Search Results

Brian Weston 'On Target 'Evolving the Force Element Group: Combat Power through Organisation – Part 4' in Australian Aviation January-February 2017 p.2 The three previous On Target columns in Australian Aviation have outlined the evolution of RAAF organisational policy to the period when the RAAF formalised the organisation of its operational units into Force Element Groups (FEGs) on 1 June 1988. The new FEGs were the Tactical Fighter Group (TFG), which included the supporting air direction units of the Air Defence Ground Environment (ADGE), the Strike Reconnaissance Group (SRG), the Maritime Patrol Group (MPG), the Air Lift Group (ALG), the Tactical Transport Group (TTG) and the Air Operational Support Group (AOSG). However, the RAAF TTG was short-lived, disbanding in February 1991 after the RAAF helicopter capability was transferred to the Army with the residual TTG Caribou capability folding back into the ALG. The development of the Jindalee over-the-horizon (OTH) radar at the Joint Facility, Alice Springs, also had implications for the RAAF ADGE as it added a new dimension to Australia's wide-area surveillance capabilities. Accordingly, the air force stood up No 1 Radar Surveillance Unit (1RSU), headquartered at Mt Everard, near Alice Springs, on 1 July 1992 and assigned the unit to No 41 Wing. Subsequently, the decision to re-shape the RAAF air defence capability more towards an air battle management capability had further organisational implications. Firstly, all ADF air traffic control services, including at army and navy airfields, were amalgamated within a reformed No 44 Wing and secondly, in 1996, both Nos 41 and 44 Wings were spun-out of the TFG into a new Surveillance and Control Group (SCG). By 1997 the Defence Efficiency Review and the follow-on Defence Reform Program had begun to impact on the RAAF by transferring much of the individual FEG’s maintenance and organic support capabilities to contractors, reducing some FEGs to a group consisting of only one wing, with an obviously unsatisfactory “one-group-commanding-one-wing” command chain. The SRG was also being exposed to new air defence capabilities, especially the increasing availability of look-down radars which eroded the ability of the F-111C to exploit terrain masking during its final approach to a target. It was becoming apparent that in future, the F-111C and F/A-18A forces would need to cooperate tactically to ensure F-111C survivability against improving air defences. But the long-standing silos that segregated the RAAF tactical fighter and strategic strike capabilities ‒ a situation going well back to the fighter and bomber heritages of both capabilities ‒ was a significant institutional barrier to fighter/bomber cooperation. That cultural fighter/bomber segregation was a concern to Chief of Air Force, Air Marshal Errol McCormack. With a Sabre and Canberra background; experience participating in the first F-111C cohort (1968); time flying the RF-4C on exchange with the USAF; and his time as OC No 82 Wing flying the F-111C; McCormack “warned” Air Commodore John Quaife of his posting as the first commander of the RAAF Air Combat Group (ACG). After spending 12 months planning the merger of the TFG and SRG, Quaife took up his post as CDR ACG in January 2002, commanding Nos 78, 81 and 82 Wings. The formation of the ACG was accompanied by further development in the new SCG when, in 1999, No 1RSU moved to Edinburgh as a precursor to controlling not only the Alice Springs OTHR but also the new OTH radars at Laverton and Longreach. Those radars came online in mid-2003, completing the Jindalee Operational Radar Network (JORN). Further developments followed, which brought the short-lived existence of the SCG to an end, when it was merged with the MPG ‒ a group which had been reduced to oversighting only one wing; No 92 Wing flying AP-3C aircraft. The SCG/MPG merger saw the establishment on 30 March 2004, of the Surveillance and Response Group (SRG) and with the impending introduction of the RAAF airborne early warning and control capability, the SRG, headquartered at Williamtown, became an FEG of considerable capability, fully justifying the appointment of a commander of air commodore rank. The SRG reached maturity on 1 January 2006, when No 42 Wing was reformed flying the E-7A Wedgetail, joining Nos 41, 44 and 92 Wings in the SRG. In contrast, the ALG saw a long period of organisational stability as it continued its 24/7 role of air transport operations although, in 1999, it gained capability when No 37 SQN traded its 1966 vintage C-130E Hercules for the much-improved C-130J. The AOSG, headquartered at Edinburgh also continued unchanged but not so the Operational Support Group (OSG) at Townsville, where the RAAF strove to retain some of its organic expeditionary support capability, so unthinkingly stripped by the crude and blunt Defence reviews of the 1990s. Certainly the 20 years to 2007 saw much organisational change, but it was re-assuring the RAAF was still able to retain an operational organization, in keeping with the principles of functional force element group reorganisation, first implemented in 1987. Air-Vice Marshal Brian Weston (Retd) was CO No 75 Squadron in 1980, CO Base Squadron Richmond in 1986, OC Base Support Wing Richmond in 1987, and CDR Tactical Fighter Group from July 1990 to July 1993. Brian is a Board Member of the Williams Foundation and this On Target article appears in Australian Aviation magazine. Download pdf

Brian Weston 'On Target: A War by another name: The RAAF in the Malayan Emergency – 1948 to 1960' in Australian Aviation September 2018 p. 110 This year has seen the recognition of many anniversaries from World War I and World War II but there is one anniversary from another war in which Australia was involved, which has received little attention. It was the declaration, on 18 June 1948, of the commencement of the Malayan Emergency following the murder of three British estate managers by guerrillas of the Malayan Communist Party (MCP), at Sungei Siput, Perak, Malaya. The targeted assassination of three estate managers was the opening shot of a war by the MCP aimed at the overthrow of British colonial rule in the Federation of Malaya. Although labelled an ‘Emergency’ – to ensure insurance policies essential to the ongoing functioning of Malaya’s economy were not voided – the Malayan Emergency was a war. It was conducted by the MCP, under the leadership of Chin Peng, employing the military skills and expertise the MCP had gained from its predecessor organisation – the Malayan Peoples’ Anti-Japanese Army – during its 1942-1945 guerrilla campaign against the Japanese. The ethnic core of the MCP was Malayan Chinese who, after an initial campaign of terror, expected to mobilise support for their revolutionary cause from the ethnic Malayan Chinese and the rural ethnic Malay population following which, the MCP expected to escalate to widespread insurgency warfare, sufficient to destabilise and overthrow the incumbent government. The revolutionary strategy was in keeping with similar campaigns under way in Indochina against the French, and in China against the Kuomintang government. Initially, the Federation of Malaya – a federation of the nine Malay British protectorates and of the two Straits Settlements of Malacca and Penang, both British colonies – was slow to respond to the MCP threat although that changed, especially after the assassination of the British High Commissioner ‒ the head of the Federation of Malaya ‒ on 6 October 1951. From then on, Britain oversighted a ‘whole of government’ response to the MCP threat; a response which is now widely regarded as an essential case study for any student of counter-insurgency warfare. In 1950, Australia responded to a British request for assistance in combatting the Emergency and deployed six RAAF Lincoln heavy bombers and eight RAAF C-47 Dakota (DC-3) transports to the region: No 1 Squadron to RAF Base Tengah, Singapore, and No 38 Squadron to RAF Base Changi, Singapore. Air support is a key capability in counter insurgency warfare and No 38 Squadron quickly filled an essential role in transporting troops; resupply of deployed troops, often by parachute into small drop zones; and psychological operations. The contribution of the RAAF Dakotas during the initial phases of the Emergency was critical and it is a contribution that has generally not been well-acknowledged. The Dakotas returned to Australia in 1953. The Lincolns, an evolution of the Avro Lancaster, also made a strong contribution to the Emergency with their ability to carry up to 14 x 450 kg bombs. The Lincoln, with its endurance, payload and high capacity British-heritage 1,000 lb (450 kg) blast and fragmentation bombs, was well-suited to the tropical, jungle operational environment and while few communist terrorists, CTs as they were called, were killed directly by the air strikes, the strikes kept the CT groups on the move where they and their camps were more likely to be detected and engaged by deployed troops and police. The Lincolns returned to Australia in 1958 having dropped 85% of the 35,000 tonnes of bombs used in the Emergency. By the time of No 1 Squadron’s return to Australia there was widespread recognition the counter-insurgency war was being won; although such wars take patience and endurance, until they grind to a close. Indeed, although the Malayan Emergency was declared ended on 31 July 1960, RAAF personnel at Butterworth continued to receive intelligence briefings on CT activities and threats into the 1970s, and some would recall watching flights of RMAF Canadair Tebuan jet trainers, each armed with two 500 lb (230 kg) Mk 82 bombs, departing Butterworth to strike CTs operating in the “border areas” not too far from Butterworth. Apart from the RAAF involvement in the Malayan Emergency, Australia also rotated battalions from the Royal Australian Regiment through Malaya ensuring an Australian infantry battalion was continuously in theatre from 1957 to 1963. The Emergency was also noteworthy in that, on 31 August 1957, during the conduct of the Emergency, the Federation of Malaya became an independent nation, and remained on amicable terms with Britain, its former colonial power. During the Emergency, Australian air and ground forces in Malaya transitioned into Australia's contribution to the British Commonwealth Far East Strategic Reserve which was established in 1955 to deter external communist aggression against countries in South-East Asia, especially Malaya and Singapore. Brian Weston is a Board Member of the Williams Foundation and this On Target article appears in the Australian Aviation magazine. Download pdf

Brian Weston 'On Target: RAAF Butterworth: From “Emergency” to “Strategic Reserve” ' in Australian Aviation October 2018 p. 1 The On Target column in the September issue of Australian Aviation outlined how the RAAF began what was to become a longstanding Australian engagement in South-East Asia. It commenced with Australia’s involvement in the Malayan Emergency in June 1948, which was indeed a war, although a war by a different name. The Malayan Emergency also foreshadowed the long timescales involved in conducting counter-insurgency warfare. This was evident not only from the 12 years it took until the Malayan Emergency was declared ended in 1960, but also from the reality that even after the declared end of the war, small groups of Communist terrorists continued to evade and operate, especially in the northern border areas of Malaya, until well into the 1970s. The Emergency also verified the concerted “whole of government” approach to counter-insurgency warfare which, by 1957, had contained the Communist insurgents such that there was widespread acceptance the Emergency was being won. But, if by 1957 the conduct of the war was proceeding towards victory, how was it that by 1959, 50% of Australia’s operational fighter force and 33% of Australia’s operational bomber force was stationed permanently at Butterworth in northern Malaya? The explanation for this large commitment of Australia’s air force lies in the fact the Malayan Emergency was only one of many security issues evident in post-World War II, South-East Asia. These security issues were of concern especially to Australia, the United States, and to those European nations that, prior to World War II, had substantial colonial and economic interests in South-East Asia. The interests of the colonizing European powers had been disrupted by the rapid advance of the Japanese through South-East Asia and the Pacific in World War II. This illustrated the brittle hold the European powers had over their colonial interests. Notwithstanding, at war’s end the European powers sought to return to their colonial territories but, following the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the abrupt end of World War II played havoc with the aspirations of the major European powers. It was only Britain that managed to return quickly and re-establish authority over its South-East Asian colonies and protectorates. France’s attempt to return to Indochina ultimately ended in a demoralizing military defeat, while the Netherlands, early on, had to concede independence to the former Dutch East Indies. As early as 1949, the map of North-East and South-East Asia was being recast. Mao Zedong’s Chinese Communist Party overran mainland China, ejecting the ruling Kuomintang to the island of Taiwan. Indonesia won its brief revolutionary conflict with the Netherlands, although what lay ahead for Indonesia was uncertain. France persisted longer in Indochina. But, with their military defeat at Dien Bien Phu by the Viet Minh led by Ho Chi Minh, the eight-year war in Indochina also came to an end, fracturing the former French colony of Indochina which would have longer term consequences; while the Korean War of 1950 to 1953 would also have consequences which still are with us today. These conflicts changed the geostrategic and geopolitical make-up of North-East and South-East Asia and contributed to the emergence of the “Domino Theory” with the generally accepted implication the next domino to fall would be Thailand; which is interesting, as Thailand is the only major South-East Asian country not to have been colonized by a European power. This rapidly changing strategic environment drove the establishment of the South-East Asia Collective Defence Treaty when in Manila, in September 1954, Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, the United Kingdom and the United States signed the Treaty; with both the Philippines and Thailand seeing merit in the establishment of a “NATO-like” American security guarantee to protect them from potential communist insurgencies. Unsurprisingly, the South-East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) established its headquarters in Bangkok, Thailand. Shortly after, in 1955, the United Kingdom, facing the inevitable independence of its South-East Asian protectorates and states, established the British Commonwealth Far East Strategic Reserve, a permanent military force aimed at countering external communist aggression against countries in South-East Asia, especially British-colonial Malaya and Singapore. Australia was invited to contribute to the Strategic Reserve, and agreed to deploy on a permanent basis two squadrons of CAC Sabre fighters; one squadron of Canberra bombers, with an embedded flight of supporting Dakota transports; and a range of supporting units to Butterworth in what was soon to become the independent Federation of Malaya. This, a commitment of 1500 RAAF personnel, plus families, in what quickly became RAAF Base Butterworth. It was a national security commitment which was to endure until 1988, before downscaling to the more modest Australian presence which remains at Butterworth today, some 70 years after the outbreak of the Malayan Emergency. Next month’s On Target column will detail the remarkable transition of a small RAF airfield into the major operational base that was to become RAAF Base Butterworth. Brian Weston is a Board Member of the Williams Foundation commanded No 75 Squadron at Butterworth from 1980 to 1982. This On Target article appears in the Australian Aviation magazine. Download pdf

Air / Sea / Land: Integrated Force 2030 11 April 2017 Program and Synopsis Download Pdf Handbook Download Pdf Final Report Dr Robbin Laird Final Report: Designing the Integrated Force: The Australian Defense Force Repositions for the Next Phase of 21st Century Force Structure Development Presentations VADM Ray Griggs AO, CSC, RAN, Vice Chief of Defence Force The Integrated Force Imperative: Vice Chief of Defence Force (the Joint Force Authority) Perspective Presentation unavailable BRIG Jason Blain DSC, CSC, Vice Chief of Defence Force Group Achieving an Integrated Force by Design - Challenges and Opportunities Download Pdf AIRCDRE Robert Chipman CSC, Royal Australian Air Force Integrated Force Design - the Air Perspective Presentation unavailable BRIG David Wainwright DSC, Australian Army Integrated Force Design - the Land Perspective Download Pdf CDRE Philip Spedding DSC, AM, RANR, Royal Australian Navy Integrated Force Design - the Sea Perspective Download Pdf Mr Steve Froelich, Lockheed Martin Industry’s view on Integrated Design Presentation unavailable LTGEN USAF (Ret) Jeff Remington, Northrop Grumman Industry’s view on Integrated Design Presentation unavailable AIRCDRE Leon Phillips, Capability Acquisition and Sustainment Group Challenges and Opportunities in Acquisition and Sustainment of the Integrated Force Download Pdf AVM Andrew Dowse AM, Chief Information Officer Group Challenges for CIOG in connecting the Integrated Environment Download Pdf RADM Tony Dalton AM, CSM RAN, Capability Acquisition and Sustainment Group Joint Capability Acquisition Download Pdf Mr Andy Watson, MBDA Australia The Defence/Industry relationship and the Integrated Force Presentation unavailable AVM John Blackburn AO (Retd), Sir Richard Williams Foundation Launch of the Williams IAMD Study - Implications for the Integrated Force Download Pdf

A New Approach, and Attitude, to Electronic Warfare In Australia 23 August 2017 Program and Synopsis Download Pdf Handbook Download Pdf Final Report Dr Robbin Laird, Second Line of Defense The Future of Electonic Warfare Final Report: A New Approach and Attitude to Electronic Warfare in Australia Download Pdf 08/26/2017 Robbin Laird The Williams Foundation Seminar on Electronic Warfare Presentations BRIG Stephen Beaumont AM, Information Warfare Division, Joint Capabilities Group Growler and Force Level Electronic Warfare Presentation unavailable GPCAPT Glen Braz CSC, DSM, 82 Wing, Royal Australian Air Force An Operators View of Growler Download Pdf Mr Lawrence Burt, Boeing TACAIR Programs Enabling Capability for EA Presentation unavailable AIRCDRE Robert Chipman CSC, Capability Planning – Air Force Royal Australian Air Force EW, C4I and Enablers Download Pdf LtGen Jon Davies (Ret) United States Marine Corp Distributed Electronic Warfare Download Pdf CAPT Steve Dryden RAN, Navy Information Warfare Royal Australian Navy Implications for the Royal Australian Navy Presentation unavailable Dr Brad Ferguson, Raytheon Industry as an Input to Electronic Warfare Capability Presentation unavailable GPCAPT Andrew Gilbert, Air Power Development Centre A Historical Perspective of RAAF Airborne Electronic Attack Presentation notes Download Pdf Mr Jeffrey D. “JD” McCreary Georgia Tech Research Institute The Future of Electronic Warfare Download Pdf CDR Mike Paul, Electronic Attack Wing, U.S. Pacific Fleet The USN Approach to Achieving EMS Superiority Download Pdf MAJGEN Kathryn Toohey AM, CSC, Land Capability Australian Army Implications for the Australian Army Presentation unavailable

The Requirements of High Intensity Warfare 22 March 2018 Synopsis and Program Download Pdf Handbook Download Pdf Final Report Dr Robbin Laird, Second Line of Defense, Final Report: The Strategic Shift from Counter-Insurgency and Stability Operations: High Tempo Ops, High Intensity Operations and Deterrence A report overview can be viewed at Defense.info Presentations Dr Ross Babbage AM, Strategic Forum The Strategic Face of Conflict in the 21st Century Presentation unavailable- for inquiries please email admin@williamsfoundation.org.au VADM Tim Barrett AO, CSC, RAN, Chief of Navy Implications of High Intensity Warfare for the Royal Australian Navy Presentation unavailable MAJGEN Sampo Eskelinen, Commander, Finnish Air Force The Requirements of High Intensity Warfare – Planning and Mobilisation: Finnish Air Force Perspective Unavailable - for inquiries please email admin@williamsfoundation.org.au ACM Sir Stephen Hillier KCB, CBE, DFC, ADC, Chief of the Air Staff, Royal Air Force High Intensity Warfare in Europe – Royal Air Force Perspective Presentation unavailable Peter Jennings PSM, Executive Director, Australian Strategic Policy Institute Shaping a way ahead – the importance of Deterrence Rear Adm. Mike Manazir (Rtd), Boeing Company The Fifth Generation Fight; An Insider’s View JD McCreary, Chief of Disruptive Programs Georgia Tech Combat Decision-Making in High Intensity Conflict Presentation unavailable Dr Carl Rhodes, RAND Australia Ensuring air operations in the presence of advanced threats Download Pdf Dr Alan Stephens OAM, Williams Foundation Fellow “The Task Ahead” Download Pdf MAJGEN Marcus Thompson AM, Deputy Chief Information Warfare, Joint Capabilities Group Information Warfare: Old & New – Emergent capability in High Intensity Warfare Presentation unavailable - for inquiries please email admin@williamsfoundation.org.au Lt. Gen. Kenneth S. Wilsbach, Commander, Eleventh Air Force, United States Pacific Air Forces The Requirements of High Intensity Warfare United States Air Force Perspective Presentation unavailable

The Imperative for an Independent Deterrent: A Joint Strike Seminar 23 August 2018 Synopsis and Program Download Pdf Handbook Download Pdf Final Report Laird, Robbin The ADF and the Way Ahead for an Australian Deterrent Strategy September 2018 Also available on the Second Line of Defense and the defense.info (ebook version) websites. The Central Blue In the lead up to the conference the Williams Foundation Blog The Central Blue focussed on the seminar theme. The Twitter/FB/LinkedIn hashtag is #jointstrike. To see the discussion, please visit, and possibly contribute, to the The Central Blue. Presentations WGCDR Jo Brick, Royal Australian Air Force and The Central Blue Strike, Deterrence and the RAAF - Speaking Notes Download Pdf Also available on The Central Blue Blog Michael Shoebridge, Australian Strategic Policy Institute The Strategic Implications of Regional Proliferation of Strike Capabilities No presentation available Dr Stephan Frühling, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University Australian Strike Capability and Nuclear Deterrence No presentation available GPCAPT Jason Begley, Headquarters Joint Operations Command The Future of Full Spectrum Strike No presentation available Dr Thomas Bussing, Raytheon Missile Systems Future Strike Systems No presentation available James Heading, Lockheed Martin Long Range Strike Presentation - available on request email info@williamsfoundation.org.au AM Stuart Atha CB, DSO, ADC, Royal Air Force Air Command Modern Deterrence: The RAF’s Contribution No presentation available AIRMSHL Gavin ‘Leo’ Davies AO, CSC, Chief of Air Force Implications for the RAAF No presentation available Michael Tarlton, Northrop Grumman Aerospace Systems Reconceptualising Independent Strike in the Digital Age: A Future Force Perspective No presentation available CDRE Timothy Brown RAN, Submarines, Royal Australian Navy In and From the Maritime Domain: The Royal Australian Navy’s Approach to Future Joint Strike No presentation available MAJGEN Adam Findlay AM, Special Operations Command Beyond the FLOT: The Australian Army’s Approach to Future Joint Strike No presentation available

LTG Michael Oates (Retd) Coalition Warfighting and Pacific AOR Interoperability Errol McCormack Members Lunch, 7 August 2019 Download pdf

Dr Robbin Laird Final Report: The Requirements of Fifth Generation Manoeuvre October 2019 In this report, the major presentations and discussions at the Williams Foundation seminar on the requirements for fifth generation manoeuvre held on October 24, 2019 in Canberra, Australia are highlighted along with interviews conducted before, during and after the seminar as well. What is fifth generation manoeuvre? The definition by Air Commodore Gordon of the Air Warfare Centre: “The ability of our forces to dynamically adapt and respond in a contested environment to achieve the desired effect through multiple redundant paths. Remove one vector of attack and we rapidly manoeuvre to bring other capabilities to bear through agile control.” The Australians are working through how to generate more effective combat and diplomatic capabilities for crafting, building, shaping and operating an integrated force. And the need for an integrated force built along the lines discussed at the Williams Foundation over the past six years, was highlighted by Vice Admiral David Johnston, Deputy Chief of the ADF at the recent Chief of the Australian Navy’s Seapower Conference in held in Sydney at the beginning of October: “It is only by being able to operate an integrated (distributed) force that we can have the kind of mass and scale able to operate with decisive effect in a crisis.” The need for such capabilities was highlighted by the significant presentation by Brendan Sargeant at the seminar where he addressed the major strategic shift facing Australia and why the kind of force transformation which the Williams Foundation seminars have highlighted are so crucial for Australia facing its future. In the future there will be times when we need to act alone, or where we will need to exercise leadership. We have not often had to do this in the past – The INTERFET operation in Timor, and RAMSI in the Solomon Islands are examples. We are far more comfortable operating as part of a coalition led by others. It is perhaps an uncomfortable truth, but that has been a consistent feature of our strategic culture. So I think our biggest challenge is not a technical or resource or even capability challenge – it is the enormous psychological step of recognising that in the world that we are entering we cannot assume that we have the support of others or that there will be others willing to lead when there is a crisis. We will need to exercise the leadership, and I think that is what we need to prepare for now. To return to the title of this talk: if we want assured access for the ADF in the Asia Pacific, then we need to work towards a world that ensures that that access is useful and relevant to the sorts of crises that are likely to emerge. I will leave one last proposition with you. Our assured access for the ADF in the Asia Pacific will be determined by our capacity to contribute to regional crisis management. That contribution will on some occasions require that we lead. The task now is to understand what this means and build that capacity. In short, it is not just about the kinetic capabilities, but the ability to generate political, economic and diplomatic capabilities which could weave capabilities to do environment shaping within which the ADF could make its maximum contribution. Download pdf

The bushfires, floods, and now COVID-19 will change the discussion of national security in Australia. The exact form of that change is still unclear; however, the subject matter experts in the Australian Defence Force must engage in and inform the debate early, consistently, and logically. This post is an example of how. Written before the effects of COVID-19 hit Australian shores, Nathan Thompson responds to calls – made in the aftermath of the bushfires – to divest the ADF of the C-27J Spartan. Recently, Michael Shoebridge from the Australian Strategic Policy Institute called for the Australian Defence Force (ADF) to restructure and divest assets that are not focused on the greatest threat level of conflict with China. Of particular note is Shoebridge’s call to divest the C-27J Spartan; to remove it from the ADF asset mix and place it with another government agency for domestic and regional disaster response. This move would produce an unbalanced force and reduce strategic options for Government, as well as a potential reduction in support from the Australian people. Geopolitical relations are increasingly being viewed as a spectrum; from cooperation to competition and at the far right, conflict.[1] This spectrum presents several challenges to international relations in an age typified by events such as the Crimean conflict,  South China Sea tensions, and ongoing economic development in Africa. Somewhere in the middle of this spectrum is a wide range of possible outcomes associated with competition that is often underestimated. A Royal Australian Air Force C-27J Spartan aircraft lands at Honiara Airport, Solomon Islands, on completion of a maritime surveillance mission during Operation Solania. Shoebridge is right to argue that the C-27J is unlikely to survive in a ‘dense threat environment of a conflict with a peer-level state military’. The C-27J, like other air mobility platforms, was not designed with the attributes that make air combat platforms survivable in high threat environments. The C-27J is, however, designed with a modern electronic warfare self-protection suite that aims to ensure its survivability in conflicts at lower threat levels than those present in a peer state military. This is important because conflict will not just be with a peer-level competitor. Throughout the Cold War – arguably, an extended competition similar to what is presently being observed with China – proxy conflicts were fought between countries with lower levels of capability, thereby presenting scenarios with lower threat levels than is present in direct conflict with China.[2] In this phase of the competition, China is increasingly seeking influence over other countries. A successful method for China to achieve this influence would be contributing militarily to a low-level conflict security mission within another state’s borders. The Australian Government’s decision to retain an ability to contribute to low-level conflict resolution is critical in this age of competition. Military air mobility platforms such as the C-27J permit survivable access to low threat level conflict, as well as survivable logistic support during the conflict, such as that provided in Afghanistan and Iraq over the past 18 years. Divesting assets not focused on the highest threshold of conflict also reduces the ability for the ADF to interact with the Australian people. By design, highly specialised military platforms have restrictive security requirements on both their display and general capability specifications. A military order of battle which features only high-end, specialised and secure capabilities will necessarily be concealed to the public. Reduced interaction with the Australian people will potentially lead to calls for re-allocation of scarce resources, and limit recruiting pools, with longer-term capability impacts. The Australian Defence Force must retain a balanced force. Assets that are part of a ‘balanced force’ are vital to the cooperation end of the spectrum for domestic and regional disaster relief. ‘Balanced force’ assets enable better interaction with the Australian population and achieve reputational benefits for the ADF. Operation Bushfire Assist earlier in 2020 demonstrated this – the C-27J evacuated citizens from Mallacoota ahead of the fire front, among other civilian authority assistance and presence. Focusing only on the highest threshold of conflict removes response options for the Government in the cooperation, competition, and conflict phases of geopolitical relations. ‘Balanced force’ assets give the Australian Government greater strategic options and have positive longer-term capability impacts. Calls to focus only on the highest threat will lead to an unbalanced force, one who struggles to maintain a positive narrative with the Australian people. Squadron Leader Nathan Thompson is a serving Royal Australian Air Force officer. He is currently a C-27J pilot and flight commander at 35 Squadron. The opinions expressed are his alone and do not reflect those of the Royal Australian Air Force, the Australian Defence Force, or the Australian Government [1] See, for example, Accelerated Warfare and The Forge [2] Hugh White, 2019, How to Defend Australia (La Trobe University Press 2019), p. 11, 14, 38. #C27JSpartan #AustralianDefencePolicy #RoyalAustralianAirForce #AirPower #AustralianDefenceForce

Edward Luttwak is a political scientist known for his works on grand strategy, military history, and international relations. Moving to the United States (US) in 1972, Luttwak received a Doctorate in International Studies in 1975 and has served as a consultant to the US National Security Council; the US Department of State; and the US Army, Navy, and Air Force. While working for the Office of the Secretary of Defense/Net Assessment, Luttwak co-developed the manoeuvre-warfare concept. He also introduced the ‘operational level of war’ concept into Army doctrine while working at the US Army Training and Doctrine Command. Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace is a prescribed textbook in US war colleges and has been translated into several languages. In this review of Strategy, David Hood draws attention to Luttwak’s theory of strategy and its paradoxical, ironic, and contradictory logic. Luttwak’s objective is to explain a universal logic of strategy ‘that conditions all forms of war as well as the adversarial dealings of nations even in peace.’ This can be done, he argues, not by examining the often ‘absurd or self-destructive’ acts of statecraft themselves in which ‘no logic can be detected’, but by examining the often unintended outcomes of those actions or inactions. Luttwak suggests that by analysing the consequences of statecraft, the paradoxical, ironic and contradictory logic of strategy becomes manifest. The most important foundation for Luttwak’s theory is that strategy has two dimensions in which its logic unfolds. In the vertical dimension, five different levels—technical, tactical, operational, theatre, and grand strategic—interact but also conflict, because no natural harmony exists between them. In the horizontal dimension, the contest of wills between belligerents plays out through a dynamic interrelationship between action, reaction, culmination, overextension, and reversal. This Clausewitzian struggle is what gives strategy its perverse, paradoxical logic, and it occurs across all five vertical levels. Luttwak provides several illustrations of the paradoxical logic of strategy, including the often-used adaptation of Vegetius (si vis pacem, para bellum; if you want peace, prepare for war). The greatest contemporary example of strategy’s paradoxical logic is nuclear deterrence, where defenders must be ready to attack at all times; where being ready to attack in retaliation is evidence of peaceful intent; where preparing anti-nuclear defences is provocative; and where to derive any strategic benefit, the use of weapons must never occur. Nuclear weapons are therefore necessary, acquired, and maintained at heavy cost, but are strategically unusable. Luttwak organises Strategy around his two dimensions—Part One focusses on the horizontal dimension, while Parts Two and Three address the vertical dimension. The logic of strategy in the horizontal dimension is explored first from the perspective of a single belligerent. Chapter two then evaluates the logic ‘in action’. With little fanfare, Luttwak eloquently frames the paradoxical logic of strategy within the dynamic contest of wills that is statecraft in both war and peace. His description underpins the remaining arguments of the book: there are of course at least two conscious, opposed wills in any strategic encounter of war or peace… the paradoxical logic of strategy [is] an objective phenomenon, which determines outcomes whether or not the participants try to exploit it or are even conscious of its workings… we can recognize the logic in its totality as the coming together, even the reversal, of opposites. And this is a process manifest… in all that is strategical, in all that is characterized by the struggle of adversary wills… when the paradoxical logic of strategy assumes a dynamic form, it becomes the coming together, even the reversal, of opposites. In the entire realm of strategy, therefore, a course of action cannot persist indefinitely. It will instead tend to evolve into its opposite… Without such change, the logic will induce a self-negating evolution, which may reach the extreme of a full reversal, undoing war and peace, victory and defeat. The remaining two chapters in Part One analyse the paradoxical logic of strategy at the technical and grand strategic levels. At the technical level, Luttwak observes that advancements in technology promise much, but in reality provide an advantage only for a short period, as their success and/or vulnerabilities are always countered. Counter-countermeasures then emerge as the contest of wills continues dynamically. The result is that, paradoxically, technological advances do not normally make significant impacts—less remarkable equipment retains its (modest) utility for longer. Luttwak does not draw the analogy, but at the technical level his paradoxical logic plays out as one form of the Red Queen Effect. To avoid being outclassed, competitors must continuously evolve in response to enemy strengths, whilst defending their own weaknesses. Such adaptation is essential, but consumes resources and produces no long-term net benefit: ‘it takes all the running you can do, to keep in the same place.’ Luttwak also makes an observation that should serve as a warning to Western militaries that have in recent times pursued smaller quantities of high quality, often specialised equipment to combat the numerical superiority of traditional and potential future adversaries. Because such equipment costs more, a drive for economy in production, maintenance, and training often results. This should, however, be avoided, because the resultant homogeneity in systems means that military capability will suffer from common and hence easily exploitable vulnerabilities. Furthermore, weapon systems that are highly specialised cannot accommodate broad countermeasures. Joseph Stalin was right—quantity has a quality of its own. At the grand strategic level, Luttwak argues that another paradox becomes evident—political leaders, particularly in democratic states, have great difficulty in acting paradoxically in the manner required by strategy. This is the result of several factors, including the sheer complexity in undertaking strategy at the grand strategic level, that politicians are unskilled in strategy, and the need for politicians to often act astrategically to preserve their power and authority. Luttwak cautions that the pursuit of logical national interests can produce undesired strategic consequences: the consequences of the pervasive contradiction between commonsense [national] aims and [paradoxical] strategic logic… has made history into a record of the follies of mankind… Attempts to project linear logic into the realm of conflict, in search of commonsense cooperative solutions, are fairly frequent. If we want peace, why not simply have it? If we agree that weapons are costly and dangerous, why not simply disarm?… of course it is not intellectual error that induces these attempts… but rather the acute temptation to escape from the cruel paradoxical logic. For Luttwak, the inability of politicians to act paradoxically—and hence strategically—explains why wars are so often won by the belligerent who can apply superior resources. Because the quantity and quality of weapons is not a matter of strategy—a linear, economic logic applies to their use—when politicians fail to understand, or choose not to apply strategy, the belligerent that is able to apply superior resources will likely be the victor. It follows that when neither side acts strategically, the results of statecraft can often be determined in advance by simply identifying who is able to apply the greatest resources. This is a worrying claim for democratic middle-powers like Australia in the current strategic climate. Irrespective of, or in some cases despite, grand strategic behaviour, Luttwak suggests that war must eventually turn into its opposite, because it consumes and destroys the material and moral resources needed to keep fighting. Paradoxically, if measures are applied to end war ‘prematurely’, such as the prevention of military imbalances, humanitarian interventions, and even forced armistices, peace will be driven further from view. In times of peace, the same paradoxical logic conspires to encourage war, for example when a lack of defensive capability invites conquest; or because cultural, economic, social or other changes alter the conditions of strength that previously assured peace. In war, the capacity to wage further war is ultimately limited by war’s own destruction… In peacetime, by contrast, [almost] every form of human progress… tends to increase war-making capacities, and not in a symmetrical way, thus disturbing the military balances that once kept the peace. If peace did not induce war, there would be no war – for war cannot perpetuate itself. Part Two of Strategy deals with the lower four levels of the vertical dimension. Success at each level relies on different factors. At the technical level, weapon systems interact which makes estimating the outcome of any discrete contest relatively easy. These results are, however, the least important strategically because success at one level does not assure success at the next. At the tactical level, skill, leadership, unit cohesion and fortune become important. At the operational level, particular styles of warfare play out. Attrition fails gracefully but can only succeed cumulatively, whereas manoeuvre fails catastrophically but can succeed with little resources being expended. The more manoeuvrist the operational style is, the more important is the operational level. At the theatre level, the mobility of forces takes primacy in shaping strategy. Because ground forces are relatively slow, theatre strategy is more relevant for the land domain than it is for air and maritime domains. Part Three of Strategy is dedicated to the grand strategic level of strategy. This is the only level where ultimate ends and means are both present. Luttwak suggests that grand strategy can be viewed as ‘a confluence of the military interactions that flow up and down level by level, forming strategy’s “vertical” dimension, with the varied external relations among states forming strategy’s “horizontal” dimension.’ Strategy provides a powerful theory through which to comprehend the nature of strategy. It also provides a different way to view strategy, compared to the works of other strategists such as Colin Gray, Lawrence Freedman, and Joseph Wylie. The value of understanding such differences is in broadening our strategic perspective thereby allowing us to interpret circumstances using different lenses. Colin Gray argued that strategy, like war, has an enduring nature but a changing character. Luttwak’s theory suggests that strategy’s changing character is the result of its paradoxical logic. Perhaps the most fundamental paradox of all is also a sombre irony of the human condition. War and peace are intimately connected; one cannot exist without the other. The paradoxical logic of strategy applies to both. Wing Commander David Hood is an Aeronautical Engineer working for the Royal Australian Air Force. He holds a Master of Gas Turbine Technology (Cranfield, UK) and a Master of Military and Defence Studies (Australian National University). Wing Commander Hood is currently Commanding Officer of Air Training and Aviation Commons Systems Program Office (ATACSPO). #BookReview #PME #organisationalculture #PMET #Strategy #ManoeuvreWarfare #ProfessionalMilitaryEducation

Dr Robbin Laird Final Report: The Requirements of Fifth Generation Manoeuvre October 2019 In this report, the major presentations and discussions at the Williams Foundation seminar on the requirements for fifth generation manoeuvre held on October 24, 2019 in Canberra, Australia are highlighted along with interviews conducted before, during and after the seminar as well. What is fifth generation manoeuvre? The definition by Air Commodore Gordon of the Air Warfare Centre: “The ability of our forces to dynamically adapt and respond in a contested environment to achieve the desired effect through multiple redundant paths. Remove one vector of attack and we rapidly manoeuvre to bring other capabilities to bear through agile control.” The Australians are working through how to generate more effective combat and diplomatic capabilities for crafting, building, shaping and operating an integrated force. And the need for an integrated force built along the lines discussed at the Williams Foundation over the past six years, was highlighted by Vice Admiral David Johnston, Deputy Chief of the ADF at the recent Chief of the Australian Navy’s Seapower Conference in held in Sydney at the beginning of October: “It is only by being able to operate an integrated (distributed) force that we can have the kind of mass and scale able to operate with decisive effect in a crisis.” The need for such capabilities was highlighted by the significant presentation by Brendan Sargeant at the seminar where he addressed the major strategic shift facing Australia and why the kind of force transformation which the Williams Foundation seminars have highlighted are so crucial for Australia facing its future. In the future there will be times when we need to act alone, or where we will need to exercise leadership. We have not often had to do this in the past – The INTERFET operation in Timor, and RAMSI in the Solomon Islands are examples. We are far more comfortable operating as part of a coalition led by others. It is perhaps an uncomfortable truth, but that has been a consistent feature of our strategic culture. So I think our biggest challenge is not a technical or resource or even capability challenge – it is the enormous psychological step of recognising that in the world that we are entering we cannot assume that we have the support of others or that there will be others willing to lead when there is a crisis. We will need to exercise the leadership, and I think that is what we need to prepare for now. To return to the title of this talk: if we want assured access for the ADF in the Asia Pacific, then we need to work towards a world that ensures that that access is useful and relevant to the sorts of crises that are likely to emerge. I will leave one last proposition with you. Our assured access for the ADF in the Asia Pacific will be determined by our capacity to contribute to regional crisis management. That contribution will on some occasions require that we lead. The task now is to understand what this means and build that capacity. In short, it is not just about the kinetic capabilities, but the ability to generate political, economic and diplomatic capabilities which could weave capabilities to do environment shaping within which the ADF could make its maximum contribution. Download pdf