Brian Weston 'Time for New Capability Acquisition Strategies' Australian Defence Business Review – July/August 2021 p 62 For more than four decades, Australian Defence capability acquisitions have been conducted in a benign national security environment guided by the concept of Warning Time which premised defence planning proceeds on the basis of no national security threat emerging for the next 10 years. In this environment, defence capabilities were often acquired undersized, or on a ‘fitted-for-but-not-with’ basis; or with insufficient logistic support; or lacking essential capability upgrades‒all justified on the basis that capability augmentation, if needed, could be undertaken within the 10-year Warning Time period. That acquisition policy changed in 2016 when Australia’s geo-strategic environment began to deteriorate and, progressively, the concept of Warning Time was replaced with a new prerogative outlined in Australia’s Force Structure Plan 2020. The 2020 Plan advocated defence planning be guided by the strategic objectives of Shape, Deter and Respond and listed the priority capability acquisitions for each operational domain. As an example, the 2020 Plan listed an expanded air-to-air refuelling ‘enabling’ capability be acquired to support Australian aerospace operations. The 2020 Plan specifically stated: An expanded replacement fleet for the KC-30A air-to-air refuelling aircraft including crewed and/or remotely piloted platforms, to enhance the capacity of the Air Force to operate at long range and sustain operations. The 2020 Plan noted this program will require an investment of between $17.5 to $26.2b, commencing from around 2035. Implicit in a period when there is no Warning Time, the replacement air-to-air refuelling fleet will need to enter service and effect a seamless transfer of operational capability from the existing KC-30A fleet. As some might judge an air-to-air capability is a relatively uncomplicated acquisition, the avoidance of an air-to-air refuelling capability gap should be manageable. But history suggests not. Already the air force has experienced developmental and schedule issues with what appeared to be the straightforward acquisition of the Airbus A330-200 and its conversion to the Multi-Role Tanker Transport (KC-30A). And Boeing, with over seven decades of air-to-air refuelling experience, has struggled to deliver the KC-46A Pegasus tanker capability (developed from the Boeing B767-200) to the USAF. The fact is defence acquisitions are rarely straightforward, especially defence programs costing between $17.5 to $26.2b. And with the 2020 Plan noting a remotely piloted platform might be in the mix to replace the KC-30A, development risk, capability risk, cost risk and schedule risk are all heightened. Although the US has developed the unmanned, carrier-launched, Boeing MQ-25A Stingray air-to-air refueller to extend the range of USN Super Hornet strike aircraft, the Stingray falls well short of the payload/range, dual boom/drogue capability required by Australia. Hence, the MQ-25A unmanned, system is unlikely to be an option for Australia’s ‘heavy-weight’ air-to-air refuelling capability. Indeed, some observers argue the USN could achieve a far greater stand-off range for its aircraft carriers by equipping them with unmanned, long-range, stealthy strike platforms rather than Super Hornets supported by the MQ-25A. But should Australia choose to go along the unmanned ‘heavyweight’ refuelling path; capability, development, certification, schedule, cost and operational risks should all be anticipated which, likely, will lead to a significant gap in Australian air-to-air refuelling capability. This will need to be mitigated by extending the life of the KC-30A or by the procurement of an interim capability. A more likely acquisition strategy might involve the procurement of an air-to-air refuelling capability solution from the marketplace. But such a strategy is hampered by the small size of the international market for long-range air-to-air refuellers, with few companies/nations prepared to commit the capital investment required. Hence, air-to-air ‘market offerings’ are likely to be few, with these ‘market offerings’ more of an incremental or evolutionary development of earlier air-to-air refuelling programs. But these incremental or evolutionary development programs are programs that could be expected to involve lesser risks, a consideration of considerable importance when there is no ‘Warning Time’ buffer. Currently, only two candidate air-to-air capability solutions appear relevant to Australia. They are incremental developments of either the Airbus MRTT or the Boeing KC-46A. Although, the USAF has released a Request for Tender for between 140-160 ‘Bridge Tankers’ to allow retirement of its KC-135 fleet. The Bridge Tanker program stipulates first delivery in 2029 and concludes with final deliveries around 2043. But, in all likelihood, the program will involve incremental developments of either the Airbus MRTT (with partner Lockheed Martin) or the Boeing KC-46A. The funding of the Bridge Tanker program will also likely defer any short-term, successor program to the USAF air-to-air refuelling capability. How this all plays out will, no doubt, be subject to many print and social media centimetres. But for Australia, the overriding consideration is that the replacement of the KC-30A air-to-air refuelling capability be achieved with no air-to-air refuelling capability gap. Brian Weston is a Board Member of the Williams Foundation and On Target is published as a regular column in the Australian Defence Business Review. Download PDF here

Brian Weston Australia’s Air Force and its Future Focus ‒ ‘Always’ 'Australian Defence Business Review – May/June 2021 p 60 The Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) celebrated its centenary on 31 March 2021, with the underlying theme of Then Now Always, with the March/April On Target column tracking the growth of the RAAF from its heritage of the Australian Flying Corps, through peace and war, to the potent middle-weight air force, that is the RAAF of today ‒ in short, the Then and Now of the first one hundred years of the RAAF. The On Target column left hanging the question of where to from here although it did flag the rapid changes that had taken place, since 2016, in Australia’s geo-strategic environment of the Indo-Pacific, that will guide the evolution of the RAAF into its second hundred years ‒ the Always. The geo-strategic changes are generally a consequence of the forceful policies of China, under the governance of the Chinese Communist Party, and its leader, the entrenched and dictatorial Xi Jinping. In that evolving geo-strategic environment, the last On Target column suggested Australia’s first strategic response will be through diplomacy ‒ professional, astute, skilled, and comprising both unilateral and multinational initiatives, with the ANZUS alliance a foundation stone of Australia’s future national security. A second response would involve the development of Australia’s cyber capabilities as in grey-zone conflict, cyber-attack by state-sponsored actors is an attractive weapon of choice. While third, is the strengthening and diversification of Australia’s economic base, including less reliance on China as a trading partner and of the rebuilding of selected national capabilities to ensure a level of autonomy of vital economic capabilities, done in partnership with Australian business and industry. It is in this Indo-Pacific and alliance context, that the future development of the RAAF must evolve as diplomacy, cyber-capability and economic power will achieve little unless backed by credible, military power and presence ‒ a role well-suited to a potent, middleweight air force with reach, speed, flexibility, responsiveness, spatial awareness and strike power ‒ an obvious focus for the future evolution of the RAAF and its theme of Always. But given the rapidity of geo-strategic change, Australia’s defence forces have little time to reshape to meet new strategic challenges, as best illustrated by the timeline associated with the Attack class submarine program, which will not deliver a credible in-service capability of sustaining six Attack class submarines, all operational and at sea ‒ from a fleet of 12 boats ‒ until around 2050. Fortunately, the RAAF is better placed to meet the new challenges as it can evolve many of its current capabilities to higher levels of capability and preparedness in a much shorter timeframe. The F-35A capability, already at IOC, will mature and benefit from further development including the early procurement of the longer range air-to-air Joint Advanced Tactical Missile and of the air-to-surface Joint Strike Missile. Similarly, the F/A-18 Super Hornet, EA-18G Growler, E-7AWedgetail and KC-30A air refuelling tanker capabilities should be prioritised for evolving upgrades, such that in 5 to 7 years, these fleet capabilities will be significantly enhanced. Similarly, new capabilities such as the MQ-4C Triton, MC-55A Peregrine, MQ-9B Sky Guardian, additional P-8A Poseidon armed with the Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile and evolving upgrades to intelligence, surveillance, communications, and command and control systems ‒ and possibly including some new capabilities in space ‒ will further improve air force capabilities in the coming 5 to 7 years. These evolutionary and imminent capability developments and introductions, managed well, and with the necessary augmentation in operational personnel and logistic support, will provide Australia with a further boost in regional presence and credibility in the Indo-Pacific within 5 to 7 years. The RAAF must also develop plans for the introduction of new capabilities, especially in unmanned and autonomous systems, space, and hypersonic missiles, and bolster its long-range strike capability as well as evolving its operational doctrine to ensure it remains an informed, credible, professional practitioner of aerospace power as the twenty-first century rolls on. In conclusion, Always is an appropriate theme for the RAAF of the early twenty-first century, with the benefit of having an extant operational capability that provides a sound foundation from which to evolve further to meet the demands of Australia’s rapidly changing geo-strategic environment. That evolution appears well-suited to a two-track process. The first, an incremental and evolutional path which builds on extant capabilities and capabilities that are coming into service in the next few years, to meet the need for a more powerful Australian aerospace capability within the nearer term timeframe of 5 to 7 years. The second path should aim to meet Australia’s longer term aerospace needs, over a timeframe of 7 to 15 years, which will bring into service capabilities involving new technologies, and new means of prosecuting power and influence in the national interest through the aerospace domain. Brian Weston is a Board Member of the Williams Foundation and On Target is published as a regular column in the Australian Defence Business Review. Download PDF here

Dr Robbin Laird 2 January 2022 At the December 1, 2021, Williams Foundation seminar on shaping a way ahead for the Australian space enterprise, a key theme was how the Australian Defence Force (ADF) works with that enterprise and shapes a way ahead for military space. AIRCDRE Nick Hogan, Director General Space Domain Review, provided on overview on the emerging approach to how the RAAF and Defence are addressing military space. In an interview which he provided to the Williams Foundation separate from the presentation at the seminar itself, he highlighted the way ahead. “The space organization that we’re starting up in January 2022 is a whole of defense organization. While Air Force will host space, it certainly does not own it. Space is a multi-domain capability, so certainly not owned by anybody in particular… “The space organization we are setting up will be a flat structure by necessity. And when I say by necessity, we will have a two-star lead with three, one star or band one equivalents that sit underneath her and then underneath that it’s a pretty skeleton like structure. “We will also bring in other organizations like the Australian Space Operation Center inside the organization…We are literally quite lean by design so that not only do we have a requirement to keep it lean so that we don’t have as much of a resource burden across the services because of course we’re doing this within our resources right now, as well as doing everything else that we normally do. “But also, we want to be able to get the lower ranks engaged who have more experience in space. We’re in an unusual situation here where we are standing up an organization where the person who leads it isn’t the most experienced person in the organization. We are standing up an organization where the lead of the organization doesn’t know as much about space as some of the junior people who have been in it for a long time. Having those junior people come into the headquarters provides us with that experience. It’s a great opportunity to be a lean and agile organization and I think that’s what you’ll see at the organization next year.” He noted that on October 12, 2021, the defense space enterprise concept was presented to the Chiefs of Service Committee. That document focused on the roles, responsibilities, and authorities for the Defense Space Commander. As the ADF shapes and interacts with the evolving Australian space enterprise, they are doing so in the context of a broader set of space developments affecting their partners and allies as well. This means that they can take account of broader allied efforts as they shape their own as well. He highlighted that a key focus of their space effort was upon supporting the joint warfighter. This is also part of shaping a broader national security strategy for whole of government. “We need to understand the effects of space on our security.” The workforce needs to have the flexibility to get full value from the evolving space work force, inside and outside of government. “What does that mean in the defense context? It means allowing people to go into industry, come out of industry, work back inside the fence. That will allow us better understanding as we move forward, truly moving forward.” He underscored the need for new training regimes, including the formation of a space warfighter course. And it is important to ensure that such a perspective fits into the evolving integrated force approach or concept. Such a focus would lead to a conclusion suggested by David Ball, regional director, Australia/New Zealand for Lockheed Martin Space. The investments being made in satellite communications need to ensure that real world warfighting needs are met. “We need to make sure that it’s military-grade and it does provide the resilience that we need to have in such an important system. We see increasing counterspace activities by adversaries in this region, we’ve seen anti-satellite attacks recently, we’ve seen co-orbital attacks from another spacecraft. Those technologies are advancing rapidly, and we need to be very cognizant of those changes as we build up our network. It’s something the satellite industry needs to take care of in all facets in the space segment as well as the ground segment and the control segment.” And in Ball’s assessment this means that space although a distinctive domain is embedded in a wider information warfighting environment facing the ADF. “In addition to the physical risk I just talked about, there’s always a cyber risk, and we’ve seen government recently make announcements in this regard about critical infrastructure in this country. That applies to civilian networks as well as to military networks, so industry as a whole needs to respond and be aware of these as cyber risks and make sure that we have bulletproofed our systems to ensure that people can’t get in to attack.” When one focuses on defence, it is always crucial to remember that it is an entity which is engaged in the ongoing defence of the nation. And as the major authoritarian powers are engaged in my view in ongoing limited war with the liberal democracies to seek to gain escalation control dominance, the focus is upon the future is now. It is important to have long-term objectives, but one must just think back to 2019 to look at how good the forecasts were for the world in 2020 to understand the need for modesty when making long-term projections. The presentation by the commander of the Air Warfare Centre, AIRCDRE Ross Bender provided an assessment of the way forward grounded in this reality. “If we need to go and conduct an operation in the next 12 months to two years, what do we know of the environment? “What do we know of the options we have available? “What are our vulnerabilities? “What are our key support requirements from our coalition partners to enable us to provide options to the joint force? “That’s the focus that I have in my current role. We need to work with industry, academia, and the coalition partners to identify those options and then explore them, so that day zero, I can be prepared to fight. Rather than day one, trying to make it up on the fly while we understand what we can and can’t do.” AIRCDRE Bender underscored a core point for today’s operating force which is crucial to focus upon and to work solutions. “Space domain awareness is critical for today’s fighting force. The reason can be reduced to one word and that is dependency. Dependency in joint operations translates to military vulnerability, which in turn may identify opportunities for an adversary. “Australian defense-based capabilities and operations are significantly dependent on the U.S. for access to space-based capabilities, along with the provision of accurate and validated observations of objects in space…. “The U.S. operates and maintains a space surveillance network that consistently collects observations on all observable space objects from multiple sensors, spreading around the globe, to extrapolate and validate orbital elements, which then form a space object catalog. The U.S. space catalog is maintained at different classification levels, and one of the primary contributors to developing space domain awareness. “Therefore, continued access to these catalogs is a critical vulnerability that the government plans to mitigate through the development of a sovereign space domain awareness capability. “It is important to note that with the focus on developing sovereign defense space capability, it might be perceived that defense may be disconnecting somewhat from our allies and partners. This could not be further from the truth. Australia holds a unique geographical position to contribute significantly to collective space domain awareness with our allies and partners, as evidenced by Defence currently hosting a U.S. ground space-based surveillance sensor. “Defence space capability delivers desired effects in supportive joint operations through the use of space as an operational domain. The desired effects are provided through space battle management, missile warning operations, access to and management of space services, including SATCOM and GPS, and access to space-based intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems. And underpinning all of this is developing and maintaining consistent and comprehensive space domain awareness.” When considering a realistic and effective way ahead for the ADF in space, Malcolm Davis sensibly focused on how Australia can work the high-low mix or focus really on the new space approach to satellite build and launch, and craft capabilities to work, in effect, ISR constellations. He argued at the seminar that by using small satellite systems Australia could shape sovereign space-based targeting for strike capabilities. Combined with innovations in reusable launch, small sats can provide the ADF with significant new capabilities. Such capabilities are part of the kind of resilience which the ADF is broadly seeking. As Davis put it: “Why should we do this? Why should we invest in sovereign capabilities? It’s all about resilience. It’s all about having the ability to maintain operations and maintain capability in a contested environment. We are responsible for this, not the Americans, not anyone else, it’s down to us to deliver this capability. “At the same time as we develop these resilience capabilities, we need to expand our ability to contribute towards deterrence, because that gives towards the common good of preventing a Pearl Harbor in space.” A Navy perspective on space was provided by CDRE Matthew Doornbos, RAN Director General Navy Intelligence and Information Warfare. He argued that “The ability to access services and benefit from space related war fighting effects and synchronizing and coordinate them with other kinetic, non-kinetic effects and physical maneuver is critical to vitality and survivability of a deployed maritime task group. Controlling the seas and projecting power from the sea complicates the strategic situation for adversaries and competitors. “As Director General Navy Intelligence and Information Warfare, I have responsibility for the oversight over the Maritime Commander Control Communications, Computers, Cyber, Intelligence, Surveillance, Electronic warfare program, or more simply the MC5ISR program, which include Navy’s endeavors in the space domain. “The creation of the program was approved by government late last year and brings together all of Navy information warfare projects under one overarching program. It includes several projects that are already delivering and several projects which deliver over the next 20 to 30 years. “A notable endorsement by government of the program is the adoption of a continuous capability development system that enables defense the ability to maintain tactically relevant, technically advanced, in fit for purpose systems that enable the maritime force to maneuver within the electromagnetic spectrum in a degraded, denied, intermittent or limited environment. At the same time, it allows us to the capability for degrading or denying adversaries freedom maneuver. “The requirement for the program was driven out of a growing realization that the current rate of technology advancements, and our contrasting inability to deliver new capability at a similar rate. It was realized that our limitations for providing rapid responses to emerging threats was derived from our process of implementation and not necessarily our capacity to develop the technology. “The future of warfare is being shaped by the world advancements in technology. And we must stay at the forefront. The rapid pace of technology development means that Navy’s mission is now only achievable through the nexus of maritime, air, land, cyber, and space domains. Navy gains several critical information advantages through space, position, navigation, and timing. B&T such as GPS provides precise geolocation, navigation, time reference services. Information essential for all Navy’s networks, sensors, weapon systems including future non-kinetic effects to be delivered through the program…. “This network provides the central warning for counter advanced ballistic missile capabilities. Intelligence surveillance reconnaissance, space based optical radar and RF sensors have been long used to support military operations. Such platforms may previously be beyond the reach of potential adversaries. Contemporary counter space authorities can’t hold these assets at risk. As soon as we leave the wharf, these space-based communications are being placed at risk in a congested and contested spectrum environment.” Operating within the dynamic war fighting environment relies on access to space and doing so requires in his view the ability to shape, support, and leverage the wider evolving Australian space eco-system. “We cannot rely on our major primes and institutions alone. Therefore, we must identify the importance of implementing the smaller players within the industry to contribute and develop our key resource, and that is our people. My goal is to develop and build and nurture the relationships between defense industry and academia. In doing so, I seek to build that academic base and give depth and breadth to support Navy’s, C5ISR needs. This partnership, where we’re all able to understand each other’s needs and pressures, will lead to a better outcome for all of us collectively. He then added that: “Navy may need to leverage commercial capabilities that reduce the cost of access to space and increase the utility and the availability of space-based systems. Navy needs to establish processes for developing and managing space expertise for our sailors. In information warfare related work groups, current career streams do not provide a path to upscale individuals, who would form the core of professional workforce in our Navy to stay abreast of rapid developments in tactics, techniques, procedures, and capability. Concurrently, Navy needs to train its officers with specialist space effects and information warfare knowledge to generate, integrate and synchronize space capabilities into maritime task group operations. He added: “In order for us to predicatively move forward with the necessary research and development and basic science and technology to meet our capability needs, there needs to be a level of funding behind the research. It’s a simple fact. That’s why we need to fully utilize the funding opportunities available to us through the defense innovation hub. “And for instance, the DSTGs next generation tech fund, these collaborative ambitions serve to rider a solid foundational relationship and can enable defense industry and academia to establish corporate process in a practical sense.” [1] An Army perspective on military space was provided by BRIG Ian Langford, Director General Future Land Warfare. “As part of the joint force, the Australian Army must contribute to orchestrating effects across all domains, to include space with our like-minded partners and allies. The more cohesive, integrated, and network force that we generate as part of the joint force, the more effective we will be in leveraging this domain. “Army’s contribution to space power is obviously not new. And as the ADF recapitalizes, to include its diverse space workforce, it’ll require expertise to be drawn from across army, navy, air force, the public service, contractors, academics, and industry, if we are to realize this ambition and the responsibilities that we have towards safeguarding the nation. “For our army, they exist inside our sixth brigade, which is that part of army which raise, trains, and sustains our air defense, our ISR electronic warfare, and our long-range fires community. That organization and those people within will need to be skilled, and in some cases re-skilled, across the decade as the ADF space strategy becomes realizable. It becomes less important of the fact that individuals join the army navy and air force rather than the fact that they’re now part of the ADF and the uniform they wear will be less important than perhaps the domain that they operate in… “The generation of space power for army will require more than just the employment of space systems. It will demand a coherent joint and integrated culture in space domain, increasing the awareness of space power within army and across defense. We must understand how each of the constituent parts of military power are enabled by the other. “And this prepares our people for roles across the department, outside of this service, expands our thinking, and ultimately contribute to our ability to be successful both in single, unified, and multi-domain operations. Army’s access to terrestrial and orbit satellite assets, for example, provide a spectrum of offensive and defensive capabilities to protect and defend the space domain.” Finally, AIRCDRE Phil Gordon, Director General Air Defence and Space underscored with regard to the Australian space effort: “We are on a journey, but we’ve got a long way to go to achieve professional mastery. We need at all levels of defense, leadership, and government to be informed and understand what it means when someone cozies up to one of our satellites, starts fiddling around, well, what does that mean? What should we do about that? We need to take an integrated commander control approach. “This is a key part of the joint force. We’re not just making space versus space decisions. Space is not just a special domain but one which impacts on all other warfighting domains.” Certainly, as Australia looks to add long-range strike, space capabilities are a key part of such a system. And that really is the point. Shaping sovereign space capabilities is a key part of the ability of Australia to have the kind of decision making appropriate to operate in the gray zone, hybrid war or what I prefer to call it engaging effectively in the ongoing limited wars and escalation control challenges being posed by today’s authoritarian peer competitors. As Gordon put it: “If we are going to make a decision to go to war, we probably shouldn’t just take someone else’s word for it. What happened? You could look back to the decisions around the invasion of Iraq and the fallout of that and weapons of mass destruction. Do we want to just rely on other people’s assessments of why our satellite just stopped communicating with us? Or do we want to have a way to independently collaborate and corroborate that information.” We put it this way with regard to defense in our book on European defense: “But it is clear this is not the 19th century in that no Western state can directly defend itself and its interests by itself. We are in a situation where even powerful Western states can only pursue defense and security strategies from a position of semi-sovereignty. “The fundamental reality is that defense is national but executed in a situation of semi-sovereignty. It is not only shaped by semi-sovereign relations with other liberal democratic states but also in terms of sorting through the kind of relationships liberal democratic states will have with 21st century authoritarians which now operate both internally and externally with regard to the liberal democracies themselves. “Alliances are crucial but not definitive in solving the direct defense challenges facing today’s liberal democratic states. National goals and objectives need to be clearly identified, stated and pursued but done so with regard as well to ensuring ensuring that those liberal democratic states most willing to act in support of your nation’s more enlightened objectives are on the same page with regard to how best to handle full spectrum crisis management. “Nations remain the focus for defense and security, even though what has emerged is clearly semi-sovereignty even for larger nations. Part of shaping the way ahead for a nation is to have tool sets which not only can defend its interests but also trigger collaboration with core partners to ensure that the overall result is more capability on the basis of “enlightened” nationalism to act, rather than on simply more agreement to discuss, but with little ability to be able to act during a crisis.” [2] The featured photo shows AIRCDRE Gordon speaking at the Williams Foundation seminar on space. [1] https://www.dst.defence.gov.au/nextgentechfund [2] Robbin Laird and Murielle Delaporte, The Return of Direct Defense in Europe: Meeting the Challenge of XXIst Century Authoritarian Powers (2020), chapter five. Link to article: The ADF and the Australian Space Enterprise (Defense.info)

Dr Robbin Laird 2 January 2022 Sovereign Australian space requires an Australian industrial space eco-system to be shaped and enhanced. How might this be done? Crafting, shaping, and building out an Australian space industry able to provide for sovereign capabilities for the Australian government decision makers is based on the enhanced opportunities in commercial space. Nick Leake, head of satellite and space systems Optus, provided a comprehensive look back at the company’s experience in the space business. Optus is one of the largest telecommunications companies in Australia. It has operated satellites as part of its business since 1985. Currently, the company operates 10 satellites with Optus 10 being the latest of their satellites. As noted by the company: “In 2003, Optus successfully launched the world’s largest hybrid commercial and military communications satellite Optus C1, together with the Australian Defence Forces. Optus C1 is the Australian hotbird with twenty four commercial Ku-band transponders operating in beams covering Australia, New Zealand, the nearby offshore islands, Papua New Guinea, Hawaii and South East Asia. Optus C1 carries subscription TV services and Aurora Free-to-Air radio and television services to remote areas in Australia." [1] All of this means that Leake spoke from the standpoint of several years of operating experience as an Australian firm with real-world experience in working a commercial telecoms satellite fleet. His discussion focused on the challenges of operating a satellite network in the growing presence of space junk and in the face of powers that believed they had the right through ASAT systems to place deliberate “junk” to disrupt or destroy a perceived adversary’s satellites. Leake underscored a number of key points about the interaction between commercial space and the need for government to focus on maintain some kind of order for space operations. “We are looking towards the future. We are looking for some cohesion within Australia with Defence and the Australian Space Agency to develop tools to give us better safety in operating our geostationary spacecraft. “The C1 spacecraft is 18 years old. We operate that satellite in what they call inclined orbit. So we operate spacecraft at 36,000 kilometers in a 70-kilometer box. We fly it in a figure of eight because it has the pull of the earth, pull of the moon, pull of the sun, so it is never static. We try to keep it in this box, pointing at earth and if you don’t have a spectrum filing, you’ve got nowhere to put your spacecraft. It’s incredibly important that you keep your spacecraft, at your orbital slots and that you maintain those spacecrafts. “If you move a spacecraft away, you’ve got three years to put that spacecraft back to keep your finding in use, so it’s called bringing into use. That’s an important part of a commercial operator, but it’s even more important for our Defence forces that they maintain their orbital filings across the orbital arcs that they want to use their spacecraft.” The impact of evolving commercial space for defence and security operations could not be more clear than in the domain of ISR. In his presentation to the seminar, AIRCDRE Richard Keir (Retd.) Strategic Advisor for National Security and Intelligence to Geospatial Intelligence Pty. Ltd, provided a targeted presentation on how the ISR demands for the civil, security and military sectors can benefit from commercial geospatial efforts. There are a number of conclusions one can draw from the emergence of a robust commercial space enabling ISR Market. Notably, since 2002, the commercial space-based earth observation market has become very dynamic and global. Essentially, Australia is involved in this market and there are clear opportunities for the Australian government to get better value out of this market for it national security requirements. In effect, commercial imagery and data from that imagery can be used along with classified sources and methods and thereby enhance the scope and quality of the data collected. By taking advantage of the growing number of commercial satellite capabilities and constellations, the Australian government can enable a whole of government strategy in defence and security. Because commercial space based ISR data and information is unclassified, it can form a solid foundation for information sharing with a wider array of allies and partners than highly classified imagery. This can prove very useful in terms of crisis management and escalation control, notably as information war is a core reality today. For example. in discussions I had during my past visits with the Maritime Border Command, it is very clear that such capabilities fit right into their evolving approach to working from maritime domain awareness shared with partners and allies. The Maritime Domain Awareness dynamic is an arena where shared information s crucial for both whole of government and working with partners and allies. In the recently released White Paper which Keir referenced in his presentation which his company just released, the nature of the MDA market for commercial space is explained in the following terms: “MDA is enhanced by space-based Earth observation as it has unique capabilities to image large swathes of the ocean and complex littoral environments using a mix of EO, IR and SAR imaging sensors – fused with AIS – and increasingly assisted by RF sensors. The latter assistance provided by RF sensors is especially useful in cases where a vessel has not enabled its AIS or has deliberately mis-characterised itself. RF sensors may provide enough of a clue to tip and cue an all-weather SAR capability or a good weather/daylight hours EO capability to classify or identify the vessel. “The use of more novel sensors can also prove valuable in MDA. For example, the Visible Infrared Imaging Radiometer Suite (VIIRS) is a sensor on board the Suomi National PolarOrbiting Partnership (Suomi NPP) and United States National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) NOAA-20 weather satellites. The sensor has the capability to detect lights on vessels at sea that are often used to attract fish.15 “Because MDA is an international issue that transcends national borders and spans issues of national security through to economic interests, information sharing is often fundamental to its success. No nation can sustain 24/7/365 full situational awareness of the oceans in isolation, so the most efficient way to achieve the desired level of knowledge is to share information with partner nations. Indeed, counterintuitively, national sovereignty frequently depends on the sharing of data, information, and intelligence between likeminded nations to achieve MDA. “Commercial space-based ISR data is unclassified, has high resolution, and is capable of 24/7/365 availability across the gamut of EO, IR, SAR, AIS and RF. It is therefore of great value to nations such as Australia in its efforts to facilitate the MDA of developing nations because it will generally have fewer constraints on its use.” [2] The main presentation outlining the current state of the Australian space eco-system and the projected way ahead was provided by Anthony Murfett. Deputy Head of the Australian Space Agency, which was launched in 2018. The purpose of the Space Agency is “ to transform and grow a globally respected Australian space industry that lifts the broader economy, inspires and improves the lives of Australians – underpinned by strong national and international engagement.” And “the Australian Space Agency aims to triple the size of the Australian space economy (from A$3.9B to $12B) and create an additional 20,000 space jobs by 2030.” The current situation finds the Australian space business operating at a level of AU$4.6 billion with 11,560 jobs existing across the Australian space industry. The investment in space capability growth is AU$7 billion with AU$800+ coming from investment by the Australian government in civil space and AU$2 billion coming from a pipeline of investment across all the Australian federal states and territories. Growing civil space provides a significant opportunity to expand the capabilities for the Australian defence sector as there are a number of key areas alignment between the two sectors. Murfett identified four key areas: satellite-based capability and services, Space Domain awareness, Position, Navigation and Timing and Earth Observation. In the following slide from Murfett’s presentation, the extant capacity in adjacent industries within the Australian space industry eco system were identified: He highlighted as well key infrastructure investments being made in Australia which can be leveraged as well to enhance the evolving Australian space industrial eco system. This includes the AU$1.3 billion in the modern manufacturing initiative of the Australian government, the establishment of a robotics, automation and AI command control centre (Fugro Marine), a space data analysis facility (Pawsey supercomputing Centre) and a missional control at Lot Fourteen (Saber Astronautics). There is an agreement with NASA which is part of the way ahead for Australian space as well. The agreement with NASA means that Australia is part of the Trailblazer program of the Moon to Mars initiative. A semi-autonomous, Australian-made rover is to be included in future NASA mission to the Moon. This effort draws on Australia’s world-leading remote operations capability and the Rover will collect lunar regolith and NASA will extract oxygen from this. Shaping a way ahead for Australian space launch capability is a key part of the way ahead. And in this slide from his presentation, Murfett highlighted the perceived way ahead: A number of international agreements are being worked to open the doors internationally for the Australian space sector. The first is a technology safeguard agreement with the United States which is establishing principles under which U.S. spaceflight technology can be licensed for export to Australia for use in spaceflight activities. The Australians are working with India on India’s first human spaceflight program where the Australian Government and ISRO are working together to track the Gaganyaan mission from Australia’s Cocos (Keeling) Islands (CKI). And finally, there is an Australian-UK space bridge framework arrangement which Increases connection, exchange, and investment across AU-UK space sectors. Murfett concluded his presentation by identifying what he saw as the next phase for the Australian civil space effort: Deliver the remaining technical roadmaps to highlight opportunities for investment; support industry to scale; connect across government to highlight how space can support growth, safety, and security; connect with the Australian community and show the value of space to our everyday lives and to inspire the nation and support the future workforce. This last point was underscored in other presentations as well, for example, in the presentation by David Ball, regional director, Australia/New Zealand for Lockheed Martin Space. “The young folks these days aren’t coming into space as we would need them to. In numbers, the Space Agency has some very aggressive numbers from government in terms of the numbers of jobs they need to create. To do that we need to inspire our younger generation and give them the path and show them there are real, tangible jobs in the space sector in this country.” Murfett provided a fitting comment to highlight the way ahead for defence working with the evolving Australian space industrial eco system: “There is an Australian industry here that can actually deliver on Defence’s future ambitions.” I would add that the challenge is to ensure that this happens in the way which fits as well into the evolution of the ADF, its forces, its strategy and its concepts of operations. The featured photo is Anthony Murfett, Deputy Head of the Australian Space Agency speaking the Williams Foundation seminar on space. [1] https://www.optus.com.au/about/network/satellite/fleet [2] Commercial Space-Based Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance and Australia’s National Security (Geospatial Intelligence Pty Ltd (December 2021). Link to article: Shaping an Australian Space Industrial Eco-System for Defence and Security (SLDinfo.com)

Dr Robbin Laird 31 December 2021 Sovereignty is a tricky term, notably when it comes to global economies and to allied based national defense. The COVD-19 crisis and the conflict with the 21st century authoritarian powers, notably China, have reminded the liberal democracies of how vulnerable they are. And when American allies talk sovereignty what they are talking about are two interrelated dynamics: the first that they have as much independence in decision making from Washington as feasible and retain necessary alliance links; and the second is to ensure that they have as much capability to act decisively against authoritarian adversaries to ensure that escalation control is possible to defend that nation’s interests. I have a lifetime of dealing with the French, who are the U.S. allies who talk the most about sovereignty and their freedom of action vis a vis the Americans. But what is sovereignty for a state like France when embedded in the European Union, dependent on a U.S. led Alliance for their ultimate security, and embedded in the global supply chain? I dealt with this question of what sovereignty in the current period is even for a large power like the United Sates in my edited book 2020: A Pivotal Year. Several of the essay’s deal with this question or theme. Essentially what we are talking about is shaping decision making capabilities for the nation to make choices within the shared sovereignty of modern defense and economic relationships facing the major liberal democratic nations. It is about getting allies and adversaries alike to go down paths favorable to a particular nations policies or identities. But how did the speakers at the space conference define what sovereignty meant to them regarding Australia and its way ahead in the space domain? The core point was relatively straightforward. And that point was made by Malcolm Davis from the Australian Strategic Policy Institute: “For the first time in a major policy document, the 2020 strategic update emphasized the importance for Australia to have our own capabilities in the operational space domain. That update made clear there is a requirement for space control that is not only about space domain awareness from the ground, but also about an ability actually to assure access to space and counter threats to our space systems and boosted the funding to do so.” One member of the key panel was very aware of how important the sovereignty focus is regarding how to focus what Australia does in the space domain and this is how he put it: “Exactly how do we define sovereign? Sovereign means different things to different people. We need to decide what degree of sovereignty we need to do the job. That might not be total ownership from start to end. It might be sovereignty of decision making. It might be sovereignty of the networks. It might be sovereignty of the data. I think there’s no one size fits all approach to sovereignty, and it really just depends on what is required actually to do the job in an assured way.” It is an interesting exercise to go through the presentations and to carefully look at how the speakers defined or used the word sovereignty to shape what course of action they then advocated. It is interesting above all because how one defines the focus of sovereignty indicates what a realistic course of action for Australia might be, given the high cost of space, the relatively limited skill sets in Australia in this industry, the tradeoffs between working in a globalized commercial space sector, or a targeted Australian funded effort tailored for the ADF. The moderator for the day highlighted the importance of sovereignty as referring to Australian-based firms, but whether these are outposts of foreign primes or Australian-generated firms is an interesting question. This is how Darin Lovett put it: “The impact of COVID has fundamentally reenergized the discussion around sovereignty and resilience, especially as it pertains to space. Do we divest and, again, rely on a foreign provider or do we invest and build sovereignty? We have an opportunity to leapfrog the old operating system, which we’ve relied on and gain traction against emerging issues, but we need holistic capability development in Australia to bed in the seeds that we’ll provide for the future.” AIRCDRE Nicholas Hogan, Director General of the Space Domain Review, identified various concrete manifestations of new capabilities which Australia needs to achieve to have sovereignty. The first is clearly on the launch side of space. The second is to build out a sovereign space industry, but again one of the challenges here is that companies in the commercial sector and the defense sector do not operate in the same manner and there is the key challenge of foreign primes and local companies in terms of what they build for the global market or for the ADF. This impacts directly on the question of the workforce and the skill sets to be developed to build out an Australian based space industry. There is clearly growing overlap between the commercial and military space sectors, but it is more of Venn diagram than single workforce, notably because of the requirement for security clearances in the national defense arena. Terry van Herren, the former Air Attaché in the United States, focused on the challenge of building an effective sovereign space industry. Here he cited the experience of Australia in building indigenous fighter aircraft from 1921 to 1939 which resulted in not very good fighters, but it did generate the infrastructure which then allowed Australia to license build Spitfires and Hurricanes. He pointedly used this example to underscore that sovereignty is not about “designing, developing and building everything but it is about doing what you can do well and take advantages of working with partners and allies around the world to work on what you’re not so good at doing.” He then cited a concrete example, namely of a company doing very innovative work in space domain awareness. LeoLabs is building a network of ground-based, phased array radars that provide a unique capability, and have approached space domain awareness from a perspective different from partners and allies. [1] CDRE Matthew Doornbos, RAN Director General for Navy Intelligence and Warfare. Made a very similar point to that of van Herren. “In our endeavors to set the conditions for long term success in the space domain, we must remain cognizant of maximizing efficient use of our resources, because the reality here in Australia, unsurprisingly, is we only have a limited number of resources. If we are to achieve our goals and ambitions, we’d have to really understand what our sovereign capability should be. But more importantly, we have to work efficiently. We have to work collaboratively, across defense, industry and academia. It’s our relationships through all aspects of our capability development, that will enable us to achieve our goals.” But the most comprehensive examination of the relationship between a realistic definition of sovereignty with how Australia should proceed was by AVM Chris Deeble, now CEO Northrop Grumman Australia, but when serving with the RAAF had extensive experience with working with advanced programs, such as the F-35. His experience clearly guided his judgements on how to achieve both enhanced sovereignty but to do so with a regard to a practical way ahead. “What is sovereignty? The pursuit of sovereignty shouldn’t be an excuse for wanting to do everything. Sovereignty and resilience go hand in glove from my perspective and how we build that strategy. When we think about space, we often think about the things that make for great photo opportunities. A launch, a satellite, those great pictures of a satellite orbiting around. They make the great photo opportunities. These are going to be important that supply chains that underpin that, will remain important for us. But we must prioritize our effort and investments. “We must ensure that from the get-go, we create that viable, scalable, innovative, and sustainable space ecosystem. And it must be underpinned by business cases that can goes to the viability and sustain sustainability at the end of the day “This will be a significant challenge for us as we move forward. Defining things in requirements terms is going to be difficult. We will have to be thinking about that in outcomes terms. As a space nation, we must have a clear strategy that articulates our sovereign security and resilient space capability outcomes. We must develop a cohesive and aligned national strategy that meets both the civil and defense needs now and into the future. “We must ensure that we prioritize and align our investments. We cannot lose sight of the underlying business cases. We can’t do it all. We have to create a sustainable viable outcome for us as we’re moving forward. The lexicon is changing, it’s a great first start. “But if we want to be a space nation, if we want to create space ecosystems for the nation, if we want to have a viable, enduring, sustainable, scalable industry, from now and into the future, we have to turn that rhetoric into reality.” BRIG Langford brought up a really key point about the impact of having sovereign space or bits of sovereignty within an overall allied space enterprise: “Does a hostile act against a space-based asset, or indeed a cyber intrusion against national infrastructure constitute an act of war under international law? And noting that blood has not been spilled, which is the traditional sort of convention around a hostile act, hostile action, hostile intent, is that now in international law, is it an act, a license, indeed a mandate to prosecute war on the physical domain. To some, it seems obvious, but like most things in life, it’s not that simple. “What is the policy framework, when an Australian owned commercial or military space-based space asset is potentially interfered or destroyed as it relates to an attack on Australian sovereignty, and what we might do about it, in terms of our obligations to assert the security versions of ourselves in that sort of environment.” The Featured Photo: AVM (Retired) Chris Deeble, now Executive Director, Strategy, Northrop Grumman, Australia [1] https://www.leolabs.space Link to article: Sovereignty and the Australian Space Effort (SLDinfo.com)

Dr Robbin Laird 30 December 2021 Recently, the Williams Foundation held its latest bi-annual seminar, this one focused on the way ahead for the Australian space enterprise. Since 2014, the Williams Foundation has held bi-annual seminars on the transformation of the ADF as it embraced fifth generation warfare and working joint force integration. Since 2018, the focus has been increasingly with regard to how to extend the reach of the ADF given the changing nature of the challenges facing Australia in the Indo-Pacific region. The discussions really began with a 2018 seminar which focused on the importance of long-range strike and was followed by seminars which focused on ways to enhance Australian resilience and sovereign capabilities. The first seminar of 2021 focused on next generation autonomous systems, and the December 1, 2021, seminar on where autonomous systems, namely satellites, have been a regular feature for both military and commercial purposes for many decades. I will publish a report on the seminar early next year, but in this article would simply wish to highlight some key elements of the discussions. The first point made throughout the presentations by speakers was that Australia has a long involvement in space activities through its working relationships with its core allies, first Britain, and then the United States. The Australians have been engaged in several support activities for the American space enterprise and that domain knowledge and engagement will continue to be critical in shaping Australia’s own efforts for enhanced sovereignty In space. The second point is the need to indeed enhance Australian independent space capabilities. As AIRCDRE Phil Gordon, Director General Air Defence and Space put it: “I would compare our position in space with being a frequent flyer who uses that service. And as we in defense are on the journey from being a consumer of other people’s space products to a contributor owner and operator in our own right.” The need for shaping sovereign capabilities comes not only from the enhanced importance of space payloads for both commercial and military activities, but from the nature of crises and the nature of allies. Gordon put it succinctly: “It’s relatively easy to have access to space capabilities from alliies when there’s plenty to go around. But if times are tough, if assets are under attack, if bandwidth is reduced, if satellites and ground stations are targeted and there’s just not enough capacity to do all the things we want to do, then where are those priorities going to lie?” This then means for Gordon: “we have to be able to have control and access of our space capabilities without needing to ask someone else’s permission.” The third point was embedded in various presentations but put most directly by BRIG Ian Langford. Director General Future Land Warfare. Even though space clearly has its own specific requirements, skill sets and capabilities, it is part of the overall transformation of the ADF and of the next round of the revolution in military affairs, or perhaps we could go back to the term used throughout the Williams Foundation Seminars, namely, a fifth-generation force but now with greater reach. Langford put it this way: “ Two years ago, I was talking to a US Air Force retired four-star general, and we were talking about the revolution of military affairs, which was demonstrated in 1991 during the first Gulf War. And that was demonstrated in that context through the effectiveness of GPS and the use in application of precision strike and advanced munitions, as it related to the ability of US-led coalition forces to be so effective and so profound in the context of that capability overmatch. Now we are on the edge of a significant defence recapitalization are we now on the edge of the next round of the RMA? And what are we to do about it?” The fourth point is that shaping of a new Australian space enterprise which started with the 2018 standup of the Australian Space Agency and will see a new ADF command to be stood up in January 2022 is occurring in the context of evolving strategic environment. And that environment as I noted in a recent discussion with Dr. Paul Bracken, the well-known strategist, is characterized by ongoing limited war with the authoritarian powers and the challenge of escalation control and management. Space assets are crucial to be able for Australia to shape effective crisis management in the ongoing conflicts with the authoritarian powers. Several speakers spoke about the militarization of space and space war. The challenge is to know when it starts. Both the cyber and space domains are domains within which conflict is ongoing, signaling difficult, but the need to be resilient crucial. Dougal Robertson of the Williams Foundation highlighted the interaction between space and the various dimensions of the evolving strategic environment. And he underscored this crucial point: “Gray-zone traditionally means we are not at war, but we’re not at peace. The gray-zone actor might be pursuing national objectives, certainly in relation to nation states, and when we talk about gray-zone activity, they’re often pursuing objectives that are linked to military advantage or political or strategic advantage.” If this is the case then, Australia certainly needs space capability which can give the ADF and the government decision making tools to evolute conflicts and crisis management options, occurring in space and cascading out to the entire combat force. The fifth point, and a major part of the day’s discussion, was on the nature of the space eco-system which Australia needs to shape going forward to have enough sovereignty to have decision making capabilities for both security and defense needs. Space is expensive and payloads are dynamically changing under the impacts of new initiative sand capabilities generated by the major space powers. So, what can Australia realistically do and how best to do it? That discussion was a significant part of the seminar and will be a major focus for the upcoming report on the conference. But in general terms, the focus was upon several key aspects which Australia can or needs to clearly do. One aspect is leveraging the dynamics of change with regard to new versus old space, which means new ways to launch space payloads, and to leverage the various ways to shape new satellite payloads and constellations. That effort will be generated as the major space powers refigure how they are working GEO, MEO and LEO payloads, and as they shape various kinetic and non-kinetic ways to shape warfare in space capabilities. That is why working with the United States and enhancing working relationship with the UK as they have launched a new space command, or with India, or Japan or ESA all will become parts of shaping the space ecosystem for the Australian space enterprise going forward. Malcolm Davis of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute provided a particularly robust and clear discussion of what Australia’s way ahead in space might look like. “We need to think about space resilience, and we need to think about space deterrence, and they should complement the existing projects in space. Sovereign launch is clearly going to happen, and I’ve always been an advocate for a high, low mix, where Australia contributes a low end in terms of small satellites that can complement the large geo birds. These small satellite systems could contribute new types of capability and new missions for the Australian defense force.” The sixth point is the central role which Australia’s geography has and will play going forward. The cooperation between the United States and Australia in part is based on Australia’s location and its extensive geography. The establishment of Pine Gap is a case in point. This location is strategically significant because of the ability of the facilitates there to work various high value satellites as they pass over one-third of the globe, including China, the Asian parts of Russia and the Middle East. And going forward launch locations and ground-based space capabilities will grow in importance as Australia builds out its own capabilities and works with partners and allies in the liberal democratic world going forward. In the panel, the former air attaché to the United States, Terry Van Herren noted: “If I was a Chinese general, I’d be worried about three things from Australia. First, I would be worried about nuclear powered submarines. Second, I would be quite concerned about long range replenishable strike. The third thing that would worry me would be a robust counter space capability developed and supported in Australia. Why? Because Perth and Beijing are on the same longitude. They would hate to see us develop real space power in this country.” Speaking of geography, there is the broad question of the changing nature of Australia’s defence geography. When I was last in Australia in March 2020, I started my return to the United States as the COVID wave started to pass over Australia in Perth visiting the subbase and a major shipyard. When you combine the need to operate from Western Australia to the first island chain, with the coming of a nuclear attack submarine, almost certainly to operate from Western Australia, and the already extant space capabilities in the region, which will be expanded, the thin population belts in the West will need to see growth in order for many of Australia’s defense plans to be realized. A good way to conclude this initial look at the seminar was a comment made by the moderator of the seminar, Darin Lovett, who is the Director of the South Australian Space Centre. “Most of us are here as professionals in the business. We understand the importance of Sovereign Defense Capability in the mission statement of the ADF to defend Australia and its national interests. “A Sovereign Defense Space Capability is somewhat harder to articulate. And there are two reasons for this. First, the Defense Space Capabilities we still rely on are largely to many people, largely still highly classified and unknown to the general populace. And secondly, our human capital, the professional cadre who underpin any capability are relatively few and they’re new. And compared to the rich heritage of land, maritime and air, we just don’t have that depth and that backbone and strategic thought that has permeated the other domains. “But space is no longer just viewed as a conduit for three things, comms, imagery, and Positioning, Navigation and Timing (PNT). It’s now seen as a domain in and of itself, to be monitored for belligerent activity and an essential element of a complex society and a way that, and a domain that underpins our way of life on earth in ways we actually don’t understand. The system is too complex to unravel. “The impact of COVID has reenergized the discussion around sovereignty and resilience, especially as it pertains to space. Now it’s a pivotal moment, billions of dollars are slated for defense capability. And we’ve got a small but dynamic space industry growing, but also large primes who are investing in this kind to build capability. “We’re unencumbered by the legacy approach to space. This is an advantage we’re not pushing 20 tons to GEO. We’re not a big player like Airbus, Boeing, Lockheed, L3, et cetera. We can move relatively fast. We’re changing the paradigm that space is primarily the playground of big powers.” Link to article: Shaping a Way Ahead for the Australian Space Enterprise (SLDinfo.com)

Dr Robbin Laird 30 December 2021 At the recent Williams Foundation seminar focused on Australian space held on December 1, 2021, the conference started appropriately enough with a look back at the history of Australia’s engagement in space activities. The Australians have been involved in the space activities of their key allies, first Britain, and then the United States from the dawn of the space age. That involvement has been based on Australia’s key geography and strong alliance relationships. As Australia moves to the next phase of its space efforts, the focus is upon being proactive and shaping the new space efforts which have generated by Australia’s key allies. But by being deeply engaged, notably with the United States, Australia can shape its own capabilities with knowledge of how the United States is shaping its way ahead in space as well as providing interactive knowledge with the United States and Australia’s allies of the evolution of adversarial space efforts as well. In other words, a proactive Australian space effort is informed not only by leveraging new commercial opportunities generated by the new space enterprises globally, but by understanding of how the United States and Australia’s key allies are evolving their own military space efforts as well. It can be an informed innovative leveraging and insertion capability within the evolving space enterprises for the liberal democracies. And within such a context, Australia can expand its role going forward. In part, this opportunity is based on Australia’s geographical location vis a vis the core space competitors for the liberal democracies. The history of Pine Gap is a case in point. The noted Australian strategist, Paul Dibb, in his book Inside the Wilderness of Mirrors provided the most complete look to date on Pine Gap and its role in the Australian-U.S. working relationship with regard to space and intelligence. As Dibb noted about his first encounter with this site: “We are going to patch you through to listen to the Soviet Northern Fleet Commander in Severomorsk talking to Naval headquarters in Moscow’. It was 1974 and I had just been appointed Head of the National Assessment Staff and I was on my first visit to Pine Gap near Alice Springs. You can imagine how impressed I was to be on the receiving end of this intelligence from a Rhyolite satellite that was 35,000 km away from Earth and with an intercept antenna more than 20 metres in diameter. Later second-generation Orion satellites had an antenna exceeding 40 metres in diameter.” [1] Even though the numbers of Australians involved in Pine Gap has been clearly very limited, this type of engagement by Australia puts it at the head table of evolving U.S. capabilities and thinking, a key aspect for shaping any forward leaning proactive Australian space policy going forward. At the seminar, Amy Hestermann-Crane of the Williams Foundation and an analyst with the Royal Australian Air Force provided the historical overview. [2] She noted that the main thrust of Australian space policy has been regarding the military side and that was based on working with Britain and then with regard to the United States. Notably, Britain used Australian territory for its nascent ICBM program and then the Americans with regard to the use of Australian geography for space tracking and control. But over the past decade, there has been more Australian involvement in civil space, as realization of the role which such space plays in the national economy and society has grown. She noted: “Although Australia has been involved in various space endeavors since the 1940s, it cannot be said that we were a proactive participant. Just a short look at our space history shows that we were motivated in strengthening relationships with historic and emerging allies, as well as gaining access to potential national security benefits from developed project capabilities” Britain after World War II shaped the Woomera Research Establishment in 1946 to establish a highly classified location for the British ICMB and Rocket Development Project that lasted nearly three decades. She underscored that “the Establishment remained under the control of Defence through the Department of Supply and is now under RAAF control as the Woomera Range Complex” With the British essentially abandoning the Blue Streak program, the United States then became the key space partner for Australia. “In 1956, a request was made to the Australian government to assist in the tracking of U.S. rockets and satellite launches. This request stressed the scientific benefits of the partnership, yet with Woomera being suggested as the first location for a facility, it was the Defense Committee which was asked for comment. “The Committee recommended approving the ground tracking station due primarily to the military significance if the United States managed to find success in their satellite program. And by 1957, the station was operational and supported the launch of the first U.S. satellite, Explorer 1, in 1958. A second facility was built in nearby Woomera in 1969 and continued to support the U.S. Defense Surveillance Program until its closure in 1999.” The NASA Deep Space Communication Centre in Tidbinbilla gained fame by supporting the Apollo landing in 1969 just a few years after its establishment. And “the United States also supported the development and assembly of Australia’s first satellite alongside British and Australian organizations, and WRESAT was launched in 1967. It was designed to increase the understanding of upper atmosphere effects on the weather and the climate, as well as gaining physical data for U.S. research programs.” “Australia further signed an agreement in 1966 to establish the joint defense space research facility known as the Joint Defense Facility of Pine Gap. And at the time, the Australian government promoted the military and scientific benefits that this facility would bring but failed to reveal the project’s support for United States intelligence collection.” The next major development for Australian space was involvement with the British when the moved on from Blue Streak to a program to develop civilian launchers. “Britain went to Commonwealth and European nations with a proposal for a civilian launch program. Australia was the only Commonwealth nation to join this program, and it was under the condition that Australia only provide facility support. Australia wasn’t excited by the civilian research prospect, but instead was motivated to recuperate financial investments in Woomera and the Blue Streak program. “Several nations did, however, answer Britain’s call and formed the European Launch Development Organization, otherwise known as ELDO. It was formed with Britain, Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, and the Netherlands, all of whom were responsible for various rocket segment development. Australia as a full partner only provided access to Woomera, and thus the Blue Streak Project founded the Europa 1 launch vehicle. “From 1964 to 1970, the project culminated in a total of 10 launches for Europa 1. However, there were five launch failures. However, by 1970, ELDO members no longer wanted to continue using Woomera as its launch facility and Australia provided Darwin as a secondary launch facility. However, this was also rejected by the organization. “As such, ELDO moved to French Guiana, offering Australia the possibility of remaining as a full organization partner despite no financial contribution. However, the Australian government saw little value in this civilian research program, especially once it moved offshore, and it declined to remain part of the ELDO organization.” “Australia’s quiet space years can be considered from the late 1970s all the way through to the 1990s. The use of foreign satellite capability for military use was still beneficial for our needs and it didn’t place any undue financial burden on the government. Australia was still motivated by national security and had not yet realized the commercial benefits that space offered. There were several attempts at establishing a commercial launch facility. However, none succeeded.” in this period,. the Space Activities Act of 1998 was written and promulgate. “This legislation, which has undergone several amendments in recent years, still forms the basis for Australian and international organizations to obtain various licenses for space-based objects, launch activities, and reentries.” She concluded that Australia is now shifting to a more proactive space effort, and one which highlights both commercial and military space. This period can be dated from 2018 with the establishment of the Australian Space Agency which is tasked with growing Australian space industry. “We have relied on foreign satellite capabilities because it was cheaper for our government to do so. We were able to progress forward as a military in that manner. And it’s only been in the last few years that we’ve understood that the space industry and civilian research is fundamental and integral to Australian life. “The militarization of space has allowed space to be cheaper. We are experiencing a booming startup industry with universities and industry and military, all being able to get involved in different space capabilities and creating greater possibilities for a sovereign capability. “And such capability is critical so that if something goes wrong in the future or our alliances change, we’re going to be able to still rely on our own capabilities that are integral to every facet of Australian life. This ranges from education to water control and in the bushfires that happened last year earth observation satellites were an important part of the effort to deal with brushfires, and obviously the military and its ability to used space for communication, for guided kinetic systems and for intelligence and national security.” [1] Paul Dibb, Inside the Wilderness of Mirrors (MUP Academic, 2018). [2] https://www.linkedin.com/in/amy-hestermann-crane-1403b81b5/?originalSubdomain=au Link to article: A Look Back at the Australian Space Effort (Defense.info)

Dr Robbin Laird 26 October 2021 The decision by the Morrison Administration to shift from a conventional submarine to a nuclear submarine is part of the strategic reset underway in Australia since 2018. With the Chinese threat ramping up, the Australians have been looking to refocus their defence efforts on the Indo-Pacific region and to find ways to expand the reach of their forces in the region. That re-focus started with an emphasis on building longer range strike weapons and to shape capability within Australia to build out their own capabilities to build guided weapons, including over time, longer range strike weapons. The Japanese when launching the war in the Pacific understood from the outset that Australia was the outlier continent which could influence the outcome significantly. The key was to isolate the continent and deny use of that continent to the United States. The Chinese Communist regime certainly understood this and approached the Australian problem by economic, cultural, and political means to reshape the Australian perspective and to isolate the United States from Australian defence. President Xi has dramatically failed. Now the Australians are working through how best to shape a way ahead to craft an integrated force capable of longer-range reach and providing more credible deterrent capabilities going forward. I have chronicled the ADF journey with regard to building out a joint force over the past few years through the perspective of the Williams Foundation seminars held from 2014 until the 2020 pandemic shutdown in my book Joint by Design published earlier this year. With the new strategy announced in 2020, there is a re-set underway within which the nuclear submarine decision is a key part. But a re-set is not built in a day, and as my former boss, Secretary Michael Wynne, often commented, “you have 80% of your force 20 years from now, right now.” So rebuilding is about re-shifting, it is about leveraging new capabilities that get you where you want to go; but it is not about working from a blank slate. To discuss the transition and its challenges, I recently spoke with Marcus Hellyer of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute about his take on the decision. From Marcus’s perspective, this decision “is the most important one in his lifetime.” It is about putting a stake in the ground, and rescoping the reach of the ADF and how it will operate in the Indo-Pacific region. We both agreed that the head of the Nuclear-Powered submarine task force, Vice Admiral Jonathan Mead, had his work cut out for him, but an essential point is for the government and the Navy to ensure that the effort, although crucial, would not dominate the efforts to re-orient the overall ADF effort itself. As Hellyer put it: “ It is important to let Jonathan Mead, do his work, and everybody else needs to focus on what we can be doing right now. I don’t have an issue with going with SSNs, but we can’t afford to sit back and say the SSNs are coming to save us. There are many, many things we can be doing to make the ADF a much more robust force. The SSNs effort could suck all the oxygen out of the room and taking all the decision makers’ time and energy and headspace. But the focus, while Mead gets on with his job, needs to be on how to get a much faster return on a much more modest investment if we pursue the right things now and figure out the right ways to use them.” A key problem facing the government is the challenge of shaping the defence narrative in a credible and effective manner. Certainly, when looking at the effort surrounding the future submarine program designed to deliver a new conventional submarine, that narrative was largely missing in action. That cannot be repeated if Australia is to make an effective strategic transition. According to Hellyer: “When the defence update came out last year, there was broad agreement that the observations about the strategic environment and the kinds of actions needed to shape new capabilities to deal with that environment were spot on. Notably, the need not to simply sit back and respond to Russia and China, but to shape new capabilities like long-range strike to create problems for them. “But what is missing is a clear relationship between that narrative and force design narrative. When look at the force structure that was attached to new defence narrative, it’s essentially the same force structure that we’ve been working on in an absolutely glacial fashion since the 2009 white paper. There is a major disconnect between the timelines, the threat environment, and the actual capabilities that to date we are acquiring to deal with it. “The government is acquiring new or additional capabilities for sure, but the narrative is not there with regard to how these capabilities are woven together and shaping the strategic relaunch. Tomahawks are being acquired for the fleet. A new squadron of Romeo ASW helicopters are being acquired. A co-operative program with the U.S. on hypersonic systems has been announced as well as one working with the U.S. Army on its ground launched long-range strike missiles. We are acquiring the longer-range JASSM. “There are a number of announcements of new defence efforts, but there is a need for the narrative reflecting and guiding the ADF build out.” It should also be noted that U.S. and allied forces in the Indo-Pacific are themselves in the throes of fundamental change, and one way ahead for Australia clearly is to be a key driver in that reshaping effort. And given its collaborative efforts in the region, those efforts can be key drivers in the transformation process as well. I have identified in my own work, especially with Ed Timperlake, a number of such points involving the United States, namely, the reshaping of the U.S. Navy around a distributed force operating in kill webs. The USAF working how to deliver agile combat employment. The USMC working its flexible basing approach and leveraging its Osprey and F-35 transitions going forward. Clearly, the United States military is a key element in the strategic re-shift but other allies are increasingly important as well, notably Japan. One innovation which Hellyer noted that could be driven by the acquisition of a new squadron of Romeos is the need to find other ship or land-based solutions to hosting the new aircraft, as the inventory will exceed the number of Royal Australian Navy ships which can currently operate the aircraft. He suggested that the two Australian amphibious ships – the HMAS Canberra and Adelaide – might include this among their roles. But the U.S. Navy has been experimenting with such an approach, as evidenced by the Black Widow exercise last Fall. During that exercise, the Navy used the USS Wasp as an ASW or USW platform. Hellyer underscored that this sort of experimentation was what he would like to see the ADF engaged in during the period ahead as it reworks its approach going forward. And he noted that the experimentation which the USMC is doing in the Pacific, is perhaps a good model for how to do so. Of course, there are a number of decisions to be made associated with the ability to operate nuclear submarines by the Royal Australian Navy or to operate them from an Australian support structure. Hellyer highlighted on key one, which is simply ramping up the number of submariners required to operate a nuclear submarine fleet. He cited the recent appearance by Chief of Navy before a Senate Committee where he needed at least 2,300 submariners, which would require an increase by two and half times over the current force. As Hellyer noted: “I think the issue is going to be how do we actually develop the crew for the SSNs and make them effective before the Collins class submarines essentially time out.” He underscored that the challenge already being faced by the ADF, namely, the sunsetting of the Collins class submarine, has not been solved, but actually is worse because the delivery schedule for the SSNs is later than the now-cancelled Attack-class conventional submarine project. So how will the RAN and the ADF deal with this? The answer probably lies not simply in the question of when Australian built nuclear submarines hit the water, or nuclear submarines built for Australia are operational, but with other solution sets as well. But here we are entering the domain of how Australia crafts its working relationships with the United States and UK navies going forward. And that is a final point. Hellyer found the fixation in the press with regard to whether the Australians would pursue a U.S. or UK nuclear submarine, Virginia or Astute, misplaced. If you are going down this route, obviously you are working with the dominant allied submarine force in the Indo-Pacific, the United States Navy. Global Britain may be a nice marketing point, but not one on which to build the future of Australian defence. As Hellyer put it: “The U.S. Navy is grappling every day with the same problems that we’re facing, which is how do you deal with an increasingly capable and aggressive Chinese military. And whatever the benefits or advantages of the Royal Navy, those are not the issues that the Royal Navy is grappling with every day. You want to be able to leverage what the U.S. military and the U.S. Navy in particular is doing going forward.” Royal Australian Navy (RAN) Collins Class submarines have been captured in impressive imagery, whilst exercising off the West Australian coast. Credit: Australian Department of Defence. Also, see the following: Link to article: The Australian Submarine Decision: Challenges and Next Steps (SLDinfo.com)

The Challenge of Building Effective Deterrent Forces Dr Robbin Laird 19 September 2021 In my interview with Lt. General Rudder, the Commander, U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Pacific (COMMARFORPAC), he clearly outlined the way ahead for the Marines in the Pacific and identified a number of challenges to be faced and met to shape that way ahead. During my visit to MARFORPAC in August 2021, I had a chance to discuss those challenges with a number of staff members in the command. One of those challenges is working effectively with allies and partners in shaping an effective deterrent strategy and ensuring that coherent warfighting capabilities can be leveraged in times of crisis. I had a chance to discuss the partnering challenges with the MARFORPAC team responsible for working those challenges. I met with Mr. Rich Hill, G-5 International Affairs Branch Head, Maj Zach Ota, G-5 NE Asia Desk Officer, Maj Dylan Buck, NE Asia Desk Officer, Mr. Justin Goldman, TSC Plans Specialist and Mr. Scot Hasskew, TSC plans Specialist. This is an impressive team and we had a wide ranging discussion of allied and partnering issues in the region. Because of my engagement with the Australians as a Research Fellow with the Williams Foundation, and because the Marine Corps Rotational Force-Darwin had just been set up when I was last visiting MARFORPAC in 2014, we discussed the Australian relationship at length. But we also discussed the tapestry of change in the Indo-Pacific as the Chinese reached out with both their economic and military power deep into the Indo-Pacific as well. The team articulated a key point underlying the Marine Corps approach in the Indo-Pacific. They are focused on working with allies and partners from the standpoint of crafting approaches to operations and not just taking a U.S. built template and incorporating allies into that template. As one participant put it: “We use our training exercises to experiment with what particular allies or partners wish to do, and to work through how we can build that into an effective coalition warfighting capability.” With the concern about what is referred to as “gray zone operations” by adversaries, deterrence delivered through interactive training throughout the region is a key focus of USMC activity in the region. Training is a weapon system, and no more so than in shaping the ecosystem for combat operations in the Indo-Pacific through training with partners and allies. A key point which emerged from the conversation was how training as a weapon system actually shaped joint coalition warfighting capability. The argument went like this: The Marines are training with partners and allies throughout the Indo-Pacific and through these efforts are shaping distributed survivable and agile network of training areas with partners and allies. This, in essence, creates combined joint task forces of varying sizes and varying locations that are scalable and agile. And by exercising through the various training events, one is creating a deterrent effect. By working throughout the entire geographical areas of the Indo-Pacific, the Marines are able to operate from multiple vectors, which is a core strategic focus of the Marines in the Indo-Pacific today. A key element of innovation in the Indo-Pacific is working through a way ahead for coalition amphibious operations, from ships to the shore, from the shore to the sea and shaping distributed and flexible combat clusters throughout the region. We discussed how ARG-MEUs coming from CENTCOM through the Indo-Pacific both on the way and on the return have been part of the training regimes. But clearly, a renewed emphasis on building amphibious task force capabilities in the Indo-Pacific is required going forward, but not simply in terms of the U.S. Navy and the USMC but broadening the efforts to shape coalition wide amphibious task force capabilities. We spent much of the time discussing the Australian relationship with the USMC. In my view, there is a significant evolution of Australian strategy underway and how that evolution crosscuts with how the Marines work their own relationship in the Pacific can provide a powerful stimulus for shaping effective deterrent forces in the region. (I wrote this prior to the announcement of the Royal Australian Navy’s nuclear submarine force which clearly underscores this point!) In part it is about the evolution of MRF-D in the future. How do the Aussies and MRF-D expand how they work together and with what focus? If the Australians focus significant attention on shaping distributed but integrated forces from Western Australia to their first island chain (the Solomon Islands), that area of operation which encompasses significant interaction with the partners in the region, provides a very innovative and significant area in which the Marines can themselves work their cross-cutting innovations. For example, bringing the newly formed Marine Littoral Regiment into an area of operations from Western Australia to the Solomon Islands and building out relationships with the Australian Army as that force rethinks its role in the region would drive significant cross-cutting operational changes important for both the Marines more widely in the Pacific and the Australians in reshaping their own defense capabilities. I introduced another idea which we discussed but I am not holding the team responsible for my own conclusions. There clearly needs to be an area to hold regular coalition amphibious task force training. This is no longer limited to operating as a greyhound bus delivery of capability ashore, the amphibious task forces of today are radically different and more capable in working the full spectrum of operations. It might make sense for the Aussies to sponsor an annual amphibious task force training exercise. It would be bilateral at its core but of course, India, Japan, South Korea, and others who have capability to be tested in the 21st century concepts of operations for an amphioxus task force could engage in this ongoing combat learning and innovation effort. The Marines face a challenge with regard to allies and partners and training which should be recognized as well. The Marines have built an integrated force capability which can deliver Marine Corps combat capability where needed. If the Marines go down a path of redesigning their force only to fit uniquely into a U.S. Naval joint force integration package via a hyper-specialization focus, they become less useful to the kind of force integration which allies, and partners are engaging in to deal with the current and evolving Indo-Pacific defense threats. But it is clear: the USMC in the Indo-Pacific will be most effective when it can integrate effectively with partners and allies throughout the entire gamut of operations from gray zone to higher levels of conflict. Featured Photo: Soldiers of 5th Battalion, The Royal Australian Regiment embark a US Marine Corps MV-22B Osprey for an Air Mobile Operations during Exercise Koolendong 2021. Credit:Australian Department of Defence. August 20, 2021. Link to article: Allies, Partners and Marines in the Indo-Pacific: The Challenge of Building Effective Deterrent Forces (SLDinfo.com)

Pierre Tran 17 September 2021 Paris – France heaped bitter resentment on Canberra’s axing an industrial partnership to build 12 attack submarines for the Australian navy, while opting to order American-designed boats as part of a strategic alliance with the U.S. and the UK. The French foreign and defense ministers filled on Sept. 16 the airwaves with anger in response to a joint announcement the night before by Australia, the UK and the US of their alliance, dubbed AUKUS. Under that trilateral agreement, the U.S. will release highly sensitive technology to allow Australia to build nuclear-powered submarines of American design, with support from the UK. The U.S. has only ever granted Britain privileged access to that know-how. “I am angry — this is not done between allies,” foreign minister Jean-Yves Le Drian said on franceinfo radio. “This is a stab in the back. This unilateral, brutal, unpredictable decision looks a lot like what Mr Trump used to do.” France had built a relationship of trust with Australia, he said. “This confidence has been betrayed,” he said, adding that he felt “a lot of bitterness.” Le Drian was defense minister when the French shipbuilder Naval Group won in 2016 a three-way competition with Germany and Japan to build a diesel-electric version of the French nuclear-powered Barracuda submarine for the Australian navy. That 50-year deal was estimated to be then worth €30 billion ($35 billion) and was hailed as “deal of the century” for France and Naval Group. The Australian switch away from building the French-designed Barracuda Shortfin boat was “serious,” and “very bad news for respecting one’s word,” armed forces minister Florence Parly said on RTL radio. The government would look at limiting any financial hit on Naval Group, she said, and did not rule out a claim for compensation against Australia. That Australian realignment caught Naval Group by surprise as the company had been expecting to sign a contract for the basic design stage in the next few days, under an imposed deadline for a signing in September. That two-year contract was reported to be worth €1.4 billion and opened the way for a detailed design deal. Naval Group had completed the preliminary design. The Australian media had long criticized the company for being behind schedule and pushing the cost higher. Naval Group had pledged to meet an Australian condition of 60 percent of local content in the future submarine program and agree to transfer technology. French operations in the Indo-Pacific France has invested heavily in forging close operational and industrial ties with Australia, seen as a key ally in the Indo-Pacific region. The French air force flew in January-February under the Skyros exercise four Rafale fighter jets, two A400M transport turboprops and an A330 multirole tanker transport jet to Australia. That Skyros exercise was a step toward the target of flying in two years time 20 Rafales and 10 A330 MRTTs over 20,000 km to the other side of the world in 48 hours. As part of that power projection into the Indo-Pacific, the French navy sailed the Emeraude nuclear-powered attack submarine, supported by the Seine fleet auxiliary ship, from France in September 2020 to dock at Perth, Western Australia, on November 9. The French boat took part in the Foxfish exercise with the Australian navy. The Emeraude sailed on to the Guam US naval base and sailed in an Aswex anti-submarine warfare exercise with a US frigate and helicopter, and a Japanese helicopter carrier, the July edition of French navy Col Bleu service magazine said. While France appears to remain committed to building its presence in the Indo-Pacific, ties with Australia and the U.S. look like they are hitting a low. “This decision is contrary to the letter and spirit of the cooperation which existed between France and Australia, founded on a relationship of political confidence as well as development of a high level defense industrial and technology base in Australia,” Le Drian and Parly said in a Sept. 16 joint statement “The American choice, which leads to Australia setting aside an ally and European partner such as France from a structural partnership, at a time when we are facing unprecedented challenges in the Indo-Pacific region…marks a lack of coherence that France can only take note and regret,” the ministerial statement said. Naval Group takes hit “This is a major disappointment for Naval Group,” the company said in a statement, adding that over the last five years the company and its partners had “given their best” and “delivered on all its commitments” in France and Australia. Naval Group will sit down with the Australian authorities to consider the effect the policy switch will have. “The analysis of the consequences of this sovereign Australian decision will be conducted with the Commonwealth of Australia in the coming days,” the company said. Thales, which is a supplier of subsystems to Lockheed Martin and holds 35 percent of Naval Group, said there was no “material impact” on its earnings. The orders from Lockheed Martin were less than €30 million, or less than 0.1 percent of the order book of €34.6 billion, the electronics company said. The stake in Naval Group contributed €22 million in 2020 earnings, or two percent of total earnings. But in 2016, Thales had expected its share of the Australian submarine program to bring in some €1 billion, with an estimated €100 million per boat based on prospective sales of sonar and electronic warfare systems. The Australian decision will have little effect in the short term for Naval Group, as the order book was fairly full with work on the Barracuda nuclear attack submarine and frigate for defense and intervention (FDI), and there were studies for the French next generation aircraft carrier and nuclear ballistic missile submarine, said Jean-Pierre Maulny, deputy director of Institut des Relations Internationales et Stratégiques, a think tank. But the company needs to boost exports, which will cut dependence on domestic orders and boost its order book for the medium term, he said. Greece is looking to order frigates, while the Netherlands is holding a competition for submarines. On Greece, France has pitched four FDI frigates, with the first to be built in France and three in Greece, modernization of the present Greek Meko frigates, and local shipbuilding. There has been an offer of a “gap filler,” with supply of two second hand French frigates, but that appears to be off the cards as the French navy needs all its warships, a defense official has said. “The U.S. is an ally and also a competitor,” Maulny said. The U.S. and UK pursue strategic interests, though it would have been courteous for the U.S. to give early notice to France. London Seeks to Calm Waters Across the Channel, the UK has sought to play down tension with France. “As the prime minister set out in the house, we have and continue to have a very close relationship with France,” a spokesman for the prime minister, Boris Johnson, told the Downing Street lobby, the Guardian daily reported. “We have longstanding security and defense relationships, as exemplified by the Lancaster House treaties and as exemplified by our combined joint expeditionary force.” The 2010 Lancaster House treaty maintains existing cooperative industrial programs but has failed to generate new arms projects for British and French industry, former British ambassador Peter Ricketts has pointed out. A senior French navy officer has previously said the 1998 St Malo bilateral agreement between France and the UK created a structure for close operational ties between the two navies. It remains to be seen whether that closeness will be backed by French political will. For the UK, building the Astute class of nuclear-powered attack submarines for the Royal Navy was only made possible with U.S .help in technology transfer and engineering skills, media reports have said. The UK’s membership of the AUKUS trilateral alliance means “Global Britain with the Americans,” Maulny said. Britain needs to negotiate a trade treaty with the U.S., having left the European Union and cast off the EU trade agreement with Washington which covers the 27 EU member states. The U.S. working an Australian submarine deal from France follows a widely held perception that president Joe Biden influenced Switzerland’s pick of the F-35 in a closely fought fighter competition. Meanwhile, British sources told the Guardian daily the Australians opened talks about the nuclear power deal in March. Australian prime minister Scott Morrison came to Paris in June, and his talks with Macron included French and Australian engagement in the Indo-Pacific and work on the future submarine program. The sinking of that Australian Barracuda submarine program has prompted France to raise the banner for European strategic autonomy. “The regrettable decision which has just been announced on the FSP program can only strengthen the need to raise loud and clear the question of European strategic autonomy,” the French ministers said. “There is no other credible way to protect our interest and our values in the world, including the Indo-Pacific.” Macron takes up in January the rotating six month presidency of the European Union. It remains to be seen what the German elections will deliver and whether Macron can rely on political support from Berlin in his drive for a stronger European arms industrial base and operational capability. Featured Photo: France’s Defense minister Jean-Yves Le Drien and Australia’s then-PM Malcolm Turnbull (center right and center left) inspecting the submarine model in 2016. Link to article: Australia Changes its Submarine Acquisition Path: French Reactions (SLDinfo.com)

Dr Robbin Laird 17 August 2021 This is the third article in our series on training and the strategic shift in warfighting and deterrence. In the first article, I focused on how to define the challenge of training for the high-end fight. In the second article, the focus was upon the skill sets which training needs to shape and reinforce for the high-end fight. This article focuses on the evolution of airpower training over the past thirty years, and what changes are required in the legacy approaches to be able to train effectively for the high-end fight. In the last article, I discussed the skill set challenge with Paul Averna of Cubic Mission and Performance Solutions. I continued the discussion with Averna, a veteran Navy pilot and training expert, about the nature of the legacy systems and associated training approaches and the challenges the potential of a Peer fight creates to providing the skill sets now needed. Training still proceeds from the core importance of learning to operate your aircraft and to master the core skills required to operate your platform in demanding combat situations. What is being added is that as the multi-mission capabilities of aircraft expand into multi-domain warfare, the aperture of training needs to expand. And that aperture is wider than what a single or even cross-linked physical training ranges can provide. Additionally, with the adversary’s capabilities to engage the blue side air combat force significantly beyond visual range, accurately replicating those threats is becoming increasingly difficult on training ranges as well. As the blue side works its own capabilities to fight via kill webs, a wide range of the capabilities being shaped, trained, and forged need to be done so in ways that the red side will not get significant information and knowledge about how the blue side wishes to evolve its cross-domain warfighting capabilities. As a Weapons School instructor during his time flying the F-14 in the Navy at NAS Fallon, and later at MCAS Yuma as a MAWTS-1 instructor, Averna noted that Top Gun was set up initially to close a performance gap uncovered in the Vietnam War. “When we got to the Vietnam War, we saw a very uneven level of competency from one squadron to another, and we saw some individual aircrew that were extremely successful at the complex environment the Vietnam air battle presented, including the introduction of technology like radar guided missiles and integrated Surface to Air Missile systems. “With the reliance on Beyond Visual Range (BVR) weapons and tactics, highly perishable Basic Fighter Maneuvering (BFM) skills atrophied and aircrew were making too many mistakes in maneuvering against more nimble opponents. And as a result, the kill ratio went down dramatically. This led to the formation of Top Gun, to deal with the challenge of the inconsistent proficiency in the fleet aircrews. “The focus was upon training the trainer. Select individuals who are very competent in their aircraft, but also have the ability to teach, to help their fellow squadron mates learn how to perform in a building block manner to the point where they can go out and be an effective instrument of national policy when it came to the counter air fight. “And to complement the new focused Air-to-Air training curriculum, new tools were fielded like the Cubic air combat maneuver instrumentation system, or ACMI system. “And why was that important? You needed to understand where everybody was in time and space to be able to reconstruct what happened. We each have a different mental image of what we did in a particular environment because we’re looking through the heads-up display through the canopy bow out over the nose of the airplane. “And to the extent that I can turn my head around that perception is good probably up to about 10 miles with a limited number of participants. “But if I have to keep track of multiple players that are well beyond visual range doing interesting things that I can’t directly see, I have a much more difficult time reconstructing what happened. And it’s in that, the accuracy of what happened that helps us develop the correct learning points out of that flying event. “And that’s the way that we have trained pilots predominantly from the 70s into the 80s and into the 90s, and that is based on understanding the building blocks that it takes to be able to deliver the right effect for particular missions. “For example, in an air-to-air syllabus, one would start out with basic fighter maneuvering, learning how to maneuver and max perform my airplane. “Then one would look at how to max perform my airplane versus an opponent’s airplane. “Then one would start working in sections and learning how to employ as a section, and then as a division against a limited number and then a larger number to an unknown number of potential adversaries. “We were focusing on the skill sets to work the mission against a relatively unsophisticated threat or a near peer threat, but certainly not one that was capable of meeting us in terms of quality and density of a fight.” What Averna described as the training focus was occurring on a physical range, with adversary aircraft or aggressors flying physically against the blue side. With the impact of both what the blue and red side can operate now, physical ranges are a necessary but not sufficient capability, and the red side is not well represented by flying aircraft like F-5s. Averna put his assessment this way: “We face a physical range constraint problem, but there’s also the challenge of using weapons that we want to use. We don’t really want people to know what we’re doing with our weapons nor seeing what our tactics are so that we maintain an element of surprise if we need to operate in combat. “And we have another limitation to our ability today to train well. Even if I was able to find a current contemporary threat system that I might face in a peer fight, I’m not finding it at the local hardware store or the local department store. I’m going to have to acquire it through some means, I might have to decompose it and make sure that I understand all the operating modes on it so that I can present its affects correctly to the aircrew or the team. And that we are interacting the right way in order to defeat it. “We don’t have that luxury of acquiring those things, they’re extremely expensive, very rare when we do get our hands on something like that. So very few people are actually able to work with it.” Expand beyond visual physical ranges are difficult and expensive. Managing training space, ensuring the right kind of training, and getting adequate training time poses the question of resource allocation. How does the DoD and its Collation partners drive down cost and expand capabilities to train effectively? One way to do so is the arrival of synthetic training systems, which can target training time to the skill set levels of individual pilots. The arrival of adaptive training systems allows for calibration of the training time needed for individual pilots. Averna explained this capability as follows: “Let’s say that Pilot A is extremely good at low-level flying, and he doesn’t need to spend all that much time in doing a lot to train for this skill. Pilot B on the other hand has problems with speed rush baseline and needs more time for the low altitude training environment. “Yet the way that we designed the syllabus is that both get the same amount of flying before they get the proficiency check. Where we are going is a recognition that people learn at different rates and people retain skills at different rates. “By moving to an adaptive training environment, we can target the skill sets which those two different pilots have and can tailor training times to generate the required proficiencies.” In other words, it is about making training more targeted and more effective. We then discussed the multi-mission challenge for training. Earlier, aircraft were more narrowly focused on mission sets than the new aircraft. Those legacy aircraft would be used for single or a smaller set of missions than later aircraft which are multi-mission focused. The Super Hornet entered the force as a multi-mission aircraft, but the challenge has been to train pilots to be able to switch missions using legacy capabilities. With the F-35’s new sensor packages, data fusion and 360-degree situational awareness expands the pilot’s capability to operate in a multi-domain environment. But how to adjust training to be able to maximize this skill set? These new capabilities impact many facets of the mission, from the way we mission plan, brief, execute, and debrief. Just take a moment to consider a concept such as mutual support between a flight lead and their wingman. This is how Averna highlighted this change: “We’ve actually started to think differently about concepts like mutual support. If you ask somebody in the early 1990s what’s the definition of mutual support, they’d probably say something along the lines of a mile to a mile and a half and 2000 feet of step up or step down. And that was visual mutual support. You’re not in the same plane but you’re close enough that you could check your lead or your wingman’s tail to make sure there was nobody coming up behind them. That was an integral part of your visual scan of the airspace around you. “Now with F-35 or F-22, mutual support is several miles plus, and the pilots will not see each other’s planes visually. If we can appropriately identify the objects and the space in front of us, and we have the ROE to engage, we’re going to take those shots well beyond visual range. “And that’s where the main training problem exists. We don’t expect to ever get into the kind of dogfights we saw in Vietnam. It’s now much more about targeting, shorting, getting the off-board queuing, processing that and figuring out how to stay low observable, and yet maintain that dynamic sanctuary we talked about the last time. It is about training to different mindset and problem set.” We closed by discussing the coming of Live Virtual Construction (LVC) systems to the training effort. As Averna put it: “When you’re dealing with a peer threat and you’re dealing with national system capabilities, how many operators are actually aware of those capabilities and how to aggregate those in a rapid manner to fight at the speed of a network? “The national means such as space-based assets provide information held at high levels of security and, is this information going to be available or not? Are they going to be applied sequentially or not? How I’m going to be able to create the dynamic sanctuary, deliver an effect, assess, and as the sanctuary window closes, because the threats reacting that I can reposition securely and confidently? How do I train to do this? “Exposure to this level of training is not going to occur on the range but will be put together in a synthetic environment or provided through LVC systems. The LVC environment is the only place that you’re going to be able to train in that environment approximating the physiological and psychological effects in the real world. Because you will not be able to replicate that all live until actual combat starts on night one.” This situation was projected in a 2015 interview we did with the head of N-9 at the time, Rear Admiral Manazir . The ability to share information between decision-makers and staffs that are not all geographically located, is getting better and better. This allows not only dynamic combat learning but provides greater fidelity to the training process as air wings prepare to deploy. In the past, we only sent text reports. Now we are sending full motion video. The EA-18G Growler can send actual data back to the warfighting center and say: “We have not seen this signal before, what is it?” And then the labs can run it through their data libraries and work the problem to ID the signal and send their findings back to the deployed fleet. The F-35s coming to the fleet will add significantly to this process. It is about rapid combat learning in a dynamic warfighting environment. We are shaping the foundation for “learning airplanes” to engage the enemy. LVC will enable us to train in a more robust environment than we are on our current ranges that are geographically constrained, and currently do not have the full high-end threat replicated. LVC will allow us to train to the full capabilities of our platforms across a variety of security environments and do so without exposing our training process to an interested adversary. Featured Photo: Navy Topgun pilots walk from their aircraft after landing Wednesday, May 29, 1996 at Naval Air Station in Fallon, Nev. The Naval aviation top fighter school completed the move from Southern California with the arrival of these pilots and their flying machines. (AP Photo/Reno Gazette Journal, David B. Parker) ( David B. Parker / Reno Gazette Journal ) Link to article: The Shift in Training: Defining the Challenge (Defense.info)

Dr Peter Layton 25 July 2021 The Chief of Air Force’s strategic intent update makes airbases a priority for future investment. Airbases certainly seem ripe for change. Conceptually, they have barely changed since World War Two when grass runways gave way to concrete ones. In this the Chief has laid out three criteria for the RAAF’s airbases: be fit for purpose, robust and resilient. In terms of purpose, RAAF airbases need to generate airpower from peace into major conflict. For this, they need to be in the right place; geography is important. In that regard, the RAAF’s southern Australian bases are very distant from potential flash points. The Air Force will need to deploy forward to bring air power to bear. In terms of robustness, airbases are large static facilities, easily targeted using kinetic and cyber weapons. In time of war, the most concerning kinetic weapons are precision guided weapons and in particular cruise missiles and ballistic missiles. Their proliferation means hardening an airbase is of little use anymore. Instead dispersion, that is hiding, is the better option. In this, the Iranian ballistic missile attacks on al Asad Air Base are instructive. The Iranian’s apparently used commercial space imagery for targeting and were able to achieve surprisingly accurate attacks. Forewarned, the US moved personnel and equipment from the area. CENTCOM General Frank McKenzie said later that the strike could have killed up to 150 Americans and destroyed 20-30 aircraft if these measures had not been taken. Iran was not a peer competitor; such attacks in a major war would be much larger, more numerous and widespread. Kinetic strikes are a wartime problem but cyber is a clear and present danger. In times of conflict the rate of cyber-attacks will step up but it is already an ongoing threat against any and all RAAF airbases. There is also a new appreciation emerging of natural disasters. Fires and floods are getting bigger, while there are more Cat 4 and 5 cyclones. Moreover, natural disasters can cascade and once triggered set off further events with impacts that can be both non-linear and distant to the triggering event. Southern Australia’s 2020 bushfires almost led to a major wide-area protracted power outage, just as the cold weather did later in Texas. Such an outage could disrupt airbases and communication networks including base personnel and their families. In terms of resilience, airbases need to be able to absorb a shock and continue to operate. In this, the shock needs to be kept to a manageable scale. If it’s very large, resilience measures can be overwhelmed and any recovery during a limited duration conflict is then unlikely. Moreover, it’s necessary to define what an airbase is to be made resilient to, when it needs to be resilient and for how long. In this, an airbase is a large facility; are some parts less important than others? Lastly, the notion of what returning to operations can range from: surviving a shock in some reduced form; continuing operation in the presence of a shock; recovering from a shock to the original form; or absorbing a shock and evolving in response. Which of those four options is desired? Let’s pull these disparate threads together into a simple quad chart. The x-axis line runs from the large southern bases across to deployment air bases, likely offshore. On the y-axis the line goes from today’s cold peace to a hope-not hot war. The chart then covers where, and in what context, airbases will need to be fit for purpose, robust, and resilient. It’s a chart to make us think about what the design of future airbases needs to be, and implicitly where to invest. Lookin’ Out My Back Door The Lookin’ Out My Back Door quadrant is the best of all worlds. The airbase is well practised in carrying out standard flying operations on a regular and ongoing basis. There is ready access to a large workforce and the ability to generate more quickly through using contractors. The airbase is well integrated into national and global supply chains. There are threats however, with cyberattacks prominent. The rise of compound and cascading disasters suggest that the airbase may need to be able to function for a short period independently of the local energy and communication networks. There is also a potential issue from nuisance commercial drones. On such airbases, the primary aim is to improve efficiency. Down on the Corner The Down on the Corner quadrant involves deploying to a northern or offshore base for an exercise that may feature a heavy international engagement strand. There will be considerable reliance on the local infrastructure and support network. RAAF staff will be a scarce asset with few available on the airbase, particularly for protracted operations. Supply will often be using commercial means with specialised maintenance items and stocks brought from Australia, at times on dedicated RAAF air transport. Cybersecurity remains a threat with the possibility of drone interference higher than in Australia. Compound and cascading disasters could still be an issue. The nature of deployed operations though is that when trouble threatens, there is always the pack up and leave option. In such an airbase, the primary aim is effectiveness; each deployed person needs to be as productive as possible. Bad Moon Rising The Bad Moon Rising quadrant involves southern bases in times of war. The main changes from the cold peace would be the higher rates of effort demanded and possibly for an extended period; the sizeable numbers of airbase personnel sent forward to run deployment airbases; the sharp rise in numbers and sophistication of cyber-attacks; and some argue the possibility of kinetic attacks from the occasional submarine launched cruise missile. Such a context means that the airbase might need operating by reservists with limited training or more likely, by newly recruited staff with enthusiasm but not much else. The advances in training that digital technology brings may be really important to bring these new people up to speed. This might be for both maintaining the airbase facilities and in sustaining the airbase’s flying operations. In terms of threats, the airbase will come under significant space-based surveillance using a variety of sensors. Moreover, it must be expected that software malware placed in systems years before will be activated to cause general disruption. This disruption might be on the airbase, but also in local and national energy and communication systems. Independent airbase operation may be necessary. Who’ll Stop the Rain The Who’ll Stop the Rain quadrant is the worst case, particularly in terms of kinetic attack. Activities will need to be dispersed so as to ensure a single attack does not inflict catastrophic damage. Regular movement may also be needed to ensure survival as attacks continue. Accordingly, a primary aim is to keep in front of the adversaries targeting system, so the location of critical items like aircraft, supplies, maintenance support and personnel is always uncertain. Precision attacks then become problematic. To back up dispersion and movement, the airbase will include active measures to fool and deceive an adversary. In this, deployed operations by their nature are always short of people while in a combat situation exposing fewer people to danger is always desirable. There are hard issues of resilience under fire. Let’s sum up. The airbases in the bottom half of the diagram aim to deliver air power as efficiently as possible. Decisions can be driven by cost-benefit analysis. In contrast, airbases in the top half of the diagram need to focus on achieving effectiveness gains. Decisions are driven by how to best increase the airbases’ outputs, hang the costs. Across all quadrants looms the spectre of cyber-attack. Crippling an airbase might cut air operations but even having someone watching online what you’re doing is bad too. Having software experts at hand looks essential, not just a nice to have, especially in the diagram’s top half combat operations. Airbases are central to air power. They need to be as the Chief sets out: fit for purpose, robust, and resilient. If not, others may steal a march. The RAAF might have the better aircraft, but with mediocre air bases might deliver less effective air power than an adversary can. That’s not a war winning place to be in. Dr Peter Layton is a Visiting Fellow at the Griffith Asia Institute, Griffith University and an Associate Fellow at the Royal United Services Institute (UK). He is the author of the book Grand Strategy. His other posts, articles and papers may be found at: https://peterlayton.academia.edu/research . This article was published by The Central Blue on June 19, 2021 . Link to article: T omorrow’s Air Force Airbases (Defense.info)