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Dr Robbin Laird, Triton’s Role in Australian Defense and Deterrence, 6 April 2023 Link to article (Defense.info) I have followed the progress of Triton in the coming of the 21st century U.S. Navy kill web enterprise for some time. The first interview I did focusing on Triton was during a 2011 visit to San Diego. In an interview with Commander Johansson, the P-3 commander looked towards the future: “I’m not a big fan of calling them unmanned anymore. I call them remotely-piloted, because it takes a lot of people to operate these systems. We moved to the family of systems (BAMS and P-8) because we felt that we could move some of the persistent ISR capabilities to a more capable platform, BAMS. “BAMS long dwell time can provide the persistence necessary more efficiently than a rotation of P-8 24/7/365. Also, if we used P-8 to do that we would have to increase squadron manpower to give them the necessary crews to fly 24/7 MDA in addition to the ASW/ASUW missions. We hope to have 5 orbits flying 24/7/365 to cover the maritime picture were required. The great thing about BAMS and P-8 is that they can work together to meet the COCOMS requirements.” That was in 2011 and through visits to Norfolk and to Jax Navy in more recent periods, I have been able to document the standup of this teaming arrangement by the U.S. Navy to create a whole new capability in delivering layered ISR for the fleet. In fact, it is a major part of why the Navy is able to craft a maritime kill web force. As we wrote in our book on the subject: “The U.S. Navy is crafting a significant paradigm shift, one which we call the kill web. In some ways, this shift is akin to the famous comment in a play by the 17th-century French playwright Molière that Monsieur Jourdain has been speaking prose for all his life but not knowing that he had. The kill web shift with the current force lays down a foundation from which to incorporate new platforms and technologies over the next phase of maritime force operations and development. No better case in point is the maritime patrol reconnaissance force. “This is a force which was defined by the P-3 anti-submarine warfare (ASW) aircraft flying “alone and unafraid” to its displacement by a “family of systems” which work together to deliver distributed but integratable kill webs capabilities to the force, both naval and joint. And as this “family of systems” shapes a new ecosystem working with the fleet, that ecosystem shapes key challenges which need to be resolved as part of the expansion of maritime autonomous systems or passive sensors added to platforms throughout the fleet.”[1] But the U.S. Navy is not doing this alone and as one U.S. Navy Admiral referred to their global partnerships as shaping “kill web matesmanship.” No force in the world is more important in this journey than the ADF. But the ADF, unlike the U.S., does not have a naval air force; they have an air force which operates in an integrated fashion with its Navy. During one visit to Australia, I went to the base where the ADF is building the operational facility integrating P-8 with Triton. In 2017, I visited RAAF Edinburgh, which is near Adelaide in South Australia and I had a chance to discuss the standup of the base and to look at the facilities being built there. Now six years later, I was able to get an update on the Triton piece of the effort from Jake Campbell, Triton Program Director, Northrop Grumman Australia. At the recent Williams Foundation on the way ahead for the Australian deterrence effort, Campbell provided an overview on how layered ISR capabilities provide Australia with deterrence capabilities across the spectrum of the deterrence options. During the presentation, he really did not focus a great deal on Triton specifically, but later we sat down to do an interview where he did precisely that. I asked him to provide an update on the program. Jake Campbell: “Triton has been supporting USINDOPACOM since 2020 as part of early operating capability. The early operating capability deployment to Guam proved Triton’s invaluable capabilities for the maritime patrol and reconnaissance mission. Meanwhile, Australia’s Triton program is making great progress with the rollout of the first aircraft from Northrop Grumman’s facility in Palmdale California in Sept. of last year. “The government is committed to three airplanes plus the associated ground systems. The facilities are being built at RAAF Edinburgh where they are building out the ground facilities right now. We will start rolling out the system late this year into next year. The first airplane will arrive in Australia mid-next year and first flight as soon as possible after that. “The first two Australian airplanes are currently in Palmdale going through the process of evaluation and finalization. The third one will soon join the other two in Palmdale. We will do the final shakedown flights there and then they will go to Pax River Naval Air Station for the process of finalization before being delivered to Australia.” Australia is tapping into what for the U.S. Navy is a mature production process but the Navy now is adding a new payload to the Triton – the multi-SIGINT package. The U.S. Navy and Northrop Grumman are fully immersed in delivering the multi-intelligence configuration of Triton, which will provide commanders an unprecedented amount of information to support critical decision making. The multi-intelligence payload includes a Northrop Grumman ZPY-3 Multi-Function Active Sensor (MFAS) electronically scanned surveillance radar under the fuselage; a Raytheon DAS-3 electro-optic, infra-red (EO/IR) sensor under the nose; as well as SIGINT Sensors. This common configuration on Triton will allow the RAAF and U.S. Navy to share data easily and provide a significant contribution to the ‘kill web’. Australia is on both the P-8 and Triton as a cooperative partner and that means that they are part of the ongoing development of the systems which allows customization to their needs as well. As Campbell underscored: “Because Australia is a cooperative partner in the program, Defence here gets to influence requirements for the future evolution of the program. The mission control stations will be at Edinburgh but the Triton will fly out of RAAF Tindal in the Northern Territory” The fact that the U.S. and Australia will fly the same airplane but into complimentary but different operational areas and environments will have an important impact as well on the future development of the program, in terms of shaping new requirements going forward. Campbell noted: “Australia has the potential to operate Triton well south to Antarctica, across the Indian Ocean, across the Southwest Pacific as well as North into Asia. This will give Australia unique experience with Triton compared to the U.S. Navy. And both experiences will flow back into the program.” We then discussed the unique capability which Triton contributes to the layered ISR system which Australia is constructing and which Campbell discussed in his Williams Foundation presentation. Capbell continued:”“In my talk, I emphasized the need to have a layered ISR capability, which is from space to undersurface, and everything in between. There is no one capability that will do everything for you in terms of intelligence collection. “Space provides some capability, but obviously there’s limitations in the sense that it’s very predictable. Whereas Triton still has the advantage of perspective by operating well above 50,000 feet. It is also persistent, and it has uncertainty in terms of an adversary understanding when it might be in the area of operation, so that’s a significant advantage, the ability to operate at range for an extended period, at the time and choosing of the operator. “And with the increase in the submarine threat, you want P8 to be focusing on that mission, much more so than then just doing standard ISR missions. Triton frees up the P8 to be able to go and focus on more of the ASW and other high end warfighting missions.” While Australia and the U.S. have a variety of means to collect information on maritime activities, Triton provides a unique capability for persistent awareness across the vast and complex environment of the APR region. As Campbell noted, “No other system can provide the range, persistence or coverage area. Satellites are limited and predictable, offering episodic coverage. Manned reconnaissance aircraft only provide limited ISR at the sacrifice of their other missions, such ASW patrols.” Triton’s high-altitude, long-endurance capabilities make it much more than an ISR & Targeting platform. With an operating altitude greater than 50k feet, and endurance great than 24 hours, Triton can provide continuous communications relay to keep a distributed force connected to ensure commanders are operating off a shared common operational picture. In addition, Northrop Grumman and the U.S. Navy are continuing to progress advanced capabilities insertion and mission expansion to keep pace with the threat and ensure Triton plays a key role in helping provide a seamlessly connected fleet for information dominance, a critical step as the branch achieves its naval operational architecture to enable distributed maritime operations. Northrop Grumman is leveraging its Triton Flying Test Bed (a manned Gulfstream IV surrogate as an uncrewed system) to research, develop, integrate, and demonstrate technologies to meet the Navy’s current and future ISR&T requirements. Just this past summer, Northrop Grumman demonstrated JADC2 across distributed platforms showcasing interoperability among F-35, MQ-4C Triton, E-2D Advanced Hawkeye, and surface vessels. By leveraging MQ-4C Triton’s utility as a gateway node the aircraft showcased the ability to connect fifth-generation platforms with naval assets across a distributed maritime fleet. The first-of-its-kind demonstration was conducted in partnership with Naval Air Systems Command, Office of Naval Research, Naval Information Warfare Center Pacific, and BAE Systems. [1] Laird, Robbin F.; Timperlake, Edward. A Maritime Kill Web Force in the Making: Deterrence and Warfighting in the 21st Century (p. 194). Kindle Edition. Featured image: The static display of a replica of the Air Force MQ-4C Triton Remotely Piloted Aircraft System at the 2023 Avalon International Airshow, Credit: Australian Department of Defence.

Dr Robbin Laird, ISR and Deterrence: Or How Detection is a Key Part of the Deterrence Effort, 5 April 2023 Link to article (Defense.info) At the recent Williams Foundation Seminar held on 30 March 2023, the focus was upon the challenge of building an Australian deterrence posture. One element of that effort was highlighted by Jake Campbell, Triton Program Director, Northrop Grumman Australia. Campbell is an experienced RAAF officer with many years of experience in the ISR area. I first met Jake when he had been appointed along with the current chief of the RAAF. Air Marshal Chipman, as the co-heads of Jericho. There initial focus was very much in line with Jake’s current work on Triton and his thoughts on “deterrence by detection”. He started his presentation by highlighting his focus as follows: How does Australia’s detection capabilities contribute to the overall deterrence package? His answer was that it depends on where and how that capability was exercised by the operational forces and I would add the ability of the political authorities who are working with the operational forces to get the deterrent effect. Put in other terms, it is the challenge of having the right military tool kit combined with the practice of the art of statecraft. Campbell argued that “deterrence can only be successful with a clearly defined and communicated outcome and with the ability to use a carefully balanced mix of necessary options to deliver that outcome. What we are really talking about is deterrence by design.” With this laydown of the concept of deterrence, he then highlighted the perspective of one analyst which emphasized the following: “Adversaries are less likely to commit opportunistic acts of aggression if they know they are being watched constantly and that their actions can be publicized widely.” Jake Campbell presenting at the Williams Foundation Seminar March 30, 2023 Detection is part of the deterrence package but for it to work as such, it must be linked to capabilities for credible action and there needs to be a track record of a state actually responding in an appropriate manner to a threat once detected. This is how Campbell characterized the above point: “Deterrence is only possible and effective if Australia has a clearly defined and communicated deterrence outcome.” Campbell cautioned that “deterrence by detection only works if it is linked to a credible deterrence response option, and a willingness to respond on order to deliver a combined deterrence effect. He expanded on that point as follows: “What is Australia’s balance of interests that drive the deterrence outcomes? And ultimately what is Australia deterring? Is it an attack on Australia? Our sea lines of communication? Is it our offshore network infrastructure, our critical onshore infrastructure? Is it an attack on our region? Whether that’s the Southwest Pacific or Southeast Asia or law of the sea, or an attack on our allies? Are we trying to deter an attack on Taiwan? Are we trying to deter a superior adversary, a near pear adversary or a rudimentary adversary?” Campbell argued that when focused on deterrence by detection, the role of layered ISR changes in the various operational phases of what one might consider a deterrent process or perhaps continuum. The slide below was how Campbell visualized the phases or continuum. He put his assessment this way: “While deterrence by detection can deliver strategic effects, deterrence is also effective in phase zero and phase one operation by leveraging quality ISR information when carefully coordinated with the public and classified use of that information. “In early phases, the full force of diplomatic, economic, and public information efforts can be brought to bear. Once combat operations have commenced, the scope of those options are significantly reduced and the effectiveness of deterrence by detection is clearly significantly reduced. “Detection operations can serve to suppress the effectiveness of gray zone operations by enabling public and international community awareness. And when necessary, the ability to use non-military responses.” He warned that “there is a risk that we will collect too much, or low fidelity data. To be effective Australia and our allies need better ways to turn the collected data into actionable intelligence…. “And there is a risk that the intelligence community won’t make the important information public. Balancing the need to protect versus the need to create deterrence will be challenging, but we need to do so for deterrence to be effective.” In his assessment, Australia is building out the kind of layered ISR capability necessary for the art of deterrence by detection. He visualized the notion of layered ISR as follows: He underscored that “critically layered ISR must be backed by a responsive sophisticated intelligence capability that can exploit the ISR product quickly to enable selective public release of information and shine a light on aggressive gray zone tactics or conventional force posture changes.” Campbell concluded that the evolution of layered ISR and its role in deterrence was a key area for industrial-government collaboration, cooperation and successful delivery of ongoing capabilities. “Deterrence resilience will depend upon industry’s ability to field advanced sensors and platforms quickly and efficiently. Digital engineering has much to offer here. But we also need to find better ways to rapidly reconstitute capabilities. And I’m not just talking about low end capabilities; we need to be able to reconstitute our high-end capabilities quickly. Industry also has a role in making the ISR layers more robust through new concepts for ISR, backed by resilient communications pathways. And I encourage defense and the services to include industry as you start to develop new thinking.”

Dr Robbin Laird, The Perspective of Air Marshal Chipman: Shaping a Way Ahead for the RAAF, 4 April 2023 Link to article (Defense.info) I have known Air Marshal Chipman since he was the first co-chair of Plan Jericho. My first interview with him was with his co-chair Jake Campbell, now of Northrop Grumman. In that first interview conducted in their offices in 2015, the emphasis was taking the coming of the F-35 as a forcing function of the joint force to create what was identified in later seminars as a fifth generation enabled force. “In effect, the blending of strike with situational awareness within a distributed C2 environment is one of the key targets of the Plan Jericho effort. And reshaping the template for operations in light of the coming of the F-35 makes sense as a C2/ISR fighter comes into the force, playing a catalytic role for further change, notably in a force which is being reconfigured to a more effective 21st century combat force.” Now as Chief of the RAAF, the challenge is to reap the advantages of that transition to deal with new strategic situation facing Australia and its allies and to build effective short to midterm change for the ADF with its allies but in way that would lead to successful deterrence in the long term. Much like the original focus of Plan Jericho was to work on the foundation of change, that challenge remains central for the RAAF. After his participation in the Williams seminar on the future paths of deterrence, I had a chance to sit down with Air Marshal Chipman in his office to expand on his views about the challenges and the way ahead for his air force and the ADF. I started by raising the point that the other air force commander who spoke at the seminar was General Wilsbach, the U.S. Pacific Air Force Commander. I noted that General Wilsbach has come to several Williams Foundation Conferences, the first being when he was 11th Air Force Commander. His interest in working with Australia is suggestive of the evolving U.S. relationship with the ADF and in particular the RAAF relationship with PACAF. It is not widely known that General Wilsbach has an Australian Deputy Commander, which reflects the nature of the evolving relationship. Air Marshal Chipman: “General Wilsbach has been a fantastic partner for Australia. He has been interested in our evolution and commits a lot of his time and his intellectual firepower to working with us. He has created a position for an Australian Deputy Commander in his headquarters. We are very fortunate to have someone who recognizes the value of our strategic partnership.” It also important to respect differences in terms of allied cultures and objectives in crisis situations. I wrote an essay in my new book Defense XII precisely on the question of recognizing differences and working relationships among the AUKUS partners, for example. Air Marshal Chipman prior to becoming air chief had some experience in Europe working with various allies and organizations and brings that experience to his current job. He noted: “In terms of our relationship with PACAF, for example, we need to understand what his ambitions are, what his needs are and how we partner to support him. At the same, we need to both understand and convey our requirements for independent operations as well. We need to be clear what part of our defense effort is focused on supporting the alliance and what part is prioritizing sovereign capability.” Alliance relationships are best understood as overlapping circles in a Venn diagram dynamically evolving in shaping capabilities and commitments, rather than being cast simply in historical terms. I then turned to the F-35 and the question of moving beyond simple interoperability. The promise of the F-35 as an international program has been to operate as a forcing function for a kind of interoperability which we have not seen before. But this promise has not been fully realized. I asked the Air Marshal for his thoughts on this challenge. Air Marshal Chipman: “The F-35 enterprise has the potential to be a forcing function for working together much more closely and effectively. The common threats we are facing are driving us to work more closely together. We will be incrementally disadvantaged over time if we are not. If the F-35 does play a forcing function, we will see this in our ability to provide collective logistics support and operate the aircraft as a common fleet.” I reminded him of what General Carlyle when he was PACAF hoped to see in the future. In a 2015 interview I did with Carlisle, this is what he hoped would happen: “General Carlisle was asked what would be the impact of a fleet of F-35s (allied and US) upon a Commander of PACAF a decade out. “It will be significant. Instead of thinking of an AOC, I can begin to think of an American and allied CAOC (Combined Air Operations Center). By sharing a common operating picture, we can become more effective tactically and strategically throughout the area of operations.” The coalition aspect is crucial for the ADF. But Chipman emphasized that such cooperation was crucial in deterring the big conflict but will not eliminate the need to manage the spectrum of conflict. To operate across the spectrum of conflict requires capabilities across that spectrum to deal with different conflict or crisis situations. This is how Air Marshal Chipman put it: “As I highlighted in my presentation last week at the Williams Foundation Seminar, there is strength in numbers to deter the worst possible outcomes but such an approach will not by itself prevent smaller scale coercion. We have to be prepared as a middle power to deal with actions from the adversary that will not trigger a broader alliance response, but nonetheless are important to us.” I then turned to the question of what are his priorities for the short to mid-term. Air Marshal Chipman: “My three key priorities are readiness, resilience and resourcefulness. We are shifting our focus from delivering new capabilities through a 10-year acquisition cycle, to integrating the capability we have in service today, to deter actions here and now. “I have to fight with what I have, and that is as much about tactics, techniques and procedures that we employ as it is about the equipment we buy now. Air Force is in a relatively good position. We have bought good equipment for 20 years, so it is not as if we starting at a position of significant disadvantage. We now have to make sure we can employ what have, and what we might add, optimally at any moment.” A key aspect of the evolving alliance situation in facing the China challenge is how the core allies Japan, Australia and the United States actually will craft more effective use of the air, maritime and land baes they use over the Pacific thought of as an extended operational space. If the three countries can work creatively land basing, with seabasing, with air basing with the use of new autonomous systems they can field and evolve an effective force for the long game of competition with China. Certainly, from this perspective, I would view Australia is the strategic reserve of the broader alliance. As Chipman commented: “I haven’t heard it described that way. But I think that’s what we are working towards. I think that’s the mindset that we have. The idea that Australia provides strategic depth for forces moving forward, is absolutely part of our thinking.” He underscored that an alliance that could take advantage of the multiple basing solutions which I highlighted, noting that would take “distributed logistics to the next level, where we need to be.” The featured photo: Air Marshal Chipman attending the Williams Foundation Conference on March 30, 2023 sitting next to the Chief of Army LTGEN Simon Stuart and Air Vice Marshal Darren Goldie, Air Commander Australia.

21 February 2018 From February to April 2018, The Central Blue and From Balloons to Drones, will be publishing a series of articles that examine the requirements of high-intensity warfare in the 21st Century. These articles provide the intellectual underpinnings to a seminar on high-intensity warfare being held on 22 March by the Williams Foundation in Canberra, Australia. In this article, Rex Harrison discusses the challenge of attrition during high-intensity conflicts and its implications for fifth-generation air forces. Technology has continued to advance in both disruptive and surprising ways. It is consequently difficult to forecast the exact way fifth-generation air power will be applied in 2035, nor the precise character of future high-intensity conflict. With the benefit of hindsight, however, history proposes broad themes and continuities in the nature of war. One such example is the persistence of attrition of the force once committed to battle. While Western air forces have been able to somewhat control their level of exposure to adversary action since the 1991 Gulf war, this may not always be the case. This level of control has been achieved through conducting operations beyond the engagement range of adversaries and behind a shield of (generally unchallenged) air defences. This technique has enabled air power to inflict significant losses without absorbing such losses themselves. This happy circumstance has been the exception rather than the rule in human history. This is particularly the case when considering the history of air power, where few combatants have had the luxury of picking and choosing the intensity and duration of the conflict. No matter how successful fifth-generation air power is in enhancing its lethality and minimising risk to the force, it is doubtful that a combat exchange in high-intensity combat will result in a ‘0’ in the ledger of either side. This being the case, I believe that success in high-intensity conflict will require a fifth-generation air force to ensure it can absorb and recover from the attrition of its forces. While it will be difficult to predict the outcomes of future air combat or the mix of technology and tactics that will provide the necessary advantage, history does provide a guide that may better inform our preparations for the future. Historical Examples The significant impact of attrition is demonstrated by the experiences of the Israeli Air Force (IAF) in the Yom Kippur War of October 1973. In this example, Israel was surprised by the new-found technical prowess of the Arab armies led by Egypt and Syria. The IAF was required to expend a sizable portion of its fighting strength to provide time for mobilisation. Surprised by the technical mastery of their opponents, in a matter of days, 102 aircraft were lost (roughly 25% of available combat aircraft), along with 53 aircrew. The crisis was only resolved by the rapid shipment of replacement aircraft from the US inventory under Operation Nickel Grass. While certainly an example of high-intensity conflict, the requirement for Australia to fight for its existence as Israel did is unlikely or would be, at the very least, preceded by warnings such that the nation could be mobilised and prepared for such a conflict. It is partially through Australia’s preferred method of warfare, the controlled commitment of forces in expeditionary wars, that such attrition has been avoided. A more pertinent example for Australian forces is the experience of No. 77 Squadron during the Korean War (a perhaps timely example given ongoing tensions on the Peninsula). The deployment of a single fighter squadron in June 1950 would seem at face value to match the characteristics of more recent Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) commitments; the level of attrition, however, was not comparable. Over a three-year commitment, 41 pilots died, and six were captured. At the peak of fighting the squadron replaced 25% the pilot force over an eighteen-month period. Finding the Second World War era North American P-51 Mustang to be outmatched after losing 13 aircraft, No. 77 Squadron was re-equipped in May 1951 with the Gloster Meteor. Of the 94 Meteors acquired by Australia, 30 were subsequently lost to enemy action, delivering a significant portion of the 54-aircraft lost in total over Korea and Japan[1]. The consequence of this action was that No. 77 Squadron, in effect, replaced all of its aircraft at least once, and in a handful of years, expending the bulk of the entire RAAF fleet. One should hope that future deployments would avoid committing forces in obsolete aircraft. However, it should be noted that the Australian government maintained the force commitment in Korea despite these and other subsequent losses. What Does This Mean? In preparing for future conflict, any fifth-generation air force must ensure access to both the physical (hardware) and human resources required to replace those lost. The procurement of aircraft and their associated supporting hardware may be the most straightforward requirement to meet, assuming access to global markets. While contemporary production rates are much lower than those of the Second World War, they are still significant for those aircraft in full production. While the Israeli losses in 1973 were substantial, production of the McDonnell Douglas F-4 Phantom II, the mainstay multi-role aircraft of the period, averaged 19 aircraft per month, over the life of production. Israel’s losses of this aircraft type (32 of the 102 total), while critical to the IAF, were only the equivalent of less than two months production out of the Fort Worth factory. The replacement of human resources, specifically aircrew, will be determined by a combination of the resources allocated to training (rather than fighting), and the desired quality of the resulting product. Given our resource-constrained environment, it may well be that ‘great’ is the enemy of ‘good enough’. In this context, a fifth-generation air force will need to accept that its workforce may not have not quite mastered the full spectrum of fifth-generation fighting techniques; however, it will need to employ them regardless. A fifth-generation air force will also need to incorporate these replacements within the chosen operational approach. Concerning hardware, it will be rare that the exact aircraft lost from the inventory will be in production. With platforms potentially being fielded for decades, it is to be expected that subsequent variants will be produced, or entirely new platforms created in the decades following acquisitions. As such, while a replacement platform may be found, the capabilities are unlikely to be identical to that it replaces. More critically to the networked fifth-generation force, it is unlikely that replacement assets will be fitted with the exquisitely detailed set of combat data and information exchange systems specified as part of the fifth-generation force structure. This will particularly be the case if the preferred supplier of our platforms is otherwise occupied. Returning to the example of No. 77 Squadron, when the Mustang was determined to be unsuitable for the Korean conflict, the RAAF initially sought the North American F-86 Sabre from the United States, however, as production was already committed to US customers, the British Meteor was chosen instead. While this aircraft was first flown in 1944 and was far from the cutting edge of technology, the war marched on, and Australia could not wait until it was ready to fight on its terms. [2] Conclusion While the aim of the technologically and professionally-advanced fifth-generation force is admirable, planning and foresight cannot overcome the uncertain nature of war, precisely the inevitability of loss. At its heart, a fifth-generation force requires flexibility to adapt to any environment. In this context, the squadron must become less of an exquisite implementation tool, and more a delivery mechanism through which aircraft and aircrew are ground against the enemy at the point of friction. In such a situation, ‘good enough’ may quickly become the new normal. Rex Harrison is an Air Combat Officer in Royal Australian Air Force officer. The views expressed are the author’s and do not reflect the official position of the Royal Australian Air Force, the Australian Department of Defence, or the Australian Government [1] Alan Stephens, Going Solo: The Royal Australian Air Force, 1946-1971 (Canberra: AGPS Press, 1995), p. 241. [2] Ibid, p.240. #Attrition #AirPower #Korea #AirForce #lessonslearned

Dr Robbin Laird, Deterrence for a Middle Power in the Context of the Evolving Global Shift: The Perspective of Air Marshal Chipman, RAAF, 1 April 2023 Link to article (Defense.info) Air Marshal Chipman presenting at the Williams Foundation seminar March 30, 2023. The recent Sir Richard Williams Foundation Seminar held on March 30, 2023 focused on the next phase of ADF and Australian defense development from a whole of government and society perspective. How can Australia as a middle power deter a major power like China from the use of force against Australia and to undercut Australian interests and way of life? This is a challenging question to pose as the world is changing significantly in the post-pandemic world and with it the evolution of the relationship among authoritarian powers and the dynamics of change within the liberal democratic allies of Australia as well. The technologies of war are in the process of significant change although the basics of war and conflict persist. At the seminar, Air Marshal Chipman provided his perspective on how the ADF and the RAAF will evolve with the deterrent challenge in the evolving context. His focus was upon deterrence from the perspective of a middle power and its ability to deliver a deterrent effect. At one point in his presentation, he highlighted a way to understand deterrence. “ADM Harry Harris, the former Commander of INDOPACOM, explained deterrence with a simple mathematical equation: deterrence = capability * resolve * signalling. If anyone of these is zero, then the product, deterrence, is zero! Resolve and signalling are orchestrated through diplomacy, but they are underpinned by military capability. “We influence the calculus of our potential adversaries in all that we do. Force generation is not just the act of preparing for war, it also signals our preparedness for war, and therefore serves to deter it. We should think strategically about our force generation signalling.” If we examine these three aspects – capability, resolve and signalling, we can look at Chipman’s presentation in terms of how he dealt with each of these elements of deterrence. Capability The question of capability must be determined in relationship to whom you are trying to deter. Given the growing capability of our authoritarian adversaries for precision strike and magazine depth, we have focused on greater ability to disperse or disaggregate force and to work ways to integrate the effects which a distributed force can deliver even though distributed. This is what I have underscored as the shaping of a kill web force. Chipman emphasized in his presentation several aspects of this trajectory of change. “We are also sharpening our deterrence capability by strengthening our resilience to military coercion and intimidation. A resilient Middle Power will minimise the consequences of adversary actions, through passive measures such as hardening, deception and dispersal. And by refining our agile fighting concepts to manoeuvre across our network of northern bases, through all domains; complicating and obscuring the adversaries’ targeting options. “Active measures that protect critical infrastructure and vulnerable supply lines, that strengthen our national resilience, will also help convince potential adversaries of the futility of their action.” Working air assets with ground and sea assets to deliver a combined effect, often referred to as multi-domain effects, is a key focus of attention for the RAAF as well. As Chipman put it: “We have successfully transitioned to the F-35, with its world-leading ability to achieve surprise, gain access, sense and share targetable data, and deliver lethal effects both in offence and in defence. “Integrated with the Super Hornet, Growler and E-7A Wedgetail, our air combat team is formidable. And they’re ready. We test them regularly, through exercises such as TASMAN SHIELD, which recently teamed our full air combat system with two Air Warfare Destroyers to practice high-end, integrated, multi-domain warfare.” “We are investing in long-range weapon systems, capable of striking well-defended warships on the move at great range from Australia. This will be an important complement to our maritime and land forces. Together, we’ll present a complex, integrated, multi-domain challenge for potential adversaries to penetrate.” This trajectory of change has taken a decade to achieve. In January 2012, I published an article in The Proceedings entitled “The Long Reach of Aegis” which projected how the F-35 and Aegis destroyers could create the kind of combat effect Chipman talked about. It was not exactly a best seller at the time. Resolve With regard to resolve, the challenge is for deterrence to be a whole of government and whole of society effort. This is hard, particularly after the land wars which have largely been experienced as a boutique military engagement. This will require taking serious looks and change with regard to economic and cultural relationships with China, sharpening realistic energy policies, shaping cyber and information resilience at home, and other macro-economic changes far beyond the ability of the ADF to generate. Chipman did not speak to these aspects of resolve in any depth, but focused on what resolve meant in terms of the ADF itself. Chipman spoke to the general issues of resolve in these terms: “it is also in our strategic culture to stand defiant when subject to coercion or intimidation. There is a role for deterrence here, through our readiness, resilience and the resourcefulness of our people. We generate combat power, integrated across domains, in pursuit of our national objectives, for the purpose of preventing conflict. But we remain resolute to act if our deterrence strategy fails.” He referred to the skill and initiative of the men and women who make up the ADF. If we are to operate successfully a kill web force, we need to have creative and capable warriors who can operate effectively at the tactical edge led by senior leaders not pre-occupied by micro-management. And Chipman’s counterpart, the PACAF Commander General Wilsbach underscored the growing impact which integrated deterrence can have on the authoritarian powers. I will write more on this in the coming articles generated from the conference and forthcoming interviews, but the point here is the ability of allied forces to work effectively and to do so within a crisis setting enhances the deterrent power of any member of the coalition, but certainly scales up the potential impact of a middle power. An effective middle power must master coalitionability. As the Colonel and now Major General Anders Rex of Denmark put in our seminar held in 2015 in Copenhagen: “Col. Anders Rex, Chief of the Expeditionary Air Staff of the Danish Air Force, coined a phrase “coalitionability” to express his focus on the core requirement of allied air forces and defense forces shaping ways to work more effectively with one another in dealing with twenty-first century challenges.” (Laird, Robbin. Joint by Design: The Evolution of Australian Defence Strategy (p. 70).Kindle Edition.) As Air Marshal Chipman put it: “Our capability and willingness to stand alongside allies and likeminded partners – with combined diplomatic and military weight. Our readiness to act in unison, with political and strategic alignment underpinned by technical, procedural and human interoperability. The threat of responding as an alliance will exacerbate a fear to attack and strengthen our deterrence capability.” Chipman went on to enhance those comments: “It is surely the central pillar of a Middle Power deterrence strategy – to operate in concert with allies and partners in pursuit of common interests. To deter other nations from acting against those interests by presenting strength in numbers, wherever and whenever that is demanded of us. This is not about surrendering sovereignty, but rather sharing it among trusted allies and partners – to advance our national interest. This is the experience of our alliance relationship with the United States for over 70 years. “But of course, this strategy extends beyond the United States. Through training, education, key leadership engagement, development assistance and crisis response. Building partner capacity, strengthening our partner’s sovereignty will help inoculate our region from the predations of others.” Signalling Now let us turn to signalling. This is key aspect of deterrence but a neglected one during the land wars. It is a forgotten art. In the 1980s, much of my work in Europe and with the Russians during the Euro-missile crisis and then the run up to what would become the unification of Germany was in the domain of communication and signalling. We only avoided nuclear war in 1983 by activating communication and signaling networks. How are we going to do that today? How do we do so with the Chinese? The Russians? The North Koreans? All three are Pacific powers and will shape the play of conflict in the region. Air Marshal Chipman in his presentation focused on the central significance of thinking through how the adversary might think in a crisis and to calibrate our messages to do so. Messaging obviously comes through actions as well as words, but both are important. This is how he put it: “Imagine you’re leader of one of the most powerful nations on earth – with deep financial resources, extraordinary industrial capacity and an impressive military capability. Power, prosperity, longevity pull on all three strings of Thucydides famous triptych – fear, honour, interest. “From your vantage point, advantage is easily accrued or coerced. What cannot be coerced can ultimately be compelled. What has long been coveted can now be imagined, and may even be within your reach. “How might your ambitions be deterred? What might make you fear to attack? “A rational leader might start with a cost-benefit judgement. Relative interest and relative power are the core ingredients that will shape this judgement. “How important is this interest? Is it a core interest or peripheral to your national objectives? How do your interests intersect the interests of others? How determined, committed or desperate will they be to defend them? “What is your military advantage – in technical and numerical terms; your strategic reserve and capacity to absorb counter actions; what about your experience, resolve, fighting spirit. “Is your force as capable as you believe it to be? Recent expeditions in Europe might give pause to ponder. “Is your adversary concealing strengths? Will they escalate in ways you can’t anticipate? Will they mobilise allies and partners against you? “These uncertainties will play on your judgement in a military sense, as will relative economic power and international legitimacy. The potential these challenges might present across all operational domains and elements of national power simultaneously, must in itself influence your thinking. “Surely, for a rational actor, doubt lingers…How might you control your destiny if you choose a path of uncertainty?” He concluded his presentation with some general observations about what one might call “the practice” of deterrence or what I would call the ability to operate your military force within the general context of the art of statecraft, which in my view seems a lost art but one which we need to recover and to build a credible version for the global order we are living through rather than some kind of net zero utopia. “Let me finish on a cautionary note. I mentioned earlier that deterrence works on the threat of escalation. But we must be clear, as a Middle Power, this must stop short of actually provoking conflict. Deterrence fails at the point conflict begins. “Strategic competition is dynamic and unstable: peripheral interests might become core over time. For a deterrence strategy to succeed through a prolonged period of strategic competition, we must also build pathways for de-escalation. This is as important in force design and force posture as it is to campaign design. The capabilities we invest in, where we stage them and how we intend to use them. “De-escalation pathways restore the pre-crisis or pre-conflict balance of power. Seizing a diplomatic off-ramp too early may cede advantage; too late will cause unnecessary attrition. Our successful deterrence strategy will need to consider escalation and de-escalation in equal measure. “So let me conclude. Our Middle Power deterrence capability is fixed by relative interest and relative power dynamics. Where a potential adversary’s core interests are at stake, deterrence requires strength, and strength comes in numbers. It is axiomatic of Australia’s strategic culture, that we seek to work with allies and partners in defence of our common interests, and this will endure.” “Which takes us back once again to the mind of our potential adversaries. To ensure they understand our core interests, and interpret our signals accurately, so that we might compete, deter and de-escalate without provoking conflict.”

Dr Robbin Laird, The Strategic Shift and Australia Recasts Its Defense Policy: The March Williams Foundation Seminar, 31 March 2023 Link to article (Defense.info) The latest Williams Foundation Seminar was held on March 30, 2023 in Canberra. It was entitled “Sharpening the Edge of Australia’s National Deterrence Capability” and focused on the strategic transition of Australia and the ADF in meeting the challenges of the decade ahead. I asked one of the young officers who attended the seminar what they got out of the seminar: “We are facing a significant strategic shift and those of us just now in service need to understand what the focus of the defense of our country is and will need to be as we work to defend our country.” Another young officer said: “The last generation fought abroad; now we are defending our country and in our region. How are we going to do so effectively?” That rather put it succinctly what the distinguished group of speakers was needed focused on doing. The seminar itself was placed midway between two major government announcements about the changing approach to defense. The first was the announcement with regard to the way ahead with the generation of a new nuclear submarine capability for Australia and the second is the forthcoming release of the Defence Strategic Review, expected in late April. For me, this session reminded me of my first engagement with the Williams Foundation in 2014 which led to my first seminar report. “On Tuesday, 11 March 2014, the Sir Richard Williams Foundation conducted its biannual seminar on ‘Air Combat Operations, 2025 and Beyond.’ The seminar explored the challenges and opportunities afforded by the introduction of fifth-generation air combat capabilities.” Well, we have almost reached 2025, and the focus of the 2014 seminar was indeed on introducing the F-35 into the ADF and the transformation which could be created to evolve the capabilities of the ADF as an integrated force able to operate across the spectrum of warfare. For the next decade, the seminars held by the Foundation provided detailed looks at that transformation through the presentations of senior ADF leaders and analysts about the evolving strategic environment and the evolving ADF capabilities and concepts of operations. I have detailed that decade in my book, Joint By Design: The Evolution of Australian Defence Strategy which was published in late 2020. As Vice Admiral (Retired) Barrett noted in his wrap up comments at the end of the seminar on March 30th: “As the Chairman of Williams, Geoff Brown, indicated at the beginning of the day we are taking a different take with this seminar and the one to follow later in the year. The subject that we discussed over the last couple of hours has been around deterrence where previously at these conferences, we’ve been talking very specifically around fifth generation capability throughout the ADF. “So the idea that we would gather, and we would have an array of esteemed speakers who would inform us, educate us, but also challenge us, but assist us in being able to formulate what our thinking about the way ahead made a great deal of sense.” Vice Admiral (Retired) Barrett closing the Williams Foundation Seminar on March 30, 20223 What Barrett said was very much in line with what the younger generation of officers wanted to discuss and learn about. But I must add that I have been working defense issues for a long time, in Europe and in the United States as well as in the Pacific. And for one who worked through the 1980s on the Euro-missile crisis, the Soviet confrontation with a Europe in transformation and certainly about nuclear weapons, the discussion of deterrence at the seminar took me back to work with Herman Kahn and Zbig Brzezinski which I did in the past. What is deterrence in this period of the 21st century? And what can we learn from a past which has been forgotten as we fought the land wars? The forthcoming report on the seminar will highlight the presentations at the seminar and the insights from additional interviews with senior ADF personnel and analysts. But I can note that the seminar took a broad view of the challenge of deterrence, that deterrent effects are not simply a result of the ADF can do with its allies and partners but what the Australian polity, economy, culture and society can deliver in competing with the 21st century authoritarian powers and cooperate with allies going through a very fluid situation in their domestic polities, societies, cultures and economies. The concluding presentation of the seminar by the head of the RAAF, Air Marshal Chipman, provided a compressive look at deterrence from the standpoint of a middle power, and drew together a number of the insights of other speakers as well. Air Marshal Chipman addressing the Williams Foundation Seminar March 30, 2023 “I mentioned earlier that deterrence works on the threat of escalation. “But we must be clear, as a Middle Power, this must stop short of actually provoking conflict. “Deterrence fails at the point conflict begins. “Strategic competition is dynamic and unstable: peripheral interests might become core over time. “For a deterrence strategy to succeed through a prolonged period of strategic competition, we must also build pathways for de-escalation. “This is as important in force design and force posture as it is to campaign design. “The capabilities we invest in, where we stage them and how we intend to use them. “De-escalation pathways restore the pre-crisis or pre-conflict balance of power. Seizing a diplomatic off-ramp too early may cede advantage; too late will cause unnecessary attrition. “Our successful deterrence strategy will need to consider escalation and de-escalation in equal measure.” Building capabilities to do so, having a society resilient enough to deal with a wide-range of threats, to have allied cohesion significant to be credible, and learn how to combine military capabilities with the art of statecraft which understands the minds of our authoritarian competitors is a work in progress. And in future seminars we will see the learning process playing out. The featured photo: Vice Admiral Jonathan Mead addressing the Williams seminar, March 30, 2022. VADM Mead is the Chief Nuclear Powered Submarine Task Force. At the seminar, he provided a succinct and powerful overview on the way ahead for the program. It is the analogy to the F-35 program which the 2014 seminar of Williams highlighted as an anchor program for ADF development.

There’s rarely been a more critical time to debate the Defence of Australia and its interests than now. And as more speculative details of the Defence Strategic Review continue to hit the news cycle, how do members of the Defence sector make reasoned arguments around the best way of implementing its findings? In this instructive piece, Air Commodore Jason “Booj” Begley lays down some practical advice on contributing to the contest of ideas and differentiating between effective writing and destructive ranting. There’s no better time to put pen to paper in the contest of ideas about air and space power. Because there’s been no more critical time for Defence, its capabilities, or our nation’s future since World War II ended. The Defence Strategic Review has dropped. Exactly what it says, and more importantly, how Defence interprets that, remains to be seen. But what we all know is that we can’t have it all. The laundry list of ‘wants’ across the services, as distinct from what we genuinely ‘need’, is too expensive (and arguably always has been). More importantly, the skilled workforce to deliver, sustain, and operate those wants/needs also needs to be grown - and that won’t simply materialise overnight. In the meantime, we’ve got to make the most of what we’ve got. But how can we extract the full potential from our existing platforms and people? How can we contribute to a more effective Joint Force? What processes and structures should we adapt, and what should we abolish? No doubt you’ve got thoughts on that. Because during your time in Defence, you’ve built knowledge and experience, and seen things work and seen things fail. AFSTRAT encourages you to be an intelligent workforce that offers up innovative solutions, but it doesn’t tell you how to do it. And what if the problem you’re trying to solve is an entrenched status quo that your organisation doesn’t seem keen to change? You’ve seen others in Defence write. Some for ASPI, the Central Blue, Cove, Strategy Bridge, and even military texts. So you checked Defence’s policy on public comment and social media, and now you’re wondering which 2* is approving publication of all those pieces. Well, there isn’t one. These authors are simply taking a calculated risk. They see an issue they think needs discussion or debate. And they have a view on that issue to which they are willing to commit their name and their professional credibility. That sort of risk has a long tradition in Air and Space Power. The will to take calculated risks characterised aviation’s pioneers. It freed us from gravity and led to an independent air force. Continually challenging the status quo allowed us to apply the latest technology and concepts to our platforms, people, and structures so they were always fit to meet the dynamic needs of our strategic environment. Per ardua ad astra is not just a motto; accepting risk to attain progress is the defining trait of Air Force culture. So it’s not a surprise that those passionate about progress will always look to express their views and beg forgiveness rather than seek permission and risk censorship. But you need to be deliberate. Forgiveness will not only depend on the merit of your argument, but the way you argue. An emotive rant rather than a reasoned argument won’t get much traction. But it will lead the audience to form a view of your credibility, professionalism, and judgement. Perhaps some examples will illustrate what I mean. This article from 2021 and another from 2022 do it right. Their author describes challenges he encountered, explained objectively why he thought they needed to be addressed and how they could be. Both drew attention. Some were from layers of the organisation so wedded to process they no longer asked why. And some from senior leaders who appreciated having their long-standing assumptions tested and were willing to look at better ways to do business. So let’s consider what not to do with a couple of hypotheticals. In Scenario 1, Government has cancelled your project. Up front, you need to remember the primacy of Government in civil-military relations in our society. You and/or your boss(es) provided (one would hope) ‘best military advice’ on this project. And Government still said no... Directly criticising that decision is a no-no, unless of course you’re willing to quit and do so as a private citizen. But indirect criticism via social media – liking, retweeting or otherwise endorsing others’ criticism of the decision – is arguably worse. Not only doesn’t it add anything useful to the debate, but the petty snarkiness of your approach also calls into question your judgement and military professionalism. In Scenario 2, ‘shaping’ public debate about projects that may be axed is also high-risk. ‘Wedging’ Government’s decision space is a mortal sin. Public statements that “not having [capability x] will put soldiers’/sailors’/aviators’ lives and Australia’s national interests at risk,” is not the statement of a military professional. It’s an appeal to public sentiment from an individual who can’t produce a compelling logical argument for a capability, but is so emotionally wedded to it that they’ll try anything to assure its survival. You need to be clear on this issue – Government decides what our national interests are and how much risk to them they are willing to accept. The same goes for how much risk they will accept to ADF lives in pursuit of those interests, which they may choose to manage by not deploying the ADF at all. Sinek says, ‘Start with why.’ Why are you expressing your ideas? You need to be honest about this because otherwise your risk assessment can’t be objective. Is this really about benefiting Defence? Or is it about what you believe you, your tribe or your favoured capability brings to Defence? Is your approach a well-considered, logical argument, one that considers alternatives that also challenge your own assumptions? Or is it simply stating one point of view as though that were fact? Writing and ranting are not the same, nor are their associated risks. So before you start it’s important to consider some questions. What are the potential consequences you may face if published? Is this important enough to put your name to? How might your professional credibility be impacted? ‘Am I willing to defend my argument with the same conviction as defending my country?’ Finding your voice and getting your ideas out there isn’t easy. Things worth doing rarely are. But we need our people putting their best ideas forward, so that we can discuss and debate them, smooth their rough edges, and get them into action. Air Commodore Jason “Booj” Begley was born and educated in Sydney, joining the Royal Australian Air Force through the Australian Defence Force Academy in 1991 and completing a Bachelor of Arts degree with Honours in Politics in 1994. He is an Editor of The Central Blue and was formerly the Director General Joint C4, Joint Capabilities Group. He's on Twitter at @ocd_booj

Are we thinking about military innovations in the wrong way? GPCAPT David Hood certainly thinks so. In this piece, he tackles the notion of RMA and some of the ways it can produce faulty thinking that can lead to vast, strategic errors. In its place, he argues for an alternate construct that’s fit for purpose when managing grand-strategic problems. The term Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) provokes interest and imagination. It implies the possibility of dramatic changes in the conduct of warfare. It evokes the hope of achieving the elusive holy grail of ‘decisive battle’. And for its proponents, the RMA offers much: lifting the Clausewitzian fog of war on the battlefield (Hewish 1994); enabling post-industrial mobilisation for total war (Wenger and Mason 2008); even changing the fundamental nature of war itself (Hoffman 2017). Despite these bold claims, RMAs are more analogous to sects than shortcuts to success. Conceptually, the RMA remains an obscure phenomenon and its promises are largely illusory. Most significantly, the belief an RMA can ‘revolutionise’ anything above the tactical level is both misleading and problematic for statecraft now and in the future. Before tackling the problems inherent in the RMA concept and how we should think differently about future war, it is necessary to define what is meant by a ‘revolution’ in the context of an RMA. The Oxford Dictionary defines a revolution as ‘a great change in conditions, ways of working, beliefs, etc. that affects large numbers of people’. It follows that an RMA can be defined as a great change in conditions, ways of working, beliefs, etc—military affairs—that affects a large number of combatants and, almost certainly, non-combatants. There are three broad and interrelated problems with RMAs in the context of current and future war. The first is conceptual: there is wide disagreement about what kind of ‘affairs’ are associated with RMA. While technology is almost always cited, many other elements are argued as either being part of, or not part of, an RMA. These include forms of combat, organisational structure, doctrine, innovation, adaptation, the nature of command, culture, ethics, the power of states, and the system of world politics. Such breadth risks cherry-picking those elements most convenient or desired, rather than those most important. Conversely, adopting all elements means an RMA becomes all things to all people, making the concept meaningless. If the concept is important at all—and revolutions must surely be important—then such lack of definitional clarity should not be acceptable. Further, as the name implies and as many scholars have argued, RMAs are the purview of military organisations only. However, many elements listed above are not specific to military affairs: they are affairs of society or the international system more broadly. Should we instead think in terms of human or societal affairs? It is misleading at best and strategically limiting at worst to credit the military as the only institution with agency to ‘revolutionise’ military affairs. It is widely recognised that whole-of-government action is essential to best manage competition in the current strategic environment. One need only look at Russian and Chinese actions to challenge and disrupt the current world order, which include a range of non-military activities such as information warfare, political subversion, and economic coercion. While these methods are hardly revolutionary—an issue that will be addressed in detail below—they have proven highly successful and are arguably more effective than any military action could be when the aim is to avoid escalation above the threshold of armed conflict. The conceptual difficulties described above make it difficult to grasp what an RMA is and what it is not; sort important elements from their opposites; and ultimately know how an RMA should be operationalised for execution on the battlefield, and by whom. A concept is worthless if it cannot be clearly understood and employed to advantage. The second problem is structural: not only is technology consistently cited as an element of RMA, it is often identified as the most fundamental driving force behind revolutionary change. This is reflected in the frequent classification of RMAs in technological terms (think ‘precision weapons’, ‘cyber’ and ‘artificial intelligence’) rather than in terms relating to non-technological affairs such as a ‘doctrinal’, ‘organisational’ or ‘cultural’ RMA. Crediting technology as the driving force behind RMA is a distorted and limiting perspective. History has repeatedly shown the introduction of new technologies does not result in revolutionary changes in military affairs. While new technology can produce short-term tactical advantages, it is invariably countered (often quickly) or otherwise provokes unpredicted reactions which constrain any ongoing advantage well before it becomes revolutionary. For example, airpower theorists envisaged invulnerable strategic bombers delivering decisive effects by striking directly at the enemy’s homeland, destroying its means to wage war and crippling its people’s will to fight. But airpower has never accomplished these effects, in large part because of the employment of counter-technologies such as radar, interceptor aircraft and anti-aircraft weapons. Naturally, these advancements were not revolutionary in themselves. Technological advances have and will continue to be important and change the character of war, but they are far more evolutionary than they are revolutionary. Most often, technological advances result in small-scale variations rather than radical and permanent step-changes. The introduction of the warhorse to the steppes of Eurasia prompted pastoralists to coalesce inside defensive fortifications, which in turn led to siege warfare and eventually mechanised manoeuvre warfare, making the horse obsolete. But this series of transformations occurred over thousands of years, and in different ways across the globe, influenced by factors such as culture and geography. Sailing ships were replaced by steamships, which were themselves replaced by motorships. But these changes did not manifest as clearly-identifiable advancements, but as gradual evolutions of trial and error. Ships of earlier eras were modified to operate in successive eras: several navies operated sail-only ships in World War One, and the United States Navy retired its last sail-only warship after World War Two. And, since their unremarkable introduction in the early 20th century, tanks and other modern armoured vehicles have been subject to innumerable modifications in response to an array of counter-armour technologies. These examples clearly illustrate evolutions of slow and unsteady progress, not revolutions in military affairs. In many cases, the theoretical potential of a particular technology is also constrained by the need to evolve supporting technologies or other factors such as doctrine, logistics and culture: technology often requires a system of systems approach to be successful. This shows a wide range of factors must be addressed before any meaningful evolution—let alone any revolution—in military affairs can occur. While it may be a step too far to suggest technology should not be considered an element of RMA at all, any focus on technology as a fundamental driver is misplaced. History demonstrates technology has less influence than idealogues argue, and for it to be influential at all it must be supported by a range of other elements. The two problems described above lead to a third, even more significant problem with RMAs: substance. If we cannot consistently discern the elements that make up an RMA, it is unlikely those elements are important or able to produce revolutionary outcomes. And if the only element consistently associated with an RMA—technology—is also not able to produce revolutionary change, it follows that no element of an RMA is revolutionary. Consequently, the most significant problem with the concept of RMA is one of substance: the so-called RMA cannot actually produce revolutions. This empirical conclusion can be arrived at intuitively if one considers RMAs in the context of the nature of war. As Carl von Clausewitz argued, war is a contest of opposing wills. Its enduring nature in this regard is therefore paradoxical: war moves dynamically, unpredictably, and non-linearly through cycles of action, reaction, over-extension, and reversal. What works today will likely not work tomorrow, precisely because it worked today. Intuitively therefore, revolutions in military affairs are not possible because the nature of war itself precludes them: anything that tends towards achieving a great change in warfare will, by virtue of its initial success, be countered. The impossibility of revolutionary military action is most noticeable—and is most important—at the strategic level. At the tactical level, changes (evolutions) in the character of war often occur. These changes do not automatically produce strategically significant results, because it is the consequences of military action that are important at the strategic level. For example, the introduction of air warfare brought significant evolutionary change to how wars were fought at the tactical level, as militaries sought to apply force in a new third dimension. But airpower has not revolutionised war at the strategic level because—like all other forms of military affairs—it is unable to produce revolutionary strategic consequences. War remains a contest of wills and airpower simply opened up a new domain in which humans could fight. Even the advent of nuclear weapons has not revolutionised war by making it obsolete, as was once prophesised by RMA advocates. Rather, the Cold War period saw an evolution in which great power war became less likely, and other forms of conflict dominated. We may be in the midst of an evolution away from that era today. Tellingly, we see no discernible revolutionary changes. Because the nature of war is unchanging, the same will be true for the emerging cyber and space domains. Where does this lead us in terms of future war? We must evolve our thinking. The concept of RMA is not fit for purpose. It is not useful today and it will continue to mislead us tomorrow. We must instead think in terms of Evolutions in Human Competition (EHC). Shifting our thinking from RMA to EHC largely addresses the problems of concept, structure and substance discussed above. A construct that recognises evolutions—the gradual process of change and development—rather than revolutions allows us to better prepare for future conflict by accepting revolution is impossible but continuing evolution is almost certain. Reframing the subject from military affairs to human competition more broadly allows military affairs to be situated into a grand-strategic context, as one of several tools that must be used cohesively to manage the contest of wills across not just ‘war’, but a spectrum of competition spanning traditional western notions of war and peace and all other forms of contest between. Granted, the elements that make up EHC remain to be defined, but conceiving of EHC rather than an RMA paves the way to deemphasise technology as a driving force and credit more important influences of change such as national will, societal resilience, culture, ethics and strategic leadership. Evolving our thinking through the lens of EHC also provides additional benefits. It deemphasises military solutions as necessarily being the best or only option for managing grand-strategic problems: EHC reminds us that many tools of statecraft exist and some may be used in conjunction with, or preferentially to, military power. Further, because an evolutionary approach rejects the notion of momentous and permanent change through large discontinuities, it encourages strategists to take a more long-term view, as opposed to placing unwarranted faith in revolutionary ‘silver bullet’ solutions which purport to decisively resolve problems in the short term. In essence, it allows strategists to view future competition as the next phase of a continuous stream of history which is fed by the competitions of the past and present. The essential task of strategy can therefore be viewed as managing currently evolving competition(s) to enable speculated futures to be shaped in favour of our long-term strategic objectives. Applying the lessons of past competitions provides the best mechanism to inform such shaping. While the future is not foreseeable, few activities are more important than preparing for future conflict. To do this, appropriate concepts must be used. While the RMA has a strong following in some circles, it is not fit for purpose and it will not best prepare militaries, societies and states for future competition. A more appropriate way to view how war—and competition more generally—will change over the course of future history is through the EHC lens. Competition undergoes evolution, not revolution, and that evolution occurs across a broad spectrum of human competition, not just the far narrower domain of ‘military affairs’. Still believe in Revolutions in Military Affairs? Time to evolve your thinking. Group Captain David Hood is an Aeronautical Engineer working for the Royal Australian Air Force. 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A core objective of The Williams Foundation is to encourage informed discussion and debate on future air power capability. Accordingly, the Foundation is committed to supporting our future leaders and the development of their ideas. The Dr Alan Stephens Air Power Literary Prize seeks to recognise authors who have pushed the creative boundary, and forced the reader to imagine a new future. The Central Blue received a number of high-calibre entries in 2022, with many varied and interesting themes. In fact, the top three submissions were hard to split. While there can only be one winner, we felt it particularly pertinent to offer two honourable mentions. Honourable mentions The case for a National UAS Strategy by Pilot Officer Tim Sullivan (AUG 22): In his submission, Tim Sullivan asks the reader to consider if it is time the Australian Government devised a National UAS Strategy that intertwines keeping the ADF at the forefront of ever-changing UAS technology whilst expanding Australia’s industrial capability and global footprint. In asking this question, Tim explores several components of such a strategy and lays out a rationale for developing it with urgency. Airpower, baby! How Air Force can unlock latent workforce capability by Squadron leader Ben Gray (JAN 22): It’s no secret that people are the principal capability that keeps any organisation functioning and competitive. In his submission, Ben Gray looks at Air Force’s flexible employment practices and how these options are vital in retaining and expanding the experienced and talented workforce the Royal Australian Air Force possesses. Prize Winner While there are a number of other stellar contributions which you can read on our site, we can only have one prize winner. We are pleased to announce the 2022 Dr Alan Stephens Air Power Literary Prize winner is Flight Lieutenant Joshua Vicino. In his submission Smart but Not Smart Enough – When Having an Engineering Degree Doesn’t Cut It, FLTLT Joshua Vicino asks the question – how can Defence maximise the brain power of its people with engineering degrees in a post-FPR world where a typical engineering degree isn’t of great assistance in a ‘govern and assure’ role. We congratulate FLTLT Joshua Vicino on his winning article.

The Sir Richard Williams Foundation is deeply saddened by the news of the passing of Senator Jim Molan AO, DSC. Jim was a Director of the Foundation before entering Federal Parliament and we will always be grateful for his contribution to our mission. During his time serving in uniform, as a national security strategist and in the Senate, Jim’s contribution has been significant and lasting. He was a passionate advocate for the Australian Defence sector and a strong supporter of the veteran community. The Board and members of the Foundation offer our sincere condolences to Anne, their children Erin, Felicity, Mick and Sarah and their families. Vale Jim Molan

It’s difficult to believe this is our last post for 2022, but with Christmas a week out, the team at The Central Blue is getting ready to head off over the break. But, not entirely check-out. This week, Wing Commander Marija Jovanovich and TCB editor Squadron Leader Jenna Higgins share their recommended reads for the summer break to bring some intellectual colour to the grey matter. Whether in-print, on-tablet or as an audiobook, these are interesting reads you can knock over, learn from, and even enjoy. It is not an exhaustive list of foundational strategic literature or leadership texts. It’s not even a list of new releases. But they’ve picked these books as ones you should be able to easily pick up and put down as time allows amid all the other things happening during your much-deserved downtime. Range: Why Generalists Triumph in a Specialized World – David Epstein (2019) In the book, Epstein argues that range – defined as more diverse experience across multiple fields – is more relevant in today's society than specialization because the wicked problems of the modern world require bridging experience and knowledge from multiple fields to foster solutions. Why should you read it? I read this book in two different ways – it is both about individuals and about teams. I venture the second is more important to us. Individuals with ‘range’ take a lifetime to make, but as leaders we can build teams with ‘range’ now. I encourage you to read this book at least in part as a leadership text. Prisoners of Geography: Ten Maps That Tell You Everything You Need to Know About Global Politics – Tim Marshall (2016) All leaders are constrained by geography. Their choices are limited by mountains, rivers, seas and concrete. Yes, to follow world events you need to understand people, ideas and movements ‐ but if you don't know geography, you'll never have the full picture Why did Jenna enjoy it? As someone who has always been fascinated by the lines on a map, this book gave me more insight into why conflict has the potential to develop and evolve. Perception and old world borders will continue influence decisions– the nine dash line is but just ONE example. Sandworm: A New Era of Cyberwar and the Hunt for the Kremlin's Most Dangerous Hackers – Andy Greenberg (2020) In 2014, the world witnessed the start of a mysterious series of cyberattacks. Targeting American utility companies, NATO, and electric grids in Eastern Europe, the strikes grew ever more brazen. They culminated in the summer of 2017, when the malware known as NotPetya was unleashed, penetrating, disrupting, and paralyzing some of the world's largest businesses. It was the largest, most destructive cyberattack the world had ever seen. The hackers behind these attacks are quickly gaining a reputation as the most dangerous team of cyberwarriors in history: a group known as Sandworm. Working in the service of Russia's military intelligence agency, they represent a persistent, highly skilled force, one whose talents are matched by their willingness to launch broad, unrestrained attacks on the most critical infrastructure of their adversaries. A chilling, globe‐spanning detective story, Sandworm considers the danger this force poses to our national security and stability. As the Kremlin's role in foreign government manipulation comes into greater focus, Sandworm exposes the realities not just of Russia's global digital offensive, but of an era where warfare ceases to be waged on the battlefield. It reveals how the lines between digital and physical conflict, between wartime and peacetime, have begun to blur—with world‐shaking implications. Why it's topical: As our coalition and NATO partners witness first‐hand the devastating physical destruction imposed by Russia within Ukraine, it’s important to reflect on two things. Firstly, this war has been going on for decades. The history between the two countries is complex and fascinating. Secondly, any cyber‐attack on Ukraine has natural global repercussions. Ukraine is both a cyberwarfare testing ground, and demonstration of cyber resilience. For those of you who have read Dune (or watched the movie) – you’ll quickly recognise the Sandworm reference. Radical Candor: Be a Kickass Boss Without Losing Your Humanity – Kim Scott (2017) Scott earned her stripes as a highly successful manager at Google and then decamped to Apple, where she developed a class on optimal management. She has earned growing fame in recent years with her vital new approach to effective management, the “radical candor” method. Radical candor is the sweet spot between managers who are obnoxiously aggressive on one side and ruinously empathetic on the other. It’s about providing guidance, which involves a mix of praise as well as criticism—delivered to produce better results and help employees achieve. Why Maz thinks you should read this book: Radical candour is a cornerstone of my command philosophy. This book is where I learned the concept; I practise a modified version, adapted to our environment. She is keen to hear what you think about the theory! (Twitter: @maz_jovanovich) Shackleton's Boat Journey – Frank A. Worsley (1940) This is an account of the Shackleton boat journey. On August 1, 1914, on the eve of World War I, Sir Ernest Shackleton and his hand‐picked crew embarked in HMS Endurance from London's West India Dock, for an expedition to the Antarctic. It was to turn into one of the most breathtaking survival stories of all time. It is an extraordinary story of courage and even good‐ humor among men who must have felt certain, secretly, that they were going to die. Worsley's account, first published in 1940, captures that bulldog spirit exactly: uncomplaining, tough, competent, modest and deeply loyal. It's gripping, and strangely moving. Why it's worth a read: In addition to being a cracking story, this may as well be a leadership textbook. Amongst many gems, there is a line in it that has stuck with me, and which resonates through my approach to command and leadership – Shackleton “had a mental finger on each man’s pulse”; that’s why he could both drive his people to achieve what they did and look after them like he did. Destined For War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides's Trap? – Graham Allison (2019) China and the United States are heading toward a war neither wants. The reason is Thucydides’s Trap: when a rising power threatens to displace a ruling one, violence is the likeliest result. Over the past five hundred years, these conditions have occurred sixteen times; war broke out in twelve. At the time of publication, an unstoppable China approached an immovable America, and both Xi Jinping and Donald Trump promised to make their countries “great again,” the seventeenth case was looking grim—it still is. A trade conflict, cyberattack, Korean crisis, or accident at sea could easily spark a major war. In Destined for War, eminent Harvard scholar Graham Allison masterfully blends history and current events to explain the timeless machinery of Thucydides’s Trap—and to explore the painful steps that might prevent disaster today. The why: 10/10 for relevance to the world today and our place within it. Have you got a read lined up for this summer that you'd like to review? Be sure to let us know by dropping us a line at thecentralblue@gmail.com. From all the team at The Central Blue, we'd like to wish you a safe, enjoyable, & refreshing Christmas break.

This December marks 50 years since the ‘maximum effort’ Operation Linebacker II air campaign that forced the North Vietnamese regime back to the negotiating table. But are there lessons from the operation that should be considered in the context of the Russo-Ukrainian War? Dr Peter Layton thinks so – and they’re not just tactical implications, either. Fifty years ago the American government was trying to end the country’s military involvement in Vietnam. It came not with a whimper but with a bang in the short, sharp Linebacker II air campaign (18-29 December 1972). This air campaign’s partially successful role in that particular war’s termination may offer some insights for today’s Ukraine war. America entered the war between South and North Vietnam in earnest in mid-1965, quickly stabilising but not winning the conflict. Frustrated, the North ordered a major uprising that became the 1968 Tet Offensive which saw the destruction of the Viet Cong guerrilla warfare forces in South Vietnam. After that, only the North Vietnamese army could win the war for Hanoi and so was accordingly developed. In the 1972 Easter Offensive, the North launched a major land assault that was comprehensively defeated by the South Vietnamese Army and American air power. This second failure still did not convince the North to agree to a peace settlement at the talks underway since late 1968. Moreover, the South Vietnamese were very unhappy with a peace agreement negotiated without its participation or consent; it demanded changes to ensure the country’s survival. US president Richard Nixon now decided ending the war required putting maximum pressure on North Vietnam. This included launching the large-scale, high-tempo Linebacker II bombing campaign. Linebacker II had the same basic targets as Linebacker (the successful interdiction campaign that helped defeat the 1972 Easter Offensive): logistic infrastructure, bridges, railways, storage depots, military facilities, airbases and surface to air missiles sites. The big difference was Nixon removed most political restrictions on bombing allowing air raids into Hanoi’s urban areas and demanded a maximum rate of effort; 20,000 tonnes of bombs were dropped and almost 2000 sorties flown in 10 days. This aimed to convince the North Vietnamese government it could not win by stalling the peace talks and to frighten the populace, convincing both that the war needed to be ended. It was a psychological assault as much as one for military gain. At the tactical level, there were errors made in the first few nights with the 15 B-52 bomber losses arguably higher than should have been. Nevertheless, USAF crews learned fast and loss rates quickly dropped. Combining tactics improvements with attacks on the Northern air defence system meant that by the end of the 10 days, American air power was effectively unopposed. Bombing could continue unimpeded for as long as required – a situation readily apparent on the ground. While there was much angst initially expressed, when reporters returned to Hanoi post-war the damage was much less than anticipated, confirming the bombing had been relatively accurate and restricted only to valid military targets (pp 2-30). However, the psychological impact on the people was significant as every night for almost two weeks they had to stay in bomb shelters while a major air war went on above. The North Vietnamese air defence forces fired several hundred Surface-to-Air Missiles (SAM) and hundreds of thousands of rounds of anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) fire. Politically, the Linebacker II campaign was effective in very quickly convincing the North to agree to the peace terms in Paris, allowing the US withdrawal under ‘peace with honour.’ The bombing also reassured the South Vietnamese government that if the North attacked again US air power would return and so it signed the peace accord as well. That’s the good news. But after the Americans left, the North Vietnamese rearmed and in 1975 launched another major land force assault into the South, during which American air power did not return. This attack comprehensively defeated the South Vietnamese Army and Air Force (pp. 57-82). While Linebacker II ended the American phase of the war, its impact only lasted three years. It did not bring lasting peace, but was decisive only for the short-term. Linebacker II bears some comparison with the present Russian air offensive in the Ukraine. The Russian weight of effort is much less than Linebacker II and now involves mainly long-range missile and drone attacks. Moreover, today’s SAM and AAA are much more effective, seemingly with about 75% of the attacking weapons being shot down. However, the Russians are attacking Ukraine’s centralised energy network and its national grid; a few well-placed weapons are generating systemic effects. Additionally, the attacks are timed to leverage Ukraine’s harsh winters so as to cause considerable psychological impact on both the population and the government. Furthermore, Ukraine’s allies are adamant it cannot retaliate and attack into Russia. South Vietnam was similarly hamstrung and needed the US air campaign to drive the North into negotiating an acceptable conclusion to the war. Russia has no incentive to seek peace; it can continue its missile and drone attacks as long as its weapon production rates allow, stockholdings permit and other nations such as Iran continue to sell. Today is then more like the middle of 1972 when the North Vietnamese land offensive had failed and the North Vietnamese government was stalling for time. The Russian army has been rolled back and suffered heavy losses but President Putin will not begin peace talks until the ‘West’ recognises Russia’s annexations of four Ukrainian regions. In 1972, the aggressor refused to accept the country it attacked was a sovereign state; Russia is using the same tactic today in trying to ignore Ukraine and its agency. Linebacker II was deemed a success but South Vietnam was invaded again in 1975. There is a real possibility that when Russia eventually agrees to peace, it may simply rearm for a future assault as North Vietnam did. NATO membership for Ukraine is being discussed; for an enduring peace it may be essential as a deterrent against further Russian adventures. Linebacker II revealed that air power can have a major role in war termination through shocking an adversary and reassuring an ally. Worryingly though, it also highlighted that a permanent peace can be difficult to achieve. Dr Peter Layton is a Visiting Fellow at the Griffith Asia Institute, an Associate Fellow with RUSI (London) and author of the book Grand Strategy.