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Dr Robbin Laird, Final Report, 8 Oct 2023

Dr Robbin Laird, Deterrence and Multi-Domain Strike: The Perspective of PACAF 8 Oct 2023 Link to article (Defense.info) I have had the privilege to work with military officers throughout the Western world for more than 30 years. If there is one constant, it has been their concern with the ready force. Long-range thinking is important, but you have to “fight tonight with the force you have.” Preparedness and availability of the ready force is what deterrence is built on; not the dreams of force planners and politicians. When one faces real world conflict, rather than war games, with your life on the line, how ready and sustainable the force is becomes your only priority. Not surprisingly at the 27 September 2023, Air Commodore Nick Osborne, Director General Preparedness within the RAAF, underscored how important a focus on preparedness of the current force really is for deterrence. His recent command was of the Surveillance and Response Group which is a key element for providing for the direct defence of Australia and is a group that has undergone fundamental transformation over the past few years, as it has added among other capabilities the P-8 and now will add the Triton. He noted that preparedness has been largely understood with the following formula: Platform x Training x Aim Point x Sustainability. But he argued that “We now have a different understanding of Preparedness, and what it means to us. It’s about what we do, and how well we do it, and to whom.” “For many years, preparedness was synonymous with readiness. And it was as simplistic as having an aircraft or a platform ready to go in a certain mode. It was very platform centric, and it didn’t clearly state what the target was, or what we had to do to the target.” Air Commodore Nick Osborne, Director General Preparedness within the RAAF, speaking at the Williams Foundation seminar 27 September 2023. “Now we have a whole new concept of preparedness in the last couple of years. It’s not just about having a capability or platform ready to go at a certain time. But it must be ready to go at a certain time to do something to a certain standard against an adversary of a certain skill, and to continue to do so for a certain length of time. “But a few years ago, we tended to look at preparedness as if we were playing a game of football. We didn’t really know who we were playing against, how good they were, or when the game would occur. And in fact, we weren’t even sure whether we were playing rugby, soccer, AFL or League. Now we’ve got a bit more clarity. “We’ve got a different understanding of preparedness and what it means to us. It’s not just about platforms, but it’s about what we do, how will we do it and to whom. “In a world marked by evolving geopolitical landscapes, and technological advancements, our ability to anticipate, adapt and accelerate air warfare has become the lynchpin of our national security. Air power remains the pillar of our defense strategy. Long gone are the days when a strong army alone could guarantee victory. Today, the ability to project airpower swiftly and decisively has become a cornerstone of military superiority. “And we live in an age where battle space extends beyond what we can see and is reaching into the digital realm. “To maintain our edge and safeguard our interests, we have to be prepared for the challenges that lie ahead and be equipped with cutting edge strike capabilities to counter our emerging threats. And enhanced preparedness actually refers to our ability to rapidly and effectively respond to a wide range of potential threats and contingencies that will occur in modern warfare. “It encompasses a multifaceted effect, and that approach includes readiness, technological advancements, training, strategic partnerships, and the capacity to adapt quickly. And of course, strike is one of those areas in which we have to be very proficient.” After the seminar, I had a chance to sit down with Air Commodore Osborne and correlate his presentation on preparedness with the challenges of being commander of the SRG. I have visited the SRG in the past, and it is a place where various parts of the surveillance capabilities of the Air Force and the ADF has been bundled. Over the past decade, the SRG has evolved into a more integrated capability and with the addition of the P-8 and Triton and the ISR enterprise built at the Edinburgh Air Base in South Australia is shaping new integrated data management capabilities. But takes time: You cannot simply take the force you have and plop into some future force structure design and presto bingo have a new force structure. It is about taking the force you have and having practical, doable steps forward in force transformation. That takes time, commitment, money, leadership and manpower and does not occur over night. I have written three books on three different new combat air systems for the USMC, the Osprey, the CH-53K and the F-35B, and all have together transformed the force, but to do so has requires operational experience, training and force structure redesign. The ADF has gone and is going down a similar path. The DSR will not create a new effective force unless the practical steps are taken to allow the ADF to find its way ahead in terms of real operational capabilities, missions, training and new approaches to sustainability and preparedness. Osborne gave an example of the new working relationship between the Australian Army and Air Force where they are working to shape how to more effectively shape and execute agile operations in areas such as Northern Australia. And I would add that will require new training, new ops approaches, and new effectors and some new equipment. It is about force mobility on the Australian landscape and probably using a new generation of UAVs as the platforms launched into the key defence area for Australia which Osborne indicated in a slide which he used during his presentation and which is the featured graphic at the beginning of this article. But put bluntly, 80% of the force you have now will be in your force structure in 20 years short of it being destroyed in conflict. So what is the plan to leverage the current force – which has made great progress in many areas of modernization in the past decade – and the force the writers of the DSR want?

Dr Robbin Laird, Reshaping Australian Defence Infrastructure and Leveraging Australian Territory, 7 Oct 2023 Link to article (Defense.info) Part of the re-working of Australian defence entails enhancing Australian defence infrastructure. It is about enhanced hardening, resilience and redundancy. It is as well working ways to enhance the engagement of allies with the ADF in terms of operating together from Australian territory. This clearly involves the Americans but increased involvement with other allies as well, such as the Japanese.It is about building enhanced defence in depth. At the 27 September 2023 seminar, there were two presentations which dealt with the issues of infrastructure and what I am calling the con-ops of an enhanced ability to leverage Australian defence, although I think much more consideration needs to be given to this con-ops dimension. Air Commodore Sandy Turner, Director General of Force Posture Initiatives, provided an overview brief on how Australia is working with the United States with regard to the overhaul of Australian defence infrastructure. Her main responsibility is overseeing and planning with regard to the U.S. Force Posture Initiatives in Australia. She noted that such activities are governed by the 2015 Force Posture Agreement with the United States. “The FPA gives permission for U.S. activities to be conducted in and through Australia. The agreement allows for U.S. forces and contractors to undertake construction on and improvements to these agreed areas and facilities. “When completed, the projects that are constructed and funded by the U.S. become the property of the Commonwealth of Australia, while they are approved for use by the U.S. forces until no longer required. Air Commodore Sandy Turner, Director General of Force Posture Initiatives, speaking at the 27 September 2023 Williams Foundation seminar. “Under the agreement, both nations are investing in a range of infrastructure projects, including airfield upgrades and fuel storage facilities, and accommodation and training area upgrades. The costs are shared between Australia and the U.S…” Air Commodore Turner highlighted work in the major areas covered by the agreement which can be seen in the slide below from her presentation: She underscored:”Key USFPI related elements within the DSR include further investments in our defence capabilities to deter through denial, or any attempt to project force against Australia, enhancing the ADF’s ability to operate from our northern bases, and a shift to a national defense strategy which involves a mobilization of the entire nation, including state territory and federal government agencies.” But sho posed a key question with regard to shaping an effective way ahead: “How can we find ways to include our industry partners and regional allies to meet the challenges of these growing expectations?” Air Commodore Turner noted a number of recent developments: Upgrades at Northern bases, including RAF bases Darwin and Tyndall, as well as scoping new investments at RAF bases, Curtin, and Shergar; Increased rotations of U.S. capabilities in Australia, including U.S. Navy maritime patrol and reconnaissance aircraft, and army watercraft; More frequent and longer nuclear powered submarine visits to Australia; The pre-positioning of U.S. Army stores and material following exercise Talisman Sabre, a first step towards a longer-term establishment of an enduring logistics support area in Australia. She then provided a more detailed look at current & completed USFPI Australian and U.S. funded projects which can be seen In the following slide: Air Commodore Turner concluded her talk with a cautionary note with regard to the challenge of translating investments into capabilities. “Australia is currently experiencing a record level of investment in infrastructure. Defence in industry cooperation will only grow as USFPI continues to deliver on the government’s strategic objectives. To that effect. Australia and U.S. Defence representatives routinely engage with industry interested in delivering force posture initiative construction projects. “To date, Australian businesses and joint ventures have won four from five U.S .funded contracts at a value of 198.4 U.S .million dollars. Earlier this year, the U.S .released four requests for proposal for US-funded infrastructure. “These will provide additional opportunities for Australian businesses, particularly on a subcontractor basis. “But we cannot shy away from the fact that we are still facing workforce and resource challenges to deliver on the current and future programme of work. The government has already had to approve a significant real cost increase for Tyndall upgrades due to supply chain issues, labor shortages and increased costs of doing business. The average annual growth rates in work availability outstrips industry’s confidence in being able to deliver on time and on budget. “The scale of demand for skills and resources is highly likely to exceed the normal capacity increases expected in the market over the next five years. We must continue our planning and engagement with industry and government agencies to ensure our developments are delivered as and when required.” Building an adequate defence infrastructure is part of the problem. Shaping the con-ops to leverage Australian geography is another part of the challenge. During my visit in March and April 2023, I talked with RAAF leaders about this aspect of the challenge which boils down to how to use Australian territory to disperse RAAF assets in times of crisis. In the presentation by Air Vice Marshal Stephen Chappell, Head of Military Strategic Commitments, he outlined such a con-ops. He projected a future “fictional” scenario. “Australia’s DSR investments in hardening and dispersal of our northern bases, and infrastructure along with the implementation of concepts for resilient and agile maneuver have paid dividends. The realization by defense bases within Australia were no longer sanctuaries has led to a deep understanding of vulnerabilities and increased preparedness to operate systems in contested environments. “The need was the need was identified to protect bases and critical supply lines, and when necessary, generate alternate pathways to sustain operations. This included combat support with command and control that will less vulnerable to disruption.” He goes on to provide more detail with regard to the scenario, but the point I want to underscore is a rather simple one: just building better infrastructure will not lead to effective deterrence unless it is combined with an ability to operate more effectively as a dispersed force across Australian territory. If we are talking about multi-domain strike, an effective strategy must encompass this scenario.

Dr Robbin Laird, Shaping a Way Ahead for Australian Defence: The Perspective of Malcolm Davis, 6 October 2023 Link to article (Defense.info) During my current visit to Australia in support of the 27 September 2023 seminar, I had a chance to visit with my colleague Malcolm Davis. Dr. Davis is a senior analyst at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute in Canberra and has focused a good deal of attention in the recent past on the importance for and the need to develop Australian sovereign space capabilities as part of the way ahead for Australian defence policy. There has been significant concern within defence circles in Australia about the government releasing a hard-hitting defence review which called for enhanced defence capability relevant to dealing with the challenges in the Pacific and then the failure to increase defence spending. We started there in our conversation. Davis made it clear that we are in a very difficult period of history in which Australia needs to enhance its capabilities both to protect its sovereign interests and to work with allies in the region. According to Davis: “The DSR talks about the strategic outlook as being much more adverse and uncertain, but then does nothing really to address that threat into it within a reasonable timeframe. “We seem to still be locked in the sort of paradigm and mindset that we have embraced really since the 1980s. We have a slow, steady capability acquisition process that takes 10 or 20 years to deliver new capabilities. “This is simply not relevant to the threat environment in which we now exist.” He warned: “We haven’t got ourselves into a mindset that would be more suitable for what might be called a pre-war period. It’s not just about capabilities in terms of hardware; it’s also about sustainment, mobilization, and readiness. “All of these capabilities are a national level challenge, not simply for the ADF to deal with. Issues such as onshore oil refineries to produce fuel for vehicles, or ships or aircraft or the hardening of key critical infrastructure against kinetic and non-kinetic attack are significant tasks which need to be addressed. “Strategic risks for Australia are growing not simply because of the actions of Beijing and Moscow, but because of the inability of Western capitals and Western leadership’s to respond to these challenges as well.” We discussed the importance of leveraging new industrial technologies associated with the 4th industrial revolution to rebuild the Australian manufacturing sector and to do so as part of a larger allied effort to shape a 21st century arsenal of democracy. We have seen a very robust arsenal of authoritarianism in operation in Ukraine which has challenged the West to rethink its manufacturing capabilities, many of which have been outsourced to China. Dr. Davis underscored the need to build for the kind of strategic resilience which Australia will need in the event of protracted conflict. The wars of choice so called were fought far from Australian shores and the West collectively built a support structure uncontested by a major power. That simply is not the case when facing major authoritarian powers. The point is rather simple: the DSR has not lead to any evident actions by the government to address resilience. Davis expressed concern that the delay in actions on shipbuilding which are being pushed to next year by the government are being done largely for budgetary reasons. The government may be waiting until they have a better sense of the economic situation next year and its impact on the budget before making any further defence procurement decisions. Dr. Davis has done a lot of work on the way ahead to shape an Australian national space capability and its importance for Australian sovereignty. He has been an advocate for the importance of having sovereign launch capability. But he sees the current government retracting from the past government’s efforts to build a national space policy, and such capabilities are crucial for the kind of sovereign capabilities which the DSR underscores as well. The discussion with Dr. Davis reminds me of a note which an Australian colleague sent me during my time here. He wrote: “I think there’s a strong case to discuss preparedness more than capabilities now.”

Dr Robbin Laird, Deterrence and Multi-Domain Strike: The Perspective of PACAF 6 Oct 2023 Link to article (Defense.info) What is the relationship among multi-domain strike capabilities, warfighting and deterrence? Multi-domain strike capabilities can only be done with foundational capabilities which enhance one’s viability in warfighting, and by being able to do so to enhance the adversary perceptions of their risk calculus. They need to believe that continuing a conflict is not worth the effort because they can not easily defeat you or intimidate you into capitulating to their demands. But I would argue that strategically enabled multi-domain strike also requires political-military leadership which understands how to engage in war termination. And I would argue being able to do effective war termination rests on the adversary’s understanding of the robustness of our ability to continue a campaign. And this rests as well on a viable distributed force structure whose continued ability to punish an adversary suggests that war termination is in their interest as well as ours. The presentations of General Wilsbach at the March and September Williams Foundation seminars provide several insights which suggest the relationships among multi-domain strike, war fighting and deterrence. From General Wilsbach’s video presentation to the 27 September 2023 Williams Foundation Seminar. At the March seminar, the General argued the following: “The message of cost imposition is simple on its surface but has layers to consider. First and foremost, we all understand that no one wins if a conflict with China breaks out in the Indo-Pacific. That would be the worst-case scenario for every nation that calls the region home and is the last thing any of us want. “So if an aggressor chooses to cross that line, they are already willing to bear considerable cost. That’s why the deterrence must be credible and convincing. You cannot leave room for doubt that the cost could be tolerable. “To do that, you need to know who should receive that message. In authoritarian regimes, it must reach the few people at the top who hold all the decision- making authority. They may never bear the cost personally, but their power relies on the fear and submission of those who will…. “Denial, cost, resilience. Ideally, our deterrence actions should convey all three messages simultaneously. If I were an adversary planner, seeing capable forces across multiple, like- minded nations committed to action, able to deny my goals at overwhelming cost to me, and resilient enough to weather any of my attacks, that would keep me up at night. Integrated deterrence requires integration, readiness, and willingness, but it also needs one more thing—belief.” In the September seminar, Wilsbach focused then on how multi-domain strike empowered deterrent capabilities. He underscored in his video presentation the following: “There are many reasons to lean into multi domain operations, but I want to focus on one in particular, multi domain operations allow us to overwhelm and trip the adversary. Historically, warfare carries certain constants. “One of the most important of these is gaining and maintaining the initiative. A combatant seizes the initiative, not through advanced technologies or superior training, but because they hit the adversary hard enough to knock them off balance, then hit them repeatedly to maintain an enduring advantage. pressure generated by synchronizing operations in time and space creates the opportunities where technology and training can make a difference.” To be able to do multi-domain operations requires a warfighting ecosystem which reflects and embodies effective warfighting and deterrent capabilities, of the sort no adversary could miss. Of course, the failure to build such an ecosystem will mean that multi-domain strike will not be feasible or viable. The adversary understands this and targets force integration across a distributed battlespace, and works to enhance antagonisms among allies in a way to undercut the kind of integration which is both possible and necessary. Wilsbach emphasized three key elements of the warfighting ecosystem which enables multi-domain strike and deterrence. “The three angles of attack I’ve covered today, optimizing internal Air Force capabilities, joint integration, and allied and partner integration are areas we need to push. If we want to execute multi domain operations. “All three will fail, however, if we don’t leverage our decisive angle, our airmen and aviators, our people are the best in the world, something our competitors recognize as they tried to copy our methods and attempt to hire our former members to train their forces….” He concluded with a fundamental warning regarding the importance of shaping multi-domain strike capabilities throughout an integrated joint and coalition force as a core enabler of warfighting and deterrence. “As I conclude allow me to make one more pass to stress the importance of multi-domain strike, Seizing and maintaining the initiative remains a key tenant of success in conflict. And you can only do that by hitting your adversary from every angle. The modern battlefield has one overarching rule–overwhelm or be overwhelmed.”

Dr Robbin Laird, ISR, Counter-ISR, C2 and Multi-Domain Strike, 6 October 2023 Link to article (Defense.info) The featured photo is a slide from Jovanovich’s presentation at the 27 September 2023 Williams Foundation Seminar. One can conceive of multi-domain strike over an extended operational area by building on a virtual revolution in the relationships among ISR, counter-ISR and C2. The dynamics of change involving ISR, Counter-ISR and C2 is obviously a major subject on its own but it is a central one to understand how a distributed force will generate multi-domain strike in areas of tactical and strategic interest. The intersection of these subjects has been one which the Williams Foundation has addressed in some of the presentations in past seminars. For example, then AIRCDRE Phillips who is now Air Marshal Phillips, Chief of Guided Weapons and Explosive Ordnance, noted in a 2019 Williams Foundation Seminar: “Earlier we built a dedicated single network connection for a specific task, such as providing targeting information to the platforms involved in a specific operation…With the new technologies and capabilities, we are now reusing networks for multiple purposes and making sure that they can adapt to the changing con-ops as well.” “We are seeing integration of the networks and the integration of the information management services and then the dual nature of the applications on top of those integrations. Rather than building a single purpose intel common operating picture, we are now capable of building an integrated intelligence and battlespace management common operating picture for the use of the combat forces engaged in operations.” In other words, “we are building an adaptable network of networks. In traditional networks, when data is brought in from a dedicated system, it needs to be repurposed for other tasks as needed.” Put in other terms, the “networked” force was built around platforms that would use networked information to create desired and often scripted events. But the C2 and ISR revolution we are now facing is reversing the logic of platforms to infrastructure; it is now about how flexible C2 and ISR interactive systems can inform the force elements to shape interactive combat operations on the fly. That is, the new capabilities are enabling tactical decision making at the edge and posing real challenges to traditional understandings of how information interacts with decision making. It is about learning how to fight effectively at the speed of light in order to achieve combat dominance. And these new capabilities are providing a real impact on force development, concepts of operations and force training as well. At the 27 September 2023 seminar, the enablement of the force to cross-operate, to do third-party targeting (which is a hallmark of fifth generation aircraft by the way) and to be able to use ISR to deceive the enemy as well as to guide operation actions to deliver meaningful strike for the desired “proportional effect” was the assumption underlying the notion of expanding the way ahead for multi-domain strike. Or put in other words, the dynamics of change involving ISR, Counter-ISR and C2 are part of the multi-domain strike enterprise. With the sensor revolution, not only are sensors much smaller but they proliferate through the operational force. If one operates a dedicated ISR platform, the range of tasks which that platform can do now compare to the past is truly amazing. The case of the Triton is a case in point of what it can see, what it can sense, what it can communicate and what it can target. And sensors can operate from a variety of platforms as integral elements of dedicated modular payloads, as we are seeing on the new maritime autonomous systems. But it it not only seeing the battlespace writ large, it is the ability of the tactical combat force or cluster to have at its service incredible ISR assets given the dynamics of change associated with sensor sets. And associated with this is the ability of decentralized C2 to operate a force with mission command which by being distributed enhances its survivability but can reach out to other platforms and work with such platforms to deliver the multi-domain strike which the seminar has focused upon. But not discussed at the seminar is the other aspect of the ISR revolution, what might be called counter ISR. In an interview I did earlier this year with a senior commander in the Pacific, he underscored the importance of counter-ISR in providing operational deception giving the force greater ability not only to survive but to find the choke points where multi-domain strike could have its most decisive impact. The mix of C2, ISR and counter-ISR was described by this senior commander as follows: “The higher headquarters may have access to better information and when it does it needs to have the ability to reach out to the tactical level to tell them to do or not do something associated with the larger political and strategic picture.” He felt that they were making significant progress in commanding a distributed force, which is a core element of shaping a force capable of deterrence in the Pacific. “We are capable of commanding from various locations and can be able to see and understand how to command in the battlespace dozens of ships, hundreds of aircraft, thousands of personnel. We are capable of seeing, understanding, and deciding what is going on in the battlespace, and tracking the enemy force using exquisite means way beyond a grease pencil and a radio call. We can and do so through links and sensor from the sea floor to the heavens.” Holding all this together is not only assured command and control but the tissue of ISR systems enabling distributed fleet operations and adding the key element of deception through various counter-ISR systems as well. In effect, fleet distribution built on a kill web effects infrastructure is being combined with what me be called a wake-a-mole operational capability. You can’t target me, if you can’t find me. The force is being distributed for survivability, but the joint force has focused considerably attention on a core capability which many cubical commandos have ignored – namely the ability of the force to become very difficult to target when on distributed operations. In my discussion with this commander, he indicated that one of highest priorities for ongoing development and funding is what he calls “counter-ISR” capabilities. As he put it: “That is why counter-ISR is the number one priority for me, to deny the adversary with to high confidence in his targeting capabilities. I need to deceive them and to make a needle look like a needle in a haystack of needles. It is important to have the capability to look like a black hole in the middle of nothing.” This particular interview put together the relationships among C2, ISR and counter ISR for a distributed maritime force quite succinctly. And at the seminar, a number of the presentations provided insights with regard to the dynamics of change in the ISR and C2 areas. Jake Campbell, Northrop Grumman Australia, at the last seminar discussed the importance of having layered ISR to allow for both the strategic and technical operational visibility necessary to make rapid, timely and effective decision making, notably for a distributed force but which would allow for strategic C2 as well. In his presentation to the 27 September seminar, he highlighted the challenges of providing the kind of ISR which is needed in a contested environment for net-enabled weapons. Actually, Jake was the only speaker who use this term but the multi-domain strike being discussed was built around net-enabled weapons or put in other terms third party targeting where a weapon launched for land, sea, or air could then be targeted from somewhere else. And that clearly is only going to work if you have accurate targeting information that comes from your ISR capabilities and a correct decision made by the shooter. He argued: “Within the ADF we really need to get our minds around the problem of doing such targeting in a degraded environment.” He noted: “The ability to generate a 24/7 target quality information, perhaps over some weeks, so that operational commanders have flexibility to generate a strike at the time and place of choosing is going to be challenging, but it’s the demand. And as you’re getting closer to those strikes, you have to have the ability to maintain what I call a chain of custody.” “You’re going to need to have eyes on that target with high fidelity target quality information and have the ability to communicate that to the weapons when they are fired.” Jake Campbell presents at the 27 September 2023 Williams Foundation Seminar. Triton is a key capability which Northrop Grumman is working with the RAAF for the ADF ISR and T capabilities. Campbell noted Triton has can provide data outside of the adversaries weapons engagement zone but also provide a range of data which will allow the ADF to make more effective targeting decisions with the reach and range of Triton’s onboard sensors. This reminded me of a comment made to me when visiting Jax Navy a few years ago. I asked a Triton operate: “What happens when your system is targeted?” His answer was direct: “Well I can see weapons at a distance few can match. I have a jet engine so I move and maneuver.” Campbell noted that the U.S. Navy and its use of the the Minotaur fusion engine is of significance in how the U.S .Navy is integrating ISR information across the force.He raised this in the context of discussing the involvement of the Triton surrogate in a Northern Edge exercise. “We operated the Triton surrogate, which is it’s a test platform that we put all the Triton sensors on, in the Northern Edge exercise, in a maritime strike scenario, where the goal was to generate a 24/7 maritime Common Operating Picture to be able to provide target quality information for the commander and then generate strike options against representative threats but to do so outside of the adversary’s weapons engagement zones of significance. “In contrast to other platforms, Triton sensors are actually able to operate and function well outside of the adversary’s weapon engagement zones right now and we are working on an ongoing basis to evolve this capability. And the height and perspective of Triton is an important factor in being able to so. “But the other thing that came out of the exercise was the importance of data fusion. There’s a system that was used in this exercise called Minotaur. Minotaur is a data fusion system that allows multiple aircraft and ships to share the network information. “It is a data fusion engine by which users can access information from whatever terminal they are on as long as you’re on the Minotaur Web. Triton and P-8s have Minotaur on them as part of their capability. And the U.S. Navy is headed full steam down the Minotaur pathway. It’s important for the ADF to get their head around what Minotaur brings to the fight and how we plug into it.” In an interview I did a few years ago, I discussed Minotaur with the then head of the US Navy’s Maritime Patrol Reconnaissance Enterprise. According to Rear Admiral Garvin who was the head of the enterprise at the time: “The Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance aviator of the future will be well versed in the synergy inherent in both manned and unmanned platforms.” “The unblinking stare of a Triton enhances the Fleet Commander’s MDA and understanding of an adversary’s pattern-of-life by observing their movements in the optical and electromagnetic spectrum.” Slide from Campbell’s presentation at the 27 September 2023 Williams Foundation Seminar. “Moreover, Triton serves as a force multiplier and enabler for the P-8. Early in Triton program development, we embraced manned and unmanned teaming and saw it as a way to expand our reach and effectiveness in the maritime domain.” “One key software capability which empowers integration is Minotaur.” “The Minotaur Track Management and Mission Management system was developed in conjunction with the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory. Minotaur was designed to integrate sensors and data into a comprehensive picture which allows multiple aircraft and vessels to share networked information.” “It is basically a data fusion engine and like many software capabilities these days, doesn’t physically have to be present on a platform to be of use.” “These capabilities ride on a Minotaur web where, if you are on the right network, you can access data from whatever terminal you happen to be on.” (See chapter six “an ISR-empowered force” in my co-authored book entitled: A Maritime Kill Web Force in the Making: Deterrence and Warfighting in the XXIst Century.) The Navy experience working with ISR was also significant to the perspectives of WGCDR Marija Jovanovich. In particular, she talked about her work with Pete “Two Times” Salvaggio, Naval Aviation Warfighting Development Center (NAWDC), Maritime ISR (MISR) Weapons School, Department Head (DH), MISR & EP-3E Weapons and Tactics Instructor (WTI) at Resolute Hunter. The WGCDR made it very clear that the work of “Two Times” and of the Navy led Resolute Hunter expressed her core emphasis on the expanded role for ISR in shaping any multi-domain strike enterprise. And in this context, she is one of the few people discussing the subject which highlighted the new innovative role in the Navy of what they call MISR officers. WGCDR Marija Jovanovich presenting at the 27 September 2023 Williams Foundation seminar. In an interview I did with “Two Times” in 2020 (and later that year I went to Resolute Hunter), he explained what they were all about and what the WGCDR was advocating. “Kill chain is to find, fix, track, target, engage and assess. For the US Navy, the weight of effort has been upon target and engage. As “Two Times” puts it “But if you cannot find, fix or track something, you never get to target.” “There is another challenge as well: in a crisis, knowing what to hit and what to avoid is crucial to crisis management. This clearly requires the kind of ISR management skills to inform the appropriate decision makers as well. “The ISR piece is particularly challenging as one operates across a multi-domain battlespace to be able to identify the best ISR information, even it is not contained within the ISR assets within your organic task force. And the training side of this is very challenging. Slide from Jovanovich’s presentation at the 27 September 2023 Williams Foundation Seminar. “That challenge might be put this way: How does one build the skills in the Navy to do what you want to do with regard to managed ISR data and deliver it in the correct but timely manner and how to get the command level to understand the absolute centrality of having such skill sets? “Two Times” identified a number of key parameters of change with the coming of MISR. “We are finally breaking the old mindset; it is only now that the department heads at NAWDC are embracing the new role for ISR in the fight.” “We are a unique organization at NAWDC for we do not own a platform. And the MISR school has both officers and enlisted in the team. We are not all aviators; we have intel specialists, we have cryptographers, pilots, crewmen etc. “Aviators follow a more rapid pace of actions; non-aviators do not have the same pace of working rapidly within chaos. Our goal at MISR is to be comfortable to work in chaos.” “Another part of the shift is to get recognition that ISR does not SUPPORT the force; it is essential element of the combat capability for the force to be able to operate effectively. It is inherent to the force; not external to it. “The kill web approach is about breaking the practice of correlating specific sensors with specific weapons; it is about shaping a much broader understanding of how to work sensor networks to deliver the outcome one is seeking. “Two Times” argued that the training within NAWDC to train MISR officers is not bad, but the big challenge is to work to break down habitual operational patterns of senior commanders, who really are not focused on how the ISR revolution is changing warfighting.” (See chapter six “an ISR-empowered force” in my co-authored book entitled: A Maritime Kill Web Force in the Making: Deterrence and Warfighting in the XXIst Century.) The C2 piece of all of this was discussed by Carl Rhodes in his presentation. He most recently was the director of RAND Australia and now director and founder of a consulting firm based in Australia, Robust Policy. In his presentation, he discussed the evolving C2 approaches which underlie multi-domain strike and which enable distributed operations but within a mission command context. He discussed the various new approaches to C2 underlying distributed operations. Two in particular stand out. The first is a kill web approach in which there are multiple ways to move information and to complete a weapons engagement. The second is the DARPA version of this which they call mosaic warfare. He argued that this approach was very adaptable and was based on an ability to have resource interchangeability including during execution of the strike. He argued that new C2 concepts require new systems and new doctrinal thinking. But I would argue that is clearly underway and has been achieved in some areas. But another part of his presentation leads nicely to the final presentation I will discuss here. Rhodes provided an interesting discussion of the Ukrainian experience in ISR and C2 and then considered its relevance to the Pacific theater of operations. But on his way to his conclusion on this subject he highlighted the question of how a space-based system, namely, Starlink has played a key role in typing together Ukrainian military efforts. Carl Rhodes presenting at the 27 September 2023 Williams Foundation seminar. He noted that: Starlink facts Over 4,500 satellites in orbit, more than 50% of all active satellites Eventual plans for 42,000 satellites Laser crosslink service is rolling out Ukraine employment C2 of aerial and maritime unmanned system Tactical communications Coordination of artillery fires Moving information around the battlefield He then underscored the advantages of LEO constellation over GEOs has been clearly demonstrated in a number of ways in the conflict: Lower latency Better anti-jam capability Less vulnerable to kinetic attack: it is a distributed system that degrades gracefully. Nick Miller, Optus Satellite and Space division, dealt with the space aspect of ISR and C2 and certainly reinforced both Campbell’s and Rhodes’s presentations. Here Miller talked about how Optus was shaping a way ahead to work with LEO operators to provide both the increased ISR layering Campbell talked about and the C2 for distributed operations that Rhodes talked about. The focus of his presentation was on “how LEO operations benefit government and defense organizations, and how we plan to integrate LEO and GEO capabilities into our own network for the future.” LEO constellations or networks have significant advantages for the creation of the layered ISR and C2 capabilities mentioned earlier by Campbell. As Miller noted: “Due to their proximity to Earth data transmission, time for latency are significantly reduced, allowing enhanced real time communication and decision- making.” The basic approach taken by Optus is to interweave their GEO satellites with other providers LEO constellations. Miller argued: “The advantage we have as Australia’s longest standing satellite operator is our agnostic ability to actually access and assess each of these technologies and its capabilities to determine the best fit for purpose for enterprise fit for government, and in some cases fit for defense. We see the advantages and disadvantages of each and how they best fold into a GEO network to provide interoperable coverage.” Nick Miller, Optus Satellite and Space Division, presenting at the Williams Foundation seminar 27 September 2023. He added: “The integration of these networks can also offer redundancy and resilience in the face of disruptions or fast changing environments. For instance, if you have a satellite network that becomes compromised, or faces issues such as jamming, the other satellite network can pick up the data to minimize downtime. “This type of redundancy allows for better support in longer term capability planning, or fast paced decision making when it’s required. When LEO and GEO satellite networks are integrated, critical data can also be efficiently routed between the two systems based on the specific requirements of the mission. High Priority data can take advantage of the low latency LEO connections while less sensitive time sensitive data can be relayed via GEO satellites.” Slide from Nick Miller’s presentation at the 27 September 2023 Williams Foundation Seminar. In short, the dynamics of ISR and C2 are shaping the foundation for the multi-domain strike enterprise. They are part of a kill web not just to be fitted into a legacy kill chain approach.

Dr Robbin Laird, The Multi-Domain Strike Enterprise: Building and Providing the Weapons, 6 October 2023 Link to article (Defense.info) Featured Graphic is from Ian Langford’s presentation. It will do little if one crafts the force for effective strike and does not work to ensure that the enterprise does not go Winchester much more rapidly than the duration of conflict. This is a major problem and at the first Williams Foundation seminar of 2023, the challenges of building a 21st century arsenal of democracy were discussed at length. The simple fact is that the United States and all of its allies have NOT built magazine depth. Each has had almost just in time delivery of weapons systems with very very limited supply. This is true for both precision and non-precision weapons. And then there is the key problem of having weapons mixes which allow the force to be able to operate throughout a prolonged operation. And almost assuredly this will not happen with the weapons production paradigm of the past twenty years. In a 2020 visit to Fallon at NAWDC, I discussed this problem ironically with the Navy Captain who is the acknowledged expert on TLAMS, the very weapon prioritized by the DSR. He warned against over reliance on such weapons alone. “A key point really would revolve around the weapons enterprise itself and how the fleet will be empowered by new ways to build out weapons arsenals and provide for adequate stockpiles for the force. That was the subject of conversation with Captain Edward Hill, the oldest Captain in the USN at sixty years of age. Because he goes back to the Cold War operating Navy, he can bring forward that experience to the return to the contested environment challenges facing the weapons enterprise. “Clearly, building adequate stockpiles of weapons is crucial. But also important is working a new weapons mix to ensure that one is not forced by necessity to rely on the most expensive weapons, and the ones that will almost always have a stockpiling issue, but to have a much more cost-effective weapons set of options. “As Captain Hill put it: “We need to get beyond golden bee-bee solution. We need to have a weapons barge come with the battle group that has an affordable weapons mix. We need $50,000 weapons; not just million-dollar weapons. We should have weapons to overwhelm an adversary with Joe’s garage weapons and not having to use the golden bee-bees as the only option.”[1] So simply buying TLAMS from the United States is not an answer to how the ADF will have adequate stockpiles of weapons in a crisis and in prolonged conflict. It is an input to a re-think but not a substitute for a rethink. If we are to have really an arsenal of democracy, we need to move beyond single production line production models. The United States needs to get on with sharing a production line for TLAMS in Australia. This is not just for Australia but the United States and various Pacific allies. It is about redundancy; it is about security of supply; and it is getting on with the key barrier the United States continues to have which is its bureaucratic interpretation of security requirements. And the Australian contribution could be significant to the collective allied rethink and redesign of a weapons enterprise. Namely, we need a new approach to building weapons and to do so in terms of something like standardization on the 155mm-artillery shell. I talked with a senior USAF officer earlier this year about this challenge and the opportunity to rebuild a weapons enterprise around standardization and multi-national production lines. This is what he had to say: “I want an 80% solution that is built about around two important criteria– the weapon or the cost per round, so I can buy a ton of them by the 1000s. And I can make them very easily. And I can keep up with wartime usage. So I don’t have the problems like we have in Ukraine, where I’ve expended all of them.” Australia is clearly focused on addressing these problems but it is early days. In the presentation by Ian Langford, formerly a senior Australian Army officer, and now with Lockheed Martin, he provided a slide which the way ahead for Australia in this area: How multi-domain strike fits into an evolving Australian deterrence strategy was provided by BRIG Langford at the March 2022 Williams Foundation Seminar. “Certainly, the ADF as a force for a medium power faces the challenge of deterrence of larger powers in the region. Here he noted:” To quote a former prime minister of Singapore, “How does a small fish in a pond of big fish become a poison shrimp?” How do we provide the kind of deterrence functions in a period where we are always at risk of being out escalated and how do you provide those shaping, or pre conflict, or competition effects? and are credible?” “BRIG Langford underscored the importance of decision superiority in shaping favorable outcomes. “It is about being able to generate relative tempo and superiority at certain points in the conflict that enable victory going forward.” And one could add – making sure that the ADF force elements are able to deliver such strikes with the right weapons, in the right numbers and the right places. AVM Gerry van Leeuwen, Head of the Guided Weapons and Explosive Ordinance, provided the overview on the projected way ahead for the ADF in the weapons area. His group is within Capability Acquisition and Sustainment Group within the Department. In his role, he is primarily responsible for the acquisition, sustainment, and disposal of all guided weapons and explosive ordinance for Defence and the delivery of associated joint force (effector) capability outcomes. Ian Langford, presenting at the Williams Foundation Seminar 27 September 2023. The AVM started by noting that the strategic direction of the effort is to shape a joint acquisition approach to the weapons area. And with the appointment of a three-star overseeing the effort, Air Marshal Phillips, structural change with the Department is under way to achieve this objective. He noted that the services will continue to sponsor weapons acquisition projects but the overall types and quantities acquired will be shaped by the new joint approach. In particular, he underscored, that the DSR highlighted the “need for long range strike, increased war, stock or inventory and the development of domestic manufacturing capabilities.” With regard to long-range strike, “we need to attack targets at greater range and hold our adversaries at risk at increased distance.” An example of the focus is upon the Army. “Our army has been challenged to reach beyond a notional 50-to-100-kilometer range and to beyond 500 kilometers in time and then out beyond 1000 kilometers.” AVM van Leeuwen underscored that the Ukraine war demonstrated the need to be able to enhance war stocks. He also noted the need to diversify sources of production in supply in this intriguing comment: “To use an analogy, it looks like everyone’s in the same buffet line. AVM Gerry van Leeuwen, Head of the Guided Weapons and Explosive Ordinance, presenting at the Williams Foundation seminar on 27 September 2023. And if you’re the back of the queue, you better not be too hungry. We’re currently working with the U.S. on creative ways to accelerate FMS orders, and especially with regard to long range strike weapons. “And not surprisingly, those weapons are the same weapons in high demand by the U.S., given our common interest in the Indo-PAC region. But our relationship is strong and collegiate. The U.S. seems willing to work with us in that regard, but I would caution that if they sell advanced weapons to Australia, we sure as hell better be prepared to use them.” This in turn leads the challenge of logistics and sustainment. “Increased inventory brings with it logistical challenges like storage and distribution, maintenance, repair and overhaul, given the shelf life associated with limitations associated with energetics and environmental degradation.” AVM van Leeuwen then turned to the knotty challenge of Australian domestic weapons production. He noted that Australia is not starting from scratch. “We already manufacture a range of munitions from small arms to aerial bombs, and we do have manufacturing capabilities already in place.” But with regard to building on these capabilities and expanding domestic production capabilities, they are adopting a “crawl, walk, run approach.” “Our decision to build a domestic manufacturing capability is in part in order to build enhanced regional resilience in supply chains, especially when supply lines across the Pacific are degraded or denied in a time of conflict. But in the longer term, we will build a stronger sovereign industrial base here in Australia on an assumption that we’re working to a readiness window of 2026 or 2027.” He added: “We need to look at production rates beyond our domestic consumption and offer access back into the global supply chain that will involve certification, quality and security requirements. The industry needs to be prepared and be ready.” He mentioned three areas where the focus will be in the short to midterm: On the Standard Missile families; on the Kongsberg Naval Strike Missile; and with regard to 155mm artillery shells.[2] He then focused on the comprehensive nature of the challenge Australia faces in the weapons area: “As a DSR priority, we have been allocated an additional $1.5 billion over the forward estimates to make a total provision of $2.5 billion for domestic manufacturing war stock. Perhaps it’s the risk is not so much about the amount allocated but our ability to spend it and realize the ambitious plan over the next five years. “Another challenge we face is workforce. The job market is heavily contested and people with the right qualifications for certain jobs are increasingly hard to find. Attracting the required workforce to realize the ambition of domestic manufacture will be a significant challenge and represents significant risk to our overall success. People have choices and the cost of living is weighing heavily on the minds of Australians.” “The selection of sites where domestic manufacture will factor into things like population demographics and logistics, for example, transport lines and distribution hubs.” [1] Robbin F. Laird, Robbin, Training for the High-End Fight: The Strategic Shift of the 2020s (pp. 82-83), Kindle Edition.) [2] https://www.navy.mil/Resources/Fact-Files/Display-FactFiles/Article/2169011/standard-missile/; https://www.kongsberg.com/kda/what-we-do/defence-and-security/missile-systems/nsm-naval-strike-missile-nsm/; https://www.australiandefence.com.au/defence/general/first-exports-roll-out-of-rheinmetall-nioa-munitions-factory; https://www.aumanufacturing.com.au/thales-to-make-155mm-artillery-shells-at-benalla.

Dr Robbin Laird, What has Happened Since the DSR has been Published: The Perspective of Marcus Hellyer, 5 October 2023 Link to article (Defense.info) During my current visit to Australia to support the Williams Foundation Seminar held on 27 September 2023, I had a chance to talk with the well-known Australian strategist, Marcus Hellyer. Formerly of ASPI, he is now is head of research at Strategic Analysis, Australia. I asked Marcus a simple question as the basis of our conversation: What has been the progress and developments since the DSR was released earlier this year? Hellyer argued that the DSR was presented as a sharp break from the past but he sees it as in many ways a throwback to the famous Paul Dibb strategic defence review in the 1980s. Namely, it has updated the concept of the defence of Australian territory to “the latest industry standard. Instead of defending Australian territory with a 100 km range missile, we are now focused on procuring missiles of a 1000 km range. But the operating concept remains focused on controlling our air and sea approaches, although there is no consensus on what this means.” He went on to note that the decision to continue the effort to procure nuclear submarines did raise a fundamental issue: “Are we meeting the threat in the South China Sea or in areas closer to Australia? Are we focused on China’s first island chain or our own?” The problem for the ADF is posed by having a new DSR but not accompanied by a budget to pay for a force design reset. It is supposed to be paid for by the cannibalization of the current force structure and restructuring the inherited approach to joint force design, a process of force transformation already underway which we have documented in detail in Williams Foundation Seminars since 2014. The government did not establish a separate fund to pay for the costly transition from conventional to a nuclear submarine enterprise. The funding issue correlated with force re-design is crucial. As Hellyer noted: “The Department of Defense’s acquisition plan is completely broken. We knew going into the DSR that it was massively over programmed. There wasn’t enough money to acquire all the things in the plan, particularly after nuclear submarines were injected into it with no additional funding. “The DSR itself injected more things into that investment plan. And so there simply isn’t enough money. But the bottom line is you’re trying to stuff more things in there with no more money. It just doesn’t work. And so that’s why a lot of acquisition decisions are simply on hold, because at the moment, the department doesn’t have a viable acquisition program.” This has led to significant uncertainty within the ADF, local defense industry and the Australian public about the winners and losers in shaping the new force structure outlined in the DSR, and outlined is the right word, for there is much uncertainty surrounding what is the strategic direction really of the force design for deterrence by denial and impactful projection and the relationship between this effort and the extant force. Hellyer already sees signs of cancelling programs to provide for money for a new way ahead, but the problem is cancellation is not correlated with ensuring the cancelled capability is replaced. An example is cancelling the only Royal Australian Navy UAV with no replacement in sight. Hellyer noted that this will have a capability impact by limiting the utility of the Royal Australian Navy’s new Arafura-class Offshore Patrol Vessels. He noted, “We’ve both written about the OPV and one obvious path is to leverage this program and to adapt it to the new warfighting approaches highlighted in the DSR. It is not terribly difficult to make these motherships for automated systems or to up gun the ship. “This is clearly the kind of approach which will be critical in shaping an operational force that is more capable in the 2020s rather than one that is being designed and planned for in 2030, 2035, 2040 or beyond. But the cancellation of the Navy UAV means the OPV won’t achieve its potential.” That said, there have been some important announcement since the DSR, such as the acquisition of a new, larger fleet of C-130J airlifters that will play an important role in archipelagic operations. Other key decisions have been deferred such as the location of an east coast SSN base. Hellyer noted that all analysis indicates an east coast base with access to Australia’s population centres will be vital to supporting a larger submarine force. But the government has put that decision off into the future as well. Because of the issue of un-affordability of new capabilities, it’s inevitable that the ADF will need to make the most of what they already have. SLD’s rule of thumb is that 80% of the force you will have in 20 years you already have—a metric that Hellyer agrees with. So how do you leverage what you have in reshaping the force to get what is envisaged by the new force design? Dr. Hellyer then focused on the key question of capability transitions: how to manage them and how to pay for them. Getting them right is essential to maintaining and increasing ADF capability without creating key operational gaps. Within recent ADF history there are some examples of transition management. The most successful one which he cited was the transition from third and fourth to fifth generation aircraft. Hellyer argues that the key piece in that transition that mitigated the risks of an ageing Hornet fleet and delayed development and delivery of the F-35A was the prescient acquisition of the Super Hornets. In contrast, there is a current example of an unsuccessful capability transition in the Australian Army’s utility helicopters. The decision has been made to replace the MRH-90s with Blackhawks, potentially allowing an orderly capability transition. But the government has decided simply to ground the MRH-90 fleet in the wake of a catastrophic fatal accident. Since there are currently only a handful of Blackhawks in country, the Australian Army will have no capability. Full stop. As the government faces the transition for conventional to nuclear submarines, how will they ensure that Australia will continue to have operational submarines in the transition? Is this following the Super Hornet transition model or that of the Army utility helicopter? In short, the DSR has introduced disruptive change. But without the money necessary to enable transition to a new force structure design. And at a time when the DSR and the government that produced it have clearly indicated that the strategic situation is worsening much more rapidly than our capabilities to deal with that environment. Featured Photo: The MRH-90 Taipan helicopters will be withdrawn from service in December 2024. Photo: Lance Corporal Riley Blennerhassett Taipans Withdrawn from Service Published 29 September 2023 by the Australian Department of Defence. The Australian Defence Force’s MRH-90 Taipan helicopters will not return to flying operations before their planned withdrawal date of December 2024. Defence Minister Richard Marles said the Government was focused on the introduction into service of the new fleet of UH‑60M Black Hawks. The first three Black Hawks have arrived in Australia and commenced flying in September, with remaining Black Hawks continuing to be delivered. Mr Marles said the MRH-90 had been an important capability for the ADF. “I recognise the hard work of the hundreds of people who dedicated themselves to acquiring, operating and sustaining the aircraft,” he said. “The first of the 40 Black Hawks that will replace the MRH-90 have arrived and are already flying in Australia. We are focused on seeing their introduction to service as quickly as possible. “The Government’s highest priority is the safety and wellbeing of our people. “We continue to support the families of the four soldiers who lost their lives earlier this year, and the broader Defence community.” The ADF will continue to operate its CH-47F Chinooks, Tigers and MH‑60R Seahawks to provide a ready aviation capability. From 2025, the new AH-64E Apache helicopters will also be introduced into service for the Army. Mr Marles said to help mitigate further impacts on Army’s operations and training, the Government was exploring options to accelerate the delivery of the Black Hawks and aircrew training. He said today’s announcement did not suggest the outcome of the investigations into the tragic incident on July 28, when an MRH-90 Taipan crashed near Lindeman Island, Queensland, during Exercise Talisman Sabre, killing the four aircrew on board. Mr Marles said the Government made clear at the time Defence would not fly the platform until investigations into the incident were complete.

Dr Robbin Laird, Deterrence by Denial, Impactful Projection, Proportionate Response and Multi-Domain Strike, 5 October 2023 Link to article (Defense.info) When reading through the Australian Government’s 2023 Defence Strategic Review (DSR), three core concepts stand out: deterrence by denial, the need to craft more impactful projection and, thirdly, to do so in order to have the capability for proportionate response. Let me review what the DSR said about these objectives and their relationship with one another. The DSR on page 37 provides a broad perspective on the purposes of the force structure redesign: “Current Australian defence policy is based on deterrence through denial. This military application of deterrence theory is based on the concept of establishing effective defence capabilities relative to the threat. “Current defence deterrence policy is based on demonstrating an ability to independently defeat threats within our immediate region. This was credible with a force structure postured for low-level and enhanced low-level regional threats. “Australia does not have effective defence capabilities relative to higher threat levels. In the present strategic circumstances, this can only be achieved by Australia working with the United States and other key partners in the maintenance of a favourable regional environment. Australia also needs to develop the capability to unilaterally deter any state from offensive military action against Australian forces or territory. “Although invasion of the Australian continent is a remote possibility, any adversary could seek to coerce Australia through cyber attacks, incursions in our north west shelf or parts of our exclusive economic zone, or disruptions to our sea lines of communication. By developing a resilient and capable ADF that can hold forces at risk in our northern maritime approaches, Australia could deter attacks on Australian forces or territory.” The DSR on page 19 identifies the capabilities which are prioritized by the review: “The ADF’s operational success will depend on the ability of the Integrated Force to apply the following critical capabilities: undersea warfare capabilities (crewed and uncrewed) optimised for persistent, long-range sub-surface intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) and strike; an enhanced integrated targeting capability; an enhanced long-range strike capability in all domains; a fully enabled, integrated amphibious-capable combined-arms land system; enhanced, all-domain, maritime capabilities for sea denial operations and localised sea control; a networked expeditionary air operations capability; an enhanced, all-domain, integrated air and missile defence capability; a joint, expeditionary theatre logistics system with strategic depth and mobility; a theatre command and control framework that enables an enhanced Integrated Force; and a developed network of northern bases to provide a platform for logistics support, denial and deterrence.” Impactful projection is discussed notably on pages 6 and 106 of the review. “As most of these objectives lie well beyond our borders, the ADF must have the capacity to engage in impactful projection across the full spectrum of proportionate response. The ADF must be able to hold an adversary at risk further from our shores.” (Page 6) Then on page six: “Accordingly, the Australian Defence Force (ADF) must have the capacity to: defend Australia and our immediate region; deter through denial any adversary’s attempt to project power against Australia through our northern approaches; protect Australia’s economic connection to our region and the world; contribute with our partners to the collective security of the Indo-Pacific; and contribute with our partners to the maintenance of the global rules-based order. “The Government agrees that new technology and asymmetric advantage is a priority, and will ensure the ADF has the capacity to engage in impactful projection across the full spectrum of proportionate response.” (Page 106). In the Williams Foundation seminar on multi-domain strike held on 27 September 2023, several ADF speakers provided insight with regard to ADF thinking about the way ahead to achieve these inter-related objectives. LTGEN Frewan, Chief of Joint Capabilities, argued that “the DSR is calling for the Australian Defence Force to become a fully integrated force. And this infers something beyond joint. It requires an ADF integrated by design, rather than the three services being required to operate together in often ad hoc and imperfect ways. “And integration also applies to our command-and-control systems, our targeting systems and our enabling and sustainment capabilities. “The DSR shifts the priority for the ADF from a balanced force to a threat focused force utilizing a net assessment of our strategic and tactical challenges, and we must build an ADF that can deter or succeed against our immediate potential adversaries.” A key aspect of the multi-domain strike enterprise which Frewan discussed was the sustainment and logistics part of the enterprise. “Targeting, even in its most kinetic sense, will require a resilient logistics network to deliver munitions, maintenance and sustainment. It will be folly to develop a sophisticated targeting enterprise that does not have comparable investment in a logistics enterprise which has in recent decades been designed for efficiency rather than resilience.” LTGEN Frewan, Chief of Joint Capabilities, speaking at the 27 September Williams Foundation seminar. MAJGEN Brett Mousley, Head of Intelligence Capability, Defence Intelligence Group, emphasized the significant change in targeting capabilities required for the kind of strategic impactful projection which the DSR calls for. “We are now required to support our own sovereign plans and be ready to execute them at pace and scale… Our strategic settings also demands that the joint targeting cycle is always on, and therefore active in competition as well as in conflict. Early identification of the potential threats to the status quo, or actions that could lead to a deterioration in the security environment must be acted upon quickly with appropriate and non-escalatory effects to prevent or dissipate any potential crisis. “And as you also know, the ADF is acquiring advanced systems including Long Range Strike weapons, expanding its suite of non-kinetic effects, and increasingly operating in and through the contested cyber and space domains. “Importantly, from a Defense Intelligence Group perspective, the DSR has now given us the clear direction to accelerate the development and delivery of the key underpinning systems that support the processing, exploitation and dissemination of collected intelligence, including the ability to produce intelligence mission data, at greater volumes and velocity to support all aspects of targeting, from identification, to engagement and to assessment for all our key platforms, and weapon systems.” Mousley then discussed what he saw as the three key challenges which needed to be met to make progress along these lines. “Firstly, scaling the enterprise, we must be able to move from a workforce supporting a niche element in a single service against a small number of targets to supporting a much broader range of targets simultaneously across all domains….” He then discussed the need to “modernize our targeting databases and tools, ensuring they can process the significant volume of targeting information across all domains. We need to make a foundational military intelligence capability accessible across the entire enterprise whilst maintaining strong interoperability with our key allies.” And the third aspect was “the speed of decision making. MAJGEN Brett Mousley, Head of Intelligence Capability, Defence Intelligence Group, speaking at the Williams Foundation Seminar 27 September 2023. “The tempo of modern warfare will be high and opportunities to apply multi-domain effects will be fleeting, and will rely on well trained well-rehearsed forces and leaders who are informed to make timely decisions in a chaotic environment. “Intelligence for targeting indeed for all areas of intelligence support to operations will need to sift through and analyze the afore mentioned data to rapidly generate intelligence making it accessible to plans, operations and logistics staff. Only then will we be able to support leaders with timely and accurate advice and recommendations in order to execute the right effects at the right time and place.” RADM Stephen Hughes, Head Navy Capability, underscored that when focusing on the maritime domain, one is inherently focused on multi-domain strike. The maritime warfighting domain is shaped by strike whether coming from land, surface, subsurface or air domains, as well the cyber and space domains. “To attain long range strike capabilities allows us to move from a strategy of defense to a strategy of deterrence through denial which signifies a national shift that aims to hold an adversary at risk a greater range raising a question in the adversaries mind about whether they want to attempt to act against us. “So what does the maritime force bring to the fight? “A maritime force is able to be agile, mobile expeditionary scalable, sustainable, versatile, networked and lethal. Maritime force provides critical advantages through their ability to use the oceans to maneuver and hide in the case of submarines, and the airspace and the space above that domain. Maritime force combines distributed fleet operations, and mobile expeditionary forces with sea control and sea denial capabilities. “However, a maritime force does not compete, deter or fight alone. The maritime force is an integral part of the joint force and works closely with allies and partners to bring to bear maritime effects. Controlling the seas enables the maritime force to project power in support of Joint Force efforts. surging into the theater of operations, where adversaries must cross open water. Sea denial deprives them the initiative prevents them from achieving their objectives. RADM Stephen Hughes, Head Navy Capability, at the 27 September 2023 Williams Foundation seminar. “Maritime force controls or denies the seas by destroying an adversary’s fleet or their associated air support. And in in the modern battle space even extends into space. It can contain it in areas that prevents meaningful operations prohibited from leaving port by controlling sea lines of communication. Maritime forces capable of controlling critical choke points enable joint forces to impose military and economic costs on the adversary.” He also added comments with regard to the innovation which Navy is working to enhance multi-domain strike. “The future of our strike capability needs to include the use of uncrewed systems. Navy is working with industry in exploring solutions through the autonomous warrior series of experimental exercises. And such systems will have the ability to strike deep against an adversary by deploying mines and other guided weapons by using sovereign Australian capabilities.” As he underscored: “The defense strategic review has placed a premium on accelerating lethality for deterrence and impactful projection,” He cited the examples not only of acquiring TLAMS but the development of greater maritime strike capabilities. against maritime forces, whether from an F-35 or from anti-ship missile capabilities. AVM Stephen Chappell, Head of Military Strategic Commitments, focused on the symbiotic relationship between offense and defense with regard to multi-domain strike. “Integrated air and missile defense and multi-domain strike are two sides of the same coin. By having an ability to protect our strike enterprises we enhance their credibility to strike back which ensures as well our enhanced deterrent capability.” He underscored: “Passive defense is just as important not only for defending critical assets, but preserving our multi-domain strike capabilities in order to execute those left jabs and those right hooks necessary. The next layer of defense we’re thinking about is counter force. This in effect is multi-domain strike, the ability to reach out and defeat a threat to our homeland or to our forces. Deterrence by denial includes that defensive protection of the chin as we deliver effective left jabs and right hooks.” And finally, COL Casey Guidolin, Director ADF Multi-Domain Strike, provided a very clear analysis of multi-domain strike and its role in deterrent capabilities. “When considering multi domain strike, we must consider what each domain intrinsically brings and how they can be applied within our strategic geography to best effect. AVM Stephen Chappell, Head of Military Strategic Commitments, speaking at the 27 September 2023 Williams Foundation seminar. “Firstly, maritime forces provide lethality reach and persistence from on, above, or under the ocean surface. However, maritime strike weapons are often unique and expensive. And consideration must be given to the speed of maritime forces and distances required to travel to launch a strike as part of an orchestrated action and the subsequent time to return to port for reloading. Submarines have an inherent attribute of stealth range and significant strike power, as well as being able to conduct ISR covertly. “Land Forces possess unique attributes that contribute to joint forces in that they can disperse far more than air or naval forces. Land Forces are persistent in posture and presence for extended periods and can have utility in applying asymmetric responses with greater depth and capacity for strike capabilities. “Land Forces currently lack the reach required to match or overmatch adversary strike weapons. And the need to maneuver within striking distance of an adversary means that like maritime forces, the time required to travel to launch a strike as part of an orchestrated action must be considered. Persistent forward basing will improve reaction and response times. “Special Operations Forces offer a unique contribution to multi-domain strike through their inherent agility and stealth and ability to operate in and across all domains. “Air domain capabilities and operations are optimized to be relatively light and fast to magnify air powers utility as a first response option that enables access for heavier and more enduring elements of national power. Air Force can contribute to or enable an immediate or short-term response. “Air Force capabilities can be equipped and postured to provide immediate, impactful options with light footprints as the timeliness and impact can have significant bearing on the outcome to support a multi-domain strike. “Space capabilities provide the ADF with diversity and resilience of communications through defense satellite communications. Space assets also provide the ADF with vital intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities. Importantly, all three are different capabilities. It’s not just ISR, which are essential in identifying and reporting the adversary’s location to support planning a multi-domain strike. COL Casey Guidolin, Director ADF Multi-Domain Strike speaking at the 27 September 2023 Williams Foundation Seminar. “The space domain is an always on capability that provides intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance and secure communication is essential to supporting the orchestration of multi-domain strikes. “Cyber domain activities span enablement through to the provision of communications to exchange data, the collection of intelligence, the delivery of non-kinetic effects, and in some instances, strike options where offensive cyber operations and electronic attack capabilities can deny or degrade or disrupt adversary systems. “The primary attribute of the cyber domain is to ensure and assure the operational suitability of cyberspace in the electromagnetic spectrum to allow the multi domain strike system of systems to deliver effectively and efficiently their effectors to achieve the intended outcome. “When the attributes of each domain are combined, and the employment of effects are planned through an enhanced integrated targeting system, this visualization of a multi domain strike (seen in his slide which is the featured photo for the article) shows how the combination of domain effects will be able to deliver the required complementary effects to defeat a complex target.” In short, several key members of the ADF provided insights with regard to how multi-domain strike enables the kind of impactful projection and proportionate response capabilities required for an effective deterrence by denial strategy.

Dr Robbin Laird, The Challenge of Dealing with the 21st Century Authoritarian Powers: Progress and Paths Forward, 4 Oct 2023 Link to article (Defense.info) During my current visit to Australia in support of the 27 September Williams Foundation Conference, I had a chance to talk with Ross Babbage, who is the Chief Executive Officer of Strategic Forum Pty Ltd and a Non-Resident Senior Fellow of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments in Washington DC. During my last visit we discussed his latest book which focused on the challenge of deterring China and avoiding the next World War. I asked him to provide an assessment of what progress has been made in Australia in focusing on the China threat and, indeed, on the broader challenge of the 21st century authoritarian powers seeking to reshape the global system to their advantage. He started by underscoring what he sees as major progress in Australia recognizing the multi-faceted challenge which the Chinese Communist Party-led China poses to Australia’s way of life. Compared to five years ago, there is now widespread recognition throughout Australian society of the broad challenge. This has been most notably demonstrated in the strong resistance of the Australian public to Chinese actions during the pandemic and it is also clear from shifts in Australian public opinion polling. But this does not translate in Babbage’s assessment into agreed agendas on what to do in response to the Chinese challenge. Rather, economic and political interests are interpreting the challenge differently and to their own perspectives. This makes it difficult to have a consensual response on all aspects of policy towards China. The Australian government and the ADF have recognized the need to broaden their working relationships throughout the region, not just as a junior partner of the United States, but as a democratic actor in its own right. We have seen the ADF expand its engagements in Indonesia and Malaysia, for example, and there is a growing effort to strengthen the cooperative relationships with Japan, South Korea and India. Babbage also noted that Australia is expanding defence and security cooperation with the Philippines which is to the benefit of all democracies defending their interests against China. He underscored that the United States has a long history with the Philippines. But Australia’s relationship with the Philippines carries fewer domestic sensitivities for Manila and so Australia has more flexibility than the United States in dealing with some issues. He characterized the Australian approach in the region as follows: “There has been progress in building a loose network and coalition of Pacific nations who are really wanting to reinforce their own security, independence and sovereignty and are very happy to work with Australia.” One area of concern has been to ensure security of supply in raw materials. And here there has been significant progress among the allies and partners in shaping common approaches and framing ways to work together. He cited the “Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity Agreement Relating to Supply Chain Resilience” as an example of progress in this area of cooperation. An article in The Diplomat characterizes the effort: “Building supply chain resilience has become a shared objective for many Indo-Pacific countries that experienced supply chain disruptions and recognized the vulnerabilities therein because of overdependence on a single source: China… “According to the U.S. embassy press release, the IPEF Agreement has several different institutional components — including the IPEF Supply Chain Council, the IPEF Supply Chain Crisis Response Network, the IPEF Labor Rights Advisory Board — that are each tasked with a specific agenda. “The IPEF Supply Chain Crisis Response Network is supposed to put in place an emergency communication network for IPEF members to enlist support in case of a supply chain disruption. The network will aid in information-sharing and cooperation among IPEF partners, with the goal of providing for “a faster and more effective response that minimizes negative effects on their economies.” “Similarly, the IPEF Supply Chain Council is supposed to institute an arrangement among IPEF partners in order to establish “sector-specific action plans for critical sectors and key goods to enhance the resilience of IPEF partner’s supply chains, including through diversification of sources, infrastructure and workforce development, enhanced logistics connectivity, business matching, joint research and development, and trade facilitation.” Ross Babbage argues that such agreements, although important, will not solve the raw material dependence problem for Australia or the United States. The core problem is rooted in the atrophy of the resource processing and manufacturing industry in Australia and the United States. The processing of raw materials within an allied context is crucial. Simply having or acquiring raw materials that are then processed by the Chinese who have built significant processing capability, hardly solves the problem. The scope of the problem was highlighted by Babbage in the following terms: “In 2004, the United States had nearly twice the manufacturing output as China. By 2019, China had nearly twice that of the United States. In Australia, it is the same story. Around 1960, about 24% of Australia’s output by value came from the Australian manufacturing sector It’s now some 5%. Australia and the United States have both decimated many of their manufacturing capacities.” “There is a pathway for allied industrial recovery but it requires energetic cross-domain initiatives by all of the Indo-Pacific allies.” We need to remove barriers to investment to build back our manufacturing base. But there are many obstacles to progress, largely political and regulatory. The contrast to China’s approach is stark. For example, while Australia moves away from the use of coal, purportedly to attenuate climate change, China is building coal powered plants at a rapid rate. In recent months Beijing has approved an average of two new coal fired power stations and commenced construction on a third every week. It will be difficult to deal with these issues unless we shape new mechanisms to frame policy debates. We tend to get stuck into social media framing events, rather than scoping out the nature of long-range problems facing our society and initiating sensible solutions. I am working on a project with my friend and colleague Dr. Harald Malmgren which we call Beyond 2024: Dealing with the Critical Issues Which are Re-Shaping America’s Role in the World. This will not be for faint hearted to read. We are in a new historical era and not of our own making. How do we shape effective policy based on global realities not social media exchanges and political posturing? This is a major challenge facing the liberal democracies. And it is central to any fully effective alliance between the United States and all of its Indo-Pacific allies. Featured Photo: Moscow. March 20 – 22, 2023. Meeting of Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin. Silhouette of Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin

Dr Robbin Laird, Maritime Autonomous Systems and the Operational Force: How to Accelerate the Effort? 3 Oct 2023 Link to article (Defense.info) Recently, I had a chance to continue my discussions with CDRE Darron Kavanagh who is Director General Warfare Innovation, Royal Australian Navy Headquarters, concerning maritime autonomous systems. Kavanagh has been one of the most articulate leaders of the development and introduction of maritime autonomous systems in Australia. It is well recognized that autonomous systems are critical to provide the mass necessary for the kind of multi-domain operations which the ADF requires. For example, as Vice Air-Marshal retired Zed Roberton noted at the 27 September Williams Foundation seminar: Going forward, Roberton argued that “we will see a massive focus on things like uncrewed aerial vehicles, uncrewed sea vehicles or land vehicles, the ability to have pre-positioned missile systems and of course, synchronized with cyber and in space effects.” But how to get the effort started operationally? We need to move from science projects and exercises to regular use by the combat forces to realize the opportunities inherent in maritime autonomous systems. But how to do so? Kavanagh started our conversation by underscoring that it is important to understand what these systems are and what they represent. They are not traditional platforms that you are focused on integrating with the force. He argued: “They don’t replace platforms; they complement the integrated force. They are complimentary to that force in that they interface rather than being fully integrated with the current force elements.” With the introduction of new crewed platforms, one must focus on backward engineering legacy systems to work with the new ones. That takes time and has high costs. This is understandable because warriors’ lives are at risk. This is not the model by which to understand maritime autonomous systems, and certainly not the way to understand how you get them into the hands of warfighters for operations. They are not crewed, and your concern is with efficacy, not a primary emphasis on survivability. Maritime autonomous systems interface with and complement the existing force to enhance their lethality. They extend the ISR and C2 range of the force and add to the non-lethal and lethal weapons available to the combat force. Maritime autonomous systems add to the survivability of the force. As CDRE Kavanagh noted: “We have a finite number of crewed exquisite platforms. By leveraging autonomous systems these platforms can extend their defensive perimeter and provide various tools to complicate the adversaries attack profile on those crewed systems.” For example, in effect, USVs can play the role of the picket ships in World War II, thereby enhancing the survivability of the destroyer and carrier fleet. Or to use a Fifth Fleet example, USVs operating with destroyers can operate as a buffer between these key assets and Iranian patrol boats. The USVs function as the police guard dogs and if the Iranians were to attack them, the destroyer’s Rules of Engagement then allows it to destroy the Iranian patrol vessel. And because of how maritime autonomous systems are developed and built, you can shape the kind of affordable mass which we discussed in the multi-domain strike seminar held by the Williams Foundation on 27 September 2023. As CDRE Kavanagh underscored: “When you start leveraging maritime autonomous systems that are low cost, you can create affordable mass, and you’re setting up a system that allows for resilience. You can manufacture them at mass. Not only can I build them in peacetime but we can keep developing them and delivering them quite quickly during hostilities.” And by focusing on complementarity rather than integration, there can be a much wider search within the commercial sector to adopt the rapid innovations in the commercial sector occurring in terms of autonomous systems. CDRE Kavanagh specifically mentioned the Australian mining sector as one where rapid progress is being made on autonomous systems. If you are not using unique military specs which are designed in order to integrate with the extant force but rather providing complimentary capabilities which can directed by the force, then there is a much wider canvas of innovation from which to adopt autonomous system innovations. Because there are a wide range of civilian and security missions that maritime autonomous systems are already being used for and their roles and numbers will increase to do so, the military can dip into this existing and growing capability as well. The protection of undersea infrastructure and wind farms are two examples which are suggestive of a broader trend. According to CDRE Kavanagh: “We simply will delay adoption of autonomous systems by reducing them to the mantra of integration. By focusing on complementarity and finding ways to use the systems as compliments to the fleet and extending the range of the various effects desired, we can find a variety of missions which these systems can meet now and in the future.” He noted that in the DSR, there is much focus on deterrence by denial. Autonomous systems can clearly help in disrupting adversary operations and deny them quick results against crewed platforms. Then there is the key question of how maritime autonomous systems are being designed from the outset to operate in clusters or wolfpacks. And by so doing, they can operate as an interactive complimentary buffer force operating with the core integrated combat force to deliver persistent effects. In short, one needs to focus on the broader con-ops of the operation of the forces, rather than on the integration of autonomous systems within the much more complicated integrated crewed combat systems. If you don’t, we simply won’t use them in the timely manner as we must in the era of strategic competition within which we live. And an aspect of con-ops we discussed as well was the relationship of maritime autonomous systems and their operations to deterrence. On the one hand, maritime autonomous systems can be deployed as part of a deterrence by detection strategy. This can be enhanced by sharing with partners who are not close allies, or the kind of allies you wish to integrate your crewed platforms with. At the March seminar, Jake Campbell highlighted the importance of deterrence by detection as follows: “Adversaries are less likely to commit opportunistic acts of aggression if they know they are being watched constantly and that their actions can be publicized widely.” On the other hand, when it comes to signalling, a key part of deterrence, sending in a maritime autonomous systems wolfpack simply does not have the same meaning as sending a Aegis led surface action group. It indicates concern, but does not raise the weapons threshold that such SAG is designed to do. In short, maritime autonomous systems considered as complimentary capabilities which are controlled by but not built to be closely integrated with the combat force can deliver a number of the key capabilities which the DSR has called for. Featured Image: 10 May 2022 photo of Rear Admiral Selby, when as the Chief of Naval Research, USN he visited Australia and met with CDRE Kavanagh and Michael Stewart, Director the Unmanned Task Force.

Dr Robbin Laird, The DSR and the Australian Strike Enterprise 30 Sep 2023 Link to article (Defense.info) We need to start first with considering how the 2023 Australian Defence Review has prioritized the need for enhanced ADF strike capabilities. In the review, the notion of enhanced strike capability entails shaping longer-range reach of those capabilities, the enhancement of joint strike capabilities and the shaping of an industrial base to support the strike enterprise transition. Here is some of the language from the DSR regarding the strike enterprise: “Due to the significant changes in Australia’s strategic circumstances, the Government agrees with the Review’s finding that the ADF as currently constituted and equipped is not fully fit for purpose. The Government deeply appreciates those who serve in the ADF and is committed to ensuring our people have the capabilities and resources they need. Delivering the Government’s vision and implementing the findings of the Review will require a more holistic approach to defence planning and strategy. Air Vice-Marshal (Retired) Zed Roberton presenting at the September Williams Foundation seminar. “Australia must have a fully integrated and more capable ADF operating across five domains which work seamlessly together on joint operations to deliver enhanced and joined-up combat power. Navy must have enhanced lethality – including through its surface fleet and conventionally-armed, nuclear-powered submarines – underpinned by a continuous naval shipbuilding program. Army must be optimised for littoral operations in our northern land and maritime spaces and provide a long-range strike capability. Air Force must provide the air support for joint operations in our north by conducting surveillance, air defence, strike and air transport. Defence must also continue to develop its cyber and space capabilities. “The Government’s immediate actions to reprioritise Defence’s capabilities in line with the Review’s recommendations include: investing in conventionally-armed, nuclear-powered submarines through the AUKUS partnership; developing the ADF’s ability to precisely strike targets at longer range and manufacture munitions in Australia….” (Page 7) A key focus is upon “an enhanced long-range strike capability in all domains.” (Page 19). This is one of the justifications proffered for acquiring nuclear powered attack submarines. “The acquisition of conventionally-armed, nuclear-powered submarines will transform Navy’s capability. Nuclear-powered submarines are key assets both in effecting a strategy of denial and in the provision of anti-submarine warfare and long-range strike options.” (Page 56). For Army this means: “Defence must rapidly accelerate and expand Army’s littoral manoeuvre vessels (medium and heavy landing craft) and long-range fires (land-based maritime strike) programs. This will require Army to re-posture key capabilities.” (Page 59). This is translated in the DSR in terms of acquiring HIMARS and a land-based maritime strike capability. (Page 59). For the RAAF, the B-21 is rejected as an acquisition option but there is an emphasis on “F-35A Joint Strike Fighter and F/A-18F Super Hornet aircraft must be able to operate the Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile. The Joint Strike Missile (JSM) should also be integrated onto the F-35A. To enable the F-35A fleet to operate the JSM, the aircraft will need to be upgraded to Block 4 configuration.” (Page 61). And finally, Australia must build up its production capability in the strike area. “Long-range strike and other guided weapons are fundamental to the ADF’s ability to hold an adversary at risk in Australia’s northern approaches. To do this, the ADF must hold sufficient stocks of guided weapons and explosive ordnance (GWEO) and have the ability to manufacture certain lines.” (Page 68). At the Williams Foundation seminar held on 27 September 2023 on the enterprise requirements of an Australian multi-domain strike capability, the former Air Commander Australia, Air Vice-Marshal (Retired) Zed Roberton discussed the DSR and strike. Roberton looked back at the history of ADF orientations and engagements and argued that until the 2020 defence initiative of the government, the ADF was equally balanced among three objectives: “Those were to defend Australia, look after the near region and to contribute to global coalitions as part of the global order. It was really interesting that those three objectives were equally weighted by design.” After 2020 and in the recent DSR, the shift has been clearly to prioritizing Australian defence within the Indo-Pacific. And in so doing, he underscored that the focus is not just the defence of Australia to the North but a much broader focus on the Indo-Pac region. This means that Australia now faces a “four ocean front” in designing and operating its force in the defense of Australia. But given the size of Australia as a continent, and the relatively small population, the ADF needs to be capable of generating agility to generate the mass required to make a significant strategic effect. Roberton argued that the ADF needs to follow three principles to generate the capability needed for agility and force integration to achieve a desired strategic effect. The first is redundancy, not resilience. “We have too many single points of failure. The multi-domain approach provides a way to focus on redundancy in strike.” The second is agility. Roberton underscored: “When you’ve got a small number of people in a defense force with a small base, your ability to bring about an effect around the continental landmass or its approaches and hold forces at risk further from Australia requires agility. And a level of agility not just in capabilities, but in our procedures and processes.” The third is focused mass. This obviously is the goal of multi-domain strike, to have an ability for an agile force to concentrate across multiple domains the desired strategic effect. Going forward, Roberton argued that “we will se a massive focus on things like uncrewed aerial vehicles, uncrewed sea vehicles or land vehicles, the ability to have pre-positioned missile systems and of course, synchronized with cyber and in space effects.” He concluded that two questions are critical moving forward which we need to consider. “How does Australia hold adversary forces at risk further from our shores? And and what does next generation deterrence really look like?” But he warned that the question of both resourcing and prioritization in defence raises real challenges for the kind of force adapation which Australia will need. He provided a slide in his presentation which highlighted the extent of the budget challenge. Put in simple terms: how does Australia pay for its nuclear submarine project and at the same time source the overall ADF transition to a multi-domain capable defence force?