheed Martin) or the Boeing KC-46A. The funding of the Bridge Tanker program will also likely defer any short-term, successor program to the USAF air-to-air refuelling capability. How this all plays out will, no doubt, be subject to many print and social media centimetres. But for Australia, the overriding consideration is that the replacement of the KC-30A air-to-air refuelling capability be achieved with no air-to-air refuelling capability gap. Brian Weston is a Board Member of the Williams Foundation and On Target is published as a regular column in the Australian Defence Business Review. Download PDF here

Brian Weston Australia’s Air Force and its Future Focus ‒ ‘Always’ 'Australian Defence Business Review – May/June 2021 p 60 The Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) celebrated its centenary on 31 March 2021, with the underlying theme of Then Now Always, with the March/April On Target column tracking the growth of the RAAF from its heritage of the Australian Flying Corps, through peace and war, to the potent middle-weight air force, that is the RAAF of today ‒ in short, the Then and Now of the first one hundred years of the RAAF. The On Target column left hanging the question of where to from here although it did flag the rapid changes that had taken place, since 2016, in Australia’s geo-strategic environment of the Indo-Pacific, that will guide the evolution of the RAAF into its second hundred years ‒ the Always. The geo-strategic changes are generally a consequence of the forceful policies of China, under the governance of the Chinese Communist Party, and its leader, the entrenched and dictatorial Xi Jinping. In that evolving geo-strategic environment, the last On Target column suggested Australia’s first strategic response will be through diplomacy ‒ professional, astute, skilled, and comprising both unilateral and multinational initiatives, with the ANZUS alliance a foundation stone of Australia’s future national security. A second response would involve the development of Australia’s cyber capabilities as in grey-zone conflict, cyber-attack by state-sponsored actors is an attractive weapon of choice. While third, is the strengthening and diversification of Australia’s economic base, including less reliance on China as a trading partner and of the rebuilding of selected national capabilities to ensure a level of autonomy of vital economic capabilities, done in partnership with Australian business and industry. It is in this Indo-Pacific and alliance context, that the future development of the RAAF must evolve as diplomacy, cyber-capability and economic power will achieve little unless backed by credible, military power and presence ‒ a role well-suited to a potent, middleweight air force with reach, speed, flexibility, responsiveness, spatial awareness and strike power ‒ an obvious focus for the future evolution of the RAAF and its theme of Always. But given the rapidity of geo-strategic change, Australia’s defence forces have little time to reshape to meet new strategic challenges, as best illustrated by the timeline associated with the Attack class submarine program, which will not deliver a credible in-service capability of sustaining six Attack class submarines, all operational and at sea ‒ from a fleet of 12 boats ‒ until around 2050. Fortunately, the RAAF is better placed to meet the new challenges as it can evolve many of its current capabilities to higher levels of capability and preparedness in a much shorter timeframe. The F-35A capability, already at IOC, will mature and benefit from further development including the early procurement of the longer range air-to-air Joint Advanced Tactical Missile and of the air-to-surface Joint Strike Missile. Similarly, the F/A-18 Super Hornet, EA-18G Growler, E-7AWedgetail and KC-30A air refuelling tanker capabilities should be prioritised for evolving upgrades, such that in 5 to 7 years, these fleet capabilities will be significantly enhanced. Similarly, new capabilities such as the MQ-4C Triton, MC-55A Peregrine, MQ-9B Sky Guardian, additional P-8A Poseidon armed with the Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile and evolving upgrades to intelligence, surveillance, communications, and command and control systems ‒ and possibly including some new capabilities in space ‒ will further improve air force capabilities in the coming 5 to 7 years. These evolutionary and imminent capability developments and introductions, managed well, and with the necessary augmentation in operational personnel and logistic support, will provide Australia with a further boost in regional presence and credibility in the Indo-Pacific within 5 to 7 years. The RAAF must also develop plans for the introduction of new capabilities, especially in unmanned and autonomous systems, space, and hypersonic missiles, and bolster its long-range strike capability as well as evolving its operational doctrine to ensure it remains an informed, credible, professional practitioner of aerospace power as the twenty-first century rolls on. In conclusion, Always is an appropriate theme for the RAAF of the early twenty-first century, with the benefit of having an extant operational capability that provides a sound foundation from which to evolve further to meet the demands of Australia’s rapidly changing geo-strategic environment. That evolution appears well-suited to a two-track process. The first, an incremental and evolutional path which builds on extant capabilities and capabilities that are coming into service in the next few years, to meet the need for a more powerful Australian aerospace capability within the nearer term timeframe of 5 to 7 years. The second path should aim to meet Australia’s longer term aerospace needs, over a timeframe of 7 to 15 years, which will bring into service capabilities involving new technologies, and new means of prosecuting power and influence in the national interest through the aerospace domain. Brian Weston is a Board Member of the Williams Foundation and On Target is published as a regular column in the Australian Defence Business Review. Download PDF here

It’s no secret that people are the principal capability that keeps any organisation functioning and competitive. Ben Gray looks at Air Force’s flexible employment practices and how these options are vital in retaining and expanding the experienced and talented workforce the Royal Australian Air Force possesses. As a new father (congratulations!), Gray examines structural and cultural changes decision-makers can make to enhance retention and members’ willingness to return to their Air Force careers after starting a family. Gray also highlights where flexible employment options can benefit any member in maximising their professional and personal lives. Although not always feasible, genuine consideration by decision-makers allows for structural problems to be identified, possible compromises to be found, and most importantly, for members to be heard. The flexible employment system offered in Air Force can be thought of much like a travel guide. It is unhelpful if left unread. It is somewhat helpful if only a few pages are read. It offers maximum value when you can talk about it with someone else who has been where you want to go. With that in mind, this post will offer a few of my musings. There are plenty of reasons why an Air Force member would want to access flexible employment, however, I’m going to focus on the most common: children. Ask any parent about their experiences with a newborn child and you will get a range of responses mainly centred on sleep, food, and tips for surviving the first few months. They are (mostly) fun experiences, but unique to each person and their family. In integrating another person into your life, you will eventually have to consider how you accommodate this newcomer into your career plans and vice versa. Flexibility, opportunity, and the way we work all influence how a new parent returns to their Air Force career. These are big, determining factors on whether our people with valuable skills and training come back to us or seek employment elsewhere. The term Fifth Generation often conjures visions of technology, engineering or a scientific edge. Yet ask someone what a fifth generation workforce looks like and you’re often met with silence. In my experience, the other side of that silence produces phrases like ‘flexibility,’ ‘different opportunities’, and ‘doing things smarter.’ The Royal Australian Air Force’s Air Force Strategy (AFSTRAT) guidance on workforce centres on education and training, posting members for influence and effect, and resilience. None of these goals are incompatible with flexibility, finding different opportunities, or doing things smarter. Therefore, it begs the question - why aren’t we there already? Barriers to re-engagement Our people are valuable assets. They take a lot of time to train and have skills that aren’t easily replaced by someone off the street. Sometimes those skills and organisational background aren’t replicable by a contractor. And yes, our preparedness to reintegrate new parents and primary carers is at times inhibited by the way we structure our work. As our platforms and roles become more complex, this problem will compound. My experience has been shaped by the decision to take on the primary carer role for my then 6-month-old son at the start of the working year in 2021. This decision offered me the opportunity to experience what a number of my (mainly female) colleagues have been experiencing from the point that they decide to have a child and continue to serve. A new parent returning to their old job has vastly different needs from just 12 months’ prior: the need to be able to start and finish work around childcare availability; perhaps a need to work a reduced working week to balance the availability of childcare; longer notice to go away on tasks or exercises so that they can organise a family member to provide care, and my personal hurdle this year, the need to drop everything and look after a sick child when required. As children get older, the challenges centre around supervision during school holidays. Some positions are already inherently compatible with this level of flexibility. Governance and headquarters-based staff roles are often more flexible in work hours due to the longer-term nature of their deliverables. Flying an aircraft, maintaining an aircraft, or working on a secure system that supports one of our platforms offer less flexibility, and often require the Air Force member to be away from home for extended periods. These barriers can limit how members, particularly women, re-engage with their career following the birth of a child. Yet, it needn’t be a limitation. The career model for generating aircrew for example has options which can be conducive to flexibly employing a workforce, with the express intent of returning to flying or finding a future career path. After gaining wings, converting to a platform and completing a first tour, a member has the option of pursuing a ground posting, be that in aviation safety, capability management and assurance, executive support, or career management or recruiting, regardless of gender. Air Force is already offering this long-term planning through the Career Development Plan. This is an opportunity to get ideas on paper and have an honest chat with a career manager and the member’s supervisor about how realistic they are, and how to make them happen. A member can explore options to find a job that provides flexibility, career progression, and the all-important access to family support. For a variety of reasons, children won’t always arrive on a timeline that neatly fits in a career plan. While your plans may be overtaken by life, planning is indispensable. Many Air Force women were doing this before it became an application form. While working in career management for officer aircrew, I have observed more and more men take this up, reflecting the social and cultural shifts in wider Australian society. When they do, families where both parents are serving members can decide for themselves which parent will return to work. This offers Air Force both a pathway for a faster re-engagement into the workforce for women, should the member desire it, and for men to have the option to plan for being in more stable and predictable posting, if they desire. This isn’t just limited to parents - members wanting to take an extended break for travel or study can also use the system to plan in this way. Leaders at all levels must be aware of the policy in place that can enable them to support their subordinates. We need to recognise it is all of our responsibility to assist in positively influencing members’ decisions to remain in Air Force. Increasing re-engagement and retention of a large segment of the current workforce by enabling Air Force to achieve postings of influence and effect for its people is necessary for Air Force to balance the highly specialised and limited workforce it has. Keeping the family in the family Once our people come back, we then need to consider how we encourage them to stay. Throughout their careers, Air Force members have a number of training, education and readiness requirements to meet. Sometimes, these can be barriers to longer term employment and retention. Some are structural, and some come down to the familiarity and confidence a supervisor has with the flexible employment system – knowing that the travel guide exists and who to talk to about it. For as long as I have been in the Air Force, Physical Fitness Tests on RAAF bases have started at 7.30am. This is fine for someone who doesn’t need to drop off a child at daycare, and is a fresh source of anxiety for someone who does. Particularly when that daycare centre opens at 7am and is 30 minutes from base. In my own case, I’ve been waiting for three months for my wife’s work roster and fitness testing to align after Covid restrictions have eased in NSW so that I can meet this obligation. When mentioning this to some colleagues with small children recently I was partially comforted to hear that I wasn’t alone in juggling an early start with finding someone to watch my child, if not surprised that no one had solved this problem yet. I saw another way of doing business whilst posted to southern NSW a few years ago. During the winter months the PTI’s ran fitness testing in the afternoon to avoid the harshest of the cold and blanketing morning fog. It’s certainly worth considering for a portion of the year at all of our bases to provide our people with greater flexibility. I’ve noticed this has already happened with the weapons component of readiness requirements at the last two bases I’ve been posted to – weapons training has either been straight after lunch or closer to 9am. A structural solution to making retention an easier consideration. Perfect! Looking further into a member’s career, Professional Military Education courses allow us to grow and shape air and space power practitioners who can contribute to the joint force, and are a requirement for promotion and progression. Air Force has used the restrictions imposed by the Covid-19 pandemic to covert most PME courses to online delivery, facilitating remote attendance for the first time. In the point PME realm the foundational Introduction to Joint Operations course was also offered online and will continue to do so on a permanent basis going forward. Some courses such as initial employment training require residential attendance, and to an extent always will – military members will always answer the call when required. Yet the success of PME’s delivery in 2020 and 2021 should encourage us to pull apart every course we currently offer and determine if it can be delivered via online or remote means. For many parents, and even those with older children, offering the opportunity to complete PME and professional development courses from our posted locations, without disrupting the family routine, is the difference between gaining a skill or experience that can enhance their knowledge and advance their career. The higher skilled our workforce is, the more we can do with it. Creating a culture of flexibility There is also a question of cultural fit. The benefits to capability of a diverse workforce are well-documented and thoroughly understood in Air Force and the broader Defence department. As Defence faces stronger competition in the labour market to attract and recruit people, our employment conditions will only increase in importance as part of the overall value proposition for potential candidates. When you talk to the next generation joining Air Force, it’s clear they have big expectations of what work can offer, both men and women, parents and those without children. Why can’t an expectant mother who is also aircrew, with her half a decade or more experience in flying, remain posted to her flying squadron whilst on maternity leave and return to it afterwards if she chooses to continue flying? Creating a workplace that is accommodating and flexible within the bounds of our capability requirements is not only achievable but necessary if we are to attract and retain our people. The above suggestions for accommodating greater flexibility rely on a decision-maker recognising a way of doing things differently and implementing it. In some cases, this is as simple as changing our mindset. A supervisor who considers an application for flexible work from a starting position of ‘yes’ and working backwards to align the member’s desires with capability requirements may still arrive at the same outcome as having started from a rigid adherence to promulgated working hours. Sometimes, the answer won’t favour the member, yet a person will remember the path they took to get there, if not the destination itself. At the very least, they’ll feel heard. In the future competition for talent, micro interactions with the flexible employment system can often be the aspect that influences a person’s decision to return to Air Force, and to stay on for a longer period thereafter. Closing thoughts For my part, I feel like I’m a better supervisor now having had first-hand experience of the challenges faced by (until recently, mainly female) members in continuing their Air Force career after the birth of a child. I’ve had the enthusiastic support of a chain of command across two jobs who have supported my variable working hours and substantial working from home. The system that can deliver our cultural change and provide an attractive employment offer to support the future Air Force is already available. It’s time to inquisitively pick up that travel guide and find out where it can take us. Ben Gray has a long career in military HR, including on operational deployment and in career management positions. All opinions expressed are his own and do not necessarily reflect those of his employer.