Dr Robbin Laird 1 October 2022 The most recent Williams Foundation Seminar was held in Canberra, Australia on September 28, 2022. The seminar was entitled, “Enhancing the Lethality and Survivability of the Integrated Force.” The seminar in effect provided a scene setting for discussing the next evolution of the ADF generated by the evolving strategic environment and the much wider demand side of dealing with security and defense that really requires a whole of nation approach. Since 2018, the Williams Foundation seminars have turned towards the major transition facing Australia and its partners and allies namely, the global confrontation between the 21st century authoritarian states and the liberal democracies. Rather than simply maintaining a “rules-based order,” the ADF and its allies and partners are now contesting the clear efforts of the major authoritarian powers to displace this order and replace it for a world safe for the authoritarians. And we have seen the Russians move from “hybrid warfare” to open industrial age warfare with some new aspects of the conduct of war introduced into the war as well. We have entered a new historical epoch, and determining how to deter, defect, contest and defeat major powers becomes part of the new context facing the ADF and the Australian nation. There are obviously no quick fixes for such challenges, but a major re-orientation for the ADF and Australia is required. As has been noted by a sage former senior U.S. defence official: “We have 80% of our force now which we will have in 20 years.” This means that reworking and reorienting the force you have but introducing new elements to make your force more lethal and survivable is a major part of the challenge from a force building perspective. The seminar speakers highlighted various aspects of what needs to be done to provide for rethinking the way ahead for the force but in the context of what is realistic to do as well as what needs to change to get the job of deterrence done effectively. At the heart of the shift is focusing on the direct defense of Australia, and working Australian geography to advantage. This means that the joint force needs to focus on how to work together to defend the continent and project relevant power into the region. The Australian Service Chiefs attending the Williams Foundation Seminar. This means as well that the new power projection instruments – those represented by cyber and space – neither of which is geographically limited are now part of the deterrence and warfighting efforts. If we can consider there is a return to a core focus on the direct defense of Australia and shaping an understanding of the strategic space defining Australia’s defense perimeter, how might the current ADF force be restructured in a template which allows for the kind of innovation going forward that will enhance ADF direct defense capabilities? How might new capabilities be added over the near to mid to longer term that enhance this defense restructuring to extend Australia’s direct defense capabilities? In other words, if one focuses on the priority of the direct defense to Australia, what kinds of force restructuring might be necessary for the current ADF? And then ask what new capabilities are coming into the force or could be integrated into the force in the near to midterm, what would that ADF look like as an integrated combat grid over the extended area of operations? If one re-shifts the focus of your force, one has to ask what is most relevant and what is not in such a strategic shift; and then determine what one needs to form the relevant concepts of operations for that force, It is crucial as well to find cost effective ways to enhance that forces capabilities and train appropriately to shape the most lethal and survivable force possible within the various constraints facing the nation. But that raises another key point. If indeed the priority of the defense of Australia is from the continent to the first island chain, then the resources necessary to do so are much greater than the ADF will possess. What kinds of infrastructure can be built in the relevant areas of sustained operations? How to enhance force mobility throughout the region? How to shape mobile basing options and capabilities? These challenges obviously require key innovative efforts for reshaping the joint force and requires government to consider investments and approaches beyond that which would be considered narrowly considered for a defence budget. The September 28, 2022 seminar provided a significant look at the reframing challenges and to how to think about the way ahead. This is how the Foundation invitation highlighted the seminar: Aim The aim of the September 2022 seminar is to examine specific measures which enhance both the lethality and survivability of an integrated Australian Defence Force. It will examine gaps and opportunities in the 5th generation force and identify priorities which accelerate preparedness for complex, sustained, high intensity operations. Background Since 2013 the Sir Richard Williams Foundation seminars have focused on building an integrated 5th generation force. Recent seminars have evolved from the acquisition of new platforms to the process of shaping and better understanding the environment in which the integrated force will prepare and operate. Moreover, they have highlighted the challenges of acting independently at an accelerated tempo and in sustained, high intensity, complex operations across all domains. Almost a decade later, the 2022 seminars reflect on the journey towards a 5th generation force and identify gaps, opportunities, and priorities for the development of next generation capability in the face of new threats and new risks, paving the way for the 2023 seminars. Despite the operational challenges, the framework and apparatus of the 5th generation force is substantially in place. And while there is still plenty of work to be done, the shift from a focus on platforms to a broader appreciation of an integrated 5th generation system of systems represents an important milestone. As identified in the March 2022 seminar, there is a shared understanding of the scale of the challenges ahead for both defence and industry, and across coalition partners, too. However, the strategic circumstances continue to deteriorate at an alarming rate, driving the need for prioritisation in both what and how we acquire new capabilities. On top of that, there is the challenge of progressing integration with the force-in-being as well as the future force. The need to balance the requirement to ‘fight tonight’ with the ability to meet future threats is vitally important, noting that the force we will have in 20 years’ time will contain 80% of what we have today based upon a series of major systems with an upgradeable software core. Towards a Lethal, Survivable, and Affordable Force The September seminar will develop the ideas identified in March and expand on the theme of an increasingly sophisticated and time-sensitive ‘lethality-survivability-affordability’ trade-off necessary to build a balanced and relevant force. A trade-off which is set within the context of a need for increased deterrence, decision-making advantage, and a commercial reality that we no longer have the time to establish the competitive tension the acquisition system has traditionally demanded to demonstrate best value for money. The seminar will focus on the gaps and opportunities as they relate to the broader requirements of the Australian Defence Force, notably in terms of enablers and integration priorities. Above all, it will focus on preparedness and the need to focus on outcomes which improve training throughput and performance at the force level, backed up by enhanced fuel, infrastructure, weapons, basing, and supply chain resilience. A core consideration will be the need for an increasingly integrated relationship between Defence and system providers to develop the industrial depth and responsiveness necessary for future operations. A relationship which works towards a better understanding of our industrial production capability needs, while recognising that competition in some areas has the unintended consequence of reducing overall sovereign production capability and capacity. Another area of interest is the need for greater exploitation of technology to enhance human performance and decision making at the force level to complement training systems associated with individual platforms and weapon systems. Improving training system effectiveness and efficiency, described in terms of ‘Mission Rehearsal’ at the March seminar, not only increases throughput but also ensures the enterprise is ready to operate across the spectrum of conflict while being disrupted, deceived, and degraded. To introduce different perspectives from elite, high performance sport, the Seminar also includes former Australian test umpire Mr Simon Taufel. For five years he was formally recognised as the world’s best cricket umpire based upon his consistent ability to make accurate decisions under pressure and his ability to integrate technology into real time decision-making. In the final session, Service chiefs will provide insight into their thoughts about the future operating environment and key observations and lessons from the transition to a networked integrated force. In later articles, I will highlight the presentations, as well as insights from interviews conducted in September 2022 with service chiefs, industrialists and analysts to expand the discussion of the challenges and opportunities to meet the challenges discussed at the seminar. Link to article: Evolving the ADF: Force Design for the Joint Force in the Direct Defense of Australia By Robbin Laird in Def https://sldinfo.com/2022/10/the-scene-setting-for-the-next-phase-of-adf-development-the-williams-foundation-seminar-september-2022/ ense.info 10/10/2022

Dr Robbin Laird 30 September 2022 On September 28, 2022, the Williams Foundation hosted its latest seminar. The title of the seminar was “enhancing the lethality and survivability of the integrated force.” At the seminar, the three service chiefs as well as the head of defence design provided key contributions to framing answers to these questions. They were joined by a distinguished group of presenters from the analytical world, defence industry and government. And next month, I will publish a report on the seminar itself. The ADF faces a double challenge. First, there is the transition away from land wars to preparing forces for higher intensity operations against global authoritarian powers. I have written several books which address how challenging this shift is for a whole generation of warriors and policy makers who have only known the land wars as a core focus for their defense forces and efforts. But Australia faces a second challenge affecting the future of the ADF as well: where is the ADF going to operate primarily in the direct defense of Australia? What exactly is the defense perimeter for Australia? How best to operate within that defense perimeter? And how to sustain the force for the time needed to prevail in conflict or crisis management? After the seminar, I had a chance to talk with the Chairman of the Williams Foundation, Air Marshal (Retired) Geoff Brown, to get his perspectives on the seminar and the way ahead for the ADF to deal with these challenges. He also provided a preview of the next seminar to be held in the first quarter of 2023. Having written the reports on the seminars since 2014, it was clear to me that the ADF was changing focus from 2018 on with regard to how to deal with the high-end fight. Seminars dealing with long range strike and on shaping a fifth-generation manoeuvre force especially underscored the nature of the shift. According to Brown, “it is becoming apparent that the timeframe for getting it right has shortened up significantly. This means that the normal pace of acquisition to shape the way ahead for the ADF is too slow. Accelerating acquisition for major platforms is very difficult, so we need to look at other elements of the force to do so. “We need to focus on the low hanging fruit to increase more rapidly our defence capabilities. At the seminar, several aspects of such an approach were highlighted, such as rapidly closing the gaps in the communications infrastructure. We need to do the tasks which we can more rapidly bulk up the force. Increasing crewing ratios by looking for ways to shorten the training process. You bulk up the force by leveraging commercial solutions that are available now. “Accelerating the procurement of unmanned systems that can be developed quickly is one way we can get a much better deterrent posture than we have now.” I noted that the entire shift to building out a kill web force provided a solid foundation for doing so as the focus in building out the kill web is focusing payloads to missions, not platforms to missions. And in the robotic areas AI areas there are a number of low hanging fruit, there a number of missions to payload capabilities which can bulk up the force. Brown noted; “We are seeing in the Ukraine conflict a number of examples of the Ukrainians using Western weapons and various gap fillers to do in a month what Western forces would need three to four years to do if we stay in the business-as-usual approach. “We can no longer afford two and a half years of staring at our navels while we decide which path we’re going to go on; we’ve actually got to make procurement to operations decisions in a much timelier manner.” He then highlighted the example which came from a presentation of how umpires made decisions at cricket matches. The core point of that presentation was simply that the initial umpire decisions have a high probability of getting it right; an extended review process added greater accuracy but delays as well. As the presenter put it: “The gut feelings if the umpires were almost always right.” Brown underscored that we need more rapid procurement to operations decision making and lengthy reviews on procurement choices really impeded combat innovation rather than enabling it. And given the compressed time line of dealing with the threats facing Australia meant that time was of the essence in accelerating the ADF’s combat capability. What comes next in terms of the Williams seminar series? Brown: “That is a good question and we are in preliminary stages of sorting that out. I think we will revisit, maybe reinforce, what our priorities need to be going forward. In this seminar, we’ve looked at the challenge of enhancing the lethality and survivability of the force. “I’d like to focus the next one on how to speed up our processes to get enhanced capabilities for that twin challenge in the next three to five years.” Link to article Dr Robbin Laird, Shaping a Way Ahead for the ADF: Air Marshal (Retired) Geoff Brown Provides His Perspective (DefenseInfo) 30 September 2022

Accelerating the Transition to a Networked, Integrated Force National Gallery of Australia 24 March 2022 Final Report Dr Robbin Laird Link to the final report on Defense.Info Download Final Report Synopsis and Program Download PDF Presentations Welcoming Remarks and Formal Close AIRMSHL Geoff Brown AO (Retd) Sir Richard Williams Foundation Introduction and MC John Conway Sir Richard Williams Foundation Keynote Address General Kenneth S. Wilsbach Commander, Pacific Air Forces Accelerating the Transition Air Vice-Marshal Robert Chipman AM, CSC Head Military Strategic Commitments Indo Pacific Context Lieutenant General Steven R. Rudder Commander, U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Pacific and Commanding General Fleet Marine Force 5th Gen Information Environment Major General Susan Coyle AM, CSC, DSM Head of Information Warfare Multi Domain operations Threats and Opportunities Air Vice-Marshal Chris Deeble AO, CSC (Retd) Executive Director, Strategy, Northrop Grumman Australia Not Just Platforms’ – Architectural & Policy Considerations Enabling Truly Effective 5th Gen Joint C2 Rod Equid Chief of Enterprise Focus Areas, Raytheon Australia The Italian Air Force, a 5th gen. Air Force and beyond Lieutenant General Aurelio Colagrande Italian Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff Acquiring and Sustaining Next Gen Capabilities Tony Dalton AM Deputy Secretary National Naval Shipbuilding UK Perspective Air Chief Marshal Sir Mike Wigston KCB, CBE, ADC Chief of the Air Staff Army Perspective Brigadier Ian Langford, DSC and Bars (PhD) Acting Head Land Capability (representing Chief of Army) Getting the bigger picture - Networking the Force Tom Rowden Vice President International Strategy and Business Development Lockheed Martin Rotary and Mission Systems Future Trends Peter Jennings PSM Executive Director, Australian Strategic Policy Institute Navy Perspective Commodore Darron Kavanagh AM CSC, RAN Director General Warfare Innovation – Navy Air Force Perspective Air Marshal Mel Hupfeld AO, DSC Chief of Air Force

Dr Robbin Laird 27 April 2022 At the Williams Foundation seminar on March 24, 2022, Peter Jennings, Executive Director of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, put it bluntly and directly to the audience: We are facing a significant defense threat, and we need to take it seriously and get prepared. A recent article by Greg Sheridan in The Australian raised a similar waring when he looked back to the 1930s and saw analogies to the current situation. “If the 2020s are really the 1930s all over again, how is it the government is not going to produce any significant new defence capabilities for the rest of this decade? “This decade does resemble the 1930s, not because we face a new Hitler or even a new imperial Japan but because of the utter fecklessness of defence policy and the miserable failure in defence of both sides of politics. Australian leaders spent the 1930s “admiring the problem” of defence. They understood Nazi Germany and imperial Japan and made sententious statements all through the decade. But they did almost nothing to provide significant Australian capabilities.” Peter Jennings speaking at the Williams Foundation seminar, March 24, 2022. Jennings noted that when Prime Minister Morrison introduced in July 2020, the new defense strategy, as an aside he was concerned that indeed the current decade had a resemblance to the global threats of the 1930s. Jennings highlighted what he sees as the key driver of this challenge, namely, what I refer to as the global threat from the 21st century authoritarian powers. Here is how he put it: “The publicly stated goals in terms of the world’s two most powerful authoritarian regimes are to break the international order and to remake it under their control. Beijing and Moscow’s, having both separate and shared interests, but their intent has been publicly articulated for at least a decade. One thing you can say about these authoritarian systems is that they do not disguise their plans. No one today could credibly claim that China is an enigma wrapped in a mystery. You just need to read Xi Jinping’s speeches….” He then underscored the question of how the authoritarian leaders have envisaged the way ahead. “We know Xi Jinping believes that the West, and the United States in particular, is in terminal decline. We know that Xi thinks of himself as a world’s historical figure, uniquely placed to hold China together and uniquely placed to force Taiwan into the People’s Republic. “I also think it’s fair to say that Xi Jinping’s view of Taiwan is somewhat like Putin’s in Ukraine shaped by emotion and by invented historical memory. In other words, this is not a bloodless game theory calculation. A war over Taiwan would ultimately be Xi Jinping’s war rather than China’s war, just as the war in Ukraine is Putin’s war, not necessarily Russia’s war. “But the tragedy of Russia and China is that their political systems have been purpose built to give one leader the capacity to take their country to war. And this is how unthinkable was happened.” But then what do Australia and the West need to do? Jennings warns: “As far as Australia is concerned, I think we find ourselves in a type of strategic twilight zone. We know we’re in such a crisis, or at least on the glide path to one. We also know that this is a crisis with the potential to grow into a global configuration. And yet, we are not behaving as though this is the reality we face. If we really thought that war was coming, wouldn’t we be doing things differently around the defense capability development today?” He underscored that Australia needs (and one could certainly add the United States to his warning) to focus on force building and strategic depth as an urgent matter for defense acquisition not only a process of long-term force building. Jennings articulated his concern as follows: “I do wonder if the defense obsession about building the perfect networks and integrated force has contributed to our current inability to change gear. Through all of my defense career, we were designing and equipping the defense force in a world where the pace of strategic change was an interesting artifact, rather than a clock ticking on Australia’s security. “We could take 20 years to design and deliver defense capability, and it didn’t really matter. “And what that meant was that we could polish those capabilities as though we were building the ultimate Hornby railway set, all designed to run around a beautifully networked and integrated track.” He then went back to his 2018 presentation at a Williams Foundation seminar to reinforce his concern and his point: “Four years ago, almost to the day at the 2018, Sir Richard Williams conference, I spoke on the topic of deterrence. And on that occasion, one thing I did was to advocate for the acquisition of the B-21 aircraft. My reasoning for this was that it would add substantial deterrent capability to an ADF, that looked to me, to be under gunned. Now, more credentialed people than me have also made this case. Had we gone down that track at the time of the 2016 defense white paper, we would have been well placed to see the arrival of B-21 currently in production sometime caught quite soon. Now, of course, that didn’t happen. And I would have to say that defense’s interest in that I idea was not so much zero as about minus 100.” As a result of the clash between geopolitical strategic reality and Australian perceptions, he forecast a “German moment” for Australia. “I think Australia is very soon going to have its own German moment. I’m sure you know that just weeks ago, Germany reversed some of its most entrenched defense and security policies, which had been embedded for decades. In response to the Ukraine crisis, Berlin under an SPD-Green government is doubling its defense expenditure and seeking to reverse a disastrously ill-considered set of energy policies that build dependence on Russia. “No one saw this coming. It happened because of a dire strategic need. Australia will have its Germany moment. No one is seeing it coming. It will happen because of a dire strategic need. “Now, if that floodgate unlocks, we will see, I think, a fundamental recasting of defense capability development plans. I don’t know where that leaves the networked an integrated force. Other than to say to you, get ready for big, fundamental changes, and the need for speed in acquisition.” Featured graphic: Photo 200885804 / Australia China © Leestat | Dreamstime.com Editor’s Note: This week the second of our three books to be published this year on the reshaping of defense was published in e-book form with the paperback to be published in June 2022. The first section of the book is entitled “crisis capabilities and escalation management” and highlights the work of Paul Dibb and Brendan Sargeant, both of whom certainly reinforce the argument of Jennings. Link to article: “Australia is Facing its German Moment” (Defense.info)

Dr Robbin Laird 27 April 2022 Interview with AIRMSHL Geoff Brown AO (Retd), Williams Foundation Chair The September 15, 2022 seminar to be held by the Williams Foundation will focus on the key question of how to enhance the lethality of the Australian Defense Force. In particular, the seminar will focus on the gaps and opportunities for the ADF driven by fifth generation airpower. The recent Williams Foundation seminar provided a prologue to the forthcoming seminar and focused on providing an assessment of where the ADF and allied forces are with regard to shaping 21st century integrated and networked forces. Recently, I discussed the seminar with the Foundations’ Chairman, Air Marshal (Retired) Geoff Brown and he provided a look back at the March 2022 seminar as well as highlighting the focus of the September 15, 2022 seminar as well. Geoff Brown: “We started down the path of working a more effective joint or integrated force effort several years ago. The seminar was designed to provide an assessment of the current state of the effort as well as discussing some ways to further enhance the integrated networked force effort. With the end of the COVID-19 perspectives, we were very pleased to have significant international participation in the seminar to provide a wider perspective on that way ahead as well. “I think we are clearly on the right path but we have major challenges remaining, notably on the acquisition side. Tom Rowden did make the point that he thought we were in a better place than the U.S., but we still have a slow-moving bureaucracy around how to get the kind of integrated capabilities which we want, especially when compared to how quickly the commercial sector can operate.” And there is the challenge of working integration forward with the legacy force as has been noted that the force which we will have in 20 years’ time will contain 80% of what we have now. Brown underscored that “we clearly need to integrate the legacy systems with new platforms, systems or capabilities. The Aegis system is a good example of how one can do this. The Aegis system evolving now is much different from the initial Aegis system as it can now work with a wide variety of weapon systems compared to where it started. The Aegis example demonstrates that the kind of force integration path we are on is achievable, but we need to expand how we in fact can do so. By putting a core system in place and then working with an open architecture enabled by that system, significant integration can take place by incorporating adjacent systems and capabilities.” This approach has clear implications for acquisition. Brown underscored that “rather than having endless competitions to drive down what seems as the lowest price provided by various primes, Defense needs to pick a core prime to manage a weapons area and allow that prime to work with a diversity of suppliers and systems providers to drive the best capabilities to the force. We actually don’t have time now for a lot of the competitive tension that the acquisition system feels it needs to do to get the best value for money. “The key is to get the operators working with industry to drive the kind of rapid change needed.” This is especially true when considering that new platforms are built around a software upgradeability core, and getting to where operators can drive change in concert with the systems providers can allow for the kind of rapid change which operators need to deal with 21st century peer adversaries. The next seminar will focus on shaping a way ahead for the ADF to become more lethal and obviously a core answer to that is the pathway identified by Air Marshal (Retired) Brown. And he added that in the forthcoming seminar one of the key capabilities to be highlighted which can drive the kind of change which the ADF is seeking is around the training domain. “We need to increase the training throughput of the force to accelerate operational changes. The technology’s out there to actually increase training outcomes quite significantly. We’re not even close to utilizing the technology that’s already available, in my mind, to get the best training outcomes. That will be one of the vectors that we’ll certainly look at in the seminar.” In addition, Brown underscored that the whole challenge of resilience of the force is another key dimension which needs to be enhanced as well in shaping a way forward for the ADF. This means looking at efforts to enhance fuel supplies, weapons, supply depth and logistics support. He argued that without the kind of industrial depth which the United States delivered in World War II, it will be difficult to build out the kind of capabilities which are needed for the United States and the core allies. “We need to understand what our real industrial production capability and suspend the idea of needless competition in areas where such competition actually reduces production capability. And on the defense side, we need to be focused on the art of realistic force development and design and avoid paths like the USMC Force Design 2030 which really goes down a unique path not really adding to the overall lethality of the joint or coalition force. We need to ask the question of how new platforms or new force design approaches really add to the lethality of the integrated and networked force or they don’t and avoid the latter. The focus has to be upon deterrence and whether you are moving the needle forward on deterrence or not; if you are not then don’t go down that platform or force design path. The Pacific in particular drives the need for long-range systems, and we are working towards enhancing our capability to acquire and operate such systems.” Link to article: Looking Back and Looking Forward: Shaping a Way Ahead for the Integrated Networked Force (Defense.info)

Dr Robbin Laird 21 April 2022 LtGen Steven Rudder, Commander, U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Pacific and Commanding General Fleet Marine Force, provided a USMC perspective on the way ahead for the networked and integrated force which highlighted the impact of the F-35 on the USMC role in Pacific operations. He noted the Marines are operating both the F-35Bs and F-35Cs in the Pacific. By having an ability to operate both from the sea and from land, the two F-35s provided a significant fifth generation warfighting capability which can enable the Marine Corps focus on expeditionary operations. As he put it: “we’ll continue to operate our F-35C from the carrier with our agreement with the Navy, but also when they’re not on the carrier, we’re operating them off land bases as well to give us the operational flexibility we want to achieve.” With the operation by allies in the Pacific, the Marines are able to bring their operating experience to Asian allies soon to operate the aircraft, notably the Singapore Air Force and the Japanese as well. He provided a slide in his presentation which highlighted the combined training which occurred with the Singapore Air Force last year as well as a slide which highlighted joint operations with Japanese Self Defense Forces during last year’s Talisman Sabre exercise. LtGen Rudder understandably underscored as well the integrated operations which the USS America operating USMC F-35Bs with HMS Queen Elizabeth operating UK F-35Bs and the ability of the Marines to cross-deck between the ships. He noted: “Our aviation communities can plug and play in coalition operations and this is key element of moving ahead with a networked integrated force.” For the Marines, airpower integration is crucial, but it is the ability to integrate from the sea to land operations which is critical as well. As Rudder put it: “we have been working on the ability to take F-35 data and to use that data for target acquisition and get such data down to our ground force.” One initiative being pursued is the deployment of ground fires, such as the Naval strike missiles, in support of naval sea control and sea denial operations, which is leveraging such a data transfer. He noted that the Marines have over the last year have been working on such an approach to force integration. Indeed, a key way ahead for the Pacific-based Marines is to be able to support the U.S. Navy’s Sea control and sea denial operations. This is another aspect being worked with regard to enhancing the ability of the Marines and Navy to deliver an enhanced network integrated force. In my own view, the intersection between the U.S. Navy’s evolving approach to distributed maritime operations and the USMC’s approach to mobile and expeditionary basing are inextricably intertwined, a subject which I address with my co-author in our forthcoming book, A Maritime Kill Web Force in the Making: Warfighting and Deterrence in the 21st Century. The Marines have also created a Marine Littoral Regiment designed to provide a new way for the infantry to operate in the Pacific. And such a force clearly needs support from airpower organic to the USMC or from the joint force. To move further down the road of a networked integrated force, Rudder underscored that “we are buying mesh networks that are able to take wave forms from space, surface, or air, and translate them into to a common operating picture for our ground forces. We are focused on enhanced shared awareness in order to be able to hold targets at risk. We need to address the threats we face in an integrated fashion.” In the interview I did this past summer at his office in Honolulu with LtGen Rudder, he highlighted how he saw the way ahead for the USMC with regard to working with allies and with the joint force. “We are focused on shaping an effective posture that combines forward bases with rotational partnerships with key Allies. I have already highlighted how important our posture is in Japan. Employing Infantry and MV-22s from Okinawa and F-35s from Iwakuni (in southwest Honshu) we readily integrate with Japans Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade.” “MRF-D plays a role as well. Six months out of the year, we rotate 2,000 Marines into Australia with ground forces, MV-22s, fires, and logistics capability. Now that the Australians are operating the F-35 and routinely exercising amphibious operations, we can work jointly on expanding high-end bi-lateral and multi-lateral operations. As a combined force, we have already increased the complexity of operations as recently demonstrated during Talisman Saber 21.” “And as we build up and deploy greater numbers of forces to Camp Blaz, Guam, we will use this location as an additional posture location for 5,000 Marines and Sailors. All of these posture developments allow us to have various operational touch points from which one could aggregate force capabilities. With a combination of air and sea lift, we are designing a force with the ability to rapidly move into positions of advantage.” We then discussed the evolution of fires which the Marines can bring to the Pacific fight. With the end of the INF (Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces) treaty, the United States can now build longer range conventional capabilities. The Marines are looking to participate in this effort, and employ them from expeditionary forward bases well inside the adversary’s weapons engagement area. The objective is to contribute to SLOC defense or be additive to offensive naval fires. According to Lt. Gen. Rudder: “If we look forward in the not-too-distant future, we’ll have the ability to have land-based long-range fires, aviation fires, and persistent high endurance ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance) with the MQ-9. We’ll be able to move those capabilities with KC-130s, MV-22s, or amphibious lift allowing us to project long-range fires forward anywhere in Asia, much like we do with the HIMARS (High-Mobility Artillery Rocket System) today.” “HIMARS fits in the back of a KC-130 allowing rapid mobilization and insertion. We will exercise the same operational tactic with anti-ship capability. We want to project sea denial capabilities to cut off a strait of our choosing or maneuver into positions to create our own maritime chokepoint. “As we saw with hunting mobile missiles in the past, having long-range fires on maneuvering platforms makes them really hard to hit. As we distribute our long-range fires on mobile platforms, we now become a hard platform to find. Our desire is to create our own anti-access and area denial capability. “For the last several years, we were thinking about the adversary’s missiles, and how they could be used to deny us access to forward locations. Now we want to be the sea denial force that is pointed in the other direction. Land based fires are perfectly suited to support naval maneuver.” “We want rapidly to move by air or sea, deliver sea denial capabilities onto land, maneuver to position of advantage, deliver fires, maneuver for another shot, or egress by air or sea. We are training current forces on concepts for sea denial missions supported by maneuver of long-range fires. This is a key element of the naval integration.” With a growing capability of joint sensor networks, the potential for more effective joint targeting is a reality. As the joint force focuses on dynamic targeting, services are closely coordinating fires networks and authorities. The advantage of land based expeditionary fires is that they provide persistence cover within an established air and surface targeting solution. This is how Lt. Gen. Rudder characterized how he saw the way ahead. “We are completely integrated with naval maneuver and working hand and hand with the joint force. I MEF and III MEF have been operating seamlessly as three-star naval task forces astride Seventh and Third Fleets. “During crises, I become the deputy JFMCC (Joint Force Maritime Component Commander) to the Pacific Fleet Commander. The MARFORPAC staff integrates with the PacFleet staff. Even during day-to-day operations, we have Marines at PacFleet planning and integrating across multiple domains. Should we ramp up towards crisis or conflict, we will reinforce our JFMCC contribution to ensure we remain fully prepared for all-domain naval force execution.This means that our anti-ship missiles will integrate into naval maneuver. “We also aggressively pursue PACAF integration for bomber, fighter, and 5th Generation support. Daily, our F-35s are integrated into the PACAF AOC (Air Operations Center). We are focused on better integration to insure we have a common operating picture for an integrated firing solution.” The USMC F-35s play a key role in all of this. Although there is a clear focus on enhanced integration with the U.S. Navy, the integration with the USAF is crucial for both the U.S. Navy and the USMC. Lt. Gen. Rudder highlighted the role which USMC F-35s play in Pacific defense and force integration. “We count on pulling fifth-gen capability forward in time of crisis. We are committed to having forward deployed F-35s conducting integrated training on a regular basis with our PACAF counterparts. “We will also conduct integrated training with our Korean, Japanese, Singaporean and Australian partners. We are also training with aircraft carriers when they operate in the region. Notably, the USS Carl Vinson, the first U.S. Navy F-35C variant carrier.” “And the F-35B has caught the operational attention of the rest of the world. The United Kingdom’s HMS QUEEN ELIZABETH is the largest fifth-generation fighter deployment ever conducted on an aircraft carrier. We are proud to be a part of that UK deployment, with a Marine F-35B squadron, VMFA-211, embarked and operating with our British partners. They are currently doing combined operations in the Western Pacific. “We are excited to see the Italians operating F-35s off the ITS CAVOUR, and we hope by the fall of this year that we’ll be landing an F-35B on the Japan Ship IZUMO, as the Japanese look ahead to the purchase of F-35Bs. The South Koreans are considering going down a similar path, with Singapore also adding F-35s to their inventory.” “Aside from shipboard operations, the F-35B can do distributed operations like no other combat aircraft. We can go into a variety of airfields which may not be accessible by other fighter aircraft, reload and refuel, and take back off again, making the both aircraft and the airfields more survivable.” The Marines are the only combat force that tactically combine fifth generation with tiltrotor capabilities. This combined capability is crucial for operations in an area characterized by tyranny of distance. The MV-22 Ospreys can also carry a wide variety of payloads that can encompass the C2 and ISR revolutions underway. And if you are focused on flexible basing, the combination of the two aircraft provides possibilities which no other force in the world currently possess. But shortfalls in the numbers of aircraft forward create challenges to unleash their full potential for enabling the Marines as a crisis management force and enhance the Marine Corps contribution to the joint force. The nature of distributed operations in the Pacific demands long range aircraft like the MV-22 to sustain the force. The amphibious operating capability of the USMC becomes more significant as flexible basing and the enhanced capabilities which a family of amphibious ships could bring to the force. This is how Lt. Gen. Rudder put it: “We can reconfigure our amphibious ships to take on many different assault functions. I think when people talk about amphibious assault, they have singular visions of near-beach operations. Instead, we need to think of our amphibious capability from the standpoint of our ability to maneuver from range. “Rather than focusing on the 3,000 or 5,000-meter closure from ship to shore, I think about the 600, 700, 1,000-mile closure, with amphibs able to distribute and put people in place or to conduct resupply once you’re there. Amphibious lift, with its ability to bring its own connectors for logistics support, is increasingly significant for the operational force. “In addition, we have to make sure that we’re able to close the force when lethal and non-lethal shaping has done its course. At some point, you’re going to need to seize and defend land. We have two ways to tactically accomplish this mission, either by air or by surface assault. There’s no other way to get forces ashore unless you secure a port that has the space to offload and a road network to move ashore. Open port options are highly unlikely during crisis, thus amphibious lift is increasingly becoming more valuable for maneuvering forces in the maritime domain.” The Marines are launching a new capability in the next couple of years, the Marine Littoral Regiment (MLR). According to the MARFORPAC commander: “We are working towards initial operating capability (IOC) of the MLR in 2023. We want to demonstrate the maneuverability of the MLR as well as the capabilities it can bring to naval operations. “Near term, we will work to exercise new capabilities in the region, such as loading the NMESIS (Navy/Marine Corps Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System) system on the KC-130s or LCAC for integrated operations with F-35s, MQ-9s, and other maritime targeting capabilities.” In short, the USMC is in transition in the Pacific, and working towards greater interoperability with the joint force, notably, the U.S. Navy and the USAF. For my assessment of the evolution of the USMC in the Pacific over the past few years, with a significant number of interviews from the MARFORPAC staff as well, see my new book on USMC transformation which has been published on March 31, 2022. Link to article: Shaping a Way Ahead for the Networked Integrated Force: The Perspective of MARFORPAC (Defense.info)

Dr Robbin Laird 20 April 2022 The Italian Air Force is part of the broader European defense transition in which the shift from the land wars to direct European defense is underway. The Italians have not only bought two variants of the F-35 but build the aircraft in Italy as well as delivering aircraft from their factory to the Netherlands. The IAF and the Italian Navy both operate F-35s with the challenge still being working integration between both services as well. The Italian Navy trained last year off the East Coast of the United States and did initial exercises between the ITS Cavour and the USS Gerald R. Ford. In addition, Italy flies the Eurofighter as a key combat aircraft and has worked integratability between the Eurofighter and the F-35 as well as having spearheaded enhanced integration of Eurofighters within Europe itself. Lieutenant General Aurelio Colagrande, Italian Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff, started his presentation to the Williams Foundation seminar by underscoring that although Italy and Australia are geographically far apart, their work on airpower modernization is not. This is how he put it: “Even though we are on the opposite sides of the world, therefore apparently very far away and with a different viewpoint on space and time, in the operational environment, Australia and Italy are closer and similar than ever before. We fly some similar aircraft, like the C-27 and the F-35. We’ve been in the same coalition in Iraq and in Afghanistan. “The entire world is changing faster and faster so that a regional issue now become immediately part of the geopolitical landscape…. From a global perspective, we act in the same realm. As air forces, we operate in a domain strongly dependent on technology in order to deliver air power rapidly and everywhere.” I have spent a great deal of time with Italian Air Force when they were first procuring the F-35 and the head of the Italian Air Force at the time, highlighted how acquiring of the F-35 would drive significant cultural change in the IAF, an argument very similar to what Air Marshal Brown was making at the same time in Australia. This is how Lt. General Preziosa put it in a 2015 interview with me: “The F-22 and the F-35 are called fifth generation aircraft, but really the F-35 is the first airplane built for the digital age, we are rapidly moving from the dog-fight concept to the data-fight evolution of the broad utilization of air power. It was conceived in and for that age, and is built around the decision tools in the cockpit and is in fact a “flying brain.” And that makes it different from other aircraft. It is a multi-tasking aircraft, and fits well into the I-phone age. Other aircraft – with the exception of the F-22 – are built to maximize out as multi-mission aircraft, which execute tasks sequentially and directed to do so. “The F-35 fleet thinks and hunts and can move around the mission set as pilots operate in the battlespace and leverage the data fusion system. It is a battlespace dominance aircraft; not a classic air superiority, air defense or ground attack aircraft. It changes the classic distinctions; confuses them and defines a whole new way to look at a combat aircraft, one built for the joint force age as well. The Army and the Navy will discover, as the F-35 fleet becomes a reality, how significant the F-35 is for their combat efforts.” In his remarks to the Williams Foundation seminar, Lieutenant General Colagrande provided an update on this perspective based on the experience of the past several years of the IAF and the F-35. “We immediately felt the need to generate a national plan to evolve with the entire organization in a fifth-generation Italian air force, where consolidated competence, new scales, different mindset, modern airmen are all vital ingredients to effectively perform an entire set of new capabilities together with legacy system. “In this air force evolutional journey, we face new challenges that we are trying to manage with new and innovative solutions, finding new partners and associates. Of course, we are just at the beginning of our trip, but the initial outcomes are definitely reassuring, and the quality of our approach seems just right.” He argued that the challenge facing an operational air force is to be able to “plug and fight” with the systems they have. As he noted: “New capabilities have never been ‘plug and fight’. It is difficult to gain rapid full operational advantage from a multitude of new capabilities because to fully exploit them, it is necessary to be equipped with greater technical competence as contemporary weapons systems are much more capable than those in the past. “This condition highlights more than ever how the human being is the weakest part of the equation. Since to fully exploit a new weapon system, there is a need for a specific dedicated, progressive training to the end users. To that end, interpretability and collaboration are key elements in order to be effective.” He then went on to discuss a very interesting Eurofighter integration effort which has happened under the radar of public recognition but suggestive of the kind of force integration efforts among allies which are critical to be able to fight more effectively tonight. Lieutenant General Colagrande highlighted this development in the following manner: “Plug and Fight is a name of a successful endeavor that the German Air Force conducted together with our British friends of the Royal Air Force and with us. “Within the NATO and as air policing framework in Europe, the German Air Force, Royal Air Force and Italian Air Force, are now able to operate in a completely mixed Eurofighter squadron, sharing not only aircraft or spare parts, the so-called material component, but also operational, maintenance, logistic procedures, and more important the will to succeed in doing operations together. “This may appear as an easy operation, but it was actually the end state of a very intensive journey started a few years ago with the launch of the European Typhoon Interoperability program. German Air Force, Royal Air Force and Italian Air Force worked out to put in place technical arrangements, to write handbooks for flying ops, ground ops, spare parts management, and maintenance, and so on. “We needed to train on a regular basis to stay proficient in performing the mission. Indeed, thanks to this initiative, at the beginning of March this year, the German Air Force and Italian Air Forces have successfully supported together a real air policing operation in Romania. And we will probably do the same in the next month with our UK friends.” This Eurofighter interoperability effort has been and is indeed a major challenge. But doing so can obviously deliver more significant coalition capability rathe rather than simply having nations operating the “same” aircraft but actually not being able to integrate those aircraft into a cohesive combat capability. I first visited the European Air Group based at High Wycombe in 2014 and the focus of that first meeting was on 4th-5th generation integration. I went back over the next few years, and saw how his coalition building group was broadening their efforts to include meeting the challenge of Eurofighter integration. The European Typhoon interoperability program to which Colagrande referred is indeed the EAG program. During a 2016 visit to the EAG we discussed the European Typhoon interoperability effort being led by the EAG. This was what I wrote at the time about the effort: “The session was led by Brigadier General de Ponti, Deputy Director, of the European Air Group and joined by the “drivers” of the ETIP (Euro Typhoon Interoperability Project) as well as organizers of exercise efforts to shape a new approach, namely Lt. Col. Jacobo Lecube of the Spanish Air Force and Lt Col. Marco Schiattioni from the Italian Air Force and Chief of Staff Col. Stephane Pierre, of the Belgian Air Force. “The overall focus of the effort is upon shaping a more common fleet approach among Eurofighter nations. Although four nations came together to build a common airplane, the planes have been used by four different air forces with limited overlap in standards and operating practices. As the Euro-Typhoon is clearly a key element for the future of European airpower and with the coming of the F-35 to Europe, this makes little sense. And what the European Air Group is focused upon are practical ways to shape more common fleet approaches among the air forces, which fly Euro-Typhoon. Also, shaping a common template in doing Baltic air policing in which Eurofighter/Typhoons are becoming a frequent asset in executing the mission provides an obvious opportunity to find ways to shape common procedures and support approaches as well. The problem was simply put by one of the participants: “When an Italian Eurofighter lands on a German base, it cannot use the ground support equipment or change a tire, because the standards are different. These are procedural issues, which may make sense in terms of national norms but not in terms of common fleet operations. Through this project we seek to end differences which get in the way of common operational support.” According to BG de Ponti: “The Eurofighter-Typhoon project is an important effort for our air forces. It is about the co-evolution of Typhoon with the shaping of a 4th-5th generation integrated force. It is two prongs of shaping more effective European airpower. It is a building blocks approach to shaping evolving capabilities.” Such an effort is what force integration among allies requires. But the better outcome is to shape common approaches at the outset of building new platforms and doing so with common C2 and ISR connectivity as well, if indeed the integrated networked force is to have its full impact on warfighting and deterrence. Lieutenant General Colagrande underscored the importance of being to leverage new capabilities throughout the combat force and this required significant emphasis on training and innovation in force operations as well. This is how he characterized how the Italian Air Force is addressing this challenge: “We soon initiated an operational testing and evaluation process that now includes both the A and B variant for novel interoperability. We participated with the F-35 air policing in Iceland. We proved our air power expeditionary concept together with our Italian Navy and the British ones. We launched a very challenging operational training infrastructure program in Sardinia, an Italian island in the Mediterranean Sea where we have lot of airspace, air to air, air to ground, EW and lots of test ranges and good weather throughout the year. “Furthermore, in Sardinia, we are setting up our international flight training school where we will train in the phase four advanced training, our future fifth generation pilots. Within the OTI framework, we are investing in connectivity network in order to offer a real effective advanced training. “And through it, we intend to achieve one of the most challenging objectives, the integration between legacy and new generation weapon system for exploiting the main operational output of the fifth-generation assets that we believe is the ability to be task enablers and force multipliers. “And we also conducted a pure fifth generation event, the Falcon Strike 2021. The first major European exercise for fifth generation aircraft, but not just with them, but for them, in a highly contested and congested scenario, a multinational coalition from United States Air Force, United States Marine Corps, Royal Air Force, Royal Navy, Israeli and Italian Air Force F-35s participated with the exercise. “Focusing on fifth generation requirements, testing new sea-basing approaches to air operation, exploring new fifth generation rules of engagement that allow a high level of delegation of decision-making to the lowest possible level, the cockpit. All small steps of course, but all pieces of an overall increased level of performance for the entire air force.” He highlighted the cooperation in the UK-led Tempest program as one element of the way ahead for the Italian Air Force as well. “The next generation fighter will not be just a simple aircraft. It will be a system of systems with very strong and secure connectivity. It must be conceived through an open system architecture to accommodate the required agility, the future technological developments and better compensate for any changes or updates to the operational requirements.” He provided a significant cautionary note as well in his presentation. The cutbacks in defense in Europe have been significant and have left Europe more vulnerable than is prudent. “The Italian Air Force has witnessed a significant reduction in aircraft numbers over the past decades. We developed the idea that greater quality may compensate for less quantity, but quality cannot substitute quantity. Technological quality advantage allows us to achieve the superiority in the operating area of a permissive scenario. “But such an approach is not an applicable paradigm in the military comparison with a peer-to-peer or near-to-peer competitor who accounts for hundreds of military assets, or when simultaneous commitments or more than one operation operate far away from each other. “In other words, mass still has its importance as we are learning by the last updates coming from the east European flank. Going back to quality versus quantity concept, we should think about the fact that quantity is by itself a quality. “The technological trap mechanism even more obvious when it comes to weaponry. State of the art weapons are so expensive to develop, acquire, and in many cases, integrate, that you end up buying too few of them, depleting the stockpile below a minimum acceptable level, thus creating a serious gap when it comes to operations. Once again, it is evident that mass enables either by a lower technological level or with new industrial or commercial solutions for greater combat capability.” Lieutenant General Aurelio Colagrande, Italian Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Aurelio Colagrande was born in L’Aquila on 8 October 1962. He attended the Air Force Academy from 1981 to 1985 and graduated as military pilot in 1986 at the European NATO Joint Jet Pilot Training (ENJJPT) in Sheppard AFB – TX, USA. In 1987, Lt Gen COLAGRANDE was assigned to the 2nd Wing in Treviso and in 1989 was moved to the 51st Wing in Istrana where he was appointed as OPS Chief and later on as 103rd Squadron Commander. Between 1995 and 1999, he flew several flying sorties over the Balkan Airspace collecting more than 70 flight hours. In July 2000, he was appointed to the Logistic Department of the Italian Air Staff in Rome and later, in 2002, moved to the Joint Strike Fighter Program Office in Washington DC (USA), as Italian National Representative. From July 2006 until September 2007, he was back to the Logistic Department of the Italian Air Staff as Head of C4 ISTAR Branch and Chairman of the Italian JSF WG. From 2007 to 2009, he was appointed as 6th Wing Commander in Ghedi, after this assignment he returned to Rome, at the Secretariat General of Defence and National Armaments Directorate as Chief of the Aeronautical Programs Office. From 2011 to 2013 he was appointed as the 46th Air Brigade Commander in Pisa, following this period he was assigned to the Air Operational Command in Rome as Deputy Chief of Staff, assuming later on the Chief position until March 2019. From 20 March 2019 to 11 January 2022, he was the Commander of the Air Education and Training Command. As of 12 January 2022, Lt.Gen. Colagrande is the Italian Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff. Lt.Gen. Colagrande has a University Degree in Aeronautical Sciences and a Master in International Studies. Link to article: Shaping a Way Ahead for the Networked Integrated Force: An Italian Air Force Perspective (Defense.info)

Dr Robbin Laird 19 April 2022 In his presentation to the Williams Foundation seminar held on March 24, 2022 which focused on “accelerating the transition to a networked integrated force”, Air Chief Marshal Sir Mike Wigston presented the perspective of the RAF on the challenge. The last time an RAF Chief of Staff spoke at a Williams Foundation Seminar was in March 2018. Air Chief Marshal Sir Stephen Hillier, then Chief of Staff of the RAF, addressed the Williams Foundation Seminar on the shift from the land wars to high intensity conflict. At that seminar, this is how Hillier highlighted the challenge: “You asked me to speak about high-intensity warfare in Europe. Perhaps I’ve not really provided that much of that specific geographical context. But then as I said right at the start, I don’t believe that what I’ve described can be bracketed within a particular geography. The challenges I’ve described are truly global and truly common to us all. I believe that airpower’s inherent characteristics and capabilities make it especially able to respond effectively to those challenges.” A clear driver of the shift is that airpower advantage will have to be fought for and not assumed. And his way ahead focused very much on leveraging what new platforms we are acquiring but to build out from them to shape new ways ahead to regain strategic advantage. “But the asymmetric advantage airpower has given us for the last three decades at least, is narrowing. The integration into our air forces of fifth generation capabilities such as the F-35 Lighting will only redress the delta to a degree. Of equal importance in maintaining our combat edge is this ability to manage vast amounts of information, and make decisions more quickly and more accurately. Technological developments will be a key element in ensuring that the lever of the best possible output from our air and space platforms, but our C2 structures, processes, and approach to information sharing will be a decisive factor.” What Hillier discussed throughout his 2018 presentation in Australia was the presaging of what would be introduced in 2020 as the new integrated operating concept for the UK forces. That operating concept which is rooted in the kill web approach was officially launched in the Fall of 2020. Chief of Defence Staff, General Sir Nick Carter, at the 2020 version of the annual Royal United Services Institute address by Chief of Defence Staff, highlighted the launch of the new strategy. “What should be our response to this ever more complex and dynamic strategic context? My view is that more of the same will not be enough. We must fundamentally change our thinking if we are not to be overwhelmed. Hence, we are launching this Integrated Operating Concept. “We cannot afford any longer to operate in silos—we have to be integrated: with allies as I have described, across Government, as a national enterprise, but particularly across the military instrument. Effective integration of maritime, land, air, space and cyber achieves a multi-domain effect that adds up to far more than simply the sum of the parts, recognizing—to paraphrase Omar Bradley—that the overall effect is only as powerful as the strength of the weakest domain.” Since Hillier last spoke, the UK has faced the challenges of Brexit, Covid-19, has introduced the new carriers as operational realities, and has operated the new carrier outside of the European area of operations. The RAF and Royal Navy have also begun the F-35 era, and the UK government has launched the Tempest next generation airpower program as well. And as the current Chief of Staff of the RAF spoke at the Williams Foundation, Europe was experiencing its first major war in a very long time. And Air Chief Marshal Sir Mike Wigston was speaking after the UK government had committed itself to increased defense spending and the launching of the new Integrated Operating Concept. In other words, the UK faces a number of challenges which certainly require better force integration within the UK forces and with allies, simply to get the scale, and depth necessary for UK direct defense, let alone contributing to wider allied considerations. How does Wigston see this getting accomplished? This is how he framed the challenges: “One year ago, the UK government published the Integrated Review of Security, Defense Development And Foreign Policy. It was a significant statement of Britain’s place in the world and the role of the UK Armed Forces in that. Last April, before the ink was even dry, Russia first threatened military action against Kyiv. It was a chilling foretaste of what we are now seeing unfolding there. The outrageous, unprovoked, and unjustified invasion of a sovereign country in Europe, thousands of deaths, and the displacement of over 10 million Ukrainian citizens, something we thought we had consigned to history.” He then argued that the Integrated Review had highlighted three key themes which current events simply reinforced as key challenges. “Firstly, the recognition that it’s an uncertain and increasingly dangerous world. We face fast evolving threats to our nation’s and our allies. “Secondly, in this era of strategic competition, the UK must be prepared and able to act globally as a problem solving, burden sharing nation, amplifying our effect through deeper relationships and partnerships. “And thirdly, with the equivalent of a 42 billion Australian uplift in defense funding over the four years from 2021, that the UK government could not be clearer in its view of the integral role of the UK Arm Forces in protecting and projecting the United Kingdom around the world.” “The Integrated Review confirmed the need for the UK to be able to deter and defend against state-based opponents, to strengthen our technological and scientific base and to continue the modernization of every aspect of our armed forces. And it also looked at broader aspects of security too, including climate change, population pressures, and resource competition.” But with the Covid-19 impact, it will be challenging for the UK or any major liberal democracy to establish sustained defense spending, so what then are the priorities to be focused upon with investments, and force design going forward? “My chief of defense staff has made his priorities, and of course they’re now my priorities, very clear. Firstly, that everyone must be absolutely focused on playing their part in turning the ambition of the Integrated Review into reality. “Second, it’s around transforming, reforming, and integrating effectively. “Third, it’s about having formations, units, platforms, systems, and people that are more deployable and deployed more, at home and abroad. “Fourth is the need to be more lethal. And to be more lethal, it’s absolutely essential that we are more innovative. “And fifth, and probably the most important, is our people, our culture, and the diversity of our workforce in every sense of the word. And threading through all of those is that critical need for multi domain integration across the maritime land air space and cyberspace domains. To achieve that nirvana of multi domain integration, we must integrate across defense by design, and we must integrate by instinct.” Wigston then highlighted how such an approach affected the RAF. “To continue to protect the UK and our allies in this threat laced world, the Royal Air Force must be ready to understand, decide, and then act faster, with even greater precision, lethality and in more places around the world simultaneously than we do today. And we’ve got to do it sustainably too, both in terms of resource and the environment Above all, it will require the Royal Air Force to integrate ever more closely with our Royal Navy, Army and Strategic Command, the Ministry of Defense, other government departments and our international partners. “Success demands, swift, joint, fully integrated action across all war fighting domains, land,, sea, air, space and cyber. Our aircraft, spacecraft and systems must integrate seamlessly to allow the transfer and exploitation of information, rapid decision making and timely delivery of effects.” In his presentation, he highlighted the way ahead as envisaged by the UK with regard to the airpower piece of shaping the evolving networked and integrated force. This is the team tempest or future combat air system approach. And this is Wigston described it: “The Future Combat Air System is such a critical development program for the nation, because we need to start work now on what will replace Typhoon from the late 2030s and why we are investing three and a half billion Australian over the next four years alongside our international partners like Italy. We’re taking a revolutionary approach, looking at a game changing mix of swarming drones and mixed formations of un-crewed combat aircraft, as well as next generation piloted aircraft like Tempest. Our uncured combat aircraft, Mosquito, is already taking shape in Belfast and our experimental swarming drone, Arvena, has already exceeded expectations on operational trials. This isn’t the stuff of a distant sci-fi future. We’re aiming for Mosquito and Arvena derivatives to be fielded operationally this decade, transforming the combat battle space in a way not seen since the advent of the Jet Age.” The integration piece for the RAF evolves on two levels, the UK national force and its ability to work more effectively with allies in coalition operations. And he describes the latter in the following terms: “We must place a premium on being allied by design, through building alliances and improving interoperability. And it means that we have to be integrated with allies across government as a national enterprise, and particularly across all the instruments of our military power. Our multi-domain effects have to add up to more than the sum of the parts. ‘In that regard, I can’t think of a better example of multi-domain integration than the UK carrier strike group that deployed last year through the Indo-Pacific region, as far as Japan. It brought to life, the deeper UK focus on the Indo-Pacific, a region the Integrated Review identified as critical to our economy, our security, and our global ambition to support an open and resilient international order. “At the heart of that carrier strike group, of course, is our ability to operate fifth generation combat aircraft from the sea. Lightning is a phenomenal war fighting machine, from land or sea. And last year 617 Squadron Royal Air Force and VMFA-211 from the US Marine Corps demonstrated that enormous utility from the Royal Navy’s HMS Queen Elizabeth.” “We must train our personnel to work together through integrated exercises with government partners and allies. As we develop our military plans and processes, we must ensure that they’re integrated by design rather than working with partners ad hoc at the point of need. Our modernization from an Industrial Age of platforms to an Information Age of systems has to be enabled at every level by a digital backbone, into which all sensors, effectors and deciders are connected.” Frankly speaking, this is very hard to do. I have spent a great deal of time over the past decade on ships, land bases in the UK and in the United States watching how the UK and the USMC and U.S. Navy have worked the integration which the RAF chief underscored with regard to the ability of the UK carriers to work with the United States. This was a deliberate effort which has been very challenging to do and, frankly, not widely noticed in the broader political or strategic world. If such efforts are to be prioritized, ensuring that they get the kind of strategic and funding support will be crucial. And the significant investment in the land wars is a significant investment cost which is not easily carried forward in such an effort. And getting governments on the same page with regard to rapid decision making is its own challenge, but equally important as shaping the joint operational approach so well laid out by the RAF Chief of Staff. Indeed, Wigston highlighted the hinge between the military and the civil authorities which is crisis management. “Air and space power gives our government the ability to act or signal strategically worldwide, at range, at speed, precisely with minimal physical and political risk and maximum political choice. We play a decisive role protecting and defending the United Kingdom and our allies 24/7 today. But as chief of the air staff, it also falls to me to design and start to build the force my successors will have to fight with and win within 10-, 20- or 30-years’ time. “The Royal air force must be ready to operate in that complex operating environment of the future. Above all, we must be able to defend the UK and our allies in the face of those sophisticated new air and missile threats.” It really is decision superiority that force integration is about. How to operate with maximum effect throughout the extended battlespace but with not just military but civil decision making capable of resolving crises. And that is a major challenge facing our democracies. Air Chief Marshal Sir Mike Wigston KCB, CBE, ADC Chief of the Air Staff Air Chief Marshal Mike Wigston CBE ADC is the Chief of the Air Staff, in command of the Royal Air Force, leading a Whole Force of some 35,000 Regular and Reserve personnel, and 5,000 Civil Servants, supported by thousands of contractors. Commissioned on a University Cadetship in 1986, he completed his pilot training on the Tornado GR1 in 1992 followed by a succession of frontline tours, including operational deployments enforcing the no-fly zones in Iraq. He commanded 12(Bomber) Squadron, flying the Tornado GR4 and leading the Squadron on two operational tours in Iraq and large force exercises in Canada, Malaysia and the USA. Appointments in operational headquarters have included Al Udeid Airbase, Qatar, as the Chief of Combat Operations in the Combined Air and Space Operations Centre; Basrah International Airport, Iraq as Commander 903 Expeditionary Air Wing; and one year in Afghanistan as the Director Air Operations in Headquarters ISAF Joint Command. He was appointed CBE in 2013 for his contribution to that mission. Staff appointments in the Ministry of Defence have included the Operations Directorate and the predecessor to what is now Military Strategic Effects. In 2013, after a short spell as the Tornado Force Commander, he became the Principal Staff Officer to the Chief of Defence Staff. In January 2015, he was appointed Administrator of the Sovereign Base Areas of Akrotiri and Dhekelia and Commander British Forces Cyprus, responsible for the civil governance of the Sovereign Base Areas and command of British forces based permanently in Cyprus. Senior Royal Air Force appointments have included Assistant Chief of the Air Staff, responsible for the strategic coherence and coordination of the Royal Air Force, and oversight of the RAF100 centenary programme. Prior to becoming Chief of the Air Staff, he was Deputy Commander Capability, responsible for the strategic planning and delivery of all aspects of Royal Air Force capability including people, equipment, infrastructure and training. Education and training includes reading Engineering Science at Oriel College, Oxford; the Advanced Command and Staff Course; an MA in Defence Studies from King’s College London; the Higher Command and Staff Course; and the UK Pinnacle Course. He is a Vice Patron of the Royal Air Force Charitable Trust and President of the Royal Air Force Rowing Association. Author’s Note: Ed Timperlake and I discuss the UK Integrated Operating Concept in the context of the kill web approach in our forthcoming book, A Maritime Kill Web Force in the Making: Deterrence and Warfighting in the XXIst Century. Link to article: Shaping a Way Ahead for the Networked Integrated Force: A Royal Air Force Perspective (Defense.info)

The Requirements of a Sovereign Defence Space Capability National Gallery of Australia 1 December 2021 Final Report Dr Robbin Laird Synopsis and Program Download PDF Handbook Download PDF Presentations Welcoming Remarks and Formal Close AIRMSHL Geoff Brown AO (Retd) Sir Richard Williams Foundation Introduction and MC Darin Lovett South Australian Space Industry Centre Australian Space Capability - Historical Perspective Amy Hestermann-Crane The Central Blue Threats to Space Operations Dougal Robertson Sir Richard Williams Foundation Presentation availability to be advised. Sovereign Defence Capability and Space Dr Malcolm Davis Australian Strategic Policy Institute Not available - email info@williamsfoundaiton.org.au to request a copy Space Domain Research & Development Prof Tanya Monro Defence Science and Technology Group Commercial Space-based ISR AIRCDRE Richard Keir AM, CSC (Retd) Sir Richard Williams Foundation Presentation availability to be advised. Sovereign and Resilient Space Battle Management AVM Chris Deeble AO, CSC (Retd) Northrop Grumman Australia Presentation availability to be advised. Space Domain Awareness Nick Leake Optus Presentation availability to be advised. Space Control AIRCDRE Phil Gordon Director General Air Defence and Space Resilient Satcom in a Counterspace Age David Ball Lockheed Martin Space Presentation availability to be advised. Sovereign Defence Space Considerations Terry Van Haren Former Air Attaché Washington The Requirements of a Sovereign Defence Space Capability AIRCDRE Ross Bender Commander Air Warfare Centre National Perspective Anthony Murfett Australian Space Agency Pre-recorded video AVM Cath Roberts AM, CSC Head of Air Force Capability Video not available Navy Perspective CDRE Matthew Doornbos RAN Director General Navy Intelligence and Information Warfare (representing Chief of Navy) No presentation Army Perspective BRIG Ian Langford DSC and Bars Director General Future Land Warfare (representing Chief of Army) Defence’s Vision for Space Capability AIRCDRE Nicholas Hogan CSC Director General Space Domain Review (representing Chief of Air Force) Seminar Outline When the United States Air Force conceived and established the Space-based Global Positioning System in 1973 to enable more accurate military navigation, few would have imagined the impact it would have on modern society, the Western national security apparatus, and the Australian way of life. Fast forward to 2021, global economic security is now dependent on Space-based capabilities, and Defence must play an increasingly prominent role given the quantum of global trade which passes through the region, a third of which transits through the South China Sea. There are now over 2,600 satellites in orbit and the Australian Defence Force has become increasingly dependent on a sophisticated blend of Space-related technologies which must now develop and accelerate to meet the demands of integrated multi-domain operations to counter new threats and new risks. These demands include resilient long-range communications, and greater levels of situational awareness with the ability to sense, track and identify targets in and from Space in all orbits. On the supply side, current Space capacity is insufficient to meet these demands, and the need for a sovereign capability must be driven by a better understanding of the full spectrum of Space-related requirements across policy, process, infrastructure and technology. The imperative to develop Space capability must consider the people and organisational aspects which leverage Australia’s relatively small but highly skilled population. It will require a national effort to leverage people, technology and Australia’s vast geographical area of interest and highly favourable environmental conditions to conduct activities in and from Space. Space is becoming increasingly congested and contested and likely to become a warfighting domain in future high intensity conflicts in the Indo-Pacific region, as well as an essential campaign enabler for Shape Deter and Respond missions and tasks. This will drive the need for increased survivability of Space-based systems and the ability to counter and deny competitors across the spectrum of conflict.

Dr Robbin Laird, Conference: The Requirements of a Sovereign Defence Space Capability 1 December 2021: A Williams Foundation Special Report, 8 January 2022 In this report, the key themes and presentations at the December 2021, Williams Foundation seminar on The Requirements of a Sovereign Defence Space Capability are highlighted. A number of interviews with participants are included. Download the report here Introduction Recently, the Williams Foundation held its latest bi-annual seminar, this one focused on the way ahead for the Australian space enterprise. Since 2014, the Williams Foundation has held bi-annual seminars on the transformation of the ADF as it embraced fifth generation warfare and working joint force integration. Since 2018, the focus has been increasingly with regard to how to extend the reach of the ADF given the changing nature of the challenges facing Australia in the Indo-Pacific region. The discussions really began with a 2018 seminar which focused on the importance of long-range strike and was followed by seminars which focused on ways to enhance Australian resilience and sovereign capabilities. The first seminar of 2021 focused on next generation autonomous systems, and the 1 December 2021, seminar on where autonomous systems, namely satellites, have been a regular feature for both military and commercial purposes for many decades. The Williams Foundation program announcing the seminar highlighted the purpose and focus of the seminar: The Requirements of a Sovereign Defence Space Capability When the United States Air Force conceived and established the Space-based Global Positioning System in 1973 to enable more accurate military navigation, few would have imagined the impact it would have on modern society, the Western national security apparatus, and the Australian way of life. Fast forward to 2021, global economic security is now dependent on Space-based capabilities, and Defence must play an increasingly prominent role given the quantum of global trade which passes through the region, a third of which transits through the South China Sea. There are now over 2,600 satellites in orbit and the Australian Defence Force has become increasingly dependent on a sophisticated blend of Space-related technologies which must now develop and accelerate to meet the demands of integrated multi-domain operations to counter new threats and new risks. These demands include resilient long-range communications, and greater levels of situational awareness with the ability to sense, track and identify targets in and from Space in all orbits. On the supply side, current Space capacity is insufficient to meet these demands, and the need for a sovereign capability must be driven by a better understanding of the full spectrum of Space-related requirements across policy, process, infrastructure, and technology. The imperative to develop Space capability must consider the people and organisational aspects which leverage Australia’s relatively small but highly skilled population. It will require a national effort to leverage people, technology and Australia’s vast geographical area of interest and highly favourable environmental conditions to conduct activities in and from Space. Space is becoming increasingly congested and contested and likely to become a warfighting domain in future high intensity conflicts in the Indo-Pacific region, as well as an essential campaign enabler for Shape Deter and Respond missions and tasks. This will drive the need for increased survivability of Space-based systems and the ability to counter and deny competitors across the spectrum of conflict. https://sldinfo.com/2022/01/the-requirements-of-a-sovereign-defence-space-capability/ The e-book version can be found here: https://defense.info/williams-foundation/2022/01/the-williams-foundation-seminar-on-building-sovereign-defence-space-capability/

Brian Weston 'On Target - 'Then Now Always ‒ Centenary of the RAAF' in Australian Defence Business Review, Mar/Apr 2021 p.84 The Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) celebrated its centenary on 31 March 2021, with the underlying theme of Then Now Always. Then traces the growth of the RAAF from its heritage of the Australian Flying Corps, through peace and war, to the potent middle-weight air force that is the RAAF of today. The Now is the RAAF of today ‒ an exemplary and respected national institution of trust, esteem, service and sacrifice, all of which provides the RAAF with a sound base to meet the challenges of the future ‒ the Always. As much has already been written about the Then and Now, this column will focus on the Always. There seems little doubt the commencement of the second 100 years of the RAAF will be dominated, possibly for decades, by a challenging and deteriorating geo-strategic scenario in the Indo-Pacific, where an increasingly assertive and belligerent China is determined to expand its power and influence over much of the region. Past prognostications of the progressive development of China into a valued international player of substance ‒ the consequence of enhanced education, free international trade, greater international capital flows, a growing economy, adherence to post-World War II international protocols, accompanied by an expanding democratisation ‒ are distant memories as the reality is that such a development will put the Chinese Communist Party’s hold on power at risk. The Chinese Communist Party has learnt well from how these developments unleashed internal forces which led to the fracturing of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and fellow- traveller European communist nations, some 30 years ago. All of which has resulted in a Chinese Communist Party consolidating its iron rule over its citizens, while China’s leader, Xi Jinping, has entrenched himself as leader of China. Xi Jinping concurrently occupies the following powerful appointments: General Secretary of the Communist Party of China; Chairman of the Central Military Commission (Commander-in-chief of the People’s Liberation Army); President of the People's Republic of China; and Chairman of the National Security Commission of the Communist Party of China. Also, Xi Jinping, in 2012, was designated as China’s Paramount Leader and, in 2018, he removed the presidential limits which previously limited the duration of occupancy of the office of President of the People's Republic of China. With Xi Jinping entrenched as the autocratic leader of the People's Republic of China, the Chinese Communist Party has put in place comprehensive monitoring and surveillance, and control and propaganda systems, to suppress any emergent democratic or populist initiatives especially with regard to free speech. The prospects of the Chinese Communist Party conceding power seem remote. Internationally, Xi Jinping has initiated an expansion of China’s power and influence, especially regionally, by pursuing initiatives that extend beyond the bounds of accepted post-World War II norms, while marking itself as a global strategic competitor to the United States. Every indication is that Australia will need to contend with the Chinese Communist Party’s rising hegemonic aspirations for years to come ‒ and in that context, the future theme for the RAAF, Always, needs to be set. In this environment, Australia’s first strategic response will be diplomacy ‒ skilled, professional and astute, comprising both unilateral and multinational initiatives with the emerging Quadrilateral Dialogue between Australia, Japan, India and the United States a prospective, powerful diplomatic tool, notwithstanding the alliance with the United States remains core to Australia’s future national security. A second response must include the development of Australia’s cyber capabilities as in grey-zone confrontation, cyber-attack by state-sponsored actors is an attractive weapon of choice. A third response is the strengthening and diversification of Australia’s economic base with less reliance on China as a trading partner and with the rebuilding of selected, vital Australian economic and industrial capabilities to ensure enhanced levels of Australian self-reliance; both of which will need to be done in partnership with Australian business and industry. But all three responses will achieve little unless backed by credible, regional military presence and power; a role well-suited to a potent, middleweight air force with reach, speed, presence, spatial awareness, flexibility, regional responsiveness and strike power ‒ all appropriate attributes of an air force with a future theme of Always, but which raises the question of how the RAAF should further evolve to meet this challenge. Presently, the capability of the RAAF has been much enhanced with the introduction of the F-35A and its support enablers of the Wedgetail airborne early warning and control capability and the KC-30A air-to-air refuelling capability; plus, the emerging complementary team of the P-8A Poseidon and MQ-4C Triton platforms, together with the EA-18G Growler and the MC-55 Peregrine ‒ all augmented by a capable regional air mobility force of C-17A, C-130J and C-27J platforms. The question is how should the RAAF evolve further in accordance with its theme of Always in the face of increasing future challenges. Brian Weston is a Board Member of the Sir Richard Williams Foundation Download PDF here

Brian Weston 'On Target - ' Operational Presence and Persistence ‒ Personnel' in Australian Defence Business Review, Jan/Feb 2021 p.72 The previous On Target column noted that while the RAAF has evolved into a potent middle-weight air force well-suited to operations in the nearer, Indo-Pacific region, the current air force capability ‒ and indeed the broader ADF capability ‒ will be sorely stretched if required to sustain a high tempo of operations for lengthy periods. The column also noted that in times of great power competition, competing nations will often place markers ‘in the sand’ to identify those issues and interests that involve a nation’s vital national interests. In that way, a nation can issue unambiguous warnings to strategic competitors which caution competitors to restrain their activities and expansions so as not to violate a nation’s vital national interests. But placing markers ‘in the sand’ without clear messaging of resolve may not deter further confrontation as messaging without resolve will likely achieve little. Strategic messaging must therefore be reinforced with actions that indicate resolve, commitment and capability. One avenue for a nation to indicate resolve is through pre-emptive military activities. Typically, these military activities, while pre-emptive, should be non-provocative and conform to international protocols. Presence and patrol operations, and of the conduct of surveillance and reconnaissance operations, are one such use of a nation’s military capabilities. In some circumstances, forward-deployed presence and patrol forces alone, may be inadequate to signify both the resolve and capability of a nation to defend its vital national interests, which could require the precautionary deployment of more substantial combat capabilities. The deployment of these forces to supporting locations, probably towards the rear of the theatre but on heightened alert levels, should provide a credible deterrent to escalation. Given these scenarios, and the distances and strategic disposition of Australia’s interests in the nearer Indo-Pacific, it is timely to enquire about the preparedness of Australia’s defence forces to sustain these operations; the nature of which should not be confused with past patterns of deployments, of one frigate or one airborne warning and control aircraft or one tanker, to the Middle East. Of particular concern given the scale of Australia’s theatre of interest, the nature of military presence and patrol operations, and of the open-ended timescales involved, is the preparedness of the RAAF, and of the wider ADF, to meet such a challenge ‒ especially regarding the numbers of trained defence personnel necessary in the sustainment of continuing, precautionary, presence and patrolling operations across a vast theatre. In such a scenario it is not just the need to sustain a higher tempo of operations, but that the increased tempo may have to be sustained for lengthy periods of time which will necessitate the augmentation of front-line operational personnel with qualified and experienced ‘reserve’ operatives, something that is not presently in the air force order of battle. The introduction of long range, long endurance, unmanned systems will assist, but even unmanned systems require operational augmentation as the numbers of unmanned human operatives increase dramatically once open-ended 24/7 operations are commenced. Similarly, tactical and operational level control centres will require augmentation to sustain 24/7 operations‒something that was not necessary when the RAAF, and the ADF, avoided this workload by ‘piggy-backing’ limited numbers of operational personnel into coalition‒mainly US‒tactical and operational level control centres. Further to the rear, command and control centres, data analysis and dissemination centres, and communication centres will need augmentation, together with critical supporting national level agencies including cyber and space. Where will these specialist personnel come from, given neither the air force, nor navy, has an extant large ‘reserve’ component, and neither are these specialist skills readily available in Australia’s civilian population‒apart from a small pool of recently retired air force and navy personnel. Unlike the Australian Army, which has a long tradition of using militia, citizen and reserve forces to augment the Regular Army, Australia’s air force and navy have not established credible and substantial ‘institutionalised’ air force and navy reserve forces. Compounding the limited availability of personnel is that few will have the required level of security clearance to operate and support ADF operations given the high security classification levels of ADF systems‒a seemingly simple issue but, in reality, a far more complex problem. In conclusion, in the strategic circumstances currently evolving in the Indo-Pacific, it is not difficult to conceive of scenarios that must be confronted with not only determined and skilled diplomacy but also the deployment of operational military forces that lay down the markers ‘in the sand’; such as, a sustained military presence, the conduct of continuing surveillance and patrol operations, and of the precautionary deployment of combat capabilities. Yet how is this to be achieved when neither air force, nor navy, has the personnel augmentation policies and capabilities necessary to sustain the 24/7 operations of such forces over long periods of time. Brian Weston is a Board Member of the Sir Richard Williams Foundation Download PDF here