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In this multi-faceted #AirForce2121 piece, SQNLDR Kylie Melville reflects on what logistics will look like over the next 100 years. Ranging from strategic challenges such as climate change, to technological innovations such as AI, she argues that the logistics function needs to also find a way of transforming itself from that of tactical executioners to operational artists who amplify airpower effects. Preamble On the first day of spring, 2021, amidst a history changing COVID19 pandemic, news broke…… ‘Australia Post to pause parcel pick-up for four days with 500 staff in COVID isolation’. As a logistician, explaining to my 9-year-old daughter why she wouldn’t receive her Grandmothers’ gift in a 20th century logistics world was something unexpected. More intriguing was her answer….. …. ‘Why don’t they use robots?’ What a good question…….. Vignette: OP BACKCAST 2121 Logistics Aviator Sini scans the real time virtual operations room in the Air and Space Operations Centre confirming Pilot Aviator Gears is about to complete a successful mission. On the 200th anniversary year for the RAAF, as a 2121 Air logistician, LA Sini reflects…… 2021 – Human centric tactical logistics capability bricks focussed on capability support to long life of type platforms, and land heavy personnel footprint operated airbases. 2041 – RAAF announces launch of logistics Capability Program encompassing - airbases, tactical autonomous delivery systems, integrated battlespace logistics systems, climate conscious logistics solutions and, agile, relevant LOGIS. 2061 – CAF announces next combat aircraft replacement will be fully autonomous coupled with exploration of fully autonomous untethered airheads in land, sea, air and space domains. 2081 – First major deployed fleet of fully autonomous tactical logistics systems with minor augmentation by human management workforce. 2101 – Doctrinal and Concept released for application of autonomous tactical logistics force as part of the air domain tactical autonomous combat power doctrine series. 2121 - The 2121 Air and Space Operations Centre is alive with humans applying analysis within their expertise influencing the daily battle plan through seamless application of operational art. Everyone is connected with virtual reality drawing data from across the joint deployed automated force, all aviators equally important in orchestrating a fully automated tactical combat power war. ……Focussing back to the virtual map displaying locations of deployed near region forces through VR lens, the battlespace changes in real time. Logistics analysis is now required by LA Sini using swift, real-time data to brief Air Commander on autonomous tactical logistics functions contributing to the fully autonomous tactical combat power. Today’s challenge - munitions…. Airbase Drift is in location as one of the numerous maritime, land, air and space airhead options, floating, ready to provide agile munitions resupply effects. Criticality is flashing in the VR lens, one sortie left at Airhead Drift. LA Sini approves automated demands with one swipe of a finger. Hyperloop Transport Company informs delivery to Airhead Drift in 20min. No sooner does Logistics Aviator Sini submit an update to Chief Combat Ops, Maritime Domain now requests diversion to HMAS KISMET, none on board. Autonomous logistics assets are redirected in line with joint force priorities – approved by Commander Joint Support. As LA Sini analyses other agile munitions resupply options, a second shipment via SpaceX priority supply vehicle is confirmed, estimated delivery time - 10min. Pilot Aviator Gears lands combat air asset 235 on Airhead Drift, just as SpaceX robotic delivery is complete. LA Sini delegates robotic rearm to the logistics team, heading to plans room with other aviators focussed on collating the air domain picture for JFACC daily briefing. Logistics in 2121: Enablers to Aviators An Air Force that successfully competes in 2121 cannot rely on advanced capabilities alone; it needs novel approaches to the traditional application of airpower. Technology advancement and climate change are two drivers influencing change in the application of tactical combat power – in particular the human dimension of tactical combat. George W Bush implied technological importance 2002 stating ‘We are witnessing a revolution in the technology of war; power is increasingly defined not by size but by mobility and swiftness – influence is measured in information….’. This is just as relevant for today’s logistician who is focussed on delivering a human-centric logistics function yet must also embrace the technology revolution. A role shift is required for the 2121 Logistician- from tactical human-centric doers to future operational artists. One capable of providing the 2121 Air Force a truly technologically advanced integrated battlespace capable of contemporary and modernised warfighting. ‘We are witnessing a revolution in the technology of war; power is increasingly defined not by size but by mobility and swiftness – influence is measured in information……’ - George W Bush [Air Force Journal of Logistics – Quotes for the Air Force Logistician Volume 1] The idea that machines will be smarter than humans is hotly debated, but the fact that a tactical combat power advantage will be provided by machines in 2121 is not. The ultimate realisation of this prophecy is far from reality; Artificial Intelligence (AI) is already used across numerous industry sectors to improve services. Health care now implements AI to support disease diagnosis, nursing and managerial assistance, promote healthy living, as well as improve mental health monitoring and reporting . The evolution of data driven verification of various neuro-psycho-physiological features is expected to predict mental health disorders faster than human diagnosis. Similarly, in transport and logistics, the potential advantage of autonomous vehicles and machinery is profound. The mining industry has implemented a number of autonomous capabilities providing: refuelling, large machinery operations, mobile equipment interfaces to monitor equipment health and maintenance demands, and computer assisted operational decision making. Militaries are also modernising their forces through autonomy. US military and industry partners are rapidly developing autonomous capabilities including armed unmanned ground vehicles, long-range high subsonic unmanned air vehicles, and unmanned underwater vehicles. The Air Force’s rapid development of the Loyal Wingman demonstrates that a modernised future-ready military will be delivered through autonomy. Technology laws[1] suggest that technology advancements will far exceed sole human capabilities, creating a world in which human intelligence won’t exist without AI enhancement. This trend suggests that in 2121, tactical combat power will be entirely autonomous and increasingly in demand, and will only be further exacerbated by the extreme physical environments faced by 2121 military forces. Future Warfare will be executed within extreme and hazardous environments brought on by climate change, making the battlespace unfit for human application of tactical combat power. Scientists around the world agree global warming caused by humans is unequivocal. Today, evidence indicates Earth’s temperature has risen by one-degree causing global sea levels to rise twenty centimetres in ten years, increased the number of extreme weather events annually, declining arctic sea ice, decreased snow cover and retreating glaciers. By 2121, these climate impacts will intensify and endure. Earth at three degrees of warming will experience a sea level rise by 80 centimetres causing coastal cities to sink, continuous extreme weather events such as droughts, floods, cyclones, hurricanes, tornadoes, bushfires and tsunamis, and loss of predictable seasonal change. Regions around the globe, as we understand them today, are expected to remain in a consistently hazardous state. In aggregate, these constant, continuous conditions will result in a 2121 operational environment which will be unfit for human application of tactical combat power. Therefore, the intersection of rapid advancements in autonomy and artificial intelligence with increased environmental hazards brought on by climate change, will result in the complete automation of both tactical combat power and logistics enablers. Today’s 2021 airminded Logistics is a critical enabler focussed on sustaining air operations through human application of tactical logistics functions, primarily through capability and airbase support. 2021 air platforms are highly complex integrated mission systems requiring substantial capability support through engineering, maintenance and supply management to remain serviceable and relevant through a long life-of-type . 2021 Air bases - expeditionary or otherwise – are the weapon system needed to successfully sustain platform rates of effort required by the Joint Campaign. 2021 logistics functions are primarily delivered through the human application of tactical logistics functions like air movements, refuelling, base warehousing, and security. Today’s tactical bias builds significant and critical expertise within the logistics community in delivering tactical logistics effects, but fails to imbue operational art into the mind of today’s air force logisticians. Transitioning today’s logisticians into operational artists required for 2121 warfare is a key requirement for executing competitive and relevant autonomous and untethered tactical logistics in the 2121 future force. ‘One machine can do the work of 50 ordinary men. No machine can do the work of one extraordinary man’. - Elbert G. Hubbard [Air Force Journal of Logistics – Quotes for the Air Force Logistician Volume 1] Elbert G. Hubbard once stated ‘[o]ne machine can do the work of 50 ordinary men. No machine can do the work of one extraordinary man’. 2121 warfare may encompass autonomous and untethered logistics; however, the 2121 nature of war will still require a human element for success. The knack for operational art will still exist in 2121. Operational art is not simply the transactional application of knowledge, tactics, and procedures, but incorporates fundamental human traits such as innovation, guile, deception and forethought to out-manoeuvre an adversary (Department of Defence, 2019). Therefore, while automation will absorb tactical combat power in 2121, it will be the human element through application of 2121 operational art that will guide the delivery of tactical combat effects. This will not just encompass combat artistry, but also the integration of logistics effects. Today’s air-minded logisticians generate tactical logistics functions after air battle plans are agreed, whereby in 2121 logistics aviators will be fully integrated into operational battlespace management through application of operational art executing autonomous and untethered logistics functions. The Air Planning Cycle orchestrates the air domain contribution to the joint force, but air logistics does not drive the creation of the air battle plan, instead takes the output and assigns tactical logistics functions to support air operations (Department of Defence, 2009). The Air Force operations logistics support model describes these tactical logistics functions as; organic logistics within squadrons, scalable combat ready support squadrons, maintenance and supply elements for capability support and responsive national support base elements (Department of Defence, 2009). Importantly these logistics functions focus on support to tactical execution, rather than designing and optimising the entire air battle plan with due consideration for logistics demand. Hence currently, logistics is not fully integrated into the air domain application of operational art. By contrast, the 2121 Air and Space Operations Centre will require all aviators to integrate their expertise - applying operational art to control the air battle plan for the autonomous and untethered tactical combat force. To realise this result, the 2121 logistician will need to transition from today’s human doer of tactical logistics functions to operational artists, integrating logistics effects seamlessly into the air battle plan. The Air Force that exists in 2121 will successfully compete when novel approaches are integrated with advanced capabilities in the application of airpower. Climate change and technology advancement will drive an autonomous tactical combat force requiring aviator operational artists at the operational level orchestrating the fight. World class airpower effects in 2121 will be dependent on a transitioned logistician that is no longer focussed on human application of tactical logistics functions, but a logistician that is astute in operational art able to integrate logistics effects into the battlespace. SQNLDR Kylie Melville has served as a logistics officer in the RAAF for 20 years which has included multiple operational logistics postings and deployments. Her last posting within the Air and Space Operations Centre at Headquarters Joint Operations Command was conducting logistics operational planning which has inspired her current work at Air Force Headquarters in Logistics Branch's Future Logistics Capability Directorate. [1] Moore’s Law: Processing powers doubles about every 2 years while prices are halved (Pinto, 2013) Gilders Law: Network bandwidth doubles every six months (Pinto, 2013) Less’s Law: The cost of storage is falling by half every 12 months, while capacity doubles (Pinto, 2013)

Automation is finding its way into more aspects of Air Force technologies. These processes are able to significantly speed up manual processes and relieve aviators of mental capacity to tackle the greater issues. But is automation the perfect solution we’re led to believe it to be? Warrant Officer Xavier Sherriff delves into the risks automation can bring when reliance is not coupled with understanding. We live in a world where automation is becoming more prominent. Examples range from the ‘do not disturb’ function on the iPhone, through to advance flight automation systems that use Artificial Intelligence. Automation can be seen as the ‘magic potion’ used to solve human induced error, but does this sword have two edges? While automation offers a range of benefits, it may also impair our depth of understanding, while almost certainly introducing new risks. But does that matter? The Emirates Flight EK407 - ATSB investigation report provides an example of where the fundamental trust in automation was misplaced. The investigation into this incident found that the payload data was entered into the aircraft Flight Management System (FMS) incorrectly - 100 metric tonnes lower than intended. This had several flow-on effects impacting the aircraft’s take-off parameters. The Emirates Flight EK407 incident is a classic case of ‘garbage in, garbage out’; however, this is by no means the first-time data entry errors have occurred, and it is unlikely to be the last. The FMS operated exactly as it should. The data was input by the co-pilot, but the lack of cross check resulted in the error being missed. A situation was created where the aircraft would breach the end of the runway. This incident clearly demonstrates how reliance on automation induces new risk if due diligence and cross checks do not occur. The results of which are disastrous to safe and effective flying operations. There are many ways automation can present hazards to flying operations. Misuse and hidden errors are two of the most common issues found when using automation. Misuse occurs when humans manipulate with automation. While hidden errors are often associated with software that doesn’t undergo certification compliance or a fault that isn’t identified during the compliance activity. Misuse As a Royal Australian Air Force loadmaster, I have seen examples where automation has greatly improved tactical effectiveness allowing the aviator to ‘hand off’ the laborious work required so that attention can be focused elsewhere. Examples include systems that enhance situational awareness and software that automatically calculates aircraft weight and balance. This automation presents a chance for a shallower depth of understanding of core concepts, while still achieving mission outcomes. Additionally, it may be limiting our ability to identify errors and creating a ‘going through the motions’ mentality. Is a shallower understanding of core concepts like weight and balance any less important than a pilot understanding ‘theory of flight’? I would argue no, and that this deeper level of understanding is vital for any high-risk profession. A detailed understanding of core concepts will increase the likelihood of identifying errors and determining the cause efficiently. With the introduction of electronic weight and balance, loadmasters no longer need to complete manual calculations post initial qualification course. Believe me, nobody is happier about this than I am! However, it also means that loadmasters are no longer practicing these skills without a conscious effort to do so. This appears to be degrading our depth of knowledge relating to core loadmaster concepts, such as weight and balance theory. This weight and balance theory forms the basis for everything we do. Hidden Errors Consider this example - when completing the weight and balance utilising the electronic application, I was presented with an error. The application indicated a forward and aft centre of gravity limitation that was 1.1% different to the FMS. All my data entry was correct and cross checked, but I was still unable to identify the error! I had unwavering faith that the application was doing everything correctly, therefore it must be automation bias. As events turned out, the application had a limitation that was not yet known. The application didn’t factor the fuel contained within the external tanks (a recent modification at the time of the event). The fuel contained within these tanks has a tangible effect on centre of gravity limitations. When the tanks were fitted gap training was provided for aircrew to make them aware of how this impacted the limits, however, the application did not receive an update, nor were these internal limitations known or recorded. Members might assume the application was functioning correctly and this error could cause significant delays. Through a process of error detection, I determined the problem and made manual amendments after consulting the Aircraft Flight Manual for the correct limitation. This demonstrates that core skills and knowledge are vital for flight safety and in preventing automation bias. Identification and Recovery My identification and resolution of the error took time, but luckily on this occasion, time is what I had. Given my aviation knowledge, skills, and experience of calculating weight and balance manually, I was able to ascertain the issue and solve the problem. Later, I thought about the event and considered that if it had been a less experienced loadmaster with a greater reliance on the automated system, they might not have identified it at all. In the end, I reverted to manually calculating the forward and aft limitations. This application issue has subsequently been identified and published to the crews. This event was by no means catastrophic in nature, the aircraft FMS would have advised the captain of the true limitation and highlighted my error, however this bias in a different situation could result in a disastrous oversight. What now? How do we maintain these skills? And further, who is responsible? As an Air Force aviator, there are many training and assessing evolutions that take place over the course of your career. The current method of assuring technical knowledge is via annual category assessments. Including manual weight and balance exercises as part of these exams is one method that could be explored. Annual performance assessments are through an observation of an aviator’s application of knowledge during standard operations, current policy does not mandate a question and answer or discussion style of evaluation with the exception of emergency procedures. These exams and assessments are part of an Aviation Safety Management System, but are they contemporary and do they meet the intent? Does mindset and attitude play a part? Should we be doing more problem resolution training? Can we teach people to have passion for self-learning? Final Thoughts Automation is and always will be a force multiplier. It enables the crew to be more efficient and effective. However, blind reliance on automation has risks that are often hidden under an exterior of perfection. Becoming aware of your own reliance on automation and the mission creep that results from this reliance is a step towards becoming a safer aviator. Warrant Officer Xavier Sherriff is a category B C-130J-30 Hercules Loadmaster with 15 years’ experience. Xavier is currently the training systems development Warrant Officer for the C-130J-30 Block 8.1 upgrade. Xavier has performed postings in Air Movements, C-130J-30 operations, ab initio training and Flight test with the Aircraft Research and Development Unit (ARDU) as an Operational Evaluator Aircrew conducting OT&E. You can follow him on Twitter at @FTLM2021

Enhancing the Lethality and Survivability of the Integrated Force National Gallery of Australia 28 September 2022 Final Report Dr Robbin Laird Link to the final report on Defense.Info Download Final Report More articles from Dr Laird are posted in Event Proceedings Synopsis and Program Download PDF Presentations Welcoming Remarks and Formal Close AIRMSHL Geoff Brown AO (Retd) Sir Richard Williams Foundation MC SQNLDR Sally Knox Sir Richard Williams Foundation Managing Strategic Risk in a Disrupted World Dr Alan Dupont AO CEO, The Cognoscenti Group Thinking Through Tradeoffs Chris McInnes Sir Richard Williams Foundation ACAUST Priorities AVM Darren Goldie AM, CSC Air Commander Australia Mission Rehearsal Gen. Kenneth S. Wilsbach Commander, Pacific Air Forces Research and Analytic Support to the Integrated Force Dr Andrew Dowse AO Director, RAND Australia Controlling Your Destiny Gen. (Ret) John William "Mick" Nicholson Jr Lockheed Martin Resilient Communications in Contested Environments AIRCDRE Jason Begley CSM Director General Joint C4 Joint Capabilities Group Delivering on the Promise of Joint All Domain Command and Control Bill Lamb, Director of the Multi-Domain Mission Command Operating Unit, Northrop Grumman Defense Systems RAF - Decision Superiority AVM Ian Duguid CB OBE MA RAF Air Officer Commanding No 1 Group Royal Air Force Decision Making – You and Technology Simon Taufel Integrity Values Leadership Defence Intelligence Enterprise RADM Stephen Hughes CSC, RAN Head Intelligence Capability Chief of Army Perspective LTGEN Simon Stuart AO, DSC Chief of Army Force Design Considerations MAJGEN Anthony Rawlins DSC, AM Head of Force Design Chief of Navy Perspective VADM Mark Hammond AM RAN Chief of Navy Chief of Air Force Perspective AIRMSHL Robert Chipman AM, CSC Chief of Air Force

Program and Presentations Enhancing the Lethality and Survivability of the Integrated Force National Gallery of Australia 28 September 2022 Final Report Dr Robbin Laird Link to the final report on Defense.Info Download Final Report Synopsis and Program Download PDF Presentations Welcoming Remarks and Formal Close AIRMSHL Geoff Brown AO (Retd) Sir Richard Williams Foundation Introduction and MC SQNLDR Sally Knox Sir Richard Williams Foundation Managing Strategic Risk in a Disrupted World Dr Alan Dupont AO Chief Executive Officer, The Cognoscenti Group Thinking Through Tradeoffs Chris McInnes Sir Richard Williams Foundation ACAUST Priorities AVM Darren Goldie AM, CSC Air Commander Australia Mission Rehearsal (video recording) Gen. Kenneth S. Wilsbach Commander, Pacific Air Forces Research and Analytic Support to the Integrated Force Dr Andrew Dowse AO Director, RAND Australia Controlling Your Destiny John W. Nicholson Jr. Retired U.S. Army General Lockheed Martin Middle East Resilient Communications in Contested Environments AIRCDRE Jason Begley CSM Director General Joint C4, Joint Capabilities Group Delivering on the Promise of Joint All Domain Command and Control Bill Lamb Director of the Multi-Domain Mission Command Operating Unit, Northrop Grumman Defense Systems RAF - Decision Superiority AVM Ian Duguid CB OBE MA RAF Air Officer Commanding No 1 Group, Royal Air Force Decision Making – You and Technology Simon Taufel Integrity Values Leadership Defence Intelligence Enterprise RADM Stephen Hughes CSC, RAN Head Intelligence Capability Chief of Army Perspective LTGEN Simon Stuart AO, DSC Chief of Army Force Design Considerations MAJGEN Anthony Rawlins DSC, AM Head of Force Design Chief of Navy Perspective VADM Mark Hammond AM, RAN Chief of Navy Chief of Air Force Perspective AIRMSHL Robert Chipman AM, CSC Chief of Air Force

Dr Robbin Laird 6 October 2022 On September 28, 2022, the Williams Foundation hosted its latest seminar. At the Williams Foundation Seminar on September 28, 2022, the new chief of Army, Lt. General Simon Stuart, provided his perspective on shaping a way ahead for the lethal and survivable within the context of affordable, ADF joint force which the nation needed in the evolving strategic environment. He started his presentation by reminding the audience that war was a national endeavour and required a whole of nation approach. He warned that the duration and brutality of armed conflict often was of a character that those who forecast short and clean conflicts tend to overlook or minimize. Lt. General Stuart warned: “There is a prevailing commentary today that speaks with undue precision and certainty about the ‘next war’. It generally comes from a perspective that focuses exclusively on the changing character of war, which either dismisses or ignores its enduring nature. “It discounts the effects of fog, friction, chaos and individual agency on the course of a war. It describes a symmetrical response in a single modality of warfare. It supposes will can be imposed and can be resisted at ever increasing distance and without having to close with an adversary. “It focuses on the outcome of the first battle or battles rather than the war. It imagines that the next war will be short, decisive and clean. And it confuses targeting and tactics for operational art and strategy. “Unfortunately, history, including Australia’s history, does not support these hypotheses.” The way ahead for the ADF needed to be placed in such a context. He argued that “the unpredictability of war demands an ADF that is relevant and credible in all domains, and integrated – as a system of systems – that has the best probability of mission success whether deterring war or prevailing in its contest.” His comments clearly implied that the shift from the land wars in the Middle East to the direct defense of Australia would form the framework within which Army and joint force modernization would proceed. He identified the way ahead in the following terms for the Australian Army: “to prevail in the 21st century, Army must be protected, connected, lethal and enabled. Army will make a greater contribution at the operational and strategic levels through new and transformed capabilities such as networked long-range fires, littoral manoeuvre, cyber, space, information warfare, and functionally aligned special operations forces. “We are modernising our scalable, world-class combined arms fighting system – which is a system of systems in and of itself. It is the only part of the ADF capable of fighting and persisting in the most lethal of land environments to give our soldiers the best probability of mission success, and the best chance of surviving and coming home. “We are enhancing and expanding our health, logistics, engineering and aviation capabilities, as well as our command and management laydown in order to be better positioned to modernise, scale, and contribute to mobilisation. “We are equally active in modernising the ways in which people can serve to help us generate the flexibility and capacity we need. “We are transforming the way we train, build partnerships, and embrace contemporary learning approaches to thinking and education – to leverage the incredible potential of our people. “Underpinning all this is the application of new and emerging technologies. We are focused on four areas: Robotics and Autonomous Systems, Artificial Intelligence and machine learning, Quantum and human performance optimisation through an applied, ‘learn by doing’ approach with industry and academia. “We are also adjusting our posture by leveraging the potential of our Total Workforce System (full-time, part-time and everything in between), investing capability and seeking to leverage joint basing opportunities and the dispersal and resilience of our estate across the 157 Army locations that span the breadth and depth of our nation.” He concluded by identifying what he sees as two key challenges to delivering the right kind of Australian Army force appropriate to the challenges facing Australia. “The first is what might be described as conventional wisdom that describes with great certitude how the next war will unfold. It is a perspective that does not contemplate an ADF that will need to be able to fight on land, in complex and urban terrain and among populations – either in support of Joint Force air and maritime manoeuvre, fires, or indeed to prosecute Joint land combat. “The second is how this thinking intersects with the necessary prioritisation of resources. The land domain is the least modernised and Army the least capitalised service. “This in itself is not the issue – but reapportioning resources beyond the point where the ADF is relevant and credible in the land domain most certainly is the point. These two contemporary challenges are consequential for the future of our Army, for a relevant and credible Australian Joint Force. Our quest for an integrated force is built on the assumption that we are more than the sum of our constituent parts – but equally each of the parts must be viable in the first instance. “ He pointedly ended his presentation by arguing that “With a 60-year-old Armoured Personnel Carrier at the core of our Joint Land Combat system and a sustained campaign by some to scuttle it’s planned and long overdue replacement.” It should be noted that Air Marshal (Retired) Geoff Brown, Chairman of the Williams Foundation, specifically commented to the Army Chief that a 60 year old weapon system should be in a museum, not on the battlefield. Link to article Dr Robbin Laird, Shaping a Way Ahead for the Australian Army: The Perspective of Lt. General Simon Stuart (DefenseInfo) 6 October 2022

Dr Robbin Laird 14 October 2022 On September 28, 2022, the Williams Foundation hosted its latest seminar. The focus was on the challenges which need to be addressed in making the biggest change to Australian defence seen in recent memory. Rather than focusing on the away games and support for its major ally in such efforts, the focus was returning to the direct defence of Australia and what needs to be done with an adversary which can cut Australia off from global supplies. As the new Chief of Navy put it: “I believe it’s important to raise our eyes above the tactical level for a moment to reflect on why we build and employ an integrated force. And I say this because what we build and what we do with it matters only in so much as it enhances our national well-being. “Our national well-being like all nations is derived from sustained economic prosperity, and peaceful coexistence with nations. And as a trading island nation connected to the global trading system by seabed cables, and maritime commerce, our economic well-being is almost exclusively enabled by the sea and by the seabed. “Enablement though is not enough. Sustained economic prosperity has only been possible because these systems — freedom of navigation for commerce, and seabed infrastructure which enables our financial and strategic connectivity with the global trading system — have flourished in an environment of acceptance and adherence to the complex array of treaties, laws and conventions that for almost 80 years have been iterated, improved and almost universally supported. “We call this the rules-based order, and we credit it with providing it with good order at sea in the collective interest of peace for all nations. Those of us who understand Australia derives its well-being from this system are alarmed that such norms are being challenged. “We are concerned that the right to peaceful coexistence with other nations can no longer be assumed. As former minister for defence the honorable Kim Beazley stated in Perth last month, and I paraphrase, what right do we have to exist as a sovereign nation of only 25 million people occupying an island continent with room and natural resources the envy of the world? “The answer is the rights conferred by adherence to the rules-based order. The very rights we have assumed to be enduring and beyond contest for decades. But that is no longer the case. This system is now being challenged and our government has commissioned the defence strategic review in response to these challenges. “It is reasonable to conclude that that which cannot be assumed, must be guaranteed. And that is why the lethality and survivability of our defence forces is being re-examined. In this context, there is a direct and distinct nexus between the lethality and survivability of the integrated force and the survivability of our nation. “And this relationship is recognized by our prime minister in the last month. The Honorable Anthony Albanese has stated that he sees the three key principles of our current security policy are to defend our territorial integrity, to protect our political sovereignty from external pressure and to promote Australia’s economic prosperity through a strong economy and resilient supply chains…. “Australia is a paradox. The geography which makes it difficult to invade and conquer Australia also makes Australia dependent upon seaborne trade. In other words, Australia might not be vulnerable to invasion, but the hostile power does not need to invade Australia to defeat Australia.” Unpacking an understanding of the evolving relationship between the nation and the ADF is at the heart of reworking the defence of the nation in the years to come. The defence capabilities which have enabled the ADF to deliver significant but targeted warfighting capability will now be adapted and refocused on Australia’s direct defence and role in its region. But how will this intersect with how national efforts unfold? How will the necessary ADF mobilization potential intersect with the mobilization of the nation? How will the ADF build out its workforce and be supported by the enhanced capability of domestic defence industry to support the ADF in a crisis or sustained conflict? The pandemic as a prologue to the kind of macro crisis which faces Australia highlighted the need for more secure and stable supply chains. How can Australia build resilient supply chains and with whom? How to build the knowledge base with regard to what needs to be protected by such an effort and what can be left to the forces of globalization? The fuel challenge is notably significant as the geopolitics of fuel and setting climate change standards without regard to geopolitical reality will only leave Australia and the liberal democracies vulnerable to energy supply extortion. It is difficult to miss what is going on in Europe and its relationship with Russia as a basic lesson in the relationship between geopolitics and energy. And the question of Australia’s geography is a foundational point for understanding how the ADF will re-deploy and re-calibrate as the nation prioritizes infrastructure in the regions in Australia central to the projection of power from the continent to the first island chain of Australia and beyond. The importance of shaping enhanced capabilities for operations from the North of Australia was a frequent point made in various presentations to the seminar. Link to article Dr Robbin Laird, Preparing for Major Change in Australian Defence: The September 2022 Williams Foundation Seminar (DefenseInfo) 14 October 2022

The last time the RAAF operated seaplanes was 1950, but is there an argument to bring back some sort of modern amphibious seaplane? FLGOFF Joakim Siira thinks there are several – from tactical concepts associated with climate change to strategic relationships with key partners in our region. Years ago, before I joined the Royal Australian Air Force, I volunteered at the RAAF Association Aviation Heritage Museum in Bull Creek, Perth (I highly recommend you visit, given the chance). While working front of house selling tickets and gifts to customers, I was taken under the wing of many older veterans with whom I became good friends, whilst also being under the wing – literally – of a Consolidated PBY Catalina, undoubtedly the most famous and celebrated seaplane of all time. The Catalina served with great distinction during the Second World War, performing a range of tasks including reconnaissance, search-and-rescue (SAR) and mine-laying. Their strategic effect was well out of proportion to the number of airframes flying. All that time under the wing of a Catalina got me wondering; can the case be made for a modern-day seaplane capable of conducting strategic level effects? The last seaplane in-service within the RAAF was…the Consolidated PBY Catalina, retiring in 1950 after a decade of service [1]. This coincided with the worldwide decline in seaplane use and development. The rise of the aircraft carrier and naval aviation, long-range missiles as well as the advent of the jet engine combined with the massive increase of land-based airfields built during the war meant water-based aircraft had become largely redundant militarily. The USSR attempted to develop a jet-powered seaplane during the late 1980s, the Lun class ekranoplan, but never saw full-scale production. Maritime reconnaissance and SAR is now conducted by the P-8A Poseidon at 11 Squadron (once employing Catalinas). Based in Adelaide, the aircraft regularly operates from northern Australia and South East Asia for operational tasking. In support of these operations, Cocos Island infrastructure is being upgraded to accommodate the Poseidon, due to be finished in 2023. Nevertheless, land-based aircraft remain victim to one of the central characteristics of air power theory – impermanence [2]. There are two considerations to this worth exploring in the context of modern military seaplanes. The first is impermanence. Simply put, no RAAF aircraft can rescue anyone from the water. A P-8A can deliver life-saving equipment for the crew of a sunken vessel, loiter overhead for hours and relay information to surface vessels, but sooner or later it needs to return to a purpose-built, kilometres-long length of strengthened concrete to land. They can help, but they cannot affect the rescue. The RAN’s Seahawk helicopters can, but they are tied to their frigates, and if said ship is outside the Seahawks maximum range, they are also of no use until getting closer – at the frigate's maximum speed of 27kts. If there is a time-critical element to a situation, speed of response is a decisive factor. This may be either in the case of a downed aircraft, a sinking ship, or in the aftermath of a natural disaster, all where exposure to the elements is a killer. A seaplane combines the mobility of a fixed-wing aircraft with the ability of a ship to operate on the water and remove people from danger. The second consideration is the impermanence of infrastructure. As noted in the Air and Space Centre’s article ‘Airbases: Now. Then. Always’, climate change is a significant risk to not just Australian airports, but those of our allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific. The 2011 and 2022 floods both necessitated RAAF platforms to operate out of RAAF Bases Amberley and Richmond, with extreme weather events and sea levels only predicted to increase by the year 2090. With an increasing frequency of extreme weather events, and consistent flooding of two of six of our operational airbases likely to continue, there will continue to be massive strategic consequences. The RAAF and ADF will not be able to fulfil their obligations to support the nation and the region if critical infrastructure is out of action. It’s possible the aforementioned runway works at Cocos Island may be finished just in time to become redundant. So, is there a place in the modern air force for a modern amphibious seaplane? And where would we get one from? The latter is relatively easy to answer, the former not so much. A seaplane would functionally share a number of roles assigned to the P-8A - maritime reconnaissance and SAR for instance. A seaplane, however, has the benefit of being able to land on both runways and suitable stretches of water, whilst also carrying personnel and cargo. Despite requiring significant financial commitment - at a reported unit cost of USD$156 million, plus sustainment, competing geopolitics in the Indo-Pacific make the investment worthy of consideration. Australian aid is going to be sent following a natural disaster, and if an Indo-Pacific islands’ runways are out of action, a seaplane may still be able to operate out of their naval facilities instead, even if degraded, allowing Australia to execute its foreign policy objectives. So where to source one? There are three military seaplane producers: Russia, China and Japan. With Russia and China being unlikely contenders in the current political climate; Japan seems like a safe choice. It is worth noting however that China has also recently developed a large seaplane, the AVIC AG600 Kunlong; it is currently undergoing flight testing. Japan has a long history of long-range seaplane production pre-dating the Second World War. Their current platform, the amphibious ShinMaywa US-2, first entered service with the Japanese Self Defence Force in 2009, with 6 currently flown by the 71st Kotukai. Significantly, it is also being developed as a water-bomber, with the ability to carry 15 tonnes of water or repellant; a capability that Australia would heavily make use of during the summer fire season. With a reported maximum range of 4700km, a mission radius of 1900km, and the ability to operate on sea or land, (by operating out of Cocos Islands, Guam, Nauru or French Polynesia), it could cover much of the Indo-Pacific in its SAR or reconnaissance capacity. There is again a geopolitical factor; a purchase of this significance would further strengthen Australian-Japanese ties on the back of the signing of the Reciprocal Access Agreement in January, as well as Japan’s attendance at Exercise Pitch Black for the first time this year. In this context, the geopolitical messaging of the first ever RAAF procurement from an Asian nation can have a strategic effect worth more than the sum of its parts – that message being Australia and its allies are stronger than ever; an important message to send to the region in these tense times. For all the current focus on potential conflict in the region and further abroad, one thing we know for sure is that sea levels are rising. As the underlying enablers of Air Force capability change, most notably availability of suitable dry land, it behoves us to adapt to that change. Seaplanes are one option that provide RAAF with a capability that negates a critical disabler – impermanence – and allows RAAF to execute the ADFs mission of Shape, Deter, Respond where it might otherwise not be able to. FLGOFF Joakim Siira is a logistics officer based at RAAF Williamtown, with a background in aviation and intermodal logistics. The views expressed are his alone and do not represent the opinion of the Royal Australian Air Force, the Department of Defence or the Australian government. #AirPower #ClimateChange #infrastructure #procurement [1] Wilson, Stewart. 1994. Military Aircraft Of Australia. Weston Creek, ACT: Aerospace Publications. [2]The Air Power Manual. 2022. 7th ed. Canberra: Air and Space Power Centre, Royal Australian Air Force. Image credits: U.S. Air Force. 2022. US-2A During Cope North. Image. https://theaviationist.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/US-2-top-new-678x381.jpg RAAF. 2013. Warbirds Downunder 2013 Air Show In Temora. Image. http://images.defence.gov.au/20131102raaf8566593_9947.jpg

By Brian Morra 20 October 2022 Link to article Brian Morra, The Next Phase of the Russo-Ukraine War: The Impact of Air Force General Sergei Vladimirovich Surovikin (DefenseInfo) 20 October 2022 Text The Kremlin announced in early October that a new overall theater commander had been appointed to run its ‘special military operation’ in Ukraine. The new commander of the Russian Ukrainian front is four-star Air Force General Sergei Vladimirovich Surovikin, who is also the commander of the Russian Aerospace Force (comprising both the Air Force and Space Force). Previously, Putin had appointed two Army generals as overall commanders. Neither used airpower effectively. General Surovikin is a different story altogether. Almost immediately after his appointment, Russian air attacks on Ukrainian infrastructure targets escalated to levels not seen since February and March of 2022. The renewed October air campaign is clearly Surovikin’s doing. He has unleashed the Russian Air Force on Ukraine’s electrical grid, power generation centers, and other public utilities in Ukraine’s urban centers. His goal seems to be to cripple the Ukrainian economy by denying all industrial sectors the power required to run their businesses. Civilian casualties are mounting as some Russian missiles miss their intended infrastructure targets, probably due to faulty targeting data and failures in terminal guidance systems. The loss of access to electricity and other power sources also means that Ukrainian civilians will struggle to heat their homes and cook their food as wintry weather approaches. Who is General Sergei Surovikin? Ironically, even though he is commander of the Russian Aerospace Force, he spent most of his career in the Army. He is a legend among hardliners, and he famously supported the KGB-led coup against Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev in 1991. As a young Army captain, his tank unit attacked Moscow protesters who were marching in the streets in support of Russian President Boris Yeltsin and against the unlawful coup against Gorbachev. Surovikin’s tanks killed three protestors, at least one of whom was a Soviet Army veteran of the war in Afghanistan. After the coup plotters failed to depose Gorbachev, Surovikin was imprisoned for his unit’s deadly actions. Russian President Yeltsin later pardoned him and Surovikin became a hero to hardliners – a status he maintains today. Putin personally called General Surovikin to wish him happy birthday earlier this year. More recently, as a three-star general, Surovikin was the architect of the successful and brutal Russian air campaign in Syria. As a reward for his service in Syria, Putin transferred him to the Air Force, promoted him to four star general, and named him commander of the Aerospace Forces. With the arrival of Surovikin, the war has entered a new and dangerous more phase. Ukraine has inadequate air defenses, and it now faces a serious, sustained air campaign for the first time. In the wake of the new air campaign, Ukrainian President Zelensky has implored NATO and the G7 member nations to supply him with promised air defense equipment. If he has sufficient weapons, Surovikin will wage a relentless campaign. The Aerospace Force that he commands is also the service most likely to employ nuclear weapons should the Kremlin decide to use them.

Dr Robbin Laird 17 October 2022 During my September 2022 trip to Australia in my role as a Research Fellow of the Williams Foundation, I wrote the report for the September 28, 2022 seminar and engaged in discussions during the month focused on the nature of the challenges facing Australia and the need to shape effective approaches to the direct defence of Australia within alliance contexts. I had a chance to discuss a number of aspects of these challenges with my colleague Dr. Ross Babbage who is the Chief Executive Officer of Strategic Forum Pty Ltd and a Non-Resident Senior Fellow of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) in Washington DC. A key issue which combines both defence and alliance issues is the challenge of ensuring reliable supply chains in the context of the digital age. The pandemic certainly brought to public attention the fragility of supply chains for Australia and the entire liberal democratic world. And the war in Ukraine has generated a broader energy crisis, notably in the wake of the aversion of many countries and the U.S. Administration to prioritize energy production during a perceived global “climate crisis.” The first issue which became evident was that the reliance on China for a significant amount of the West’s manufacturing capability left them vulnerable to the 21st century authoritarian states and their political agenda to change the “rules-based order” forged after World War II. With the Western economies eschewing heavy manufacturing in favor of a more environmentally friendly “service economy,” there is a key question of how then the West maintains a viable “arsenal of democracy”? The energy dependence of Europe on Russia has clearly underscored how not having viable alternatives for basic commodities can undercut Western agendas and policies. Although there is currently much focus on building alternatives in Europe, the continued emphasis on the “climate change emergency” clearly conflicts with a realistic long-term geopolitical energy strategy for all of the allies. And the Biden Administration’s rapid move away from the American energy independence reduces America’s ability to help allies in extremis. And indeed, when it comes to critical supplies, given the current U.S. trajectory, how much allied sharing will really be possible during a future crisis? The second issue which we discussed was the way ahead with rare earth minerals and processed metals. Dr. Babbage underscored that Australia has large quantities of many of the key rare earth minerals. But it generally does not process them; that has largely been done in China. This clearly needs to change, but this requires Australia and her partners to shoulder the key processing opportunities and burdens. It also means that Australia, her partners and allies need to work through ways to build and sustain relevant supply chains The third issue is that the Australian government needs to work with a variety of allies and partners, and not just wait for leadership from Washington. This is how he put it: “The slowness on some of the issues in this area means that Australia needs to move rapidly and take the initiative ourselves in developing bilateral or trilateral or multi-lateral alliance or partner relationships.” He underscored that “we need to get the network of allies and partners working effectively together to improve supply chains. In addition to our discussions with agencies in Washington, we’ve been having discussions with our friends in the region, most notably Japan and South Korea, but also with some of the ASEAN countries and India. “We are also focused on discussions in Europe because their industrial base is very significant and could play important roles in future Indo-Pacific contingencies. We have our own independent and close relationships with most of these European countries facilitated in part by our own European-origin populations.” The fourth issue is to expand ways for government to work with industry to ensure that essential supplies are available in a crisis and to ensure that Australia can do all of the important things it needs to do even during a very prolonged crisis. And Dr. Babbage underscored that innovations being generated by industry in a number of areas to strengthen supply chain robustness also can enhance Australian resilience as well. This is the case, for instance, in rare earth materials, as well as in advanced robotic technologies and some types of smart manufacturing. Babbage cited the example of an Australian rare earth minerals company, Lynas Rare Earths. They currently have a processing plant in Malaysia which they are closing in the coming two-to- three years. They are currently building a new plant in Australia and a second with an American partner in Texas. They are also modifying and modernizing the conventional rare earth refining process. He then mentioned another Australian company, Australian Strategic Materials, which has teamed with a South Korean company to develop and put into operation a completely new technology for rare earth mineral processing. This new technology process is much cleaner, less power intensive and cheaper to operate than legacy processing technologies. The first of this new type of processing plants is now fully operational in South Korea and is supplying Korean and other customers. This company is planning an even larger rare earth mining and processing operation in Australia and is also considering licensing their advanced technologies to allied partners. As a result of these and related developments China may lose its dominance of the rare earths industry during the coming decade. Put another way, shaping a way ahead for the defence of Australia is much broader than buying a new platform for the ADF. It is now also about the ecosystem for strengthening the supply chains that foster Australia’s prosperity as a functioning society and also the country’s security and that of its allies and security partners. The pandemic provided a hammer blow; the war in Ukraine triggered a global food and energy crisis; and the two together made it very clear that defense against a multi-domain power like China is not simply about winning the next battle with powerful military forces. It is also about being able to prevail in a struggle for national and allied survival. The featured graphic: Australian Supply Chains: State of Play. AUSTRALIAN CEO SURVEY 2021-2022. Link to article Dr Robbin Laird, Reliable Supply Chains, Defence, Partners and Allies: Shaping a Way Ahead for Australia (DefenseInfo) 17 October 2022

What does manoeuvre in the cyber domain look like? And how is it critical for future warfighting concepts? In this address by TCB’s own AIRCDRE Jason Begley (Director General Joint C4) at the recent Sir Richard Williams Foundation Conference on Enhancing the Lethality and Survivability of the Integrated Force, he unpacks how ensuring information communication resilience is essential for freedom of action. Manoeuvre. It’s the doctrinal foundations of Australian Military Power across all five of our warfighting domains. That shouldn’t come as a surprise to this forum, even if you don’t spend your nights curled up with a glass of red reading doctrine like I do. So whenever we talk about Defence capabilities and concepts of any kind, we need to be doing it through the lens of how they will assure our ability to manoeuvre. Because if we’re not, then a) we’re doing it wrong, and b) we’re not really in a position to achieve a consistent understanding of what we mean when we say resilience. Let’s take a closer look at manoeuvre. This is how our doctrine defines it. And within that, there’s some key phrases worth noting. Position of advantage. Series of actions orchestrated to a single purpose. And for the purposes of my topic today, those last few words… protecting friendly vulnerabilities. We also need to understand the way the doctrine defines the relationship between manoeuvre and the five warfighting domains. It makes manoeuvre central by defining the domains as, “a critical manoeuvre space whose access or control is vital to the freedom of action and superiority required by the mission.” Freedom of action. Keep that phrase in mind as we continue. None of this should be news to this audience because manoeuvre’s been around for a long time. Coordinating your assets to mass your strengths to deliver effects against an adversary’s assessed vulnerabilities has always been a part of warfare. This was especially true of smaller forces that couldn’t rely on the brute force of attrition in the battlespace, and so needed an asymmetric advantage to prevail. Manoeuvre’s also a concept that has leveraged technology throughout history, much of which we now take for granted in our everyday lives. On land, manoeuvre was greatly improved by the wheel and internal combustion engines. In the maritime domain, we’ve moved from ships and sail to carrier battle groups and submarines. The latter of those has obvious benefits in terms of asymmetric advantage through its ability to constrain an adversary’s freedom of action simply through its existence. Meanwhile, in the air and space domains, technology set us free from the shackles of gravity, giving us reach, perspective, and the other characteristic advantages of air and space power with which you’re all too familiar. So let’s take a look at technology and its relationship with manoeuvre in the cyber domain. I often find when I talk to people about the cyber domain people’s minds immediately leap to cyber warfare operations, particularly offensive effects. Unfortunately for you all, that’s in ASD’s lane not mine, so that’s something you’ll need to ask someone who works there. It’s also not the focus of what we need to get our heads around today. About now you’re probably sick of me banging on about doctrine. But if we’re going to have a common and consistent understanding of something as complex as the cyber domain, doctrine has to be our go‐to reference point. So let me your attention to two key points you need to appreciate when it comes to manoeuvre in the cyber domain. First, look closely at our definition of cyber power. It doesn’t say effects, it says activities. Activities in and through – bringing us back to assuring our freedom of action in the cyber domain just the same as we would in the physical domains. But there are some unique differences between the cyber domain and the others. Sure, it has some physical characteristics and constraints – 1s and 0s need a medium to move through, whether it’s through hard connections or the Electromagnetic Spectrum. And both of those have to live with the limitations imposed by the laws of physics. But as a terrain that we intend to operate in and through, we don’t have the same degree of geographic constraints. This brings me to the second point. The cyber domain is one that we create ourselves. We’ve built radios, phones and networks to manoeuvre information through the domain, and we’ve always done it in a way that tries to gain us an advantage, even when we know the domain will be contested. For example, we secure our communications through encryption and waveforms to limit their ability to be intercepted, geo‐located, disrupted or exploited by adversaries. Meanwhile, we also keep finding new ways to produce more bandwidth or compress data so that we can move information around a global theatre to meet our needs, despite geography. We can build and manipulate this terrain like no other, whereas there’s no easy way to move a tank into a useful position inside an A2AD bubble. But how do we visualise manoeuvre in the cyber domain? Here’s a generic OV‐1 Googled from the web. Modern Defence Forces are full of them, but no matter where you’re from, they all share four common design elements. The first three are obvious – sensors, deciders and effectors. And those basic building blocks are the lens through which our ADF’s C4ISR Design folk in Force Integration Division see the world. But it’s the fourth one, normally represented by the ubiquitous cloud or lightning bolt, that we’re interested in. This is the connective tissue of the cyber domain through which information must flow. Because without it, the coordinated and synchronised objective of manoeuvre simply isn’t possible. Realistically, a sensor that can’t disseminate its intelligence product is functionally irrelevant. A decider with no access to that data lacks the situational awareness they need to make informed decisions. And so their ability to affect command is now significantly degraded, and the synchronisation of effects we need to support Joint, Coalition and multi‐agency manoeuvre simply can’t happen. Meanwhile, the effector’s ability to act now faces a greater risk of collateral effects and fratricide, because their original tasking may no longer be current, and their ability to act is now limited to their span of mission command and the battlespace intelligence and operational context they can derive from organic sensors. So assuring our freedom of action in the cyber domain, the ability to move information where, when and to whom we need it, is central to any form of Joint, Coalition or Multi-domain operation. So clearly, resilience is critical to warfighting of any form. But for every new effort we make to terraform the cyber domain to our advantage, our adversary is looking for ways to disrupt or deny it. Most of us grew up with fairly rudimentary PACE plans, but these simply aren’t going to cut it in a conflict whose speed is defined by the pace at which data flows from sensor to decider to effector. This has given rise to a range of concepts, like mosaic warfare, Joint All Domain Command and Control, Overmatch, Convergence and Kill Webs. Their differences are minor because they all stem from common design DNA – meshed networking to assure maximum connectivity from sensor to decider to effector. The goal, every sensor, best shooter. Now that’s more easily said than done, because if the conflict is going to happen at the speed of information flow, I can’t afford the time lag of operators switching settings between bearers as they implement PACE plans. Because if that’s the difference between winning and losing, automation will beat me every time. My web of networks needs to be able to constantly scan all of its strands, both hard-wired and EMS, to pass information via the most expeditious path. In the perfect world, my operator is sitting in their cockpit or ground station, and the actual bearer over which they transmit and receive information would be invisible to them. Now this all briefs well, but we need to pull this thread a little to be sure we understand what it means in terms of cost. And I don’t mean dollars. Picture a day in the life of a piece of data based on this image of a future conflict. My data’s born in a sensor, passed through networks to a ship via SATCOM, then from there to the jet via Link‐16, at which it and the ship both pickle off net‐enabled weapons for a synchronised strike. Sounds simple, right? Well, let’s start with Link 16. Despite what many of my vintage believe, it’s not the Link‐11 they grew up with. Load a crypto box, dial in the freq from the OPTASK Link, initialise and boom, you’re in the net and all sharing the same information. That’s history. These are sophisticated networks for which every platform is profiled based on its data needs, classification, outputs, and so on. Because those determine how often it gets a slice of the network action. A sensor passing data to a network‐enabled weapon clearly needs more access so it can provide continuous updates, than a tanker that’s just keen for some battlespace SA. This requires these modern networks to be engineered, and their operators and supporting elements to be far better trained than in years gone by. It also requires facilities for network validation and testing of networks to be appropriately equipped and accredited. None of that comes cheap. Let’s also talk about the network concepts themselves, because we know our future fight won’t be one where we go it alone. The future is one in which data is the centre of things, and need‐to‐share is the driving force. And for anyone who’s enjoyed the NOFORN experience, achieving that sharing can be both technically and culturally hard to achieve. The machine speed conflict of the future means we have to achieve that same pace of information manoeuvre. Doing so requires us to pivot to data‐centricity. By properly managing and tagging data with its classification, releasability and other meta‐characteristics, I can share it more freely. Sounds great in principle, right? But it also means I need to change the way my networks are designed. Because for that data to be shared, both on the network and between networks, without the need for cross‐domain gateways, translators and other denoodlers that introduce lag in my information flow, I need the network to be truly open in design, not one built to a specific level of classification or releasability. In this construct, my individual credentials, nationality, security clearance and physical location on the network determines what I can and cannot see. On the same network, the RAF officer next to me will see only the information they are meant to – some more, some less than me. And both our pictures and available information will be very different to the Japanese officer across from us. This is all impressive stuff. But for every strand I add to my web to increase my communications resilience and manoeuvrability in the cyber domain, I also create another attack surface for the adversary. So while greater resilience might solve my tactical DDIL issues, it might simultaneously generate a strategic hole of Optus proportions. So we need to think carefully about the cost of ownership that assured resilience brings. Especially for networks and technologies that have significant overheads for network engineering, integration and test labs that may go up to TS levels. For every strand we buy, we need to be able to assure it to an acceptable risk level, and as we are all discovering, cyberworthiness doesn’t come cheap in terms of workforce. So how much is enough? And how much is more than we can assure? If you think this is a vexed issue for us as a Defence Force, think about it from a vendor standpoint, especially those that deal with C2 and battle management systems. How quickly will they be able to pivot from open architectures that are still network-based to the data-centric future that meets our needs for rapid information flow. What might it cost them to change their vast suites of legacy applications to tag every track, based on how it was collected and processed and who by, with the metadata required to achieve data‐centricity? Picture the challenge for vendors that use their own proprietary data standards, albeit within an open network design. Because the future is one where data needs to flow freely, without delay, from a TS network to one where it can be shared directly with the PNGDF. How we get there is in itself a challenge. In the past our single services have chosen their own adventure in terms of the communications systems and networks they’ve acquired. That’s made the way forward much more complicated. We need the communications, and we need them to be resilient. And if you listen to the media, we’re on a tight timeline. This means some hard conversations about risk. Risk to the force in being against risk to the future force. Risk in physical domains against risk to resilient communications. The way forward requires deliberate choices, an objective whole‐of‐Defence rather than single-Service perspective, and discipline. If we can’t achieve that, the biggest DDIL risk to the ADF will continue to one that’s self-inflicted.

Next Generation Autonomous Systems National Gallery of Australia 8 April 2021 Final Report Dr Robbin Laird Synopsis and Program Handbook Download pdf Presentations Historical perspective GPCAPT Jo Brick Australian War College Some Legal Aspects of Autonomous Systems Professor Rob McLaughlin Australian National Centre for Oceans Resources and Security Trusted Autonomous Systems and Force Design CDRE Michael Turner CSM and Bar, RAN Director General Force Exploration Current Initiatives and Opportunities Professor Jason Scholz Trusted Autonomous Systems Defence Cooperative Research Centre Presentation availability to be advised Navy Vision for Autonomous Systems VADM Michael Noonan AO, RAN Chief of Navy Presentation unavailable The RAAF Loyal Wingman and reviving Australian Aerospace Industry Andrew Glynn Airpower Teaming System (ATS) Program Manager, Boeing Australia Presentation availability to be advised Countering Autonomous Systems AVM Bill Henman AM (Retd) Strategic Advisor Air & Space, Raytheon Australia Presentation unavailable Building Enduring Sovereign Industry Capability Dr John Best Vice President, Chief Technical Officer, Thales Australia Autonomy and Logistics COL David Beaumont Director, Australian Army Research Centre Opportunities for Disruptive Innovation Marcus Hellyer Senior Analyst, Australian Strategic Policy Institute Investing in Autonomy for National Resilience – Not a Luxury but a Necessity Dr Andrew Lucas Founder and Managing Director, Agent Oriented Software Group Autonomous Systems as an Enabler for Networked Operations AVM Chris Deeble AM, CSC (Retd), CEO, Northrop Grumman Australia No presentation and Scott Winship via Zoom Sector Vice President, Advanced Programs, Northrop Grumman Aeronautics Systems, Northrop Grumman Corporation No presentation Developmental Requirements and Challenges Dr Tony Lindsay Lockheed Martin Presentation availability to be advised Army Vision for Autonomous Systems LTGEN Richard Burr AO, DSC, MVO Chief of Army Air Force Vision for Autonomous Systems AIRMSHL Mel Hupfeld AO, DSC Chief of Air Force No presentation Seminar Outline The concept of the Unmanned Air System (UAS), or Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV), is nothing new nor is their use in missions which traditionally challenge human performance, fragility, and endurance. Ongoing operational experience confirms unmanned systems on their own are not the panacea and trusted autonomy in manned and unmanned teaming arrangements in each environmental domain is emerging as a key operational requirement. The narrative has progressed the argument for greater numbers of unmanned systems in a far more mature and balanced way than hitherto. The manned-unmanned narrative is now sensibly shifting towards ‘and’, rather than ‘or’. Manned and unmanned teaming leverages the strengths and mitigates the weakness of each platform and concentrates the mind on the important operational aspects, such as imaginative new roles, and the challenges of integration to generate the desired overwhelming firepower. This capability will require a complex web of advanced data links and communication systems to make it operate as a combat system. Designing and building the ‘kill web’ so that it can enable the delivery of manned-unmanned firepower across domains will be a huge challenge not least due to the laws of physics. However, the ability to train, test, evaluate and validate tactics and procedures will add a whole new level of complexity to generate the ‘trusted autonomy’ required for warfighting. The aim of the April 2021 conference is to promote discussion about the future implications of autonomous systems. It will investigate potential roles for autonomous systems set within the context of each environmental domain, providing Service Chiefs with an opportunity to present their personal perspective on the effect it will have on their Service. The conference will also explore the operational aspects of autonomous systems, including command and control and the legal and social implications that affect their employment. And finally the conference will examine the current research agenda and allow industry an opportunity to provide their perspective on recent developments in unmanned air, land, surface and sub-surface combatants. The Sir Richard Williams Foundation has identified pre-eminent speakers from across the Australian and international defence communities, as well as inviting industry representatives to reflect the integral role they will play in the national framework of future operational capability.

Dr Robbin Laird 10 October 2022 On September 28, 2022, the Williams Foundation hosted its latest seminar. The most recent Williams Foundation Seminar was held in Canberra, Australia on September 28, 2022. The seminar was entitled, “Enhancing the Lethality and Survivability of the Integrated Force.” The seminar in effect provided a scene setting for discussing the next evolution of the ADF generated by the evolving strategic environment and the much wider demand side of dealing with security and defense that really requires a whole of nation approach. Since 2018, the Williams Foundation seminars have turned towards the major transition facing Australia and its partners and allies namely, the global confrontation between the 21st century authoritarian states and the liberal democracies. Rather than simply maintaining a “rules-based order,” the ADF and its allies and partners are now contesting the clear efforts of the major authoritarian powers to displace this order and replace it for a world safe for the authoritarians. And we have seen the Russians move from “hybrid warfare” to open industrial age warfare with some new aspects of the conduct of war introduced into the war as well. We have entered a new historical epoch, and determining how to deter, defect, contest and defeat major powers becomes part of the new context facing the ADF and the Australian nation. There are obviously no quick fixes for such challenges, but a major re-orientation for the ADF and Australia is required. As has been noted by a sage former senior U.S. defence official: “We have 80% of our force now which we will have in 20 years.” This means that reworking and reorienting the force you have but introducing new elements to make your force more lethal and survivable is a major part of the challenge from a force building perspective. The seminar speakers highlighted various aspects of what needs to be done to provide for rethinking the way ahead for the force but in the context of what is realistic to do as well as what needs to change to get the job of deterrence done effectively. At the heart of the shift is focusing on the direct defense of Australia, and working Australian geography to advantage. This means that the joint force needs to focus on how to work together to defend the continent and project relevant power into the region. The Australian Service Chiefs attending the Williams Foundation Seminar. This means as well that the new power projection instruments – those represented by cyber and space – neither of which is geographically limited are now part of the deterrence and warfighting efforts. If we can consider there is a return to a core focus on the direct defense of Australia and shaping an understanding of the strategic space defining Australia’s defense perimeter, how might the current ADF force be restructured in a template which allows for the kind of innovation going forward that will enhance ADF direct defense capabilities? How might new capabilities be added over the near to mid to longer term that enhance this defense restructuring to extend Australia’s direct defense capabilities? In other words, if one focuses on the priority of the direct defense to Australia, what kinds of force restructuring might be necessary for the current ADF? And then ask what new capabilities are coming into the force or could be integrated into the force in the near to midterm, what would that ADF look like as an integrated combat grid over the extended area of operations? If one re-shifts the focus of your force, one has to ask what is most relevant and what is not in such a strategic shift; and then determine what one needs to form the relevant concepts of operations for that force, It is crucial as well to find cost effective ways to enhance that forces capabilities and train appropriately to shape the most lethal and survivable force possible within the various constraints facing the nation. But that raises another key point. If indeed the priority of the defense of Australia is from the continent to the first island chain, then the resources necessary to do so are much greater than the ADF will possess. What kinds of infrastructure can be built in the relevant areas of sustained operations? How to enhance force mobility throughout the region? How to shape mobile basing options and capabilities? These challenges obviously require key innovative efforts for reshaping the joint force and requires government to consider investments and approaches beyond that which would be considered narrowly considered for a defence budget. The September 28, 2022 seminar provided a significant look at the reframing challenges and to how to think about the way ahead. This is how the Foundation invitation highlighted the seminar: Aim The aim of the September 2022 seminar is to examine specific measures which enhance both the lethality and survivability of an integrated Australian Defence Force. It will examine gaps and opportunities in the 5th generation force and identify priorities which accelerate preparedness for complex, sustained, high intensity operations. Background Since 2013 the Sir Richard Williams Foundation seminars have focused on building an integrated 5th generation force. Recent seminars have evolved from the acquisition of new platforms to the process of shaping and better understanding the environment in which the integrated force will prepare and operate. Moreover, they have highlighted the challenges of acting independently at an accelerated tempo and in sustained, high intensity, complex operations across all domains. Almost a decade later, the 2022 seminars reflect on the journey towards a 5th generation force and identify gaps, opportunities, and priorities for the development of next generation capability in the face of new threats and new risks, paving the way for the 2023 seminars. Despite the operational challenges, the framework and apparatus of the 5th generation force is substantially in place. And while there is still plenty of work to be done, the shift from a focus on platforms to a broader appreciation of an integrated 5th generation system of systems represents an important milestone. As identified in the March 2022 seminar, there is a shared understanding of the scale of the challenges ahead for both defence and industry, and across coalition partners, too. However, the strategic circumstances continue to deteriorate at an alarming rate, driving the need for prioritisation in both what and how we acquire new capabilities. On top of that, there is the challenge of progressing integration with the force-in-being as well as the future force. The need to balance the requirement to ‘fight tonight’ with the ability to meet future threats is vitally important, noting that the force we will have in 20 years’ time will contain 80% of what we have today based upon a series of major systems with an upgradeable software core. Towards a Lethal, Survivable, and Affordable Force The September seminar will develop the ideas identified in March and expand on the theme of an increasingly sophisticated and time-sensitive ‘lethality-survivability-affordability’ trade-off necessary to build a balanced and relevant force. A trade-off which is set within the context of a need for increased deterrence, decision-making advantage, and a commercial reality that we no longer have the time to establish the competitive tension the acquisition system has traditionally demanded to demonstrate best value for money. The seminar will focus on the gaps and opportunities as they relate to the broader requirements of the Australian Defence Force, notably in terms of enablers and integration priorities. Above all, it will focus on preparedness and the need to focus on outcomes which improve training throughput and performance at the force level, backed up by enhanced fuel, infrastructure, weapons, basing, and supply chain resilience. A core consideration will be the need for an increasingly integrated relationship between Defence and system providers to develop the industrial depth and responsiveness necessary for future operations. A relationship which works towards a better understanding of our industrial production capability needs, while recognising that competition in some areas has the unintended consequence of reducing overall sovereign production capability and capacity. Another area of interest is the need for greater exploitation of technology to enhance human performance and decision making at the force level to complement training systems associated with individual platforms and weapon systems. Improving training system effectiveness and efficiency, described in terms of ‘Mission Rehearsal’ at the March seminar, not only increases throughput but also ensures the enterprise is ready to operate across the spectrum of conflict while being disrupted, deceived, and degraded. To introduce different perspectives from elite, high performance sport, the Seminar also includes former Australian test umpire Mr Simon Taufel. For five years he was formally recognised as the world’s best cricket umpire based upon his consistent ability to make accurate decisions under pressure and his ability to integrate technology into real time decision-making. In the final session, Service chiefs will provide insight into their thoughts about the future operating environment and key observations and lessons from the transition to a networked integrated force. In later articles, I will highlight the presentations, as well as insights from interviews conducted in September 2022 with service chiefs, industrialists and analysts to expand the discussion of the challenges and opportunities to meet the challenges discussed at the seminar. Link to article Dr Robbin Laird, Re-setting the Current Force: Shaping a Way for Ahead for the ADF in the Direct Defense of Australia (DefenseInfo) 10 October 2022