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Alan Stephens Running Silent – ASW in the ADF March 2013 Early in the Falklands War in May 1982, the (British) Royal Navy hunter-killer submarine HMS Conqueror sank the Argentine Navy cruiser ARA Belgrano. Three hundred and twenty-three lives were lost, half of all Argentines who died during the conflict. For the rest of the war Argentina’s admirals dared not let their fleet venture more than a few kilometres from their home ports. In effect, an entire navy had been defeated by a single action. In terms of creating a strategic effect, nothing has changed since then. Submarines continue to represent one of the most potent capabilities a defence force can operate. The corollary is that any defence force that needs to protect sea lines of communications will risk failure if it lacks a credible anti-submarine warfare capability. Nowhere does this apply more than in Australia. It should be self-evident that, as an island continent, Australia is a maritime nation. Australia is one of the world’s largest importers/exporters, with 83 per cent by value of all goods being moved by sea. Even more significant is the fact that 85 per cent of all oil is imported by sea, either as crude for local refineries, or as refined petrol, diesel and jet fuel. Those are compelling numbers. Stop maritime trade and you stop Australia. It is a matter of concern that over the past twenty years the Australian Defence Force’s ASW capabilities – which are hard won and easily lost - have been allowed to degrade in both the RAN and the RAAF. Before discussing the reasons, the growth of submarine forces in the Asia-Pacific warrants comment. That growth is one of the region’s most striking military developments. Within ten years there is likely to be some 160 submarines in the Asia-Pacific, many of which will be new and highly capable. Leading the charge, unsurprisingly, is China, whose shipyards are already building 2-3 boats per year, and which by 2025 may have as many as 75 on its orbat. Types include nuclear-powered attack boats, ballistic missile launchers, land- and maritime-strike missile launchers, and advanced diesel electric boats specialising in intelligence collection and surface ship attack. Other nations modernising and expanding their submarine forces include India, Pakistan, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, and (we hope) Australia. One of the ADF’s problems has been the diversion of the RAAF’s AP-3C maritime patrol wing onto land surveillance operations to support the war in Afghanistan. This is of course a matter of priorities, and if the soldiers fighting the Taliban need that support then it must be provided. The point here simply is that having to sustain two aircraft and their crews in the Middle East has been a large drain on the wing, and has come at a cost to other roles. The issue of platform numbers will arise again in several years when the eighteen AP-3Cs are replaced by eight P-8As. While the P-8As will be more capable, basic numbers cannot be ignored. For example, past operations have required four AP-3Cs to continuously track a Russian nuclear-powered submarine for an extended period. Allowing for aircraft undergoing maintenance, or allocated to training and other tasks, the entire AP-3C force would probably be needed to prosecute two nuclear-powered submarines simultaneously. The smaller P-8A force, however, is likely to be limited to one target only. Turning to the Navy, one of the best ASW assets a fleet can have is helicopters using dipping sonar to generate rapid submarine tracking data. Yet the RAN has lacked this critical capability since its Sea King helicopters were withdrawn from ASW operations in 1990. The introduction of twenty-four MH-60R Seahawks in 2014 will finally redress this deficiency, but in the meantime a generation of RAN Aviation Warfare Officers has grown up without regular exposure to dipping sonar. Finally, there is the problem of the RAN’s submarines themselves. Because of the well-documented technical problems experienced by the Collins-class boats, all components of the ADF’s ASW force – surface ships, submarines, fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft, and command and control centres – which rely on the Collins fleet to act as the ‘enemy’ during exercises - have had their training time and experience constrained. In the opinion of some specialists, it could take the ADF around ten years to regain the level of ASW expertise it had at the end of the 1980s, and which it will need to be credible in the coming decades. Moreover, the situation will only improve if new platforms arrive on time and in sufficient numbers, crews are available, training time is allocated, regular exercises are held, and the capability is treated as a system and not as separate components. For more than twenty years ASW in the ADF has been running silent. Developments in the region make it clear that this vital capability must be restored as a matter of priority. Download pdf

Errol McCormack Protecting Australia with UAS (Unmanned Aerial Systems), The Williams Foundation, February 2014 Executive Summary The capabilities and use of unmanned aerial systems (UAS) has grown rapidly over the last decade or so. Australia’s geography is uniquely well suited to the use of UAS in a variety of military and civilian missions and roles over water and over land. The Australian Defence Force (ADF), while relatively slow to adopt UAS, has recent successful operational experience with UAS in Iraq and Afghanistan. The ADF plans to build on this experience including through the potential acquisition of new multi-mission UAS with an Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) capability as a complementary capability to the replacement of the AP-3C Orion maritime patrol aircraft with a new manned aircraft (Project Air 7000). In addition to the ISR role, the introduction of UAS strike capability by Australia appears to be inevitable. A potentially cost-effective way of acquiring armed UAS would be to investigate expanding the scope of Project Air 7000 to include the acquisition of a strike capability for the chosen ISR platform. Fully exploiting the potential benefits of UAS, however, requires addressing a range of issues. The current debate and analysis on particular manned versus unmanned platforms for specific roles should shift its focus instead identifying the optimum mix of manned and unmanned systems to achieve the desired effect in the most cost effective way. Policy implications of armed UAS need to be settled in the short term in the context of Australia’s current Rules of Engagement and its obligations under International Laws of Armed Conflict. Australia should consider following the lead of the United Nations (UN) and the United States (US) by adopting a no full autonomy policy for UAS operations. However, acquiring new unmanned and manned aircraft is only part of the capability requirement. These new technologies will not be properly exploited unless the ADF is able to fully process, exploit and disseminate the gathered imagery and technical information. What is needed is not a separate or new UAS processing, exploitation and dissemination (PED) capability but one integrated PED for all data collection that will be able to cope with future data volumes. In addition, new UAS technologies will need to be applied to the entire set of ADF core function areas to increase the effectiveness of operations, rather than just plugging UAS into conventional Concept of Operations. Australia should seek to be an influential UAS buyer as the Defence budget will not afford the scale and diversity of UAS acquisition that can be undertaken by US forces. Next generation UAS preferably should have the flexibility to perform more than just one function through the development of modules so that different mission sets can be accomplished by changing the configuration of the aircraft itself. Australia should also collaborate with other UAS military users to overcome current UAS limitations particularly their vulnerability in contested and denied air environments, and current data link and bandwidth limitations. In the specific context of defence, the ADF needs to develop appropriate capabilities to counter potential UAS terrorist acts; an appropriate ADF personnel selection, management and training system to underpin UAS; and a sound understanding of current Australian UAS research and development (R&D) and industry capabilities. In addition, the ADF needs to shape future R&D and industry development to meet expected ADF requirements. Looking more broadly, UAS will enhance the ADF’s contribution to national support tasks such as civil emergencies and border protection. The persistence and surveillance capabilities of UAS provide new and innovative options for these tasks and will free manned platforms for more complex tasks. Defence, though, is not the only Australian Government agency acquiring or potentially acquiring UAS. An important issue for Government consideration is whether agencies such as Customs and the Australian Maritime Safety Authority (AMSA) should own their own UAS assets, as is the case for manned assets, or whether they should be in a largely centralised pool owned and operated by the ADF. With rapid military and civil UAS growth in Australia expected, the civil airspace challenge for the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) is to ensure the safety of other airspace users as well as the safety of persons and property on the ground. CASA is working closely with the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and other international bodies to update Australia’s regulatory framework. CASA might like to follow the US precedent by developing a UAS Integration Roadmap and establishing UAS test sites in Australia. Download pdf of full report

On Tuesday 11 March 2014, The Sir Richard Williams Foundation conducted its biannual seminar on ‘Air Combat Operations – 2025 and Beyond.’ Robbin Laird In my recent visit to Australia, I had a chance to visit the new tanker (KC-30A) and new airborne “AWACS” system (Wedgetail), the hypersonics development center and to participate in an RAAF sponsored conference on the impact of the F-35 on the evolving Aussie air combat approach. What clearly came through is that Australia is building out a modest but effective 21st century Air Force built around the best available 21st century platforms and technologies. And in a discussion with a senior Canadian Air Force officer attending the RAAF air power conference, the point was made that “Australia is very relevant to our thinking about the future.” Australia had not bought new equipment for a long period but with the East Timor and Afghan experiences under their belt, they are building out capability to deal with the challenges in the neighborhood. And they are not going in for the low end; they are shaping a multi-function, multi-mission force able to work with key allies in the region and to support their joint force able to operate a greater distance, for more sustainable operations. First up was the acquisition of their six C-17s. The C-17 helped launch the re-set of the Aussie Air Force by providing reach, range, and capability, which the RAAF had never had before. And underlying the C-17 acquisition is participation in a global sustainment program, which enhances the ability of the aircraft to operate globally. In an interview with the PACAF staff in Honolulu prior to coming to Australia, Jim Silva, a senior logistician with the Air Force highlighted the nature of this global sustainment program: With our global sustainment program, if one of our C-17’s breaks in Australia, they have C-17 parts. We don’t even have to negotiate anything because there is pre-set agreement that we just trade parts. All of their parts are certified and can be used on any C-17 aircraft around the world. So we can go take an Aussie part and put it on an Air Force airplane, and vice versa; they can even use a U.S. Air Force part if one of their jets lands here in Hickam.  The system is managed across the enterprise." An important addition to shaping the reach, range and sustainability of the RAAF is the coming of the Airbus Military MRTT tanker to the fleet. The fleet of 5 aircraft will be fully operational by 2015 and will be joined in the region by 6 Singapore Airbus tankers as well and the Aussies clearly intend to work closely with Singapore to build out a regional collaborative fleet. Two of the five planes were at Amberly during the visit. Three of the Aussie five tanker aircraft are currently involved in maintenance, upgrade, testing, and residual acquisition activities in Madrid and Australia. The squadron fleet should be at full strength in 2015. Download pdf of the report

SQNLDR Travis Hallen, Flawed Doctrine: The Problem With Centralised Control And Decentralised Execution This paper focuses on two objections to current ADF doctrine. First, reliance on a ‘bumper-sticker’4 as the basis for developing command arrangements is unwise; it discourages understanding, inhibits flexibility and promotes blind-adherence. Second, modern views of air power command and control stem from a misinterpretation of past experience, a misinterpretation that has become conventional wisdom. Download pdf

Williams Foundation EW in Offensive Air Operations, Jan 2012 Ever since military forces started to use the electromagnetic spectrum in support of air operations, opposing forces have attempted to prevent their use through either a hard kill (German attacks on the RAF Chain Home Radar sites during the Battle of Britain) or soft kill (German attempts to disrupt or bend the radio beams (Oboe) used to direct RAF Bomber Command Pathfinder aircraft towards their targets in WWII). Like all aspects of warfare there is no “silver bullet” since countermeasures are usually developed to offset the attack. This is particularly relevant in electronic warfare (EW) since the very use of a portion of the spectrum against operational forces is of itself a training cycle for the target of the emissions. Because of the size and weight of equipment and the need for human interface with that equipment, early airborne EW systems were developed using multi-crew aircraft. However, these large aircraft were vulnerable to attack particularly with development of Integrated Air Defence Systems (IADS) that integrated surveillance, tracking and guidance radars with the full range of air defence weapons: air defence fighters, Surface to Air Missiles and Anti Aircraft guns. Fielding of IADS resulted in development of aircraft able to operate in a hostile air environment and support strikes against defended targets. The F105 Wild Weasel used by the USAF over North Vietnam was an early example of the type used to support strike missions through attacks against the IADS including systems such as the SA-2 Ground to-Air missiles employed by North Vietnam. The Wild Weasel systems were able to detect and analyse electromagnetic signals and direct anti-radiation missiles against missile guidance systems. Accompanying F105 Thunderchief aircraft armed with bombs were used to attack air defence systems pinpointed by the Wild Weasels. With continued development of EW systems in both weight/size and capability fighter type aircraft are now capable of conducting many of the missions once restricted to large multi-crew aircraft. These missions include passive operations such as Enemy Order of Battle (EOB) analysis, Kill Chain analysis and active operations such as Suppression of Enemy Air Defences (SEAD), Force Protection and Maritime Support as follows: EOB analysis involves development of detailed information on the location, frequencies and capabilities of possible enemy systems that could diminish the capabilities of friendly systems. Since air defence systems include long (early warning) and short (missile guidance) range systems, EOB analysis requires systems able to monitor as much of the electromagnetic spectrum as possible. Even then physics decrees that the higher the frequency the more accurate the location. Kill Chain Analysis is the term given to analysis of the electromagnetic spectrum in a hostile environment and disseminating that information electronically to other parties in near real time so that fleeting targets such as mobile SAM sites can be engaged. The aim is to shorten the decision cycle of friendly forces and lengthen the decision cycle of enemy forces: in air force terminology affect OODA (Observe, Orientate, Decide, Act) loop of both friendly (reduce cycle time) and enemy (increase cycle time) forces. SEAD involves the degradation or defeat of integrated enemy air defence systems thus enabling attack forces to enter defended enemy territory. Hard and soft kills are usually made in combination to degrade IADS capability Force Protection involves prevention of enemy use of the electromagnetic spectrum to conduct attacks against friendly ground forces. These operations could be used to deny the enemy use of the spectrum to communicate and/or initiate Improvised Explosive Devices (IED). Maritime Support is the term given to operations to protect the fleet from attack by anti-ship missiles and radar directed gunfire. It involves degradation or defeat of electronic location, targeting and guidance systems. The EA-18G Growler, the latest Western development of fighter type EW capability, is replacing the EA6B Prowler in US service. Whereas the Prowler is manned by one pilot and three systems operators the Growler is a two place aircraft developed from the F/A-18F: the EW role is considered too complex at this stage for single pilot operation. It is understood that even with two seats the USN tends to operate the Growler in flights of two or three to provide full EW capability, accuracy and self-protection. The capability and flexibility of the Growler was demonstrated recently when a squadron operating over Iraq in the Force Protection role switched to SEAD over Libya in under 48 hours. The Growler in the USN is not utilised as an attack fighter. While capable of utilizing guided weapons the USN has separated the two roles apparently because Growler crews are stretched maintaining skills in their primary EW role. Without fighter type EW systems in the Air Order of Battle the ADF could suffer significant losses during any attempt to operate in contested airspace. If required to operate in contested airspace the ADF would have to rely on allied support. Download pdf

Andrew McLaughlin Air Combat Operations 2025 and Beyond: Seminar Executive Summary, April 2014 On Tuesday 11 March 2014, The Sir Richard Williams Foundation conducted its biannual seminar on ‘Air Combat Operations – 2025 and Beyond.’ The seminar explored the challenges and opportunities afforded by the introduction of 5th generation air combat capabilities. Themes explored included: The future Asia/Pacific security environment Future technology advances and challenges How the US Marines are approaching the challenge of integration of 5th generation capabilities with the legacy force Consideration on how the RAAF will approach the transition to, and integration of, 5th generation airpower capabilities Download pdf