Dr Robbin Laird, Maritime Autonomous Systems and the Operational Force: How to Accelerate the Effort? 3 Oct 2023 Link to article (Defense.info) Recently, I had a chance to continue my discussions with CDRE Darron Kavanagh who is Director General Warfare Innovation, Royal Australian Navy Headquarters, concerning maritime autonomous systems. Kavanagh has been one of the most articulate leaders of the development and introduction of maritime autonomous systems in Australia. It is well recognized that autonomous systems are critical to provide the mass necessary for the kind of multi-domain operations which the ADF requires. For example, as Vice Air-Marshal retired Zed Roberton noted at the 27 September Williams Foundation seminar: Going forward, Roberton argued that “we will see a massive focus on things like uncrewed aerial vehicles, uncrewed sea vehicles or land vehicles, the ability to have pre-positioned missile systems and of course, synchronized with cyber and in space effects.” But how to get the effort started operationally? We need to move from science projects and exercises to regular use by the combat forces to realize the opportunities inherent in maritime autonomous systems. But how to do so? Kavanagh started our conversation by underscoring that it is important to understand what these systems are and what they represent. They are not traditional platforms that you are focused on integrating with the force. He argued: “They don’t replace platforms; they complement the integrated force. They are complimentary to that force in that they interface rather than being fully integrated with the current force elements.” With the introduction of new crewed platforms, one must focus on backward engineering legacy systems to work with the new ones. That takes time and has high costs. This is understandable because warriors’ lives are at risk. This is not the model by which to understand maritime autonomous systems, and certainly not the way to understand how you get them into the hands of warfighters for operations. They are not crewed, and your concern is with efficacy, not a primary emphasis on survivability. Maritime autonomous systems interface with and complement the existing force to enhance their lethality. They extend the ISR and C2 range of the force and add to the non-lethal and lethal weapons available to the combat force. Maritime autonomous systems add to the survivability of the force. As CDRE Kavanagh noted: “We have a finite number of crewed exquisite platforms. By leveraging autonomous systems these platforms can extend their defensive perimeter and provide various tools to complicate the adversaries attack profile on those crewed systems.” For example, in effect, USVs can play the role of the picket ships in World War II, thereby enhancing the survivability of the destroyer and carrier fleet. Or to use a Fifth Fleet example, USVs operating with destroyers can operate as a buffer between these key assets and Iranian patrol boats. The USVs function as the police guard dogs and if the Iranians were to attack them, the destroyer’s Rules of Engagement then allows it to destroy the Iranian patrol vessel. And because of how maritime autonomous systems are developed and built, you can shape the kind of affordable mass which we discussed in the multi-domain strike seminar held by the Williams Foundation on 27 September 2023. As CDRE Kavanagh underscored: “When you start leveraging maritime autonomous systems that are low cost, you can create affordable mass, and you’re setting up a system that allows for resilience. You can manufacture them at mass. Not only can I build them in peacetime but we can keep developing them and delivering them quite quickly during hostilities.” And by focusing on complementarity rather than integration, there can be a much wider search within the commercial sector to adopt the rapid innovations in the commercial sector occurring in terms of autonomous systems. CDRE Kavanagh specifically mentioned the Australian mining sector as one where rapid progress is being made on autonomous systems. If you are not using unique military specs which are designed in order to integrate with the extant force but rather providing complimentary capabilities which can directed by the force, then there is a much wider canvas of innovation from which to adopt autonomous system innovations. Because there are a wide range of civilian and security missions that maritime autonomous systems are already being used for and their roles and numbers will increase to do so, the military can dip into this existing and growing capability as well. The protection of undersea infrastructure and wind farms are two examples which are suggestive of a broader trend. According to CDRE Kavanagh: “We simply will delay adoption of autonomous systems by reducing them to the mantra of integration. By focusing on complementarity and finding ways to use the systems as compliments to the fleet and extending the range of the various effects desired, we can find a variety of missions which these systems can meet now and in the future.” He noted that in the DSR, there is much focus on deterrence by denial. Autonomous systems can clearly help in disrupting adversary operations and deny them quick results against crewed platforms. Then there is the key question of how maritime autonomous systems are being designed from the outset to operate in clusters or wolfpacks. And by so doing, they can operate as an interactive complimentary buffer force operating with the core integrated combat force to deliver persistent effects. In short, one needs to focus on the broader con-ops of the operation of the forces, rather than on the integration of autonomous systems within the much more complicated integrated crewed combat systems. If you don’t, we simply won’t use them in the timely manner as we must in the era of strategic competition within which we live. And an aspect of con-ops we discussed as well was the relationship of maritime autonomous systems and their operations to deterrence. On the one hand, maritime autonomous systems can be deployed as part of a deterrence by detection strategy. This can be enhanced by sharing with partners who are not close allies, or the kind of allies you wish to integrate your crewed platforms with. At the March seminar, Jake Campbell highlighted the importance of deterrence by detection as follows: “Adversaries are less likely to commit opportunistic acts of aggression if they know they are being watched constantly and that their actions can be publicized widely.” On the other hand, when it comes to signalling, a key part of deterrence, sending in a maritime autonomous systems wolfpack simply does not have the same meaning as sending a Aegis led surface action group. It indicates concern, but does not raise the weapons threshold that such SAG is designed to do. In short, maritime autonomous systems considered as complimentary capabilities which are controlled by but not built to be closely integrated with the combat force can deliver a number of the key capabilities which the DSR has called for. Featured Image: 10 May 2022 photo of Rear Admiral Selby, when as the Chief of Naval Research, USN he visited Australia and met with CDRE Kavanagh and Michael Stewart, Director the Unmanned Task Force.

Dr Robbin Laird, The Sir Richard Williams Foundation Seminar September 2023: The Enterprise Requirements of an Australian Multi-Domain Strike Enterprise, 29 Sep 2023 Link to article (Defense.info) On 27 September 2023, the second Williams Foundation seminar for the year was held at the National Gallery in Canberra. The first focused on deterrence and the second provided a case study of building blocks for enhanced deterrent capabilities, namely shaping a multi-domain strike enterprise for the ADF and the support structure for so doing. At the outset of the Seminar, Air Marshal (Retired) Geoff Brown, the Williams Foundation Chairman, underscored the purpose and focus of the seminar: “Simply new weapons like Tomahawk will not by themselves give Australia a credible strike enterprise. All those weapons do not give you a long-range strike capability. We are focused on the requirements to build a multi-domain enterprise beyond the question of the specific weapons.” SQNLDR Sally Knox, the moderator for the seminar and a member of the Williams Foundation added: “The aim of today’s seminar is to further develop the theme of deterrence, which we spoke about at the March conference. We will examine the enterprise requirements of a sovereign multi-domain strike capability in the context of the defence strategic review. As part of that effort, we will examine the apparatus of an Australian capability needed to strike into the into the broader region, including the implications of a national industrial base, as well as access and basing considerations.” Australia has focused on building a fifth-Generation force which inherently is focused on integrability at the high-end. Part of the discussions revolved around looking at next steps, for multi-domain strike is inherent in the concept of fifth generation airpower. Multi-domain strike is about interactive targeting capability across a deployed force or third-party targeting. The question of what the roles of ISR and C2 are in the evolution of fifth generation airpower has been a key theme over the past few years in Williams Foundation seminars. This discussion was broadened to focus on strike enablement by such an integrated force. SQNLDR Sally Knox, the moderator for the Seminar. But linking the first seminar of the year with the second raises a key question: What kinds of strike have higher deterrent value than others? Is it range? Is it targeting the adversary’s C2 and core ISR capabilities? There clearly is a difference between strike delivered by HIMARS systems and by Tomahawks with regard to purpose and deterrent effect. This was inherent in the discussions but not focused on as a core question, but clearly needs further consideration as well. In the report to follow, I will highlight all of the presentations and organize the key contributions of the presenters within the overall discussion of shaping a strike enterprise. Here I will quote a few of the presentations to highlight key themes discussed during the day. The PACAF Commander, General Ken Wilsbach, provided a video presentation. He has been a stalwart supporter of the Williams Foundation seminars during his time as PACAF for many reasons, but a core one is his emphasis on the positive impact of the integratability of the U.S. and Australian Air Forces and their sharing with other allies of their robust integrated operating experience. The collaboration between the operational militaries has been a key factor shaping more effective defence collaboration, and combat and deterrent capabilities. Wilsbach underscored why enhanced multi-domain strike was so important in shaping force evolution in the region: “Multi-domain operations allow us to overwhelm the adversary. Historically, warfare carries certain constants. One of the most important of these is gaining and maintaining the initiative. A combatant seizes the initiative, not through advanced technologies or PACAF Commander, General Ken Wilsbach superior training, but because they hit the adversary hard enough to knock them off balance, then hit them repeatedly to maintain an enduring advantage. pressure generated by synchronizing operations in time and space creates the opportunities where technology and training can make a difference.” In my recent book on the F-35 global enterprise, I emphasized how crucial collaboration among allied militaries has been to even see the emergence of fifth generation capability. General Wilsbach made a similar point with regard to shaping a way ahead for a multi-domain strike enterprise. “Our first job is to ensure that everyone in our respective services understand why these new multi-domain skills are necessary. If they don’t buy in, they won’t work toward developing at the pace we need. “Our second job is to remove the obstacles from their path to modernize, integrate and innovate. “Every person at this conference likely has a story of how a great idea was shut down before it got off the ground purely due to bureaucracy. This is an area that America can and should learn from Australia; your aviators are far less likely to stumble over bureaucratic hurdles than American airmen. We cannot afford to let process stand in the way of progress. “The men and women in this room are the ones who set priorities and establish expectations. If you as leaders are onboard and your aviators are ready, but progress still stalls, find the chaff in your organization and burn it out. We will only be able to effectively compete if we stop hobbling ourselves. First; deterrence is our top priority but should it fail, we must also ensure our people are prepared for what follows. Those same men and women that set the global standard for what an airman or aviator should be in competition must also set the standard for how a joint operator executes the mission and conflict. “Those personnel are the ones most likely to understand the challenges we face from a pure adversary and the inadequacy of a single domain response as leaders convey the why and then trust them to make the changes necessary to accelerate our response for new airmen and aviators joining our ranks built in multi domain warfare concepts from the outset. To them, the differences between services should be nothing more than the uniform.” In a later presentation, the other distinguished foreign airpower leader, Air Marshal Harvey Smyth, the Air and Apace commander, Royal Air Force, underscored that all strike is not equal. He highlighted the importance of longer-range strike, which for the RAF was their Storm Shadow weapon, first deployed on Tornados and now on Eurofighters. The next generation of Storm Shadow is the SPEAR family of weapons being developed to be able to be fired by the F-35 as well. It should be noted that MBDA as a French-British company is a key part of building capability for both air forces and does represent the core need to collaborate in weapons development and production between allied countries. But Smyth added a key thought with regard to multi-domain strike and the defence enterprise. If you are shaping multi-domain strike you need to be focused as well on integrated air and missile defence. This is key reminder that development in one part of defence capability drives change in another. There was significant discussion of the changes in ISR and C2 associated with building a multi-domain strike enterprise. And the several years of discussion of fifth generation airpower and force building in earlier Williams Foundation seminars presaged much of this discussion and provides a significant body of analysis in thinking through the way ahead. ISR delivered through various means, Triton UAVs, space-based assets, F-35s, Growlers, specialized ISR airplanes, etc, are becoming more than simply collectors for decision makers. Given the need to operate at the speed of relevance those ISR Air Marshal Harvey Smyth, the Air and Space Commander, Royal Air Force. operators are now part of providing rapid inputs to strike decisions and are not part of a long ISR to decider kill chain which has been used in the land wars. Speed to relevance requires a significant shift in how ISR is embodied in decision-making more rapidly. One of the speakers, WGCDR Marija Jovanovich, Commanding Officer 10 SQN, explicitly discussed what I think is nothing less than a revolution in ISR capabilities at the tactical edge and their role in empowering distributed force C2. She mentioned explicitly her participation in NAWDCs’ Resolute Hunter exercise, an exercise which I observed in part which highlights the change. The essence of the training seen in Resolute Hunger is part of newly evolving shape of the multi-domain strike enterprise. This is how I and my co-author described the exercise in our book on The Maritime WGCDR Marija Jovanovich, Commanding Officer 10 SQN Kill Web Force in the Making (which coincidently has a drawing of an Australian Triton on the cover): “Cmdr. Pete “Two Times” Salvaggio, the head of the MISR Weapons School (MISRWS), was in charge of the Resolute Hunter exercise. In a discussion with “Two Times” in his office during the November 2020 visit, he underscored the shift underway. The goal of the training embodied in the exercise is for operators in airborne ISR to operate as “puzzle solvers.” Rather than looking at these airborne teams as the human managers of airborne sensors, “we are training future Jedi Knights.” “And to be clear, all the assets used in the exercise are not normally thought of as ISR platforms but are platforms that have significant sensor capabilities. It really was about focusing on sensor networks and sorting through how these platform/networks could best shape an understanding of the evolving mission and paths to mission effectiveness. “The ISR sensor networks with men in the loop can deliver decisions with regard to the nature of the evolving tactical situation, and the kinds of decisions which need to be made in the fluid combat environment. It may be to kill or to adjust judgements about what that battlespace actually signifies in terms of what needs to be done. “And given the speed with which kill decisions need to be made with regards to certain classes of weapons, the ISR/C2 network will operate as the key element of a strike auction. Which shooter needs to do what at which point in time to degrade the target? How best to determine which element of the shoot sequence—not the kill chain—needs to do what in a timely manner, when fighting at the speed of light? “What ISR capabilities can deliver are “moments of clarity” with regard to decisive actions. At a minimum, the ISR teams are shifting from providing information for someone else to make a decision to being able to deconstruct the battlefield decision to craft real time understanding of the situation and the targeting options and priorities.” The discussion of C2 throughout the day underscored the impact of the shift to distributed force operations upon how to make decisions which tapped into various groupings of platforms to deliver multi-domain strike to deliver the desired effect. In the presentation by defence analyst Carl Rhodes, he underscored the scope and nature of the change required: “So if we look at command and control, what allows us to go from today’s capabilities to these future concepts? “First of all, the decision making needs to go from a very centralized process to a more decentralized process, delegating more authority down to the commanders who are in the air, potentially, or to multiple command cells in the field. “The planning and execution can move from primarily a human centric process, assisted by computers, to maybe human centric AI assisted process to an AI enabled process, where humans are helping the process, but the AI is doing a lot of the work. “So that’s command and control. You also need improved communications as well. So today, interoperability exists. It’s enabled in specific kill chains, but doesn’t exist for all parts of the force. “And to move to these future concepts, you need to build it into systems, all systems kind of at birth across domain. You also need to think about resilience rather than just protecting individual links. How do you protect the entire system by using diverse paths independent decision making?” A key theme embedded in several presentations was the nature of the ADF transition needed to fully adapt to multi-domain strike operations. For example, several speakers talked about the significant progress in tactical joint force targeting over the past decade. Now the challenge was to build on that progress to work more effectively to provide strategic multi-domain targeting. And building out the military kit necessary to deliver strike is a key challenge for Australia. Here the working relationship with the United States is key to delivering the initial long-range strike capability. But going forward, as we discussed in the last seminar, there clearly needs to be Carl Rhodes presenting at the Sir Richard Williams Seminar. an arsenal of democracy. This means the United Sates or the European designer of the weapon system is able to open production lines in Australia both Australian and allied needs. As AVM Gerry van Leeuwen, Head of Guided Weapons and Explosive Ordinance put it: “As global suppliers work to refill their inventory still recovering from the impacts of the “COVID global pandemic, they’re working in capacity to meet increasing demand, and the world seems to have woken up. To use an analogy, it looks like everyone’s in the same buffet line. And if you’re the back of the queue, you better not be too hungry. “We’re currently working on creative ways to accelerate orders, and especially those long-range strike weapons. And not surprisingly, those weapons are the same weapons in high demand by the U.S. given our common interest in the Indo-PACOM region. But our AVM Gerry van Leeuwen, Head of Guided Weapons and Explosive Ordinance. relationship is strong and collegiate. The U.S. seemed willing to work with us in that regard, but have cautioned that if they provide advanced weapons for Australia, we sure as hell better be prepared to use them.” The scope of enterprise considerations was a key theme of the presentation by LTGEN John Frewen, Chief of Joint Capabilities. “Multi-domain infers the integration of all five domains, not just the three traditional domains with space, cyber and information as auxiliary add ones. Multi-domain requires the prioritization, sequencing and layering of kinetic and non-kinetic effects at moments in time and throughout a campaign. And this applies in both competition and conflict. “And I offer four thoughts or areas for focus around Australia’s multi-domain strike enterprise…I’m just back from the U.S. last week. And all of the briefings I recently received spoke to see five ISR T and the T is targeting. “And I think this is clear acknowledgment that our command-and-control systems and our targeting systems are inherently linked. And we’ve got to start to design and operate our C2 and targeting systems as part of a whole and to defend them and our freedom to operate through cybersecurity, space control and electronic warfare. “We will also need the ability to force generate the people and collective skills required to generate increasingly complex targeting and that will be an endeavor on itself. “Secondly, no C2 targeting system going forward will be effective unless it is empowered through artificial LTGEN John Frewen, Chief of Joint Capabilitie s. intelligence. This is both in a sense of data management of ever-increasing volumes of data and decision support in ever more complicated environments, including machine on machine contests. We must build effective AI into all of our systems from here on in and start to grow the specialist workforce needed to design enable and oversee ai ai capabilities. “Whether in competition or conflict, no government or military endeavor will succeed without understanding, if not dominating the information environment. And this has always been true even if we have not always been as conscious of it as we are now. “What has changed is the scale of content and range of mediums for information, the evolution of the art of misinformation, and the appetite of some populations for alternative truths. All of this is now being fueled by machine capabilities and AI in ways that are beyond traditional means of management. “We must increasingly grow our capacities both human and machine in the information environment. This is essential to deterrence and to competition and conflict and we must not permit a targeting system to evolve that is not fully aware of and nested with information and other non-kinetic effects. “And finally, we cannot overlook the centrality of logistics to all we do. This applies to multi-domain targeting as much as it does to conventional maneuver. Targeting, even in its most kinetic sense, will require a resilient logistics network to deliver money, munitions, maintenance and sustainment both here domestically. “And in areas of intense conflict, it will be folly to develop a sophisticated targeting enterprise that does not have comparable investment in a logistics enterprise that has in recent decades been designed for efficiency rather than resilience.” Air Marshal (Retired) Brown concluded the session by raising two cautionary notes. The first was the question of structuring DoD to be able to deliver the effects desired. And second was the question of resources. “We have a DSR that is strategically ambitious. And I basically agree with most of the things that are in it, but it is not funded. And while it is not funded, that creates an enormous problem for the DoD and for the IDF going forward.” Air Marshal (Retired) Geoff Brown.

Dr Robbin Laird, The DSR and the Australian Strike Enterprise 30 Sep 2023 Link to article (Defense.info) We need to start first with considering how the 2023 Australian Defence Review has prioritized the need for enhanced ADF strike capabilities. In the review, the notion of enhanced strike capability entails shaping longer-range reach of those capabilities, the enhancement of joint strike capabilities and the shaping of an industrial base to support the strike enterprise transition. Here is some of the language from the DSR regarding the strike enterprise : “Due to the significant changes in Australia’s strategic circumstances, the Government agrees with the Review’s finding that the ADF as currently constituted and equipped is not fully fit for purpose. The Government deeply appreciates those who serve in the ADF and is committed to ensuring our people have the capabilities and resources they need. Delivering the Government’s vision and implementing the findings of the Review will require a more holistic approach to defence planning and strategy. Air Vice-Marshal (Retired) Zed Roberton presenting at the September Williams Foundation seminar. “Australia must have a fully integrated and more capable ADF operating across five domains which work seamlessly together on joint operations to deliver enhanced and joined-up combat power. Navy must have enhanced lethality – including through its surface fleet and conventionally-armed, nuclear-powered submarines – underpinned by a continuous naval shipbuilding program. Army must be optimised for littoral operations in our northern land and maritime spaces and provide a long-range strike capability. Air Force must provide the air support for joint operations in our north by conducting surveillance, air defence, strike and air transport. Defence must also continue to develop its cyber and space capabilities. “The Government’s immediate actions to reprioritise Defence’s capabilities in line with the Review’s recommendations include: investing in conventionally-armed, nuclear-powered submarines through the AUKUS partnership; developing the ADF’s ability to precisely strike targets at longer range and manufacture munitions in Australia….” (Page 7) A key focus is upon “an enhanced long-range strike capability in all domains.” (Page 19). This is one of the justifications proffered for acquiring nuclear powered attack submarines. “The acquisition of conventionally-armed, nuclear-powered submarines will transform Navy’s capability. Nuclear-powered submarines are key assets both in effecting a strategy of denial and in the provision of anti-submarine warfare and long-range strike options.” (Page 56). For Army this means: “Defence must rapidly accelerate and expand Army’s littoral manoeuvre vessels (medium and heavy landing craft) and long-range fires (land-based maritime strike) programs. This will require Army to re-posture key capabilities.” (Page 59). This is translated in the DSR in terms of acquiring HIMARS and a land-based maritime strike capability. (Page 59). For the RAAF, the B-21 is rejected as an acquisition option but there is an emphasis on “F-35A Joint Strike Fighter and F/A-18F Super Hornet aircraft must be able to operate the Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile. The Joint Strike Missile (JSM) should also be integrated onto the F-35A. To enable the F-35A fleet to operate the JSM, the aircraft will need to be upgraded to Block 4 configuration.” (Page 61). And finally, Australia must build up its production capability in the strike area. “Long-range strike and other guided weapons are fundamental to the ADF’s ability to hold an adversary at risk in Australia’s northern approaches. To do this, the ADF must hold sufficient stocks of guided weapons and explosive ordnance (GWEO) and have the ability to manufacture certain lines.” (Page 68). At the Williams Foundation seminar held on 27 September 2023 on the enterprise requirements of an Australian multi-domain strike capability, the former Air Commander Australia, Air Vice-Marshal (Retired) Zed Roberton discussed the DSR and strike. Roberton looked back at the history of ADF orientations and engagements and argued that until the 2020 defence initiative of the government, the ADF was equally balanced among three objectives: “Those were to defend Australia, look after the near region and to contribute to global coalitions as part of the global order. It was really interesting that those three objectives were equally weighted by design.” After 2020 and in the recent DSR, the shift has been clearly to prioritizing Australian defence within the Indo-Pacific. And in so doing, he underscored that the focus is not just the defence of Australia to the North but a much broader focus on the Indo-Pac region. This means that Australia now faces a “four ocean front” in designing and operating its force in the defense of Australia. But given the size of Australia as a continent, and the relatively small population, the ADF needs to be capable of generating agility to generate the mass required to make a significant strategic effect. Roberton argued that the ADF needs to follow three principles to generate the capability needed for agility and force integration to achieve a desired strategic effect. The first is redundancy, not resilience. “We have too many single points of failure. The multi-domain approach provides a way to focus on redundancy in strike.” The second is agility. Roberton underscored: “When you’ve got a small number of people in a defense force with a small base, your ability to bring about an effect around the continental landmass or its approaches and hold forces at risk further from Australia requires agility. And a level of agility not just in capabilities, but in our procedures and processes.” The third is focused mass. This obviously is the goal of multi-domain strike, to have an ability for an agile force to concentrate across multiple domains the desired strategic effect. Going forward, Roberton argued that “we will se a massive focus on things like uncrewed aerial vehicles, uncrewed sea vehicles or land vehicles, the ability to have pre-positioned missile systems and of course, synchronized with cyber and in space effects.” He concluded that two questions are critical moving forward which we need to consider. “How does Australia hold adversary forces at risk further from our shores? And and what does next generation deterrence really look like?” But he warned that the question of both resourcing and prioritization in defence raises real challenges for the kind of force adapation which Australia will need. He provided a slide in his presentation which highlighted the extent of the budget challenge. Put in simple terms: how does Australia pay for its nuclear submarine project and at the same time source the overall ADF transition to a multi-domain capable defence force?

Dr Robbin Laird, Considering the Nature of Strike and Its Role in Deterrence Strategy, 1 Oct 2023 Link to article (Defense.info) At the 27 September 2023 Williams Foundation Seminar, Chris McInnes of the Foundation provided a conceptual analysis of the elements of strike and their utility In warfighting and deterrence. He warned against the experience of the past two decades where precision strike has been used by the liberal democracies to reduce risk to themselves and collateral damage against our adversaries. He looked back at World War II and provided several examples of the need for a prolonged campaign of strike to achieve objectives, and indeed, the challenges facing World War II bombing campaigns in Europe to achieve objectives as the Germans responded in asymmetric ways to reduce the strategic effect of those strike efforts on the German war effort. McInnes underscored: “Understanding the driving purposes behind why Australia is investing in strike is crucial to building strike forces. Strike direction must be supported by diverse philosophies that enable a generation of new ideas and approaches. These in turn should be tried and tested through many small experiments. These philosophical elements underpin the range of opportunities strike provides. “To exploit these opportunities, we must carefully consider the elements of utility and access. Utility is context dependent, and includes considerations of effectiveness, reliability, flexibility, and repeatability. Access is an outcome of operational reach, which requires the packaging of forces with appropriate permissions, range, responsiveness and sustainability.” Chris McInnes speaking at the Williams Foundation Seminar 27 September 2023 . I would note that the DSR talks often of deterrence by denial in which clearly multi-domain strike plays a key role. But what is the exact correlation between types of strikes and where they are delivered to achieve deterrence by denial? This really is an unanswered question in the DSR but is crucial in connecting any considerations of what strike, when and how leads to deterrence rather than ongoing escalation. The war in Ukraine certainly is a warning with regard to the question of what strike options are related to war termination which is the function of deterrence in conflict short of total war. There seems to be little consideration of how escalating strike options for Ukraine is connected with war termination or “victory.” In effect, McInnes was calling for clear headed thinking with regard to shaping long range and multi-domain strike capabilities by Australia to the strategic purposes of deterrence. McInnes provided a one-slide summary of what he called the elements of strike. This slide underscored that the strike which is possible needs to be correlated with the purpose and duration of conducting strikes. Where are your strike assets deployed or located? What can they achieve against your adversary? In tactical terms and in deterrent meaning? Long-range strike is part of an effort to touch the adversary further from your forces or your territory. Yet multi-domain strike in a key area delivered by ground-maritime-air forces tactically may have the strategic effect one is looking for. But from my personal point of view, it is crucial to link strike considerations with deterrent considerations with capabilities to negotiate in conflict situations. Strike capabilities are key parts of negotiating from strength, but only if the political actors understand the relationship between particular strike capabilities and conflict termination. This is a subject for considered attention going forward.

Dr Robbin Laird, The Role of Maritime Autonomous Systems: Mission Thread Capabilities to Meet the Needs of Modern Warfare, 11 May 2023 Link to article (Defense.info) If you are looking at the potential role of maritime autonomous systems from the standpoint of traditional acquisition approaches, the legacy concept of platforms, and are not focused on the priority for software transient advantage in modern warfighting, then you will totally miss what the coming of maritime autonomous systems is all about. During my March-April 2023 visit to Australia, I had a chance to meet again with Commodore Darron Kavanagh, Director General Warfare Innovation, Royal Australian Navy Headquarters, to discuss maritime autonomous systems and their role going forward. As a nation facing major maritime challenges, there is probably no nation on earth that needs to get this right more than Australia. Threats tend to focus the mind and the efforts. Maritime autonomous systems don’t fit into the classic platform development mode or the sharp distinction between how particular platforms operate or perform and the various payloads they can carry. They are defined by the controlling software and the payloads they can deliver individually or as a wolfpack with the role of platforms subordinated to the effects they can deliver through their payloads. The software enables the payloads to be leveraged either individually, though more likely in combination as a wolfpack or a contributor to a combat cluster. We started our discussion by focusing on mission threads as a way to understand the role and contribution of maritime autonomous systems. What missions does a combat commander need to accomplish? And how can maritime autonomous systems contribute to a mission thread for that combat commander, within the context of combat clusters? As CDRE Kavanagh underscored: “One of the issues about how we’ve been looking at these systems is that we think in terms of using traditional approaches of capability realization with them. We are not creating a defense capability from scratch. These things exist, already, to a degree out in the commercial world, regardless of what defense does. AI built into robotic and autonomous systems are in the real world regardless of what the defence entities think or do. “And we have shown through various autonomous warrior exercises, that we can already make important contributions to mission threads which combat commanders need to build out now and even more so going forward.” And that is really the next point. The use of maritime autonomous systems is driven by evolving concepts of operations and the mission threads within those evolving CONOPS rather than by a platform-centric traditional model of acquisition. CDRE Kavanagh pointed out that traditional acquisition is primarily focused on platform replacement, and has difficulty in supporting evolving concepts of operations. This is how he put it: “We’re good at replacing platforms. That doesn’t actually require a detailed CONOPS when we are just replacing something. But we now need to examine on a regular basis what other options do we have? How could we do a mission in a different way which would require a different profile completely?” Put another way, combatant commanders can conduct mission rehearsals with their forces and can identify gaps to be closed. But the traditional acquisition approach is not optimized for closing such gaps at speed through the use of disruptive technologies. The deployment and development of autonomous systems are part of the response to the question of how gaps can be closed or narrowed rapidly and without expensive solution sets. In an interview I did earlier this year with a senior Naval commander, he identified the “gaps” problem. “Rehearsal of operations sheds light on our gaps. if you are rehearsing, you are writing mission orders down to the trigger puller, and the trigger puller will get these orders and go, I don’t know what you want me to do. Where do you want me to be? Who am I supposed to check in with? What do you want me to kill when I get there? What are my left and right limits? Do I have target engagement authority? “This then allows a better process of writing effective mission orders. so that we’re actually telling the joint force what we want them to do and who’s got the lead at a specific operational point. By such an approach, we are learning. We’re driving requirements from the people who are actually out there trying to execute the mission, as opposed to the war gamers who were sitting on the staff trying to figure out what the trigger pullers should do.” But how to close the gaps? As CDRE Kavanagh argued: “We need to deliver lethality at the speed of relevance. But if I go after the conventional solution, and I’m just replacing something, that’s actually not a good use of my very finite resources. We need to be answering the operational commanders request to fill a gap in capability, even if it is a 30% solution compared to no solution on offer from the traditional acquisition process.” These are not technologies looked at in terms of a traditional acquisition process which requires them to go through a long period of development to form a platform which can procured with a long-life use expectancy. CDRE Kavanagh simply pointed out that maritime autonomous systems are NOT technologies to be understood in this manner. “We build our platforms in a classical waterfall approach where you design, develop and build a platform over twenty years to make them excellent. But their ability to adapt quickly is very limited. This is where software intensive systems such as maritime autonomous systems are a useful complement to the conventional platforms. Maritime autonomous systems are built around software first approaches and we are able to do rapid readjustments of the code in a combat situation.” And the legacy acquisition approach is not well aligned with the evolution of warfare. Not only is the focus changing to what distributed combat clusters can combine to do in terms of combat effects but the payload impacts at a point of relevance is also becoming of increased salience to warfighting approaches. What is emerging clearly is a need to adapt more rapidly than what traditional platforms and their upgrade processes can do. Gaps will emerge and need to be closed not just in mission rehearsals but in the combat operations to be anticipated in the current and future combat situations. And to endure in conflict, it will be crucial as well to protect one’s core combat capital capabilities and platforms which calls for increased reliance on capabilities like maritime autonomous systems to take the brunt of attrition in combat situations as capital ships become mother ships rather than simply being the core assets doing the brunt of combat with whatever organic capabilities they have onboard. As CDRE Kavanagh noted: “The nuclear powered submarine is absolutely necessary for what we need to do for our defense in depth, but what we’re focused on with maritime autonomous systems completely complements it, because what I want to do is ensure that the dangerous stuff gets done by the autonomous forces as much as possible, because we can rebuild that capability much more rapidly. We can actually restore it whereas we can’t restore a nuclear powered submarine quickly if lost.” I wrote in a previous piece about the shift from the distributed force being shaped in the Pacific to an enduring force. The distributed force and its correlated capabilities are a near to mid-term answer to providing for enhanced Pacific defense and deterrence, but longer-term answers are needed for an enduring force. CDRE Kavanagh closed our discussion by emphasizing the crucial need for Australia to have an ability to stay in the fight in case of conflict in the Pacific. He argued that having their own abilities to innovate in autonomous systems areas was part of such a desired capability. “Resilience in a combat situation is an ability to be able to experiment and adjust on the fly. To have an enduring force that can operate until statecraft can shape an end state, the warriors and their support community must adjust the combat force rapidly to the real-world combat conditions. By shaping a deployment and ongoing development process in the maritime autonomous systems area, we are contributing to such a combat capability.“ Featured Photo: Director General Warfare Innovation, Royal Australian Navy, Commodore Darron Kavanagh inspects the ‘Dive-LD’ autonomous underwater vehicle. Credit: Australian Department of Defence

Dr Robbin Laird, Rethinking Sustainable Defence Forces: A Discussion with Dr. Alan Dupont , 9 May 2023 Link to article (Defense.info) In an earlier discussion with David Beaumont, I focused on the challenge facing the ADF of managing what I called the strategic triangle for force enablement. That triangle is conceptualized in the featured graphic for this article. At the core of the triangle is the challenge of sustainability, the provision of supplies, magazine depth and what can produced by the allied arsenal of democracy. At the 28 March 2023 Williams Foundation Seminar, Dr. Dupont looked at the sustainability challenge as understood in terms of the capabilities of the defence industrial base. He provided an assessment of the significant limitations facing the Western industrial base to support sustainable defense forces which could endure through a significant period of conflict. As Dupont characterized the very significant challenge facing the liberal democracies: “The country or alliance that can deliver the biggest punch and outlast adversaries will win. Right now, that is not us. The arsenal of democracy has been replaced by the arsenal of autocracy. The Ukraine conflict has exposed Australia’s and the West’s thin, under-resourced defence industrial base. If we don’t fix the problem – and quickly – we won’t prevail in a conflict with a better equipped adversary.” This is a key challenge as the West simply has hollowed out basic consumable production for just-in time wars supported by just-in time supply chains. But neither the industrial base nor the supply chains are up to prolonged conflict of any sort. If Australia and the West want to deter the post-Cold war legacy approach to defense industry and supply chains will simply not be adequate. A major re-think and re-structuring is in order. I had a chance after the seminar to discuss with him on 3 April 2023 on how to do so. One could consider this a discussion of the defense industrial base, but we both think this is too limiting as it really is about shaping the entire eco-system for sustainable defense forces, which includes specific defense companies, new acquisition approaches, companies that support the core capabilities which defense taps into but are not specifically defense companies per se, and tapping into new logistical and support approaches to support distributed force. As Dupont concluded our conversation: “I think we should move away from this defense industrial base language which can be very clunky and 20th century. People think in terms of big factories and production and development cycles of 20 years. We need a very different focus.” Dupont started the discussion by laying out his methodology for building what he considers to be an appropriate Australian defense industrial effort. As it stands know, Australia is almost entirely dependent on overseas supplies and when Australia orders what it needs it joins the queue along with other customers, with no certainty be supplied in a timely manner. Added to this the tyranny of distance facing the transportation of military parts to Australia, and you have a perfect storm facing Australian defence in terms of conflict. To deal with this challenge, Australia needs to enhance its sovereign defense production capabilities. But to do so, Dupont suggests the need for a realistic methodology to shape the way ahead. What does Australia need in terms of defense capabilities over the next two decades? How much of what it needs could realistically be produced in Australia? What can it do with co-development or co-production with key allies? And what will it simply have to procure from allied countries and producers? In those areas where it feasible to build sovereign capabilities, a new development approach is needed. Many of the dynamic new capabilities being used by defense forces come from smaller more innovative firms. Australia has such firms but there is no Australian government policy to support them or to ensure that they have the capital to grow. There is a need for an Australian industrial policy in this area. In areas where Australia could produce for its own needs, the government should commit to a South Korean, Israeli, or Swedish path of growing for exports. He pointed out that South Korea now exports 17 billons of dollars of exports which provides a key pillar for its own defence. In addition, to discussing his methodology for the development of Australian sovereign defense industrial capabilities, we discussed the strategic direction of defense and how best to support it. Defence forces in the Pacific for the liberal democracies are focusing on force distribution for survivability. There are new technologies to support force distribution such as synthetic fuel production and 3D printing in the field. New approaches to sustaining distributed forces through a relevant development and production support are crucial to provide enhanced capabilities for distributed forces. New platform/payload combinations are being introduced through such sectors as aerial and maritime autonomous systems. How will Australia support this effort? How will it do so in a way that allows for exportability? How will it work with core allies to enhance the rapidity of change in this area? Cost effective and expendable platforms carrying a variety of payloads are a key element of the new defense equipment ecosystem. How will this ecosystem be supported and thrive? Most likely not with old acquisition approaches and older concepts of a “defense industrial base.” In short, a reworking of the Australian approach to supplying its forces is required. But it should be done a realistic manner but with a focus on the force structure changes taking place and the need to help sustain a distributed defense force both now and in the future.

Sharpening the Edge of Australia’s National Deterrence Capability National Gallery of Australia 30 March 2023 Final Report Dr Robbin Laird More articles from Dr Laird are posted in Event Proceedings Synopsis and Program Presentations Welcoming Remarks AIRMSHL Geoff Brown AO (Retd) Sir Richard Williams Foundation MC SQNLDR Sally Knox Sir Richard Williams Foundation Fundamentals of Deterrence AIRMSHL John Harvey AM (Retd) Deterrence from a UK Perspective AIRMSHL Harvey Smyth CB, OBE, DFC Deputy Commander Operations, Royal Air Force Resilience and Deterrence Mike Pezzullo AO Secretary, Department of Home Affairs Integrated Deterrence Gen. Ken Wilsbach Commander, Pacific Air Forces Reinvigorating the Industrial Base Dr Alan Dupont AO CEO, The Cognoscenti Group Manufacturing Deterrence Ken Kota Vice President, Australian Defense Strategic Capabilities Office, Missiles and Fire Control (MFC), Lockheed Martin Defence and Industry Policy Implications Kate Louis Head of Defence and Industry Policy, Australian Industry Group Deterrence by Detection Jake Campbell, AM Triton Program Director Australia, Northrop Grumman Operating Critical Infrastructure in Space Nick Leake Head of Satellite and Space Systems, Optus Nuclear Submarines as a Deterrence VADM Jonathan Mead AO, RAN Chief Nuclear Powered Submarine Taskforce Chief of Army Perspective LTGEN Simon Stuart AO, DSC Chief of Army Chief of Air Force Perspective AIRMSHL Robert Chipman AM, CSC Chief of Air Force Transcript

Final Report: Sharpening the Edge of Australia’s National Deterrence Capability National Gallery of Australia 30 March 2023 Final Report Dr Robbin Laird More articles from Dr Laird are posted in Event Proceedings Synopsis and Program

Dr Robbin Laird, Deterrence in Shaping Australia’s Path in the Global Transition, 18 April 2023 Link to article (Defense.info) As global conflict continues apace, and Australia navigates its way ahead, there is a clear desire to defend Australia’s interests and to deter actions by China which significantly undercut those interests. But what does Australia wish to deter? How does it do so? And how does it work its allied and partner relationships in conjunction with defining its new relationship with China? During my current trip to Australia, I had a chance to discuss these questions with Dr. Andrew Carr of Australian National University. We started by focusing on the salience of deterrence and its discussion and debate in Australia to shaping Australia’s way ahead in dealing with China. Carr: “What are we deterring China from doing? This is not just a military task. We need to address it publicly, both to gain ongoing support from the public but also to clarify what we expect from government coordination across the whole of government to deter China. “Deterrence is very new in the Australian experience. We have been part of a Western coalition for a very long time, but we have never had to do the kind of messaging and communication which is a crucial part of deterrence. There is not a lot of muscle memory in Australia for deterrent discourse.” China has become a different kind of competitor and adversary and partner as it changed from the reform years and building its economy to that of the China under President Xi who is combining elements of power to shape the global system more in the Chinese image. What will Australia accept in working with its main trade partners? And what will it not? What role will foreign students from China play in Australian universities? What actions by China are clearly to be countered? Which tolerated? Which ignored? All of this is part of shaping deterrent language and narrative. What tools does Australia need to deter against which types of actions? Where does the military fit into a broader deterrent effort involving broader Australia economic, social, cultural, information and security interests? Carr’s key point s that such questions need to be central to Australian debate and consideration, and regularly so. There are ongoing considerations of what is to be deterred and what means need to be developed to do so. Carr concluded our conversation by highlighting a central problem facing Western policy makers. Simply put, with the end of the Cold War and the seeming end of history and the victory of liberal democracy underwritten by the United States, policy makers saw the rules-based order as global with little clarity with regard to what are core versus peripheral interests. The term global commons came into vogue and suggested a global interdependent order in which interests were dictated by the need to deal with the gaps in the seams wherever and whenever they occurred. Deterrence is national in character and to be effective requires clarity with regard to core interests versus peripheral interests. It also requires a realistic sense of limits. What can the nation actually do that will be seen as credible by the adversary? And will the nation have the will to do so? As Carr put it: “The gray zone challenge comes from this global lack of clarity. With our “rules-based order” language, we tend to suggest that everything in the status quo is of interest for the West. Chinese actions in the South China Sea and Russia’s actions in Crimea in 2014, called our bluff. “Deterrence is then a policy of limits as well as focus. But it cannot remain a policy only pursued by the military, while absent from the discussions of the political class and the public” The China relationship shaped in the past two decades cannot continue; but what kind of relationship can it be? What are its limits and what are the paths of cooperation and the focus of deterrence? Dr. Andrew Carr Andrew Carr is a Senior Lecturer in the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian National University. His research interests include Australian foreign and defence policy, middle power theory and Asia-Pacific security. His recent books are Winning the Peace: Australia’s campaign to change the Asia-Pacific (MUP, 2015) and Asia-Pacific Security: An Introduction (Georgetown University Press, 2016). Dr Carr is also the editor of the Centre of Gravity policy paper series, a co-editor of the journal Security Challenges and a frequent media commentator for both Australian and Asia-Pacific press.

Dr Robbin Laird, The Role of Geography in the Direct Defence of Australia, 17 April 2023 Link to article (Defense.info) As Australia reworks its deterrence and defence strategy to deal with China, the question of the reach of the Australian defence force as well as its survivability is a key one. In providing answers to these questions, Australia’s geography can play a key role, in both providing for deployment and sustainment mobility as well as providing diverse launch points for longer range effects, alone or with allied engagement from Australian territory. I had a chance to discuss these developments with Dr. Andrew Carr of Australian National University during my current visit to Australia. Carr started by reminding me that the question of the use of territory in the direct defense of Australia has a long history. “Looking back at Australian history, there has been experience which can be drawn on as we look forward. And much of our investment in the ADF has focused on infrastructure in Australia. But with the more direct challenge posed by China, there is a re-think and re-focus going on with regard to how best to leverage Australian territory in our defence posture.” Carr noted that the focus has previously not been fighting off Australian territory, but that is a focus now. But the focus now is upon “what are the key areas of Australia for defence efforts, whether population centers, bases, supply centers, production centers and so on. In effect, what is being considered is an archipelago concept in terms of understanding how the Australian territorial chessboard can be most effectively utilized in deterrence and defence.” This has an important impact on the Australian Army, for example, as the Army shifts from a primary focus on being an expeditionary force going somewhere globally, to being a key enabler of the direct defence of Australia and leveraging Australian territory as an enabler in regional defence and deterrence. The Northern and Western parts of Australia provide significant territory in such an effort, but resources and population are scarce to do so. But new technologies – notably various autonomous technologies, such as UAVs, USVs UUVs, and ground robotic vehicles – provide for new ways to leverage Australian territory even in the presence of limited civilian infrastructure. If one thinks of Australian territory as a launchpad for operations into the region, then how do you organize the ADF to do so? How do you work with core allies such as the U.S. and Japan to share use of territory for projection of force? What kind of new basing solutions might be created to share operations between Australians and allies and to enable more robust ADF national operations? Care noted: “We are perhaps talking about a new alliance bargain for Australia. We would work together as coalition partners, and we would be doing tasks towards a common mission. “But I think clarity about how Australia contributes to the alliance, what Australia is getting from that alliance are actually going to be first order questions in order to make the specific operations from Australian soil more effective. “If we just simply have more Japanese forces and more American forces here on Australian soil, and they’re replicating what the Australians are trying to do, or they’re competing for use of the key locations and key airfields, and things like that, then there’s going to be real challenges and impediments to operations and potentially negative public spillover from such strategic confusion.” Carr concluded: “When we think in terms of a chessboard or archipelagic metaphor, then some of the distinctions between what is specifically Australian territory and what are kind of forward presence points are crucial will start to become clearer. It will be our ability to move between a whole range of access points that will be absolutely critical.” Featured image as presented in briefing by John Blaxland presented at RUSI Australia, Canberra, meeting on 12 April 2023.

Dr Robbin Laird, Shaping a Nuclear Submarine Enterprise in Australia: The Perspective of Vice-Admiral Jonathan Mead, 13 April 2023 Link to article (Defense.info) In March 2020, I was visiting Western Australia including HMAS Sterling. I was there to visit the HMAS Rankin, one of the Collins class submarines homeported at HMAS Sterling on Garden Island. When I informed a senior U.S. Navy Admiral that I was going to visit the Royal Australian Navy at Garden Island, he wrote: “Awesome, say hello to the fellas down south, incredible team! And absolutely critical in/out of a fight.” Little did I know at the time of my visit which was 12 March 2020, that in fact I was visiting a future SSN base. I also did not know that I was about to have to escape Australia to get back to the United States with the onset of the pandemic. In my visits to Australia during the period when Australia was working with France on the build of a new generation diesel-powered submarine, my work with the U.S. Navy, my time in France at my Paris apartment and discussions with the French, and my discussions in Australia gave me a good view of progress on this program. Then in September 2021, while in my apartment in Paris, the Australian, British and American governments announced that Australia was to cancel the French program in favor of an SSN program which would involve the three countries or the Anglo-Saxons as the French refer to the three, although it is difficult to view the United States or the UK in this light as the two countries change significantly. Being in France, I certainly had a chance to talk with the French and with colleagues in the United States I could do so by phone and video, and of course reached out to Australian colleagues to sort out an initial read on all of this as well. I wrote several pieces on this development at the time, but not surprisingly, the most perceptive of the pieces was built around an interview with Vice-Admiral Tim Barrett (Retired). This is what I wrote in a piece published 19 October 2021: “During my visit to Europe earlier this Fall, the surprise announcement of the Morrison Administration’s decision to shift from their French alliance to deliver a long-range diesel submarine to acquiring nuclear submarine capability through an alliance with the United States and Britain was made. I talked with both French and Australian analysts and provided my initial assessment in a series of articles which highlighted the decision and the dynamics of change associated with that decision. “But what was clear that the strategic environment has changed dramatically from when the Australian government made its decision to stay with a conventional submarine capability. The nature of the Chinese threat as well as the actions of the Xi Administration has clearly driven a shift in Australian thinking and perceived needs for longer range operational capability in the Indo-Pacific region. “At the same time, its closest allies in the region the United States and Japan clearly recognize the need to expand their capabilities to operate throughout the region to complicate Chinese operational considerations, and to deter via more capability to operate throughout the wider Pacific as well. “The announced decision highlighted an 18-month period with Vice Admiral Jonathan Mead in charge on the Australian side of negotiating within the new nuclear submarine alliance to deliver Australian solutions. I interviewed Mead when he was head of Navy Capability in 2016. He then went on to be Commander Australian Fleet and then Chief of Joint Capabilities and Command of Joint Capabilities Group. He has a strong ASW background as well as working closely with the other member of the Quad, namely India. He is now the Chief of the Nuclear -Powered Submarine Task Force…. “I had a chance to discuss these issues on October 14, 2021, in a phone interview with Vice-Admiral (Retired) Tim Barrett, with whom I have had the opportunity to discuss maritime issues since 2015. As the exact nature of what will happen in the program is a work in progress and not really open to public disclosure until that 18-month period is completed, we focused on the context and how one might assess that context. “Vice-Admiral (Retired) Barrett made three key points. First, the nuclear submarine effort was a strategic one, which was about Australian defense and not primarily focused on a priority on ship building on Australian soil. It is crucial to understand that this is about adding core defense capabilities earlier rather than later and would almost certainly encompass interaction between shaping the eco system for the operation of Australian nuclear submarines and the presence of allied nuclear submarines working with the Australian eco system. “The second key point was that the priority needed to be focused on adding nuclear submarine capability to the evolving USW or ASW capability which Australia was already building out. The Australian government recently decided to add another squadron of Romeo helicopters to the fleet, and has procured P-8s and Tritons as part of an expanded ASW or USW warfighting capability. The submarine is not a silver bullet for ASW or USW mission sets but part of the evolution of the kill web approach to ASW and USW missions going forward…. “According to Barrett: “The submarine decision is part of a broader set of decisions with regard to how the ADF should respond to the challenges in the Indo-Pacific. This was a deliberate and considered position from the Navy’s perspective, but the political and geopolitical circumstances have changed. This is not the first time that Australia has sought or considered the acquisition of a nuclear submarine.” “The third key point was that flexibility and innovations will be part of working out a way ahead and he noted that Mead had worked with him previously. When Commander of the Australian Fleet, then Commodore Mead was instrumental in working an innovative plan to manage a temporary capability deficiency for fleet fuel tanking. To shore up a gap, the RAN ‘leased’ a Spanish Navy oiler for 8 months, and the RAN crews trained on the ship and operated the ship in support of the Australian Fleet. “Eventually, the RAN acquired two new Spanish oilers, but the kind of innovation demonstrated in this example, will almost certainly be part of the way ahead in meeting the challenges of accelerating the operational acquisition of nuclear submarine capacity in support of Australian defense. “According to Vice Admiral (Retired) Barrett: “The strategic environment has changed. We need to reconsider the balance between sovereign capability for a thirty-year build and the need for creation of capability in the near term. The earlier 30-year period build approach should not be the dominant approach; the capability and its presence to shape deterrent capabilities is crucial and work out over time how the build side of this effort is clarified and put in place. The program needs to be driven by the need for creative capability options first.” Now after the 18-month period, the three countries announced their joint decision on how to proceed on the Australian approach to acquiring nuclear attack submarine technology and capability. To do so, will require Australia to build a comprehensive enterprise to operate, maintain, to sustain, and build an Australian nuclear attack submarine. The comprehensive approach to do so was announced in mid-March 2023 in San Diego by the three heads of state. The Williams Seminar was held on 30 March 2023 and is sandwiched between this event and the public release of the strategic defence review sometime in April. Australian Deputy Prime Minister, the Hon. Richard Marles MP speaks to the media during a visit to HMAS Stirling, Western Australia. The Australian government released a report laying out how it saw the “partnership for the future” or “the AUKUS nuclear-powered submarine pathway.” In that report, the government describe the advantage of nuclear-powered submarines and why Australia was transitioning to an SSN capability. “In the future security environment of the Indo-Pacific, conventionally-powered submarines will be increasingly less able to meet Australia’s needs. The United Kingdom Royal Navy and United States Navy retired their last conventionally-powered submarines in the early 1990s because SSNs have superior stealth, speed, maneuverability, survivability and endurance when compared to diesel-electric powered submarines.” At the Williams Seminar, Vice-Admiral Mead provided an overview to the approach being taken to establish a nuclear submarine enterprise in Australia. In essence, the approach is three-fold. In the first phase, UK and US nuclear submarines will visit HMAS Stirling, and the Royal Australian Navy will learn how to support these ships during their visits. As part of this standup phase, Australia will work with the United States in operating Virginia class submarines. In the second phase, Australia will obtain Virginia class submarines and operate anywhere from three to five of these boats going forward. And in a third phase, Australia will particulate with its partners in shaping a new class of SSNs, which will be British designed but enabled by U.S. technologies. In this third phase, Australia will have built its own submarine yard at Osborne where in effect this would be the fourth nuclear submarine yard in the trilateral alliance. In other words, the notion of building an arsenal of democracy through allied cooperation would be realized. Vice-Admiral Mead started his presentation by indicating that “in 2027, the U.S. will forward rotate Virginia class submarines to Australia and the UK would rotate one nuclear submarine to HMAS Sterling. The aim of this effort will be to allow Australia to deeply immerse itself in a nuclear-powered program. We will be doing maintenance on Virginia class submarines and will be doing crewing of these submarines out of Western Australia. “After a period of about four or five years, we will reach the point where our partners and we will be able to ensure that Australia is a safe and secure steward of nuclear technology, of nuclear materials and a nuclear reactors. From that point in time, the United States would offer us for sale or transfer up to five Virginia class submarines.” This would constitute the standup and launch phase for Australia shaping a nuclear submarine exercise, and really the key one to ensure a capability being able to operate to replace the Collins class submarines. This is really the key effort which enables the threshold to be crossed into a period of operating nuclear submarines. In my view, this also allows Australia to build its con-ops for integrated USW and ASW with the P-8s, Tritons, and various air and maritime assets, including the coming of maritime autonomous systems to build an integrated offensive-defensive capability to protect Australian sea lanes. What then follows is working through what a follow-on submarine program would look like. And this effort will entail in depth cooperation with both the UK and the United States. According to Mead: “It will be a follow-on to the British nuclear-powered submarine but will incorporate U.S. technology, including weapons, sensors, VLS combat systems and torpedoes.” Vice-Admiral Mead speaking at the Williams Foundation seminar on 30 March 2023. Vice-Admiral Mead then looked beyond the pathway discussion to the broader question of what Australia needs to do for this effort to be successful. The first element is addressing the strategy and being able to gain support for the effort within the Australian public. “We are going to have to be very clear on our strategy.” Second, Australia must successfully manage the trilateral working relationship. “How can we make the best of Australia working with the U.S. and the UK to delver this capability?” Third, creating, training and sustaining the appropriate workforce for the enterprise is a major challenge within Australia. “We will be the first country in the world to operate a nuclear submarine without having a civilian nuclear industry. This presents some unique challenges.” Fourth, Australia needs to build the appropriate infrastructure both in terms of basing and in terms of the shipyard itself. There will be some unique aspects to the yard including shaping high security protection for the yard as well. “We need to design the yard, build the yard and start building the nuclear-powered submarine by the end of the decade.” Fifth, Australia needs to build an industrial base for this effort which can support and sustain the effort into the indefinite future. Osborne will become the fourth nuclear submarine yard to go with the two in the U.S. and the one in the UK. “Osborne will become one of the most advanced and complex technological hubs in the world.” Sixth, the security of the enterprise is a major element for success. In addition to the physical security mentioned earlier, the IAEA involvement will be significant in verifying the quality of Australian nuclear power stewardship. “If we don’t have the international community along with us, the enterprise will fail.” But the point of all this effort was highlighted by VADM Mead at the beginning of his presentation: “there is no more powerful instrument of conventional deterrence than a nuclear-powered submarine capability.”

Dr Robbin Laird, The United Kingdom and Integrated Deterrence: The Perspective of Air Marshal Harvey Smyth, 12 April 2023 Link to article (Defense.info) At the recent Sir Richard Williams Foundation Seminar held on 30 March 2023, Air Marshal Harvey Smyth, the Deputy Commander Operations, presented a UK perspective of the challenges facing the UK and her allies in the contentious 2020’s. I first met Smyth when he was the head of the UK F-35 program. In an interview I did with him 2016, Air Commodore Smyth highlighted the coming of the F-35 the UK joint force. In that discussion, he highlighted the importance of the F-35 in enabling coalition operations, which is now considered a key element for integrated deterrence. This what we emphasized in that interview: “It can be easily forgotten that the USAF and the RAF have not flown the same aircraft for a very long time indeed. The RAF and the Marines have flown Harriers and along with the Spanish and Italians formed a three-decade Harrier community. And Smyth as a Harrier pilot underscored the importance of this shared legacy moving forward. “As an RAF pilot with significant maritime and carrier operational experience, we are shaping a collegiate and joint way ahead with the Royal Navy which brings the RAF domain knowledge of ways to operate in the extended battlespace with the coming of the F-35B to the new Queen Elizabeth class carrier. “Being radical, I think it would make sense to put a picture of the Queen Elizabeth class carrier on our RAF recruiting poster: the RAF and the RN are jointly delivering the UK’s future Carrier Strike capability, and all RAF Lightning pilots will spend some of their time at sea, as I did throughout my 16-year career in Joint Force Harrier – we are forging an integrated approach together, which is incredibly exciting.” The point simply put is that Smyth has been working integrated deterrence via the F-35 program for several years. But this was before Brexit, before several years of turbulence in UK and European politics and the return of war to the European context. (Oct. 3, 2021) The United Kingdom’s carrier strike group led by HMS Queen Elizabeth (R 08), and the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) led by Hyuga-class helicopter destroyer JS Ise (DDH 182) joined with U.S. Navy carrier strike groups led by flagships USS Ronald Reagan (CVN 76) and USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70) to conduct multiple carrier strike group operations in the Philippine Sea. The integrated at-sea operations brought together more than 15,000 Sailors across six nations, and demonstrates the U.S. Navy’s ability to work closely with its unmatched network of alliances and partnerships in support of a free and open Indo-Pacific. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Gray Gibson) But it was also prior to the recognition of the broader challenges posed by the global reach of the 21st century authoritarian powers. When my co-author and I decided to write a book on the return of direct defense in Europe, which we started to write in 2014 and published in late 2020, our original publisher wanted this book to focus on Russia. We significantly disagreed. We argued that the challenge for Europe’s direct defense was posed equally by China as a force within Europe and operating globally. Our view was an anomaly at the time, but it is no longer. In fact, Air Marshal Smyth underscored that we now face a Euro-Atlantic-Pacific global threat envelope and that the UK is focused on shaping its contribution accordingly within the scope of its means. He argued that the UK recognized that global deterrence was the critical focus of their defense effort, but such a focus clearly needed to encompass close working relationships will allies going forward. He made the point that even for the United States it was beyond its capability to fight a two-front war. This meant that shaping more effective allied cooperation through a process of integration was critical and that is what is meant by integrated deterrence. But such an aspiration cannot be realized within the legacy limits on information and technology sharing. As he underscored: “The key to success will center on our ability to share more of our intelligence, share more of our information, sharing more data, and share more technology. We need to work together to identify the gaps and the vulnerabilities in our deterrence posture that an adversary might exploit. And we need to work out how best to work as a collective, rather than as individual nations. This is really, really hard to do.” Air Marshal Smyth emphasized that in spite of its successes, NATO scoped to European defence was not enough for today’s UK deterrent structure. “It is clear that given the changing threat picture, effective defense deterrence will mean working through other groupings further beyond NATO, and beyond the Euro Atlantic theater, with a renewed emphasis on the concept of strategics, developing and establishing new frameworks, and building a new international security architecture to manage systemic competition and escalation. “And in today’s multipolar environments, the UK will continue to develop a broader deterrence toolkit to include information operations and offensive cyber tools and make greater use of open source information alongside our historically more classified intelligence capabilities.” “We will launch a new economic deterrence initiative to strengthen our diplomatic and economic tools to respond to and deter hostile acts by current and future aggressors. On nuclear, of course, the foundational component of UK is an integrated approach to deterrence with our minimal but credible, independent, UK nuclear deterrent. It is assigned to the defense of NATO to ensure that potential adversaries can never use their capabilities to threaten the UK, or indeed our NATO allies… “We would consider using our nuclear weapons only in extreme circumstances of self-defense, including the defense of NATO allies, and of course, only the Prime Minister can authorize their use. “But in addition to our nuclear deterrent, the UK’s conventional, cyber, and space forces are now becoming sufficiently capable, resilient, deployable and adaptive, to deter potential adversaries from engaging in conflict and to win if indeed, deterrence fails. “Beyond these military instruments, we’ll also see UK working the much wider aspects of state power to increase the costs of aggression by hostile actors above and below the threshold of armed conflict. The UK will continue to develop such levers to adapt to the changing global threat environments. In particular, we will strengthen our economic capabilities and information statecraft…” Air Marshal Smyth brought to the attention of the audience, the recent update of the 2021 UK Strategic Defence Review. The Integrated Review Refresh 2023 or the IRR was released last month. And in that review, deter and deterrence was frequently cited throughout and provides a good overview of the current UK government’s view of the deterrence challenge facing Britain and her allies. Based on this document, Air Marshal Smyth discussed the UK current concept of deterrence. As Air Marshal Smyth underscored: “We are all very familiar with the three C’s of traditional deterrence: capability, credibility, and communication. But in the UK, we’re now finding it helpful to consider integrated deterrence through the lens of an additional three C’s: comprehensive, coordinated, and coherence. “First, deterrence must be comprehensive, as discussed in the IRR. This means taking into account all state levers of power and tailoring our approach to maximize use of those levers of power that are best suited to change the perceptions of a specific adversary. The integrated approach attempts to avoid the age-old temptation of over focusing on the military instruments of power… To be truly comprehensive, integrated deterrence must be both multi domain and multi-agency. “Second, deterrence must be impeccably coordinated with allies and partners so that the impact of our actions are greater than the sum of the parts, from force posturing, all the way to the imposition of economic sanctions. None of us can do this alone. “And whilst we have all worked hand in glove for many decades in terms of deterrence and defense, in today’s information driven, intimately connected, rapidly dynamic but ever shrinking world, there is always more effort required, especially if we are to truly deliver a coordinated, integrated, and determined effect. “Lastly, we need to take a more coherent approach to developing our deterrence strategies, understanding the complex interplay across the spectrum of conflict and considering the temporal nature of crises to ensure that our activities remain aligned with the overall objectives and desired end states. “It is fair to say that capabilities available to state and non-state actors in today’s complex world have blurred the traditional thresholds of conflict…And also understanding the role and the impact of strategic or nuclear messaging well below the nuclear threshold, as well as how to manage escalation over time. And this is definitely something Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has brought into sharp focus. “Thus, alongside the long standing capability, credibility and communication aspects of deterrence, we add three more C’s of deterrence: comprehensive, coordinated and preparedness. “And for me, there’s no question that the development of integrated deterrence remains incredibly complex both by necessity and by design across government, and working with allies is challenging enough in the best of times, but for sure, the juice is definitely worth the squeeze.” AIR MARSHAL HARVEY SMYTH The Deputy Commander Operations is the senior Royal Air Force war fighter responsible for the conduct of air operations at home and overseas. Working together with other Services and international operational commanders, he oversees the generation and employment of air power in all environments. This wide remit includes the Air Defence of the United Kingdom, the delivery of intervention operations abroad and the conduct of humanitarian and disaster relief operations. Air Marshal Harvey Smyth was born and educated in Northern Ireland and joined the RAF in 1991 via the Sixth Form and Flying Scholarship Schemes. After qualifying as a fast-jet pilot, he spent 15 years as a frontline Harrier pilot and weapons instructor. He has extensive combat experience having flown hundreds of operational missions from both land bases and aircraft carriers over: Bosnia; Kosovo; Serbia; Iraq; and Afghanistan. In staff roles, Smyth has worked in the UK Air & Space Warfare Centre and spent 2 tours in the F-35 Lightning programme: the first as the Requirements Manager in MOD’s Directorate of Equipment Capability, and the second based in Washington DC as the UK’s F-35 National Director, where he was at the forefront of bringing the first UK Lightnings into service. In 2013 Smyth retrained as a Tornado pilot and became the Station Commander of RAF Marham, supporting concurrent operations in Afghanistan, West Africa, Iraq and Syria. On promotion to Air Commodore (1*) in 2015 he became the Tornado Force Commander, and shortly thereafter, the UK’s first Lightning F-35 Force Commander. He followed this with a short appointment as the Head of Carrier Enabled Power Projection (CEPP) within the MOD, before then conducting an operational tour as Director of the Combined Air Operations Centre in Qatar, responsible for planning and authorising ~1000 daily air & space missions at the height of the counter-ISIS campaign. Promoted to Air Vice-Marshal (2*) in 2018, Smyth retrained as a Typhoon pilot and became Air Officer Commanding Number 1 Group (AOC 1Gp), where he was responsible for the Air Combat Group of the RAF. In early 2020, Smyth then became UK MOD’s inaugural Director Space, building the Space Directorate and setting the foundation for the stand-up of UK Space Command. As a member of the PM-chaired National Space Council, and co-chair of the National Space Board, he was responsible for the production of UK’s first National and Defence Space Strategies, and establishment of a more ambitious Defence Space Programme. Smyth was promoted to Air Marshal (3*) in 2022 and appointed as the RAF’s Deputy Commander (Operations).