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This week, FLTLT Joshua Vicino asks the question – how can Defence maximise the brain power of its people with engineering degrees in a post-FPR world where a typical engineering degree isn’t of great assistance in a ‘govern and assure’ role. The story is always the same. An Engineering Officer newly posted to Capability Acquisition and Sustainment Group (CASG) arrives to a vague and non-descript duty statement with little understanding of what they’re supposed to do. In an attempt to prove their usefulness, they send emails, attend meetings, and read documents, all the while wondering in bewilderment how the system seems to function with such an open ended approach to posting. Confronted with this exact situation, I at least enjoyed the benefit of a newly established formal induction training session. The session explained core System Program Office (SPO) business in the post First Principles Review (FPR) world. It covered planning, governing, and assuring the ‘actual’ work of capability acquisition, which was expected to be contracted out at every opportunity. Like many others in my position, I had never worked in an acquisition agency before, and most definitely had never undertaken any of the detailed development and analysis tasking that is associated with the delivery of complex military systems. Confronted with this guidance and a prevailing sense of panic at not understanding my new role, I asked the presenter how I was supposed to plan, govern, and assure such work given my limited experience and skillset. The answer contained advice that is now infused in my identify: ‘Josh, you’re a smart dude with an engineering degree; you’ll figure it out.’ Now, I’m not going to lie. This was simultaneously the most liberating and the most terrifying thing that I had ever heard. On the one hand, it was liberating to know that I had the support and backing of my organisation to put my best foot forward. On the other hand, it was terrifying. I witnessed Senator Penny Wong observe at a Senate Estimate Hearing that, cumulatively speaking, there are ‘around 39 Defence projects running a total of 79 years late and 17 major projects running $4.3 billion over budget’. I couldn’t help but feel like I was part of the problem. In acknowledging this fact we must ask; how can Defence maximise all the utility and brain power afforded by smart people with engineering degrees in a post FPR world? Delving Deeper Internal reporting, community sentiment, and personal experience describe a problem characterised by an inadequate understanding of job requirements, underpinned by a lack of appropriate training and education that is feeding a broader skills shortage. An internal study into engineering support identified that suitable training is not provided to SPO personnel on how to fuse governance and assurance practices with contracted organisations who undertake the ‘actual’ work of delivering technical services. The study goes on to note that at best, Commonwealth staff will often infer good governance and assurance practice through ad hoc comments provided in a range of disparate training courses. Additionally, the internal study found that the govern and assure practices espoused by the FPR create major difficulties for SPOs in retaining engineering competencies in their Commonwealth workforce. This in turn was identified as a factor that inhibits the provision of engineering support. Such findings were reinforced at a recent CASG engineering conference, where participants commented on the difficulty of recruiting and retaining sufficiently qualified people who can operate in the new govern and assure paradigm. In particular, one organisation noted that they have been carrying a crucial vacancy at the engineering executive level for nearly two years. Given the requirement for CASG to principally undertake ‘govern and assure’ practices, it must be noted that a typical engineering degree isn’t of great assistance here either. Speaking to my own experience, whilst I can do math and write code (not very well, I admit), I am yet to see a great deal of relevance in recursive least squares optimisation methods or multivariate vector calculus to the role of a CASG engineering Officer. Now, having suitably described the problem, the question remains - what to do about it? Solving the Problem I believe there are two parts to this – Firstly; training in the core competencies associated with governance and assurance within SPOs. Secondly; greater education on broader, more philosophical aspects of how to think and behave in a large, complex organisation such as CASG. Much like the maintenance organisation training that Engineering Officers receive in anticipation of posting to an operational Squadron, CASG incumbents require short (i.e. one or half day) courses that tackle what it means to ‘plan, govern, and assure’. Training should include examples that link these practices back to one’s current project context. This is best thought of as a vocational trade based program – members undertake on the job training at work, learning from experienced hands like Chief Engineers, Chief Logisticians, resident ‘olds and bolds’ (you know who I mean - we’ve all got them, remember to give yours a high-five at work tomorrow) whilst simultaneously getting the equivalent of one day a week at trade school. This approach is designed to help members understand the ‘nuts and bolts’ (no, dear reader, I will not be pardoning this pun) of their duty statement as they slowly stitch it together with ‘real world’ experience over the course of their posting. Secondly, members need support for attending longer (i.e. one/two week) courses on more philosophical topics such as organisational leadership, behaviour, and change etc. These courses, the kinds of which are offered by Business schools across the country, are the types of longer term professional development programs that need to be provided in order to open Defence members up to alternate approaches and broader perspectives. If we continue to raise junior members in the ways of old then we simply grow them in the image of the past, serving only to exacerbate our current state of being perpetually over budget and late to need. Closing Remarks It is a well-known fact that Defence’s Engineering Officers are smart, and indeed, have engineering degrees (it’s a requirement of the job). However, the clearly documented deficiencies in training, education, and skills suggest that a degree alone is insufficient for the needs of the organisation. Indeed, my personal experience of CASG to date has left me feeling like an apprentice who isn’t getting their day a week at trade school - untrained in core skills, making it up as I go, and wondering when the house is going to fall down. If Defence is to address Senator Wong’s observation that it is ‘79 years late’ and ‘4.3 billion dollars over budget’ across a suite of projects, then these problems need to be addressed. As articulated in this thought piece, the solutions need not be excessively complicated or, dare I say it, even ‘innovative’. What it does require though is suitable training, delivered at the right time, and by the right people. Flight Lieutenant Joshua Vicino is an Electronics Engineer working in the Royal Australian Air Force. He holds a Bachelor of Science and Master of Electrical Engineering from The University of Melbourne. He is currently the Project Engineering Manager for Project AIR7000 Phase 1B - MQ-4C Triton Acquisition.

This week we return to one of our core writing themes for this year - #FutureChiefs. In this instalment, TCB editor Luke Webb explores a new role for future CAFs – that of technology leader. Should future Chiefs of Air Force (CAF) be the leaders and figureheads of an aviation enterprise, or some other organisational ontology? It’s my contention that the centre of gravity of Air Force is moving from being a flying enterprise to a knowledge-actor network that’s fuelled by a range of advanced technologies – both in the air/orbit and on the ground. As such, future CAF’s will be charged with developing, advancing, and exerting the effects that spring from this Blue intellectual force and its associated technologies base – all in addition to the existing suite of responsibilities CAFs are expected to fulfil. Sure, the Air Force of the future will still do plenty of flying and exerting effects, and the prospect of the enterprise echoing a Silicon Valley tech behemoth is not likely the most relevant model to adopt despite the burgeoning technology stack that powers Air Force. But whilst Air Force is not a technology outfit, it reverts to an aviation social club without a high degree of tech-centricity [1], and this, I argue, means that a #FutureChief needs to add technology leader to their epaulettes. A parallel to examine would be the leaders of other public sector organisations like DSTG, CSIRO and the Chief Scientist of Australia. Individuals who know their technical tradecraft, but whose role and identity are not so firmly set around deep domain expertise. Instead, these are leaders who have substantial experience in transformations – whether in launching new high-tech start-ups (such as Alan Finkel), leading major research efforts whilst managing many risks and unknowns (such as Professor Graeme Clark) or making breakthroughs in areas of significant complexity and communicating these to non-technical audiences (such as Professor Lisa Harvey-Smith). They’re effective managers of the business of discovery, experimentation, and transformation, and not just of the end-products of science & technology (S&T) processes. Articulating how a future Air Force will likely be shaped by technology and intellect management would fill a series of articles, but as technology cycles shorten and the reliance on the technical expertise of its people increases, the success of Air Force will depend on far more than the ability to launch airborne sorties. It will become an organisation that needs to constantly evolve its technology and intellectual network to produce the effects that modern conflict will demand of it. Therefore, it will need a leader that is intimately aware of the fragility of evolving an organisation along these lines. To empower this vision, I’d argue #FutureChiefs will need to expand their role to include (or beef up) the following personas: An aerospace power futurist (or at least someone who can listen and respond to futurists, but with a critical lens). A Socratic master – the key knowledge provocateur and instigator of deeper organisational thinking and learning A narrative setter and a storyteller – painting the vision of how the enterprise needs to change and its ‘next state’ intent An ambassador to the Government of the day and an educator of the stakeholders that will shape the enterprise’s future. Articulating constant change is a delicate art and a time-consuming activity – especially when a major strand to this effort is masterly explaining failure and uncertainty The Chief attorney & ethicist to lead and challenge technological developments to be in line with the codified and uncodified expectations of the national (and increasingly international) citizenry whom Air Force serves. The Air Force of the future will face significant challenges around information mobility and rapid sensemaking. Whilst a future CAF won't be the primary technology architect, it will be their role to empower the Air Force ecosystem to continue iterating, adapting, and changing. It will require a leader who not only recognises the complexity and dependencies of the tail-to-tooth chain of Air Force, but who also has an instinct to lead its successful adaptation to deliver ever-new aerospace-derived effects – all without losing its aviation professionalism that makes Air Force such a unique organisation. [1] And by tech-centricity, this is not to assert that technology is the one core strand of DNA of Air Force. Aerospace power relies on the masterful skill and knowledge of its people, using their experience to leverage technology to produce effects in, from and through air & space. This piece assumes that the growing focus on Air Force people will remain a core part of CAF’s role (along with all the other existing components) and rather advocates for another important strand to future CAFs’ work - leading Air Force in S&T mastery. Luke Webb is a Melbourne-based aerospace engineer, casual academic & science communicator. He is the Chair of the Melbourne Branch of the Royal Aeronautical Society, and one of the editors of The Central Blue.

Editorial Note: Between February and April 2018, The Central Blue and From Balloons to Drones, will be publishing a series of articles that examine the requirements of high-intensity warfare in the 21st Century. These articles provide the intellectual underpinnings to a seminar on high-intensity warfare being held on 22 March by the Williams Foundation in Canberra, Australia. In this article, Dr Randall Wakelam examines the importance of education for aviators in the 21st Century. While drawing on the experience of the Royal Canadian Air Force, Wakelam argues that while the value of education is often hard to quantify, it is nonetheless an essential aspect in the development of airmen who need to master the profession of arms and the challenges associated with that idea. His argument transcends national boundaries and applies to any large, medium, or small air force seeking to prepare for the challenges posed by the future operating environment. I have a prejudice: My prejudice is that airmen do not like thinking: Airmen are obsessed with bombs, fuses, cockpits and screens and are actually rather uncomfortable exploring the underpinning logic and doctrine: So producing a thinking air force is a strategic requirement. Air Chief Marshal Sir Brian Burridge, RAF Air Power Review, 2004 In Burridge’s statement from the early years of this century, one can readily see that education for air power professionals has been and will continue to be important for the successful management of air forces both regarding national and international processes like procurement and collation operations and the day to day conduct of air operations. However, the caution that he offers about discomfort for education is equally important, and his concern is not new. Indeed one of the central themes of Carl Builder’s study of the USAF – The Icarus Syndrome – was that leaders had too often shifted their focus from the tough questions of running the institution to a more limited attention to technologies and air vehicles.[1] Moreover, we see a similar tendency to eschew non-technical aspects of air power in the early days of the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) College where of a 5,500-hour, four-year syllabus, fully 1,955 hours were spent on the sciences, while only 230 were dedicated to history, war studies, and imperial defence issues. There was no non-technical course on air power theory. In the view of former RAAF historian Alan Stephens, ‘the Air Force [was] very plainly identifying itself as a technocracy.’[2] Building on these examples and concerns I want to argue that education is good for the RCAF, both for individuals and for the institution. A recent RCAF Journal article ‘Professional Airpower Mastery and the RCAF’ also makes the point, stating that Canada’s air force is very good tactically, but that beyond this it lacks the ability to be as effective as it might at higher levels of warfighting or in the broad domain of national and international security.[3] At those levels, we, again both individually and institutionally, tend to muddle through problems – sometimes successfully, sometimes less so. To put that article in context for an Australian audience, it should be noted that one of the many sources used by those authors was Sanu Kainikara’s 2011 work At the Critical Juncture: The Predicament of Small Air Forces.[4] Returning to a Canadian context, a late 1960s study, The Report of the Officer Development Board (ODB), posited that all officers move away from hands-on tactical and technical expertise fairly early in their careers, replacing those technical and tactical ‘occupational skills’ with broader pan-service and then pan-Canadian Forces/whole of government ‘military expertise’ competencies.[5] This progression is as true of the RCAF as it is of the Royal Canadian Navy or the Canadian Army. More to the point of this article, the ODB also stated that officers needed to start their service with a strong intellectual ability and then have to grow that as the challenges they confront become less predictable. The ODB made this point in the context of a world which was dominated by tense geopolitical circumstances, burgeoning technological advances and security challenges that ranged from superpower standoff to asymmetric conflict to the full range of peace support operations.[6] Things are not much different today. We are called upon to deal with the often abstract and chaotic problems of the 21st century using what the ODB labelled called ‘executive and military executive abilities’. Major-General David Fraser, then just returned from commanding Regional Command South in Kandahar, made a similar observation in a 2006 lecture at the Canadian Forces College, pointing out that at the tactical level leaders need to have the intellectual agility, and associated confidence to be able to deviate from a plan when circumstances dictate.[7] However, he went on to argue that while at the tactical level circumstances can be complicated, at the operational and strategic levels of war decision makers often face complexity, overlaid with ambiguity and chaos – what is often called the wicked problem. We learn technical and tactical skills through training for the most part, but the broader competencies are more generally the product of education. Training allows for standardised responses to predictable circumstances whereas education permits reasoned responses to unpredictable circumstances.[8] Training can be relatively well measured as we can see in the course training standards and training and education plans that form the basis of hundreds of qualifications. From Robert Smith-Barry’s reforms to pilot training that he implemented a century ago today we implicitly understand the value of standardised training for aircrew and more broadly for all air force hands-on competencies. Knowing that your winger knows what she or he is doing; knowing that the techs have done their snag rectification by the book and that battle managers understand clearly what they can do to assist in the fight allows each of us to perform confidently. Moreover, all these skills and knowledge are based on a validated training system which ensures technical and tactical competence. Education, and its value is, on the other hand, a bit less quantifiable: does a Bachelor’s in aeronautical engineering equate to an effective aircraft designer or a skilled technical authority? Does a Master’s in International Relations make for an effective commanding officer (CO) when deployed on coalition operations or an astute policy analyst proposing changes to air force roles and structures? In these examples, the answers are probably yes, but there is no easily applied ‘training standard’ to tell us so. The ODB said that the undergraduate degree provided a necessary ‘training of the mind’ and a graduate degree in areas related to the profession of arms was a useful and necessary enrichment both in knowledge and intellectual capacity.[9] Those thoughts from 50 years ago are all well and good, but those who do not have a degree, or an advanced degree often seem to do ‘just fine’.  However, what does just fine mean? It may mean that success has not come from an optimal application of thinking power – allowing a logical, viable solution. Rather, it may mean that a solution is derived from a limited perspective based on the individual’s limited or skewed sense of the issues. Education is not a guaranteed antidote to the latter problems, but it frequently offers the learner new ways of considering evidence and weighing alternatives. Indeed, this was the implicit message in the RCAF’s curriculum of the RCAF War Staff Course. Air Commodore George Wait, the Staff College’s first commandant, had an opportunity to offer his thoughts on the content and conduct of the syllabus and by extension the notion of a professional development philosophy that combined training and education. He wrote: [t]he backbone of the course consists of a series of lectures on staff duties given by the Directing Staff, which leads students through service writing, precis writing, appreciations and orders and instructions.  The students then put their knowledge to work by doing a series of practical problems on the employment of air power.[10] However, to give this routine staff training some added richness the programme of studies also included lectures given by well-qualified visiting speakers, both officers and civilian officials, on a variety of topics, including other services, allied and enemy forces, matters of the strategic direction of the war, and war production. ‘Only by such a means,’ Wait had said in earlier correspondence with Air Force Headquarters, ‘can the students be given the broader and more authoritative outlook that they will require in staff positions.’[11] The same notion of broad education was stated more explicitly in the late 1950s in the RCAF Staff College’s syllabus: The RCAF Staff College makes no attempt to graduate experts in a particular field, nor does it expound any easy universally applicable doctrines. Rather by providing its graduates with an education of the broadest scope and by developing habits of clear thinking, it attempts to provide them with the breadth of interest, openness of mind, reasoning ability, and a broad view of their Service and profession, which will enable them to master the specific tasks of any appointment and to make sound decisions in any situation. (emphasis added)[12] Much of my original paper had been drafted before the 7 June 2017 release of Canada’s new defence policy ‘Strong, Secure, Engaged’. Reading through it and ‘blue sky’ imagining the work needed to implement the policy one cannot but think that it will require big and imaginative minds to deal with how we make good on the vision and indeed there are repeated references to flexibility of mind and the utility of education. Tactical excellence alone, one can surmise, will not guarantee success. Practically, how do we do develop a learning strategy that ensures policy ends? The recently restructured and re-energised RCAF officer professional development system offers a flight plan towards realising this goal. First, we have confirmed the need for all officers to achieve, or in certain special cases to be on the path to achieving, an undergraduate degree before commissioning. As of 2016, in Canada, we now have a course – the Air Power Operations Course (APOC), that looks remarkably similar to the War Staff Course, albeit only 60 percent as long. Finally, there is a vision, yet to be defined and approved, for expanded senior officer education, this to be achieved through focused workshops of several days or a few weeks duration depending on the topic. The APOC has six ‘performance objectives’, the first being a learning outcome to develop the air-mindedness of students, who are drawn from all RCAF occupations, so that they can work collaboratively with officers across all flying and technical communities within the RCAF and can explain and represent the air power concepts and practices to officers in joint headquarters and other services. The second objective is to develop staff officer competencies in clear and logical thinking and communications. The remaining objectives – planning of operations in deployed and coalition situations – build on the first two and expose students to the complexity of modern air operations, and this in a service where tactical and maritime helicopters (and everything else that flies) are air force resources. What the more senior follow-on courses might look like is still very much undefined, but the wisdom of the 1959 syllabus would suggest that a tactically oriented curriculum will not do. What senior air force leaders need is something more. This same idea was much in evidence in a recent Australian Defence Force study. The following are extracts from ‘The Chiefs: A Study of Strategic Leadership.’[13] The report reaches three major conclusions, relating respectively to individual development, organisational development and leadership style. These conclusions are that: for the ambitious officer, “what got you here won’t get you there”; for the military institution, “what got us here won’t get us there”; and the principle that “leadership is a team sport” is just as valid at the senior level as it is lower in the organisation.[14] It is recommended that: the core JPME [Joint Professional Military Education] effort (or at least that from mid-career onwards) be oriented around the four strategic leadership roles of Strategic Leader, Strategic Builder, Strategic Director and Steward of the Profession. such JPME be focused on preparing officers for future roles in both leadership and support for senior leaders. officers from mid-career onwards periodically be exposed to and engage with contemporary and evolving issues at the strategic level, with exercises that require them to examine the responsibilities and skills needed for the Director-Leader-Manager-Steward forms within their own current and immediate-future career roles. (For example, as part of preparation for ship/unit command, O4 and O5 could examine the application of these four roles to that level of command and the level of command immediately above it.) such engagement use active rather than passive modes of learner behaviour. each Service continue with the current encouraging trend of introducing career models that enable selected officers to develop in-depth specialisations within relevant fields – not just within “personnel management” and “project management/technology” but also within economics, politics and military sociology.[15] We can see that technical and tactical competencies are no guarantee to success at higher levels of command and leadership and that organisations that are similarly successful like likely need to approach institutional and national/international challenges with ways and means (intellectually and practically) that differ from what works in tactical situations. Some, if not all the Australian Defence Force’s recommendations for learning could be implemented within the RCAF’s professional education programme, but there is much to be gained from learning environments outside the air force. The recent introduction of sponsored assignments to complete a Masters in War Studies at the Royal Military College (with a focus on air power topics) is one such avenue. Similarly, a new internship programme, with placements in think tanks, industry and government will expose air force officers to different ways of thinking, planning and operating. Where does this leave us as we advance through the new century? As suggested at the outset a narrow focus on technical and tactical proficiency, while necessary, cannot be the nexus of professional education. Many observers and practitioners have noted this. A broad blend of intellectual dexterity coupled with both hands-on skills and broad knowledge would seem to have been and remains today the essence of professional effectiveness and thus the desired outcome of an aviator’s education. Dr Randall Wakelam teaches military and air power history at the Royal Military College of Canada.  After graduating from RMC in 1975 he flew helicopters for the Army, becoming CO of 408 Tactical Helicopter Squadron in 1991. Along the way, he also had staff appointments in aircraft procurement and language training policy. Since 1993 he has been an educator, first in uniform at the Canadian Forces College in Toronto and now at RMC. His research and publishing focus on air power and military education. *A shorter version of this paper was first drafted for the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) in the Fall of 2017, but both it and this version are the products of about 30 years of thinking about how military professionals can best educate themselves.  Where the examples used are largely specific to historical and contemporary Canadian experience there is, I believe, much that is common to most, if not all, modern air forces. [1] Carl Builder, The Icarus Syndrome:  Air Power Theory and the Evolution of the Air Force (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Press, 1998). [2] Alan Stephens, Power Plus Attitude: Ideas, Strategy and Doctrine in the Royal Australian Air Force 1921-1991 (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1992), pp. 109–11. [3] Brad Gladman et al, ‘Professional Airpower Mastery and the RCAF,’ RCAF Journal, 5:1 (2016), pp. 8-23. [4] Sanu Kainikara, At the Critical Juncture: The Predicament of Small Air Forces (Canberra: Air Power Development Centre, 2011). [5] Randall Wakelam and Howard Coombs (eds.) The Report of the Officer Development Board: Major-General Roger Rowley and the Education of the Canadian Forces (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2010), p. 46. The same issue applies to senior warrant officers as they reach formation (wing, air group, etc.) and national level senior appointments where they must be able to understand the sorts of challenges their commanders face. [6] Ibid, pp. 26-31. [7] Major-General David Fraser, Lecture to the Advanced Military Studies Course, Canadian Forces College Toronto, October 2006. [8] Ronald Haycock, ‘Historical and Contemporary Aspects of Canadian Military Education’ in Greg Kennedy and Keith Neilson (eds.) Military Education:  Past, Present, and Future (Westport, CT.: Praeger, 2002), p. 171. [9] Wakelam and Coombs, Officer Development Board, p. 40. [10] William R. Shields and Dace Sefers, Canadian Forces Command and Staff College: A History 1797-1946 (Toronto: Canadian Forces College History Project, Canadian Forces College, 1987), pp. 4-15. [11] Ibid, pp. 4-16. [12] R.C.A.F. Staff College Calendar Course 23 (1958-9), “Conclusion.” [13] Nicholas Jans, Stephen Mugford, James Cullens and Judy Fraser-Jans, ‘The Chiefs:  A Study of Strategic Leadership’ (Canberra:  Australian Defence College, 2013). [14] Ibid, p. 111. [15] Ibid, p. 113. #Training #PME #RAAF #organisationalculture #PMET #AirPower #AirForce #Education

Is it possible to reconceptualise the value of failure to the RAAF and its operational effectiveness? In this new #FailureWins post, Christopher Kourloufas examines the notion of complex failure and its valuable counterbalance known as ‘intelligent failures’. In doing so, he explores ‘safe to fail’ experimentation concepts and how they can enhance Air Force professional mastery. Failure is neither always bad nor always good – what matters is the context. Any response to failure must be tuned to the context within which it occurs. Especially if we want to encourage positive behaviours of our people and teams in the increasingly complex operational environment. Is it possible to reconceptualise the value of failure to our organisation and operational effectiveness? The focus of this piece is complex failure, and its valuable counterbalance known as ‘intelligent failures’. What I’m not talking about are the preventable failures - those caused by deviations from accepted procedures (See ‘types of failure’ insert). Air Force relationship with failure Failure within the Air Force is generally not an option that is welcomed. Failure is indeed bad in certain contexts. However, given the complex and uncertain nature of military operations, jumping to simple explanations can neglect the nuance of the situation, opportunities for learning and ways of gaining advantage. Our understanding of failure is coloured by our experience in training, aviation safety and risk management settings. For instance, trainees passing or failing against performance metrics for fitness, weapon safety and courses. In an aviation safety setting, failure is dealt with in a dry, technical way – part failure, procedural failure, system failure. And within risk management, failure is related to the non-achievement of an outcome. Failure is something to be detected, reported, analysed and managed. And the risk of failure is to be controlled (to avoid it) or mitigated (to respond to it). All of this adds up to a strong, negative conception of failure for the aviator. It encourages failure avoidance at all costs – which leaves opportunity on the table, could lead to hiding failure or potentially punishment for individuals responsible for failure. In spite of nice sentiments about learning from failure’s lessons and the sprinkling of thought leaders within the organisation that embody this, the brutal fact is that it simply is not valued by the organisation. For instance, failure is dealt with in a superficial way in both the leadership and learning doctrines, providing little nuance for the military professional. Other hints come from examining how we view the success of our people. Success is fundamental to our promotion, performance reporting and awards systems. We format individual reporting narratives with templates like ‘Did-Achieved-Demonstrated’ and previously ‘Situation-Task-Action-Result’. What this emphasises, is that behaviour is valued on the basis of achievement, results and demonstrable outcomes. This prevents the possibility to set conditions for a possible future whose results may not be apparent for some time. The preference then is for the present, the status-quo. The shallow narratives that we craft, however, leave the reader with no appreciation of the means for how these results came about. They are also prone to cognitive biases, for example, the ‘narrative fallacy’ which is the tendency to link unrelated events into a narrative and impose a pattern of causality. This cognitive trap typically overestimates the role of skill and underestimates the role of luck as factors of success. The challenge How is this resolved against the overwhelming body of evidence that has said for decades that ‘failure’ is neither a synonym for ‘incompetence’ nor always bad? There is a conflict between what is known within contemporary literature as being productive and our reflexive response to failure. And how do we progress from here, so that we can actively promote and nurture valuable ‘intelligent failure’ that acts as a counterbalance to complex failure? The complexity-failure relationship Our operations and capabilities grow ever more complex – and this is especially apparent within competition below the threshold of conflict. Competition is about gaining and maintaining relative advantage. It is a non-linear (temporally and in effect), continuous process that is not addressed via technological superiority. The expectation from our political and military leadership is that we must advance national interests in contexts that challenge our mental ‘map’ of the world. This is because ‘[our] map is not the actual territory’. What that means for us, is that we are spending more time at the ‘frontier’ of the profession of arms – where we leave the solid ground of ‘best practice’ and even ‘good practice’. Productive reactions to complexity flow in the order of ‘probe-sense-respond’. It is about pushing forward through the darkness of our understanding and illuminating as far forward as we can. This can be thought of as an experimental process during which we will of course face failure– but we can fail intelligently, too. ‘Safe to fail’ experiments The good news is that we don’t have to be scientists to carry out experiments at the frontier to generate novel practices. There is room for experimentation at all levels of the Air Force and in every workplace. Intelligent failures which result from experiments at the frontier provide valuable new knowledge that can help us leap ahead of a competitor or adversary. These experiments are small and pragmatic, they outline a direction and not a destination and have a focus on learning and sharing ideas. It’s a good idea to design the experiment so that the stakes are lowered as far as possible – and in some instances consequences may even be reversible. Experiments can be playful or run in parallel. Taking small, pragmatic steps toward a new direction can help constrain uncertainty and illuminate new ground of the frontier. The preferred direction could be called ‘mission command’ in the military sense; and in the business world, a shared vision of the future guides these experiments. Importantly, safe to fail experiments must be underpinned by Psychological Safety – the absence of interpersonal fear. That is, team members have a safe space to give constructive, critical feedback to surface errors and identify novel opportunities for improvement. Safe to fail experiment considerations I offer the below approach to carrying out experiments at the frontier adapted from the body of knowledge referenced so far. These experiments are investments into understanding a possible future state. Importantly, having a window into a potential future informs planning, management and decision making. I know from experience as a structural integrity engineer, however, that experiments will never be fully representative of real life and all the possible conditions faced in the future. Safe to fail experiments are also crucial investments in our people’s capacity to deal with ambiguity, uncertainty and complexity. It is imperative, then, that we continue to empower our professional masters to boldly explore uncharted territories. The value of failure to the Air Force We have an opportunity to reframe failure in a way that better prepares us for complexity and enables us to seize advantage that comes from ambiguity and novel situations. This is possible through the design and conduct of “safe to fail” experiments that produce intelligent failures. These valuable failures enhance decision making and help us navigate at the frontier of our professional mastery. As well as enriching our decision making, these experiments are productive ways to grow the capacity of our aviators to grapple with ambiguity and complexity. As members of the profession of arms, it is our responsibility to continue to courageously illuminate new frontiers so that we can further national objectives. [T]he only thing I know for sure after all of this research is that if you’re going to dare greatly, you’re going to get your ass kicked at some point. If you choose courage, you will absolutely know failure, disappointment, setback, even heartbreak. That’s why we call it courage. That’s why it’s so rare. - Brene Brown in Dare to Lead, 2018 Biography In an attempt to avoid the Dunning-Kruger Effect, Chris is sticking to what he knows – failure. As a structural integrity engineer, he has had a career focused on detecting, analysing and learning from failures. Understanding what can go wrong and influencing decision making at all levels of the Air Force has been crucial in keeping our personnel safe and capabilities effective.

Accelerating the Transition to a Networked, Integrated Force National Gallery of Australia 24 March 2022 Final Report Dr Robbin Laird Link to the final report on Defense.Info Download Final Report Synopsis and Program Download PDF Presentations Welcoming Remarks and Formal Close AIRMSHL Geoff Brown AO (Retd) Sir Richard Williams Foundation Introduction and MC John Conway Sir Richard Williams Foundation Keynote Address General Kenneth S. Wilsbach Commander, Pacific Air Forces Accelerating the Transition Air Vice-Marshal Robert Chipman AM, CSC Head Military Strategic Commitments Indo Pacific Context Lieutenant General Steven R. Rudder Commander, U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Pacific and Commanding General Fleet Marine Force 5th Gen Information Environment Major General Susan Coyle AM, CSC, DSM Head of Information Warfare Multi Domain operations Threats and Opportunities Air Vice-Marshal Chris Deeble AO, CSC (Retd) Executive Director, Strategy, Northrop Grumman Australia Not Just Platforms’ – Architectural & Policy Considerations Enabling Truly Effective 5th Gen Joint C2 Rod Equid Chief of Enterprise Focus Areas, Raytheon Australia The Italian Air Force, a 5th gen. Air Force and beyond Lieutenant General Aurelio Colagrande Italian Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff Acquiring and Sustaining Next Gen Capabilities Tony Dalton AM Deputy Secretary National Naval Shipbuilding UK Perspective Air Chief Marshal Sir Mike Wigston KCB, CBE, ADC Chief of the Air Staff Army Perspective Brigadier Ian Langford, DSC and Bars (PhD) Acting Head Land Capability (representing Chief of Army) Getting the bigger picture - Networking the Force Tom Rowden Vice President International Strategy and Business Development Lockheed Martin Rotary and Mission Systems Future Trends Peter Jennings PSM Executive Director, Australian Strategic Policy Institute Navy Perspective Commodore Darron Kavanagh AM CSC, RAN Director General Warfare Innovation – Navy Air Force Perspective Air Marshal Mel Hupfeld AO, DSC Chief of Air Force

Dr Robbin Laird 27 April 2022 At the Williams Foundation seminar on March 24, 2022, Peter Jennings, Executive Director of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, put it bluntly and directly to the audience: We are facing a significant defense threat, and we need to take it seriously and get prepared. A recent article by Greg Sheridan in The Australian raised a similar waring when he looked back to the 1930s and saw analogies to the current situation. “If the 2020s are really the 1930s all over again, how is it the government is not going to produce any significant new defence capabilities for the rest of this decade? “This decade does resemble the 1930s, not because we face a new Hitler or even a new imperial Japan but because of the utter fecklessness of defence policy and the miserable failure in defence of both sides of politics. Australian leaders spent the 1930s “admiring the problem” of defence. They understood Nazi Germany and imperial Japan and made sententious statements all through the decade. But they did almost nothing to provide significant Australian capabilities.” Peter Jennings speaking at the Williams Foundation seminar, March 24, 2022. Jennings noted that when Prime Minister Morrison introduced in July 2020, the new defense strategy, as an aside he was concerned that indeed the current decade had a resemblance to the global threats of the 1930s. Jennings highlighted what he sees as the key driver of this challenge, namely, what I refer to as the global threat from the 21st century authoritarian powers. Here is how he put it: “The publicly stated goals in terms of the world’s two most powerful authoritarian regimes are to break the international order and to remake it under their control. Beijing and Moscow’s, having both separate and shared interests, but their intent has been publicly articulated for at least a decade. One thing you can say about these authoritarian systems is that they do not disguise their plans. No one today could credibly claim that China is an enigma wrapped in a mystery. You just need to read Xi Jinping’s speeches….” He then underscored the question of how the authoritarian leaders have envisaged the way ahead. “We know Xi Jinping believes that the West, and the United States in particular, is in terminal decline. We know that Xi thinks of himself as a world’s historical figure, uniquely placed to hold China together and uniquely placed to force Taiwan into the People’s Republic. “I also think it’s fair to say that Xi Jinping’s view of Taiwan is somewhat like Putin’s in Ukraine shaped by emotion and by invented historical memory. In other words, this is not a bloodless game theory calculation. A war over Taiwan would ultimately be Xi Jinping’s war rather than China’s war, just as the war in Ukraine is Putin’s war, not necessarily Russia’s war. “But the tragedy of Russia and China is that their political systems have been purpose built to give one leader the capacity to take their country to war. And this is how unthinkable was happened.” But then what do Australia and the West need to do? Jennings warns: “As far as Australia is concerned, I think we find ourselves in a type of strategic twilight zone. We know we’re in such a crisis, or at least on the glide path to one. We also know that this is a crisis with the potential to grow into a global configuration. And yet, we are not behaving as though this is the reality we face. If we really thought that war was coming, wouldn’t we be doing things differently around the defense capability development today?” He underscored that Australia needs (and one could certainly add the United States to his warning) to focus on force building and strategic depth as an urgent matter for defense acquisition not only a process of long-term force building. Jennings articulated his concern as follows: “I do wonder if the defense obsession about building the perfect networks and integrated force has contributed to our current inability to change gear. Through all of my defense career, we were designing and equipping the defense force in a world where the pace of strategic change was an interesting artifact, rather than a clock ticking on Australia’s security. “We could take 20 years to design and deliver defense capability, and it didn’t really matter. “And what that meant was that we could polish those capabilities as though we were building the ultimate Hornby railway set, all designed to run around a beautifully networked and integrated track.” He then went back to his 2018 presentation at a Williams Foundation seminar to reinforce his concern and his point: “Four years ago, almost to the day at the 2018, Sir Richard Williams conference, I spoke on the topic of deterrence. And on that occasion, one thing I did was to advocate for the acquisition of the B-21 aircraft. My reasoning for this was that it would add substantial deterrent capability to an ADF, that looked to me, to be under gunned. Now, more credentialed people than me have also made this case. Had we gone down that track at the time of the 2016 defense white paper, we would have been well placed to see the arrival of B-21 currently in production sometime caught quite soon. Now, of course, that didn’t happen. And I would have to say that defense’s interest in that I idea was not so much zero as about minus 100.” As a result of the clash between geopolitical strategic reality and Australian perceptions, he forecast a “German moment” for Australia. “I think Australia is very soon going to have its own German moment. I’m sure you know that just weeks ago, Germany reversed some of its most entrenched defense and security policies, which had been embedded for decades. In response to the Ukraine crisis, Berlin under an SPD-Green government is doubling its defense expenditure and seeking to reverse a disastrously ill-considered set of energy policies that build dependence on Russia. “No one saw this coming. It happened because of a dire strategic need. Australia will have its Germany moment. No one is seeing it coming. It will happen because of a dire strategic need. “Now, if that floodgate unlocks, we will see, I think, a fundamental recasting of defense capability development plans. I don’t know where that leaves the networked an integrated force. Other than to say to you, get ready for big, fundamental changes, and the need for speed in acquisition.” Featured graphic: Photo 200885804 / Australia China © Leestat | Dreamstime.com Editor’s Note: This week the second of our three books to be published this year on the reshaping of defense was published in e-book form with the paperback to be published in June 2022. The first section of the book is entitled “crisis capabilities and escalation management” and highlights the work of Paul Dibb and Brendan Sargeant, both of whom certainly reinforce the argument of Jennings. Link to article: “Australia is Facing its German Moment” (Defense.info)

Dr Robbin Laird 27 April 2022 Interview with AIRMSHL Geoff Brown AO (Retd), Williams Foundation Chair The September 15, 2022 seminar to be held by the Williams Foundation will focus on the key question of how to enhance the lethality of the Australian Defense Force. In particular, the seminar will focus on the gaps and opportunities for the ADF driven by fifth generation airpower. The recent Williams Foundation seminar provided a prologue to the forthcoming seminar and focused on providing an assessment of where the ADF and allied forces are with regard to shaping 21st century integrated and networked forces. Recently, I discussed the seminar with the Foundations’ Chairman, Air Marshal (Retired) Geoff Brown and he provided a look back at the March 2022 seminar as well as highlighting the focus of the September 15, 2022 seminar as well. Geoff Brown: “We started down the path of working a more effective joint or integrated force effort several years ago. The seminar was designed to provide an assessment of the current state of the effort as well as discussing some ways to further enhance the integrated networked force effort. With the end of the COVID-19 perspectives, we were very pleased to have significant international participation in the seminar to provide a wider perspective on that way ahead as well. “I think we are clearly on the right path but we have major challenges remaining, notably on the acquisition side. Tom Rowden did make the point that he thought we were in a better place than the U.S., but we still have a slow-moving bureaucracy around how to get the kind of integrated capabilities which we want, especially when compared to how quickly the commercial sector can operate.” And there is the challenge of working integration forward with the legacy force as has been noted that the force which we will have in 20 years’ time will contain 80% of what we have now. Brown underscored that “we clearly need to integrate the legacy systems with new platforms, systems or capabilities. The Aegis system is a good example of how one can do this. The Aegis system evolving now is much different from the initial Aegis system as it can now work with a wide variety of weapon systems compared to where it started. The Aegis example demonstrates that the kind of force integration path we are on is achievable, but we need to expand how we in fact can do so. By putting a core system in place and then working with an open architecture enabled by that system, significant integration can take place by incorporating adjacent systems and capabilities.” This approach has clear implications for acquisition. Brown underscored that “rather than having endless competitions to drive down what seems as the lowest price provided by various primes, Defense needs to pick a core prime to manage a weapons area and allow that prime to work with a diversity of suppliers and systems providers to drive the best capabilities to the force. We actually don’t have time now for a lot of the competitive tension that the acquisition system feels it needs to do to get the best value for money. “The key is to get the operators working with industry to drive the kind of rapid change needed.” This is especially true when considering that new platforms are built around a software upgradeability core, and getting to where operators can drive change in concert with the systems providers can allow for the kind of rapid change which operators need to deal with 21st century peer adversaries. The next seminar will focus on shaping a way ahead for the ADF to become more lethal and obviously a core answer to that is the pathway identified by Air Marshal (Retired) Brown. And he added that in the forthcoming seminar one of the key capabilities to be highlighted which can drive the kind of change which the ADF is seeking is around the training domain. “We need to increase the training throughput of the force to accelerate operational changes. The technology’s out there to actually increase training outcomes quite significantly. We’re not even close to utilizing the technology that’s already available, in my mind, to get the best training outcomes. That will be one of the vectors that we’ll certainly look at in the seminar.” In addition, Brown underscored that the whole challenge of resilience of the force is another key dimension which needs to be enhanced as well in shaping a way forward for the ADF. This means looking at efforts to enhance fuel supplies, weapons, supply depth and logistics support. He argued that without the kind of industrial depth which the United States delivered in World War II, it will be difficult to build out the kind of capabilities which are needed for the United States and the core allies. “We need to understand what our real industrial production capability and suspend the idea of needless competition in areas where such competition actually reduces production capability. And on the defense side, we need to be focused on the art of realistic force development and design and avoid paths like the USMC Force Design 2030 which really goes down a unique path not really adding to the overall lethality of the joint or coalition force. We need to ask the question of how new platforms or new force design approaches really add to the lethality of the integrated and networked force or they don’t and avoid the latter. The focus has to be upon deterrence and whether you are moving the needle forward on deterrence or not; if you are not then don’t go down that platform or force design path. The Pacific in particular drives the need for long-range systems, and we are working towards enhancing our capability to acquire and operate such systems.” Link to article: Looking Back and Looking Forward: Shaping a Way Ahead for the Integrated Networked Force (Defense.info)

Is a culture where acceptance of failure is normalised one that will have a positive impact on ADF capability? Robert Vine argues that in at least a training environment, outcomes should be evaluated on a scale of performance rather than as a binary pass/fail schema. As part of our #FailureWins series, Vine makes the point that if we want to improve performance and measure capability, we need to measure ourselves against several different variable scales rather than a polarised classification. Is a culture where acceptance of failure is normalised one that will have a positive impact on ADF capability? When you reflect on a career’s worth of experience, what sticks in your mind is the times where things went wrong and it's these hard lessons that influence your approach to the future. If the experience of failure is a strong driver for improvement then maximising this culture seems logical. But what would be the negative consequences of a force that never succeeds in training? How should we balance the competing benefits of success and failure? All training events, be it individual, unit level, joint or coalition is a balance of the needs to teach people, test equipment, develop tactics and verify capability. Meeting a training objective demonstrates that a standard has been met. It proves that individual performance, system operation and tactical proficiency produce a capability. Failing to meet an objective identifies a deficiency that needs to be resolved. It is important to measure success or failure to demonstrate if the ADF is ready for the roles that it is directed to perform. In this context, failure is not a negative outcome. Failure clearly identifies what needs to be fixed, with repeat attempts serving as a way to confirm whether the fix has worked. This methodology is useful to encourage improved performance, but what does failure tell us about the capability of the force as it currently stands? Rather than viewing training outcomes as a binary pass/fail, the ADF must emphasise training as a scale of performance. If we want to improve performance and measure capability, we need to measure ourselves against a number of different variable scales. For example: Losses: How much of the force was expended to achieve the mission? Capacity: How much of our resources were used to achieve the mission? Timeliness: How long did it take to achieve the mission? Resilience: How long did it take to recover capability after the mission? Consequences: Did the force achieve the mission without adverse consequences? Adaptability: Did the force adapt to changes in the adversary or operating environment? Integration: Did the force optimise its resources towards the mission? Outcome: Did the force achieve the mission in the manner planned? This method of capability assessment requires the ADF to exercise in a realistic environment. It can no longer be acceptable to exercise against a limited adversary such that the mission is challenging, but still achievable. Logistics must be tested, rather than assumed away. Bases must be measured against a genuine threat rather than treated as safe-havens. When did we last allow the adversary to use initiative and asymmetric approaches? Without a realistic exercise environment, any measure of success is pointless because war is a relative game where the adversary adapts and improves. To understand our capability relative to an adversary, the ADF must incorporate an independent organisation that sets exercise scenarios which mimic the operational environment. No longer can we develop scenarios as a training aid to demonstrate performance of the force against the adversary we would like to fight. Instead, we must employ a realistic operational environment that allows us to understand how we will actually perform on operations and provide context to what improvements we need to make to the force. Similarly, the ADF must carefully consider how individual performance is measured. Utilising a system where performance is measured on a scale, which is valued higher; someone who achieves the highest score, or someone who achieves the greatest improvement? If success in warfare is a game of continuous improvement relative to the adversary, then we must reward those who are most adept at improving, not those who demonstrate the best initial performance but fail to adapt to the adversary. Utilising these performance metrics would drive a culture of continuous improvement while still demonstrating the performance of the force. One of my experiences on Air Warfare Instructor Course still comes to mind over 10 years later, not just because it was a poor performance (an assessment failure) but because of the personal and organisation improvement that has occurred since then. I was to be the Mission Commander for a mission that required us to adjust all our plans from offensive to defensive operations within just three hours. It became apparent in the first few minutes of the mission that the plan was poor. Despite this acknowledgement, I did not adapt quickly enough. The mission was a failure. However, my analysis of the reasons for the mission failure were good – identifying that our process for planning required too long and relied too much on individual experience rather than tactical procedures. I would go on to pass the course, fix this issue by writing the procedures we needed, and train others in how to use them. Now, I regard this event as one of the most positive in my career. I am proud of my efforts to improve individually, and to aid in improving the organisation. Unfortunately, we rarely provide people the opportunity to transfer individual lessons to the organisation. If we are to judge performance on a scale and value improvement, then we need to provide people the ability to implement hard won lessons into the organisation. We need to provide people time to write new tactics, the authority to change their systems configuration, the budget to buy necessary equipment, and reward testing new ideas. Failure can prove to be a strong driver for some individuals to improve performance, but normalising failure should not neglect the need for the ADF to know that it is ready to perform its role. A system that measures performance not just as a binary pass/fail but as a scale offers the potential to drive individual and organisational change. When coupled with a system that rewards improvement and provides the broad ability to make the changes quickly, we can generate a culture that is able to improve at a greater rate than an adversary. To achieve this the ADF must train in a realistic environment rather than an idealistic one. Robert Vine is an Air Battle Manager in the Royal Australian Air Force currently specialising in futures and concepts for Joint Command and Control, and Integrated Air and Missile Defence. The opinions expressed are his alone and do not reflect those of the Royal Australian Air Force, the Australian Defence Force, or the Australian Government.

Dr Robbin Laird 21 April 2022 LtGen Steven Rudder, Commander, U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Pacific and Commanding General Fleet Marine Force, provided a USMC perspective on the way ahead for the networked and integrated force which highlighted the impact of the F-35 on the USMC role in Pacific operations. He noted the Marines are operating both the F-35Bs and F-35Cs in the Pacific. By having an ability to operate both from the sea and from land, the two F-35s provided a significant fifth generation warfighting capability which can enable the Marine Corps focus on expeditionary operations. As he put it: “we’ll continue to operate our F-35C from the carrier with our agreement with the Navy, but also when they’re not on the carrier, we’re operating them off land bases as well to give us the operational flexibility we want to achieve.” With the operation by allies in the Pacific, the Marines are able to bring their operating experience to Asian allies soon to operate the aircraft, notably the Singapore Air Force and the Japanese as well. He provided a slide in his presentation which highlighted the combined training which occurred with the Singapore Air Force last year as well as a slide which highlighted joint operations with Japanese Self Defense Forces during last year’s Talisman Sabre exercise. LtGen Rudder understandably underscored as well the integrated operations which the USS America operating USMC F-35Bs with HMS Queen Elizabeth operating UK F-35Bs and the ability of the Marines to cross-deck between the ships. He noted: “Our aviation communities can plug and play in coalition operations and this is key element of moving ahead with a networked integrated force.” For the Marines, airpower integration is crucial, but it is the ability to integrate from the sea to land operations which is critical as well. As Rudder put it: “we have been working on the ability to take F-35 data and to use that data for target acquisition and get such data down to our ground force.” One initiative being pursued is the deployment of ground fires, such as the Naval strike missiles, in support of naval sea control and sea denial operations, which is leveraging such a data transfer. He noted that the Marines have over the last year have been working on such an approach to force integration. Indeed, a key way ahead for the Pacific-based Marines is to be able to support the U.S. Navy’s Sea control and sea denial operations. This is another aspect being worked with regard to enhancing the ability of the Marines and Navy to deliver an enhanced network integrated force. In my own view, the intersection between the U.S. Navy’s evolving approach to distributed maritime operations and the USMC’s approach to mobile and expeditionary basing are inextricably intertwined, a subject which I address with my co-author in our forthcoming book, A Maritime Kill Web Force in the Making: Warfighting and Deterrence in the 21st Century. The Marines have also created a Marine Littoral Regiment designed to provide a new way for the infantry to operate in the Pacific. And such a force clearly needs support from airpower organic to the USMC or from the joint force. To move further down the road of a networked integrated force, Rudder underscored that “we are buying mesh networks that are able to take wave forms from space, surface, or air, and translate them into to a common operating picture for our ground forces. We are focused on enhanced shared awareness in order to be able to hold targets at risk. We need to address the threats we face in an integrated fashion.” In the interview I did this past summer at his office in Honolulu with LtGen Rudder, he highlighted how he saw the way ahead for the USMC with regard to working with allies and with the joint force. “We are focused on shaping an effective posture that combines forward bases with rotational partnerships with key Allies. I have already highlighted how important our posture is in Japan. Employing Infantry and MV-22s from Okinawa and F-35s from Iwakuni (in southwest Honshu) we readily integrate with Japans Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade.” “MRF-D plays a role as well. Six months out of the year, we rotate 2,000 Marines into Australia with ground forces, MV-22s, fires, and logistics capability. Now that the Australians are operating the F-35 and routinely exercising amphibious operations, we can work jointly on expanding high-end bi-lateral and multi-lateral operations. As a combined force, we have already increased the complexity of operations as recently demonstrated during Talisman Saber 21.” “And as we build up and deploy greater numbers of forces to Camp Blaz, Guam, we will use this location as an additional posture location for 5,000 Marines and Sailors. All of these posture developments allow us to have various operational touch points from which one could aggregate force capabilities. With a combination of air and sea lift, we are designing a force with the ability to rapidly move into positions of advantage.” We then discussed the evolution of fires which the Marines can bring to the Pacific fight. With the end of the INF (Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces) treaty, the United States can now build longer range conventional capabilities. The Marines are looking to participate in this effort, and employ them from expeditionary forward bases well inside the adversary’s weapons engagement area. The objective is to contribute to SLOC defense or be additive to offensive naval fires. According to Lt. Gen. Rudder: “If we look forward in the not-too-distant future, we’ll have the ability to have land-based long-range fires, aviation fires, and persistent high endurance ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance) with the MQ-9. We’ll be able to move those capabilities with KC-130s, MV-22s, or amphibious lift allowing us to project long-range fires forward anywhere in Asia, much like we do with the HIMARS (High-Mobility Artillery Rocket System) today.” “HIMARS fits in the back of a KC-130 allowing rapid mobilization and insertion. We will exercise the same operational tactic with anti-ship capability. We want to project sea denial capabilities to cut off a strait of our choosing or maneuver into positions to create our own maritime chokepoint. “As we saw with hunting mobile missiles in the past, having long-range fires on maneuvering platforms makes them really hard to hit. As we distribute our long-range fires on mobile platforms, we now become a hard platform to find. Our desire is to create our own anti-access and area denial capability. “For the last several years, we were thinking about the adversary’s missiles, and how they could be used to deny us access to forward locations. Now we want to be the sea denial force that is pointed in the other direction. Land based fires are perfectly suited to support naval maneuver.” “We want rapidly to move by air or sea, deliver sea denial capabilities onto land, maneuver to position of advantage, deliver fires, maneuver for another shot, or egress by air or sea. We are training current forces on concepts for sea denial missions supported by maneuver of long-range fires. This is a key element of the naval integration.” With a growing capability of joint sensor networks, the potential for more effective joint targeting is a reality. As the joint force focuses on dynamic targeting, services are closely coordinating fires networks and authorities. The advantage of land based expeditionary fires is that they provide persistence cover within an established air and surface targeting solution. This is how Lt. Gen. Rudder characterized how he saw the way ahead. “We are completely integrated with naval maneuver and working hand and hand with the joint force. I MEF and III MEF have been operating seamlessly as three-star naval task forces astride Seventh and Third Fleets. “During crises, I become the deputy JFMCC (Joint Force Maritime Component Commander) to the Pacific Fleet Commander. The MARFORPAC staff integrates with the PacFleet staff. Even during day-to-day operations, we have Marines at PacFleet planning and integrating across multiple domains. Should we ramp up towards crisis or conflict, we will reinforce our JFMCC contribution to ensure we remain fully prepared for all-domain naval force execution.This means that our anti-ship missiles will integrate into naval maneuver. “We also aggressively pursue PACAF integration for bomber, fighter, and 5th Generation support. Daily, our F-35s are integrated into the PACAF AOC (Air Operations Center). We are focused on better integration to insure we have a common operating picture for an integrated firing solution.” The USMC F-35s play a key role in all of this. Although there is a clear focus on enhanced integration with the U.S. Navy, the integration with the USAF is crucial for both the U.S. Navy and the USMC. Lt. Gen. Rudder highlighted the role which USMC F-35s play in Pacific defense and force integration. “We count on pulling fifth-gen capability forward in time of crisis. We are committed to having forward deployed F-35s conducting integrated training on a regular basis with our PACAF counterparts. “We will also conduct integrated training with our Korean, Japanese, Singaporean and Australian partners. We are also training with aircraft carriers when they operate in the region. Notably, the USS Carl Vinson, the first U.S. Navy F-35C variant carrier.” “And the F-35B has caught the operational attention of the rest of the world. The United Kingdom’s HMS QUEEN ELIZABETH is the largest fifth-generation fighter deployment ever conducted on an aircraft carrier. We are proud to be a part of that UK deployment, with a Marine F-35B squadron, VMFA-211, embarked and operating with our British partners. They are currently doing combined operations in the Western Pacific. “We are excited to see the Italians operating F-35s off the ITS CAVOUR, and we hope by the fall of this year that we’ll be landing an F-35B on the Japan Ship IZUMO, as the Japanese look ahead to the purchase of F-35Bs. The South Koreans are considering going down a similar path, with Singapore also adding F-35s to their inventory.” “Aside from shipboard operations, the F-35B can do distributed operations like no other combat aircraft. We can go into a variety of airfields which may not be accessible by other fighter aircraft, reload and refuel, and take back off again, making the both aircraft and the airfields more survivable.” The Marines are the only combat force that tactically combine fifth generation with tiltrotor capabilities. This combined capability is crucial for operations in an area characterized by tyranny of distance. The MV-22 Ospreys can also carry a wide variety of payloads that can encompass the C2 and ISR revolutions underway. And if you are focused on flexible basing, the combination of the two aircraft provides possibilities which no other force in the world currently possess. But shortfalls in the numbers of aircraft forward create challenges to unleash their full potential for enabling the Marines as a crisis management force and enhance the Marine Corps contribution to the joint force. The nature of distributed operations in the Pacific demands long range aircraft like the MV-22 to sustain the force. The amphibious operating capability of the USMC becomes more significant as flexible basing and the enhanced capabilities which a family of amphibious ships could bring to the force. This is how Lt. Gen. Rudder put it: “We can reconfigure our amphibious ships to take on many different assault functions. I think when people talk about amphibious assault, they have singular visions of near-beach operations. Instead, we need to think of our amphibious capability from the standpoint of our ability to maneuver from range. “Rather than focusing on the 3,000 or 5,000-meter closure from ship to shore, I think about the 600, 700, 1,000-mile closure, with amphibs able to distribute and put people in place or to conduct resupply once you’re there. Amphibious lift, with its ability to bring its own connectors for logistics support, is increasingly significant for the operational force. “In addition, we have to make sure that we’re able to close the force when lethal and non-lethal shaping has done its course. At some point, you’re going to need to seize and defend land. We have two ways to tactically accomplish this mission, either by air or by surface assault. There’s no other way to get forces ashore unless you secure a port that has the space to offload and a road network to move ashore. Open port options are highly unlikely during crisis, thus amphibious lift is increasingly becoming more valuable for maneuvering forces in the maritime domain.” The Marines are launching a new capability in the next couple of years, the Marine Littoral Regiment (MLR). According to the MARFORPAC commander: “We are working towards initial operating capability (IOC) of the MLR in 2023. We want to demonstrate the maneuverability of the MLR as well as the capabilities it can bring to naval operations. “Near term, we will work to exercise new capabilities in the region, such as loading the NMESIS (Navy/Marine Corps Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System) system on the KC-130s or LCAC for integrated operations with F-35s, MQ-9s, and other maritime targeting capabilities.” In short, the USMC is in transition in the Pacific, and working towards greater interoperability with the joint force, notably, the U.S. Navy and the USAF. For my assessment of the evolution of the USMC in the Pacific over the past few years, with a significant number of interviews from the MARFORPAC staff as well, see my new book on USMC transformation which has been published on March 31, 2022. Link to article: Shaping a Way Ahead for the Networked Integrated Force: The Perspective of MARFORPAC (Defense.info)

Dr Robbin Laird 20 April 2022 The Italian Air Force is part of the broader European defense transition in which the shift from the land wars to direct European defense is underway. The Italians have not only bought two variants of the F-35 but build the aircraft in Italy as well as delivering aircraft from their factory to the Netherlands. The IAF and the Italian Navy both operate F-35s with the challenge still being working integration between both services as well. The Italian Navy trained last year off the East Coast of the United States and did initial exercises between the ITS Cavour and the USS Gerald R. Ford. In addition, Italy flies the Eurofighter as a key combat aircraft and has worked integratability between the Eurofighter and the F-35 as well as having spearheaded enhanced integration of Eurofighters within Europe itself. Lieutenant General Aurelio Colagrande, Italian Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff, started his presentation to the Williams Foundation seminar by underscoring that although Italy and Australia are geographically far apart, their work on airpower modernization is not. This is how he put it: “Even though we are on the opposite sides of the world, therefore apparently very far away and with a different viewpoint on space and time, in the operational environment, Australia and Italy are closer and similar than ever before. We fly some similar aircraft, like the C-27 and the F-35. We’ve been in the same coalition in Iraq and in Afghanistan. “The entire world is changing faster and faster so that a regional issue now become immediately part of the geopolitical landscape…. From a global perspective, we act in the same realm. As air forces, we operate in a domain strongly dependent on technology in order to deliver air power rapidly and everywhere.” I have spent a great deal of time with Italian Air Force when they were first procuring the F-35 and the head of the Italian Air Force at the time, highlighted how acquiring of the F-35 would drive significant cultural change in the IAF, an argument very similar to what Air Marshal Brown was making at the same time in Australia. This is how Lt. General Preziosa put it in a 2015 interview with me: “The F-22 and the F-35 are called fifth generation aircraft, but really the F-35 is the first airplane built for the digital age, we are rapidly moving from the dog-fight concept to the data-fight evolution of the broad utilization of air power. It was conceived in and for that age, and is built around the decision tools in the cockpit and is in fact a “flying brain.” And that makes it different from other aircraft. It is a multi-tasking aircraft, and fits well into the I-phone age. Other aircraft – with the exception of the F-22 – are built to maximize out as multi-mission aircraft, which execute tasks sequentially and directed to do so. “The F-35 fleet thinks and hunts and can move around the mission set as pilots operate in the battlespace and leverage the data fusion system. It is a battlespace dominance aircraft; not a classic air superiority, air defense or ground attack aircraft. It changes the classic distinctions; confuses them and defines a whole new way to look at a combat aircraft, one built for the joint force age as well. The Army and the Navy will discover, as the F-35 fleet becomes a reality, how significant the F-35 is for their combat efforts.” In his remarks to the Williams Foundation seminar, Lieutenant General Colagrande provided an update on this perspective based on the experience of the past several years of the IAF and the F-35. “We immediately felt the need to generate a national plan to evolve with the entire organization in a fifth-generation Italian air force, where consolidated competence, new scales, different mindset, modern airmen are all vital ingredients to effectively perform an entire set of new capabilities together with legacy system. “In this air force evolutional journey, we face new challenges that we are trying to manage with new and innovative solutions, finding new partners and associates. Of course, we are just at the beginning of our trip, but the initial outcomes are definitely reassuring, and the quality of our approach seems just right.” He argued that the challenge facing an operational air force is to be able to “plug and fight” with the systems they have. As he noted: “New capabilities have never been ‘plug and fight’. It is difficult to gain rapid full operational advantage from a multitude of new capabilities because to fully exploit them, it is necessary to be equipped with greater technical competence as contemporary weapons systems are much more capable than those in the past. “This condition highlights more than ever how the human being is the weakest part of the equation. Since to fully exploit a new weapon system, there is a need for a specific dedicated, progressive training to the end users. To that end, interpretability and collaboration are key elements in order to be effective.” He then went on to discuss a very interesting Eurofighter integration effort which has happened under the radar of public recognition but suggestive of the kind of force integration efforts among allies which are critical to be able to fight more effectively tonight. Lieutenant General Colagrande highlighted this development in the following manner: “Plug and Fight is a name of a successful endeavor that the German Air Force conducted together with our British friends of the Royal Air Force and with us. “Within the NATO and as air policing framework in Europe, the German Air Force, Royal Air Force and Italian Air Force, are now able to operate in a completely mixed Eurofighter squadron, sharing not only aircraft or spare parts, the so-called material component, but also operational, maintenance, logistic procedures, and more important the will to succeed in doing operations together. “This may appear as an easy operation, but it was actually the end state of a very intensive journey started a few years ago with the launch of the European Typhoon Interoperability program. German Air Force, Royal Air Force and Italian Air Force worked out to put in place technical arrangements, to write handbooks for flying ops, ground ops, spare parts management, and maintenance, and so on. “We needed to train on a regular basis to stay proficient in performing the mission. Indeed, thanks to this initiative, at the beginning of March this year, the German Air Force and Italian Air Forces have successfully supported together a real air policing operation in Romania. And we will probably do the same in the next month with our UK friends.” This Eurofighter interoperability effort has been and is indeed a major challenge. But doing so can obviously deliver more significant coalition capability rathe rather than simply having nations operating the “same” aircraft but actually not being able to integrate those aircraft into a cohesive combat capability. I first visited the European Air Group based at High Wycombe in 2014 and the focus of that first meeting was on 4th-5th generation integration. I went back over the next few years, and saw how his coalition building group was broadening their efforts to include meeting the challenge of Eurofighter integration. The European Typhoon interoperability program to which Colagrande referred is indeed the EAG program. During a 2016 visit to the EAG we discussed the European Typhoon interoperability effort being led by the EAG. This was what I wrote at the time about the effort: “The session was led by Brigadier General de Ponti, Deputy Director, of the European Air Group and joined by the “drivers” of the ETIP (Euro Typhoon Interoperability Project) as well as organizers of exercise efforts to shape a new approach, namely Lt. Col. Jacobo Lecube of the Spanish Air Force and Lt Col. Marco Schiattioni from the Italian Air Force and Chief of Staff Col. Stephane Pierre, of the Belgian Air Force. “The overall focus of the effort is upon shaping a more common fleet approach among Eurofighter nations. Although four nations came together to build a common airplane, the planes have been used by four different air forces with limited overlap in standards and operating practices. As the Euro-Typhoon is clearly a key element for the future of European airpower and with the coming of the F-35 to Europe, this makes little sense. And what the European Air Group is focused upon are practical ways to shape more common fleet approaches among the air forces, which fly Euro-Typhoon. Also, shaping a common template in doing Baltic air policing in which Eurofighter/Typhoons are becoming a frequent asset in executing the mission provides an obvious opportunity to find ways to shape common procedures and support approaches as well. The problem was simply put by one of the participants: “When an Italian Eurofighter lands on a German base, it cannot use the ground support equipment or change a tire, because the standards are different. These are procedural issues, which may make sense in terms of national norms but not in terms of common fleet operations. Through this project we seek to end differences which get in the way of common operational support.” According to BG de Ponti: “The Eurofighter-Typhoon project is an important effort for our air forces. It is about the co-evolution of Typhoon with the shaping of a 4th-5th generation integrated force. It is two prongs of shaping more effective European airpower. It is a building blocks approach to shaping evolving capabilities.” Such an effort is what force integration among allies requires. But the better outcome is to shape common approaches at the outset of building new platforms and doing so with common C2 and ISR connectivity as well, if indeed the integrated networked force is to have its full impact on warfighting and deterrence. Lieutenant General Colagrande underscored the importance of being to leverage new capabilities throughout the combat force and this required significant emphasis on training and innovation in force operations as well. This is how he characterized how the Italian Air Force is addressing this challenge: “We soon initiated an operational testing and evaluation process that now includes both the A and B variant for novel interoperability. We participated with the F-35 air policing in Iceland. We proved our air power expeditionary concept together with our Italian Navy and the British ones. We launched a very challenging operational training infrastructure program in Sardinia, an Italian island in the Mediterranean Sea where we have lot of airspace, air to air, air to ground, EW and lots of test ranges and good weather throughout the year. “Furthermore, in Sardinia, we are setting up our international flight training school where we will train in the phase four advanced training, our future fifth generation pilots. Within the OTI framework, we are investing in connectivity network in order to offer a real effective advanced training. “And through it, we intend to achieve one of the most challenging objectives, the integration between legacy and new generation weapon system for exploiting the main operational output of the fifth-generation assets that we believe is the ability to be task enablers and force multipliers. “And we also conducted a pure fifth generation event, the Falcon Strike 2021. The first major European exercise for fifth generation aircraft, but not just with them, but for them, in a highly contested and congested scenario, a multinational coalition from United States Air Force, United States Marine Corps, Royal Air Force, Royal Navy, Israeli and Italian Air Force F-35s participated with the exercise. “Focusing on fifth generation requirements, testing new sea-basing approaches to air operation, exploring new fifth generation rules of engagement that allow a high level of delegation of decision-making to the lowest possible level, the cockpit. All small steps of course, but all pieces of an overall increased level of performance for the entire air force.” He highlighted the cooperation in the UK-led Tempest program as one element of the way ahead for the Italian Air Force as well. “The next generation fighter will not be just a simple aircraft. It will be a system of systems with very strong and secure connectivity. It must be conceived through an open system architecture to accommodate the required agility, the future technological developments and better compensate for any changes or updates to the operational requirements.” He provided a significant cautionary note as well in his presentation. The cutbacks in defense in Europe have been significant and have left Europe more vulnerable than is prudent. “The Italian Air Force has witnessed a significant reduction in aircraft numbers over the past decades. We developed the idea that greater quality may compensate for less quantity, but quality cannot substitute quantity. Technological quality advantage allows us to achieve the superiority in the operating area of a permissive scenario. “But such an approach is not an applicable paradigm in the military comparison with a peer-to-peer or near-to-peer competitor who accounts for hundreds of military assets, or when simultaneous commitments or more than one operation operate far away from each other. “In other words, mass still has its importance as we are learning by the last updates coming from the east European flank. Going back to quality versus quantity concept, we should think about the fact that quantity is by itself a quality. “The technological trap mechanism even more obvious when it comes to weaponry. State of the art weapons are so expensive to develop, acquire, and in many cases, integrate, that you end up buying too few of them, depleting the stockpile below a minimum acceptable level, thus creating a serious gap when it comes to operations. Once again, it is evident that mass enables either by a lower technological level or with new industrial or commercial solutions for greater combat capability.” Lieutenant General Aurelio Colagrande, Italian Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Aurelio Colagrande was born in L’Aquila on 8 October 1962. He attended the Air Force Academy from 1981 to 1985 and graduated as military pilot in 1986 at the European NATO Joint Jet Pilot Training (ENJJPT) in Sheppard AFB – TX, USA. In 1987, Lt Gen COLAGRANDE was assigned to the 2nd Wing in Treviso and in 1989 was moved to the 51st Wing in Istrana where he was appointed as OPS Chief and later on as 103rd Squadron Commander. Between 1995 and 1999, he flew several flying sorties over the Balkan Airspace collecting more than 70 flight hours. In July 2000, he was appointed to the Logistic Department of the Italian Air Staff in Rome and later, in 2002, moved to the Joint Strike Fighter Program Office in Washington DC (USA), as Italian National Representative. From July 2006 until September 2007, he was back to the Logistic Department of the Italian Air Staff as Head of C4 ISTAR Branch and Chairman of the Italian JSF WG. From 2007 to 2009, he was appointed as 6th Wing Commander in Ghedi, after this assignment he returned to Rome, at the Secretariat General of Defence and National Armaments Directorate as Chief of the Aeronautical Programs Office. From 2011 to 2013 he was appointed as the 46th Air Brigade Commander in Pisa, following this period he was assigned to the Air Operational Command in Rome as Deputy Chief of Staff, assuming later on the Chief position until March 2019. From 20 March 2019 to 11 January 2022, he was the Commander of the Air Education and Training Command. As of 12 January 2022, Lt.Gen. Colagrande is the Italian Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff. Lt.Gen. Colagrande has a University Degree in Aeronautical Sciences and a Master in International Studies. Link to article: Shaping a Way Ahead for the Networked Integrated Force: An Italian Air Force Perspective (Defense.info)

Dr Robbin Laird 19 April 2022 In his presentation to the Williams Foundation seminar held on March 24, 2022 which focused on “accelerating the transition to a networked integrated force”, Air Chief Marshal Sir Mike Wigston presented the perspective of the RAF on the challenge. The last time an RAF Chief of Staff spoke at a Williams Foundation Seminar was in March 2018. Air Chief Marshal Sir Stephen Hillier, then Chief of Staff of the RAF, addressed the Williams Foundation Seminar on the shift from the land wars to high intensity conflict. At that seminar, this is how Hillier highlighted the challenge: “You asked me to speak about high-intensity warfare in Europe. Perhaps I’ve not really provided that much of that specific geographical context. But then as I said right at the start, I don’t believe that what I’ve described can be bracketed within a particular geography. The challenges I’ve described are truly global and truly common to us all. I believe that airpower’s inherent characteristics and capabilities make it especially able to respond effectively to those challenges.” A clear driver of the shift is that airpower advantage will have to be fought for and not assumed. And his way ahead focused very much on leveraging what new platforms we are acquiring but to build out from them to shape new ways ahead to regain strategic advantage. “But the asymmetric advantage airpower has given us for the last three decades at least, is narrowing. The integration into our air forces of fifth generation capabilities such as the F-35 Lighting will only redress the delta to a degree. Of equal importance in maintaining our combat edge is this ability to manage vast amounts of information, and make decisions more quickly and more accurately. Technological developments will be a key element in ensuring that the lever of the best possible output from our air and space platforms, but our C2 structures, processes, and approach to information sharing will be a decisive factor.” What Hillier discussed throughout his 2018 presentation in Australia was the presaging of what would be introduced in 2020 as the new integrated operating concept for the UK forces. That operating concept which is rooted in the kill web approach was officially launched in the Fall of 2020. Chief of Defence Staff, General Sir Nick Carter, at the 2020 version of the annual Royal United Services Institute address by Chief of Defence Staff, highlighted the launch of the new strategy. “What should be our response to this ever more complex and dynamic strategic context? My view is that more of the same will not be enough. We must fundamentally change our thinking if we are not to be overwhelmed. Hence, we are launching this Integrated Operating Concept. “We cannot afford any longer to operate in silos—we have to be integrated: with allies as I have described, across Government, as a national enterprise, but particularly across the military instrument. Effective integration of maritime, land, air, space and cyber achieves a multi-domain effect that adds up to far more than simply the sum of the parts, recognizing—to paraphrase Omar Bradley—that the overall effect is only as powerful as the strength of the weakest domain.” Since Hillier last spoke, the UK has faced the challenges of Brexit, Covid-19, has introduced the new carriers as operational realities, and has operated the new carrier outside of the European area of operations. The RAF and Royal Navy have also begun the F-35 era, and the UK government has launched the Tempest next generation airpower program as well. And as the current Chief of Staff of the RAF spoke at the Williams Foundation, Europe was experiencing its first major war in a very long time. And Air Chief Marshal Sir Mike Wigston was speaking after the UK government had committed itself to increased defense spending and the launching of the new Integrated Operating Concept. In other words, the UK faces a number of challenges which certainly require better force integration within the UK forces and with allies, simply to get the scale, and depth necessary for UK direct defense, let alone contributing to wider allied considerations. How does Wigston see this getting accomplished? This is how he framed the challenges: “One year ago, the UK government published the Integrated Review of Security, Defense Development And Foreign Policy. It was a significant statement of Britain’s place in the world and the role of the UK Armed Forces in that. Last April, before the ink was even dry, Russia first threatened military action against Kyiv. It was a chilling foretaste of what we are now seeing unfolding there. The outrageous, unprovoked, and unjustified invasion of a sovereign country in Europe, thousands of deaths, and the displacement of over 10 million Ukrainian citizens, something we thought we had consigned to history.” He then argued that the Integrated Review had highlighted three key themes which current events simply reinforced as key challenges. “Firstly, the recognition that it’s an uncertain and increasingly dangerous world. We face fast evolving threats to our nation’s and our allies. “Secondly, in this era of strategic competition, the UK must be prepared and able to act globally as a problem solving, burden sharing nation, amplifying our effect through deeper relationships and partnerships. “And thirdly, with the equivalent of a 42 billion Australian uplift in defense funding over the four years from 2021, that the UK government could not be clearer in its view of the integral role of the UK Arm Forces in protecting and projecting the United Kingdom around the world.” “The Integrated Review confirmed the need for the UK to be able to deter and defend against state-based opponents, to strengthen our technological and scientific base and to continue the modernization of every aspect of our armed forces. And it also looked at broader aspects of security too, including climate change, population pressures, and resource competition.” But with the Covid-19 impact, it will be challenging for the UK or any major liberal democracy to establish sustained defense spending, so what then are the priorities to be focused upon with investments, and force design going forward? “My chief of defense staff has made his priorities, and of course they’re now my priorities, very clear. Firstly, that everyone must be absolutely focused on playing their part in turning the ambition of the Integrated Review into reality. “Second, it’s around transforming, reforming, and integrating effectively. “Third, it’s about having formations, units, platforms, systems, and people that are more deployable and deployed more, at home and abroad. “Fourth is the need to be more lethal. And to be more lethal, it’s absolutely essential that we are more innovative. “And fifth, and probably the most important, is our people, our culture, and the diversity of our workforce in every sense of the word. And threading through all of those is that critical need for multi domain integration across the maritime land air space and cyberspace domains. To achieve that nirvana of multi domain integration, we must integrate across defense by design, and we must integrate by instinct.” Wigston then highlighted how such an approach affected the RAF. “To continue to protect the UK and our allies in this threat laced world, the Royal Air Force must be ready to understand, decide, and then act faster, with even greater precision, lethality and in more places around the world simultaneously than we do today. And we’ve got to do it sustainably too, both in terms of resource and the environment Above all, it will require the Royal Air Force to integrate ever more closely with our Royal Navy, Army and Strategic Command, the Ministry of Defense, other government departments and our international partners. “Success demands, swift, joint, fully integrated action across all war fighting domains, land,, sea, air, space and cyber. Our aircraft, spacecraft and systems must integrate seamlessly to allow the transfer and exploitation of information, rapid decision making and timely delivery of effects.” In his presentation, he highlighted the way ahead as envisaged by the UK with regard to the airpower piece of shaping the evolving networked and integrated force. This is the team tempest or future combat air system approach. And this is Wigston described it: “The Future Combat Air System is such a critical development program for the nation, because we need to start work now on what will replace Typhoon from the late 2030s and why we are investing three and a half billion Australian over the next four years alongside our international partners like Italy. We’re taking a revolutionary approach, looking at a game changing mix of swarming drones and mixed formations of un-crewed combat aircraft, as well as next generation piloted aircraft like Tempest. Our uncured combat aircraft, Mosquito, is already taking shape in Belfast and our experimental swarming drone, Arvena, has already exceeded expectations on operational trials. This isn’t the stuff of a distant sci-fi future. We’re aiming for Mosquito and Arvena derivatives to be fielded operationally this decade, transforming the combat battle space in a way not seen since the advent of the Jet Age.” The integration piece for the RAF evolves on two levels, the UK national force and its ability to work more effectively with allies in coalition operations. And he describes the latter in the following terms: “We must place a premium on being allied by design, through building alliances and improving interoperability. And it means that we have to be integrated with allies across government as a national enterprise, and particularly across all the instruments of our military power. Our multi-domain effects have to add up to more than the sum of the parts. ‘In that regard, I can’t think of a better example of multi-domain integration than the UK carrier strike group that deployed last year through the Indo-Pacific region, as far as Japan. It brought to life, the deeper UK focus on the Indo-Pacific, a region the Integrated Review identified as critical to our economy, our security, and our global ambition to support an open and resilient international order. “At the heart of that carrier strike group, of course, is our ability to operate fifth generation combat aircraft from the sea. Lightning is a phenomenal war fighting machine, from land or sea. And last year 617 Squadron Royal Air Force and VMFA-211 from the US Marine Corps demonstrated that enormous utility from the Royal Navy’s HMS Queen Elizabeth.” “We must train our personnel to work together through integrated exercises with government partners and allies. As we develop our military plans and processes, we must ensure that they’re integrated by design rather than working with partners ad hoc at the point of need. Our modernization from an Industrial Age of platforms to an Information Age of systems has to be enabled at every level by a digital backbone, into which all sensors, effectors and deciders are connected.” Frankly speaking, this is very hard to do. I have spent a great deal of time over the past decade on ships, land bases in the UK and in the United States watching how the UK and the USMC and U.S. Navy have worked the integration which the RAF chief underscored with regard to the ability of the UK carriers to work with the United States. This was a deliberate effort which has been very challenging to do and, frankly, not widely noticed in the broader political or strategic world. If such efforts are to be prioritized, ensuring that they get the kind of strategic and funding support will be crucial. And the significant investment in the land wars is a significant investment cost which is not easily carried forward in such an effort. And getting governments on the same page with regard to rapid decision making is its own challenge, but equally important as shaping the joint operational approach so well laid out by the RAF Chief of Staff. Indeed, Wigston highlighted the hinge between the military and the civil authorities which is crisis management. “Air and space power gives our government the ability to act or signal strategically worldwide, at range, at speed, precisely with minimal physical and political risk and maximum political choice. We play a decisive role protecting and defending the United Kingdom and our allies 24/7 today. But as chief of the air staff, it also falls to me to design and start to build the force my successors will have to fight with and win within 10-, 20- or 30-years’ time. “The Royal air force must be ready to operate in that complex operating environment of the future. Above all, we must be able to defend the UK and our allies in the face of those sophisticated new air and missile threats.” It really is decision superiority that force integration is about. How to operate with maximum effect throughout the extended battlespace but with not just military but civil decision making capable of resolving crises. And that is a major challenge facing our democracies. Air Chief Marshal Sir Mike Wigston KCB, CBE, ADC Chief of the Air Staff Air Chief Marshal Mike Wigston CBE ADC is the Chief of the Air Staff, in command of the Royal Air Force, leading a Whole Force of some 35,000 Regular and Reserve personnel, and 5,000 Civil Servants, supported by thousands of contractors. Commissioned on a University Cadetship in 1986, he completed his pilot training on the Tornado GR1 in 1992 followed by a succession of frontline tours, including operational deployments enforcing the no-fly zones in Iraq. He commanded 12(Bomber) Squadron, flying the Tornado GR4 and leading the Squadron on two operational tours in Iraq and large force exercises in Canada, Malaysia and the USA. Appointments in operational headquarters have included Al Udeid Airbase, Qatar, as the Chief of Combat Operations in the Combined Air and Space Operations Centre; Basrah International Airport, Iraq as Commander 903 Expeditionary Air Wing; and one year in Afghanistan as the Director Air Operations in Headquarters ISAF Joint Command. He was appointed CBE in 2013 for his contribution to that mission. Staff appointments in the Ministry of Defence have included the Operations Directorate and the predecessor to what is now Military Strategic Effects. In 2013, after a short spell as the Tornado Force Commander, he became the Principal Staff Officer to the Chief of Defence Staff. In January 2015, he was appointed Administrator of the Sovereign Base Areas of Akrotiri and Dhekelia and Commander British Forces Cyprus, responsible for the civil governance of the Sovereign Base Areas and command of British forces based permanently in Cyprus. Senior Royal Air Force appointments have included Assistant Chief of the Air Staff, responsible for the strategic coherence and coordination of the Royal Air Force, and oversight of the RAF100 centenary programme. Prior to becoming Chief of the Air Staff, he was Deputy Commander Capability, responsible for the strategic planning and delivery of all aspects of Royal Air Force capability including people, equipment, infrastructure and training. Education and training includes reading Engineering Science at Oriel College, Oxford; the Advanced Command and Staff Course; an MA in Defence Studies from King’s College London; the Higher Command and Staff Course; and the UK Pinnacle Course. He is a Vice Patron of the Royal Air Force Charitable Trust and President of the Royal Air Force Rowing Association. Author’s Note: Ed Timperlake and I discuss the UK Integrated Operating Concept in the context of the kill web approach in our forthcoming book, A Maritime Kill Web Force in the Making: Deterrence and Warfighting in the XXIst Century. Link to article: Shaping a Way Ahead for the Networked Integrated Force: A Royal Air Force Perspective (Defense.info)

In this instalment of #FutureChiefs, Keirin Joyce (@keirinjoyce) questions if AI could fill the role of CAF - or is a hybrid affair the best way forward? Could the future Chief of Air Force be a computer? Probably not. War is a human affair after all. But could we say “Any Aviator, paired with the Chief’s computer”? The role of the RAAF is to generate first class Air and Space Power. To do this requires two activities; Raise, Train and Sustain (RTS) (fixed wing) air and space capabilities, and run their capability life cycle (CLC). This is achieved successively by Air Force 2-stars. Subsequently , the requirements for the Chief can be derived as follows: They must lead RTS and CLC activities, as well as be the Defence Aviation Authority (DAA). In addition, the Chief must lead the Air Force Board (AFB), perform representative and ceremonial functions, and front Government as the face of Air Force (as seen by most in the regular appearances at Senate Estimates hearings). This leads to the next key question: What experience does CAF need to do those things? They must intrinsically understand airworthiness, have the ability to lead, mediate and guide the 2-stars, be a good public speaker, not bad at drill, and have an elephantine memory in order to answer questions on notice about anything and everything Air Force. However, it’s easy to see that no one meets the memory requirement; that’s why CAF takes a stack of massive flagged binders into Senate Estimates. So, remove this, and you have our Air and Space Power Leader. Do any of these attributes require someone performing the role of CAF to be a pilot? That’s an easy no! As Air Force moves toward greater non-piloted air and space power applications, the requirement for a pilot to lead Air Force diminishes further. One simply needs to consider the growth in uncrewed (and autonomous) aviation, space, cyber, integrated air and missile defence and air-basing. It is very simple math that there is a time in the not too distant future when piloted aircraft effects will be outweighed by the rest of air and space power capability. So what will make the best #FutureChief of Air Force? One kick-ass computer that supplements the memory requirement, that knows every rule, regulation, fact, figure and story of the Air Force; an artificial intelligence device that can crunch the data to meet the goal of true concept led force design. Pair that computer with someone with airworthiness (spaceworthiness?) experience, who is well spoken, okay(ish) at drill, and a competent LEADER. And that could be any Aviator! Wing Commander Keirin Joyce, CSC is an Air Force officer who has been supporting UAS technology development within the ADF for the last 15+ years. More information on this #FutureChiefs series can be found here.